Alma Covita vs. SSM Maritime Services, Inc.
December 7, 2016
G.R. No. 206600
Peralta, J.
Facts:
On May 7, 2009, Rolando Covita, petitioner’s husband,
boarded his vessel of assignment arising from the
contract of employment with private respondent.
However, after a week of employment,Rolando
developed weakness of both lower extremities and was
vomiting. Subsequently, he was medically repatriated to
the Philippines. He was diagnosed by the company-
designated physician, with chronic renal failure.
Rolando died on September 20, 2009. Hence, the
petitioner herein filed with the LA a claim for death
benefits under Sec. 20 of 2000 POEA Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) which the latter
granted. The private respondent appealed to the NLRC
alleging that the cause of Rolando’s death was not
work-related. The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA
and granted the appeal. CA affirmed the reversal.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to claim
for death benefits in the present case
Held:
No, her claim cannot be granted. The 2000 POEA-SEC
provides that to be entitled for death compensation and
benefits from the employer, the death of the seafarer:
(1) must be work-related; and
(2) musthappen during the term of the employment
contract.
Rolando was diagnosed with end stage renal failure
which could not have developed over his one week
employment in the private respondent. The petitioner
must show substantial evidence to declare that the
cause of her husband’s death is work-related or work-
aggravated.Moreover, when Rolando was medically
repatriated, his contract of employment with
respondent was effectively terminated. Since he died
after the termination of the contract, it did not satisfy
the second requirement that death must occur during
the term of the employment contract to be entitled for
death benefits. Considering the foregoing facts, the
Court ruled that Rolando’s death is not compensable.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 is a proper recourse in the case at bar
Held:
Yes, the petition is proper. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, only questions of law may be raised. This Court is
not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in
labor cases. The reason for this is that the quasi-judicial
agencies, like the Arbitration Board and the NLRC, have
acquired a unique expertise because their jurisdiction
are confined to specific matters. However, factual
issues may be considered and resolved when the
findings of facts and conclusions of law of the Labor
Arbiter are inconsistent with those of the NLRC and the
CA as in the case at bar.
Note: Landmark case of St.Martin Funeral vs NLRC 1998;
observance of Heirarchy of Courts
Angelina De Guzman vs Gloria A. Chico
December 07, 2016
G.R. No.195445
JARDELEZA, J.
Facts:
Petitioners filed a special civil action
for certiorari before the CA to annul the January 19,
2010 and April 19, 2010 Orders of the court a quo.
Petitioners argued that CA committed reversible error
in ruling that because of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, a
certification of non-forum shopping was unnecessary in
the ex parte petition, and thus it was unnecessary to
examine respondent Chico and her counsel on said
certification.
Issue:
Whether certification of non-forum shopping is
necessary in this case
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Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that a certificate against
forum shopping is not a requirement in an ex
parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
An ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of
possession is not a complaint or other initiatory
pleading as contemplated in Section 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The non-initiatory nature of an ex parte motion or
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is best
explained in Arquiza v. Court of Appeals. In that case the
Court ruled that the ex parte petition for the issuance of
a writ of possession filed by the respondent is not an
initiatory pleading. Although the private respondent
denominated its pleading as a petition, it is,
nonetheless, a motion. What distinguishes a motion
from a petition or other pleading is not its form or the
title given by the party executing it, but rather its
purpose.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession does
not aim to initiate new litigation, but rather issues as an
incident or consequence of the original registration or
cadastral proceedings. As such, the requirement for a
forum shopping certification is dispelled.
ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL CLINICS FOR OVERSEAS
WORKERS, INC., (AMCOW), vs. ASSOCIATION, INC.
and CHRISTIAN CANGCO
December 6, 2016
GR. No. 207132
Brion, j.
Facts:
On March 8, 2001, the DOH issued Administrative Order
No. 5, Series of 20015(AO 5-01) which directed the
decking or equal distribution of migrant workers among
the several clinics who are members of GAMCA.
Subsequently, the DOH issued AO No. 106, Series of
20026holding in abeyance the implementation of the
referral decking system. The DOH reiterated its directive
suspending the referral decking system in AO No. 159,
Series of 2004.
In 2004, the DOH issued another administrative order,
reasoning that the referral decking system did not
guarantee the migrant workers' right to safe and quality
health service.
On March 8, 2010, Republic Act (RA) No. 10022 lapsed
into law without the President's signature. Section 16 of
RA No. 10022 amended Section 23 of RA No. 8042,
adding two new paragraphs - paragraphs (c) and (d).
The pertinent portions of the amendatory provisions
read:
(c) Department of Health. - The Department of Health
(DOH) shall regulate the activities and operations of all
clinics which conduct medical, physical, optical, dental,
psychological and other similar examinations,
hereinafter referred to as health examinations, on
Filipino migrant workers as requirement for their
overseas employment. Pursuant to this, the DOH shall
ensure that:
(c.3) No group or groups of medical clinics shall have a
monopoly of exclusively conducting health
examinations on migrant workers for certain receiving
countries;
(c.4) Every Filipino migrant worker shall have the
freedom to choose any of the DOH-accredited or DOH-
operated clinics that will conduct his/her health
examinations and that his or her rights as a patient are
respected. The decking practice, which requires an
overseas Filipino worker to go first to an office for
registration and then farmed out to a medical clinic
located elsewhere, shall not be allowed;
Pursuant to Section 16 of RA No. 10022, the DOH,
through its August 23, 2010 letter-order,directed
GAMCA to cease and desist from implementing the
referral decking system and to wrap up their operations
within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
On August 26, 2010, GAMCA filed with the RTC of Pasig
City a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (GAMCA's petition).
It assailed: (1) the DOH's August 23, 2010 letter-order
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion; and (2)
paragraphs c.3 and c.4, Section 16 of RA No. 10022, as
well as Section 1 (c) and (d), Rule XI of the IRR,
as unconstitutional. The RTC ruled in their favor, hence
this petition.
Issue: whether the Regional Trial Court legally erred in
giving due course to the petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the DOH CDO letters;
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Held:
The RTC legally erred when it gave due course to
GAMCA's petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Since the CDO Letter was a quasi-judicial act, the
manner by which GAMCA assailed it before the courts
of law had been erroneous; the RTC should not have
entertained GAMCA's petition.
In the present case, the act alleged to be
unconstitutional refers to the cease and desist order
that the DOH issued against GAMCA's referral decking
system. Its constitutionality was questioned through a
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC.
The case reached this Court through a Rule 45 appeal by
certiorari under the traditional route.
In using a petition for certiorari and prohibition to assail
the DOH-CDO letters, GAMCA committed several
procedural lapses that rendered its petition readily
dismissible by the RTC. Not only did the petitioner
present a premature challenge against an
administrative act; it also committed the grave
jurisdictional error of filing the petition before the
wrong court.
Since the DOH is part of the Executive Department and
has acted in its quasi-judicial capacity, the petition
challenging its CDO letter should have been filed before
the Court of Appeals. The RTC thus did not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petitions and
erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari
and prohibition against the DOH CDO letters. In
procedural terms, petitions for certiorari and
prohibition against a government agency are remedies
available to assail its quasi-judicial acts, and should thus
have been filed before the CA.
Further, the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City unduly
disregarded the requirements that there be "no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law" and the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
when it gave due course to the certiorari and
prohibition petition against the DOH's CDO.
In this case, GAMCA should have asked the DOH
Secretary to reconsider or clarify its letter-order, after
which it could appeal, should the ruling be unfavorable,
to the Office of the President.
Issue:
Whether the DOH CDO letters prohibiting GAMCA from
implementing the referral decking system embodied
under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 10022 violates
Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution for being an
undue taking of property
Held:
The cease and desist order is a valid exercise of police
power.
To be considered reasonable, the government's exercise
of police power must satisfy the "valid object and valid
means" method of analysis: first, the interest of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, requires interference; and second, the
means employed are reasonably necessary to attain the
objective sought and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
These two elements of reasonableness are undeniably
present in Section 16 of RA No. 10022. The prohibition
against the referral decking system is consistent with
the State's exercise of the police power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, safety, and general
welfare of the people. Public interest demands State
interference on health matters, since the welfare of
migrant workers is a legitimate public concern.
BAYAN MUNA PATRY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE OCAMPO,
ET.AL. VS. MENDOZA
January 31, 2017
G.R. No. 190431
Sereno, CJ.
Facts:
On 15 December 1997, DOTC/LTO awarded to Stradcom
a contract for the construction and operation of an
information technology structurecalled the LTO IT
Project Build-Own-Operate Agreement (BOO
Agreement),making Stradcom the exclusive information
technology provider of DOTC/LTO.The LTO IT Project is
a long-term strategic plan to modernize the land
transportation systemswhich will interconnect LTO's
district offices nationwide, enable online transaction
processing and integrate its mission critical business
processes.
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On 26 September 2007, Stradcom presented to the LTO
the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Project as an
enhancement to the current motor vehicle registration
system.
On 6 May 2009, the DOTC issued Circular No. 2009-065
entitled DOTC RFID Rules. These rules required all
motor vehicles to have an RFID tag "as a prerequisite to
registration or reregistration."It also provided that after
1 August 2009, no motor vehicle shall be permitted
registration without first having an RFID tag, for which
afee of P350 shall be collected.
On 16 June 2009, the RFID Memorandum of Agreement
(RFID MOA)7 was entered into between DOTC/LTO and
Stradcom. The RFIDMOA provided that fees due to
Stradcom shall be collected and deposited by the LTO in
a government depository bank account designated by
and in the name of Stradcom.
On 7 August 2009, the LTO issued Memorandum
Circular No. ACL-2009-1199. The RFID IRR provided that
the commencements date of RFID tagging shall be 1
October 2009 and that the RFID Tag, which has a shelf
life of up to 10 years, is composed of two portions: (1)
Write Once, which would contain the Unique ID (UID)
number only and could not be changed during the life
of the RFID tag; and (2) Write Many, which may save
certain information that would be made available to
authorized personnel with the use of the RFID Reader.
The information which may be saved in the RFID Tag
includes the following: (1) motor vehicle file number, (2)
engine number, (3) chassis number, (4) plate number,
(5) motor vehicle type, (6) color, (7) make, (8) series, (9)
year model, (10) body type, ( 11) motor vehicle
classification, ( 12) franchise, ( 13) route, ( 14) owner's
name, (15) last registration date, ( 16) alarms (settled
and unsettled), and ( 1 7) other data deemed necessary.
Issues:
1. Whether the DOTC/LTO in implementing the
RFID project committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and violated RA 9184 and RA. 6957.
2. Whether the assailed executive issuances are
unconstitutional as the same were issued in
usurpation of the legislative power of congress
due to the absence of a law providing for the
installation of radio frequency identification tag
on all motor vehicles as a pre-requisite for the
registration or re-registration thereof.
3. Whether the assailed executive issuances are
unconstitutional as the same fail to present
compelling interest or interests and are absent
of sufficient safeguards and well-defined
standards to prevent impermissible intrusions
on the right to privacy.
Held:
RA 9184.The RFID MOA is a separate and distinct
contract from the BOO Agreement. To reiterate, the
additions introduced by the RFID MOA are those that
were not offered in the original bid and entailed
changes in the original cost. Thus, from the terms of the
BOO Agreement itself, these are not allowable
variations.
As a general rule, for contracts executed under the BOT
Law, the government agency and the project proponent
shall execute the draft contract as approved. However,
certain contract variations are allowed, as long as they
comply with the applicable law at the time the RFID
MOA was entered into.
The RFID MOA is not an allowable contract variation,
involving as it does an increase in the agreed fees, tolls,
and charges to be exacted upon the public. As
previously stated, the RFID Project will entail an
additional charge of P350 for every motor vehicle. This
charge was not contemplated in the original contract
and is not an increase allowed under the formula
provided in Article 14 of the BOO Agreement. Further,
as already discussed, there is a fundamental change in
the contractual arrangement between the parties. It
cannot be said either that this contract variation is
necessary due to an unforeseeable event beyond the
control of the parties.
In conclusion, while the RFID Project may possibly be
considered as an enhancement of the existing LTO IT
Project, requiring as it does an integration into the
existing motor vehicle registration system and other
database and information technology systems, the RFID
MOA is not an allowable "enhancement" or variation of
the existing BOO Agreement.
RA 6957.The RFID MOA is void for failure to undergo
competitive public bidding.Hence,a violation of RA
6957.
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Section 5 of the BOT Law provides that upon the
approval of a project, a notice must be made inviting all
prospective project proponents to a competitive public
bidding. The public bidding must be conducted under a
two-envelope/two-stage system: the first envelope to
contain the technical proposal and the second one to
contain the financial proposal.
In this case, it is patently admitted by DOTC/L TO that
no public bidding was conducted on the RFID Project,
which was presented by Stradcom as a proposal that
would enhance the existing L TO IT Project. Neither
does this case fall under the exception to the rule on
public bidding.
The RFID MOA must, thus, be struck down by this Court
for failure to comply with the rules on public bidding.
There is no guarantee that the RFID fee that will be
charged to the public is a fair and reasonable price, as it
has not undergone public bidding.On the other hand,
Stradcom, which has been awarded the exclusive right
to develop and operate the RFID system without having
undergone competitive public bidding, stands to earn
considerable amounts of revenue from the contract.
Even if one were to follow Stradcom's argument that
the RFID MOA is not separate from the BOO
Agreement, still, its case would not prosper. The RFID
MOA is not so much a "mere enhancement" of the BOO
Agreement as it is a substantial amendment thereof. It
goes without saying that any contract awarded as a
result of competitive public bidding must be executed
faithfully by the parties.
As to the second and third issues raised by petitioners
assailing the constitutionality of the DOTC/LTO
issuances for being issued in usurpation of Congress'
legislative powers, and for violating the right to privacy,
it is unnecessary to rule on the same considering the
foregoing discussion declaring the RFID MOA null and
void for failure to undergo competitive public bidding.
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Radio Frequency
Identification Memorandum of Agreement dated 16
June 2009, entered into by respondents Stradcom
Corporation and the Department of Transportation and
Communication/Land Transportation Office, is hereby
declared null and void.
The RFID fees collected during the implementation of
the RFID Project prior to the issuance of this Court's
Status Quo Ante Order are likewise ordered refunded to
the payors thereof.
Buisan vs. Commission on Audit
January 31, 2017
G.R. No. 212376
Reyes, J.
Facts:
In 1989, the DPWH undertook the construction of the
Liguasan Cut-off Channel (Project) in Maguindanao to
minimize the flooding in the area. In 2001, the DPWH
received various claims for damages allegedly caused to
land owners’ properties by the premature opening of
the project which was subsequently investigated by the
Regional Director, DPWH Regional Office, No. XII,
Cotabato City that then recommended the payment of
just compensation to the claimants. In 2006, an ad hoc
committee was created to determine the legality and
propriety of the claims. However, no final resolution
was made the DPWH because of lapse of time and
insufficiency of evidence. In 2010, the petitioners filed a
petition with the COA praying that they be
compensated for their damaged properties.
The COA held that petitioners have committed laches
and their cause of action has already prescribed for
failure to file their money claims within a reasonable
time. A motion for reconsideration by petitioners was
denied.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ claim was barred by
laches and prescription.
Held:
Yes. Article 1146 of the Civil Code provides that actions
upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within 4 years.
The petitioners’ money claims had already prescribed
since those were only filed in 2004 or even in 2001
considering that the alleged damages took place in
1989.
Furthermore, “laches has been defined as the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence could
or should have been done earlier.”
In this case, the petitioners have committed laches
because: (1) The premature opening of the project
allegedly causing flash floods and damage to properties
5
took place in 1989 or even in 1992; (2) It took the
petitioners 15 years to assert their rights in filing a
complaint against the DPWH in 2004; (3) COA shall have
original jurisdiction over money claims against the
Government, among others as provided by Rule VIII,
Section I(a); therefore, the petitioners’ money claims
have prescribed and are barred by laches for their
failure to timely file the petition with the COA; and (4)
There is an apparent lack of notice that would give the
DPWH the opportunity to defend itself since the
petitioners failed to file a formal suit for their claims
before the COA and either because the condition of the
alleged inundation of crops has changed, or the physical
impossibility of accounting for the lost and damaged
crops due to the considerable lapse of time, the
plausibility of the allegations remains difficult.
CHUA vs. DE CASTRO
December 5, 2016
A.C. No. 10671
Reyes, J.
Facts:
Complainant Chua, alleged that his company Nemar
Computer Resources Corp. (NCRC) filed a collection case
against Dr. Concepcion Aguila Memorial College,
represented by its counsel, Atty. De Castro. According
to Chua, respondent employed unmeritorious excuses
to delay the case, such as simple absence without
notice, by alleging ailment without medical certificates,
by claiming insufficiency of time to prepare, among
others. As a result thereof, it took five years to present
one witness for NCRC.
Respondent Atty. Castro, in his defense, alleged that the
resetting were without objection from the counsel of
NCRC. He further alleged that the several
postponements were found meritorious by the RTC, and
some postponements were at the motions and at the
instance of Chua’s counsel.
Issue:Whether or not respondent be suspended for
deterring the speedy and efficient administration of
justice by employing delaying tactics.
Held:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, every
lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. The Court found that the delay
in the disposition of the case was not solely attributable
to Atty. De Castro. The trial court itself, either its own
initiative or at the instance of Chua’s counsel, allowed
the delays. Consequently, if not all of such delays were
attributable to Atty. De Castro’s doing; it would be
unfair to hold him solely responsible for the delays
caused in the case. In the initial finding where Atty.
Castro violated Rule 1.03 and Rule 10.3 of the CPR, the
Court, however, found that Chua failed to show that
Atty. De Castro was indeed moved to cause delays by
malice, or dishonesty, or deceit, or grave misconduct as
to warrant a finding of administrative liability against
him. Notwithstanding with the absence of malice,
dishonesty, or ill motive, it is good to remind Atty. De
Castro that as a member of the Bar, he isexpected to
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
CALDITO vs. OBADO
January 30, 2017
G.R. No. 181596
Reyes, J.
Facts:
The record showed that as early as 1921, Lot No. 1633
was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Felipe Obado (Felipe). After Felipe's death, Paterno
Obado (Paterno), whom Felipe treated like his own son,
subsequently occupied Lot No. 1633 and continued to
pay the realty taxes of the same. Antonio Ballesteros
(Antonio) executed an Affidavit of Ownership dated
February 23, 1995 claimed that Lot No. 1633 was co-
owned by Felipe with his five siblings. The next day,
Spouses Ballesteros sold the property to the petitioners
for the sum of P70,000.000by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In 2002, the petitioners attempted to build a house on
the subject parcel of land but the respondents
prevented them from completing the same.
Respondents averred that the Spouses Ballesteros were
not the owners and possessors of the subject parcel of
land since the former had been in open, peaceful and
uninterrupted possession of the whole property up to
the present or for more than 30 years in the concept of
an owner.
The RTC decision in favor of the petitioners was
reversed and set aside by the CA due to petitioners’
failure to support their claim while the respondents
enjoy a legal presumption of just title in their favor
since they are in possession of the entire Lot No.1633.
6
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were able to
prove ownership over the subject parcel of land.
Held:
In resolving this issue, the pertinent point of inquiry is
whether the petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, the
Spouses Ballesteros, have lawful title over the subject
parcel of land.
In this case, the petitioners' cause of action relates to an
action to quiet title which has two indispensable
requisites, namely: ( 1) the plaintiff or complainant has
a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; find (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud
on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its primafacie appearance of validity
or legal efficacy.
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the
petitioners' cause of action must necessarily fail mainly
in view of the absence of the first requisite since the
petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or
ownership over the subject parcel of land.
The petitioners' claim of legal title over the subject
parcel of land by virtue of the Deed of Sale and Affidavit
of Ownership issued by Antonio cannot stand because
they failed to prove the title of their immediate
predecessors-in-interest, the Spouses Ballesteros. The
Court cannot give full credence to Antonio's Affidavit of
Ownership for he simply made general and self-serving
statements therein which were favorable to him, and
which were not supported with documentary evidence,
with no specifics as to when their predecessors-in-
interest acquired the subject parcel of land, and when
the Donations Propter Nuptias were made. The
petitioners must present proof of specific acts of
ownership to substantiate his claim and cannot just
offer general statements which are mere conclusions of
law than factual evidence of possession.
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as
in the instant case, they are good indicia of possession
in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or constructive possession. They constitute
evidence of great weight in support of the claim of title
of ownership by prescription when considered with the
actual possession of the property by the applicant.
Thus, it is clear that the petitioners were not able to
prove equitable title or ownership over the subject
parcel of land. Except for their claim that they merely
purchased the same from the Spouses Ballesteros, the
petitioners presented no other justification to disprove
the ownership of the respondents. Since the Spouses
Ballesteros had no right to sell the subject parcel of
land, the petitioners cannot be deemed to have been
the lawful owners of the same.
CAMINO vs. PASAGUI
September 20,2016
A.C. No. 11095
PER CURIAM.
Facts:
Complainant is the vendor of a lot that is still registered
under the name of the Heirs of her father. Respondent
Atty. Pasagui was allegedly the lawyer of Cong. Mila Tan
who was in charge of handling the payments for the
property which Camino sold to Tan in 2010.
Camino narrated that Atty. Pasagui offered her Tan's
payment in the amount of P30,000. However, Camino
refused to accept the same. Atty. Pasagui then told her
that there will be a recall and Tan would not have
enough money to pay her. The respondent also assured
her that he will take care of everything and encouraged
her to look for a new buyer and advised her to set its
price at P7,000,000.
Complainant informed the respondent that she has a
new buyer, but the latter wanted to have a clean title of
the property since it still not under her name.
Respondent facilitate the transferring under her name.
Respondent also told her that the transfer of the title in
her name will cost about P700,000.
Sometime in January 2011, Atty. Pasagui told Camino
that they will proceed with the sale to another buyer.
Convinced by Atty. Pasagui's, she told him that she will
look for a sufficient amount of money necessary for the
processing of the transfer of the title.
Atty. Pasagui advised Camino to apply for a loan using
her residential house and lot as collateral. The proceeds
thereof will then be used for the expenses in
transferring the title in her name.
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Subsequently, Camino and her husband, executed an
SPA in favor of respondent Atty. Pasagui, authorizing
the latter to obtain a loan in their behalf with PHCCI to
be secured by their own property. Camino inquire to
Atty. Pasagui about the status of the loan application.
She was informed that it was still in process and that
she can only loan P700,000.
After a month, Camino discovered that the loan was
already approved and that the proceeds thereof
amounting to P1,000,000 was already released.Upon
meeting with Tan, an envelope containing the amount
of P150,000 was handed to her. Atty. Pasagui gave her a
signal to accept the envelope. Camino, confuse and
wondering that Atty. Pasagui already told her that the
sale of the property will no longer push through.
On April 28, 2011, Camino tried to call Atty. Pasagui to
follow up on Tan's payment but he did not answer her
call. Neither did Atty. Pasagui get in touch with her after
their meeting.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Held:
Yes. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR -
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 15 - A lawyer is duty-bound to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his clients.
The profession, therefore, demands of an attorney an
absolute abdication of every personal advantage
conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with the
interest of his client.
In the instant case, Atty. Pasagui's guilt is undisputed. A
perusal of the SPA issued by Camino and her husband to
Atty. Pasagui clearly shows that the application of the
loan with PHCCI was in behalf of the Caminos and that
the property mortgaged was likewise the property of
the latter. If it were true that it was a personal loan to
him, Atty. Pasagui failed to provide an explanation as to
why he used Camino's property as collateral.
The failure of Atty. Pasagui to inform Camino of the
status of the transfer of title despite the release of the
loan to finance the transfer of the title, is a clear
indicium that he converted the money for his own use
and constituted a gross violation of professional ethics
and betrayal of public confidence ·in the legal
profession. Furthermore he violated the whole Canon
16 and its sub-rules.
Canon 16 - a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those of others
kept by him.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property
of his client when due or upon demand. However, he
shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees
and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to
his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on
all judgments and executions he has secured for his
client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
He is obligated to report promptly the money of his
client that has come into his possession. He should not
commingle it with his private property or use it for his
personal purposes without his client's consent.
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his
client for a particular purpose he should promptly
account to the client how the money was spent. If he
does not use the money for its intended purpose, he
must immediately return it to the client.
Respondent, by converting the money of his client to his
own personal use without her consent, was guilty of
deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct.
Communication and Information Systems Corp.
vs. Mark Sensing Australia Pty. Ltd.
January 25, 2017
G.R. 192159
JARDALEZA, J.
Facts:
Petitioner MSAPL and respondent CISC entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated March 1,
2002 whereby the latter appointed CISC as its "exclusive
AGENT” to PCSO. MSAPL agreed to pay CISC a
8
commission of 24.5% of future gross sales to PCSO,
exclusive duties and taxes, for six years. However, it
stopped remitting commissions to CISC during 2nd
quarter of 2004 alleging that Carolina de Jesus,
President of CISC, violated her authority when she
negotiated the Supply Contract with PCSO and three of
MSAPL's competitors. For this reason, MSAPL felt short-
changed by CISC's efforts and thus decided to withhold
payment of commissions.
Consequently, CISC filed a complaint before the RTC for
specific performance against the respondent and
further asked the court an amended writ of attachment
to include unpaid commissions in excess of the amount
stated in their complaint and the same was granted.
On July 8, 2009, CJSC posted a bond in the amount
of1,113,197,309.10 through Plaridel Surety and
Insurance Company (Plaridel) in favor of MSAPL, which
the RTC approved on the same date.24 Two days later,
MSAPL filed a motion to determine the sufficiency of
the bond because of questions regarding the financial
capacity of Plaridel to underwrite the bond pursuant to
Section 215 of the old Insurance Code.
On September 4, 2009, the RTC denied MSAPL's motion,
finding that although Plaridel cannot underwrite the
bond by itself, the amount covered by the attachment
bond "was likewise reinsured to sixteen other insurance
companies." However, "for the best interest of both
parties," the RTC ordered Plaridel to submit proof that
the amount was reinsured.
Plaridel submitted its compliance on September 11,
2009, attaching therein the reinsurance contracts.
Issue:
WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
approving the attachment bond whose faceamount
exceeded the retention limit of the surety.
Held:
No. The RTC not only correctly applied the law but also
acted judiciously in requiring Plaridel to submit proof of
its reinsurance contracts after MSAPL questioned its
capacity to underwrite the attachment bond.
Section 215 of the old Insurance Code, the law in force
at the time Plaridel issued the attachment bond, limits
the amount of risk that insurance companies can retain
to a maximum of 20% of its net worth.
In this case, both the RTC and CA determined that,
based on Plaridel's financial statement that was
attached to its certificate of authority issued by the
Insurance Commission, its net worth is
P289,332,999.00. Plaridel's retention limit is therefore
P57,866,599.80, which is below the Pl 13,197,309.10
face value of the attachment bond.
However, it only retained an insurable risk of
Pl7,377,938.19 because the remaining amount of
P98,819,770.91was ceded to 16 other insurance
companies. Thus, the risk retained by Plaridel is actually
P40 Million below its maximum retention limit.
Therefore, the approval of the attachment bond by the
RTC was in order.
Petition is GRANTED.
CRISPINO, ET AL. vs. TANSAY
December 5, 2016
GR. No. 184466
Leonen, J.
Facts:
In civil case for Revocation of Trust, Declaration of
Nullity of Transfer and Cancellation of Titles, the
Regional Trial Court held that Tansay is the lawful
owner of the subjected lot. Petitioners assailed the
decision of the trial court and filed an Urgent Motion to
Remand Records of the Case for the Re-opening of the
trial, which was considered by the appellate court as
motion for new trial and denied because the evidence
presented was not the kind of newly discovered
evidence contemplated by the rules.
Issue: Can the CA receive new evidence on appeal?
Held:
Yes. Although the CA has the power to receive evidence
pursuant to its expanded powers under Sec 9 of BP 129,
this power is not without limit. The CA cannot simply
accept additional evidence from the parties. If the
interpretation were otherwise, then there would be no
end to litigation. Hence, in appeals in civil cases, the CA
may only receive evidence when it grants a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence. This
notwithstanding, the CA cannot accept any kind of
evidence in a motion for new trial. A motion for new
trial under Rule 53 is limited to newly discovered
evidence.
9
Newly discovered evidence has a specific meaning
under the law. Under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court, the
following criteria must be satisfied for evidence to be
considered newly discovered; (a) the evidence could not
have been discovered prior to trial in the court below by
exercise of due diligence and; (b) it is of such character
as would probably change the result.
Issue: Whether an interlocutory order may be assailed
in an appeal of the appellate court’s decision.
Held:
Yes, an interlocutory order may not be questioned on
appeal except only as part of an appeal that may be
eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in
the case.
In determining the correct procedural remedy,
aggrieved parties must first ascertain the nature of the
decision, order, or resolution they intend to challenge.
A final judgment or order, from which an appeal may be
taken, is one that finally disposes of the case and leaves
nothing more to be done by the court (e.g. adjudication
on the merits of the case on the basis of the evidence).
In contrast, an interlocutory order is one that merely
resolves incidental matters and does not finally dispose
of the case. When an interlocutory order is issued, the
court is still tasked with adjudication on the merits of
the case.
The remedy against an interlocutory order is not appeal
but a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. The reason for the prohibition is to
prevent multiple appeals in a single action that would
necessarily cause delay during trial. This
notwithstanding, a special civil action for certiorari is
not the only remedy that aggrieved parties may take
against interlocutory order, since it may be appealed in
an appeal of the judgment itself.
DASMARINAS T. ARCAINA and MAGNANI T. BANTA vs.
NOEMI L. INGRAM, represented by MA. NENETTE L.
ARCHINUE
February 15, 2017
G.R. No. 196444
Facts:
Arcaina is the owner of Lot No. 3230 (property) located
at Salvacion, Sto. Domingo, Albay. Sometime in 2004,
her attorney-in-fact, Banta, entered into a contract with
Ingram for the sale of the property. The contract price
was P1,860,000.00, with Ingram making installment
payments for the property from May 5, 2004 to
February 10, 2005 totaling P1,715,000.00.6 Banta and
Ingram' thereafter executed a Memorandum of
Agreement acknowledging the previous payments and
that Ingram still had an obligation to pay the remaining
balance in the amount of P145,000.00.7 They also
separately executed deeds of absolute sale over the
property in Ingram's favor. Both deeds described the
propertywith an area of SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
(6,200) sq. meters more or less.
Subsequently, Ingram caused the property to be
surveyed and discovered that it has an area of 12,000
sq. m. Upon learning of the actual area of the property,
Banta allegedly insisted that the difference of 5,800 sq.
m. remains unsold. This was opposed by Ingram who
claims that she owns the whole lot by virtue of the sale.
The MCTC held in favor of the petitioners and declared
that for Ingram to be awarded the excess 5,800 sq. m.
portion of the property, she should have presented
evidence that she paid for the surplus area consistent
with Article 1540 of the Civil Code. Since Ingram failed
to show that she paid for the value of the excess land
area, the MCTC held that she cannot claim ownership
and possession of the whole property.
On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the Order of
the MCTC. The RTC found that neither of the parties
presented competent evidence to prove the property's
actual area. Hence, the RTC concluded that the area of
the property is only 6,200 sq. m. more or less. In
addition, the RTC held that Article 1542, which covers
sale of real estate in lump sum, applies in this case. The
CA affirmed the RTC's ruling with modification.
Petitioners now assail the CA' s declaration that the sale
of the property was made for a lump sum. They insist
that they sold the property on a per-square-meter
basis, at the rate of P300.00 per sq. m. Since the sale
was on a per-square-meter basis, petitioners argue that
it is Article 1539,34 and not Article 1542 of the Civil
Code, which govems.
Issue:
Whether the sale was made on a lump sum or per-
square-meter basis.
Ruling:
10
We now resolve the main issue in this case and hold
that Lot No. 3230 was sold for a lump sum. In sales
involving real estate, the parties may choose between
two types of pricing agreement: a unit price contract
wherein the purchase price is determined by way of
reference to a stated rate per unit area (e.g, P1,000.00
per sq. m.) or a lump sum contract which states a full
purchase price for an immovable the area of which may
be declared based on an estimate or where both the
area and boundaries are stated (e.g., Pl million for 1,000
sq. m., etc.)41 Here, the Deed of Sale executed by Banta
on March 21, 2005 and the Deed of Sale executed by
Arcaina on April 13, 200543 both show that the property
was conveyed to Ingram at the predetermined price of
Pl,860,000.00. There was no indication that it was
bought on a per-square-meter basis. Thus, Article 1542
of the Civil Code governs the sale.
However, there is an exception. In Del Prado v. Spouses
Caballero, we were confronted with facts analogous to
the present petition. We did not apply Article 1542. In
holding that Del Prado is entitled only to the area stated
in the contract of sale, we explained:
"x xx. The use of "more or less" or similar words in
designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess
or deficiency. A vendee of land sold in gross or with the
description "more or less" with reference to its area
does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in
the land Xxx”
In a lump sum contract, a vendor is generally obligated
to deliver all the land covered within the boundaries,
regardless of whether the real area should be greater or
smaller than that recited in the deed. However, in case
there is conflict between the area actually covered by
the boundaries and the estimated area stated in the
contract of sale, he/ she shall do so only when the
excess or deficiency between the former and the latter
is reasonable.
Therefore, we rule that Ingram is entitled only to 6,200
sq. m. of the property. An area of 5,800 sq. m. more
than the area intended to be sold is not a reasonable
excess that can be deemed included in the sale.
Deutsche Knowledge Services Pte. Ltd. vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
December 1, 2016
G.R. No. 197980.
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Facts:
Petitioner avers that on March 31, 2009, it filed an
application for Tax Credit/Refund of its allegedly excess
and unutilized input VAT for the 1st quarter of the
calendar year 2007 in the amount of P12,549,446.30
with respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(empowered to act upon and approve claims for refund
or tax credit as provided by law) through its BIR
Revenue District No. 47.
Citing inaction on the part of respondent, petitioner on
April 17, 2009 filed a Petition for Review or seventeen
(17) days after petitioner filed an application for tax
credit/refund with respondent based on Section 112
and 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997,
as amended.
However, on June 8, 2009, instead of an Answer
respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on ground of
prescription. Citing the case of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (Mirant Case),
respondent alleged that the Petition for Review was
filed out of time on the ground of having been filed
beyond the two-year prescriptive period.
A day after or on June 9, 2009, respondent filed an
Answer again citing the same grounds in the Motion to
Dismiss in her Special and Affirmative defenses.
After hearing and the filing of Comment/Opposition on
the Motion to Dismiss, the former Second Division of
this Court resolved to grant said motion on October 28,
2009. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
thereon on November 16, 2009.
However, in an Order dated January 11, 2010, the case
was ordered to be transferred to the Third Division of
this Court pursuant to CTA Administrative Circular No.
01-2010, "Implementing the Fully Expanded
Membership in the Court of Tax Appeals".
Notwithstanding, on February 8, 2010, the former
Second Division of this Court promulgated a Resolution
which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the
CTA En Banc. However, the said tribunal merely
affirmed with modification the assailed resolutions and
dismissed petitioner's suit for having been prematurely
11
filed prior to the expiration of the 120-day period
granted to respondent to resolve the tax claim.
Issues: Whether or not the petition for review of the
petitioner was made properly pursuant to Section 112
of the NIRC of 1997.
Ruling:
YES, the petition for review of the petitioner was made
properly.
In the instant case, the administrative claim or
application for tax credit/refund of its allegedly excess
and unutilized input VAT for the first quarter of taxable
year 2007 was filed on March 31, 2009 or within the
two-year prescriptive period. Respondent had 120 days
or until July 29, 2009 to determine the validity of the
claim. However, petitioner filed an appeal by way of a
petition for review on April 17, 2009 or 17 days after
the filing of the administrative claim. Apparently,
petitioner did not wait for the decision of the CIR or the
lapse of the 120-day period and this is in clear
contravention of Section 112(D) [now Section 112(C)] of
the 1997 NIRC.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque
Power Corporation (San Roque case) and stated that a
judicial claim for refund of input VAT which was filed
with the CTA before the lapse of the 120-day period
under Section 112 of the NIRC is considered to have
been timely made, if such filing occurred after the
issuance of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Ruling
No. DA-489-03 dated December 10, 2003.
The SC in the San Roque case stated that the "taxpayer-
claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day
period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA
by way of Petition for Review,"
In the present case, the records indicate that petitioner
filed its administrative claim for tax credit/refund of its
allegedly excess and unutilized input VAT for the 1st
quarter of the calendar year 2007 in the amount of
P12,549,446.30 with respondent on March 31, 2009.
Subsequently, petitioner filed its judicial claim on the
same matter through a petition for review with the CTA
on April 17, 2009. It is undisputed that the
aforementioned date of filing falls within the period
following the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on
December 10, 2003.
DIMSON vs. CHUA
December 5, 2016
GR No. 192318
Reyes, J.
Facts: The case herein is an offshoot from the labor
case of illegal dismissal, which was filed by the
petitioner representing the other 14 complainants
against respondent. The said labor case was decided in
favor of the complainants wherein SEASUMCO and
MAC, as well as the members of their board of
directors, were ordered to pay jointly and severally the
sum of P3,827,470.51. Petitioner filed an ex-parte
motion for the issuance of an amended alias writ of
execution asking for the inclusion of the board of
directors and corporate officers of SEASUMCO and MAC
to hold them liable for satisfaction of the decision. The
said motion was granted by the LA which resulted in the
inclusion of herein respondent.
Respondent, aggrieved with the decision, elevated the
matter to the NLRC arguing that he was denied of due
process.
The CA nullified and set aside the rulings of the NLRC,
and made the writ of preliminary injunction permanent.
The CA held that the respondent was indeed denied of
due process for LA cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent without the latter being
served with summons, and in the absence of service of
summons or a valid waiver thereof, the hearing and
judgment rendered by the LA are null and void.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent can be held
solidary liable with the corporation, of which he was an
officer and a stockholder, when he was not served with
summons and was never impleaded as a party to the
case.
Held:
As to the respondent’s alleged solidary liability with the
corporation, the Court sustained the CA’s ruling that the
respondent as one of SEASUMCO’s corporate officer
12
and stockholder should not be held solidary liable with
the corporation for its monetary liabilities with the
petitioner. To hold the director or officer personally
liable for corporate obligations, two requisites must
concur: (1) it must be alleged in the complaint that the
director or officer assented to patently unlawful acts of
the corporation of that the officer was guilty of gross
negligence or bad faith; and (2) there must be proof
that officer acted in bad faith. In the absence of a
finding that respondent acted with malice or bad faith,
it was error for the labor tribunals to hold him
responsible.
The piercing of the veil of the corporate fiction is
frowned upon and can only be done if it has been
clearly established that the separate and distinct
personality of the corporation is used to justify a wrong,
protect fraud, or perpetrate deception. To disregard the
separate juridical personality of a corporation, the
wrongdoing must be established clearly and
convincingly. It cannot be presumed.
Heirs of Pacifico Gonzales vs. Juanito De Leon
December 7, 2016
G.R. No. 210428.
Perez, J.
Facts:
Subject of the controversy is a parcel of land located at
Sitio Guinting, Brgy. Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna covered by
four (4) separate Transfer Certificates of Title registered
under the name of Pacifico Gonzales. It appears that the
said lots are covered by CARP based on the findings of
DAR-PARO. The Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator of Cabuyao issued a Certification dated 18
July 2002 classifying the subject properties as a
municipal park.Late Luningning Gonzales filed an
Application for Exemption/Clearance.
Petitioners stressed that the land is more than 18% in
slope, it is not irrigated, 70% thereof is not cultivated,
and is not planted to rice and corn,
Petitioners filed a complaint for Ejectment against the
respondents before the Municipal Trial Court. The MTC
held that the evidence presented by the respondents
failed to prove the essential requisites of tenancy
relationship between plaintiff and respondents. DAR
OIC-Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman (OIC-Secretary
Pangandaman) acted on the application of the late
Luningning Gonzales and approve the Application for
Exemption Clearance. OP affirmed DAR’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not the subject lots are exempt from
agrarian reform coverage?
Held: Yes. Section 10 of CARP provides that Lands
actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves,
reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds,
watersheds, and mangroves, national defense, school
sites and campuses including experimental farm
stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and
pilot production centers, church sites and convents
appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers
appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and
cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually
worked by the inmates, government and private
research and quarantine centers and all lands with
eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those
already developed shall be exempt from the coverage
of the Act.
HEIRS OF SIXTO L. TAN, SR. vs. BELTRAN
February 01,2017
A.C. No. 5819
Sereno, CJ.
Facts:
On July 2001, complainants filed a criminal action which
was subsequently dismissed.
Respondent as the counsel of the complainants filed an
appeal via a Petition for Review before the Secretary of
DOJ. It was, however, filed beyond the 15-days
reglementary period. Consequently the SOJ dismissed it.
The respondent no longer filed a motion for
reconsideration to remedy the ruling.
On September 2001, complainants instituted a related
civil suit to annul the sale of their commercial
properties before the RTC of Naga. Respondent was
given P7,000 by his clients, to pay the docket fees
computed at P 1,722.
Unfortunately, the Clerk of Court erred in the
assessment of the docket fees. To correct the error, the
RTC required the payment of additional docket fees
13
through an Order dated 20 May 2002, which
respondent received on 29 May 2002.
However, two weeks earlier, on 13 May 2002, he had
moved to withdraw as counsel with the conformity of
his clients. No separate copy of the Order dated 20 May
2002 was sent to any of the complainants.
The balance of the docket fees remained unpaid.
Subsequently, the RTC dismissed the civil case for non-
payment of docket fees as one of its bases.
Aggrieved by their defeat, complainants filed a case
against the respondent, for his actions and for he had
unduly received P200,000 as attorney’s fee, despite his
failure to render effective legal service for them.
In his reply, respondent claimed that he could no longer
move for the reconsideration as he had only learned of
the dismissal after the period to file a motion for
reconsideration had lapsed. He argued that while he
prepared the Petition for Review, his clients themselves,
through Nilo Tan and Recto Tan, signed and filed the
same. Thus, he imputed to complainants the belated
filing of the appeal.
As for the dismissal due to non-payment of docket fees,
respondent disclaimed any fault on his part, since he
had already withdrawn as counsel in that case.
Issue: Whether respondent is guilty of violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for filing belated
appeal before the SOJ
Held:
Yes. The SC ruled that failure of the counsel to appeal
within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and
malpractice.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable."
The excuse forwarded by respondent - that he
delegated the filing of the Petition for Review to
complainants - will not exculpate him from
administrative liability. Respondent cannot disclaim
negligence, since he was the lawyer tasked to pursue
the legal remedies available to his clients.
Lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the
rudiments of law and legal procedure.
Issue: Whether the respondent is bound to inform
complainants of the RTC Order even after his
withdrawal as their counsel.
Held:
Yes. The rule that the withdrawal of a counsel with the
written conformity of the client is immediately
effective, however, is not absolute.
When the counsel's impending withdrawal with the
written conformity of the client would leave the latter
with no legal representation in the case, it is an
accepted practice for courts to order the deferment of
the effectivity of such withdrawal until such time that it
becomes certain that service of court processes and
other papers to the party-client would not thereby be
compromised - either by the due substitution of the
withdrawing counsel in the case or by the express
assurance of the party-client that he now undertakes to
himself receive serviceable processes and other papers.
(Mercado v. CHED)
When respondent herein received the RTC Order dated
20 May 2002, complainants still had no new counsel on
record. Therefore, Atty. Beltran should have acted with
prudence by informing his previous clients that he had
received the directive of the court requiring the
payment of docket fees.
The respondent failed to act with prudence by failing to
inform complainants of the RTC Order.
Issue: Whether respondent unduly received P200,000
as attorney's fees.
Held:
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of
proof required is preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other.
Complainants have the burden to discharge that
required quantum of proof. Their argument has no
other supporting evidence - object, documentary, or
testimonial. General allegations will not meet the
evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence.
14
 executory. The subject property was then transferred to
NIDSLAND.

Then Napal filed with the CA a petition for annulment of

judgment, Napal sought the nullification of the SEC
decision as well as the orders and writs issued pursuant
to it. He argued that the SEC has no jurisdiction over the
IMPERIAL & NISLAND CORP. vs. ARMES
SEC case as it did not involve any intra-corporate
January 30, 2017
controversy. CA on its decision dismissed the appeal,
GR No. 178842
such annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is not
Jardeleza, J.
available to annul SEC decision, and the proper remedy
Facts:
is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
Napal and Imperial entered into a MOA to organize a under Rule 65. Following the decision of CA, the case
domestic corporation to be named NIDSLAND, for which was redocketed to the RTC, after trial parties submitted
they agreed to entered into a real estate business. For their respective memorandum in which Imperial and
his capital contribution to the corporation, Napal NIDSLAND assail the jurisdiction of the case.
undertook to convey to NIDSLAND a tract of land
They file an Omnibus Motion on the ground of lack of
consisting of four lots covered by Transfer Certificate of
jurisdiction, such motion was denied. Imperial and
Title, and to Imperial a two hectare portion of the
NIDSLAND then filed a petition for certiorari and
Property situated in Taysan, Legazpi City intended for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
subdivision project. Imperial faithfully complied with his
the CA, such petition assailed the validity of Respondent
obligations under the MOA, however, Napal failed to
Judge Armes' orders, however such petition was dismiss
convey to NIDSLAND a certain portion of the property
for lack of merit. Imperial then moved for a motion for
which was subsequently sold by Napal to Cruz as
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, Imperial and
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. As Napal
NIDSLAND filed this petition for review on Certiorari
continued to refuse to convey the subject property to
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of
NIDSLAND under the MOA, Imperial filed for himself
the two assailed resolutions, they argue that the CA
and in representation of NIDSLAND, a derivative suit
erred in affirming the RTC decision on the RTC petition.
before the Securities and Exchange Commission.
They argue that the CA should have reversed the error
Imperial also filed a notice of lispendens for the SEC
of the RTC Legazpi City in allowing the filing of the
case with the Registry of Deeds of Legazpi City. The
RTCpetition way beyond the 60-day period for the filing
notice of lispendens was carried over to the new TCT
of a special civil action for certiorari. They stress that
issued in the name of Cruz. The SEC case proceeded
the RTC petition was filed three and a half years after
without the participation of Cruz who had possession of
the finality of the SEC decision and two years and three
the new TCT covering the subject property during the
months from the time Cruz received notice of its
continuation of the hearings. SEC Hearing Officer
promulgation. They argue thatneither the CA nor Cruz
Gonzales rendered a decision in favor of Imperial and
was able to present any compelling reason for the
NIDSLAND. The decision declared the Deed of Absolute
relaxation of the reglementary period. While the First
Sale between Napal and Cruz void ab initio as the SEC
Petition was pending, RTC Legazpi City rendered a
found that the sale was simulated and was intentionally
decision dated March 24, 2009. The RTC Legazpi City
made to appear to have been perfected prior to the
ruled that SEC Hearing Officer Gonzales acted with
filing of the notice of lispendens. Thus, the SEC ordered
grave abuse of discretion when he annulled the Deed of
the cancellation of the TCT in the name of Cruz. Further,
Sale of the subject property between Napal and Cruz,
the SEC directed Napal to execute the proper deed of
ordered the cancellation of Cruz's TCT, and directed
conveyance of the subject property in favor of
Napal to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of
NIDSLAND. The SEC also mandated Napal to deliver the
NIDSLAND.
possession of the subject property to NIDSLAND. Napal
did not appeal rendering the decision final and According to the RTC main decision, the CA has already
definitively settled the issue of RTC Legazpi City's

15
jurisdiction over the case. It held that there is no merit
in Imperial and NIDSLAND's contention that the RTC
petition should have been dismissed for non-
compliance with the 60-day period for the filing of a
special civil action for certiorari and for failure of the
RTC petition to state the material dates.
On the other hand, the RTC main decision found that
the SEC had no jurisdiction over Cruz and as such, in
issuing orders affecting his ownership over the subject
property, it violated Cruz's right not to be deprived of
property without due process of law.
Further, the RTC Main Decision stated that RTC Legazpi
City cannot settle the issue as to the rightful ownership
of the subject property in a special civil action for
certiorari. The RTC Main Decision however affirmed the
award of damages in favor of Imperial and NIDSLAND in
the SEC case.
Issue: Whether RTC Legazpi City has jurisdiction to
declare the nullity of the decision of the SEC?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled the RTC petition
should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and
that the SEC decision was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to an excess of jurisdiction. Upon
examination of the RTC petition, the SC rules that
contrary to the findings of the lower courts, it is an
action for the annulment of judgment on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.
They held that the issue of the RTC petition's allegation
is that the SEC declared as void ab initio the sale
between Napal and Cruz without impleading Cruz in the
proceedings. The SEC also had no power to order the
transfer of title over the subject property from Cruz to
NIDSLAND because Cruz was never heard in these
proceedings. It is true in Cruz assertion that the SEC
never acquired jurisdiction over his person. However in
the issue raised, and with the passage of BP 129, it
expressly vested the CA with jurisdiction over
annulment of judgments of regional trial courts.
Notably, it does not mention jurisdiction over
annulment of judgment of quasi-judicial bodies. While it
is correct that both the regional trial courts and the CA
cannot take cognizance of a petition for annulment of
judgment of a quasi-judicial body under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court, they may nevertheless do so, if a law
categorically provides for such a remedy and clearly
provides them with jurisdiction.
Applying this to the present case, we rule that there is
no law at the time pertinent to this case, which allows
the filing of a petition for annulment of judgment
before the RTC’s and the CA to set aside a void
judgment of the SEC on the basis of lack of jurisdiction.
SC hasten to emphasize, however, that this pertains
only to cases filed prior to RA 8799 which transferred
the jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes to regional
trial courts designated as commercial courts. As to the
latter, Rule 4 7 clearly applies.
This leads to the conclusion that the RTC petition is not
the proper remedy to assail the SEC decision. Since it is
an action for the annulment of judgment, the RTC
petition cannot prosper as pointed out by SC because
such remedy is not available in this particular case.
However, the error in Cruz's RTC petition does not
automatically warrant a dismissal of these proceedings.
The Supreme Court ruled that the SEC, in nullifying the
sale between Napal and Cruz and in ordering the
cancellation of Cruz's TCTs in favor of NIDSLAND,
overstepped its jurisdiction. The SEC decision was
rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the SEC also
does not possess the expertise to go into the reception
of evidence and the conduct of hearings geared for the
purpose of resolving issues proper for a civil action. The
resolution of a civil action requires preponderance of
evidence as a burden of proof. On the other hand, cases
before quasi-judicial bodies require only substantial
evidence.
Hence, the propriety of annulling a sale and cancelling a
Torrens title-which are in the nature of a civil action-on
the basis merely of substantial evidence determined by
an administrative body, raises due process concerns.
Hence, because the SEC decision was issued with grave
abuse of discretion and is therefore void, all acts
emanating from it have no force and effect. Thus, the
Deed of Conveyance issued pursuant to it has no legal
effect.
Jaime N. Soriano, et al. vs. Margarito B. Teves
January 24, 2017
G.R. No. 184450/G.R. No. 184508/G.R. No.
184538/G.R. No. 185234
Sereno, CJ.
Facts:
These consolidated petitions seek to nullify certain
provisions of Revenue Regulations No.10-2008. The RR
16
was issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on 24
September 2008 to implement the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9504. The law granted, among others,
income tax exemption for minimum wage earners
(MWEs), as well as an increase in personal and
additional exemptions for individual taxpayers.
The regulation allegedly restricts the implementation of
the MWEs’ income tax exemption only to the period
starting from 8 July 2008, instead of applying the
exemption to the entire year 2008. They further
challenge the BIR’s adoption of the prorated application
of the new set of personal and additional exemptions
for taxable year 2008. They also contest the validity of
the RR’s alleged imposition of a condition for the
availment by MWE s of the exemption provided by R.A.
9504. Supposedly, in the event they received other
benefits in excess of P30,000, they can no longer avail
themselves of that exemption. Petitioners contend that
the law provides for the conditional exemption of
MWEs from income tax and, thus, pray that the RR be
nullified.
Issues:
Whether the increased personal and additional
exemptions provided by R.A. 9504 should be applied to
the entire taxable year 2008 or prorated, considering
that R.A. 9504 took effect only on 6 July 2008.
Whether an MWE is exempt for the entire taxable year
2008 or from 6 July 2008 only.
Whether Sections 1 and 3 of RR 10-2008 are consistent
with the law in providing that an MWE who receives
other benefits in excess of the statutory limit of P30,000
is no longer entitled to the exemption provided by R.A.
9504.
Held:
Yes. The personal and additional exemptions by R.A.
9504 should be applied to the entire taxable year 2008.
The test is whether the new set of personal and
additional exemptions was available at the time of the
filing of the income tax return. In other words, while the
status of the individual taxpayers is determined at the
close of the taxable year, their personal and additional
exemptions are reckoned when the tax becomes due,
and not while the income is being earned or received.
Further, R.A. 9504, like R.A. 7176 in Umali vs. Estanislao,
was a piece of social legislation clearly intended to
afford immediate tax relief to individual taxpayers,
particularly low-income compensation earners.
The MWE is exempt for the entire taxable year 2008.
The calendar year 2008 remained as one taxable year
for an individual taxpayer. Therefore, RR-2008 cannot
declare the income earned by a minimum wage earner
from 1 January 2008 to 5 July 2008 to be taxable and
those earned by him for the rest of that year to be tax-
exempt.
Sections 1 and 3 of RR 10-2008 add a requirement not
found in the law by effectively declaring that an MWE
who receives other benefits in excess of the statutory
limit of P30,000 is no longer entitled to the exemption
provided by R.A. 9504. To be exempt, one must be an
MWE. Section 22 (HH) of the NIRC says he/she must be
one who is paid statutory minimum wage if he/she
works in the private sector, or not more than the
statutory minimum wage in the non-agricultural sector
where he/she is assigned, if he/she is a government
employee. Thus, one is either an MWE or he/she is not.
B. STA. ANA vs. MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC. (MCJI)
February 15, 2017
G.R. 208459
Del Castillo, J.
Facts:
MCJI dismissed Julieta Sta. Ana as teller of its off-track
betting outlet in Tayuman. The company cited loss of
trust and confidence on her as ground. She allegedly (1)
used MCJI personnel during office hours as conduit for
her lending business, and (2) extended loan using
corporate fund in one occasion. The second accusation
stemmed from the cash shortages in the Treasury
Department where Tejada, a friend of Sta. Ana, worked
as Assistant Head/Cashier. The Special Disciplinary
Committee (SDC) of MCJI reported that Tejada was
lending money to co-employees using corporate fund.
Herein petitioner was implicated based on the
testimony of Benjie Sunga that the money he borrowed
from Sta. Ana came from Tejada.
Petitioner contested the validity of her dismissal. The
Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC found it valid. The CA
affirmed said decision hence this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
17
Whether or not Sta. Ana was validly dismissed on the
ground of loss of trust and confidence.
Held:
No, the dismissal of Sta. Ana was not valid.
As a rule, petition under Rule 45 covers only questions
of law subject to some exceptions. Said exceptions
include a situation where the CA manifestly overlooked
undisputed relevant facts which would warrant a
different conclusion.
To legally dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of
trust, the employer must establish that:
a) the employee occupied a position of trust and
confidence, or has been routinely charged with the care
and custody of the employer's money or property;
b) the employee committed a willful breach of trust
based on clearly established facts; and,
c) such loss of trust relates to the employee's
performance of duties.
While the petitioner held a position of trust and
confidence and MCJI afforded her procedural due
process, the respondent failed to provide clear and
convincing evidence to prove items b and c above. The
two borrowers who testified that a company driver
delivered the money to them did not say that it was
done during office hours.
For the missing corporate fund, MCJI was not able to
present credible evidence to link it to Sta. Ana’s
business. Mere allegation of being business partner
with Tejada does not prove the involvement of Tejada
in her lending activities. The petitioner on the other
hand presented various evidence to show her sources
of funds used as capital for her lending business such as
bank statements, bank certification of mortgaging her
real property, and proof of selling property.
LEODEGARIA SANCHEZ-PONTIGON vs. HEIRSD OF
MELITON SANCHEZ
December 5, 2016
GR. No. 221513
Perez,j.
Facts:
Meliton Sanchez had been the owner of a 24-hectare
parcel of land situated in Gutad, Floridablanca,
Pampanga. Said property was duly-registered in his
name under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 207
issued on October 15, 1938. Meliton died intestate,
leaving the subject property to his surviving heirs
Apollo, Juan and Flaviana. Juan is the father of
Leodegaria, herein petitioner. The other heirs
(respondents) alleged that they were deprived of their
inheritance because while the property in issue has
never been partitioned among the heirs, the petitioners
fraudulently cause the registration of the parcel of land
with the Register of Deeds in their own name, and in
lieu of which, a Transfer Certificate of Title has been
issued and the Original Certificate of Title cancelled.
The petitioner also obtained a loan in the amount of
P6,617,000.00 with Quedan and Rural and Credit
Guarantee, and mortgaged the property to secure the
said obligation an act which the respondent alleged to
be fraudulently done, contending further that Quedan
failed to verify the real owner of the property. Hence,
herein respondents seek to declare the Transfer
Certificate and consequently the mortgaged as null and
void.
In their affirmative defense, the petitioner alleged that
the conveyance of the property subject of the dispute is
evidence by an extrajudicial settlement, and that the
co-owners Apollo, Juan, Flaviana sold the property to
herein petitioners. They further contend that the action
to nullify the same is already barred by prescription.
While Quedan on the other hand averred that the
mortgage is done in good faith since it has already
verified the veracity of the title of the Petitioner with
the Registrar of Deed.
The RTC ruled that the action is not barred by
prescription since the action is reconvenyance of
property resulting from “trust relationship” established
among the parties which is the exception to the 1 year
prescriptive period to nullify Torrens Certificate of title.
The CA affirmed the lower court, hence this case.
Issue: Whether or not respondents' cause of action is
barred by prescription
Held:
It is already barred by prescription.
Under the Torrens System as enshrined in P.D. No.
1529, the decree of registration and the certificate of
title issued become incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one ( 1) year from the date of entry of the
decree of registration, without prejudice to an action
18
for damages against the applicant or any person
responsible for the fraud. However, actions for
reconveyance based on implied trusts may be allowed
beyond the one-year period.
In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration
is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead
is the transfer of the property, in this case the title
thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person's name, to its rightful and
legal owner, or to one with a better right. This is what
reconveyance is all about. Yet, the right to seek
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
is not absolute nor is it imprescriptible. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
must perforce prescribe in ten years from the issuance
of the Torrens title over the property.
Accordingly, respondents should have commenced the
action within ten (10) years reckoned from May 21,
1980, the date of issuance of TCT No. 162403-R, instead
of on September 17, 2000 or more than twenty (20)
years thereafter.
Issues:
Whether or not the Extrajudicial Settlement binds the
respondents.
Held:
The extrajudicial settlement binds the respondents.
The extra judicial settlement is a private document that
binds the parties to the agreement. This still holds true
notwithstanding the glaring irregularities in the Petition
for Approval. Obvious to the eye and intellect as the
errors may be, they are of no moment since the
Extrajudicial Settlement, a private writing and
unpublished as it were, nevertheless remains to be
binding upon any person who participated thereon or
had notice thereof.
MANUEL C. UBAS, SR. vs. WILSON CHAN
FEBRUARY 06, 2017
G.R. No. 215910
Perlas –Bernabe, J.
Facts: This case stemmed from a complaint for sum of
money with application for writ of attachment before
the RTC of Catarman, Northern Samar, Branch 19. In his
complaint, petitioner alleged that respondent, "doing
business under the name and style of UNIMASTER," was
indebted to him in the amount of P 1,500,000.00,
representing the price of boulders, sand, gravel, and
other construction materials allegedly purchased by
respondent from him for the construction of the
Macagtas Dam in Barangay Macagtas,Catarman,
Northern Samar.
He claimed that the said obligation has long become
due and demandable and yet, respondent unjustly
refused to pay the same despite repeated demands.
Further, he averred that respondent had issued three
(3) bank checks, payable to "CASH" in the amount of
P500,000.00 but when petitioner presented the subject
checks for encashment on June 29, 1998, the same
were dishonored due to a stop payment order. As such,
respondent was guilty of fraud in incurring the
obligation.
RTC ruled that petitioner had a cause of action against
respondent and ordered him to pay the petitioner the
amount of P 1, 500, 000.00 representing the principal
obligation and legal interest. CA reversed the ruling and
found that petitioner’s unpaid deliveries had no merit.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing
petitioner’s complaint for lack of cause of action.
Held:Yes.The Court holds that the CA erred in dismissing
petitioner's complaint against respondent on the
ground of lack of cause of action. Respondent was not
able to overcome the presumption of consideration
under Section 24 of the NIL and establish any of his
affirmative defenses. On the other hand, as the holder
of the subject checks which are presumed to have been
issued for a valuable consideration, and having
established his privity of contract with respondent,
petitioner has substantiated his cause of action by a
preponderance of evidence.
“'Preponderance of evidence' is a phrase that, in the
last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy
of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto." Consequently, petitioner's Complaint
shouldbe granted.
Although the checks were under the account name of
Unimasters, it should be emphasized that the manner
or mode of payment does not alter the nature of the
19
obligation. The source of obligation, as claimed by
petitioner in this case, stems from his contract with
respondent. When they agreed upon the purchase of
the construction materials on credit for the amount of
P1,500,000.00, the contract between them was
perfected. Therefore, even if corporate checks were
issued for the payment of the obligation, the fact
remains that the juridical tie between the two (2)
parties was already yestablished during the contract's
perfection stage and, thus, does not preclude the
creditor from proceeding against the debtor during the
contract's consummation stage.
Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares vs. Atty. Roberto
"Argee" C. Guevarra
December 1, 2016
A.C. No. 11394.
Perlas-Bernabe, J
Facts:
This instant administative case arose from a verified
complaint for disbarment filed by complainant
complainant Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee"
C. Guevarra (respondent) for alleged violations of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant is the Medical Director and principal
stockholder of the Belo Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI), a
corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws 2 and engaged in the specialized field of
cosmetic surgery.3 On the other hand, respondent is
the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio
(Norcio ), who filed criminal cases against complainant
for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her
buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing
infection and making her ill in 2009.
In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his
Facebook account insulting and verbally abusing
complainant. The complaint further alleged that
respondent posted remarks on his Facebook account
that were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's medical
personnel, as well as the entire medical practice of
around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause.
His posts include the following excerpts:
In defense, respondent claimed that the complaint was
filed in violation of his constitutionally-guaranteed right
to privacy, asserting that the posts quoted by
complainant were private remarks on his private
account on Facebook, meant to be shared only with his
circle of friends of which complainant was not a part. He
also averred that he wrote the posts in the exercise of
his freedom of speech, and contended that the
complaint was filed to derail the criminal cases that his
client, Norcio, had filed against complainant. He denied
that the remarks were vulgar and obscene, and that he
made them in order to inspire public hatred against
complainant. He likewise denied that he attempted to
extort money from her, explaining that he sent the
demand letter as a requirement prior to the filing of the
criminal case for estafa, as well as the civil case for
damages against her. Finally, respondent pointed out
that complainant was a public figure who is, therefore,
the subject of fair comment.
Issues: Whether respondent can validly invoke his right
to privacy and whether respondent can validly invoke
freedom of speech.
Held:
NO. He cannot invoke his right to privacy.
Respondent never denied that he posted the
purportedly vulgar and obscene remarks about
complainant and BMGI on his Facebook account. In
defense, however, he invokes his right to privacy,
claiming that they were "private remarks" on his
"private account" that can only be viewed by his circle
of friends. Thus, when complainant accessed the same,
she violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to
privacy.
The defense is untenable. Before, can have an
expectation of privacy in his or her online social
networking activity -in this case, Facebook -it is first
necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep
certain posts private, through the employment of
measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility. This intention can materialize in cyberspace
through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In
other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the
manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's
invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook
posts maligning and insulting complainant, which posts
respondent insists were set to private view. However,
the latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized
any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook
available to him to protect his posts, or that he
restricted its privacy to a select few. Therefore, without
20
any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that
the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto,
were visible only to him and his circle of friends,
respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving, thus
deserving scant consideration.
Moreover, even if the Court were to accept
respondent's allegation that his posts were limited to or
viewable by his "Friends" only, there is no assurance
that the same -or other digital content that he uploads
or publishes on his Facebook profile -will be
safeguarded as within the confines of privacy, in light of
the following:
1. Facebook "allows the world to be more open
and connected by giving its users the tools to
interact and share in any conceivable way";
2. A good number of Facebook users "befriend"
other users who are total strangers;
3. The sheer number of "Friends" one user has,
usually by the hundreds; and
4. A user's Facebook friend can "share" the
former's post, or "tag" others who are not
Facebook friends with the former, despite its
being visible only to his or her own Facebook
friends.
Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to
"Friends" does not guarantee absolute protection from
the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to
one's circle of friends. The user's own Facebook friend
can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook
friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by
the latter is Face book friends or not with the former.
Also, when the post is shared or when a person is
tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person
who shared the post or who was tagged can view the
post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."
Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim
of violation of right to privacy is negated.
He cannot validly invoke freedom of speech.
As to the second issue, it has been held that the
freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute. As such, the
constitutional right of freedom of expression may not
be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult
others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them
into disrepute.
A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks
complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made
with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation
of complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack
doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng Payola," and
"Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has
been bribing people to destroy respondent smacks of
bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the name
and reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI.
Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence upon
complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant
disfigured ( "binaboy ") his client Norcio, labeling BMGI
a "Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a boycott of
BMGI's services -all these despite the pendency of the
criminal cases that Norcio had already filed against
complainant. He even threatened complainant with
conviction for criminal negligence and estafa -which is
contrary to one's obligation "to act with justice."
In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate
and obscene language, and his act of publicly insulting
and undermining the reputation of complainant
through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in
complete and utter violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. By posting the subject remarks on
Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI,
respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is
bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in
his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he
must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the
court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he
acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words
unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted
himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and
maligning complainant's and BMGI' s reputation.
That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity
and therefore, a public personage who is exposed to
criticism does not justify respondent's disrespectful
language. It is the cardinal condition of all criticism that
it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. In this case, respondent's
remarks against complainant breached the said walls,
for which reason the former must be administratively
sanctioned..
MAYOR MICHAEL L. RAMA vs. HON. GILBERT P.
MOISES
December 06, 2016
G.R. No. 197146,
Benjamin, J.
Facts:
21
The Cebu City formed the Metro Cebu Water District
(MCWD) in 1974.From 1974 to 2002, the Cebu City
Mayor appointed all the members of the MCWD Board
of Directors in accordance with Section 3 (b) of P. D. No.
198. It appears that Mayor Osmeña would be
appointing Joel Mari S. Yu to replace Atty. Sitoy as a
member of the MCWD Board of Directors. Governor
Garcia filed a complaint to declare the nullity of the
appointment of Yu as a member of the MCWD Board of
Directors alleging that the appointment by Mayor
Osmeña was illegal; and that it was the Provincial
Governor of Cebu who was vested with the authority to
appoint members of the MCWD Board of Directors
because the total active water service connections of
Cebu City and of the other cities and municipalities
were below 75% of the total water service connections
in the area of the MCWD.
Issue: Whether the appointment of the board of
directors of MCWD should be vested to the Provincial
Governor.
Held:
No. Settled is the rule that Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198
should be partially struck down for being repugnant to
the local autonomy granted by the 1987 Constitution to
LGUs, and for being inconsistent with the Local
Government Code and related laws on local
governments. Following the 1987 Constitution, Cebu
City is reclassified as Highly Urbanized City. Highly
urbanized cities and independent component cities shall
be independent of the province. All matters relating to
its administration, powers and functions were exercised
through its local executives led by the City Mayor,
subject to the President's retained power of general
supervision over Highly Urbanized Cities.
In the case at bar, the decree was enacted to provide
adequate, quality and reliable water and waste-water
services to meet the needs of the local communities
and their growing populations. The needs of the
communities served were paramount. Hence, we deem
it to be inconsistent with the true objectives of the
decree to still leave to the provincial governor the
appointing authority if the provincial governor had
administrative supervision only over municipalities and
component cities accounting for 16.92% of the active
water service connection in the MCWD.Section 3(b) of
P.D. 198 is unconstitutional for violating the Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.
MAYOR WILLIAM N. MAMBA, ATTY. FRANCISCO N.
MAMBA, JR., ARIEL MALANA, NARDING AGGANGAN,
JOMARI SAGALON, JUN CINABRE, FREDERICK
BALIGOD, ROMMEL ENCOLLADO, JOSEPH TUMALIUAN,
and RANDY DAYAG vs. LEOMAR BUENO
February 7, 2017
G.R. No. 191416
Reyes, J.
Facts: The canteen owned by Emelita Mamba in Tuao,
Cagayan was robbed. The Task Force Lingkod Bayan
created by the Sanggunian Bayan of Tuao who
undertook an investigation on the robbery invited
Bueno, a minor at that time, for questioning on his
supposed involvement in the incident to which the
latter and his mother acceded.
According to the herein petitioners, since there were no
police investigators at that time, Bueno’s custody was
referred to the Task Force. Bueno’s custody was only
transferred to the PNP Cagayan Regional Office after
four days.
However, according to Bueno, he was brought to Mayor
Mamba’s house by some members of the Task Force
and was subsequently beaten inside a van. His co-
accused was also invited and they were both tortured
to force them to admit to their involvement in the
robbery. Respondent’s mother, Maritess, sought the
assistance of P/Supt. Buenaobra but Bueno was already
released.
Maritess filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of
Amparo with CA and it was granted. The subsequent
MR was also denied. The petitioner claims inter alia that
a writ of amparo is not the proper remedy. Respondent
claims that the petition was filed beyond the
reglementary period and that the MR was a prohibited
pleading because it is dilatory.
Issue: Whether the petition for review on certiorari
before the Court was filed within the reglementary
period
Held: Yes, the petition was filed within the
reglementary period. Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
provides that an appeal from the final judgment under
22
Rule 45 shall be 5 working days from the notice of the
adverse judgment. Also, the rule does not prohibit filing
of MR of a final judgment because it no longer affects
the summary proceeding of the petition. What is
prohibited are MRs against interlocutory orders or
interim relief orders.
Issue: Whether the grant of a Writ of Amparo was
proper
Held:
Yes, the grant was proper. A writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose rights to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity. In an
amparo action, the parties must establish their
respective claims by substantial evidence. In the case,
the positive testimony of the respondent, corroborated
by his witnesses, meets this requisite. In contrast, the
testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioners merely
consisted in denial which is inherently a weak defense.
Although the respondent was already released, a writ of
amparo may still be issued to facilitate the punishment
of those behind the illegal detention through
subsequent investigation and action.
Medina v. Lizardo
January 31, 2017
A.C. No. 10533
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Facts:
Silvestra entrusted the owner’s duplicates of Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 13866 and 3900 to Atty.
Lizardo. However, since complainants are not the only
owners of the properties, other heirs were asking for
the original duplicate copies, requesting the return of
said TCTs in 2011 but Atty. Lizardo refused because of
lack of Martinez written consent. According to Atty.
Lizardo, Silvestra and her sister Alicia entrusted the TCTs
to him in 1987 because their shares in lots 456, 457, and
458 were sold to Martinez but their co-owners resisted
the transfer of the titles to said properties, forcing them
to file a Complaint for Partition. Martinez shouldered all
the legal expenses for the partition to protect his
interest. Upon the death of Alicia, her heirs executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale wherein the heirs
agreed to convey in favor of Martinez.
During the Mandatory Conference in 2011, Santos
testified that he and Silvestra did not notice that said
lots were sold and they did not read the Extrajudicial
Settlement since they trusted Atty. Lizardo to sell only
one parcel of land covering 1,000 square meters. This
prompted them to terminate the services of Atty.
Lizardo for total loss of trust and confidence and prayed
for the latter’s disbarment. In the IBP Board of
Governors Resolution, it was found that Atty.
Lizardohas represented conflicting interests.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Lizardo violated Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility involving
conflicting interests.
Held:
Yes. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts. There is conflict of interest
when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two
or more opposing parties. The test of the inconsistency
of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation
will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.
In the case at bar, it is undeniable that complainants, on
one hand, and Martinez, on the other, have conflicting
interests with regard to the disputed property which
complainants assert they never sold to Martinez. Atty.
Lizardo now finds himself arguing against the ownership
by Silvestra and Santos of their shares in the disputed
property, which is the very legal position he was bound
to defend as their counsel in the partition case.
As counsels for Silvestra and Alicia, Atty. Lizardo is
required to deliver the property of his client when due
or upon demand, and mandated to always be loyal to
them and vigilant to protect their interests, in
accordance with the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand.
23
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may
apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy
his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a
lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions
he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules
of Court.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Atty. Lizardo's withholding of the TCTs entrusted to him
by his clients to protect another purported client who
surreptitiously acquired his services despite a conflict of
interest is therefore a clear violation of several
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
MEJIA-ESPINOZA and MEJIA-DELLOSA vs. CARIŇO
January 25, 2017
G.R. No. 193397
Jardeleza, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Estrella Mejia-Espinoza was the plaintiff in an
action for ejectment against NenaCariño before MTC of
Mangaldan, Pangasinan. On August 25, 1998, MTC
rendered a joint decision in favour of Espinoza. Cariño
appealed to the RTC of Dagupan City which reversed
the decision. Espinoza appealed to the CA which
reversed the RTC decision and affirmed the decision of
the MTC. Cariño was not able to elevate the case on
certiorari because of her failure to file within extended
period.
Espinoza filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution
before the MTC. MTC granted the motion. On March
16, 2005, the writ was served by Sheriff Hortaleza upon
Cariño. At that time, Sheriff Hortaleza found out the
Cariño already vacated the place. Sheriff Hortaleza was
able to successfully turn over the property to the
plaintiff. He also levied a separate commercial lot
owned by Nena to cover the monetary awards for rent,
litigation expenses and attorney’s fees.
Cariño filed a complaint before the RTC of Dagupan City
arguing that she was deprived of the opportunity to ask
for reconsideration on the order granting the writ of
execution because she was not furnished a copy
thereof. In her answer, Espinoza emphasized that the
writ of execution was properly served and received by
Cariño on March 16, 2005. She added that Cariño
already removed all her personal belongings from the
premises before the service of writ. The RTC dismissed
the complaint for lack of cause of action. Upon appeal,
the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. It held that
Cariña correctly filed the petition in accordance with
Section 10 of Rule 47.
(Remedial Law; Rule 47)
Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the
respondent’s complaint.
Held: No. The RTC did not err in dismissing the
complaint. A petition for annulment of judgment or
final order under Rule 47 is an extraordinary remedy
that may be availed only under certain extraordinary
circumstances.
Under Rule 47, there are three requirements. First,
remedy is available only when petitioner can no longer
resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
through no fault of the petitioner. Second, an action for
annulment of judgment may be based only on two
grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Third,
the action must be filed within the temporal window
allowed by the Rules.
The averments of Cariño’s complaint do not make out
an action for annulment of judgment or final order. The
MTC’s issuance of the writ of execution, the notice of
levy and notice of sale on the real property are not
judgments or final orders contemplated by Rule 47. The
proper remedy for Cariño was to file a motion to nullify
the writ of execution and notices of levy and sale before
the MTC, instead of instituting a new complaint.
Therefore, the petition is granted. The CA decision is
reversed and set aside. The decision of the RTC is
hereby affirmed.
NUEV A ECIJA II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., AREA I,
Mr. REYNALDO VILLANUEVA, President, Board of
Directors, and Mrs. EULALIA CASTRO, General
Manager vs. ELMER B. MAPAGU
February 15, 2017
G.R. No. 196084
Jardeleza, j:
24
Facts:
Respondent Elmer B. Mapaguwas employed with NEEC
as a data processor. The National Electrification
Administration (NEA) conducted a special audit on the
power bills and accounts receivables of the consumers,
as well as related internal control and procedure, of
NEEC. The audit revealed unaccounted consumption or
readings which have accumulated due to under-reading
and under-billing in prior years or months. Mapagu's
electric consumption was found to be under-read and
under-billed. As a result, petitioners charged Mapagu
with grave violations of Sections 7.2.18 & 7.2.19 of the
NEEC Code of Ethics and Discipline.
Mapagu denied the allegation. NEEC created an
Investigation and Appeals Committee (IAC) to
investigate Mapagu and the other workers implicated in
the special audit. The IAC held that while the charges of
under-reading and under billing were not established,
Mapagu failed to observe the highest degree of honesty
as an employee. Nevertheless, and for humanitarian
reasons, the IAC recommended that Mapagu only be
suspended for two years, and was also ordered to pay
his unbilled consumption. However, Mapagu received a
Notice of Dismissal from service. Hence, he filed a
Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
allowances against petitioners.
Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of petitioners. Mapagu
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), which reversed and set aside the ruling of the
LA. Petitioners sought reconsideration but this was
denied by the NLRC. Petitioners elevated the case to the
CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court (Rules).
The CA dismissed the petition outright. Petitioners filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied.
Mapagu filed his Comment, claiming that the petition is
filed out of time. He asserts that petitioners themselves
disclosed that they received the Resolution of the CA
denying their Motion for Reconsideration on March 17,
2011; hence, they only had until April 2, 2011 to file a
petition for review on certiorari. The petition was filed
on May 5, 2011, well beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioners filed their Reply and insist that they have 60
days from March 17, 2011 (or until May 17, 2011) to file
the petition for review on certiorari. Since the petition
was filed on May 6, 2011, they maintain that the same
was in fact, filed 11 days ahead of the deadline for
submission.
Issue:
Whether the petition for review on certiorari was, filed
before the CA within the reglementary period?
Ruling:
NO, The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and
must be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law. The case
before us calls for the application of the requirements
of appeal under Rule 45, to wit:
Sec. 2. Time for filing; extension. - The petition shall be
filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or
of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the
judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full
payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the
deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for
justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days
only within which to file the petition.
Petitioners failed to comply with the foregoing
provisions. They confuse petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 with petitions for certiorari
under Rule 65.
A party litigant wishing to file a petition for review on
certiorari must do so within 15 days from notice of the
judgment, final order or resolution sought to be
appealed. Here, petitioners received the Resolution of
the CA denying their Motion for Reconsideration on
March 17, 2011. Under the Rules, they have until April
1, 2011 to file the petition. However; they filed the
same only on May 6, 2011. This was 50 days beyond the
15-day period provided under Section 2, Rule 45 and 30
days beyond the extension asked for. Even if petitioners
were given the maximum period of extension of 30
days, their petition before us still cannot stand. The
Rules allow only for a maximum period of 45 days
within which an aggrieved party may file petition for
review on certiorari.
25

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ASHARY
M. ALAUY
December 06, 2016
A.M. No. SDC-14-7-P
PER CURIAM
Facts:
The financial audit on the books of accounts of Mr.
Alauya, Clerk of Court VI, SDC, Marawi City was
conducted for failure of the aforesaid court to submit
monthly financial reports despite several notices and
due to the anonymous letter-complaint filed against its
clerk of court. Mr. Alauya denied that there were
shortages incurred, non-remittance and/or delay in the
remittance of collections and branded these charges as
baseless and fabricated.
Issue: Whether the Clerk of Court is liable of gross
neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Held:
Yes. The clerk of court is an important officer in our
judicial system. His office is the nucleus of all court
activities, adjudicative and administrative. His
administrative functions are as vital to the prompt and
proper administration of justice as his judicial duties.
The clerk of court performs a very deficate function. He
or she is the custodian of the courts funds and
revenues, records, property and premises. Being the
custodian thereof, the clerk of court is liable for any
loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of said funds
and property.
In the present case, it was established that cash bonds
for the FF were not remitted to the depository bank,
but instead, were kept by respondent clerk of court
until withdrawn by the bondsmen.By failing to properly
remit the cash collections constituting public funds, Mr.
Alauya violated the trust reposed in him as the
disbursing officer of the Judiciary. Delayed remittance
of cash collections constitutes gross neglect of duty
because this omission deprives the court of the interest
that could have been earned if the amounts were
deposited in the authorized depository bank. It should
be stressed that clerks of court are required by SC
Circular No. 13-92 to withdraw interest earned on
deposits, and to remit the same to the account of the
JDF within two (2) weeks after the end of each quarter.
Delay in the remittance of court funds in the period
required casts a serious doubt on the court employee's
trustworthiness and integrity. Mr. Alauya's failure to
remit the court funds is tantamount to gross neglect of
duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service.
PD 1271 COMMITTEE vs. RODRIGUEZ
December 5, 2016
GR. No. 187291
Leonen, J.
Facts:
These consolidated case concern the validation of
certain properties under PD 1271, which declared null
and void all orders and decisions decreeing lands within
the Baguio Townsite Reservation in favor of the private
parties. Rodriguez claims that the subject Transfer
Certificates of Titles therein present an identical
situation as that of titles found by the CA not to
correspond to any application for validation that may be
considered by the Baguio Validation Committee. She
insists applying the law of the case.
Issue: Whether the doctrine of law of the case applies
on the application for validation of two the certificate of
titles.
Held:
No. The law of the case does not apply to bar any ruling
on the Transfer Certificates of Title. The doctrine of the
law of the case provides that questions of law
previously determined by a court will generally govern a
case through all its subsequent stages where “the
determination has already been made on prior appeal
to a court of law resort.
In People vs. Olarte, ‘Law of the case’ has been defined
as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More
specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule of decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to
be the law of the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
26
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the
case before the court.
If an appellate court has determined a legal issue and
has remanded it to the lower court for further
proceedings, another appeal in that same case should
no longer differently determine the legal issue
previously passed upon. Similar to res judicata, it is a
refusal to reopen what was already been decided.
Rulings:
The ruling of the Court of Appeals on the other Transfer
Certificates of Title is not a ruling that can bind or limit
this court on another matter. The Supreme Court is the
final arbiter of all legal questions brought before it. This
court’s decision constitutes the final disposition of the
case. This court’s judgment, when final, binds the lower
courts and not the other way around. It is the lower
courts that are bound by and cannot alter or modify
doctrine.
Peninsula Employees Union (PEU) vs. Michael B.
Esquivel, et al.
December 1, 2016
G.R. No. 218454.
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts:
On December 13, 2007, Peninsula Employees Union’
(PEU) Board of Directors passed Local Board Resolution
No. 12, series of 20078 authorizing, among others, the
affiliation of PEU with NUWHRAIN, and the direct
membership of its individual members thereto. On the
same day, the said act was submitted to the general
membership, and was duly ratified by 223 PEU
members. Beginning January 1, 2009, PEU-NUWHRAIN
sought to increase the union dues/agency fees from
one percent (1 % ) to two percent (2%) of the rank and
file employees’ monthly salaries, brought about by
PEU’s affiliation with NUWHRAIN, which supposedly
requires its affiliates to remit to it two percent (2%) of
their monthly salaries.
The non-PEU members objected to the assessment of
increased agency fees arguing that: (a) the new CBA is
unenforceable since no written CBA has been formally
signed and executed by PEU-NUWHRAIN and the Hotel;
(b) the 2% agency fee is exorbitant and unreasonable;
and (c) PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements for such increase.
Issues:
1. Whether PEU-NUWHRAIN has right to collect
the increased agency fees.
2. Whether PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with
the mandatory requirements for such increase.
3. Whether the agency is exorbitant and
unreasonable.
1. Yes. The recognized collective bargaining union
which successfully negotiated the CBA with the
employer is given the right to collect a
reasonable fee called “agency fee” from non-
union members who are employees of the
appropriate bargaining unit, in an amount
equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by
union members, in case they accept the
benefits under the CBA. While the collection of
agency fees is recognized by Article 259
(formerly Article 248) of the Labor Code, as
amended, the legal basis of the union’s right to
agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory,
but quasi-contractual, deriving from the
established principle that non-union employees
may not unjustly enrich themselves by
benefiting from employment conditions
negotiated by the bargaining union. In the
present case, PEU-NUWHRAIN’s right to collect
agency fees is not disputed.
2. Yes. Case law interpreting Article 250 (n) and
(o) of the Labor Code mandates the submission
of three (3) documentary requisites in order to
justify a valid levy of increased union dues.
These are: (a) an authorization by a written
resolution of the majority of all the members at
the general membership meeting duly called for
the purpose; (b) the secretary’s record of the
minutes of the meeting, which shall include the
list of all members present, the votes cast, the
purpose of the special assessment or fees and
the recipient of such assessment or fees; and (c)
individual written authorizations for check-off
duly signed by the employees concerned. In the
present case, however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed
to show compliance with the foregoing
requirements. It attempted to remedy the
27
“inadvertent omission” of the matter of the expired CBA, i.e., at one percent (1 %) of the
approval of the deduction of two percent (2%) employee’s monthly basic salary.
union dues from the monthly basic salary of
each union member.

While the matter of implementing the two

percent (2%) union dues was taken up during PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO
the PEU-NUWHRAIN’s 8th General Membership January 25, 2017
Meeting on October 28, 2008, there was no GR No. 212818
sufficient showing that the same had been duly Del Castillo, J.
deliberated and approved. The minutes of the
Assembly itself belie PEU-NUWHRAIN’s claim Facts:
that the increase in union dues and the
On November 17, 2002, Roberto Solayao was having a
corresponding check-off were duly approved
drinking session at Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque
since it merely stated that “the [two percent
City. Paquito Solayao, Roberto’s father, came to fetch
(2%)] Union dues will have to be implemented,”
his son when he saw three persons fighting. He claimed
meaning, it would still require the submission of
that it was Gregorio who was holding Roberto’s hand at
such matter to the Assembly for deliberation
the back while Fleno was stabbing the victim. When
and approval.
Roberto’s father shouted, the assailants ran away.
3. Yes. Having failed to establish due Roberto’s father ran after them but did not pursue the
deliberation and approval of the increase in assailants anymore when they reached a dark alley.
union dues from one percent (1 %) to two They brought Roberto to the nearest hospital buthe was
percent (2% ), as well as the deduction of the already dead.
two percent (2%) union dues during PEU-
Gregorio, the accused, claimed that he did not know nor
NUWHRAIN’s 8th General Membership Meeting
met the victim even once. He was only invited to the
on October 28, 2008, there was nothing to
birthday party where they had eaten and had partaken
confirm, affirm, or ratify through the July 1,
of liquor. He added that Roberto was angry with them.
2010 GMR. Contrary to the ruling of the OSEC in
So to avoid trouble, he decided to leave the place of
its March 6, 2012 Order, the July 1 2010 GMR,
celebration. However, the group of Roberto was waiting
by itself, cannot justify the collection of two
for them along the road. Afterwards, a fight erupted.
percent (2%) agency fees from the non-PEU
Fortunately, the residents of the place were able to
members beginning July 2010. The Assembly
pacify the protagonists. They left and went home. In
was not called for the purpose of approving the
2004, he transferred his family from Sucat, Muntinlupa
proposed increase in union dues and the
to Dasmariñas, Cavite. It was only in 2007 that someone
corresponding check-off, but merely to
told him about the warrant of arrest waiting for him in
“confirm and affirm” a purported prior action
Parañaque City. On January 8, 2007, Quita was arrested
which PEU-NUWHRAIN, however, failed to
and the case was revived.
establish.
The Regional Trial Court found Gregorio guilty of the
Corollary, no individual check-off authorizations
treacherous killing of Roberto Solayao. The testimonies
can proceed therefrom, and the submission of
of Paquitov Solayao and Dr. Vida, according to RTC,
the November 2008 check-off authorizations
were enough to find the accused guilty beyond
becomes inconsequential. Jurisprudence states
reasonable doubt. The accused sought an appeal to the
that the express consent of the employee to
CA but to no avail. The CA only modified the civil liability
any deduction in his compensation is required
but sustained the RTC decision with regards the criminal
to be obtained in accordance with the steps
liability of Quita.
outlined by the law, which must be followed to
the letter; however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to Issue: Whether or not Gregorio Quita is guilty of murder
comply. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that there for killing Roberto Solayao.
is no legal basis to impose union dues and
agency fees more than that allowed in the

28

Held:
Yes. The elements of murder are
(1) that a person was killed;
(2) that the accused killed him;
(3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code; and
(4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
The Supreme Court is satisfied that the findings of both
lower courts are in accord with the evidence on record.
However, the civil liability shall be modified to conform
strictly to the recent jurisprudence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN RICHARD
TIONLOC MARQUEZ
February 15, 2017
G.R. 212193
Del Castillo, J.
Facts:
AAA, 24 years old, testified that she had a drinking
session with her assailants that night. Feeling dizzy, she
took a nap. She woke up with 14 year old Elvin James
Meneses raping her. She did not resist for fear that she
would be killed with the knife lying in a table nearby.
When Meneses left the room, herein respondent came
in and asked her if he could have sex with her too.
When she did not answer because she was still
shivering, Marquez mounted her. Thereafter,
respondent left the room and AAA went home.
The trial court and later the CA found Juan Richard
Marquez guilty of rape. Meneses could not be
prosecuted due to his minority.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding
Juan Richard Marquez guilty of rape.
Held:
Yes.All the elements of rape must be present to
overcome the presumption of appellant’s innocence, to
wit:
(1) that the offender is a man;
(2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman;
(3) that such act was accomplished by using force,
threat or intimidation.
The prosecution failed to prove the presence of force,
threat, or intimidation. There was no evidence that the
knife nearby was intended to threaten or intimidate
AAA. Appellant did not even utter any word to such
effect and AAA did not show any hint of rejecting him.
Marquez immediately desisted when the alleged victim
tried to move after feeling a slight pain during their
sexual congress.
Prosecution also failed to establish the absence of will
power due to drunkenness. AAA was even able to stand
up and go home immediately after the alleged rape.
People vs. Palanay
February 1, 2017
G.R. No. 224583
Velasco, Jr., J.
Facts:
Accussed-appellant Michael Palanay was found guilty of
qualified rape under Article 266-A in relation to Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353.
According to the victim, she was sleeping when she felt
that someone was removing her pants and underwear.
Upon waking-up, she discovered that it was her uncle
and her mother’s brother, Palanay, who was lying
beside her and was removing his own short pants. She
narrated that Palanay kissed her lips, touched her
breasts, and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Accussed-appellant denied the accusations and as a
defense told the court that he was at a friend’s house
drinking until the wee hours of the morning during that
day. He also contend that the charge against him was
driven by the fight he had with the victim’s mother.
Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of
qualified rape.
Held:
Yes. The elements of qualified rape as provided by
Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B are as follows:
29
 1. Sexual congress;
2. With a woman;
3. Done by force, threat, or intimidation without
consent;
4. Victim is under 18 years of age at the time of
rape;
5. Offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree of the victim, or the
common-law spouse of the victim’s parent.
In the case at bar, the victim asserted her uncle’s carnal
knowledge of her as evidenced by undressing and
touching her against her will and forcibly inserting his
penis into her vagina.
The Supreme Court ruled that accused-appellant’s
argument that the victim failed to resist his advances
are not tenable as rape victims react differently, with
some offering strong resistance while others are left too
weak to defend themselves. The Court added that in the
case at bar, the accused-appellant being the victim’s
uncle provided additional fear as he is expected to
exercise moral authority over her, which in turn caused
her to be immobilized and unable to offer physical
resistance.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs SUSAN M. TAMAÑO
and JAFFY B. GULMATICO
December 5, 2016
GR.208643
Peralta, J.
Facts:
Appellants Susan M. Tamaño and Jaffy B. Gulmatico
were convicted of Violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12,
Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.No.) 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.Appellants elevated the aforesaid Decision of the
CA to this Court via a Notice of Appeal.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid buy-bust operation
Held:
Yes. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, like shabu in this case, the following elements
must be sufficiently proved to sustain a conviction
therefor: ( 1) the identity of the buyer, as well as the
seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
What is material is proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the dangerous drugs seized as evidence. The
commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling
transaction, which happens the moment the buyer
receives the drug from the seller. Settled is the rule that
as long as the police officer went through the operation
as a buyer and his offer was accepted by appellant and
the dangerous drugs delivered to the former, the crime
is considered consummated by the delivery of the
goods.
2.) Whether the chain of custody rule was complied
with.
Held:
Section 1 (b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No.
1, Series of 2002, implementing R.A. No. 9165, defines
chain of custody as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory
to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item
shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date
and time when such transfer of custody were made in
the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence,
and the final disposition.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to
demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the confiscated drugs had not been compromised
because it established the crucial link in the chain of
custody of the seized item from the time it was
firstdiscovered until it was brought to the court for
examination. The chain of custody rule requires the
identification of the persons who handled the
confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring
the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or
drug paraphernalia from the time they were seized
from the accused until they are presented in court.
30

People of the Philippines vs. Willy Vallar et. al.
December 05, 2016
G.R. No. 196256
Sereno, CJ:
Facts:
That on June 21, 1989, accused Willy, Danny, Oracleo
and Edgardo stole cash money of P15,000 from the
store of Bagabaldo. Oracleo and Edgardo acted as look-
outs. Danny and Willy pointed their guns and declared
robbery, shot and stabbed Cipriano Opiso. RTC held
Oracleo Vallar, Jr. et al guilty of the crime of robbery
with homicide and frustrated homicide, attended by the
aggravating circumstance of employment of disguise
and commission of the crime by a band. CA modified
ruling of the RTC and changed it to crime of robbery
with homicide only, attended by the aggravating
circumstances of employment of disguise and abuse of
superior strength.
Issue:
Whether there is proof that appellant is guilty of the
crime of robbery with homicide, attended by the
aggravating circumstances of employment of disguise
and abuse of superior strength.
Held:
Yes. It was held that the testimonies have been clear,
categorical and straightforward. That even though the
face of accused was not seen directly, he has been
familiar with the physical build and bodily actions of the
appellants. Concerning the legal characterization of the
crime, the Court found that its proper designation is not
robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide as
inaccurately labeled by the prosecution and unwittingly
adopted by the trial court but simply one of robbery
with homicide. It has been jurisprudentially settled that
the term homicide in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code is to be used in its generic sense, to
embrace not only the acts that result in death, but all
other acts producing any bodily injury short of death. It
is thus characterized as such regardless of the number
of the homicides committed and the physical injuries
inflicted. Both lower courts have properly appreciated
the aggravating circumstances of employment of
disguise, the commission of a crime by a band was not
established because Willy, Danny and Oracleo were
proven to have carried arms. Nevertheless, the CA
properly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of
superior strength, considering the number of
malefactors and the kind of weapons used in facilitating
the commission of the crime.
PNB vs Raymundo
December 07, 2016
G.R. No. 208672
Peralta, J.
Facts:
On July 30, 1993, Pablo V. Raymundo then Department
Manager of PNB San Pedro Branch, approved for
deposit a foreign draft in the amount of $172,549.00
issued by Solomon Guggenheim Foundation, drawn
against Morgan Guaranty Company of New York,
payable to Merry May Juan in the opening of the latter's
checking account with PNB San Pedro Branch.On even
date, Ms. Juan drew six (6) PNB Checks, five (5) of which
were made payable to C&T Global Futures and one (1)
payable to "CASH", all in the aggregate amount of FOUR
MILLION PESOS (P4,000,000.00). The six (6) checks were
negotiated by Ms. Juan and were approved for payment
on the same day by Raymundo, without waiting for the
foreign draft check, intended to fund the issued check,
to be cleared by the PNB Foreign Currency Clearing
Unit.
For irregularly approving the payment of the six (6)
checks issued by Ms. Juan, without waiting for the
foreign draft check to be cleared, Raymundo, as then
Department Manager of PNB San Pedro Branch, was
administratively charged by PNB for Conduct Prejudicial
to the Interest of the Service and/or Gross Violation of
Bank's Rules and Regulations.
Accused Pablo V. Raymundo denied the allegations that
he committed acts. He noted that it is the duty of the
bookkeeper to go over the records of the account of
each particular client.
The RTC held that it would be too harsh and inequitable
to impose criminal liability considering that Raymundo's
duties as Branch Manager entailed a lot of responsibility
and found it almost unreasonable to expect him to
directly and personally check the books of accounts of
each particular client.
31
CA ruled that Raymundo acted in good faith in relying
upon his subordinates. It held that he has no duty to go
beyond the verification of the documents submitted by
the bookkeeper and the accountant, and to personally
authenticate the procedures taken.
(Remedial Law, Civil Liability)
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is civilly liable.
Held:
Yes. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First
is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of. This
instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any
act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability
ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if
any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds
other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The
second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if
the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily
established, he is not exempt from civil liability which
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal,
the judgment shall state "whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist.
A bank's disregard of its own banking policy amounts to
gross negligence. Payment of the amounts of checks
without previously clearing them with the drawee bank,
especially so where the drawee bank is a foreign bank
and the amounts involved were large, is contrary to
normal or ordinary banking practice.
It is well settled that actual damages, to be recoverable,
must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. To justify
an award of actual damages, there must be competent
proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be
given only to claims which are duly supported by
receipts, and courts cannot simply rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and
amount of damages. While the PNB claims having
suffered damages to the extent of P4,000,000.00 due to
the encashment of checks drawn against uncollected
deposit, the testimonial and documentary evidence on
record show that it only incurred losses in the total sum
of P2,100,882.87.Since PNB was unduly deprived of its
use of the P2,100,882.87 due to Raymundo's gross
negligence, the Court also finds it proper to impose on
such forbearance of money legal interests in line with
current jurisprudence.
Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. vs. Antonio K. Litonjua
and Aurelio K. Litonjua, Jr.
December 5, 2016
G.R. No. 204014
Perez, J.
Facts:
The Litonjua Group wrote a letter-agreement to
Trendline Securities, Inc. (Trendline) through its
President Priscilla D. Zapanta (Zapanta), confirming a
previous agreement for the acquisition of the 85%
majority equity of Trendline's membership seat in PSE, a
domestic stock corporation licensed by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to engage in the
business of operating a market for the buying and
selling of securities.
In a letter-confirmation dated 21 April 1999, the
Litonjua Group undertook to pay the amount of
Php8,547,643.81 directly to PSE within three working
days upon confirmation that it will be for the full
settlement of all claims and outstanding obligations
including interest of Trendline to lift its membership
suspension and the resumption to normal trading
operation. Further in the letter, Trendline was obligated
to secure the approval and written confirmation of PSE
for a new corporation to be incorporated that will own
a seat.
Trendline, in compliance with the conditions set forth in
the 20 April 1999 letter-agreement, advised PSE of the
salient terms and conditions imposed upon it for the
acquisition of the membership/seat.
Subsequently, the PSE, through Atty. Ruben L. Almadro
(Atty. Almadro), Vice-President for Compliance and
Surveillance Department, sent a letter to Trendline
advising the latter that the Business Conduct and Ethics
Committee (BCEC) of PSE has resolved to accept the
32
amount of Php 9,000,000.00 as full and final settlement
of its outstanding obligations to be paid not later than
13 May 1999.
The letter and checks were received by the PSE from
Trendline on 13 May 1999 as evidenced by Official
Receipt Number 42264. It bore an annotation that the
checks were received as an advance payment for full
settlement of Trendline's outstanding obligation to PSE
Trendline, on its part, also sent a letter dated 13 May
1999 advising PSE of the payment of penalties and
interest and reactivation of its suspension to
seat/membership. Further, PSE was informed that
Zapanta had already resigned as Trendline's nominee
and in lieu of the position, nominate Aurelio K. Litonjua,
Jr. as the new nominee to the seat/membership.
Despite several exchange of letters of conformity and
delivery of checks representing payment of full
settlement of Trendline's obligations, PSE failed to lift
the suspension imposed on Trendline's seat.
On 30 July 2006, the Litonjua Group, through a letter,
requested PSE to reimburse the P19,000,000.00 it had
paid with interest, upon knowledge that the specific
performance by PSE of transferring the membership
seat under the agreement will no longer be possible.
PSE, however, refused to refund the claimed amount as
without any legal basis. As a result, the Litonjua Group
on 10 October 2006 filed a Complaint for Collection of
Sum of Money with Damages against PSE before the
RTC of Pasig City
Issue:
1.) Whether PSE considered a party to the letter
agreement?
Held:
No. In corporations, consent is manifested through a
board resolution since powers are exercised through its
board of directors. The mandate of Section 23 of the
Corporation Code is clear that unless otherwise
provided in the Code, "the corporate powers of all
corporations shall be exercised, all business conducted
and all property of such corporations controlled and
held by the board of directors or trustees ... "
Further, as a juridical entity, a corporation may act
through its board of directors, which exercises almost
all corporate powers, lays down all corporate business
policies and is responsible for the efficiency of
management. As a general rule, in the absence of
authority from the board of directors, no person, not
even its officers, can validly bind a corporation. This is
so because a corporation is a juridical person, separate
and distinct from its stockholders and members, having
powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized
by law or incident to its existence.
Admittedly in this case, no board resolution was issued
to authorize PSE to become a party to the letter-
agreement. This fact was confirmed by PSE's Corporate
Secretary Atty. Aissa V. Encarnacion in her direct
testimony by way of judicial affidavit. She testified that
based on her review of the meetings of the PSE Board
of Directors from 1998 to July 2009, there was no
record of any board resolution authorizing PSE to bind
itself to the said obligations under the letter-agreement
or to lift the suspension over Trendline's PSE seat in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the said
letter-agreement. PSE was never authorized by the
Board to be bound by the obligations stated therein.
This fact was confirmed by Antonio K. Litonjua himself
when he admitted during cross-examination that he
failed to ask from PSE for any board resolution
authorizing itself to be bound by the terms of the letter-
agreement.
2.) Whether PSE is liable to return the payment
received?
Held:
Yes. This is pursuant to the principles of unjust
enrichment and estoppel; it is only but rightful to return
the money received since PSE has no intention from the
beginning to be a party to the agreement.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of anotheragainst the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience. The principle of unjust enrichment requires
two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a
valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is
derived at the expense of another.
Applying law and jurisprudence, the principle of unjust
enrichment requires PSE to return the money it had
received at the expense of the Litonjua Group since it
benefited from the use of it without any valid
justification.
33

Power Sector Assets and Liabitlities Management
Corporation vs. Sem-Calaca Power Corporation
December 5, 2016
G.R. No. 204719
Peralta, J.
Facts:
The Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA),
or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136 by President Arroyo was
intended to provide a framework for the restructuring
of the electric power industry, including the
privatization of the assets of the National Power
Corporation (NPC), the transition to the desired
competitive structure and the definition of the
responsibilities of the various government agencies and
private entities with respect to the reform of the
electric power industry.
The EPIRA also provided for the creation of petitioner
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation (PSALM), a government owned and
controlled corporation which took over ownership of
the generation assets, liabilities, independent power
producer contracts, real estate and other disposable
assets of the NPC. PSALM's principal purpose under the
law is to "manage the orderly sale, disposition, and
privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and
other disposable assets, and IPP contracts with the
objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and
stranded contract costs in an optimal manner."
On December 2, 2009, DMCI transferred all of its rights
and obligations under the APA and the Land Lease
Agreement (also called Final Transaction Documents) to
SEM-Calaca Power Corporation (SCPC) by entering into
an Amendment, Accession and Assumption Agreement
that was signed by PSALM, DMCI and SCPC. SCPC also
alleged that on that same date, it took over the physical
possession, operation and maintenance of the Calaca
Power Plant. On the same date, SCPC started providing
electricity to customers listed in Schedule W of the APA,
among which is MERALC0.
SCPC contends that it is obliged to supply 10.841 % of
MERALCO's total requirement but not to exceed
169,000 kW in any hourly interval. However, PSALM
holds a different view and contends that SCPC is bound
to supply the entire 10.841 % of what MERALCO
requires, without regard to any cap or limit.
Thus, during a period of high demand, specifically in the
summer of the year 2010, when SCPC fell short of
supplying the entire 10.841 % of MERALCO's
requirements, the deficiency was filled by supply from
the Wholesale Electricity Spot Market (WESM). SCPC
contends that this was the consequence of NPC's and
PSALM's nominations in excess of what SCPC claims to
be the 169,000 kW cap or limit in its supply. PSALM
disputes that there is such a cap or limit, noting that
SCPC was obligated to supply the entire 10.841 % under
Schedule W of the APA. Thus, NPC and PSALM, who
contend that they were merely following the Transition
Supply Contract (TSC) with MERALCO, billed the latter
for the electricity delivered by SCPC and that supplied
through WESM. SCPC claims, however, that PSALM
withheld MERALCO's payments even for the electricity
that SCPC supplied without the latter's knowledge nor
consent.
On March 16, 2010, SCPC wrote a letter to PSALM
insisting that the 169,000 kW supplied to MERALCO
"should be treated as the maximum limit of the
MERALCO allocation which SCPC is bound to supply
under the APA in accordance with Schedule W." On
April 20, 2010, SCPC wrote a demand letter formally
asking both PSALM and NPC to release MERALCO's
payments for the period of January 26, 2010 to
February 25, 2010 amounting to Php451,450,889.13
and to directly remit to SCPC all subsequent amounts
due from MERALC0.
On May 13, 2010, PSALM replied through a letter
reiterating that SCPC assumed the obligation to supply
10.841 % of MERALCO's TSC and that the latter's
payments would be remitted to SCPC only after
deducting the cost of power supplied by WESM.
Thus, PSALM proceeded to deduct from its remittances
to SCPC the cost of the power that NPC allegedly
purchased from WESM. SCPC claims that for the
months of January 2010 to June 2010, the amounts due
it wasPhp 1,894,028,305.00. Instead, PSALM paid it the
amount of only Php934,114,678.04, or short of
Php959,913,626.96, which allegedly represents the cost
of electricity that PSALM charged against SCPC
representing the power NPC supposedly obtained from
WESM to fill the alleged deficiency in SCPC's supply to
MERALCO.
34
Eventually, following negotiations PSALM agreed,
through a letter dated June 21, 2010, to cap MERALCO's
nominations from the Calaca Power Plant "in any hour
up to 169MWh or 10.841 % of each hourly energy
nomination submitted by MERALCO to NPC under the
MERALCO TSC effective June 26, 2010."
However, as SCPC was insisting that the MERALCO cap
should have taken effect much earlier, or on December
2, 2009.Hence, SCPC initiated the instant case by filing a
Petition for Dispute Resolution (with Prayer for
Provisional Remedies) before the Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC) against NPC and PSALM.
The CA sustained the ERC's interpretation of the APA
that SCPC's obligation was to supply 10.841 % of
MERALCO's energy requirement, but not to exceed
169,000 kW at any given hour, as such interpretation
would reconcile the presence of the two figures in
Schedule W and harmonize the provisions of the said
contract. Likewise, the appellate court upheld ERC in
explaining why a cap of 169,000 kW is placed on SCPC's
obligation to supply electricity to MERALCO, the
explanation being: unlike before the privatization when
NPC, with all its generation assets, was the sole supplier
of MERALCO and, therefore, could obtain electricity
from any of those assets, in the current situation, SCPC
is just one of many suppliers and SCPC's asset is only the
Calaca Power Plant, which has a limited capacity. The
CA likewise stated that the findings of administrative or
regulatory agencies on matters within their technical
area of expertise are generally accorded not only
respect but finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence.
Issue: Whether there was error in the CA's affirmation
of the ERC's interpretation of Schedule W of the so
called Asset Purchase Agreement (APA), i.e., the
contract between the parties PSALM and SCPC, to mean
that SCPC's obligation thereunder is to deliver 10.841%
of MERALCO's energy requirements but not to exceed
169,000 kW capacity allocation, at any given hour.
Held:
It is general practice among the courts that the rulings
of administrative agencies like the ERC are accorded
great respect, owing to a traditional deference given to
such administrative agencies equipped with the special
knowledge, experience and capability to hear and
determine promptly disputes on technical matters.
Factual findings of administrative agencies that are
affirmed by the Court of Appeals are generally
conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this
Court. Although there are instances when such a
practice is not applied, such as when the board or
official has gone beyond its/his statutory authority,
exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted
arbitrarily without regard to its/his duty or with grave
abuse of discretion, or when the actuation of the
administrative official or administrative board or agency
is tainted by a failure to abide by the command of the
law, none of such instances obtain in the present case
which would prompt this Court to reverse the findings
of the tribunal below.
On the contrary, the Court found the ERC to have acted
within its statutory powers as defined in Section 43 (u),
RA 9136, or the EPIRA Law, which grants it original and
exclusive jurisdiction "over all cases involving disputes
between and among participants or players in the
energy sector." Jurisprudence also states that
administrative agencies like the ERC, which were
created to address the complexities of settling disputes
in a modem and diverse society and economy, count
among their functions the interpretation of contracts
and the determination of the rights of parties, which
traditionally were the exclusive domain of the judicial
branch.
The ERC merely performed its statutory function of
resolving disputes among the parties who are players in
the industry, and exercised its quasi-judicial and
administrative powers as outlined in jurisprudence by
interpreting the contract between the parties in the
present dispute, the so-called APA and specifically its
Schedule W.
As for the correctness of the ERC's interpretation and
finding, this Court examined the records and found no
reason to depart from the rule that especially when
supported by substantial evidence and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, the findings of a quasi-judicial body
like the ERC deserve the highest respect, if not finality.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES
SOTERO
December 07, 2016
G.R. No. 186976
JARDELEZA, J.
Facts:
35
Respondent Spouses Sotero Octobre, Jr. and Henrissa A.
Octobre signed a Reservation Agreement with
petitioner Pryce Properties Corporation for the
purchase of two lots. Pryce had yet to deliver the
certificates of title, which prompted Spouses Octobre to
formally demand its delivery. Despite repeated
demands, Pryce failed to comply. Thus, spouses Octobre
filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) for specific performance,
revocation of certificate of registration, refund of
payments, damages and attorney's fees.
Issue:
Whether compensatory damages should have been
awarded.
Held:
No. In the absence of adequate proof, compensatory
damages should not have been awarded. Nominal
damages, in lieu of compensatory damages, are proper
in this case. Under Article 2221, nominal damages may
be awarded in order that the plaintiff’s right, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. Nominal
damages are "recoverable where a legal right is
technically violated and must be vindicated against an
invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any
kind or where there has been a breach of contract and
no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever
have been or can be shown." So long as there is a
violation of the right of the plaintiff—whether based on
law, contract, or other sources of obligations—an award
of nominal damages is proper. Proof of bad faith is not
required. The HLURB Arbiter and the Court of Appeals
appear to have confused nominal damages with
compensatory damages, since their justifications more
closely fit the former.
RE: COMPLAINT OF AERO ENGR, DARWIN A. RECI
AGAINST COURT ADMINISTRATOR JOSE MIDAS P.
MARQUEZ AND DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR
THELMA C. BAHIA RELATIVE TO CRIMINAL CASE NO.
05-236956February 7, 2017
A.M. NO. 17-01-04-SC
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts:
PO2 Reci, brother of the complainant, was convicted in
a criminal case. A Notice of Appeal was filed before the
RTC but the records of the case were only transmitted
after 3 years. The delayed transmittal led to reprimand
and warning to the clerk of court and court
stenographer of the said court. Feeling that such
sanctions were insufficient, complainant filed this
complaint against CA Marquez and DCA Bahia of Gross
Negligence and Dereliction of Duty for failing to monitor
the gross incompetence in the transmittal of the
records in the criminal case.
Issue:Whether CA Marquez and DCA Bahia should be
administratively liable for Gross Negligence and
Dereliction of Duty.
Held:
No. Dereliction of duty may be classified as gross or
simple neglect of duty or negligence. Gross neglect of
duty or gross negligence "refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, or by
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a
duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the
consequences, insofar as other persons may be
affected. In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the
failure of an employee or official to give proper
attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a
"disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference. The quantum of evidence necessary to find
an individual liable for the aforesaid offenses is
substantial evidence. Aside from his bare allegations,
complainant has not shown any prima facie evidence to
support his claim that CA Marquez and DCA Bahia
should be held equally liable for the delay in the
transmittal of the case records of criminal case. Absent
any proof, the respondents are presumed to have
regularly performed their duties.
36

Richard A. Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.
Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al.
Richard A. Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.
John Raymund De Asis vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et
al.
Ronald John Lim vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al.
Janet Lim Napoles vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al.
Mario L. Relampagos, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan and
People of the Philippines
December 6, 2016
G.R. Nos. 212014-15
G.R. Nos. 212427-28
G.R. Nos. 212694-95
G.R. Nos. 213477-78
G.R. Nos. 213532-33
G.R. Nos. 213536-37
G.R. Nos. 218744-59
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts:
The petitioners are altogether charged as co-
conspirator for their individual cooperation in the illicit
pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority
Development Assistance Fund or PDAF of Sen. Revilla
for the years 2006 to 2010. As claimed, the PDAF
scheme begins with Napoles meeting with Sen. Revilla
giving an offer to get his PDAF allocation in return for a
commission amounting up to a specific percentage of
the PDAF. Upon their agreement on the condition of the
PDAF, the relating Implementing Agencies (IA)
entrusted to execute the same, and the lawmaker's
commission or kickback ranging from 40-60% of either
the project cost or the sum stated in the Special
Allotment Release Order (SARO), the legislator would
then write a letter addressed to the Senate President
for the prompt arrival of his PDAF, who in turn, will
endorse it to the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) for the release of the SARO.
At this point, the portion of the commission would be
transmitted by Napoles to the legislator and upon the
release of the SARO, Napoles would then direct her staff
including BenhurLuy, Marina Sula, and MerlinaSuñas,
the whistle blowers, to produce the PDAF documents
containing the preferred JLN-controlled NGO that will
be used as a conduit for the execution of the project
and the endorsement letters to be signed by the
legislator and/or his staff and would transmit the rest of
the portion or adjust the commission of the legislator,
which is normally conveyed by her staff, Lim and De Asis
and once the documents are endorsed, the same would
be transmitted to the Implementing Agencies (IA) which
would deal with the planning of the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) to be executed by the official's office,
the IA and the picked NGO.
From that point, the DBM would discharge the Notice of
Cash Allowance (NCA) to the IA concerned, the
head/authority of which, in turn, would assist the
exchange and arrival of the relating check to the PDAF
disbursement in return for a (10%) in the project cost.
Among those entrusted by Napoles to get the checks
and store them to the ledgers of the NGO concerned
were Luy, Suñas, and De Asis. Once the assets are in the
record of the JLN-controlled NGO, Napoles would then
call the bank to encourage the withdrawal thereof.
Napoles would then choose how much will be left in the
workplace and how much will be gotten to her home.
De Asis, Lim, Luy, and Suñas were the ones trained to
convey the cash to Napoles and her staff would
fabricate invented arrangements of recipients,
liquidation reports, examination reports and
comparative records that would make it create the
impression that the PDAF-subsidized tasks were
actualized when, in truth, they were not since they
were really inexistent projects.
Under this usual way of doing things, Sen. Revilla, with
the assistance of applicants, among others, purportedly
channelled his PDAF adding up to the JLN-controlled
NGOs and, consequently, got commissions or kickbacks.
The Ombudsman held that reasonable justification
exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and
Lim for Plunder because Sen. Revilla was a public officer
at the time material to the charges with the assistance
of his co-accused, who are also public officers and
private persons and that Sen. Revilla collected or
procured such ill-gotten wealth more than the amount
of required in the crime of Plunder.
Cambe then tried to abrogate and put aside the
Ombudsman's March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied
his petition to suspend the proceedings contending that
the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a
37
condition precedent to the filing of the criminal
accusations against him while Sen. Revilla seeks to
annul the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June
4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman discovering
reasonable justification against him for the violations
charged. Among others, Sen. Revilla sued the
Ombudsman for ignoring his defense and the absence
of a competent testimony.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman did not consider
the whistle blowers’ testimonies who in accordance to
the doctrine of res inter alias acta rule. Napoles
comparably tries to annul the Ombudsman's March 28,
2014 Joint Resolution and June 4, 2014 Joint Order
discovering reasonable justification against her for
Plunder and for infringement of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019. She contends that the complaints did not build up
particular acts of the crime in which she committed and
that since she is not a public officer, she cannot be
prosecuted by the Ombudsman before the
Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the findings of probable cause against all
petitioners should be upheld.
Held:
Yes. The findings of probable cause against all
petitioners should be upheld.
First, in the probable cause against Sen. Revilla, the
Supreme Court held that the finding of it against Sen.
Revilla is sufficiently bolstered by the evidence on
record which were the PDAF reports, comprising of the
written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla himself
asking for the IAs to discharge his PDAF funds to the
JLN-controlled NGOs as well as the other documents
which were made possible for the processing of his
PDAF (e.g., the MOAs executed by the legislator’s office,
the IA, and the chosen NGO). All of the documents and
records, even those not really signed by Sen. Revilla,
directly implicate him for the crime charged, as they
were all issued under the authority of his Office as a
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines.
Second, the Supreme Court also held that all of the
pieces of evidence are equally significant to establish
probable cause against Cambe as Sen. Revilla’s trusted
aide, being his Chief of Staff, he also exercised
operational control over the affairs of the legislator’s
office including the allocation of the PDAF. Also,
Cambe’s signatures appeared on several PDAF
documents (the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen.
Revilla’s PDAF funds allocated to various JLN-controlled
NGOs). Cambe was also personally identified by the
whistle blowers to have received the PDAF money for
himself and for Sen. Revilla.
Third, the Supreme Court also held that there is a
probable cause against Napoles for the reason that
records show clearly that she played an integral part or
role in the illegal utilization as well as the disbursement
of Sen. Revilla’s PDAF and was tagged to be the
mastermind of the entire PDAF scam.
Fourth, there is also a probable cause found by the
Supreme Court against De Asis because records show
that he was designated as the President or Incorporator
of KPMFI, one of the many NGOs controlled by Napoles,
that was used in the embezzlement of Sen. Revilla’s
allocations. Also, Luy and Suñas named him as one of
those who prepared the money to be given to Sen.
Revilla and that he received the checks issued by the IAs
and deposited it in the same bank to be withdrawn and
tasked to bring the money back to Napoles’ house.
Fifth, the probable cause against Lim. As pointed out by
the Ombudsman, Luy and Suñas that Lim is one of the
staff of Napoles which would prepare and deliver the
kickbacks intended for Sen. Revilla. These acts of him
are indeed an overt act that will relate him to his
involvement in the PDAF scam.
Lastly, as also pointed out by the Ombudsman and
Sandiganbayan, some of the SAROs and NCAs were
issued by the Office of Relampagos as the DBM
Undersecretary where Nuñez, Bare and Paule are all
working. Luy also identified him together with the
others as Napoles’ contact person in the DBM.
Ricardo Del Poso y Dela Cerna Vs. People of the
Philippines
December 7, 2016
G.R No. 210810
Peralta, J.
Facts:
The petitioner caught the minor-victim complainant
sleeping while attending to the former’s photocopying
business. He then became furious and placed a heated
flat iron on her which she tried to evade and as a result,
38
she sustained 1st degree burns on some parts of her
body. The RTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of
Sec. 10(a) of RA 7610, which the CA affirmed. He then
filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
and alleged that the CA erred in convicting him when he
was just trying to scare the complainant, and that she
sustained the burns through her own acts when she
tried to evade the heated iron. Also, assuming his
conviction was proper, the CA erred when it refused to
appreciate the mitigating circumstances of no intention
to commit so grave a wrong and passion and/or
obfuscation.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not the petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of RA 7610 (The Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act)
Held:
Yes. He was guilty for the prosecution was able to prove
the elements of the violation of the said law present in
the case at bar, namely: (1) the minority of the victim;
(2) the acts constituting physical abuse, committed by
petitioner against the victim; and (3) the said acts are
clearly punishable under R.A. No. 7610.
2.) Whether or not a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 is a proper recourse in the case at bar.
Held:
No. Under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari. A question of law
exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts.” The issues
presented by petitioner are all factual in nature, and
thus, does not fall within the scope of a petition for
review under Rule 45.
3.)Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the
aforementioned mitigating circumstances in his favor.
Held:
The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong can be taken into account
only when the facts proven show that there is a notable
and evident disproportion between the means
employed to execute the criminal act and its
consequences. The facts found by the trial court and the
CA show that petitioner intended the natural
consequence of his act.
He is also not entitled to the application of the
mitigating circumstance of passion and/or obfuscation.
It only applies if the act of the victim is both unlawful
and sufficient to produce such condition of mind. A
child who fell asleep while attending to a business
establishment is not an offense at all and could not give
rise to an impulse sufficiently powerful to naturally
produce a justified diminution of an adult's self-control.
SERI SOMBOONSAKDIKUL vs. ORLANE S.A.
February 1, 2017
G. R. No. 188996
Jardeleza, J.
Facts:
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in its
decision that affirmed the ruling of the Director General
of the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) denying their
application for the mark “LOLANE.”
An application for registration of the mark was filed
with the IPO for goods classified under Class 3 (personal
care products). Respondent filed an opposition arguing
that the mark “LOLANE” was similar to their mark
“ORLANE,” which it has been using since 1948 for
products like perfume, lotions, and make-up creams
among others.
In his answer, petitioner argued that there was no
confusion over the two marks, may it be subjected to
the dominancy test or the holistic test.
In the CA decision, it found grounds that petitioner
imitated respondent’s mark with the use of the mark
“LOLANE,” which was concluded after applying the
dominancy test.
Issue:
Whether or not there would be a confusion over
LOLANE and ORLANE which would bar the registration
of LOLANE.
Held:
No. According to Section 123 of Republic Act 8293, a
trademark cannot be registered if it is identical with a
39
registered mark belonging to a different proprietor or a
mark with an earlier filing or priority date.
The Court cited the principle it laid down in Mighty
Corporation v. E. & J. Gallo Winery particularly over
requirements for finding of likelihood of confusion, in
which the following should be met:
a) Resemblance between the trademarks;
b) Similarity of goods to which trademarks are
attached;
c) Likely effect on the purchaser; and
d) Registrant’s express or implied consent and other
fair equitable considerations.
The Court also differentiated the dominancy test
against the holistic test, wherein the former considers
the similarity of the prevalent or dominant features of
the competing trademarks that might cause confusion,
mistake, and deception in the mind of consumers while
the latter considers the entirety of the marks as applied
to the products, including the labels and packaging, in
determining confusing similarity.
While the Court also used the same dominancy test as
used by the CA, it arrived at a different conclusion,
which are as follows:
1) That there are noticeable differences in the
appearance of the marks “LOLANE” and “ORLANE,”
particularly in the way they are written or printed;
and
2) The aural aspects of the marks “LOLANE” and
“ORLANE” do not sound alike.
The petition was granted by the Court after finding
distinct visual and aural differences of the marks after
subjecting them to the dominancy test.
SPOUSES RODEL AND ELEONOR CAÑOS vs. ATTY.
LOUISE MARIE THERESE B. ESCOBIDO
FEBRUARY 06, 2017
A.M. No. P-15-3315
Jardeleza, J.
Facts:
Complainant filed an administrative case to respondent
for grave misconduct, grave violation of oath as a public
official, and a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Escobido offered to get some items from the
complainant to resell as she used to be in the same
business. Since Sps. Caños trusted Escobido as clerk of
court and as a lawyer, they agreed to her proposal. She
purchased on credit various jewelry and imported
goods, aside from that she also borrowed money from
them. As payment, she issued postdated checks but the
checks were dishonored by the drawee banks for the
reason “ACCOUNT CLOSED’.
Sps. Caños made written and verbal demands for
Escobido to pay her debts. Despite the demands, she
refuses to pay her obligations. Finally, Sps. Caños
alleged that Escobido useher position as clerk of court
or profession as a lawyer to dissuade them from filing a
case against her and boast about her connections in
theOffice of the City Prosecutor of Davao City.
Issue:
Whether or not Escobido should be held
administratively liable for willful failure to pay just debts
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
Held: Yes. The Court agrees to the OCA that Escobido
should be held administratively liable for the said
offenses.
Executive Order No. (EO) 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, provides that a public
employee's failure to pay just debts is a ground for
disciplinary action. Section 22, Rule XIV of the Rules
Implementing Book V of EO 292, as modified by Section
46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), defines "just debts"
as those: (a) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (b)
claims the existence and justness of which are admitted
by the debtor.
The Court ruled that the penalty for willful failure to pay
just debts is imposed at a civil servant's actuation
unbecoming a public official, thus tarnishing the image
of the public office. Public employees may likewise be
penalized for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. Acts may constitute conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service as long as they tarnish
the image and integrity of his/her public office. Such
40
violation is classified as a grave offense, punishable by
suspension of six months and one day to one year
forthe first offense and dismissal from the service for
the second offense.
The Court agrees with the OCA that Escobido’s repeated
acts of contracting loans and paying them with
worthless checks reflect bad faith on her part. It must
be noted that Escobido, as clerk of court, is not a mere
public employee. She is both an employee of the Court
and a member of the Bar. Thus, she is expected to meet
a high standard of uprightness and propriety. By
deliberately failing to meet her contractual obligations,
she fell short of such standard.
Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law
Offices vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
December 6, 2016
G.R. No. 216914
Perez, J.
Facts:
A year before the 2016 Presidential Election, reports
abounded about the disproportionate wealth of the
then VP Jejomar Binay and the rest of his family, where
some of them were elected public officers. For this
reason, the Ombudsman and the Senate conducted
investigations. From different news reports announcing
the inquiry of VP’s bank accounts together with his
family, the petitioner SPCMB was the most concerned
with the article published in Manila Times entitled
“Inspect Binay Bank Accounts,” it was written that the
Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) asked the Court
of Appeals (CA) to allow the Council to peek in the bank
accounts of the Binays, their corporations and a law
office where a family member was once a partner, the
SPCMB Law Offices.
By 8 March 2015, the Manila Times distributed another
article entitled, "CA orders probe of Binay's assets"
reporting that the appellate court had issued a
Resolution conceding the ex-parte application of the
AMLC to look at the bank accounts of SPCMB.
Prevented in the CA consequently charging that it had
no ordinary, plain, speedy, and sufficient remedy to
secure its rights and interests in the ongoing
unconstitutional examination of its bank accounts by
the public respondent AMLC, the SPCMB attempted
direct resort to this Court by this appeal for certiorari
and prohibition on the grounds that the Anti-Money
Laundering Act is unlawful as it permits the examination
of a bank account with no notice to the affected party,
that it violates the individual's right to due process and
it violates the person's right to privacy.
Issues:
1.) Whether the Anti-Money Laundering Act is
unconstitutional for it violates the person’s right to due
process and right to privacy.
Held:
1. No. The Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA),
specifically Section 11 (Authority to Inquire into Bank
Deposits) is constitutional for it did not violate the
person’s right to due process and right to privacy.
SPCMB is adamant that the CA's denial of its request to
be furnished copies of AMLC's ex-parte application for a
bank inquiry order and all subsequent pleadings,
documents and orders filed and issued in relation
thereto, constitutes grave abuse of discretion where the
purported blanket authority under Section 11 partakes
of a general warrant intended to aid a mere fishing
expedition, violates the attorney-client privilege, is not
preceded by predicate crime charging SPCMB of a
money laundering offense; and is a form of political
harassment of SPCMB' s clientele.
The Supreme Court found that it provides safeguards
before a bank inquiry order is issued, ensuring
adherence to the general state policy of preserving the
absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank
accounts:
(1) the AMLC is required to establish probable cause as
basis for its ex-parte application for bank inquiry order,
(2) the CA, independent of the AMLC's demonstration
of probable cause, itself makes a finding of probable
cause that the deposits or investments are related to an
unlawful activity under Section 3(i) or a money
laundering offense under Section 4 of the AMLA,
(3)a bank inquiry court order ex-parte for related
accounts is preceded by a bank inquiry court order ex-
parte for the principal account which court order ex-
parte for related accounts is separately based on
probable cause that such related account is materially
linked to the principal account inquired into and
(4)the authority to inquire into or examine the main or
principal account and the related accounts shall comply
41
with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of cannot be said to violate SPCMB's constitutional right to
the Constitution. due process.

The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and

examination into the bank account are not undertaken
whimsically and solely based on the investigative YABUT v. ALCANTARA
discretion of the AMLC. In particular, the requirement March 6, 2017
of demonstration by the AMLC, and determination by G.R. No. 200349
the CA, of probable cause emphasizes the limits of such PERALTA, J.
governmental action. The Supreme Court affirm the
constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA allowing the Facts:
ex-parte application by the AMLC for authority to
inquire into, and examine, certain bank deposits and As far back as December 9, 1927, petitioner’s father,
investments. Ballesteros applied for a Sales Application (SA 10279)
including the subject land with the Bureau of Lands. On
2.) Whether the Anti-Money Laundering Act violates July 31, 1928, Barbara Andoy filed a Sales Application
substantial due process. (SA 10960) over a portion of the same land area applied
for by Ballesteros. But SA 10279 was given due course.
Held: Andoy’s heirs entered and laid out their claims on
portions of SA 10279. However, during Ballesteros’
No. The Supreme Court held that Section 11 of the
absence being captured as prisoner of war, Andoy's son,
AMLA providing for ex-parte application and inquiry by
Faustino Andoy Jamisola, sold 6 hectares of the subject
the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments
property to PantaleonSuazola. Said part was later
does not violate substantive due process, there being
identified as Lot No. 6509-A. Upon his return,
no physical seizure of property involved at that stage. It
Ballesteros recognized the sale in an Affidavit, in
is the preliminary and actual seizure of the bank
deference to Suazola's son, who was his compadre,
deposits or investments in question which brings these
despite the covered property being part of SA 10279.
within reach of the judicial process, specifically a
But the sale turned out to be the whole 11.5 hectares
determination that the seizure violated due process and
belonging to Ballesteros; thus, he filed a letter of
that at the stage in which the petition was filed, the
protest with the Director of Lands which ruled in favour
inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments by
of him. On August 5, 1969, Ballesteros sold Lot Nos.
the AMLC still does not contemplate any form of
6509-B, 6509-C, and 6509-D to his daughter, Yabut.
physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property.
Respondent Alcantara filed a Complaint for
Reconveyance alleging that he was the true and lawful
owner and possessor of parcels of the subject land after
having bought it in 1960 from one Pantaleon Suazola
3.)Whether the Anti-Money Laundering Act violates and then applied for a Free Patent over the land on the
procedural due process. same year and on 1962 over the other subject Lot.
Further claiming that, Ballesteros, the father of
No. The Supreme Court held that procedural due
petitioners, then purportedly employed fraud to have
process is essentially the opportunity to be heard. In
the contested property registered in his name. And
this case, at the investigation stage by the AMLC into
barely six months later, Ballesteros sold the lots to his
possible money laundering offenses, SPCMB demands
daughter, Fe Yabut.
that it have notice and hearing of AMLC's investigation
into its bank accounts. Plainly, the AMLC's investigation
The lower court gave weight to Alcantara's free patent
of money laundering offenses and its determination of
applications and declared him as the real owner of the
possible money laundering offenses, specifically its
properties in question.
inquiry into certain bank accounts allowed by court
order, does not transform it into an investigative body
exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of
the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order,

42
Issue: Whether or not there is legal basis to support the
reconveyance of the properties in question in favor of
the Alcantaras.
Held:
No. Respondents failed to present adequate evidence
to prove any legal and valid source of a right over the
land they are claiming.
It is settled that a free patent application is not proof of
ownership until all requirements are met and the
patent is granted. While Alcantara filed his application
for free patent only on 1960 over Lot 6509-C only on
October 15, 1960, and the one over Lot 6509-D on April
25, 1962, Ballesteros had filed his as early as December
9, 1927, which was decided with finality in G.R. No. L-
17466.
In order to obtain title over public agricultural lands, the
procedure laid down under the law should be strictly
followed. But Alcantara simply bought the rights over
the property from the defeated claimants and applied
for free patents without fulfilling the requirements for
the grant of a free patent. Alcantara's acts alone could
not ripen into ownership over said public agricultural
lands.
Further, even assuming that the subject properties were
indeed wrongfully titled in the name of Ballesteros, it
would be the State, and not Alcantara, that has the legal
standing to bring an action for reconveyance.
Alcantara was deemed to have acknowledged that the
lands covered by his free patent applications actually
belong to the State when he filed a free patent
application over the subject land.
PEOPLE v. EDDIE BARTE y MENDOZA
March 1, 2017
G.R. No. 179749
BERSAMIN, J.
Facts:
The lower court found accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, as amended, following his arrest for selling a
quantity of shabu to a police officer-poseur buyer
during a buy-bust operation.
Under Section 21 of this Act, the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drug in the presence of the
accused or his representative or counsel, a media
representative and the Department of Justice and any
elected official who must all sign the inventory and
furnished with a copy thereof must be complied.
Although no evidence has been produced to prove
compliance of the procedure, in rendering its decision,
the court believes that it is not fatal to the State's cause
on the validity of the entrapment. Thus, the court gave
full credence to the testimonies of the policemen
concerned; according them with the presumption of
regularity of performance of police duties.
Issue: Whether or not the guilt of the accused-appellant
for the crime charged was proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
Held:
No. Absence of proof showing the compliance by the
arresting officers with the procedure under Sec. 21 of
RA No. 9165 was fatal to the entrapment as it cast
doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti presented in
court and directly affected the validity of the buy-bust
operation.
Such non-compliance with the procedural safeguards
under Section 21 put into serious question whether the
sachet of shabu had really come from the accused-
appellant, and whether the sachet of shabu presented
in court was the same sachet of shabu obtained from
the accused-appellant at the time of the arrest.
Testimonies provided by the police officers and the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties did not override the non-compliance with the
procedural safeguards instituted by our laws.
Although non-compliance with the prescribed
procedural requirements would not automatically
render the seizure and custody of the contraband
invalid, that is true only when there is a justifiable
ground for such non-compliance. However, the State’s
agent miserably failed to tender any justifiable ground
for such non-compliance. Therefore, failure to prove
chain of custody means that the guilt of the accused-
appellant beyond reasonable doubt was not established
by the prosecution.
43

JALANDONI v. ENCOMIENDA
March 1, 2017
G.R. No. 205578
PERALTA, J.
Facts:
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for
claim for sum of money asserting that the latter
borrowed money for the search and rescue operation of
her children in Manila, who were allegedly taken by
their father as well as payments for bills in Cebu.
However, whenpetitioner came back to Cebu she never
informed respondent. Encomienda then later gave
Jalandoni 6 weeks to settle her debts. Despite several
demands, no payment was made. When they had to
appear before the Barangay for conciliation, no
settlement was reached. But a member of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Kasambagan, Laureano
Rogero, attested that Jalandoni admitted having
borrowed money from Encomienda and that she was
willing to return it. Jalandoni said she would talk to her
lawyer first, but she never came back.
For her defense, petitioner confirmed that respondent
indeed deposited money in her account and has made
payments for her expenses. But she insisted that when
asked, Encomienda would tell her that she just wanted
to extend some help and that it was not a loan.
However, petitioner’s refusal to be fetched at the
airport on her return to Cebu, allegedly made the
respondent upset which caused the latter to eventually
demand payment for the amounts originally intended
to be gratuitous.
Issue: Whether or not Encomienda is entitled to be
reimbursed for the amounts she defrayed for Jalandoni.
Held:
Yes. Art. 1236 (2) of the Civil Code provides:
“whoever pays for another may demand from the
debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without
the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can
recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial
to the debtor.”
Clearly, petitioner cannot deny the fact that the
unauthorized bank deposits and payments made by
respondent inured to her benefit. Also, even after
learning about the payments, petitioner did nothing to
express her objection to or repudiation of the same,
within a reasonable time. Thus, respondent has the
right to reimbursement for the amounts defrayed for
the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not there is unjust enrichment on the
petitioner’s part.
Held:
Yes. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, there is unjust
enrichment when:
(1) a person is unjustly benefited, and
(2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with
damages to another.
Clearly, allowing Jalandoni to keep the amounts
received fromEncomienda will certainly cause an unjust
enrichment on Jalandoni's part and to Encomienda's
damage and prejudice.
PEOPLE v. ENRILE DONIO y UNTALAN
March 1, 2017
G.R. No. 212815
PERALTA, J.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Donio was charged of the crime of
carnapping with homicide of Raul Layug. The
prosecution presented the following evidence to prove
accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged:
a. Donio was driving the tricycle when he, Paulino and
Ryan were accosted during a police checkpoint at the
junction of the MacArthur Highway at around 2:30 in
the morning on November 26, 2003;
b. His possession of the vehicle was not fully explained
as he failed to produce its registration papers;
44
c. He was in possession of the victim's temporary
license. He even presented it and introduced himself as
Raul to the police;
d. A blood-stained mini jungle bolo was found inside the
tricycle;
e. Rodrigo, brother of the victim ascertained that Raul
was the driver of his tricycle, and that he was looking
for him on the same day that Donio and the others
were flagged down;
f. Raul was last seen driving the tricycle at 10:00 in the
evening on November 25, 2003 when he passed by at
the Mawaque Terminal at the comer of MacArthur
Highway and Mawaque Road;
g. Bantay Bayan of Madapdap Resettlement found
Raul's body at around 6:30 in the morning on November
26, 2003 at a vacant lot towards the road to Sta. Lucia
Resettlement comer Barangay Dapdap;
h. Raul sustained multiple stab wounds caused by a
sharp instrument as depicted in the post-mortem
examination sketch by Dr. Dizon and reflected in the
Certificate of Death.
i. Donio was subsequently apprehended and SP04
Taberdo positively identified him as the driver they
flagged down at the checkpoint
On the other hand, respondent denied the accusations
and asserted the following:
a. As a sugarcane plantation worker, he has a long
palang for harvesting and cutting which was not similar
to the sharp and pointed mini jungle bolo;
b. On November 24, 2003, he was harvesting sugarcane
in Capas, Tarlac. However, from the evening of
November 25, 2003 until the next day, he was at home
after his wife fetched him to tend to their sick child. He
first learned of the carnapping charge when the police
officers came to his house looking for a certain Val
Paulino.
Moreover, respondent alleged that while it is true that
criminal conviction may be predicated on a series of
circumstantial evidence, the same must be convincing,
plausible and credible. The facts established by SP04
Taberdo' s testimony are insufficient bases and do not
lead to an inference exclusively consistent with his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether or not circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution are sufficient to convict
Donio of the crime of carnapping with homicide.
Held:
Yes. Circumstantial, indirect or presumptive evidence, if
sufficient, can replace direct evidence as provided by
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. To warrant
conviction, it requires the following:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have
been proven; and
(c) the combination of all these circumstances results in
a moral certainty that the accused to the exclusion of all
others, is the one who committed the crime.
After a careful perusal of the records, the Court finds
that the confluence of the following pieces of
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution,
consistent with one another, establishes Donio's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Moreover, the Court disregarded respondent’s
uncorroborated alibi that in Capas, Tarlac attending to
his sick child at the time of the crime.
For the alibi to prosper, the accused must establish the
following:
(1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the
offense was committed; and
(2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene at the time of its commission.
It must be supported by credible corroboration from
disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the
accused.
However,aside from his bare allegations, he failed to
present convincing evidence of the physical
impossibility for him to be at the scene at the time of
carnapping.
In sum, the prosecution established through sufficient
circumstantial evidence that the accused was indeed
one of the perpetrators of the crime of carnapping with
homicide.
45
Thus, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubtof the crime Carnapping with
homicide and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties.
Issue: Whether or not accused-apellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping with
homicide.
Held:
Yes. To prove such special complex crime, there must
be proof not only of the essential elements of
carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal
design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi, which is an internal
act, is presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor
vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain.
Records show that all elements of carnapping were
present in the case and were proven during the trial.
Accused-appellant’s unexplained possession, coupled
with the circumstances proven in the trial, therefore,
raises the presumption that he was one of the
perpetrators responsible for the unlawful taking of the
vehicle and Raul's death.
Thus, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping with
homicide.
GRANDE v. Philippine Nautical Training College
March 1, 2017
G.R. No. 213137
PERALTA, J.
Facts:
Respondent PNTC is a private entity engaged in the
business of providing maritime training and education.
In February 2011, several employees of respondent's
Registration Department, including the VP for Training
Department, which is the current post held by the
petitioner, were placed under preventive suspension in
view of the anomalies in the enlistment of students. On
March 1, 2011, the VP for Corporate Affairs, Frederick
Pios called petitioner for a meeting to relay the message
of PNTC's President for her to tender her resignation
from the school in view of her reported involvement in
the anomalies under her department. Pios assured
petitioner of absolution from the alleged anomalies if
she would resign. Petitioner then prepared a
resignation letter, signed it and filed it with the Office of
the PNTC President. The respondent accomplished for
her the necessary exit clearance. In the evening of the
same date, petitioner, accompanied by counsel, filed a
police blotter for a complaint for unjust vexation against
Pios.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
alleging that she was forced to resign from her
employment; that it was the "undue influence and
pressure" exerted upon her by respondent that
compelled her to submit the resignation letter.
On the other hand, respondent claimed that petitioner
voluntarily resigned to evade the pending
administrative charge against her. Obviously, the acts of
petitioner - the resignation, the blotter with thepolice,
the continued processing of clearance the day after the
resignation and the filing of the illegal dismissal case -
showed that she used "calculated reasoning to protect
herself from possible charges that PNTC may file against
her.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed
from service.
Held:
Yes. For the resignation of an employee to be a viable
defense in an action for illegal dismissal, an employer
has the burden of proving that the resignation was
voluntary, and its evidence thereon must be clear,
positive and convincing.
In this case, the filing of the complaint in the NLRC the
day after she tendered her resignation evidently belies
respondent's claim that petitioner voluntarily resigned.
“It would have been illogical for herein petitioner to
resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the said
complaint”. (Valdez v. NLRC; Fungo v. Lourdes School of
Mandaluyong)
Moreover, while indeed there was no employment of
force from the language used by Pios, still, there was
the presence of undue influence. Petitioner’s
46
resignation immediately tendered after the
conversation is not voluntary. With an order coming
from the President of PNTC, no less, undue influence
and pressure was exerted upon petitioner.
Thus, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement with full
backwages.
Rosemarie B. Bintudan vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 211937, March 21, 2017
Ponente: Bersamin, J
Facts:
The petitioner was a Disbursing Officer II of DILG-CAR
when some unidentified suspects robbed the Provincial
Office by breaking the outer door of the steel cabinet
but opening the vault through the combination number
posted outside the door of the vault, and carted away
an amount of P114,907.30. The petitioner reported the
robbery to the provincial police as well as to the Audit
Team Leader.
She then requested from the ATL that she be relieved
from liability over the stolen money. However, such
request was denied by the Legal and Adjudication Office
National of the COA because of the petitioner’s
negligence. Bintudan filed a motion for reconsideration
which was also denied by the COA LSS by observing that
her acts of posting the number combination of the
safety vault on its door, the early withdrawal of the
funds for the salaries of the employees, and her failure
to inform the security office of the large amount of
money kept in the vault constituted contributory
negligence on her part. Petitioner then filed an appealto
COA which was also denied.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of negligence.
Ruling:
Yes .Negligence is the omission to do something that a
reasonable man, guided upon those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent
man and reasonable man could not do. Stated
otherwise, negligence is want of care required by the
circumstances.
Findings show that the petitioner was severely
negligent in the performance of her duties as the
disbursing officer. She did not properly discharge her
responsibility to safeguard the public funds entrusted to
her. The ATL found that she had withdrawn from a
nearby bank the funds for salaries 13 days from the
deadline for the submission of reports, and had placed
the funds inside the safety vault despite the number
combination having been left posted at safety vault's
very door. She was further found to have even failed to
inform the security guard on duty that she had kept a
considerable amount of cash in the safety vault if only
to ensure that the amount would be safe.
As an officer of the Government having custody of
public funds, she was fully accountable for the
safekeeping of the funds under her custody. Although
she could be exonerated from liability in cases of theft
and loss caused by force majeure, she must be able to
establish that the loss was not by reason of her
negligence. She could have locked the safety vault, the
steel cabinet, and the doors and windows of the office
where the safety vault was kept, but the fact that she
had not denied having allowed the posting of the
number combination on the vault's door manifested her
negligence.
Republic of the Philippines through its trustee, The
Privatization and Management Office vs. Philippine
International Corporation
G.R. No. 181984, March 20, 2017
Ponente: Sereno, Cj
Facts:
The Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) and
respondent PIC entered into a Lease Agreement. In that
agreement, CCP leased to PIC a parcel of land located
within the CCP Complex in Pasay City, including the
building erected on a portion thereon, within the term
of twenty five (25) years from and after the date of this
47
Contract, renewable for a like period under the same
terms and conditions at the option of the lessee. Eight
years later, CCP alienated the property in favor of PNB
through Dacion in payment with lease. Five years later,
PNB leased the property back to CCP.
Through Proclamation No. 50, Committee on
Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) was
created. PNB, pursuant to Proclamation no. 50,
assigned the subject property to the national
government under a Deed of transfer, in which the
national government also executed a Trust Agreement
with APT with regard the said property. Later, PIC
requested PNB to annotate its leasehold rights, which
the latter refused to comply. Due to PNB’s refusal, PIC
instituted a Complaint to compel CCP, PNB, and APT to
respect the terms and conditions of the Lease
Agreement and the amendment thereto. PIC also
wanted the three to be compelled to deliver the title of
the subject property, so that the lease could be
annotated thereon. The RTC decided in favor of PIC.
When the term of APT expired, PMO was created and
was mandated to take over the assets of APT and
inherit the latter’s powers and functions. In view of the
forthcoming expiration of the lease, PMO informed PIC
that its request to exercise its option to renew the lease
had been denied. PIC declined PMO's assertion for
being without any legal basis. It insisted that it exercised
its option and considered the lease renewed thereby.
Due to PIC’s refusal to vacate the property, PMO filed a
complaint of unlawful detainer to MeTC, which decided
in favor of PIC. PMO appealed to RTC raising for the first
time the issue that the lease contract cannot bind a
non-party like PMO. RTC decided in favor of PIC, which
cause PMO to appeal to the CA, which affirmed the
decision of RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not PMO is bound of the lease agreement.
Ruling:
Yes. It is undisputed that PMO is the successor agency
of APT. Consequently, it assumes the existing
obligations of APT upon the termination of the latter's
existence.One of the existing obligations of APT upon
the termination of its term was to respect the Lease
Agreement. To recall, there is a previous judgment by
the RTC and CA, as affirmed by this Court, finding that
APT had an obligation to respect the lease by virtue of
its constructive notice of the same. This is a judgment
that has lapsed into finality. It is settled that the dictum
laid down in a final judgment or order becomes binding
between the same parties, their privies, and their
successors-in-interest.
Joy Vanessa Sebastian vs. Nelson C. Cruz and Christina
P. Cruz and the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan
G.R. No. 220940, March 20, 2017
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts:
The respondent spouse were the owner of a parcel of
land which was sold by Nelson through his father and
attorney-in-fact Lamberto P. Cruz to the petitioner,
Sebastian. The parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
wherein upon Sebantian’s payment of the purchase
price Lamberto surrendered to her the possession of
the subject land. When Sebastian was about to transfer
the title into her name by presenting the said document
to the Registry of Deeds, the latter directed her to
secure a SPA executed by the spouses Cruz authorizing
Lamberto to sell the land to her. Upon request,
Lamberto promise to produce the SPA but was never
been complied. Thus, Sebastian was constrained to
cause the annotation.
When Sebastian inquired in the Registry of Deeds about
the status of the title, she discovered that Nelson
executed an Affidavit of loss of the title and requested
for the issuance of the second owner’s copy which was
granted to him through the decision of the RTC.
Sebastian filed a petition for annulment of judgment to
the CA contending that the RTC has no jurisdiction of
the case and that the decision shall have no effect
because the title has never been lost and is in her
possession all along. The CA dismissed her petition,
thus, this case.
48

Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly denied due course
Sebastian’s petition for annulment of judgment.
Ruling:
No. The following requisites must be complied with for
an order for reconstitution to be issued: (a) that the
certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that
the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient
and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is
the registered owner of the property or had an interest
therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at
the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e) that the
description, area and boundaries of the property are
substantially the same as those contained in the lost or
destroyed certificate of title. Verily, the reconstitution
of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original
form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument
attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. The
purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after
observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title
reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when
the loss or destruction occurred. RA 26 presupposes
that the property whose title is sought to be
reconstituted has already been brought under the
provisions of the Torrens System.
Indubitably, the fact of loss or destruction of the
owner's duplicate certificate of title is crucial in clothing
the RTC with jurisdiction over thejudicial reconstitution
proceedings. In Spouses Paulino v. CA, the Court
reiterated the rule that when the owner's duplicate
certificate of title was not actually lost or destroyed, but
is in fact in the possession of another person, the
reconstituted title is void because the court that
rendered the order of reconstitution had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case.
Felix Plazo Urban Poor Settlers Community
Association, Inc. vs. Alfredo Lipat Sr. and Alfredo Lipat
Jr.
G.R. No. 182409, March 20, 2017
Ponente: Reyes, J.
Facts:
Alfredo Lipat Sr., as representative of Alfredo Lipat Jr.,
executed a Contract to Sell (CTS) two parcels of land to
the petitioner subject to a condition that the petitioner
has 90 days to pay in full the purchase price of the lands
otherwise the CTS will automatically expire. The 90 days
period had elapsed without payment of the full
consideration by the petitioner. The petitioner contends
that the 90-day period provided in the CTS was subject
to the condition that the subject properties be cleared
of all claims from third persons considering that there
were pending litigations involving the same. Upon the
expiry of the 90-day period, and despite the failure to
clear the subject properties from the claims of third
persons, the petitioner contributed financial assistance
for the expenses of litigation involving the subject
properties with the assurance that the CTS will still be
enforced once the cases are settled. In the meantime,
the petitioner agreed to pay rental fees for their
occupation of the subject properties
After the termination of cases involving the subject
property, the respondent refused to enforce the CTS on
the ground that the same has expired and that there
has been no agreement to extend its term. The
petitioner filed a case for Specific Performance and
Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction against the respondents. The respondent’s
defense was that the petitioner failed to pay the selling
price before the expiration of the term which is why the
latter is required to pay rental fees corresponding the
property they are occupying. Moreover, petitioner
contends that the so called financial assistance they
received form petitioner is in a form of loan and it has
nothing to do with the extension of the CTS. The RTC
decided in favor of the petitioner and demanded that
the CTS be enforced after the purchase price of the
subject property be paid by the petitioner. Feeling
aggrieved, the respondents appealed to the CA and was
granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
petitioner but was denied.
49

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can oblige the
respondents to sell the property covered by CTS.
Ruling:
No. Indeed, the contract executed by the parties is the
law between them. Consequently, from the time the
contract is perfected, all parties privy to it are bound
not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but likewise to all consequences which,
according to their nature, may be in keeping with good
faith, usage and law.
The obligation of the seller to sell becomes demandable
only upon the occurrence of the suspensive condition.
In the present case, as correctly observed by the CA, the
suspensive condition is the payment in full of the
purchase price by the petitioner prior to the expiration
of the 90 day period stipulated in their CTS, which the
latter failed to do so. Thus the respondents are within
their rights to refuse to enforce the same.
Rogel Ortiz vs. DHL Philippines Corporation, et al.
G.R. No. 183399, March 20, 2017
Ponente: Reyes, J.
Facts:
The petitioner is an employee of the respondent
corporation. His shift is from 11 am to 8 pm. During his
employment, he committed infractions by leaving the
office before his shift ends and asking the security guard
or his co-employee to punch out his time card minutes
after 8 pm. This practice of him was discovered by their
Branch Supervisor. At first he was reprimanded and told
to practice proper diligence. There were also several
memorandum asking for his explanation. However, the
infractions continued to the extent he was made
investigated and was proven that indeed he left the
office before his shift ends. During confrontation, he
apologized for his ill behavior and admitted all the
charges against him. When he was informed that his
infraction may warrant his dismissal he pleaded that he
be given suspension instead. He wrote a letter to the
management to appeal for a lesser penalty, however,
DHL denied the petitioner’s plea. It was pointed out
that the gravity of the infractions and the fact that the
same had been continuously committed for a period of
two years amount to grave dishonesty and serious
misconduct which deserved no less than dismissal.
The petitioner received a Notice of Dismissal.
Thereafter, he filed a case for unfair labor practice and
illegal dismissal, with claims for the payment of
indemnity, damages and costs of suit against DHL and
its responsible officers. However, such complaint was
dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for lack of merit. On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA with
modification that the petitioner should receive a
separation pay for his long service to DHL. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the
NLRC denied the same. While, the CA decided affirming
the decision of NLRC but with modification. CA deleted
the award of separation pay, instead it was changed to
nominal damages for the violation of the procedural
due process. The petitioner filed a motion of partial
reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed.
Ruling:
No. It is well settled that a valid dismissal necessitates
compliance with substantive and procedural
requirements. Specifically, in Mantle Trading Services,
Inc. and/or Del Rosario v. NLRC, et al., the Court
emphasized that (a) there should be just and valid cause
as provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code, and (b)
the employee be afforded an opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself.
After a careful examination of the facts and the records
of this case, the Court finds that the petitioner's
dismissal was founded on acts constituting serious
misconduct and grave dishonesty which are grounds for
a valid dismissal. The truthfulness of the charges against
the petitioner was well established by the joint
50
affidavits executed by his co-employees and Both parties executed a compromise agreement,
corroborated by documentary evidence presented by assisted by their counsels, and jointly filed in court a
DHL. Apart from the foregoing, the petitioner readily motion for judgment based on compromise agreement.
admitted to the infractions he committed during the
RTC approved the compromise agreement. CA reversed
investigation conducted by the company.Further, right RTC decision and ordered to issue writ of execution to
after the formal investigation, he wrote a letter to the enforce respondents claim to extent of petitioners
management admitting his faults and undertook never remaining balance.
to commit the same infractions again. Unfortunately for
him, the management of DHL imposed the penalty of Issue: Whether or not the delay of petitioner in
dismissal as stated in the company manual, stressing complying with its obligation under the Compromise
Agreement is justified under the principle that no
that the totality and the gravity of the offenses he
person shall be responsible for those events which
committed do not merit consideration. could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were
inevitable.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA
vs. ALA INDUSTRIES CORPORATION
Held:
February 13, 2004
A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the
G.R. No. 147349
parties make reciprocal concessions to resolve their
PANGANIBAN, J.:
differences, thus avoiding litigation or putting an end to
one that has already commenced.
Facts:
MIAA conducted a public bidding for a contract
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently held
involving the structural repair and waterproofing of the
that a compromise once approved by final orders of the
International Passenger Terminal (IPT) and International
court has the force of res judicata between the parties
Container Terminal (ICT) buildings of the Ninoy Aquino
and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent
International Airport (NAIA). ALA was awarded the
or forgery. Hence, a decision on a compromise
contract from the bidding.
agreement is final and executory. Such agreement has
Respondent made the necessary repairs and
the force of law and is conclusive between the
waterproofing. After submission of its progress billings
parties. It transcends its identity as a mere contract
to petitioner, respondent received partial
binding only upon the parties thereto, as it becomes a
payments. Progress billing No. 6 remained unpaid
judgment that is subject to execution in accordance
despite repeated demands by respondent. Petitioner
with the Rules. Judges therefore have the ministerial
unilaterally rescinded the contract on the ground that
and mandatory duty to implement and enforce it.
respondent failed to complete the project within the
agreed completion date.
To be valid, a compromise agreement is merely
required by law, first, to be based on real
Petitioner then advised respondent of a committee
claims; second, to be actually agreed upon in good
formed to determine the extent of the work done which
faith. Both conditions are present in this case.
was given until September 30, 1994 to submit its
findings. Just the same, respondent was not fully paid.
The failure to pay on the date stipulated was clearly a
Respondent objected to the rescission made by
violation of the Agreement. Within thirty days from
petitioner and reiterated its claims. As of the filing of
receipt of the judicial Order approving it -- on December
the complaint for sum of money and
20, 1997 -- payment should have been made, but was
damages,respondent was seeking to recover from
not. Thus, nonfulfillment of the terms of the
petitioner P10,376,017.00 as the latter’s outstanding
compromise justified execution.
obligation and P1,642,112.84 due from the first to fifth
progress billings. With the filing of respondent’s sur-
The Christmas season cannot be cited as an act of God
rejoinder to petitioners’ rejoinder, the trial Court
that would excuse a delay in the processing of claims by
directed the parties to proceed to arbitration.
a government entity that is subject to routine
accounting and auditing rules.

51

A fortuitous event is one that cannot be foreseen or,
though foreseen, is inevitable. It has the following
characteristics:
(a) [T]he cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with
his obligations, must be independent of human will; (b)
it must be impossible to foresee the event which
constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it
must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor
must be free from any participation in the aggravation
of the injury resulting to the creditor.
None of these elements appears in this case.
First, processing claims against the government and
subjecting these to the usual accounting and auditing
procedures are certainly not only foreseeable and
expectable, but also dependent upon the human will.
Second, the Christmas season is not a caso fortuito, but
a regularly occurring event. It is in fact foreseeable, and
its occurrence has absolutely nothing to do with the
processing of claims. Further, in order to claim
exemption from liability by reason of a fortuitous event,
such event should be the sole and proximate cause of
the injury to or the loss or destruction of the object of
the contract or compromise, which was the payment to
be made by petitioner. Granting arguendo such loss or
destruction, the Christmas season could not have been
the sole and proximate cause thereof.
Third, the occurrence of the Christmas season did not at
all render impossible the normal fulfillment of the
obligation of petitioner. It ought to have taken
appropriate measures to ensure that a delay would be
avoided. When it entered into the Agreement, it knew
fully well that the 30-day period for it to pay its
obligation would end during the Christmas season.
Fourth, petitioner cannot argue that it is free from any
participation in the delay. The Compromise Agreement
was a contract perfected by mere consent; hence, it
should have been respected.
Basic is the rule that if a party fails or refuses to abide
by a compromise agreement, the other may either
enforce it or regard it as rescinded and insist upon the
original demand. For failure of petitioner to abide by
the judicial compromise, respondent chose to enforce
it. Foreseeable difficulties that occur during the
Christmas season and cause a delay do not constitute a
fortuitous event.
The difficulties in processing claims during that period
are not acts of God that would excuse noncompliance
with judicially approved obligations.
MST Maritime Services INc vs. Teody D. Asuncion
March 27, 2017
G.R. No. 211335
Reyes, J.
Facts: MST Marine, on behalf of its foreign principal
Thome Ship hired Asuncion as a GP1 Motorman on
board its vessel for nine months. On his way to the
vessel while at work, he lost his balance and fell down
the floor. He felt pain on his back which persisted
despite intake of pain relievers.
An Indian doctor recommended repatriation for
medical evaluation and treatment. In Manila, he was
designated to the company physician which conducted
test showing normal results. Asuncion still complaining
of low back pains. While undergoing therapy, Asuncion
filed a complaint for total and permanent disability
benefits with the Labor Arbiter.
A private physician diagnosed him with Chronic Low
Back Pain Syndrome. Dr. Escutin (private physician)
rendered Asuncion having permanent disability and
unfit for sea duty in whatever capacity as a seaman.
The company physician assessed Asuncion with
Disability Grade 8- moderate rigidity of two-thirds loss
of motion or lifting power of the trunk. LA rendered
MST Marine liable for permanent total and disability
benefits. MST Marine, Thome Ship and del Castillo
appealed the decision of LA with NLRC which affirmed
LA’s ruling. CA promulgated the assailed Decision
holding petitioners liable for total and permanent
disability benefits.
According to CA, the disability grading made by the
company-designated physician is “not final, binding, or
conclusive on the seafarer, the labor tribunals, or the
courts.” Citing jurisprudence, the CA held that the true
test whether Asuncion suffered total and permanent
disability is his inability to perform his job for more than
120 days from the time he was repatriated to the
Philippines, his disability is permanent and total.
52

Issue:Whether or not Asuncion deserves full and
permanent disability benefits notwithstanding the
partial disability Grade 8 assessed by the company-
designated physician.
Held:
The court held that the mere lapse of the 120—day
period itself does not automatically warrant the
payment of total and permanent disability benefits.
In Vergara vs. Hammonia Maritime, the Court ruled that
a temporary total disability becomes permanent when
declared by the company-physician within the period
allowed, or upon expiration of the maximum 240-day
medical treatment period in case of absence of a
declaration of fitness or permanent disability.
In Scanmar Maritime vs. Emilio Conag, the court
reiterated that the disability grading received whether
from a company-physician or from the third
independent physician must be the basis for the
declaration of disability.
In Asuncion’s case, he neither sought to be referred to
a third doctor nor did he offer any explanation for his
non-observance of this procedure that when he filed
the complaint for payment of disability, there was no
factual medical basis rendering the complaint as clearly
immature.
The Court holds that the payment of Asuncion’s claim
should be treated as voluntary settlement of his claim in
full satisfaction of the NLRC Decision, rendering
petition moot and academic. CA decision and resolution
affirmed.
People of the Philippines vs. Mryna Gayoso Arguelles
March 27,, 2017
G.R. No. 206590
Del Castillo, J.
Facts:
Arguelles acted without the necessary permit from
proper authorities, had in her possession and control
and custody eleven sachets of shabu and another
information charging appellant of selling, delivering and
dispensing one small heat sachet of shabu whom she
entered a plea of not guilty in both cases. Joint trial
ensued.
RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal sale and possession of shabu. Ruling that the
evidence sufficiently established the chain of custody of
the sachets of shabu from the time they were bought
from appellant and seized from her house.
RTC rejected appellant’s defense of denial and frame-up
in view of her positive identification by eyewitnesses as
the criminal offender.
CA affirmed RTC ruling and ruled that all the elements
of the sale of shabu were established during the “test-
buy operation”.
Issue:Whether or not chain of custody had been
followed.
Held:
Contention has no merit. Probable cause for a valid
search warrant is defined “as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched.”
The probable cause must be “determined personally by
the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.”
Its determination is on whether the affiant has
reasonable grounds to believe that the accused
committed or is committing the crime charged.
Confirmatory test-buy solicitation does not constitute
instigation. Chain of custody is defined as “duly
recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in
court for destruction.”
Four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated
item must be established:
53
 first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for the laboratory
examination; and
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.
The chain of custody rule also requires that the marking
of the seized contraband be done (1) in the presence of
the apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon
confiscation. In this case, no records show that the
arresting officers have done both. There was a
complete absence of evidence to prove authorship of
the markings. The failure of the arresting officers to
comply with the marking of evidence immediately after
confiscation constitutes the first gap in the chain of
custody. In criminal prosecutions for illegal sale and
possession of shabu, primordial importance must be
given to “the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be
used to determine the guilt and innocence of the
accused.”
The court finds that the apprehending officers failed to
properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of
the confiscated shabu.
The apprehending team never conducted a physical
inventory of the seized items at the place where the
search warrant was served in the presence of a
representative of the DOH nor did it photograph the
same in the presence of the appellant after the initial
custody and control of said drug, and after immediately
seizing and confiscating the same.
The appeal is granted and Arguelles acquitted of
charges, her guilt not having been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Joel T. Maturan vs. COMELEC and Allan Patino
March 28, 2017
G.R. No. 227155
Bersamin, J.
Facts:
In 2015, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy as
Basilan Governor. Patino filed a petition for
disqualification of petitioner on ground that the latter
failed to file SOCE corresponding to 2010 and 2013
elections. Petitioner asserts that petition had been
moot on account of his withdrawal from mayoralty race
in 2013 and he was held accountable for failure to file
SOCE in 2010 which he paid a fine. COMELEC first
division rendered petitioner disqualified to hold public
office.
Issue:
Whether or not a candidate who withdrew his
candidacy is liable for not filing SOCE despite
withdrawal.
Held:
Yes. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2348 in the
interpretation of RA No. 7166 on election contributions
and expenditures. Section 13 categorically refers to “all
candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy”.
Section 14 of RA 7166 states that “every candidate” has
the obligation to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures. Every candidate must be deemed to refer
not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but
also to one who withdrew his candidacy. In Pilar vs.
COMELEC, every candidate, including one who
withdraws candidacy is required to file SOCE under
Section 14 of RA 7166. Congress has deemed fit to
impose the penalty of perpetual disqualification on
candidates who repeatedly failed to file their SOCE,
which cannot be subject to judicial inquiry.
Congress has the absolute discretion to penalize by law
with perpetual disqualification from holding public
office in addition to administrative fines the seekers of
public office who fail more than once to file their SOCE.
Such penalty is intended to underscore the need to file
the SOCE as another means of ensuring the sanctity of
the electoral process.
The penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public
office may be properly imposed on a candidate for
public office who repeatedly fails to submit his
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE)
pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166.
54

Sps. Carbonell vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company
April 26, 2017
G.R. No. 178467
Bersamin, J.
Facts:
Petitioners travelled to Bangkok after withdrawing
notes from their dollar account, they had exchanged
five of the bills into Baht but only four were accepted
since the fifth was “no good”, then they have tried
exchanging the same bill at the bank, the teller
informing them that the dollar bill was fake and
confiscated such note. They bought jewelry at Bangkok
and was confronted by the owner the next day that the
bills had turned out to be counterfeit. Upon return to
Ph, they confronted the manager of the bank’s branch
but the latter insisted that the dollar bills released are
genuine. Said bills were submitted to BSP for
examination which certified dollar bills as near perfect
genuine notes. RTC dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for
lack of merit. CA promulgated assailed decision
affirming RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent’s failure to exercise the
degree of diligence required in handling the affairs of its
clients showed that it was liable not just for simple
negligence but for misrepresentation and bad faith
amounting to fraud.
Held:
Appeal is partly meritorious. The General Banking Act of
2000 demands of banks the highest standards of
integrity and performance. As such, the banks are under
obligation to treat the accounts of their depositors with
meticulous care. In order for gross negligence to exist as
to warrant holding the respondent liable therefor, the
petitioners must establish that the latter did not exert
any effort at all to avoid unpleasant consequences, or
that it wilfully and intentionally disregarded the proper
protocols or procedure in the handling of US dollar
notes and in selecting and supervising its employees.
Even if the law imposed a high standard on the latter as
a bank by virtue of the fiduciary nature of its banking
business, bad faith or gross negligence amounting to
bad faith was absent. Hence, there simply was no legal
basis for holding the respondent liable for moral and
exemplary damages. In breach of contract, moral
damages may be awarded only where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. That was not true
herein because the respondent was not shown to have
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. This is pursuant to
Article 2220 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal
ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.
Although the petitioners suffered humiliation resulting
from their unwitting use of the counterfeit US dollar
bills, the respondent, by virtue of its having observed
the proper protocols and procedure in handling the US
dollar bills involved, did not violate any legal duty
towards them. Being neither guilty of negligence nor
remiss in its exercise of the degree of diligence required
by law or the nature of its obligation as a banking
institution, the latter was not liable for damages. Given
the situation being one of damnum absque injuria, they
could not be compensated for the damage sustained.
PEOPLE vs. UMAPAS
March 22, 2017
GR. 215742
Peralta, J.
Facts:
The appellant Jose Umapas mauled his wife Gemma
Umapas and with the use of alcohol, doused her with it
and set her ablaze at their home located at Olongapo
City. Gemma was brought to James L. Gordon Memorial
Hospital for treatment Gemma was found to have
suffered multiple injuries. Due to the severity of the
injuries, the victim died from multiple organ failure
55
secondary to thermal burns. The Regional Trial Court
found the appellant guilty of the crime of parricide.
Issue: Whether Appellant Jose Umapas is guilty of the
crime of parricide.
Held:
Yes. Appellant Jose Umapas is guilty of the crime of
parricide.
Parricide is commited when;
1. a person is killed;
2. the deceased is killed by the accused;
3. the deceased is the father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of
accused.
In the instant case the accused Jose murdered his
legitimate spouse Gemma by mauling her and setting
her body on fire. Therefore, the accused is guilty of the
crime of parricide.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY vs. NASIPIT
INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES
INC.
March 22, 2017
GR.214864
Caguioa, J.
Facts:
Petitioners herein advised NIASSI that PPA received
numerous complaints regarding the poor quality of its
services due to the use of inadequately maintained
equipment. Petitioner further relayed that PP A would
take over the cargo-handling services at the Nasipit
Port.
Issue: Whether the PPA can execute a cargo handling
contract in favour of NIASI for a full 10 year term.
Held:
Yes. The PPA can execute a cargo handling contract in
favour of NIASI for a full 10 year term.
The Court compels the PPA to formally execute a 10
year cargo-handling contract at this time on the basis of
conditions prevailing nearly two decades ago would
certainly be unreasonable and iniquitous.
DY vs. KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS ELECTRONICS
March 22, 2017
GR.186088
Sereno, C.J.
Facts:
Respondents alleged that the registration of the
trademark PHILITES & LETTER P DEVICE in the name of
the petitioners will violate the proprietary rights and
interests, business reputation and goodwill of the
respondent over its trademark, considering that the
distinctiveness of the trademark PHILIPS will be diluted.
Issue: Whether petitioner can register a mark nearly
resembling that of respondent’s mark.
Held:
No. The petitioner cannot register a mark nearly
resembling that of respondent’s mark.
Applying the dominancy test in the instant case, it
shows the uncanny resemblance or confusing similarity
between the trademarks applied for by respondent with
that of petitioner's registered trademark.
OUR LADY OF LOURDES HOSPITAL vs. SPOUSES
CAPANZA
March 22, 2017
GR.189218
Sereno, C.J.
Facts:
Respondents imputed negligence to Drs. Ramos and
Santos for the latter's failure to detect the heart disease
of Regina, resulting in failure not only to refer her to a
cardiologist for cardiac clearance, but also to provide
the appropriate medical management before, during,
and after the operation.
Issue: Whether the petitioners are liable for negligence
for the death of Regina.
Held:
Yes. The petitioners are liable for negligence for the
death of Regina.
56

Applying the law, whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done, the obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
PEOPLE vs. MENDOZA
March 22, 2017
GR.224295
Reyes, J.
Facts:
The accused-appellant, with lewd design, through
intimidation, did feloniously inserted his penis into the
vagina and buttocks of his own daughter. The RTC held
that the accused-appellant Ariel is guilty of qualified
rape.
Issue: Whether the accused-appellant is guilty for the
crime of qualified rape.
Held:
Yes. The accused-appellant is guilty for the crime of
qualified rape.
Article 266-A provides that rape is committed by a man
who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman; through
force, threat or intimidation; when the offended party is
deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; by
means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; when the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE
TAPULADO, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 199141
March 8, 2017
Mendoza, J.
Facts:
Deceased Tapulado was the owner of twoparcels of
land located in Kiblagon, Sulop, Davao del Sur and
another in Kisulan, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur.
In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
placed the subject lands under the coverage of the
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program pursuant to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27; and in 1978, awarded
them to the farmer-beneficiaries. Tapulado, however,
did not receive any compensation from the
government.
The respondents, the Heirs of Tapulado rejected the
valuation of the subject lands at P38,002.4 7 or P 1,315
.00 per hectare. They filed a petition for determination
of just compensation before the DARAB referred their
petition to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of
Davao del Surfor the recomputation of the value of the
subjectLands.
Without waiting for the laters re-evaluation,the
Tapulados filed a petition before the R TC, sitting as
Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the determination and
payment of just compensation.
RTC pegged the amount of P200,000.00 per hectare and
awarded the amounts of P300,000.00 as moral damages
and Pl00,000.00 as attorney's fees.
On appeal, CA agreed with the R TC that the
computation of the just compensation should be in
accordance with R.A. No. 6657 because the
compensation had remained unsettled up to the
passage of the new law.
Issue:
WON CA committed grave error of law when it ordered
the remand of the case to the sac for the reception of
evidence as to the date of the grant of emancipation
patent and the computation ofj ust compensation in
accordance with the market-data approach despite the
clear mandate of DAR A.O. no. 1, series of 2010,
implementing R.A no. 9700 as to the formula to be used
and that the reckoning date in computing just
compensation is June 30, 2009.
Ruling:
NO.
The Court agrees with the CA that the case should be
remanded to the
RTC for the computation of just compensation.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 9700, the LBP agreed
with the order of remand for the computation of just
compensation conformably with the said law. A reading
of R.A. No. 9700, however, reveals that the case still
falls within the ambit of Section 17 ofR.A. No. 6657 as
57
amended. Section 5 of R.A. No. 9700, clearly provides
that "previously acquired lands wherein the valuation is
subject to challenge shall be completed and resolved
pursuant to Section 17 ofR.A. No. 6657, as amended.
In the case at bench, the subject property was awarded
to the farmer beneficiaries in 1978. On March 24, 1980,
LBP approved its initial valuation. Clearly, the process of
the determination of just compensation should be
governed by Section 17 ofR.A. No. 6657.
Accordingly, the Court sets aside the R TC valuation of
their property at P200,000.00 per hectare. The RTC
valuation failed to comply with the parameters of
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR regulation. In fact,
the RTC neither used any formula in coming up with the
valuation of the subject land nor explained its reason
for deviating therefrom. It simply declared the amount
of P200,000.00 per hectare as the fair and reasonable
amount of compensation, without any clear basis.
In the determination of just compensation, the RTC
should be guided by the following:
1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of
taking, or the time when the owner was deprived of the
use and benefit of his property, that is, the date when
the title or the emancipation patents were issued in the
names of the farmer beneficiaries.
2. Just compensation must be determined pursuant to
the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657,
as amended, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700.
Nevertheless, while it should take into account the
different formulas created by the DAR in arriving at the
just compensation, it is not strictly bound thereto if the
situations before it do not warrant their application. In
which case, the RTC must clearly explain the reasons for
deviating therefrom, and for using other factors or
formulas in arriving at a reasonable just compensation.
3. Interest may be awarded as warranted by the
circumstances of the case and based on prevailing
jurisprudence. In previous cases, the Court had allowed
the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where
there was delay in the payment since the just
compensation due to the landowners was deemed to
be an effective forbearance on the part of the State.
Legal interest on the unpaid balance shall be fixed at
the rate of 12% per annum from the time of taking and
6% per annum from the finality of the decision until
fully paid.
OCA vs. Retired Judge Chavez, et. al.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219
March 7, 2017
PER CURIAM:
Facts:
Respondent Judge Chavez previously presided over
Branch 87 of the RTC of Rosario, Batangas along with
Atty. Dimaculangan, JR., as Clerk of Court VI, Mr.
Marquez and Ms. Bagsic as Court Interpreter III, and Mr.
Caguimbal as Process Server, all of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas,
In February 1, 2010 Court resolution, administrative
complaints of gross dereliction of duty, gross
inefficiency, gross incompetence, serious misconduct,
corruption and deliberate violation of the law on
marriage; violation of Administrative Circulars; violation
of Supreme Court Circular; violation of Section 5, Canon
IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel; gross
inefficiency and incompetence and gross irregularity in
the service of summons on annulment of marriages
cases were charged to the respondents respectively.
Judge Chavez himself admits that he has been overly
lenient and lax and that, as Presiding Judge for 11 years,
"he overly relied on the representations of his court
staff, particularly his Clerk of Court that the case records
and disposition of cases are proper and in order." He
laments that he is a victim of his court staff's betrayal
and perfidy
Respondent Dimaculangan, Clerk of
Court VI, blames the clerks-incharge having physical
custody of the court's folders for the negligence.
Respondent Caguimbal, denies the charges against him
and states that he performed his duties with utmost
good faith and honesty. Further, he alleges that in cases
where summons were served to persons other than the
respondent or defendant, he made sure that the
summons were received by persons of suitable age and
discretion. He also claims that he is unsure whether he
58
issued and signed some of the returns of summons
concerning annulment of marriages.
For Bagsic, the main charge against respondent Bagsic
involves her failure to transcribe TSNs in nullity and
annulment of marriage cases. The OCA also found that
the TSNs were not attached to their proper case
records.
Respondent Marquez claims that his failure to prepare
the minutes of the proceedings was due to lack of
sufficient time. He further claims that he prioritized
criminal cases over civil cases. He also denies that he
acted as an agent for Atty. Jose Calingasan when he
referred said counsel to Ms. Rene Frane Arillano for
possible lawyer-client relationship. He claims that he
merely provided the names of counsels within the
vicinity of the Hall of Justice.
Issue:
WON respondents are administratively liable.
Ruling:
YES.
Judge Pablo R. Chavez is found GUILTY of gross neglect
of duty and undue delay of rendering decisions. Judge
Chavez' unexplained and unreasonable delay in deciding
cases and resolving incidents and motions, and his
failure to decide the remaining cases before his
compulsory retirement constitute gross inefficiency
which cannot be tolerated.
Judge Chavez' excuses are not sufficient to absolve him
of disciplinary action. Judges and clerks of court should
personally conduct a physical inventory of the pending
cases in their courts and personally examine the records
of each case at the time of their assumption to office,
and every semester thereafter. Judges should know
which cases are submitted for decision and are
expected to keep their own record of cases so that they
may act on them promptly.
In this case, the totality of the findings of the judicial
audit team proves Judge Chavez' reckless and
irresponsible attitude towards his duties. He utterly and
glaringly lacked the necessary care and organization in
handling and managing his court and personnel. He was
completely remiss in his duties to ensure that there is
order and inefficiency in his court, to maintain a well-
organized system of record-keeping and docket
management, and to supervise his personnel and make
sure that they are aware of and comply with the
exacting standards imposed on all public servants.
Atty. Teofilo A.Dimaculangan, Jr. is found GUILTY of
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct. Further,
there was no evidence that respondent Dimaculangan
complied with the requirements stated in Section 7(o)
of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
These guidelines emphasize the importance and
seriousness of the duty imposed upon clerks of courts
who manage and secure the funds of the Court. Mere
delay in remitting the funds collected has, in fact, been
considered gross neglect of duty or grave misconduct.
Clerks of court are the custodians of the courts' funds
and revenues, records, properties, and premises. They
are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or
impairment of those entrusted to them. Any shortages
in the amounts to be remitted and the delay in the
actual remittance constitute gross neglect of duty for
which the clerk of court shall be held administratively
liable.
Given respondent Dimaculangan's numerous and grave
infractions, the Court finds that he was not only remiss
in his duties; he took advantage of his position as clerk
of court to circumvent and disregard the rules. His acts
do not only point to gross neglect of duty but also grave
misconduct. Misconduct is grave if corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an
established rule is present; otherwise, the misconduct is
only simple.
David Caguimbal is found GUILTY of grave misconduct
and serious dishonesty. The Court said that the duty of
a process server is vital to the administration of justice.
A process server's primary duty is to serve court notices
which precisely requires utmost care on' his part to
ensure that all notices assigned to him are duly served
on the parties. It is therefore important that
summonses, other writs and court processes be served
expeditiously.
Respondent Caguimbal committed grave misconduct
and serious dishonesty when he signed process server
returns without actually serving any such summons or
court process. Misconduct is an unacceptable behavior
that transgresses the established rules of conduct for
public officers. To be considered as grave and to
warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct
59
must be serious, important, weighty, momentous and
not trifling. It must imply wrongful intention and not a
mere error of judgment and it must have a direct
relation to, and be connected with, the performance of
his official duties amounting either to
maladministration, willful, intentional neglect or failure
to discharge the duties of the office. On the other hand,
dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; unworthiness; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray.
Editha E. Bagsic is found GUILTY of simple neglect of
duty. Stenographers should comply faithfully with
paragraph 1, Section 17, Rule 136, of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Bagsic explained that it is their practice to
keep TSNs in their cabinets. If there were stenographic
notes that were not transcribed, she claims that this
was due to lack of time. These excuses, however, are
not acceptable. Clearly, respondent Bagsic was remiss in
her duties as stenographer and should be held liable for
simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is the
failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a
duty due to carelessness or indifference.
Armando Ermelito M. Marquez is found GUILTY of
simple neglect of duty and simple misconduct. As court
interpreter, respondent Marquez is duty-bound to
prepare and sign the minutes of court sessions, failure
to do so constitutes simple neglect of duty.
Section 5, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel enjoins all court personnel from
recommending private attorneys to litigants,
prospective litigants or anyone dealing with the
judiciary. As an employee of the judiciary, respondent
Marquez must maintain a neutral attitude in dealing
with party-litigants. In this case, respondent Marquez
transgressed the strict norm of conduct required from
court employees by referring a prospective litigant to a
private lawyer. His act gave the impression that the
court is indorsing a particular lawyer, thereby
undermining the public's faith in the impartiality of the
courts.
Simple misconduct has been defined as an
unacceptable behavior which transgresses the
established rules of conduct for public officers, work-
related or not.
MANUEL L. BAUTISTA, et.al, vs. MARGARITO L.
BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 202088
March 8, 2017
Peralta, J.
Facts:
The present case stemmed from a Complaint for
Partition and Accounting with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction filed by the petitioners against
Margarito and the other defendants over several
properties allegedly co-owned by them, which included
the subject property.
The Bautista siblings - Margarito, Carmelita, Aniano,
Florencia, and Ester, established a lending business
through a common fund from the proceeds of the sale
of a parcel of coconut land they inherited from their
mother. Through the said lending business, the siblings
acquired several real properties in San
Pablo City.
On March 2, 1998, Amelia obtained a loan in the
amount of P690,000.00 from Florencia, and secured the
same with a real estate mortgage over the Sta. Monica
property. They later extended the mmigage through a
Kasulatan ng Pagdaragdag ng Sanla, for an additional
loan of Pl 15,000.00 on April 6, 1998; on May 13, 1998,
Pl ,085,000.0010 and cancelled the previous loan of
P690,000.00; and on April 12, 1999, Amelia and
Florencia executed another in the amount of
P57,500.00.
Florencia, thereafter, received the owner's duplicate
copy of the same property. On November 28, 2002,
Amelia allegedly sold the subject property to Margarito
through a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan 13 for
P500,000.00 and, likewise, cancelled the Pl ,085,000.00
loan while Florencia filed a Petition for the Issuance of a
Second Owner's Duplicate and alleged that she was the
mortgagee of the subject property, she misplaced the
owner's duplicate title in her possession sometime in
September 2002.
60
Petitioners tried to oppose the issuance, but on January
30, 2003, the RTC granted the petition and the property
was later issued in the name of Margarito as
representative of Florencia. Failing to settle their
differences, petitioners subsequently instituted a
Complaint for Partition and Accounting with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction over several properties against herein
respondents.
Petitioners averred that Margarito and the others
refused their oral and written demands for the partition
of the properties they co-owned, which included the
Sta. Monica property.
Petitioners presented copies of their bank transactions
with Far East Bank to support their claim of co-
ownership over the same.25 They also presented an
undated, unnotarized, and blank Kasulatan, which
Amelia purportedly executed and signed disposing the
subject property in favor of the Bautista siblings.
On February 16, 2009, the RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioners and declared, among other things, that the
Sta. Monica property was commonly owned by the
siblings. The RTC also ordered that the property be
partitioned among all of them and that an accounting of
its income be held. Aggrieved, Margarito elevated the
case before the CA. The CA on March 06, 2012
concluded that petitioners failed to establish that they
are co-owners of the Sta. Monica property.
Issues:
WON co-ownership is established by the petitioners.
Ruling:
YES.
A special civil action of judicial partition under Rule 69
of the Rules of Court is a judicial controversy between
persons who, being co-owners or coparceners of
common property, seek to secure a division or partition
thereof among themselves, giving to each one of them
the part corresponding to him.42 The object of partition
is to enable those who own property as joint tenants, or
coparceners, or tenants in common to put an end to the
joint tenancy so as to vest in each a sole estate in
specific property or an allotment in the lands or
tenements. Hence, unless and until the issue of
coownership is definitively resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of an estate.
In the case at bar, petitioners aver that although the
Sta. Monica property was registered solely in
Margarito's name, they are co-owners of the property
because it was acquired through the siblings' lending
business, as such, they are entitled to partition and the
conveyance to them of their respective shares.
To support their allegations, petitioners presented
several mortgage contracts evidencing the transactions
between Amelia and Florencia, computer printouts of
their bank transactions, and the blank Kasulatan.
It is elementary that he who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not
evidence. It appears that Margarito's evidence of
exclusive ownership are the certificate of title, the tax
declarations pertaining thereto, his bank deposits, and
other mortgage contracts involving different
mortgagors.
Despite all these, Margarito failed to prove that Amelia
conveyed the Sta. Monica property exclusively in his
name. It is also quite intriguing why he did not even
bother to present the testimony of Amelia or of
Florencia, who could have enlightened the court about
their transactions. In addition, the Court find it
incredible that a property, which secured a loan roughly
over a million pesos, would be sold for considerably less
than that amount or for only P550,000.00.
Although a certificate of title is the best proof of
ownership of a piece of land, the mere issuance of the
same in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-
ownership with persons not named in the certificate or
that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other
parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title.
There is an implied trust when a property is sold and
the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is
paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial
interest of the property.
From the foregoing, this Court finds that an implied
resulting trust existed among the parties. The pieces of
evidence presented demonstrate their intention to
acquire the Sta.
Monica property in the course of their business, just like
the other properties that were also the subjects of the
61
partition case and the compromise agreement they
entered into.
Although the Sta. Monica property was titled under the
name of Margarito, the surrounding circumstances as to
its acquisition speak of the intent that the equitable or
beneficial ownership of the property should belong to
the Bautista siblings.
LOUH, JR. and LOUH, vs. BPI
G.R. No. 225562
March 8, 2017
Reyes, J.
Facts:
BPI issued a credit card in William's name, with Irene as
the extension card holder. Pursuant to the terms and
conditions of the cards' issuance, 3.5% finance charge
and 6% late payment charge shall be imposed monthly
upon unpaid credit availments.
The Spouses Louh made purchases from the use of the
credit cards and paid regularly based on the amounts
indicated in the Statement of Accounts (SO As).
However, they were remiss in their obligations starting
October 14, 2009. 5 As of August 15, 2010, their
account was unsettled prompting BPI to send written
demand letters dated August 7, 2010, January 25, 2011
and May 19, 2011. By September 14, 2010, they
owed BPI the total amount of ?533,836.27. Despite
repeated verbal and written demands, the Spouses
Louh failed to pay BPI.
On August 4, 2011, BPI filed a Complaint7 for Collection
of a Sum of Money. RTC granted an extension of Time
to File an Answer or Responsive Pleading of 15 days or
up to March 4, 2012, but the Spouses Louh still failed to
comply within the prescribed period. The Spouses Louh
filed an Answer12 on July 20, 2012 or more than three
months late. The RTC declared the Spouses, default. The
RTC explained that BPI had adduced preponderant
evidence proving that the Spouses Louh had in fact
availed of credit accommodations from the use of the
cards. However, the RTC found the 3.5% finance and 6%
late payment monthly charges18 imposed by BPI as
iniquitous and unconscionable. Hence, both charges
were reduced to 1 % monthly.
The CA affirmed that The RTC explained that BPI had
adduced preponderant evidence proving that the
Spouses Louh had in fact availed of credit
accommodations from the use of the cards. However,
the RTC found the 3.5% finance and 6% late payment
monthly charges18 imposed by BPI as iniquitous and
unconscionable. Hence, both charges were reduced to 1
% monthly.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in sustaining BPI's complaint.
Ruling:
NO.
The Court affirms the herein assailed decision and
resolution, but modifies the principal amount and
attorney's fees awarded by the RTC and the CA.
When they were thereafter declared in default, they
filed no motion to set aside the RTC's order, a remedy
which is allowed under Rule 9, Section 3 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Spouses Louh failed to show that
they exerted due diligence in timely pursuing their
cause so as to entitle them to a liberal construction of
the rules, which can only be made in exceptional cases.
The Spouses Louh slept on their rights to refute BPI's
evidence, including the receipt of the SO As and
demand letters. BPI cannot be made to pay for the
Spouses Louh's negligence, omission or belated actions.
TSM Shipping Phils., et al. vs Louie Patiñosa
March 20,2017
GR No. 210289
Del Castillo, J.
Facts:
Petitioner entered into a Contract of Employment with
respondent for a period of six months. While
performing his duties in a foreign country, respondent
injured his right hand and was repatriated.
Respondent was examined by the company physician,
Dr. Cruz, upon arrival and monitored his condition.
Respondent filed for benefits and damages before Dr.
Cruz rendered a disability rating of Grade 10 on
September 29, 2010.
Respondent consulted Dr. Escutin whose findings
proclaim that respondent cannot fully perform his job
as a seaman and thus not physically fit to perform the
62
job of a seaman. These findings became the basis for
the labor arbiter, the NLRC, and the appellate court’s
decision in favor of respondent.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for total
disability benefits
Held:
No. The Court reiterated the rule that “a temporary
total disability only becomes permanent when the
company-designate physician, within the 240-day
period, declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of
the said period, he fails to make such declaration”
The final assessment, a Grade 10 disability rating which
is merely equivalent to a permanent partial disability
under the POEA-SEC, made by the company physician
was made within the 240-day period.
Moreover, the medical opinion of Dr. Escutin ought not
to be given more weight than the disability grading
given by Dr. Cruz. In Veritas Maritime Corporation v.
Gepanaga, Jr., the Court held that in case of conflict of
assessment between the company physician and the
physician appointed by the seafarer, the opinion of a
third doctor may be agreed jointly between the parties
and its decision shall be final and binding on them.
As the petitioner failed to observe the procedures, the
certification of the company-designated physician
regarding the respondent’s disability is final and
binding.
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Amado M. Mendoza
March 20, 2017
GR No. 198799
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts:
Respondents opened a foreign currency savings account
using a US Treasury Check. After respondents withdrew
the amount deposited, the check was discredited by the
correspondent bank, Bankers Trust Company New York,
stating in an e-mail that it was due to “amount altered”
and the original check was confiscated by the
government.
The RTC ruled in favor of herein petitioners stating that
BPI duly notified respondents of the dishonor, and that
Amado unmistakably acknowledged the same.
However, the CA reversed said decision citing that BPI
failed to prove the dishonor of the check.
Issue: Whether or not BPI failed to prove the dishonor
of the subject check by merely presenting a photocopy
and an e-mail from Bankers Trust stating the same was
altered.
Held:
No. The Court held that in order to fail under the
exceptions stated in Section 3, Rule 130, it is crucial that
the offeror proves:
(a) the existence or due execution of the
original;
(b) the loss and destruction of the original, or
the reason for its non-production in court;
and
(c) The absence of bad faith on the part of the
offeror to which the unavailability can be
attributed.
In this case, BPI sufficiently complied with the requisites
therefore the presentation of the photocopy of the
subject check was permissible.
As to the e-mail, while it was not properly
authenticated in accordance with the Rules on
Electronic Evidence, the same was corroborative
evidence, and should not diminish the probative value
of the other evidence proving respondents obligation
towards BPI.
Felix B. Tiu vs. Sps. Jacinto Jangas and Petronila
Mertoa-Jangas, et al.
March 20, 2017
GR. No. 200285
Reyes, J.
Facts:
Gregorio Pajulas was an owner of a certain piece of
land. Upon his death, the lot was divided to three equal
shares for Gregorio’s three daughters, Adelaida, Bruna,
and Isabel. Bruna sold her share to Spouses Gaudencio
and Lucia Delayco.
Bridiana Delayco, who was the heir of spouses Delayco,
was issued a title of the whole lot to her name alone.
Bridiana sold the land petitioner Tiu.
63
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Tiu is a buyer in good
faith.
Held:
No. The Court held petitioner merely stepped into the
shoes of Bruna and acquired whatever rights and
obligations appertain thereto.
The respondents share of the lot were never alienated
from them despite having the whole lot titled under
Bridiana. Consequently, even when the lot in issue is
titled under petitioners name, the respondents were
never displaced.
Moreover, petitioner had knowledge that there were
other occupants of the subject property. When a piece
of land is in the actual possession of persons other than
the seller, the buyer must be wary and should
investigate the rights of those possession. Without
making such inquiry, one cannot claim that he is a buyer
in good faith.
In Hortizuela v. Tagufa, the Court held that the
registration of a piece of land does not create or vest
title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It
cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true
owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission
of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at
the expense of others.
As the Court is convinced that petitioner is not a byer
and registrant in good faith, the petition was denied.
Lourdes C. Rodriguez vs. Sps. Vicente & Estelita B.
Javier et al.
March 20, 2017
GR. No. 222980
Leonen, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Rodriguez was an employee of spouses Javier
for 25 years. Over the course of time, Rodriguez was
trusted with both personal and business affairs of the
spouses.
Petitioner alleges that she was constructively dismissed
by reason that her employers were allegedly hot-
headed, and embarrass her in the presence of co-
workers.
Rodriguez also claims for her service incentive leave pay
for the whole 25 years contrary to what the CA decided
the she should only be rewarded service incentive leave
pay for the last three years as the previous years had
prescribed
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Rodriguez was
constructively dismissed by the respondents.
Held:
No. The Court held that there is constructive dismissal
when an employer’s act of clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain becomes so unbearable on the
part of the employee as to foreclose any choice on his
part except to resign from such employment. The
standard for constructive dismissal is “whether a
reasonable person in the employee’s position would
have felt compelled to give up his employment under
the circumstances.”
Rodriguez was entrusted with the respondents’ assets,
the care and safeguarding of their house, custody of
company files, and authorization to make withdrawals
and deposits to both the personal and business
accounts of the respondents; all of which belies the
claim that petitioner was treated harshly by the
respondents.
The Court further held that the words uttered by
Estelita “Kung ayaw mo sa ginagawa mo, we can
manage!” were merely a consequence of her
spontaneous outburst of feelings from the petitioner’s
failure to perform her task which was long overdue.
The words were not sufficient to make the continued
employment of petitioner impossible, or unreasonable;
spontaneous expressions of an employer do not
automatically render a hostile work atmosphere.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to 25 years
worth of service incentive leave pay.
Held:
Yes. In Auto Bus Transport System, Inc v. Bautista, the
Court clarified the correct reckoning of the prescriptive
period for service incentive leave pay:
“.. In the case of service incentive leave, the
employee may choose to either use his leave credits
64
 or commute it to its monetary equivalent if not
exhausted at the end of the year. Furthermore, if the
employee entitled to service incentive leave does
not use or commute the same, he is entitled upon
his resignation or separation from work to the
commutation of his accrued service incentive
leave..”
The Court, applying Article 291 of the Labor Code,
conclude that the three-year prescriptive period
commences, not at the end of the year when the
employee becomes entitled to the commutation of his
service incentive leave, but from the time when the
employer refuses to pay its monetary equivalent after
demand of commutation or upon termination of the
employee’s services.
Therefore, Rodriguez was entitled to the whole 25 year
service incentive leave and not only three as
determined by the Court of Appeals.
People of the Philippines Vs. Chrisopher Mejaro Roa
G.R. No. 225599
March 22, 2017
Facts:
The accused was charged with murder for the killing of
Eliseo Delmiguez.
A resident of Brgy. San Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur,
accused [Roa] is known to have suffered mental
disorder prior to his commission of the crime charged.
While his uncle, Issac [Mejaro ], attributes said
condition to an incident in the year 2000 when accused
was reportedly struck in the head by some teenagers,
SPOl [Nelson] Ballebar claimed to have learned from
others and the mother of the accused that the ailment
is due to his use of illegal drugs when he was working in
Manila.
When accused returned from Manila in 2001, Issac
recalled that, in marked contrast to the silent and
formal deportment with which he normally associated
his nephew, the latter became talkative and was
observed to be "always talking to himself' and
"complaining of a headache.
On September 27, 2001, accused had a psychotic
episode and was brought to the [Don Susana J.
Rodriguez Mental Hospital] DSJRM by his mother and
Mrs. Sombrero.
On March 16, 2007, at about 3 :30 p.m., it appears that
Eliseo, then 50 years old, was walking with Edgar on the
street in front of the store of Marieta Ballecer at Zone 3,
San Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur. From a distance of
about 3 meters, the pair was spotted by Rico who, while
waiting for someone at the roadside, also saw accused
sitting on the sidecar of a trimobile parked nearby.
When Eliseo passed by the trimobile, he was
approached from behind by accused who suddenly
stabbed him on the left lower back with a bolo locally
known as ginunting of an approximate length of 8 to 12
inches.
Issue:
Whether or not the defense of insanity is tenable.
Ruling:
No, it is not tenable.
Insanity as an exempting circumstance is not easily
available to the accused as a successful defense. It is an
exception rather than the rule on the human condition.
Anyone who pleads insanity as an exempting
circumstance bears the burden of proving it with clear
and convincing evidence. The testimony or proof of an
accused's insanity must relate to the time immediately
preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the
offense with which he is charged
In the case at bar, the testimonies presented by
accused-appellant unfortunately fail to pass muster.
First, the testimony of Dr. Laguidao to the effect
that accused-appellant was suffering from
undifferentiated schizophrenia stems from her
psychiatric evaluation of the accused in 2012, or about
five years after the crime was committed. His mental
condition five years after the crime was committed is
irrelevant for purposes of determining whether he was
also insane when he committed the offense. While it
may be said that the 2012 diagnosis of Dr. Laguidao
must be taken with her testimony that the accused was
65
also diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2001, it is worth
noting that the testimony of Dr. Laguidao as to the 2001
diagnosis of the accused is pure hearsay.
Second, the testimony of Mejaro also cannot be
used as a basis to find that accused-appellant was
insane during the commission of the offense in 2007.
His testimony merely demonstrated the possible
underlying reasons behind accused-appellant's mental
condition, but similar to Dr. Laguidao's testimony, it
failed to shed light on accused-appellant's mental
condition immediately prior to, during, and immediately
after accused-appellant stabbed the victim without any
apparent provocation.
There are circumstances surrounding the
incident that negate a complete absence of intelligence
on the part of accused-appellant when he attacked the
victim. First, he surprised the victim when he attacked
from behind. This is supported by the companion of the
victim, who testified that while they were walking, they
did not notice any danger when they saw accused-
appellant standing near the trimobile. Second, accused-
appellant's attempt to flee from the scene of the crime
afterstabbing the victim indicates that he knew that
what he just committed was wrong. And third, when
the police officers called out to accused-appellant to
surrender, he voluntarily came out of the house where
he was hiding and voluntarily turned himself over to
them.
In fine, therefore, the defense failed to present
any convincing evidence of accused-appellant's mental
condition when he committed the crime in March 2007.
While there is evidence on record of his mental
condition in 2001 and in 2012, the dates of these two
diagnoses are too far away from the date of the
commission of the offense in 2007, as to altogether
preclude the possibility that accused-appellant was
conscious of his actions in 2007.
Alexis C. Almendras Vs. South Davao Development
Corporation, Inc. (SODACO), et al.
G.R. No. 198209
March 22, 2017
Facts:
On September 13, 2004, petitioner filed an
Amended Complaint seeking to annul the Deed of Sale
(DOS) executed by and among respondents Caridad C.
Almendras (Caridad), Rolando C. Sanchez (Rolando) and
Leonardo Dalwampo over a parcel of unregistered land
located at Inawayan, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur containing
approximately 6.3087 hectares.
Petitioner alleged that he owned and had
occupied said parcel of land since September 21, 1978
until he was forcibly dispossessed by respondent South
Davao Development Company, Inc. (SODACO) on April
23, 1994. Petitioner claimed that Caridad sold the
property to Rolando, a purported dummy of SODACO.
During the proceedings on March 16, 2010,
Rolando filed a Request for Admission addressed to
petitioner which the latter failed to respond to.
Rolando, as a result, filed a motion for Summary
Judgment which was opposed by Petitioner.
RTC then concluded that by petitioner's failure
to respond to the Request for Admission, he was
deemed to have admitted or impliedly admitted the
matters specified therein. In particular, petitioner is
deemed to have admitted the fact that the property in
question had been validly sold to Rolando thereby
rendering the complaint without any cause of action.
Aggrieved by the RTC's Orders, petitioner sought
recourse directly to this Court via the instant Petition
for Review.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for review on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion was proper.
Ruling:
No, it was not proper.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is glaringly different from a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. "A
petition for review under Rule 45 of the x x x Rules of
66
Court is generally limited only to questions of law or
errors of judgment. On the other hand; a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of to correct
errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
ofjurisdiction."
Here, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion to
the RTC claiming that contrary to the lower court's
ruling, he could not have received the motion on March
24, 2010 (as stated in the postmaster's certification)
given that the motion was filed only on July 26, 2010.
It must be stressed that only questions of law may be
properly raised in a petition for review. Whether or not
petitioner received a copy of the motion on March 24,
2010 is a factual issue and such is not within the ambit
of a petition for review. In any case, it may be well to
remind petitioner that he never raised the issue of lack
of service of the Motion for Summary of Judgment to
him. His petition mainly rests on the failure to serve him
a copy of the Request for Admission. Given that the
Request for Admission was dated March 11, 2010, it
would be logical to think that the registry return card
was for the said Request.
If he were really keen on protecting his rights after
noting the flaw in the IVlarch 28, 2011 Order, it would
have been prudent for him to file a Motion for
Correction of Judgment or to seek a different mode of
appeal (i.e. Petition for Certiorari) but he did not.
Martin Villamor y Tayson and Victor Banaobra y
Gianan
vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 200396
March 22, 2017
Facts:
Villamor and Banaobra, the former acting as a
‘collector’ and the latter as a manager and as an
operator was charged with the violation of Section 3(c)
of RA 9287 or collecting and soliciting bets for an illegal
numbers game locally known as "lotteng” and
possessing a list of various numbers, a calculator, a
cellphone, and cash.
On July 17, 2005, at around 9:00 a.m., PD Penaflor
received a call from an informant regarding an ongoing
illegal numbers game at Barangay Francia, Virac,
Catanduanes, specifically at the residence of Bonaobra.
A team composed of PD Penaflor, Saraspi, PO 1 Rolando
Ami, a driver, and a civilian asset proceeded to
Bonaobra's residence to confirm the report. Upon
arrival at the target area, the team parked their service
vehicle outside the compound fenced by bamboo slats
installed two inches apart which allowed them to see
the goings on inside. According to the police officers,
they saw petitioners in the act of cOLmtingbetsj
described by the Bicol term "revisar," which means
collating and examining numbers placed in "papelitos,"
which are slips of paper containing bet numbers, and
counting money bets.
When they entered the gate of the compound, they
introduced themselves as police officers and
confiscated the items found on the table consisting of
cash amounting to Pl ,500.00 in different
denominations, the "papelitos," a calculator, a cellular
phone, and a pen. Petitioners were then brought to
Camp Francisco Camacho where they were investigated
for illegal gambling. Subsequently, a case was filed
against the petitioners before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid arrest.
Ruling:
There was NO valid arrest in this case.
The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against
unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by the
arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's
compound without a valid warrant of arrest or a search
warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule
requiring a warrant for a valid search and seizure, none
applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence
obtained by the police officers is inadmissible against
the petitioners, the same having been obtained in
violation of the said right.
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In this case, the apprehending officers claim that
petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto, or caught in
the act of committing an offense. PD Penaflor and his
team of police officers claim that petitioners were
committing the offense of illegal numbers game when
they were arrested without a warrant.
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a),
Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely "(a) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer."
It was not properly established that petitioners had just
committed, or were actually committing, or attempting
to commit a crime and that said act or acts were done
in the presence of the arresting officers. Based on the
testimonies of PO 1 Saraspi and PD Penaflor, they were
positioned some 15 to 20 meters away from petitioners.
Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant
distance between the police officers and the
petitioners, the Court finds it doubtful that the police
officers were able to determine that a criminal activity
was ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in
flagrante delicto warrantless arrest and a search
incidental to a warrantless arrest thereafter. The police
officers even admitted that the compound was
surrounded by a bamboo fence 5'7" to 5'9" in height,
which made it harder to see what was happening inside
the compound.
It appears that the police officers acted based solely on
the information received from PD Penaflor's informant
and not on personal knowledge that a crime had just
been committed, was actually being committed, or was
about to be committed in their presence.
Thee accused are acquitted by the Supreme Court.
People of the Philippines
Vs. AnastacioHementiza y Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 227398. March 22, 2017
Facts:
On May 25, 2003, at around 1:15 o'clock in the
morning, the police conducted a buy-bust operation at
Sitio Lower Sto. Nifio, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo
City.A confidential informant (CI) told them that a
certain Anastacio was peddling drugs in the area.
Upon arrival, the CI pointed to their target
person. Palconit approached accused-appellant and
asked if he could buy shabu. After receiving the marked
money, accused-appellant handed to Palconit one (1)
small heat-sealed plastic sachet containing shabu. The
accused was arrested and the substance and marked
money were recovered.
After examination, a report was issued confirming that
the crystalline substance in the sachets were positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that on May
25, 2003 at around 1: 15 o'clock in the morning, he was
playing billiards at Sitio Lower Sto. Nifio when three (3)
armed men suddenly arrived and pointed a gun at him.
Without saying anything, the men frisked and
handcuffed him but found nothing illegal on him. He
was arrested and brought to an office in Lores where he
was detained, interrogated, and forced to admit a
wrongdoing. He was also asked to point to other
persons so that he could be released.
Issue:
Whether the guilt of the accused for the crimes charged
has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
No, it was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The corpus delicti in cases involving dangerous drugs is
the presentation of the dangerous drug itself.Thus, the
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chain of custody over the dangerous drug must be
shown to establish the corpus delicti.
In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to
demonstrate substantial compliance by the
apprehending officers with the safeguards provided by
R.A. No. 9165 as regards the rule on chain of custody.
To begin with, the records are bereft of any showing
that an inventory of the seized items was made. Neither
does it appear on record that the apprehending team
photographed the contraband in accordance with law.
In this case, Palconit claimed that he had placed his
initials on the seized items. Based on his testimony, it is
clear that the marking was not immediately done at the
place of seizure; instead, the markings were only placed
at the PDEA office, for which the prosecution did not
offer any justifiable reason.
To make matters worse, from the place of seizure to the
PDEA office, the seized items were not marked. It could
not, therefore, be determined how the unmarked drugs
were transported and who took custody of them while
in transit.
Moreover, the identity of the investigating officer was
unknown and it was uncertain who received the seized
items when it was brought to the forensic laboratory.
The records are bereft of any evidence as to how the
illegal drugs were brought to court. Fabros merely
testified that she made a report confirming that the
substance contained in the sachets brought to her was
positive for shabu.
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited
drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a
persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The
identity of the prohibited drug must be established with
moral certainty.
It could be that the accused was really involved in the
sale of shabu, but considering the doubts engendered
by the paucity of the prosecution's evidence, the Court
has no recourse but to give him the benefit thereof.
Landbank of the Philippines Vs.
Antonio Marcos, Sr., namely: Anita M. Rubio, Lolita M.
Pelino, Antonio Marcos, jr. and Ramiro D. Marcos
G.R. No. 175726. March 22, 2017
Facts:
The deceased Antonio Marcos, Sr. (Antonio) was the
owner of two parcels of agricultural land in Sorsogon.
On April 3, 1995, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, 6
Ramiro Marcos (Ramiro), authorized representative of
the heirs of Antonio, namely: Anita Rubio, Lolita M.
Pelino, Antonio Marcos, Jr. and Ramiro, offered to sell
the landholdings to the Republic of the Philippines
through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
LBP valued the lands covered by TCT Nos. 2552 and
2562 at P195,603.70 and P79,096.26. The DARAB,
however, set aside this value upon filing of the DAR, and
a new valuation is fixed at P446,786.03 which the LBP
opposed.
The Special Agrarian Court (SAC)ruled in favor of the
DAR and the CA upheld this decision.
Issues:
Whether or not the SAC may disregard the valuation
factors under section 17 of R.A. 6657 which are
translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative
Order and affirmed by the Supreme Court in the cases
of Sps. Banal and Celada, in fixing the just compensation
for subject properties?
Whether or not the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) may abrogate, vary or alter a
consummated contract between the government and
respondents in regard to subject properties?
Ruling:
1. Yes. When acting within the parameters set by the
law itself, the RTC-SACs are not strictly bound to apply
the DAR formula to its minute detail, particularly when
69
faced with situations that do not warrant the formula's
strict application; they may, in the exercise of their
discretion, relax the formula's application to fit the
factual situations before them. They must, however,
clearly explain the reason for any deviation from the
factors and formula that the law and the rules have
provided
In the case at bar, the RTC-SAC did not clearly explain
why the formula was not applied although the factors
enumerated were considered in determining just
compensation. There was no reasoned explanation
grounded on evidence on record why the court did not
comply with the established rules. Thus, this Court finds
that the case does not warrant for deviation from the
factors and formula set forth by the law and rules
applicable.
2. Yes. The LBP's valuation of lands covered by the CARP
Law considered only as an initial determination, which
is not conclusive, as it is the RTC-SAC that could make
the final determination of just compensation, taking
into consideration the factors provided in R.A. No. 6657
and the applicable DAR regulations. The LBP's valuation
has to be substantiated during an appropriate hearing
before it could be considered sufficient in accordance
with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the DAR
regulations.
Since it is the RTC-SAC that could make the final
determination of just compensation, the supposed
acceptance of the LBP's valuation cannot be considered
as consummated contract.
Since this case needs to determine just compensation,
the case was remanded to the court of origin, the SC
not being a trier of facts.
Sps. Elvira Alcantara and Edwin Alcantara vs.
Sps. Florante Belen and Zenaida Ananias
G.R. No. 200204.
April 25, 2017
Facts:
In 2005, Spouses Alcantara filed before the RTC a
Complaint against Spouses Belen for the quieting of
title, reconveyance of possession, and accounting of
harvest with damages of Lot No. 16932. Petitioners
argued that their neighbors, respondents herein, had
extended the latter's possession up to the land titled to
Spouses Alcantara, and usurped the harvests therefrom.
Elvira Alcantara traced her ownership of the property to
her inheritance from her mother, Asuncion Alimon.
In addition to the certificate of title, Spouses Alcantara
submitted as evidence the Tax Declarations of the
property registered to them and their predecessors-in-
interest, receipts of their payments for real property
taxes, and a Sketch/Special Plan[9] of Lot No. 16932
prepared by Geodetic Engineer Augusto C. Rivera.
On the strength of a sales agreement called
KasulatanngBilihangTuluyanngLupa, respondents
countered Spouses Alcantara's claims over the
property. Spouses Belen alleged that they bought the
property from its prior owners. Even though
respondents did not have any certificate of title over
the property, they supported their claim of ownership
with various Tax Declarations under the name of their
predecessors-in-interest.
Furthermore, Spouses Belen attacked the OCT of
Asuncion Alimon. They claimed that fraud attended the
issuance of a Free Patent to her, considering that the
Belens had occupied the property ever since. According
to respondents, they already protested her title still
pending before the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed error in judgment in
ruling against Sps. Alcantara despite their TCT and in
favor of Sps. Belen with their Tax declarations and Deed
of Sale.
Ruling:
Yes the CA’s judgment was erroneous.
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A cursory reading of the facts clearly shows that the lot
claimed by petitioners is not the property conveyed in
the deed of sale presented by respondents. Aside from
their difference in size, the two properties have
distinctive boundaries. Therefore, on the face of the
documents, the CA incorrectly ruled that these
pertained to Lot No. 16932.
The ruling of the CA that respondents own Lot No.
16932 based on their Tax Declarations is likewise
erroneous. Tracing the history of the Tax Declarations
registered under the names of respondents to those of
their predecessors-in-interest, we find that none of
these refers to Lot No. 16932.
Even assuming that the Tax Declarations of respondents
pertain to the subject property, this Court finds that the
CA incorrectly applied the law on land titles. The
appellate court should not have set aside the RTC's
appreciation of the certificate of title registered to
Spouses Alcantara just because Spouses Belen
presented their Tax Declarations.
Based on established jurisprudence, we rule that the
certificate of title of petitioners is an absolute and
indefeasible evidence of their ownership of the
property. The irrelevant Tax Declarations of Spouses
Belen cannot defeat TCT No. T-36252 of Spouses
Alcantara, as it is binding and conclusive upon the
whole world.
The CA Ruling was reversed and the SC ruled in favor of
Sps. Alcantara.
SPS ORSOLINO vs. VIOLETA FRANY
March 29, 2017
GR.193887
Reyes, J.
Facts:
This case stemmed from a complaint for ejectment over
a house situated in Novaliches filed by Respondent
SpsFrany against petitioners SpsOrsolino. SpsFrany
claimed that Carolina Orsolino authorized his son
Sander to sell subject property as evidenced by SPA to
which the same was sold as evidenced by a Deed of
Sale. However, despite repeated demands to vacate
said property, petitioners failed to do so. On the other
hand, respondent contends that they were not aware of
the sale, petitioner Dennis has no brother named
Sander, signature of Carolina appearing in SPA and
Deed of Sale is a forgery and that there were no
demands letter coming from SpsFrany.
The MeTC ruled in favor of SpsFrany and declared the
sale valid and that there was no existence of forgery
thereby dismissing the complaint. Upon appeal, RTC set
aside the ruling of MeTC declaring the SPA and Deed of
Sale showed patent irregularities and alterations which
rendered it null and void ab initio. However on appeal
to CA, it reinstated the ruling of MeTC. It upheld the
validity of SPA and Deed of Sale which were duly
notarized since the same carry evidenciary weight with
respect to their due execution and this presumption
was not rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary by Spouses Orsolino.Hence, this case.
Issue:
1. Whether the signatures of Carolina on the documents
were falsified
2. Whether the authenticity and due execution of the
SPA and Deed of Absolute Sale have been sufficiently
established.
Held:
1. Basic is the rule that forgery cannot be presumed and
must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence, thus, the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery. One who alleges forgery has the
burden to establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence.
In this case, the Court sustains the findings of the lower
courts that the bases presented by SpsOrsolino were
inadequate to sustain their allegation of forgery. Mere
variance of the signatures cannot be considered as
conclusive proof that the same was forged.
Furthermore, there had never been an accurate
examination of the questioned signatures.
2. The court agrees with the conclusion of the CA and
the MeTC that the validity of the said documents must
be upheld on the ground that it enjoys the presumption
of regularity of a public document since the same carry
evidentiary weight with respect to their due execution.
Furthermore, the fact of forgery is not established by
the patent irregularities and alterations in the said
71
documents, such as the changing of names of the places
and the date written thereon.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs KING REX AMBATANG
March 29, 2017
GR.205855
Leonen, J.
Facts:
Accused-appellant King Ambatang (Amabatang) was
charged with murder of Ely Vidal (Vidal) with the use of
knife hitting the victim in different parts of the body,
thereby inflicting upon him fatal injuries which caused
his instantaneous death. The said killing was attended
by the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength which
qualified such killing to murder. However, Ambatang in
his defense claimed that he was at AMA Computer
LeamingCenter. He stated that while he was doing the
laundry, barangay tanods went to their house looking
for a person named Louie.He then heard a noise from a
commotion outside his house.His mother and sister
went out and instructed him to stay in the sala with his
girlfriend.
Minutes later, he went out to see his friend Lobo who
lived roughly eight to ten meters from their house. Lobo
was not there, but he was able to speak to a certain
Rael for a few seconds. He then left Lobo's house and
was arrested by barangay tanods on his way home. In
support of this testimony, his mother and girlfriend
both testified that Ambatang was inside the house
when the stabbing occurred.
The RTC found Ambatang guilty of murder and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to which was also upheld by the CA which
only modified to include an additional award of
damages.
Issue:
Whether accussed-appellant Ambatang is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder
Held:
The court held that the lower courts made definitive
findings that Jennifer and Acaba made positive,
unequivocal and categorical identifications of accussed-
appellant as the person who stabbed the deceased
Vidal. As against these, accused-appellant offered denial
and alibi as defenses, which jurisprudence has long
considered weak and unreliable. In addition, an alibi
corroborated mainly by relatives and friends of the
accused, is held by the court with extreme suspicion for
it is easy to fabricate and concoct.
Ambtang also assails the inconsistencies in the
statements of Jennifer and Acaba. The court ruled that
regardless of Jennifer and Acaba's supposed
discrepancies on how accused-appellant left his
residence to stab Vidal and the exact number of times
they saw him stab Vidal, what ultimately matters is that
they witnessed how accused-appellant stabbed Vidal.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs SPS CHIU
March 29, 2017
GR.192345
Del Castillo, J.
Facts:
Respondents were the registered owners of two parcels
of agricultural lands located in Sorsogon which were
acquired by the government pursuant to its agrarian
reform program. The first parcel of land was acquired
by PD 27 and the second was acquired under RA 6657
which was initially valued by LBP at P177,657.98 and
P263,928.57, respectively.
Respondents rejected LBP's valuation; hence summary
administrative proceedings were conducted before
PARAD to determine the just compensation. The PARAD
recomputed the valuations arrived by the LBP. The
PARAD recomputed the value of the RA 6657-acquired
property at P1,542,360.00 (or P200,000.00/ha.) based
on the comparable sales transaction of similar nearby
lots as well as Municipal Resolution No. 79, series
of2002, declaring Hacienda Chu as industrial area.
In addition, it considered the subject property's good
production, topography, and accessibility. As regards
the PD 27-acquired land, the PARAD valued the subject
property at P983,663.94 using the formula: Land Value=
AGP x ASP x 2.5 (or Average Gross Production of 75.2 x
Actual Support Price of 11350.00 x 2.5). LBP’s Motion
for Reconsideration was denied by DARAB. On appeal to
RTC, it fixed the just compensation at P2,313,478.00 for
the RA 6657-acquired property and P1,155,173.00 for
the PD 27-acquired land. On appeal, the CA modified
the RTC's ruling. The CA noted that the formula used by
the PARAD (i.e., LV = AGP x ASP x 2.5) in computing the
72
valuation for the PD 27-acquired land is correct.
However, the amount used for the ASP, which is P350,
is erroneous. According to the CA, the mandated ASP in
i Executive Order No. 22820 (EO 228) is only P35, not
P350.
Issue:
Whether the CA committed serious errors of law when:
1. Insofar as the RA 6657-acquired land, it disregarded
the valuation factors under section 17 of RA 6657 and
the pertinent DAR Administrative Orders in fixing its
value at P1,542,360.00
2. Insofar as the PD 27-acquired land, it refused to
remand the instant case to the trial court for a
recomputation of its value pursuant to section 17 of RA
6657, as amended
Held:
The court held that the judgment arrived at by the
PARAD and the RTC, which rulings were subsequently
affirmed in toto and with modifications, respectively, by
the CA, as to the RA 6657-acquired property, was to
some extent based on a misapprehension or erroneous
appreciation of facts. As regards the PARAD's and the
CA's ruling, on one hand, and the RTC's on the other, on
the PD 27-acquired land, their findings thereon are
conflicting. Additionally, the PARAD's and the CA's
reliance on PD 27 and its implementing rules, which
formed the basis of their respective Decisions, are now
inapplicable thereto.
Furthermore, this court cannot sustain LBP's valuation
of P263,928.57 as just compensation for the RA 6657-
acquired property for failure to substantiate the same.
In this case, we hold that the LBP was not able to justify
its valuation. Although the LBP maintained that it
stringently applied the pertinent law and its relevant
implementing rules in arriving at its computation, it
failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the
truthfulness or correctness of its assertions.
Also, we cannot agree to the valuations fixed by the
PARAD and the RTC, valuations that found their way
into rulings that were affirmed in toto and with
modification by the CA, respectively. These rulings were
arrived at in clear disregard of the formula set forth
under DAR A.O. No. 05-98. As borne out by their
respective Decisions, these tribunals considered only
the Comparable Sales (CS) factor to the exclusion of the
other factors, namely, the CNI and MY.
The court is thus constrained to remand the case to RTC
for the receipt of evidence and determination of just
compensation.
Although RA 9700 was enacted during the pendency of
this case, this court still views that this case falls within
the ambit of sec 17 of RA 6657, as amended.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs TIRSO SIBBU
March 29, 2017
GR.214757
Del Castillo, J.
Facts:
Appelant Tirso Sibbu was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted murder and of murder.
Bryan the private complainant and a common witness
to all cases testified that he was with his daughter, his
mother and father on their azotea when he saw from a
distance of five meters a person in camouflage uniform
with a long firearm slung across his chest and a black
bonnet over his head.
When the armed man inched closer to the house, he
tried to fix his bonnet thereby providing Bryan the
opportunity to see his face; Bryan had a clear look at
the armed man because there were Christmas lights
hanging from the roof of their porch. Bryan recognized
the armed man as the appellant. Fearing the worst,
Bryan shouted a warning to his family.
Appellant then fired upon them killing Trisha, Ofelia and
Warlito. However, appellant interposed the defense of
denial and alibi stating that he did not leave the house
because they had a visitor and that he tended to his
child. Upon ruling, the RTC rendered judgment finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
and attempted murder. The RTC gave credence to
Bryan’s positive identification of appellant who shot his
family and find the defense of denial and alibi weak.
This was also affirmed by the CA. Hence, this case.
Issue:
1. Whether the trial court erred in giving undue
credence to the testimony of Bryan
73

2. Whether the aggravating circumstances of treachery,
dwelling, and use of disguise were not sufficiently
established
Held:
1.The court upheld the findings of the RTC, which were
affirmed by the CA, that Bryan positively identified
appellant as the person who shot at him and killed
Warlito, Ofelia, and Trisha. It has consistently ruled that
factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed
by the appellate court, are entitled to respect and
generally should not be disturbed on appeal unless
certain substantial facts were overlooked which, if
considered, may affect the outcome of the case. Bryan’s
narration oh how he was able to recognize the
appellant was credible and convincing because he was
only five meters away from the appellant when the
shooting incident happened and was able to get a
glimpse of appellant's face when the latter fixed his
bonnet. In addition, Christmas lights hanging from the
roof of the porch provided illumination enabling Bryan
to identify the appellant. Moreover, Bryan is familiar
with the appellant's built, height, and body movements.
2. Treachery was correctly appreciated as qualifying
circumstance in the instant case.
Treachery is present “when the offender commits any
of the crimes against person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.” The victims were all
unarmed thus unable to mount a defense in the event
of an attack. On the other hand, appellant and his
cohorts were armed. They also surreptitiously
approached the residence of the victims.
With regard to the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, the trial court correctly held: xx aggravating
circumstance of dwelling should be taken into account.
Although the triggerman fired the shot from outside the
house, his victim was inside. For this circumstance to be
considered it is not necessary that the accused should
have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to
commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was
attacked inside his own house, although the assailant
may have devised means to perpetrate the assault from
without xx.
The use of disguise was likewise correctly appreciated
as an aggravating circumstance in this case. Bryan
testified that the appellant covered his face with a
bonnet during the shooting incident There could be no
other possible purpose for wearing a bonnet over
appellant's face but to conceal his identity, especially
since Bryan and appellant live in the same barangay and
are familiar with each other.
RENATO MA. R.PERALTA vs JOSE RAY RAVAL
March 29,2017
GR. 188467
Reyes, J.
Facts:
This case involves a lease agreement over two parcels
of land located in Ilocos Norte covered by TCTs under
the names of Sps Arzaga. On 1974, Sps Arzaga, as
lessors, entered into a 40yr Contract of Lease with
Peralta, as lessee, over the subject lot and
improvements thereon. Under the lease contract,
Peralta was also to construct thereon a building that
should become property of the Sps. Arzaga upon lease
termination, to pay realty taxes for both lots and to
develop water system for the use of both parties.
However, Flaviano Jr filed with the RTC a complaint for
annulment of the contract against Peralta who allegedly
breached his obligations which was later on dismissed
and was upheld by the CA.
Flaviano Jr assigned all his rights and interests to Raval
via Deed of Assignment over the subject lots however
Peralta refused to recognize such fact. Beginning 1995,
Raval demanded from Peralta the compliance of the
terms and conditions of lease contract.
74
Castor, father and counsel of Raval, wrote a letter to
Peralta demanding removal of structures that it built as
he claimed it was not covered by lease agreement to
which Peralta refused to heed. Hence, demand letters
were sent and were later on referred to Brgy
Conciliation. Raval filed for the rescission of leased
contract to which Peralta opposed contending that
Raval is not a real party-in-interest. RTC denied the
rescission to which was modified by the CA by granting
Raval an award for unpaid rental payments.
Issue:
1. Whether the Deed of Assignment between Flaviano Jr
and Raval is void and thus cannot be deemed to have
conferred to Raval the rights of a new owner and lessor
2. Whether the lease contract should be rescinded
Held:
1.The court sustains the validity of the Deed of
Assignment. Raval cannot be deemed a "total stranger"
to Peralta's contract of lease with the Spouses Arzaga
because by the subsequent transfers of rights over the
leased premises, Peralta became the original lessors'
successor-in-interest. It is material that the lone heir of
the Spouses Arzaga, Flaviano Jr., has executed the
subject deed of assignment. Furthermore, the deed of
assignment between Flaviano Jr. and Raval was
declared valid by the trial court, as it ordered the
cancellation of the Spouses Arzaga' s TCTs, and the
issuance of new titles under Raval' s name hence this
ruling resulted in an acknowledgment of Raval's rights
over the property, his interest in the court action
entitlement to monthly rentals from Peralta. The SC
also upheld that RTC then correctly rejected Peralta's
claim against the agreement's legality, as it states the
prohibition against a collateral attack on the land titles.
“Section 48 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, provides that "[a]
certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified,
or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law." Pursuant to this
provision,the courts have consistently ruled
against collateral attacks on land titles.”
2.Considering that the subject contract of lease
provided for a 40-year term and was executed in 1974,
the agreement had already terminated in 2014. Thus, a
moot and academic case.
"A moot and academic case is one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on
ground of mootness.”
However, the court still finds it necessary to address
other issues that are intertwined with the issue of
rescission such as the allegations of prescription, the
award of unpaid rentals. It must be emphasized though
that specifically on the matter of rescission of lease
agreements, Article 1659 of the NCC applies as a rule. It
reads:
“Article 1659. If the lessor or the lessee should
not comply with the obligations set forth in
Articles 1654 and 1657, the aggrieved party
may ask for the rescission of the contract and
indemnification for damages, or only the latter,
allowing the contract to remain in force.”
Article 1654 referred to in Article 1659 pertains to the
obligations of a lessor in a lease agreement. Article
1657, on the other hand, enumerates the obligations of
a lessee, as it provides:
“Article 1657. The lessee is obliged: (1)
stipulated; to pay the price of the lease
according to the terms (2) To use the thing
leased as a diligent father of a family, devoting
it to the use stipulated; and in the absence of
stipulation, to that which may be inferred from
the nature of the thing leased, according to the
custom of the place; (3) To pay expenses for the
deed of lease.”
75

As for the unpaid claims of monthly rentals, the court
held that all payments made by Peralta for the account
of Flaviano Jr. could not be simply disregarded for the
purpose of determining Peralta’s compliance with his
obligation to pay the monthly rentals. Since the records
confirmed that Peralta has been paying his monthly
rentals up to the time and even after the complaint for
rescission was filed in 1998, the prayer in the complaint
for unpaid rentals should have been denied.
RODANTE GUYAMIN ET AL vs JACINTO FLORES ET AL
April 25, 2017
GR.202189
Del Castillo, J.
Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint in the RTC for the
Recovery of Possession against petitioners.
Respondents alleges in their complaint that they are the
registered owners of the land and that petitioners are
their relatives who occupies the said property for many
years by mere tolerance of respondents' predecessors
and parents, the original owners of the same.
Petitioners have been reminded to vacate the premises
because respondents have decided to sell the property
but petitioners failed to vacate.
Respondents then made several attempts to settle the
matter through conciliation before the Punong
Barangay but the same proved futile to which the
Punong Barangay was constrained to issue a
Certification To File Action. Subsequently, summons and
a copy of complaint were served upon petitioners
through Eileen who nonetheless refused to sign and
acknowledge receipt thereof. The RTC rendered its
judgment rendering petitioners in default for failure to
file their responsive answer within reglementary period
of 15days and ordered the defendants to vacate said
property. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Hence, this case.
Issue:
Whether CA erred in finding that the RTC was correct in
declaring petitioners in default and proceeding to
receive respondent’s evidence ex parte and Whether CA
erred when it ruled that the RTC validly rendered its
decision favorable to the respondents without the filing
of formal offer of evidence
Ruling:
The court supports the CA's pronouncement that since
respondents' exhibits were presented and marked
during the ex parte hearing, the trial court judge
committed no error when he admitted and considered
them in the resolution of the case notwithstanding that
no formal offer of evidence was made.
The pieces of evidence were identified during the ex
parte hearing and marked as Exhibits "A" to "F" for
respondents and were incorporated into the records of
the case.
As a matter of fact, the RTC Judge referred to them in
its Decision. If they were not included in the record, the
RTC Judge could not have referred to them in arriving at
judgment. By not attaching a copy of their Answer to
their Petition, petitioners are shielding themselves from
a perusal of their defense; in a sense, this is quite
revealing of the merits of their claim, and in another, it
is an ingenious scheme that this Court censures. Indeed,
they failed to realize that this Court is not composed of
machines that will mindlessly and mechanically solve a
problem at the touch of a button; it will not be forced
into motion on petitioners' turn of a key.
Knights of Rizal vs DMCI Homes Inc.
GR 213948
(TORRE DE MANILA CASE)
Facts:
On 1 September 2011, DMCI Project Developers, Inc.
(DMCI-PDI) acquired a lot in Manila. The lot was
earmarked for the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de
Manila condominium project.
DMCI-PDI secured its Barangay Clearance to start the
construction of its project. It then obtained a Zoning
76
Permit from the City of Manila's City Planning and
Development Office (CPDO).
Then, the City of Manila's Office of the Building Official
granted DMCI-PDI a Building Permit, allowing it to build
a "Fort-Nine (49) storey w/ Basement & 2 penthouse
Level Res'l./Condominium" on the property.
On 24 July 2012, the City Council of Manila issued
Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building
Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of
DMCI-PDI, citing among others, that "the Torre de
Manila Condominium, based on their development
plans, upon completion, will rise up high above the back
of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue
of our hero, and with such towering heights, would
certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal the frontal
Roxas Boulevard vantage point[.]"
On 23 December 2013, the Manila Zoning Board of
Adjustments and Appeals i(MZBAA) issued Zoning Board
Resolution No. 06, Series of 2013,14 recommending the
approval of DMCI-PDI's application for variance. The
MZBAA noted that the Torre de Manila project "exceeds
the prescribed maximum Percentage of Land Occupancy
(PLO) and exceeds the prescribeµ Floor Area Ratio (FAR)
as stipulated in Article V, Section 17 of City Ordinance
No. 8119[.]" However, the MZBAA still recommended
the approval of the variance subject to the five
conditions set under the same resolution.
After some clarification sought by DMCI-PDI, the
MZBAA issued Zoning Board Resolution No. 06-A, Series
of 2013, on 8 January 2014, amending, condition (c) in
the earlier resolution.
On 16 January 2014, the City Council of Manila issued
Resolution No. 5, Series of 2014, 17 adopting Zoning
Board Resolution Nos. 06 and 06A. The City Council
resolution states that "the City Council of Manila find[ s]
no cogent reason to deny and/or reverse the aforesaid
recommendation of the [MZBAA] and hereby ratifies
and confirm[s] all previous issued permits, licenses and
approvals issued by the City [Council] of Manila for
Torre de Manila[.]"
Issue:
Whether or not the Court can issue a writ of mandamus
against the officials of the City of Manila to stop the
construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila project.
Held:
The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must be
dismissed.
There is no law prohibiting the construction of the
Torre de Manila.
In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service
Commission, the Court held that "what is not expressly
or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except
when the act is contrary to morals, customs and I public
order." This principle is fundamental in a democratic
society, to protect the weak against the strong, the
minority against the majority, and the individual citizen
against the government. In essence, this principle,
which is the foundation of a civilized society under the
rule of law, prescribes that the freedom to act can be
curtailed only through law. Without this principle, the
rights, freedoms, and civil liberties of citizens can be
arbitrarily and whimsically trampled upon by the
shifting passions of those who can spout the loudest, or
those who can gather the biggest crowd or the most
number of Internet trolls.
In other instances, the Court has allowed or upheld
actions that were not expressly prohibited by statutes
when it determined that these acts were not contrary
to morals, customs, and public order, or that upholding
the same would lead to a more equitable solution to the
controversy. However, it is the law itself -Articles 1306
and 1409(1) of the Civil Code -which prescribes that acts
not contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy are allowed if also not contrary to law.
In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the
Torre de Manila project is "contrary to morals, customs,
77
and public order" or that it brings harm, danger, or
hazard to the community. On the contrary, the City of
Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with
the standards set under the pertinent laws and local
ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila Project.
There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There
is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de
Manila due to its effect on the background "view, vista,
sightline, or setting" of the Rizal Monument.
Zoning, as well as land use, in the City of Manila is
governed by Ordinance No. 8119. The ordinance
provides for standards and guidelines to regulate
development projects of historic sites and facilities
within the City of Manila;
Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates
the "development of historic sites and facilities."
Section 48 regulates "large commercial signage and/or
pylon." There is nothing in Sections 47 and 48 of
Ordinance No. 8119 that disallows the construction of a
building outside the boundaries of a historic site or
facility, where such building may affect the background
of a historic site. In this case, the Torre de Manila stands
870 meters outside and to the rear of the Rizal
Monument and "cannot possibly obstruct the front view
of the [Rizal] Monument." Likewise, the Torre de Manila
is not in an area that has been declared as an
"anthropological or archaeological area" or in an area
designated as a heritage zone, cultural property,
historical landmark, or a national treasure by the NHCP.
Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals
with the subject of arts and culture, provides that "[t]he
State shall conserve, promote and popularize the
nation's historical and cultural heritage and resources x
x x." Since this provision is not self-executory, Congress
passed laws dealing with the preservation and
conservation of our cultural heritage.
One such law is Republic Act No. 10066, or the National
Cultural Heritage Act of 2009, which empowers the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts and other
cultural agencies to issue a cease and desist order
"when the physical integrity of the national cultural
treasures or important 1 cultural properties [is] found
to be in danger of destruction or significant alteration
from its original state." This law declares that the State
should protect the "physical integrity" of the heritage
property or building if there is "danger of destruction or
significant alteration from its original state." Physical
integrity refers to the structure itself -how strong and
sound the structure is. The same law does not mention
that another project, building, or property, not itself a
heritage property or building, may be the subject of a
cease and desist order when it adversely affects the
background view, vista, or sightline of a heritage
property or building. Thus, Republic Act No. 10066
cannot apply to the Torre de Manila condominium
project.
Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila.
The Constitution states that "[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law x x x." It is a fundamental principle that no
property shall be taken away from an individual without
due process, whether substantive or procedural. The
dispossession of property, or in this case the stoppage
of the construction of a building in one's own property,
would violate substantive due process.
The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus
only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed
upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to
perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus
has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.
In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance
No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that
matter, that the construction of a building outside Rizal
Park is prohibited if the building is within the
background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument.
Thus, there is no legal duty on the part of the City of
Manila "to consider," in the words of the Dissenting
Opinion, 'the standards set under Ordinance No. 8119"
in relation to the application of DMCI-PDI for the Torre
de Manila since under the ordinance these standards
can never be applied outside the boundaries of Rizal
Park.
78
While the Rizal Park has been declared a National
Historical Site, the area where Torre de Manila is being
built is a privately-owned property that is "not part of
the Rizal Park that has been declared as a National
Heritage Site in IQ95," and the Torre de Manila area is
in fact "well-beyond" the Rizal Park, according to NHCP
Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno.
Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila been
designated as a "heritage zone, a cultural property, a
historical landmark or even a national treasure."
Also, to declare that the City of Manila failed to consider
the standards under Ordinance No. 8119 would involve
making a finding of fact. A finding of fact requires
notice, hearing, and the submission of evidence to
ascertain compliance with the law or regulation. In such
a case, it is the Regional Trial Court which has the
jurisdiction to hear the case, receive evidence, make a
proper finding of fact, and determine whether the Torre
de Manila project properly complied with the standards
set by the ordinance.
To compel the City of Manila to consider the standards
under Ordinance No. 8119 to the Torre de Manila
project will be an empty exercise since these standards
cannot apply outside of the Rizal Park -and the Torre de
Manila is outside the Rizal Park. Mandamus will lie only
if the officials if the City of Manila have a ministerial
duty to consider these standards I to buildings outside
of the Rizal Park. There can be no such ministerial duty
because these standards are not applicable to buildings
outside of the Rizal Park.
Dutch Movers Inc. vs Edilberto Lequin
GR 210032
FACTS:
DMI, a domestic corporation engaged in hauling
liquefied petroleum gas, employed Lequin as truck
driver and the rest of respondents as helpers; on
December 28, 2004, Cesar Lee, through the Supervisor
Nazario Furio, informed them that DMI would cease its
hauling operation for no reason; as such, they
requested DMl to issue a formal notice regarding the
matter but to no avail. Later, upon respondents'
request, the DOLE NCR issued a certification revealing
that DMI did not file any notice of business closure.
Thus, respondents argued that they were illegally
dismissed as their termination was without cause and
only on the pretext of closure.
The Labor Arbiter Aliman D. Mangandog dismissed the
case for lack of cause of action. The NLRC , however,
reversed LA Decision. It ruled that respondents were
illegally dismissed because DMI simply placed them on
standby, and no longer provide them with work.
The NLRC Decision became final and executory and the
same issued an Entry of Judgment on the case.
Consequently, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of
Execution. Later, they submitted a Reiterating Motion
for Writ of Execution with Updated Computation of Full
Backwages. Pending resolution of these motions,
respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Implead stating that upon investigation, they
discovered that DMI no longer operates. They,
nonetheless, insisted that petitioners -who managed
and operated DMI, and consistently represented to
respondents that they were the owners of DMI
continue to work at Toyota Alabang, which they
(petitioners) also own and operate. They further
averred that the Articles of Incorporation (AOI) of DMI
ironically did not include petitioners as its directors or
officers; and those named directors and officers were
persons unknown to them. They likewise claimed that
per inquiry with the SEC20 and the DOLE, they learned
that DMI did not file any notice of business closure; and
the creation and operation of DMI was attended with
fraud making it convenient for petitioners to evade
their legal obligations to them.
Respondents prayed that petitioners, and the officers
named in DMI's AOI, which included Edgar N. Smith and
Millicent C. Smith (spouses Smith), be impleaded, and
be held solidarily liable with DMI in paying the judgment
awards.
In their Opposition to Motion to Implead, spouses Smith
alleged that as part of their services as lawyers, they
79
lent their names to petitioners to assist them in
incorporating DMI. Allegedly, after such undertaking,
spouses Smith promptly transferred their supposed
rights in DMI in favor of petitioners.
Spouses Smith stressed that they never participated in
the management and operations of DMI, and they were
not its stockholders, directors, officers, or managers at
the time respondents were terminated. They further
insisted that they were not afforded due process as
they were not impleaded from the inception of the
illegal dismissal case; and hence, they cannot be held
liable for the liabilities of DMI.
On April 1, 2009; LA Savari issued an Order holding
petitioners liable for the judgment awards. Later,
petitioners moved to quash the Writ of Execution
contending that the April 1, 2009 LA Order was void
because the LA has no jurisdiction to modify the final
and executory NLRC Decision, and the same cannot
anymore be altered or modified since ·there was no
finding of bad faith against them.
On July 1, 2013, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC
Resolutions, and accordingly affirmed the Writ of
Execution impleading petitioners as party-respondents
liable to answer for the judgment awards.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are personally liable to pay the
judgment awards in favor of respondents.
Whether the principle of immutability of judgment is
applied in this case.
Ruling:
The Court denies the Petition.
To begin with, the Court is not a trier of facts and only
questions of law may be raised in a petition under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, nevertheless, allows
certain exceptions, which include such instance where
the factual findings of the CA are contrary to those of
the lower court or tribunal. Considering the divergent
factual findings of the CA and the NLRC in this case, the
Court deems it necessary to examine, review and
evaluate anew the evidence on record.
Moreover, after a thorough review of the records, the
Court finds that contrary to petitioners' claim,
Valderrama v. National Labor Relations Commission,
and David v. Court of Appeals are applicable here. In
said cases, the Court held that the principle of
immutability of judgment, or the rule that once a
judgment has become final and executory, the same
can no longer be altered or modified and the court's
duty is only to order its execution, is not absolute. One
of its exceptions is when there is a supervening event
occurring after the judgment becomes final and
executory, which renders the decision unenforceable.
To note, a supervening event refers to facts that
transpired after judgment has become final and
executory, or to new situation that developed after the
same attained finality. Supervening events include
matters that the parties were unaware of before or
during trial as they were not yet existing.
In considering the foregoing events, the Court is not
unmindful of the basic tenet that a corporation has a
separate and distinct personality from its stockholders,
and from other corporations it may be connected with.
However, such personality may be disregarded, or the
veil of corporate fiction may be pierced attaching
personal liability against responsible person if the
corporation's personality "is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend
crime, or is used as a device to defeat the labor laws x x
x." By responsible person, we refer to an individual or
entity responsible for, and who acted in bad faith in
committing illegal dismissal or in violation of the Labor
Code; or one who actively participated in the
management of the corporation. Also, piercing the veil
of corporate fiction is allowed where a corporation is a
mere alter ego or a conduit of a person, or another
corporation.36
Here, the veil of corporate fiction must be pierced and
accordingly, petitioners should be held personally liable
for judgment awards because the peculiarity of the
situation shows that they controlled DMI; they actively
80
participated in its operation such that DMI existed not
as a separate entity but only as business conduit of
petitioners.
In this case, petitioners were impleaded from the
inception of this case. They had ample opportunity to
debunk the claim that they illegally dismissed
respondents, and that they should be held personally
liable for having controlled DMI and actively
participated in its management, and for having used it
to evade legal obligations to respondents.
Finally, it appearing that respondents' reinstatement is
no longer feasible by reason of the closure of DMI, then
separation pay should be awarded to respondents
instead.
California Manufacturing Company, Inc vs Advanced
Technology System, Inc.
GR 202454
Facts: Petitioner CMCI is a domestic corporation
engaged in the food and beverage manufacturing
business. Respondent ATSI is also a domestic
corporation that fabricates and distributes food
processing machinery and equipment, spare parts, and
its allied products.
In August 2001, CMCI leased from ATSI a Prodopak
machine which was used to pack products in 20-ml.
pouches. In November 2003, ATSI filed a Complaint for
Sum of Money against CMCI to collect unpaid rentals
for the months of June, July, August, and September
2003. ATSI alleged that CMCI was consistently paying
the rents until June 2003 when the latter defaulted on
its obligation without just cause. ATSI also claimed that
CMCI ignored all the billing statements and its demand
letter. Hence, in addition to the unpaid rents A TSI
sought payment for the contingent attorney's fee
equivalent to 30% of the judgment award.
CMCI moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of extinguishment of obligation through legal
compensation. The RTC, however, ruled that the
conflicting claims of the parties required trial on the
merits. It therefore dismissed the motion to dismiss and
directed CMCI to file an Answer.
Issue:
Whether or not legal compensation between ATSI's
claim against CMCI on the one hand, and the latter's
claim against PPPC on the other hand, has not set in.
Ruling:
Any piercing of the corporate veil must be done with
caution. It must be certain that the corporate fiction
was misused to such an extent that injustice, fraud, or
crime was committed against another, in disregard of
rights. Moreover, the wrongdoing must be clearly and
convincingly established.
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only
in three (3) basic areas, namely: 1) defeat of public
convenience as when the corporate fiction is used as a
vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation; 2) fraud
cases or when the corporate entity is used to justify a
wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime; or 3) alter ego
cases, where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a
mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or
where the corporation is so organized and controlled
and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an
instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another
corporation.
CMCI 's alter ego theory rests on the alleged
interlocking boards of directors and stock ownership of
the two corporations. The instrumentality or control
test of the alter ego doctrine requires not mere majority
or complete stock control, but complete domination of
finances, policy and business practice with respect to
the transaction in question. The corporate entity must
be shown to have no separate mind, will, or existence
of its own at the time of the transaction.
The fraud test, which is the second of the three-prong
test to determine the application of the alter ego
doctrine, requires that the parent corporation's conduct
in using the subsidiary corporation be unjust, fraudulent
81
or wrongful. Under the third prong, or the harm test, a
causal connection between the fraudulent conduct
committed through the instrumentality of the
subsidiary and the injury suffered or the damage
incurred by the plaintiff has to be established. None of
these elements have been demonstrated in this case.
Hence, we can only agree with the CA and RTC in ruling
out mutuality of parties to justify the application of
legal compensation in this case.
Article 1279 of the Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 1279. In order that compensation may be
proper, it is necessary:
(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally,
and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of
the other;
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the
things due are consumable, they be of the same kind,
and also of the same quality if the latter has been
stated;
(3) That the two debts be due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or
controversy, commenced by third persons and
communicated in due time to the debtor.
The law, therefore, requires that the debts be
liquidated and demandable. Liquidated debts are those
whose exact amounts have already been determined.
CMCI has not presented any credible proof, or even just
an exact computation, of the supposed debt of PPPC. It
claims that the mobilization fund that it had advanced
to PPPC was in the amount of P4 million. Yet,
Felicisima's proposal to conduct offsetting in her letter
dated 30 July 2001 pertained to a P3 .2 million debt of
PPPC to CMCI. Meanwhile, in its Answer to ATSI's
complaint, CMCI sought to set off its unpaid rentals
against the alleged P 10 million debt of PPPC. The
uncertainty in the supposed debt of PPPC to CMCI
negates the latter's invocation of legal compensation as
justification for its non-payment of the rentals for the
subject Prodopak machine.
Baclaran Marketing Corporation vs.Fernando C. Nieva
and Mamerto Sibulo, Jr.
G.R. No. 189881, April 19, 2017
FACTS:
The CA reversed the decision of the lower court
dismissing the complaint of Sibulo (Respondent)in a
previous case involving damages arising from a
vehicular collision owned by BMC (Petitioner) and
driven by its employee and a car owned and driven by
Sibulo. In the absence of a motion for reconsideration,
the Decision became final and executory. The court
directed the Deputy Sheriff, upon motion of Sibulo, to
implement the Writ of Execution against the real
properties owned by BMC, as it appears that BMC has
no personal properties. He sold the property and its
improvements through public auction. For BMC's failure
to redeem the property within one year from the sale,
Nieva consolidated ownership over it. He filed a Petition
for Cancellation of Transfer Certificate Title and
Issuance of New [Title] in the RTC, granted. Petitioner
failed to submit the owner’s duplicate thus the court
ordered the Register of Deeds to annul TCT and issue a
new title in Nieva's name which became final.
Consequently, writ of possession was filed over the
property, granted.
In view of the Writ of Possession and Notice to
Vacate issued against it, BMC filed a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment before the CA alleging that its
counsel Atty. Rizon committed acts of gross and
inexcusable negligence constituting "extrinsic fraud,"
which deprived it of due process and an opportunity to
present its side claiming that they did not know Sibulo
appealed and only have known of such fact upon paying
real estate tax on the property that the title had already
been transferred to Nieva. The CA denied the petition
for Annulment of Judgment ruling that the remedy is
not available to the petitioner.
ISSUE:
82
WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for
annulment of judgment of the petitioner
RULING:
YES. Rule 4 7 of the Rules of Court governs
actions for the annulment of final judgments, orders, or
resolutions of regional trial courts in civil actions. It is a
recourse equitable in character, allowed only in
exceptional cases where there is no available or other
adequate remedy. The Court ruled that the petitioner
must comply with the requirements:
(1) The remedy is available only when the
petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies through no fault
of the petitioner;
(2) The grounds for the action of annulment of
judgment are limited to either extrinsic fraud or
lack of jurisdiction;
(3) The action must be filed within four years
from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if
based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought
before it is barred by laches or estoppel; and
( 4) The petition must be verified, and should
allege with particularity the facts and the law
relied upon for annulment, as well as those
supporting the petitioner's good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
BMC's petition for annulment of judgment fails to
meet the first and second requisites.
On the first requisite, Rule 47, Section 1 limits
the applicability of the remedy of annulment of
judgment to final judgments, orders or resolutions. A
final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a
case, leaving nothing more for the com1 to do in
respect thereto. In contrast, an interlocutory order does
not dispose of a case completely but leaves something
to be done upon its merits. In Guiang v. Co we declared
that an auction sale and a writ of execution are not final
orders. Corollarily, an order implementing a writ of
execution issued over certain real properties is also not
a final order as it merely enforces a judicial process over
an identified object. In fine, only the Decision of the
Parafiaque Court ordering the cancellation of BMC's
title over the property qualifies as a final judgment. It is
a judgment on the merits declaring who between Nieva
and BMC has the right over the title to the property.
Therefore, it may be the subject of an action for
annulment of judgment. Be that as it may, BMC failed to
prove that any of the grounds for annulment are
present in this case.
On the second requisite, Rule 4 7, Section 2
provides extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction as the
exclusive grounds for the remedy of annulment of
judgment. Case law, however, recognizes a third
ground--denial of due process of law. We are not
persuaded. Extrinsic fraud refers to a fraud committed
to the unsuccessful party by his opponent preventing
him from fully exhibiting his case by keeping him away
from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where
the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or when an
attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at
his defeat. In this case, the CA correctly found that BMC
neither alleged nor proved that the gross negligence of
its fonner counsel was done in connivance with Nieva or
Sibulo. Therefore, it is not the extrinsic fraud
contemplated under Rule 47, Section 2.
Asiatrust Development Bank vs. CIR
G.R. No. 201530 and G.R. Nos. 201680-81, April 19,
2017
FACTS:
On separate dates, Asiatrus received from the CIR
three Formal Letters of Demand (FLD) with Assessment
Notices for deficiency internal revenue taxes in the
amounts of P131,909,161.85, P83,012,265.78, and Pl
44,012,918.42 for fiscal years ending June 30, 1996,
1997, and 1998, respectively. Asiatrust timely
protested. Due to the inaction of the CIR on the protest,
Asiatrust filed before the CTA a Petition for Review
praying for the cancellation of the tax assessments for
deficiency income tax, documentary stamp tax (DST) -
regular, DST - industry issue, final withholding tax,
83
expanded withholding tax, and fringe benefits tax
issued against it by the CIR. The CIR issued against
Asiatrust new Assessment Notices for deficiency taxes
in the amounts of Pl 12,816,258.73, P53,314,512.72,
and P133,013,458.73 covering 1996, 1997, and 1998
respectively on which the petitioner paid partially
leaving a balance.
During the trial, Asiatrust manifested that it availed of
the Tax Abatement Program for its deficiency trust
assessments for fiscal years and had paid basic tax.
Petitioner also claimed that they availed the Tax
Amnesty Law. CTA declared 1996 tax assessment void
for issuing beyond the three-year prescriptive period.
However, due to the failure of Asiatrust to present
documentary and testimonial evidence to prove its
availment of the Tax Abatement Program and the Tax
Amnesty Law, the CTA Division affirmed the deficiency
assessments for the fiscal years 1997 and 1998 in the
total amount of P142,777,785.91.
Asiatrust filed a Motion for Reconsideration attaching
photocopies of its Application for Abatement Program
and other documents which support Tax Amnesty law
while CIR filed a partial consideration assailing CTA’s
decision finding of prescription and cancellation of
assessment notices for deficiency for fiscal years ending
1997 and 1998. Petitioner’s motion partially granted
setting hearing for the availment of tax amnesty law
and refusal for the availment of Tax abatement program
while respondent’s motion is denied. Meanwhile CIR
apealled, CTA en banc dismissed petition for being
premature still being in CTA Division. Petitioner filed a
manifestation that BIR issued a certification. CTA
rendered tax abatement program cannot be availed due
to lack of termination letter but can now avail of tax
amnesty law.
Both appealed to CTA En Banc. Asiatrust contends that
the certification if proof of availment and further posits
that since it already paid the basic taxes, the affirmance
of the deficiency final withholding tax assessment for
fiscal year 1998 would constitute double taxation as
Asiatrust would be made to pay the basic tax twice.
While CIR contest the dismissal of his appeal. The court
denied both petition.
ISSUE:
WON Asiatrust is liable for Deficiency for final
withholding tax of the fiscal year 1998?
YES. An application for tax abatenu;mt is considered
approved only upon the issuance of a termination
letter. The BIR issued .RR No. 15-06 prescribing the
guidelines on the implementation of the one-time
administrative abatement of all penalties surcharges
interest on delinquent accounts and assessments.
Based on the guidelines, the last step in the tax
abatement process is the issuance of the termination
letter. The presentation of the termination letter is
essential as it proves that the taxpayer's application for
tax abatement has been approved. Thus, without a
termination letter, a tax assessment cannot be
considered closed and terminated. In this case,
Asiatrust failed to present a termination letter from the
BIR. Instead, it presented a Certification issued by the
BIR to prove that it availed of the Tax Abatement
Program and paid the basic tax. It also attached copies
of its BIR Tax Payment Deposit Slips and a Jetter issued
by RDO Nacar. These documents, however, do not
prove that Asiatrust's application for tax abatement has
been approved. If at all, these documents only prove
Asiatrust's payment of basic taxes, which is not a
ground to consider its deficiency tax assessment closed
and terminated.
WON paying the final withholding tax again would
amount to double taxation?
NO. Since no tennination letter has been issued by the
BIR, there is no reason for the Court to consider as
closed a.'1d terminated the tax assessment on
Asiatrust's final withholding tax for fiscal year ending
June 30, 1998. Asiatrust's application for tax abatement
will be deemed approved only upon the issuance of a
tem1ination letter, and only then will the deficiency tax
assessment be considered closed and terminated.
However, in case Asiatrust's application for tax
84
abatement is denied, any payment made by it would be
applied to its outstanding tax liability. For this reason,
Asiatrust' s allegation of double taxation must also fail.

WON CIR failed to comply with Sec. 1, Rule 8 of the

Revised Rules of the CTA?

YES. An appeal to the CTA En Banc must be preceded by

the filing of a timely motion for reconsideration or new
trial with the CTA Division.

In order for the CTA En Banc to take cognizance of an

appeal via a petition for review, a timely motion for
reconsideration or new trial must first be filed with the
CTA Division that issued the assailed decision or
resolution. Failure to do so is a ground for the dismissal
of the appeal as the word "must" indicates that the
filing of a prior motion is mandatory, and not merely
directory.

The same is true in the case of an amended decision.

Section 3, Rule 14 of the same rules defines an
amended decision as "[a ]ny action modifying or
reversing a decision of the Court en bane or in Division."
As explained in CE Luzon Geothermal Power Company,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, an amended
decision is a different decision, and thus, is a· proper
subject of a motion for reconsideration. In this case,
:the CIR' s failure to move for a reconsideration of the
Amended Decision of the CTA Division is a ground for
the dismissal of its Petition for Review before the CTA
En Banc. Thus, the CTA En .Banc did not err in denying
the CIR's appeal on procedural grounds.

85
Bankard Inc., vs. Luz P. Alarte evidence. In determining where the preponderance or
G.R. No. 202573, April 19, 2017 superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies,
the court may consider all the facts and circumstances
FACTS:
of the case, x x x.'
Petitioner Bankard, Inc. (Bankard now RCBC
The statement of account submitted is worded
Bankard Services Corporation) is a duly constituted
indicates that it is a running balance, a continuing and
domestic corporation doing business as a credit card
mounting bill of charges consisting of a combined
provider. In 2007, petitioner filed a collection case
principal amount with finance and penalty charges
against respondent Luz P. Alarte before the MTC. In its
imposed, which respondent appears to have failed to
Complaint, petitioner alleged that respondent applied
pay in the past. This is shown by the fact that
for and was granted credit accommodations under
respondent has failed to pay a past bill amounting to
Bankard myDream JCB; that respondent, using the said
:P64,615.64 - the "previous statement balance" in the
credit card, availed herself of credit accommodations by
very first line of the above-quoted statement of
"purchasing various products; that per Statement of
account. This could mean that there really were no
Account dated July, 2006, respondent's credit
immediate purchase transactions made by respondent
availments amounted to a total of P67,944.82, inclusive
for the month that needed to be specified in the July 9,
of unbilled monthly installments, charges and penalties
2006 Statement of Account; that instead, she simply
or at least the minimum amount due under the credit
repeatedly failed and continues to fail to pay her credit
card; and that respondent failed and refuses to pay her
card debt arising out of past credit card purchase
obligations despite her receipt of a written demand.
transactions to petitioner, which thus resulted in a
Despite service of summons, respondent failed to file
mounting pile of charges imposed upon her outstanding
her answer. For this reason, petitioner filed a Motion to
account as reflected in a statement or bill of charges or
Render Judgment which was granted.
accounts regularly sent to her.
Plaintiff merely submitted a document that the
While the Court believes that petitioner's claim
balance indicating the alleged purchases made by
mnay be well-founded, it is not enough as to allow
single statement of account which merely reflected
judgment in its favor on the basis of extant evidence. It
amounts imposed as late charges of the defendant and
must prove the validity of its claim; this it may do by
not as the result availment of the credit card. Therefore,
amending its Complaint and adducing additional
MTC descion, case dismissed because the petitioner
evidence of respondent's credit history and proving the
failed to establish evidence that would amount to
loan transactions between them. After all, credit card
preponderance of evidences needed as provided by the
arrangements are simple loan arrangements between
Rules on Summary Procedure. RTC affirmed. CA
the card issuer and the card holder. Simply put, every
affirmed. Thus, this present petition.
credit card transaction involves three contracts, namely:
ISSUE: (a) the sales contract between the credit card holder
and the merchant or the business establishment which
WON the petitioner had established a preponderance of accepted the credit card; (b) the loan agreement
evidence to support its claim? between the credit card issuer and the credit card
holder; and lastly, ( c) the promise to pay between the
RULING:
credit card issuer and the merchant or business
NO. Petitioner failed to established establishment.
preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of
evidence, in civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by a preponderance of

86
Philippine Steel Coating Corporation vs. Edward
Quinones
G. R. No. 194533, May 19, 2017
FACTS:
This case arose from a Complaint for damages
filed by respondent Quinones (owner of Amianan
Motors) against petitioner PhilSteel. The Complaint
alleged that in early 1994, a sales engineer of PhilSteel,
offered Quinones their new product: primer-coated,
long-span, rolled galvanized iron (G.1.) sheets. The
latter showed interest, but asked Lopez if the primer-
coated sheets were compatible with the Guilder acrylic
paint process used by Amianan Motors.. Uncertain, he
referred the query to his immediate superior, Ferdinand
Angbengco, PhilSteel's sales manager. Angbengco
assured Quinones that the quality of their new product
was superior to that of the non-primer coated G.l.
sheets being used by the latter in his business and
further guaranteed that a laboratory test confirming
that they are compatible; hence, Quinones purchase
the product and use it in the manufacture of bus units.
However, sometime in 1995, Quinones received
several complaints that the paint of the bus they bought
are peeling off. Quinones sent a complaint to Philsteel
invoking warranties. Philsteel said that the damage was
attributable to the incompabality of the product,
contrary to their prior assurance to Quinones. PhilSteel
counters that Quinones himself offered to purchase the
subject product directly from the former without being
induced by any of PhilSteel's representatives and that
the damages was caused by the erroneous painting
application done by respondent. The R TC rendered a
Decision in favor of Quinones because the assurance
made by Angbengco constituted an express warranty
under Article 1546 of the Civil Code. Quinones incurred
damages from the repair of the buses and suffered
business reverses.. CA Affirmed. Thus, this petition.
ISSUES:
WON vague oral statements made by seller on the
characteristics of a generic good can be considered
warranties that may be invoked to warrant payment of
damages?
YES. As held in Carrascoso, Jr. v. CA, 7 the following
requisites must be established in order to prove that
there is an express warranty in a contract of sale: ( 1)
the express warranty must be an affirmation of fact or
any promise by the seller relating to the subject matter
of the sale; (2) the natural effect of the affirmation or
promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the thing;
and (3) the buyer purchases the thing relying on that
affirmation or promise.
A warranty is a statement or representation made by
the seller of goods - contemporaneously and as part of
the contract of sale - that has reference to the
character, quality or title of the goods; and is issued to
promise or undertake to insure that certiain facts are or
shall be as the seller represents them. A warranty is not
necessarily written. It may be oral as long as it is not
given as a mere opinion or judgment. Rather, it is a
positive affirmation of a fact that buyers rely upon, and
that influences or induces them to purchase the
product.
Contrary to the assertions of petitioner, the finding of
the CA was that the former, through Angbengco, did
not simply make vague oral statements on purported
warranties. Petitioner expressly represented to
respondent that the primer-coated G .I. sheets were
compatible with the acrylic paint process used by the
latter on his bus units. This representation was made in
the face of respondent's express concerns regarding
incompatibility. Petitioner also claimed that the use of
their product by Quinones would cut costs. Angbengco
was so certain of the compatibility that he suggested to
respondent to assemble a bus using the primer-coated
sheet and have it painted with the acrylic paint used in
Amianan Motors.
Thus, it was not accurate for petitioner to state that
they had made no warranties. It insisted that at best,
they only gave "'assurances" of possible savings
Quinones might have if he relied on PhilSteel's primer-
coated G.I. sheets and eliminated the need to apply an
additional primer.
87
WON general warranties on the suitability of products
sold prescribe in six (6) months under Article 1571 of
the Civil Code?
NO. Article 1398 is applicable. There being an express
warranty, this Court holds that the prescription period
applicable to the instant case is that prescribed for
breach of an express warranty. The applicable
prescription period is therefore that which is specified
in the contract; in its absence, that period shall be
based on the general rule on the rescission of contracts:
four years (see Article 1389, Civil Code). In this case, no
prescription period specified in the contract between
the parties has been put forward. Quinones filed the
instant case on 6 September 1996 or several months
after the last delivery of the thing sold. His filing of the
suit was well within the prescriptive period of four
years; hence, his action has not prescribed.
WON respondent as buyer is equally negligent
NO. Negligence is the absence of reasonable care and
caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in a given situation. Under Article 1173 of the Civil
Code, where it is not stipulated in the law or the
contract, the diligence required to comply with one's
obligations is commonly referred to as paterfamilias; or,
more specifically, as bonos paterfamilias or "a good
father of a family." A good father of a family means a
person of ordinary or average diligence. To determine
the prudence and diligence that must be required of all
persons, we must use as basis the abstract average
standard corresponding to a normal orderly person.
Anyone who uses diligence below this standard is guilty
of negligence.
It bears reiteration that Quinones had already raised
the compatibility issue at the outset. He relied on the
manpower and expertise of PhilSteel, but at the same
time reasonably asked for more details regarding the
product. It was not an impulsive or rush decision to buy.
In fact, it took 4 to 5 meetings to convince him to buy
the primed G .I. sheets. And even after making an initial
order, he did not make subsequent orders until after a
painting test, done upon the instructions of Angbengco
proved successful. The test was conducted using their
acrylic paint over PhilSteel's primer-coated G.I. sheets.
Only then did Quinones make subsequent orders of the
primer-coated product, which was then used in the
mass production of bus bodies by Amianan motors.
Francis C. Arsenio vs. Atty. Johan A. Tabuzo
A.C. No. 8658, April 24, 2017
FACTS:
A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Tabuzo,
Overseas Eployment Adjudicator, which stemmed from
an administrative complaint by the petioner against a
recruitment agency. During a scheduled hearing, Atty.
Tabuzo asked Asenio to sign 3 blank papers in which he
complied with. A week after, Arsenio asked Atty.
Tabuzo the reason why he was made to sign blank
sheets of paper. Atty. Tabuzo angrily said, "Bwiset!
Napakakulit mo, doon mo malaman mamaya
pagdating.ng kalaban mo!" Thereafter, Arsenio again
asked Atty. Tabuzo as per advised of Senator Cayetano
but the latter again shouted at him saying, "Bwiset!
Goddamit! Alam mo ba na maraming abogado dito sa
POEA na nagbebenta ng kaso? x x x.” Arsenio later on
discovered that his case against the agancy was
dismissed. Hence, he filed a complaint against Atty.
Romeo Tabuzo before the Office of the Ombudsman for
violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the "Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In a Resolution , Graft Investigation ordered that an
Information be filed against Atty. Romeo Tabuzo upon
finding of probable cause. Atty. Tabuzo filed a Motion
for Reconsideration alleging, among others, that there
is no Atty. Romeo Tabuso in the POEA and that he was
never handed any copy of summons. He claimed that he
was merely taking the initiative in filing the said motion
to clear his name as he believed he was the person
referred to in the earlier Order of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Motion Denied. RTC, acquitted Atty.
Tabuzo.
Subsequently, Arsenio filed the present Complaint-
Affidavit before this Court. Case was recommended to
IBP. Atty. Tabuzo denied the accusations against him,
claiming that the alleged unethical acts are baseless. He
88
averred that he had never acted in any conduct
unbecoming of a public officer or uttered invectives and
other alleged acts. IBP recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for 3 months. Atty. Tabuzo filed
a Motion for Reconsideration, denied.
ISSUE:
WON the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a
sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Tabuzo?
RULING:
NO. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis
and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a
civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the
legal profession of its undesirable members in order to
protect the public and the courts In the recent case of
Reyes v. Nieva, this Court had the occasion to clarify
that the proper evidentiary threshold in disbarment
cases is substantial evidence. In this case, noteworthy is
the fact that the reason advanced by the IBP-CBD in
recommending reprimand against Atty. Tabuzo is its
consideration of the: (1) Resolution issued by the Office
of the Ombudsman, which states that there was
probable cause against Atty. Tabuzo for violating RA
3019; and (2) Complaint-Affidavit of Arsenio, which
alleges that Atty. Tabuzo made offensive statements.
However, a careful scrutiny of the evidence presented
reveals that the degree of proof indispensable in a
disbarment case was not met.
In Arsenio’s Sworn Affidavit, Arsenio merely narrated
that Atty. Tabuzo uttered offensive statements and no
other evidence was presented to substantiate his claim.
Emphatically, such Complaint-Affidavit is self-serving.
Summarily, the Resolution issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman together with the Affidavit of Arsenio
cannot be considered as substantial evidence. For one,
the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman was
decided on the basis of the failure of Atty. Tabuzo to
controvert the allegations of Arsenio. Also, the
Complaint-Affidavit was not sufficient as no evidence
was further offered to prove the allegations contained
therein. While the quantum of evidence required in
disbarment cases is substantial evidence, this Court is
not persuaded to exercise its disciplinary authority over
Atty. Tabuzo.
VILLARAMA vs. ATTY. DE JESUS
April 17, 2017
G.R. No. 217004
PERALTA, J.
FACTS: Defendant agreed to render legal services for
petitioner and as stipulated in their contract, aside from
Professional Fee, Success Fee of P1 Million shall be paid
to defendant upon the latter's success in retaining
possession and titling of the property under the
petitioner's name. Defendant was successful in
retaining 70% of petitioner's possession of the property,
however, was not able to fulfill the second condition
due to (according to the CA) legal impossibility.
ISSUE:Whether Atty. De Jesus is entitled to the
stipulated success fee of P1 Million
RULING: “Yes. He is still entitled to 50% of the P1
Million success fee stipulated in the contract. The
payment of success fee is dependent on the fulfillment
of the two conditions this falls under a contingent fee
contract. A contingent fee contract is an agreement in
writing where the fee, often a fixed percentage of what
may be recovered in the action, is made to depend
upon the success of the litigation.
There is no legal impossibility in the fulfillment of the
second condition. It was petitioner-client who refused
to pay the Bank 30% equity of the property for the
whole property to be finally titled under his name. The
SC considered the fact that through the services of
defendant, petitioner was awarded 70% of the
property.
In the absence of the written agreement, the lawyer's
compensation shall be based on quantum meruit, which
means 'as much as he deserved.'"
UNDURAN vs. ABERASTURI
April 18, 2017
G.R. No. 181284
PERALTA, J.
89
FACTS: Petitioners contend that IPRA was not enacted
to protect an IP from another IP whether from the same
or different group, because they have their own means
of resolving a dispute arising between them, through
customary laws, as had been done for a very long time
even before the passage of the law. Thus it is the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples which has
the jurisdiction over such case involving a conflicting
claim over an ancestral domain and not the regular
courts.
ISSUE:Whether it is the NCIP and not the regular courts
who has the jurisdiction over such case
RULING: “The NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they
arise between or among parties belonging to the same
ICC/IP group because of the qualifying provision under
Sec 66 of the IPRA that 'no such dispute shall be
brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted
all remedies provided under their customary laws.'
NCIP's jurisdiction under Sec 66 of the IPRA is limited,
but not concurrent with the regular courts. The Court
restates that under Sec 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall
have limited jurisdiction over claims and disputes
involving rights of IPs/ICCs only when they arise
between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP
group; but if such claims and disputes arise between or
among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP
group, the proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction."
FERGUSON vs. ATTY. RAMOS
April 18, 2017
A.C. No. 9209
Per Curiam:
FACTS: Defendant-lawyer was suspended from the
practice of law for 6 months for engaging in a private
practice while employed in the government service. The
price of the property in the Deed of Sale of the
petitioners was fraudulently altered by the defendant,
their signatures were forged, and the same was
notarized by the defendant without the presence of the
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Ramos violated the Rules on
Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional
Responsibility
RULING: Yes. Section 2 (b), Rule IV of the Rules· on
Notarial Practice of 2004 mandates that a notary public,
before notarizing a document, should require the
presence of the very person who executed the same.
The presence of the parties to the deed is necessary to
enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of
the signature of the affiant.
It must be emphasized that notarization is not an
empty, meaningless and routinary act. It is imbued with
public interest and only those who are qualified and
authorized may act as notaries public.
He likewise violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which obliges a lawyer to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes; and Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any
unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, Atty. Ramos
was mandated to exercise the function of his office and
must observe with utmost care the basic formalities of
his office and requisites in the performance of his
duties.
In Santuyo v. Atty. Hidalgo, the respondent lawyer
similarly denied having notarized the subject deed of
sale. The Court found him negligent not only in the
supposed notarization but in allowing the office
secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial
registry which was supposed to be done and kept by
him alone.
While in Ocampo-lngcoco v. Atty. Yrreverre, Jr., the
Court held that a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed it are the very
same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the truth of the contents
therein.
90
ROY vs. HERBOSA
April 18, 2017
G.R. No. 207246
CAGUIOA, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner-movant declared that the SEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing SEC-MC No.
8 as the same was in compliance with the decision of
the Court in Gamboa vs. Teves. The movant also raised
his requisite standing because this case is one of
transcendental importance and that the Court has the
constitutional duty to exercise judicial review over any
grave abuse of discretion by any instrumentality of
government.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has a legal standing
RULING:
No. Movant's repeated invocation of the transcendental
importance of the Gamboa case does not ipso facto
accord locus standi to movant. Being a new petition,
movant had the burden to justify his locus standi in his
own petition.
Indispensable parties are those with such a material and
direct interest in the controversy that a final decree
would necessarily affect their rights, so that the court
cannot proceed without their presence.
There is a need of an actual case or controversy before
the Court may exercise its power of judicial review. The
movant's petition is not that actual case or
controversy.”
QUIMVEL vs. PEOPLE
April 18, 2017
G.R. No. 214497
VELASCO, JR., J.
FACTS: The challenged rulings of the CA sustained and
modified the petitioner's conviction by the Trial Court of
the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Sec.
5(b), Art. III of RA 7610. The issue raised in this case is if
he may be convicted only of acts of lasciviousness under
Art. 336 of the RPC and not in relation to Sec. 5(b) of RA
7610.
ISSUE: WhetherSec. 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 shall be
applied or Art. 336 of the RPC
RULING: “Petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized
under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.
It is fundamental that, in criminal prosecutions, every
element constituting the offense must be alleged in the
Information before an accused can be convicted of the
crime charged to apprise the accused of the nature of
the accusation against him.
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused, the designation of the offense by
the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed.
Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.- Those who commit the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual
abuse; Provided, That when the [victim] is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336
of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code,
for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be:
Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x
The allegations are sufficient to classify the victim as
one 'exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual
abuse.' This is anchored on the very definition of the
phrase in Sec. 5 of RA 7610, which encompasses
children who indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group. The law punishes not only
child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse
against children.”
91
VISAYAS GEOTHERMAL POWER CO. vs. CIR
G.R. No. 205279
April 26, 2017
REYES, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner filed for a refund of unutilized input
VAT with BIR. After 45 days, petitioner immediately
filed a petition for review with the CTA claiming that BIR
failed to act upon the claim for refund. CTA denied the
petition for being prematurely filed.
ISSUE: Whether the tax refund was prematurely filed
RULING: “Section 112(C) of the 1997 NIRC, provides
that the Commissioner has 120 days within which to
decide on an application for refund or tax credit, to be
reckoned from the date of submission of complete
documents in support of the application.
The Court ruled in San Roque case that 'failure
to comply with the 120-day waiting period violates a
mandatory provision of law. It violates the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and renders the
petition premature and thus without a cause of action,
with the effect that the CTA does not acquire
jurisdiction over the taxpayer's petition.'
With the current rule that gives a taxpayer 30
days to file the judicial claim even if the CIR fails to act
within the 120-day period, the remedy of a judicial
claim for refund or credit is always available to a
taxpayer.
The CTA en banc's reliance on the general rule
enunciated by the Court in San Roque is misplaced.
Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner failed to
wait for the expiration of the 120-day mandatory
period, the CTA could still take cognizance of the
petition for review.”
In re: Alleged immorality and unexplained wealth of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado and
Clerk of Court IV Mona Lisa A. Buencamino,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City
A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-21-SB-J
April 4, 2017
Mendoza, J.
Facts:
The case stemmed from an anonymous letter-complaint
filed before the Office of the President charging
respondents Justice Jurado and Atty. Buencamino with
unexplained wealth and immorality. The anonymous
letter was eventually referred to the Court by the
Ombudsman.
The respondents respectfully explained the alleged
inconsistencies in the Office of Court Administrator
report regarding their properties as indicated in their
SALNs.
Issue:
Whether there is substantial proof to prove the guilt of
the respondents
Ruling:
No. In administrative cases, the quantum of proof
necessary for the finding of guilt is substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence; it is the amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
In this case, there is no prima facie shoeing that either
of the respondents has unlawfully accumulated wealth.
Both had sufficiently explained how they got into the
business of real estate which was supported by the
evidence on record.
Renato S.D. Domingo in his own behalf and on behalf
of his co-heirs of the late Sps. Felicidad De Domingo
and Macario C. Domingo vs. Sps. Engracia D. Singson
and Manuel F. Singson/Heirs of Spouses Felicidad S.D.
Domingo and Macario Domingo Vs. Engracia D.
Singson, et al.
G.R. No. 203287/G.R. No. 207936
April 5, 2017
Reyes, J.
Facts:
Respondent Engracia originally filed a complaint for
ejectment against the petitioners alleging that she is the
owner of the subject lot evidenced by Deed of Absolute
Sale. Petitioners contended that the signature in the
92
DAS was forged, hence charged the respondent of
falsification of documents. Engracia filed a motion to
suspend the criminal proceeding due to prejudicial
question.
Respondents alleged that the validity and genuineness
of the Absolute Deed of Sale which was the subject of
the civil case was determinative of their guilt of the
crime charged. The private prosecutor filed an
opposition to the motion stating that the criminal case
can proceed independently from the civil case. The
motion to suspend however was granted.
Issue:
Whether prejudicial question exists
Ruling:
Yes. A prejudicial question is understood in law to be
that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in a said case
and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into
play generally in a situation where civil and criminal
actions are pending and the issues involved in both
cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must
be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the
criminal action can proceed, The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions.
For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a
criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal
proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case,
the following requisites must be present; 1) the civil
case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based; 2) in
the resolution of the issue raised in the civil action, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined; and 3) jurisdiction to try said question
must be lodged in another tribunal.
Based on the issues raised in both civil and criminal case
against the respondents, there indeed appears to be a
prejudicial question in the case at bar. The defense in
the civil case for annulment of sale is that Engracia
bought the subject property from their parents prior to
their demise and that their signatures appearing on the
DAS are true and genuine. Their allegation in the civil
case is based on the very same facts, which would
necessarily determinative of their guilt or innocence as
accused in the criminal case.
California Manufacturing Company, Inc. vs. Advanced
Technology System, Inc.
G.R. No. 202454
April 25, 2017
Sereno, CJ.
Facts:
Respondent ATSI filed a complaint for Sum of Money
against CMCI to collect unpaid rentals. CMCI moved for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
extinguishment of obligation through legal
compensation. CMCI argued that legal compensation
had set in.
Issue:
Whether legal compensation has set in
Ruling:
No. Contrary to the claim of CMCI, none of the letter
from the Spouses tends to show that ATSI was even
remotely involved on the proposed offsetting of the
outstanding debts of CMCI and PPPC. Article 1279 of the
Civil Code provides that in order that compensation
may be proper, the law requires that the debts be
liquidated and demandable. Liquidated debts are those
whose exact amounts have already been determined.
CMCI has not presented any credible proof, or even just
an exact computation of the supposed debts of PPPC.
The uncertainty in the supposed debt of PPPC to CMCI
negates the latter’s invocation of legal compensation as
justification for its non-payment of the rentals of the
machines,
Republic of the Philippines vs. Valentina Espinosa, et
al.
G.R. No. 186603
April 5, 2017
Jardeleza, J.
Facts:
A cadastral decree was issued to Espinosa. Espinosa
sold the property to Caliston. The State filed a
complaint for Annulment of the title and reversion of
land claiming that the property is inalienable public land
because it fell within a timberland area as indicated in a
Land Classification Map. Caliston countered that the
property was not a timberland.
93
Issue:
Whether the State has sufficiently proved that the
property is part of inalienable forest land at the time
Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree and issued a
title.
Ruling:
No. In land registration proceedings, the applicant has
the burden of overcoming the presumption of State
ownership. It must establish, through incontrovertible
evidence, that the land sought to be registered is
alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the
government. Since cadastral; proceedings are governed
by the usual rules of practice, procedure and evidence,
a cadastral decree and a certificate of title are issued
only after the applicant proves all the requisite
jurisdictional facts-that they are entitled to the claimed
lot, that all the parties are heard, and that evidence is
considered. As such, the cadastral decree is a judgment
which adjudicates ownerships after proving these
jurisdictional facts.
Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a
cadastral decree and was subsequently issue OCT No,
the predecessor of Caliston’s TCT No. Having been
granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa
can be presumed to have overcome the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain. This means that Espinosa, as the
applicant, was able to prove by incontrovertible
evidence that the property is alienable and disposable
property in the cadastral proceedings.
This is not to say, however, that the State has no
remedy to recover the property if indeed it is part of the
inalienable lands of the public domain. The State may
still do so through the action for reversion, as in the
present case.
Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to
the Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the
mass of the public domain. It is proper when public land
is frequently awarded and disposed to private
individuals or corporations. There are also instances
when we granted reversion on grounds other than
fraud, such when a person obtains title under the
Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands
which cannot be registered under Torrens system, or
when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction
over the same because it is of the public domain.
People of the Philippines vs. Carlito Claro y Mahinay
G.R. No. 199894
April 5, 2017
Bersamin, J.
Facts:
RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of rape and
was affirmed by the CA. The accused denied the
allegation and invoke the sweetheart defense.
Issue:
Whether the lower courts correctly find and pronounce
the accused guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
No. The sweetheart defense is not usually regarded
with favor in the absence of strong corroboration. This
is because the mere fact that the accused and the
victim were lovers should not exculpate him from
criminal liability for rape. In People v. Orquina, the
Court observed that an allegation of a "love
relationship" between the parties, even if found to be
true, did not eliminate the use of force to consummate
the crime because the gravamen of rape is the carnal
knowledge of a woman against her will and without her
consent.
Yet, it is not fair and just to quickly reject the defense of
consensual sexual intercourse interposed by the
accused. To be noted first and foremost is that he and
AAA were adults capable of consenting to the sexual
intercourse. The established circumstances- their having
agreed to go on a lover’s date, the travelling together a
long way from their meeting place on board the
jeepney, their alighting in Rizal Avenue to take meal
together, their walking together to the motel, and
checking in together at the motel without the
complainant manifesting resistance and their entering
the designated room without protest from her-
indicated beyond all doubt that they had consented to
culminate their lover’s date in bed inside the motel.
Although she claimed that he had held her by the hand
and pulled her upstairs, there is no evidence showing
that she resisted in that whole time or exhibited a
reluctance to enter the motel with him. Instead, she
appeared to have walked with him towards the motel,
and to have entered it without hesitation. What she did
not do was eloquent proof of her consent.
94
JONATHAN Y. DEE v. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT
LIMITED, et. al,
March 15, 2017
G.R. No. 224834
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, et. al. v.
ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., et. al.
G.R. No. 224871
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts: Harvest, et. al. are minority stockholders of
Alliance. As per Alliance by-laws, its Annual
Stockholder’s Meeting (ASM) is held every June 15.
However, the BOD, in its special meeting, passed a
Board Resolution indefinitely postponing the ASM
pending complete subscription to its Stocks Rights
Offering (SRO)consisting of shares with total value of
Php 1 Billion. Harvest filed the Application for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
and TRO claiming that the subscription to the new
shares cannot be made a condition precedent to the
exercise by the current stockholders of their right to
vote in the 2015 ASM. They paid Php 8,860 as filing
fees. Alliance raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on
the ground of Harvest’s failure to pay the correct filing
fees arguing that the same should be based on the SRO
valued at Php 1 Billion. The RTC dismissed the complaint
but the CA reversed the same.
Issue: Whether or not Harvest paid insufficient filing
fees for their complaint
Held: The Court, after having classified that the subject
matter of the action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, remanded the case to the RTC to determine
if the payment of the filing fees constitutes sufficient
compliance with Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 (fees for
all other actions not involving property), in conformity
with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5,2016.
In determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation,
the nature of the principal action or remedy being
sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover
a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of the principal sought ,
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money. The action of Harvest is incapable of
pecuniary estimation since its main purpose is to have
Alliance hold its 2015 ASM on the date set in the
corporation’s by-laws.
ROMULO ABROGAR and ERLINDA ABROGAR v.
COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY and INTERGAMES,INC.
March 15,2017
G.R.No. 164749
Bersamin, J.
Facts: Rommel Abrogar, the son of the petitioners,
joined the ‘’1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon” running
contest organized by the respondents. During the
marathon, Rommel was bumped by a jeepney that was
then running along the route of the marathon. Despite
treatment, Rommel died. Petitioners sue the
respondents to recover damages for the death of their
son.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and awarded
actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees. All the parties appealed. The
petitioners contended that damages for loss of earning
capacity should have been awarded.
The respondents, on the other hand, argued that that
they were not negligent and hence not liable in the
death of Rommel. The CA reversed the decision and
held, inter alia, that the respondents were not negligent
and that the doctrine of assumption of risk was
applicable. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Court can review the factual
issues of the case
2. Whether or not the respondents’ negligence was the
cause of the death of Rommel
3. Whether or not the doctrine of assumption of risk
was applicable
4. Whether or not damages for loss of earning capacity
should be awarded
Held:
95
1. Yes, the Court can review the factual findings
because there was conflict between the findings of fact
by the RTC and the CA on the issue of negligence. The
Court recognized the following exceptions to the rule
that the findings of the fact of the CA are conclusive and
binding:
a. When the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures;
b. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible;
c. when there is grave abuse of discretion;
d. When the judgment is based on the misapprehension
of facts
e. When the findings of facts are conflicting;
f. When in making its findings the CA went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appelant and the appelee;
g. When the findings are contrary to the trial court;
h. When the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
i. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent;
j. When the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record;
k. When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion
2. Yes, the negligence of Intergames as the organizer
was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel but
Cosmos was not liable for the negligence of Intergames.
To be considered the proximate cause of the injury, the
negligence need not be the event closest in time to the
injury; a cause is still proximate, although farther in
time in relation to injury, if the happening of it set other
foreseeable events into motion resulting ultimately in
the damage. Intergames was negligent for not
conducting the race in a road blocked off from vehicular
traffic and in not properly coordinating the personnel
manning the route. Vehicular accident was an event
known and foreseeable which could have been avoided
with due diligence. The negligence of the driver was not
an efficient intervening cause enough to break the chain
of connection between the negligence of Intergames
and the death of Rommel.
3. No, the doctrine of assumption of risk was not
applicable. This doctrine means that one who
voluntarily exposes himself to an obvious, known and
appreciated danger assumes the risk of injury that may
result therefrom. It requires three elements,namely: 1)
the plaintiff must know that the risk is present; 2) he
must further understand its nature; and 3) his choice to
incur it must be free and voluntary. These elements
were not shown to exist.
4. Yes, damages for loss of earning capacity may be
awarded to the heirs of a deceased non-working victim
simply because earning capacity, not actual earning,
may be lost. The formula for this purpose is:
Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x (Gross Annual
Income LESS Necessary Living Expenses)
MERCEDITA C. COOMBS v. VICTORIA C. CASTANEDA,
VIRGILIO VELOSO SANTOS, SPS. PANCHO & EDITH
LEVISTE, BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK and the REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF MUNTINLUPA CITY
March 15,2017
G.R.No. 192353
Leonardo-De Castro, J
Facts: Coombs is the owner of the real property covered
by TCT No. 6715. When she tried to pay the RPT, she
was told that said property was no longer under her
name. She later found out that TCT No. 6715 was
already cancelled and replaced by another under the
name of Santos. TCT No. 6715 was ordered cancelled by
the RTC upon petition of Castaneda for the issuance of
second owner’s duplicate copy.
Coombs filed a petition for the annulment of said
judgment contending that the TC did not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter because the
owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT was never lost and
had always been in her possession but CA dismissed the
same.
Issue: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the
subject matter
Held: No, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter. What was conferred by Section 10 of RA No. 26
to RTC is judicial reconstitution of a lost or destroyed
owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title. Since the
owner’s duplicate copy was never lost nor destroyed
96
because it has always been with the petitioner, then
RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter. Grounds for
annulment under Section 2, Rule 47 include extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, the CA should
have not dismissed the petition for annulment of
judgment.
DEMETRIO R. ALCANTARA v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et. al.
March 15,2017
G.R.No. 192536
Bersamin, J.
Facts: Alcantara was the owner of a parcel of land. The
BIR informed him, through a letter, that a certain
amount was still due from him representing deficiency
income tax and fixed tax, surcharge, interest and
compromise penalty for late payment but there was no
response from Alcantara. The BIR then issued two
demand letters but still there was no response.
The CIR issued a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy
against the properties of Alcantara. Subsequently, the
BIR issued a Notice of Seizure of Real Property but since
no bidder appeared or the highest bidder is insufficient
to pay taxes, a Declaration of Forfeiture of Real
Property was issued and the levied property was
forfeited to the Government to which a new title was
issued. Subsequently, the BIR issued a Notice of Sale for
the resale of the property to which Lagahit was
proclaimed the winning bidder.
Alcantara filed a complaint for depriving him of his
property without due process of law. The RTC dismissed
the complaint and the CA affirmed the same on the
ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction because what
was being challenged was the validity of the assessment
made by the BIR and that even assuming the RTC has
jurisdiction, it is the CTA which has jurisdiction over the
appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the
complaint
2. Whether or not the proper appellate authority to
question the decision of the RTC was the CTA
Held:
1. No, the RTC had no jurisdiction because what was
being assailed by Alcantara was the assessment and
collection of taxes made against him. Alcantara should
have first protested administratively in the CIR as
provided for in Section 229and 230 of PD 1158.
2. Yes, the CTA shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions of the CIR
in cases involving disputed assessments as provided for
by RA No. 1125 prior to its amendment by RA No. 9282.
The CA was correct in dismissing the complaint because
the appeal was erroneous (Section 2, Rule 50).
DE OCAMPO MEMORIAL SCHOOLS, INC., v. BIGKIS
MANGGAGAWA SA DE OCAMPO MEMORIAL SCHOOL,
INC.
March 15,2017
G.R.No. 192648
Jardeleza, J.
Facts: Union registration was issued in favor of Bigkis
Manggagawa sa De Ocampo Memorial Medical Center
(BMDOMMC). Later on, a union registration was also
issued to Bigkis Manggagawa sa De Ocampo Memorial
School (BMDOMSI). De Ocampo filed a petition for
Cancellation of Certificate of Registration of the
BMDOMSI with the DOLE-NCR on the ground of
misrepresentation, mixed membership of rank-and-file
and managerial employees and inappropriate
bargaining unit. DOLE-NCR ruled in favor of de Ocampo
so BMDOMSI filed an appeal to the BLR. BLR reversed
the decision. De Ocampo filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the CA but the CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether BMDOMSI committed
misrepresentation and fraud in applying for a union
registration
Held: No. For fraud and misrepresentation to constitute
grounds for cancellation of union registration under the
Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and
misrepresentation must be grave and compelling
enought to vitiate the consent of a majority union
members.
97
UST vs Samahang Manggagawa ng UST
GR 184262
April 24, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe,J:
Facts:
This case stemmed from a complaint for regularization
and illegal dismissal filed by the respondents.
Respondents alleged that on various periods from 1990-
1999 petitioner repeatedly filed the respondents to
perform various maintenance work. Hence they should
be deemed as regular employees. On the other hand
maintained that they were merely hired on a per
project basis evidenced by their contractual agreements
that petitioner’s employment will be automatically
terminated (a) upon the expiration of the specific term
specified in the CEA; (b) when the project is completed
ahead of such expiration; or (c) in cases when their
employment was extended due to the non-completion
of the specific project for which they were hired, upon
the completion of the said project.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners were regular employees
and were illegally dismissed?
Held:
Yes. Petitioners are regular employees. the law
provides for two (2) types of regular employees,
namely: (a) those who are engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer (first category); and
(b) those who have rendered at least one year of
service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to
the activity in which they are employed (second
category). Petitioners fall under the second category.
Also petitioners could not be considered as project
employees because the specific undertakings or
projects for which they were employed were not clearly
delineated.
Bilag vs. Ay-ay
G.R. No. 189950
April 24, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J:
Facts:
Respondents alleged that petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest, sold to them separately various portions of a
parcel of land and that they registered the
corresponding Deeds of Sale. According to the
respondents, the petitioner’s predecessor has
acknowledge the same and has caused to remove the
subject land to the Ancestral Land Claims.Petitioners
averred that the subject lands are untitled,
unregistered, and form part of the Baguio Townsite
Reservation which were long classified as lands of the
public domain. As such, the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the case as it is the Land Management Bureau which is
vested with the authority to determine issues of
ownership over unregistered public lands. RTC ruled in
the petioner’s favor.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the said case?
Held:
No. RTC is without jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is defined as
the power and authority of acourt to hear, try, and
decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative
body to have authority to dispose of the case on the
merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over
the subject matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over
the subject matter is the power to hear and determine
the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or
acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous
belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power
it has is to dismiss the action. Since the subject lands
are untitled and unregistered public lands it is the
Director of Lands who has the authority to award
ownership.
98
Mendoza vs Peroxide Phil Inc
G.R. No. 203492
April 24, 2017
Reyes, J:
Facts:
The petitioner’s predecessor in interest executed a
Contract of Lease with the respondents over a parcel of
land. his case stemmed from the ejectment case filed by
the petitioners against the respondents. The METC
ordered the respondents to vacate the land. Upon a
public auction the petitioner was the highest bidder and
the levied properties of the respondents were found
inside the subject property. A writ of preliminary
injunction was issued and the deputy sheriff padlocked
the said property. Petitioners however forcibly opened
the gate and dismantled the machineries of the
respondents. For several days petitioners refused to
obey the court order. The petitioners' sole argument is
premised on the fact that since they are the registered
owners of the subject property, then the lower courts
do not have legal basis in ordering that the subject
property be turned over to respondents and the same
be padlocked pending trial of the main case.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injuction is proper?
Held:
Yes. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any
stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment
or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a
person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is the
'strong arm of equity, An extraordinary peremptory
remedy that must be used with extreme caution,
affecting as it does the respective rights of the parties.
The sole purpose of which is to preserve the status quo
until the merits of the main case can be heard. Under
the factual setting of this case, PPI was able to
sufficiently establish that it had a right over the
properties which should be protected while being
litigated. PPI' s claimed ownership over the
improvements erected and/or introduced in the subject
property was then being violated by the petitioners who
had started entering the premises and started
dismantling the improvements and machineries
thereon.
BIR vs Lepanto Ceramics
G.R. No. 224764
April 24, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J:
Facts:
Lepanto Ceramics filed a petition for corporate
rehabilitation stating that it has entered into a state of
insolvency. The Rehabilitation Court issued a
Commencement order declaring the respondent to be
under corporate rehabilitation and suspending all
proceedings for the enforcement of claims against it.
Despite such order the BIR sent a notice of informal
conference and Formal Letter of Demand to the
respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the BIR has violated the
Commencement Order?
Held:
Yes. The inherent purpose of rehabilitation is to find
ways and means to minimize the expenses of a
distressed corporation during the rehabilitation period.
However creditors of the distressed corporation are not
without remedy as they may participate in the
proceedings. The acts of sending a notice of informal
conference and a formal letter of demand are part and
parcel of the entire process for the assessment and
collection of deficiency taxes from a delinquent
taxpayer—an action for the enforcement o a claim
which should have been suspended pursuant to the
Commencement Order.
Bustos vs Millians Shoe
GR 185024
April 24, 2017
99
Sereno, CJ:
Facts:
A parcel of land was levied by the city government for
non payment of real estate taxes. When the proper was
auctioned the petitioner emerged as the highest bidder.
The same property was also involved in a rehabilitation
proceeding of the respondent company. The
respondent aver that the previous owners of the
property are shareholders of it as a close corporation
and therefore liable for its obligations. Petitioner moved
for the exclusion of the property from the Stay Order.
RTC denied it.
Issue:
Whether or not the property is answerable for the
obligations of the respondent corporation?
Held:
No. There is no evidence that the corporation is a close
corporation. The Supreme Court thus applied the
general doctrine of separate juridical personality which
provides that a corporation has a legal personality
separate and distinct from that of people comprising it.
Herma Shipyard, Inc. and Mr. Herminio
Esguerra vs. Danilo Oliveros, et al.
April 17, 2017
G.R. No. 208936
Del Castillo, J.
Facts:
The respondents were employees of Herma Shipyard
(Herma) occupying various positions. They filed a
Complaint for illegal dismissal, regularization and non-
payment of service incentive leave pay alleging that
they are Herma’s regular employees who have been
continuously performing tasks usually necessary and
desirable in its business. However, they were dismissed
from their employment. They also alleged that as a
condition to their continuous and uninterrupted
employment, Herma made them sign employment
contracts for a fixed period of 1 to 4 months to make it
appear that they were project-based employees and
stated that Herma did this scheme to defeat their right
to security of tenure and if they were project
employees, Herma should have reported to DOLE the
completion of project but they failed to do so.
As a defense, Herma argued that the respondents were
its project-based employees in its projects and that the
specific project for which they were hired has been
completed and as a support, they showed the contracts
of employment, Kasunduang Paglilingkod (Pang-
Proyeldong Kawani).
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Herma stating that
the respondents were project-based employees whose
services were validly terminated upon the completion
of the specific work in which they were hired. On
appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
sustained the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the CA and set aside the previous Decisions and held
that even if the contracts of employment indicated
were hired as project employees, their status have
become regular since they were performing tasks that
are necessary, desirable and vital to the operation of
Herma’s business and their failure to present proof that
the respondents were hired for a specific period and it’s
not clear from the contracts presented that the
completion or termination of the project was already
determined. Also, it the respondents were repeatedly
and successively rehired as employees.
Issue:
Whether the respondents were project-based
employees and not regular employees of Herma.
Held:
1. Yes, they were project-based employees of Herma.
The Supreme Court ruled that project-based employee
under Article 280 (now Art. 294) of the Labor Code is
one whose employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking, the completion or termination
of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee. The principal test in
determining whether the employees were engaged as
project-based is whether they were assigned to carry
out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and
scope of which was specified and made known to them
at the time of the engagement. In this case, the
respondents knowingly and voluntarily entered into and
signed the project-based employment contracts for all
their contracts state clearly the date of the
commencement of the specific task and the expected
completion date.
100

Roberto P. Fuentes vs. People of the Philippines
April 17, 2017
G.R. No. 186421
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts:
Roberto Fuentes (Fuentes) is the Municipal Mayor of
Isabel, Leyte who in such capacity committed an offense
in relation to his office which cause undue injury to Fe
Valenzuela (Valenzuela), the private complainant, by
refusing for unreasonable length of time the renewal of
her Business Permit without any legal basis or reason
despite the compliance of Valenzuela that caused
damage to the perishable ship provisions of Valenzuela
and a denial of her right to engage in a legitimate
business.
The prosecution alleged that Valenzuela is the sole
proprietor of Triple A Ship Candling and General
Maritime Services (Triple A) which was operating in the
Port since 1993 until 2001 through the Business Permits
issued by the LGU of Isabela. However, in 2002, Fuented
refused to sign Triple A’s Business Permit despite the
compliance of the requirements. Initially, the company
was able to carry its business by securing temporary
permits but soon shut down after it was alleged to be
involved in a smuggling and drug trading that caused
the BOC to require Valenzuela to secure a Business
Permit but to no avail.
Fuentes then averred that as early as 1999-2001, he has
been hearing rumors that Valenzuela was engaged in
smuggling and drug trading but he did not act on the
same. However, in 2002, he received written reports
from the Prime Movers for Peace and Progress and
Isabel Chief of Police allegedly confirming the said
rumors that prompted him to hold Valenzuela’s
approval of Triple A’s permit. So she filed a criminal case
against Fuentes in Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan found Fuented guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the prosecution had established
all the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Aggrieved, Fuentes moved for reconsideration but was
denied.
Issue:
(Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
1. Whether the Sandiganbayan’s Decision is correct.
Held:
1. Yes, it is correct. The Supreme Court reiterated that
the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are
as follows: (1) that the accused must be a public
officerdischarging administrative, judicial, or official
functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy
with such public officers); (2) that he acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable
negligence; and (3) that his action caused any undue
injury to any party, including the government, or giving
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference in the discharge of his functions.
As to the 1st element, it is undisputed that Fuentes was
a public officer. As to the 2nd element, Fuentes done the
three modes of the commission of the crime for him
himself testified that all of his basis were according to
the rumors that he heard. As regards to bad faith, it is
the prerogative of the mayor to suspend, revoke, or
refuse to issue Business Permits pursuant to Sections
1623 and 444(b) (3) (iv)24 of the Local Government
Code even the fact that Valenzuela had complied with
all the requirements, he did not issue Valenzuela a
Business Permit. As to the 3rd element, suffice it to say
that Fuentes's acts of refusing to issue a Business Permit
in Valenzuela's favor, coupled with his issuance of the
unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred
Triple A from engaging in its ship chandling operations
without such Business Permit, caused some sort of
undue injury on the part of Valenzuela. Undeniably,
such suspension of Triple A's ship chandling operations
prevented Valenzuela from engaging in an otherwise
lawful endeavor for the year 2002. To make things
worse, Valenzuela was also not issued a Business Permit
for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, as it was only
in 2007 that such permit was issued in Triple A's favor.
Under prevailing case law, proof of the extent of
damage is not essential, it being sufficient that the
injury suffered or the benefit received is perceived to be
substantial enough and not merely negligible.
RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF ROWIE A.
QUIMNO, Utility Worker I, Municipal Circuit Trial Court
101
of Ipil -Tungawan - Roseller T. Lim, Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay
April 17, 2017
A.M. No. 17-03-33-MCTC
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts:
Rowie A. Quimno (Quimno) is a Utility Worker I on
MCTC of Ipil-Tungawan-Roseller T. Lim in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. The records of the Employees’
Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) show that Quimno
submitted his Daily Time Record (DTR) since February
2016 up to the present neither submitted any
application for leave resulting to an absence without
official leave since February 1, 2016.
Moreover, Presiding Judge Ventura informed OCA that
Quimno not only failed to submit his DTR since February
2016 but also failed to report for work since July 20,
2016 without applying for leave and that prior to this,
he was either late for work or absent, was lazy,
indifferent and unreliable.
Thus, Quimno received unsatisfactory ratings. Later on,
Judge Ventura found out that Quimno was arrested and
was formally charged for violationg RA No, 9165 but
still, Quimno has still not reported from work so OCA
recommended that Quimno’s name be dropped from
the rolls, that his position be declared vacant and be
informed about his separation from service but still
qualified to receive the benefits he may be entitled and
may still be reemployed in the government.
Issue:
Whether Quimno should be dropped from the rolls.
Held:
Yes. Under 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave,
as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 13, Series of
2007, the effect of absences without approved Leave is
that the official or employee shall be considered on
absence without leave (AWOL) and shall be separated
from the service or dropped from the rolls without
proper notice. Indeed, the prolonged unauthorized
absences of Quimno cause inefficiency in the public
service and its continued absence without leave
disrupts the normal functions of the court which
contravenes the duty of a public servant to serve with
utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.
Teddy Castro and Lauro Sebastian vs. Pablito V.
Mendoza, Sr., et al.
April 26, 2017
G.R. No. 212778
Jardeleza, J.
Facts:
The respondents in this case are the compulsory heirs
of Simeon Santos regarding a parcel of land while the
petitioners are agricultural tenants of the original
Santos property. From July 1981 when Teddy
substituted his mother Rosalina Castro in the tenancy of
the original Santos property, he has been in its actual
possession, occupation, and cultivation, personally
performing all aspects of production with the aid of
labor from the other petitioner Sebastian and paying
the agreed lease rentals.
The controversy started when Jesus (owner-heir) sold
his undivided share in the original Santos property to
respondent Municipalitywhich was acquired for the
expansion and construction of the Bustos public
market.As of 1989, the lots surrounding the first public
market in respondent Municipality, including the
original Santos property and the portion sold by Jesus,
have been classified as a commercial area.From 1991 to
1994, all phases of the sales transaction between Jesus
and respondent Municipality and the subsequent
construction and completion of the public market, were
effected without issue or complaint from the
petitioners.
Most notably, after the transfer of ownership of the
property to respondent Municipality, the latter, in 1993,
began construction of the public market which was
eventually inaugurated and after the inauguration of
the public market, petitioners filed their complaint for
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with prayer for
Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction; Pre-emption
and Redemption; and Damages before the PARAD.
In their complaint, petitioners categorically manifested
their serious intent to exercise their rights of pre-
emption and redemption provided for under Sections
11 and 12, Republic Act No. 388and soon deposited the
redemption price for the property. The PARAD ruled
that the petitioners are the tenants of the entire
original Santos property, including the property now
102
owned by respondent Municipality and both Jesus and
respondent Municipality failed to give notice of the sale
of the property to the tenants, the petitioners.
On appeal, The Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) also affirmed PARAD’s
Decision but ruled that it would be impractical to
reinstate them in the possession or allow them to
redeem it where there is no showing of petitioner’s
capacity to pay the redemption price. The petitioners
appealed to the CA where it affirmed the rulings of
PARAD and DARAB.
Issues:
1. Whether the private respondents, as owners of the
market stalls and lessees in the public market, are real
parties-in-interest.
2. Whether the transfer of ownership is covered by the
PARAD’s original ruling recognizing petitioners’ right to
redeem the property.
3. Whether petitioners validly exercised their right of
redemption.
Held:
1. Yes, as vendor-owner of the market stalls, possessors
of the property, private respondents are necessary
parties who ought to have been impleaded in the case if
complete relief is to be accorded those already parties,
or for a complete determination or settlement of the
claim subject of the action.
2. The Decision of PARAD indeed recognized petitioner’s
right of redemption but it did not contemplate an
adjudication of ownership. Basic is the rule that a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable.Once a case is decided with finality, the
controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest.68
Such a rule rests on public policy and sound practice
that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of
courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must
become final at some definite date fixed by law.
3. No, under Section 12 of the RA 3844, the right of
redemption is validly exercised upon compliance with
the following requirements: (a) the redemptioner must
be an agricultural lessee or share tenant; (b) the land
must have been sold by the owner to a third patty
without prior written notice of the sale given to the
lessee or lessees and the DAR; (c) only the area
cultivated by the agricultural lessee may be redeemed;
and (d) the right of redemption must be exercised
within 180 days from written notice of the sale by the
vendee. In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners are
bona fide tenants of the original Santos property and
portion of that land was sold by an owner-heir, Jesus, to
a third party, respondent Municipality, without any
written notice of the sale to petitioners and the DAR
also the fact that the petitioners failed to consign the
full redemption price when they filed the complaint,
then there was no valid exercise of the right to redeem
the property.
CITY OF DAVAO, represented by RODRIGO R. DUTERTE,
in his capacity as City Mayor, RIZALINA JUSTOL, in her
capacity as the City Accountant, and ATTY. WIDEL E.
AVISADO, in his capacity as City Administrator vs.
Robert E. Olanolan
April 17, 2017
G.R. No. 181149
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts:
Robert Olanolan (Olanolan) was elected and proclaimed
as the Punong Barangay of Brhy. 76-A. an election
protest was filed by the opposing candidate, Celso Tizon
(Tizon) but was initially dismissed but was later granted
by the COMELEC, 2nd Division, on appeal declaring Tizon
as the duly-elected Punong Barangay. Olanolan then
filed a motion for reconsideration but to no avail. Thus,
he filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition with a prayer for the Issuance of a TRO
where the Court en banc gave due course and issued a
Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) which was immediately
implemented by DILG resulting to the reinstatement of
Olanolan.
In his reinstatement, he presided and passed an
ordinance. On March 2005, the Court en banc dismissed
respondent’s petition and recalled its SQAO. He then
filed for a motion for reconsideration but the DILG
Region XI rejected Tizon’s legal counsel for immediate
implementation of the Court’s Recall Order because the
Recall Order was in effect, an order of dissolution which
is immediately executory and effective that’s why the
City of Davao refused to recognize all acts and
transactions made and entered into by Olanolan as
Punong Barangay after his receipt of the Recall Order.
Nothwithstanding this, the Office of the Sangguniang
Barangay issued a Resolution requesting the Regional
Director of DILG Region XI to issue a directive for the
officials of petitioner to recognize the legitimacy of
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Olanolan as the Punong Barangay but before any action
could be taken by the DILG, he filed a Petition for
Mandamus seeking to compel petitioner to allow the
release of funds in payment of all obligations incurred
under his administration. In the interim, the Court en
banc denied with finality Olanolan’s motion for
reconsideration.
The RTC dismissed Olanolan’s mandamus for the reason
that there was still an adequate remedy which are
available in the ordinary course of law violating the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Dissatisfied, he filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied and elevated his case to the CA on certiorari
and ruled that an exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion was present in that the mandamus only
raised pure legal question, hence should not be
dismissed and that it is the ministerial duty of the
petitioner to release the share of Brgy. 76-A in the
annual budget and that the city government is not
authorized to withhold the said share. Aggrieved, the
petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied in
a Resolution.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in reversing RTC’s dismissal of
Olanolan’s mandamus petition.
Held:
Yes, the Supreme Court defined mandamus as a writ
commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to
do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such
other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, Olanolan has no clear legal right to the
performance of the legal act to be compelled. Thus,
considering that Olanolan had no right to the office of
the Punong Barangay at the time he filed his mandamus
petition, during which the SQAO had already been
recalled, he had no valid legal interest to the reliefs of
which altogether justifies the dismissal of his petition.
Also, It is well-settled that mandamus only lies to
enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and
not to control the performance of a discretionary
power. Purely administrative and discretionary
functions may not be interfered with by the courts.
In this case, the petitioner, as city government, had to
exercise its discretion not te release the funds to
Olanolan considering the COMELEC’s declaration of
Tizon as the duly-elected Punong Barangay and it was a
part of petitioner’s fiscal responsibility to ensure that
the barangay funds would not be released to a person
without proper authority, that Barangay funds shall be
kept in the custody of the city or municipal treasurer, at
the option of the barangay and any officer of the local
government unit whose duty permits or requires the
possession or custody of local government funds shall
be accountable and responsible for the safekeeping
thereof in conformity with the provisions of the law.
Sumifru (Philippines) Corporation vs. Bernabe Baya
April 17, 2017
G.R. No. 188269
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts:
Baya alleged that he had been employed by AMSFC and
DFC since 1985 and from then, worked his way to a
supervisory rank on 1997. As a supervisor, he joined the
union of supervisors and formed AMS Kapalong
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multipurpose
Cooperative (AMSKARBEMCO). In 1999, he was
reassigned to a series pf supervisory positions in
AMSFC’s sister company, DFC, where he also became a
member of its supervisory union while at the same
time, was active at AMSKARBEMCO.
Later on, AMSKARBEMCO petitioned before DAR some
hectares of AMSFC’s property a banana plantation
which was covered by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law and soon transferred to AMFSC’s regular
employees as Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARB),
including Baya. When AMSFC learned that
AMSKARBEMCO entered into an export agreement with
another company, it summoned AMSKARBEMCO
officers, including Baya, to lash out and threatened
them that the ARBs' takeover of the lands would not
push through.
A few days later, Baya received a letter stating that his
secondment with DFC has ended, thus, ordering his
return to AMSFC. However, upon Baya' s return to
AMSFC, he was informed that there were no
supervisory positions available thus, he wasassigned to
different rank-and-file positions instead. He then filed a
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written request to be restored to a supervisory position
but was denied prompting him to file a complaint. In
their defense, AMSFC and DFC stated that they did not
illegaly or constructively dismiss Baya considering that
his termination from employment was a direct result of
the ARB’s takeover through the agrarian reform
program.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in Baya’s favor since it was
undisputed that Baya held supervisory positions in
AMSFC and DFC and that his demotion to various rank-
and-file positions without any justifiable reason
constituted constructive dismissal.
Aggrieved, the respondents appealed to the NLRC and
reversed and set aside the ruling of the LA for they
found that the termination was not caused by illegal or
constructive dismissal but by the cessation of AMSFC’s
business operation or undertaking in large portions of
its banana plantation due to the implementation of the
agrarian reform program.
Baya moved for reconsideration but was denied
prompting him to file a petition for certiorari before the
CA and reinstated the ruling of LA with modification of
deleting the award of backwages, annual vacation leave
pay, and subsidies for it is undisputed that the facts
clearly establish constructive dismissal.
Issue:
1. Whether Baya was constructively dismissed
2. Whether AMSFC and DFC are liable to Baya for
separation pay.
3. Whether Sumifru should be held solidarily liable with
AMSFC for Baya’s monetary awards.
Held:
1. Yes, the Supreme Court reiterated that constructive
dismissal exists where there is cessation of work,
because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a
demotion in rank or a diminution in pay and other
benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act
amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were
not, constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act
of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an
employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the
employee that it could foreclose any choice by him
except to forego his continued employment. In this
case, the records reveal that the top management of
AMSFC and DFC were well-aware of the lack pf
supervisory positions in AMSFC and notwithstanding
this, they still proceeded to order Baya’s return forcing
him to accept rank-and-file positions. Thus, the Court
cannot lend credence to the contention that Baya’s
termination was due to ARB’s takeover of the banana
plantation because the takeover occurred on
September 2002 while the acts of constructive dismissal
were performed as early as August 2002.
2. Yes, because Baya was constructively dismissed, the
Supreme Court used the doctrine of strained relations.
Under this doctrine, the payment of separation pay is
considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement
when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable.
On one hand, such payment liberates the employee
from what could be a highly oppressive work
environment. On the other hand, it releases the
employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of
maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer
trust.
3. No, AMSFC and DFC are the ones guilty of acts
constitutive of constructive dismissal performed against
Baya. As such, they should be deemed as solidarily
liable for the monetary awards in favor of Baya.
Meanwhile, Sumifru, as the surviving entity in its
merger with DFC, must be held answerable only for the
latter's liabilities, including its solidary liability with
AMSFC arising herein. A jurisprudence states that “in
the merger of two existing corporations, one of the
corporations survives and continues the business, while
the other is dissolved and all its rights, properties and
liabilities are acquired by the surviving corporation," as
in this case.
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