Rules of Court

Rule 3 Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a

pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty
of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the
fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to

appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if

the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may
order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of
an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased, and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs.

Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the actions that survived and
may be filed against the decedent's representatives as follows: (1) actions to
recover real or personal property or an interest thereon, (2) actions to enforce
liens thereon, and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to a person or a
property. In such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of
his client and give the name and address of the latter's legal representative.
(Napere v. Barbarona, G.R. No. 160426, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 376, 381).

Dela Cruz v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 576, 584, which
states: The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every partys
right to due process. x x x [N]o adjudication can be made against the successor
of the deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is denied. The Court
has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without the appearance of the
legal representatives of the deceased, but also the resulting judgments.

Formal substitution of heirs is not necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily
appeared, shared in the case and presented evidence in defense of deceased
defendant. (Brioso vs Rili-Mariano G.R. No. 132765 January 31, 2003 Citing Vda.
de Salazar v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 305 1995).
CIVIL LAW; LEASE; A RECIPROCAL CONTRACT DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN
AGREED UPON FOR THE BENEFIT OF BOTH PARTIES. — The new rule, is that
a stipulation in thelease contract which provides for the extension of the
period of lease, the terms and conditions of which are subject to the mutual
agreement of the lessor and the lessee, should be interpreted to mean that
the lease may be extended only upon mutual agreement of the parties and not at
the option alone of the lessee or even the lessor for that matter. The Court
in Fernandez v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., (166 SCRA 577) elaborated further
on this point, thus: "It is also important to bear in mind that in a reciprocal contract
like a lease, the period of the lease must be deemed to have been agreed upon
for the benefit of both parties, absent language showing that the term was
deliberately set for the benefit of the lessee or lessor alone. We are not
aware of any presumption in law that the term of a lease is designated for the
benefit of the lessee alone. Koh and Cruz in effect rested upon such a
presumption. But that presumption cannot reasonably be indulged in casually in
an era of rapid economic change, marked by, among other things, volatile
costs of living and fluctuations in the value of the domestic currency. The longer
the period the more clearly unreasonable such a presumption would be. In an age
like that we live in, very specific language is necessary to show an intent to grant
a unilateral faculty to extend or renew a contract of lease to the lessee alone, or to
the lessor alone for that matter. We hold that the above-quoted rulings in Koh v.
Ongsiaco and Cruz v. Alberto should be and are overruled." (Heirs of Dalisay v.
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Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94654, [September 24, 1991], 278 PHIL 738-746)