TITLE SEVEN

CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

CHAPTER ONE
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS

A. ART 203 - WHO ARE PUBLIC OFFICERS

B. FELICIANO MANIEGO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Contention of the State: Petitioner was convicted for the violation of Article 210 of the RPC. Maniego
was appointed as a laborer in Municipal Court of Manila, he been placed in charge of issuing summons
and subpoenas for traffic violations and was permitted to write motions for dismissal of prescribed traffic
cases against offenders without counsel, and to submit them to the Court for action. Rabia, the
complainant, inquired about the subpoena he received for a traffic violation.
Maniego informed the Fiscal that the case has prescribed. The Fiscal instructed Maniego that
he could write motion for dismissal. The court granted the motion. However, According to Rabia he was
informed that he is subject to a 15 peso fine. Which in turn Maniego informed Rabia that he could fix
the case if Rabia would pay him 10 pesos. Rabia paid and Maniego pocketed the money. Maniego was
charged with the violation of Art 210 Direct Bribery.

Defense of the Accused: He is not a public officer in the scope of Art 203 of the RPC because he is
appointed as a laborer.

Ruling of the Court: Though originally assigned to the preparation of summons and subpoenas had
been allowed to prepare motion for dismissals. Article 203, which includes all persons "who, by direct
provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the
performance of public functions in the Philippine Government, or shall perform in said government or
any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or class."

A. Art. 210 - Direct Bribery

1. Tad-Y v. People
GR No. 148862, August 11, 2005

Contention of the State: Engineer Rubin Tad-y, Structural Analyst and Engineer Nestor Velez,
Building Inspector, both of the Office of the City Engineer (OCE), Bacolod City, were charged with direct
bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code in an Information filed on July 26, 1995 with the
MTCC of Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 57216. The accusatory portion of the
Information for direct bribery reads:
That on or about the 24th day of July 1995, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, public officers, being then engineers at the City
Engineer's Office, Bacolod City, with corrupt intent and motivated with pecuniary interest for
themselves, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and accept marked money
in the amount of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos from Julio Encabo, electrical contractor and duly-
authorized representative of Mildred Wong, offended party and owner of Atrium Building located at
Gonzaga Street, Bacolod City, in an entrapment operation conducted by the PNP Criminal Investigation
Service Command at Andre's Bakeshop, Bacolod City, which amount was earlier solicited by said
accused from the offended party in exchange for the signing/approval of permit for building occupancy
of the building owned by the offended party, the signing/approval of said building permit is in connection
with the performance of the official duties of said accused as engineers in the Office of the City
Engineer, Bacolod City, in violation of the aforementioned law.
Defense of the Accused: Tad-y denied demanding and receiving P4,000.00 from Encabo in
consideration for the conduct of the building inspection, and his signature on the certificate of inspection
and the certificate of occupancy. He insists that under P.D. No. 1096, he is not authorized to sign and
issue a certificate of occupancy. He claimed that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling: Petitioners were acquitted. It was not proved that their acts satisfies the requisites of bribery.
Direct bribery has the following essential elements:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through
another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view
to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute
a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty
to do; and
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.
The prosecution is mandated to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the essential elements of the
felony and that the petitioner is the perpetrator thereof. However, there is also no credible evidence on
record that the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Wong, through Encabo, in exchange for the
signing of the certificate of occupancy. Indeed, it is incredible that the petitioner would demand the said
amount as a precondition to his signing a certificate, considering that, under Section 309 of P.D. No.
1096, the authority to sign said certificate is vested specifically on the building official, and not on the
petitioner. . When Encabo handed the envelope to the petitioner, the latter inquired what the envelope
was for.
The petitioner opened the envelope in full view of Velez and saw its contents. He handed the
envelope to Velez instead of putting it into his pocket, even after Encabo had assured the petitioner
that it was not dangerous for the latter to receive it. It is incredible that, as claimed by Encabo, the
petitioner handed over the envelope to Velez under the table. Such facts and circumstances show that
the petitioner had no intention to accept the money and consider it his own; they negate the
prosecution's contention that the petitioner demanded and expected to receive P4,000.00 as bribe
money.

2. Manipon vs. Sandiganbayan

Contention of the State: Manipon, a deputy sheriff assigned to execute the decision of the labor arbiter
ordering Harry Dominguez, a building contractor to pay the balance of their work contract. He sent a
notice to the Comtrust Bank in Baguio City garnishing the bank accounts of Dominguez. Dominguez
sought Manipon's help in the withdrawal of the garnished account. The two met again at the Office of
the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA) Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy
the withdrawal so they will have something for the New Year." An entrapment operation was planned
by the authorities. The next day at Comtrust, Dominguez and Manipon met and the latter delivered a
letter to the bank lifting the garnishment. Dominguez was able to withdraw his money and immediately
gave Manipon P1,000. Afterwards, while walking in session road, Manipon was apprehended and
authorities seized the P1,000.

Defense of the accused: Manipon narrates that during his meeting with Dominguez at the NISA office
on December 27, 1979, Dominguez requested Manipon to convey to the creditors that he was only
willing to pay for the time being a partial amount of P1,000.00, the balance of P 1,720. 00 to be paid
after the New Year.
Ruling of the court: The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
consists of the following elements:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise;
(3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some
crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official
duty to do, and
(4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.

It is very strange indeed that for such an important agreement that would be a final judgment,
no one took the bother of putting it down or paper. Of course Manipon would have us believe that there
was no need for it because he trusted Dominguez and Tabek. And yet did he not also claim that
Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge? And if there was really an agreement to alter the
judgment, why did he not inform the labor arbiter about it considering that it was the labor arbiter who
had issued the order of execution? Manipon could not give satisfactory explanations because there
was no such agreement in the first place.

3. Dacumos v. Sandigan

Contention of the State: Petitioner (P) is convicted of Direct Bribery. P, a BIR revenue examiner
offered to settle the tax liability of R Revilla Interiors (RRI), by pulling out its assessment papers from
the BIR Commissioner’s Office (BIRCO) in exchange of money. RRI’s manager (M) pretended to
agree but reported the incident to the NBI. During the planned exchange of money between P and M,
P was arrested through entrapment.

Defense of the Accused: That he was framed by M because he refused to be bribed in exchange of
reducing the tax assessment of RRI; that he met M only because he is irritatingly insistent on
securing his help regarding the RRI’s tax amnesty; I; that he had rejected the envelope (money) twice

Ruling: The Court finds it remarkable that P met M met at a private place (café) instead of his office,
considering that they were supposed to be discussing official business and it was M who he says was
requesting his assistance. The Court is not inclined to believe that M would be so vindictive as to
falsely incriminate the P with direct bribery simply because P refused to reduce the tax assessment of
RRi and there is actual evidence, the fluorescent powder on the P’s hands matching that of the
envelope.

4. MAGNO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147904, October 4, 2002

Contention of the State: Respondent filed a petition for the disqualification of petitioner Nestor
Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during May elections on the ground that
petitioner was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery penalized
under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.

Defense of the Accused: Petitioner argues that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude
cited in Section 40 of RA 7160. Petitioner insists that he had already served his sentence as of March
5, 1998 when he was discharged from probation. Such being the case, the two-year disqualification
period imposed by Section 40 of the Local Government Code expired on March 5, 2000. Thus,
petitioner was qualified to run in the 2001 elections.
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct
bribery:
 1. the offender is a public officer
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through
another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a
view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official
duty to do; and [Italics supplied]
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.

Ruling: Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to
accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official
duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on
the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes
advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a
conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In
all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
Note:
There appears to be a glaring incompatibility between the five-year disqualification period
provided in Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code and the two-year disqualification period in
Section 40 of the Local Government Code.
It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) was approved on December 3, 1985
while the Local Government Code (RA 7160) took effect on January 1, 1992. It is basic in statutory
construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail,
being the more recent expression of legislative will. Section 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it governs the
disqualifications of candidates for local positions, assumes the nature of a special law which ought to
prevail.
Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless
could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). Petitioners
disqualification ceased as of March 5, 2000 and he was therefore under no such disqualification
anymore when he ran for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija.

C. ART 212 – CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS

E. CASES:

1. MARIANO G. ALMEDA, SR., and VALERIANA F. ALMEDA v. THE HON. JESUS Y. PEREZ
G.R. No. L-18428 August 30, 1962

CONTENTION OF THE STATE: Mariano G. Almeda, Sr. have acquired, during his incumbency as
government employee, cash and properties from unknown sources in the total amount of
P121,407.98 which acquisitions, according to the complaint, were manifestly out of proportion to the
salary and other lawful income of said Mariano G. Almeda, Sr., and, therefore, in violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law. In a resolution of said
investigators it was certified that there is reasonable ground to believe that from 1950 to 1959,
Mariano G. Almeda, Sr. acquired properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as Assistant
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and to his other lawful income.
On March 25, 1961 the Solicitor General filed the amended petition for forfeiture, adding other
counts and items of alleged unlawful acquisitions and disbursements thus increasing the alleged cash
from unexplained sources received by the respondent from the years 1950-59
DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED: Petitioners herein, objected to the amendment on the ground that
the new counts or charges already been investigated and dismissed after investigation, and
petitioners had not been given a new preliminary investigation with respect to the new counts or
charges that the proceeding under Republic Act No. 1379 being criminal in nature, the petition may
not be amended as substance without petitioners' consent. It is also claim that the amendments were
presented only to delay the proceedings to the prejudice of the petitioners, and that the new counts or
charges could not be included because one year had already elapsed after a general election in
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379.

RULING: As the proceeding for forfeiture, as pointed out and as provided for in the law, is not a penal
proceeding but a civil one for the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired, and as the procedure
outlined in the law is that which is followed in civil actions, amendment of the charges or the petition
for forfeiture may be made as in ordinary civil actions; i.e., the amendments may be made before trial
or in the course of trial without need of another investigation. It also follows that amendments setting
forth newly discovered acquisitions may be in the petition without obtaining the consent of the
respondent.

2. CABAL v. KAPUNAN
G.R. No. L-19052
December 29, 1962

Contention of the State: In August 1961, Col. Maristela of Phil. Army filed with the Secretary of
Nation Defence a letter-complaint charging Manuel Cabal, an AFP Chief of State, with "graft, corrupt
practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman dictatorial
tendencies, giving false statements of his as sets and liabilities in 1958 and other equally
reprehensible acts.” The President created a committee of five members to investigate the charge of
unexplained wealth. The committee requested Cabal to take the witness stand and be sworn to as
witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Cabal objected,
invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. City Fiscal of Manila charged Cabal with
contempt of the Presidential Committee under section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code in
relation to sections I and 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

Defense of the Accused: Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash the charge and/or
order to show cause, upon the ground: (1) that the City Fiscal has neither authority nor personality to
file said charge and the same is null and void, for, if criminal, the charge has been filed without a
preliminary investigation, and, civil, the City Fiscal may not file it, his authority in respect of civil cases
being limited to representing the City of Manila; (2) that the facts charged constitute no offense for
section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the charge is based, violates due
process, in that it is vague and uncertain as regards the offense therein defined and the fine
imposable therefor and that it fail to specify whether said offense shall be treated also contempt of an
inferior court or of a superior court (3) that more than one offense is charged, for the contempt
imputed to petitioner is sought to be punished as contempt of an inferior court, as contempt of a
superior court an as contempt under section 7 of Rule 64 of the Rules Court; (4) that the Committee
had no power to order an require petitioner to take the witness stand and be sworn to, upon the
request of Col. Maristela, as witness for the latter, inasmuch as said order violates petitioner's
constitutional right against self-incrimination.

Ruling: The investigation being conducted by the Committee above referred to is administrative, not
criminal, in nature; that the legal provision relied upon by petitioner in relation to preliminary
investigations is inapplicable to contempt proceedings; that, contempt against an administrative
officer is to be dealt with as contempt of a superior court; that petitioner herein is charged with only
one offense; and that, tinder the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, petitioner herein
may refuse, not to take the witness stand, but to answer incriminatory questions.
It seems conceded that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is not seek the removal of
petitioner herein as Chief of Staff of the AFP. As a matter of fact he no longer holds such office. But
apply the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a
public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such
forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of the nature of a penalty.
A forfeiture is a divestiture property without compensation, in consequence of a default an
offense, and the term is used in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed
by way of punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, but by the lawmaking power, to
insure a prescribed course of conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by the legislature to restrain
the commission of an offense and to aid in the prevention of such a offense. The effect of such a
forfeiture is to transfer the title to the specific thing from the owner to the sovereign power (23 Am.
Jur. 599)
The rule protecting a person from being compelled to furnish evidence which would incriminate
him exists not only when he is liable criminally to prosecution and punishment, but also when his
answer would tend to expose him to a ... forfeiture .... (58 Am. Jur., See. 43, p. 48; emphasis ours.)
In general, both at common law and under a constitution provision against compulsory self-
incrimination, a person may not be compelled to answer any question as a witness which would
subject him to a penalty orforfeiture, or testify in action against him for a penalty.
FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY IN SUBSTANCE IS A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING FOR THE
PURPOSE OF PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION; CASE OF BOYD vs. U.S. and THURSTON vs. CLARK, CITED. — In Boyd vs. U.S.
(116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed., 746), it was held that the information, in a proceeding to declare a forfeiture
of certain property because of the evasion of a certain revenue law, “though technically a civil
proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal one”, and that suits for penalties and forfeitures are
within the reason of criminal proceedings for the purposes of that portion of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the U.S. which declares that no person shall be compelled in a criminal to be a witness
against himself. Similarly, a proceeding for the removal of an officer was held, in Thurston vs. Clark
(107 Cal. 285, 40 pp. 435, 437), to be in substance criminal, for said portion of the Fifth Amendment
applies “to all cases in which the action prosecuted is not to establish, recover or redress private and
civil rights, but to try and punish persons charged with the commission of public offenses” and “a
criminal case is an action, suit or cause instituted to punish an infraction of the criminal laws, and, with
this object in view, it matters not in what form a statute may clothe it; it is still a criminal case . . . .”
Respondent Judge hereby enjoined permanently from proceeding further.

3. REPUBLIC v. CA
172 SCRA 296, (RA 3019)

CONTENTION OF THE STATE: Simplicio Berdon, an Assistant Staff Civil Engineer assigned to
Regional Office No. VII of the Bureau of Public Highways in Cebu City, with having acquired
unexplained wealth in violation of Republic Act No. 1379. It alleged that during the period from 1963
to 1969 he and his wife Gaudiosa Mangubat Berdon purchased parcels of land and constructed a
house, the purchase prices and costs of which were not commensurate to their incomes, savings or
declared assets. Pleaded as defendants in the petition were Berdon, his wife, and Luis Berdon, his
father. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, which valued the unexplained wealth at P124,495.82,
thus sought the forfeiture of the properties and the issuance of a writ of attachment

DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED: Respondent spouses had acquired properties and constructed a
house the costs of which were disproportionate to their combined incomes from their employment in
the government it had been proved that such were financed through a donation and loans, to wit:
 (1) a P3,000.00 donation and a P5,000.00 loan from the parents of Mrs. Berdon who owned
several parcels of land and a movie house
(2) a P14,000.00 loan from the Government Service Insurance System;
(3) a P6,000.00 loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines; and,
(4) a P100,000.00 loan from Congressman Ramon Durano, a wedding sponsor of respondent
spouses, for the purchase of agricultural land to be planted with sugarcane (although only a total
amount of approximately P60,000.00 was actually released)

RULING: The presumption under See. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 that the subject properties were unlawfully
acquired had been successfully rebutted by private respondents through competent evidence. Hence,
the Intermediate Appellate Court did not err in affirming the trial court's decision dismissing the
Republic's petition
• The accuracy of entries in statements of assets and liabilities becomes material in criminal or
administrative proceedings for violation of Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended (the "Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"), which requires every public officer to file a "true, detailed
and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year."

4. MORFE v. MUTUC
22 SCRA 424

5. HILARIO JARAVATA v. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. L-56170 January 31, 1984

Contention of the State: Sandiganbayan decided that Hilario Jaravata violated Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019. In the Municipality of Tubao, Province of La Union, the accused, being then
the Assistant Principal and with the use of his influence as such public official and taking advantage
of his moral and official ascendancy over his classroom teachers, with deliberate intent made demand
and actually received payments from other classroom teachers, various sums of money out of their
salary differentials, in consideration of accused having officially intervened in the release of the salary
differentials of the six classroom teachers, to the prejudice and damage of the said classroom
teachers, in the total amount of Php 338.00.

Defense of the Accused: Any amount which Jaravata received in excess of P36.00 from each of the
complainants was in the concept of a gift or benefit. The arrangement was "to facilitate its [salary
differential] payment accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up the papers
in Manila with the obligation on the part of the classroom teachers to reimburse the accused of his
expenses.

Ruling: Petition is granted and the judgment of the Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner is set
aside. Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, refers to a public officer whose official intervention is required by
law in a contract or transaction.
There is no law which invests the petitioner with the power to intervene in the payment of the
salary differentials of the complainants or anyone for that matter. Far from exercising any power, the
petitioner played the humble role of a supplicant whose mission was to expedite payment of the
salary differentials. In his official capacity as assistant principal he is not required by law to intervene
in the payment of the salary differentials. Accordingly, he cannot be said to have violated the law
although he exerted efforts to facilitate the payment of the salary differentials.

NOTE: Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:
 Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit,
for himself or for any other person in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law.

RA 3019
6. TRIESTE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
145 SCRA 508

Contention of the State: The accused, being then the Municipal Mayor and member of the
Committee on Award of the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan had administrative control of the funds of
the municipality and whose approval is required in the disbursements of municipal funds, intervened
or took part in his official capacity in the purchases of construction materials from Trigen Agro-
Industrial Development Corporation, of which the accused is the president, incorporator, director and
major stockholder.
He awarded the supply and delivery of said materials to Trigen Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation and approving payment thereof to said corporation in violation of the Anti-Graft and
corrupt Practices Act.

Defense of the accused: The petitioner did not, in any way, intervene in making the awards and
payment of the purchases in question as he merely signed the voucher only after all the
purchases had already been made, delivered and paid for by the Municipal Treasurer without his
knowledge. It was further pointed out that there was no bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in
the twelve informations filed against him because the transactions involved were emergency direct
purchases by personal canvass. He also contends that he divested his shares in the Corporation
before the transactions were made.

Ruling: Trieste is acquitted.

Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were delivered,
petitioner's signature on the vouchers after payment is not the kind of intervention contemplated
under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.
What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the
transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. The
official need not dispose his shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm
in its contract with the office. For the law aims to prevent the use of influence, authority and power.
There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, used his influence,
power, and authority in having the transactions given to Trigen.

7. ARTURO A. MEJORADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. L-51065-72
June 30, 1987

CONTENTION OF THE STATE: Arturo A. Mejorada is convicted guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 3(E) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
During October 1977 to February 1978, in the municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines
the accused, being employed in the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila, as
Right-of-Way-Agent conspiring and confederating together with two (2) other John Does whose true
Identities and present whereabouts are still unknown, with evident bad faith, and for personal gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, directly intervene, work for, and facilitate the approval
of one Isagani de Leon's claim for the payment in the removal and reconstruction of his house and a
part of his land expropriated by the government having been affected by the proposed Pasig-Sta Cruz-
Calamba Road. 2nd IBRD Project at Binangonan, Rizal, while the accused, Arturo A. Mejorada is in
the discharge of his official and/or administrative functions. and after said claim was approved and the
corresponding PNB Check No. SN 5625748 was issued and encashed in the amount of P7,200.00
given only P1,000.00 to claimant (Isagani de Leon), appropriating, applying and converting to
themselves the amount of P6,200.00, causing damage and prejudice to Isagani de Leon and the
government in the aforementioned amount of P6,200.00.

DEFFENSE OF THE ACCUSED: Petitioner contends that the eight information filed against him before
the Sandiganbayan are fatally defective in that it failed to allege the essential ingredients or elements
constituting the offense penalized by Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.
He argues that for the third element to be present, the alleged injury or damage to the
complainants and the government must have been caused by the public officer in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions and inasmuch as when the damage was caused to the
complainants, he was no longer discharging his official administrative functions, therefore, he is not
liable for the offense charged.
Petitioner denies that there was injury or damage caused the Government because the
payments were allegedly made on the basis of a document solely made by the Highway District
Engineer to which petitioner had no hand in preparing

RULING: The petitioner took advantage of his position as a right-of-way-agent by making the claimants
sign the aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained falsified
declarations of the value of the improvements and lots. There was evident bad faith on the part of the
petitioner when he inflated the values of the true claims and when he divested the claimants of a large
share of the amounts due them.
The government suffered undue injury as a result of the petitioner's having inflated the true
claims of complainants which became the basis of the report submitted by the Highway District
Engineer to the Regional Director of the Department of Highways and which eventually became the
basis of payment. His contention that he had no participation is belied by the fact that as a right-of-way-
agent, his duty was precisely to negotiate with property owners who are affected by highway
constructions for the purpose of compensating them.

8. ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
November 21, 2001

Contention of the State: As an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former
President and members of his family, his associates, friends, and conspirators were filed with the
respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
The respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting the
filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and the
other respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No.
7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan,
Metro Manila.

Defense of the Accused: The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague. And that, the fact the
Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder leads to its violation of
the right of the accused to due process.
Ruling: The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men in common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.
This rationale does NOT apply to penal statues.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because of the employment of general terms
or the failure to define the terms used therein. The validity of the law is sustained, so long as that law
provides some comprehensible guide as to what would render those subjects to the said law liable to
its penalties. The petitioner cannot rely on the void-for-vagueness doctrine, since this doctrine does not
apply to laws that merely consist of imprecise language.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in criminal prosecutions to be presumed
innocent until proven otherwise. Thus, he is entitled to an acquittal unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating the guilt of the accused with proof beyond reasonable doubt.

CHAPTER FOUR

CRIMES CALLED MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY

(ART. 217 – 221)

A. ART. 217 – MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY

3. LABATAGOS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
183 SCRA 415

4. ESTEPA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
182 SCRA 269

5. ILOGON v. SANDIGANBAYAN
218 SCRA 766

6. AZARCON v. SANDIGANBAYAN
268 SCRA 747

CHAPTER FIVE

C. ART. 225 – ESCAPE OF PRISONER UNDER CUSTODY OF A PERSON NOT A PUBLIC

OFFICER

• RODILLAS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
161 SCRA 347

Contention of the State: Accused Rodillas was charged with infidelity in the custody of prisoners.
The accused, a police officer, was tasked with the custody of a detention prisoner charged with the
crime of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. After the hearing, the husband of the accused sought
permission from the accused to have lunch with the detainee. The accused consented. Later on, the
detainee asked to go to the comfort room. After 10 minutes, the accused became suspicious and
entered the comfort room. Thereafter, he realized that the detainee had already escaped.

Defense of the Accused: That the petitioner's conviction by the Sandiganbayan was only based on
his admissions without the prosecution having presented evidence to prove his negligence will lie and
his acts could be qualified as definite laxity amounting to deliberate non-performance of duty to
sustain his conviction

Ruling of the Court: The accused was found guilty. In the crime of infidelity in the custody of
prisoners, the offender may be liable even if he acted negligently or even if he did not connive with
the prisoner. It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary
precautions to assure the absence of any means of escape. A failure to undertake these precautions
will make his act one of definite laxity or negligence amounting to deliberate non- performance of
duty. His tolerance of arrangements whereby the prisoner and her companions could plan and make
good her escape should have aroused the suspicion of a person of ordinary prudence.