Modern Theology 22:1 January 2006

ISSN 0266-7177 (Print)

ISSN 1468-0025 (Online)

CHRISTIAN ORTHODOXY AND

RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

TERRENCE W. TILLEY

A vexing issue in the Christian theology of religions has been the compati-
bility of pluralist theories of religion with orthodox teaching in ecclesiology,
soteriology and Christology. Extreme positions can be ignored: radical
exclusivism which claims that all who do not believe in Jesus’ name are
bound for hell is as intolerable to orthodox theology as indifferentist plu-
ralism which finds that all religions are equally valid or invalid paths to a
single transcendent goal. Between these two positions, however, the limits
of orthodoxy are not clear. The point of this paper is to show, against those
who would argue otherwise, that at least one form of pluralism, labeled
“inclusivist pluralism” is compatible with orthodox belief. The approach is
to demonstrate that the position of the late Jacques Dupuis, S.J., is compati-
ble with that of the small syllabus on religious pluralism issued by the
Roman Catholic Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Dominius Iesus.
Technically a declaration, Dominus Iesus (DI) issued on 6 August 2000, was
received as a mixed blessing by the theological community and leaders of
other churches, ecclesial communities, and living religious traditions.1 Sup-
porters have claimed that “nothing new” was to be found in the text. DI
simply grouped together elements of standard Catholic teaching on religious
diversity. Critics agreed, but noted that DI seemed to take some statements
out of context and to ignore the developments of thirty-five years of ecu-
menical and inter-religious discussion. Not only was the text of DI said to
be regressive and disappointing, but it also reminded some of previous sum-
maries of church teachings like the Syllabus of Errors (1864) or Pascendi
Dominici Gregis (1908). The Syllabus and Pascendi, however, were framed in
terms of condemnations whereas DI was developed in terms of what the

Terrence W. Tilley
Department of Religious Studies, University of Dayton, 300 College Park, Dayton, OH 45469-
1530, USA

© 2006 The Author

Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
52 Terrence W. Tilley

church positively teaches. F.X. Clooney, S.J., (SN, pp. 165–166) has suggested
that this new style is not very helpful. While I would ordinarily tend to agree
with Clooney’s point, this positive format of DI makes the present analysis
possible.
The key element of DI is the rejection of theories of “de jure” religious plu-
ralism (DI, 4). These theories must be rejected, DI states, because they or their
presuppositions are incompatible with Catholic teaching. The present essay
shows what it means for a theory of “de jure” religious pluralism to be incom-
patible or inconsistent with the propositions DI puts forth as Catholic teach-
ing. The issue of incompatibility, however, is properly a logical issue, and
only secondarily a theological issue. Unfortunately, almost all commentary
and reaction has focused on the latter. This essay seeks to remedy that lack.
The conclusion shows the significance of this logical work for one powerful,
practical theological approach to Christians’ working with religious
diversity.

Compatibility and Incompatibility

Two views, theories, or positions can be said to be incompatible precisely
insofar as the propositions that express each are incompatible with each
other.2 To use a simple example, if I view this hat as green and you see it as
blue, then our views are incompatible because the propositions each of us
would use in expressing our views, “this hat is blue” and “this hat is green”
are contradictory. Both cannot be true.3 When DI asserts that it proposes to
refute “specific positions that are erroneous or ambiguous” (DI, 3), it pro-
poses to show that propositions found in certain forms of “de jure” religious
pluralism are incompatible with “certain truths that are part of the church’s
faith” (DI, 3). DI asserts as truths of the faith a set of propositions that must
be “firmly believed” (DI, 5, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 20), “firmly held” (DI, 7), that
“the Catholic faithful are required to profess” (DI, 6) or are “truths of the
faith” (DI, 22). While theologians may properly debate the best formulations
of these “truths of the faith” or their place in a hierarchy of truths, those
issues are not our concern in this essay. The only question discussed here is
whether the propositions DI asserts with grave authority can properly be
said to be incompatible with the propositions that express a “de jure” reli-
gious pluralism.
The claim DI makes is fundamentally logical; it is only after the logical
issues are clarified that theological theories can properly be developed. This
essay does not propose a theory of religious diversity. Nor does it attend to
theories that clearly support real religious indifferentism. Nor does it deal
with philosophical theories, like John Hick’s,4 or any theory that finds all
religious traditions simply on a level with each other regarding truth and/or
salvific efficacy. Nor is this essay concerned with intra-Christian, ecumeni-
cal issues. Rather, it examines only the logical issues involved in the posi-
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 Christian Orthodoxy and Religious Pluralism 53

tion DI takes regarding theories of “de jure” religious pluralism. What this
essay shows is that there are some versions of a “de jure” pluralist theology
of religions that simply are not incompatible with the “truths of the Catholic
faith”.
The exercise undertaken here is analogous to the “free will defense” in
work on the problem of evil. Philosophers from the Enlightenment (e.g.,
David Hume) to recent times (e.g. John Mackey) had formulated the problem
of evil as a problem of incoherence, incompatibility or contradiction. Their
claims, when rendered most clearly, were that no person could rationally
hold a view that there was real evil in the world and that God as tradition-
ally conceived exists. In logical form, they claimed two propositions entailed
a contradiction:
p: “God is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent” and
q: “There is (genuine) evil in the (actual) world.”5
“If God is all-good, all-powerful and all-knowing, why is there evil in the
world?” Since God knew about it, could do something about it and would
want to, to believe in God was finally incompatible with believing that there
was evil in the world. In other words, if one believed p, they said, one could
not rationally also believe q.
However, the free will defense demonstrates that p and q are compatible
and that a person can hold these both without self-contradiction or inco-
herence.6 The solution to the logical problem of evil was accomplished by
showing that a proposition like r, “All evils result from the actions/choices
of free creatures” is possibly true and compatible with p. Combining p and
r entails q. This demonstrates the logical compatibility of p and q. The stick-
ing point in this demonstration was divine omnipotence. A free will defense
shows that God could make creatures free or make them good, but that even
an omnipotent God could not make creatures which always freely chose the
good; so even an omnipotent creator could not both make beings free and
make them unwaveringly good. Hence, it is possibly true that all evils in the
world result from the free choices or actions of creatures—choices and
actions beyond the control of even an omnipotent creator. While other issues
remain regarding God and evil, the logical problem of evil has been solved
by showing that p (which we believe) is compatible with q (which we believe)
because combining p with r (which is possibly true, but which we may or
may not believe) entails q.
The parallel question investigated here is whether we can solve the logical
problem of religious pluralism. Can we show theories of “de jure” religious
pluralism are compatible with the Catholic faith? To answer this question,
three exercises are required.
First, we must formulate the propositions that express the relevant truths
of the Catholic faith (a set of propositions a). They cannot be abbreviated so
simply and elegantly as p above, as DI identifies ten truths relevant to the
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54 Terrence W. Tilley

issue at hand, whereas only three attributes of God are relevant in discus-
sions of the problem of evil. But happily this first exercise is made relatively
straightforward since DI carefully marks the relevant propositions; in what
follows, I have combined some of these truths and have expressed them in
eight propositions.
Second, we must formulate a proposition or propositions that express the
key issue in theories of de jure religious pluralism (a proposition or set of
propositions b). These propositions must represent a specific type of theory
that DI alleges is incompatible with the Catholic faith, a “de jure” as opposed
to a “de facto” version of religious pluralism (cf. DI, 4). Happily, this is not
difficult.
Third, we must formulate a possibly true proposition (not one which we
must believe or assert or think actually true) which, when combined with
(a) entails (b). If we can find such a proposition, then we have shown that
the central proposition of “de jure” religious pluralism is compatible with the
truths of Catholic faith identified by DI, despite DI’s assertion to the
contrary.

The Truths of Dominus Iesus

The first task is to lay out the propositions of set (a), those propositions iden-
tified in DI as part of the faith. Some of these propositions are stated here in
slightly simplified terms, but throughout are understood in the way that DI
states and nuances them.
(a1) “The revelation of Jesus Christ is definite and complete” (DI, 5).
The document asserts that the contrary of this position is the view that
the revelation of Jesus Christ is “limited, incomplete, or imperfect” (DI, 6)
because no religion could grasp and manifest the truth about God in its
“globality and completeness” (DI, 6). The “words, deeds, and entire histor-
ical event of Jesus . . . possess in themselves the definitiveness and com-
pleteness of the revelation of God’s salvific ways, even if the depths of the
divine mystery in itself remains transcendent and inexhaustible” (DI, 6).
That everything that God has revealed is completed or perfected in Jesus,
however, does not imply that anyone knows that revelation completely or
perfectly. That would be a claim so fraught with hubris as to be untenable.
It is entirely possible that Christians’ interactions with those of other reli-
gious or philosophical traditions may lead Christians to understand more
fully that which God has revealed or to find various expressions that may
properly deepen, nuance, or otherwise modify our understanding of the
definitive and perfect revelation. For example, the use of the term homoousios
to express Christ’s relationship to the Father—a term not explicitly found in
Scripture—by Church Fathers may be an instance of realizing more fully and
expressing more clearly what was definitively and completely revealed in
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 Christian Orthodoxy and Religious Pluralism 55

Jesus. (a1) concerns the ordo essendi, what the church believes is the revela-
tion in Jesus, not the ordo cognoscendi, what the church understands of the rev-
elation in Jesus.
(a2) “Theological faith must be distinguished from belief in other
religions” (DI, 7).
Theological faith is a gift of grace. It “involves a dual adherence: to God
who reveals and to the truth which he reveals” (DI, 7). Belief in other reli-
gions is asserted to be “religious experience still in search of the absolute
truth and still lacking in assent to God who reveals himself” (DI, 7). The doc-
ument reminds Catholics that understanding faith as a gift of grace received
in obedience has a long tradition in Christianity. However, the specific con-
trast the document draws between faith and belief is rooted in a distinction
made prominent by twentieth-century Protestant theologian Karl Barth. Yet,
as Harvey Egan, S.J., has noted, “The church teaches explicitly that a person
is saved through faith” and also noted that DI (2, 21) affirms that those
outside of Christianity can be saved (SN, p. 61).
DI seems to have in mind philosophers of religion who cannot make a the-
ological distinction between faith and belief. In so doing, DI reminds us that
theologians cannot simply take over philosophical categories. However,
while one can recognize that beliefs present in other religious traditions may
be the product of human experience, it is not at all clear that they must be
the product only of human experience. If any who are saved are saved by
grace through faith, it is possible that at least some members of those tradi-
tions have used their beliefs as their ways of expressing their responses also
to the grace of saving faith given them by God.
The issue of Christianity’s relationship with Judaism and the status of
Judaism is crucial here. As Philip Cunningham put it, “this section reads as
saying that Jews have no faith and no divine revelation, but possess only
humanly derived beliefs about God. This construal . . . denies God’s election
of Israel and the establishment of the Sinaitic covenant” (SN, p. 136). As
Cunningham noted, Jews and Judaism were simply out of the picture when
DI was composed (cf. SN, p. 137). So while proposition (a2), as it stands, can
be validly claimed to express a truth of the faith, it is not clear that the
document’s own gloss of this proposition, at least with regard to belief
and faith, is a full or adequate account of belief in other traditions. As we
move into the next section of this article, this distinction will be seen to be
important.
(a3) “Jesus alone is the Son and Word of the Father” (cf. DI, 10).
This proposition opposes those views that separate the salvific activity of
the logos from Jesus. Some find that the World is equally manifest in other
figures, that an economy of salvation exists “outside the Church” (DI, 9), or
that the logos of God has exercised salvific activity “‘in addition to’ or
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56 Terrence W. Tilley

‘beyond’ the humanity of Christ” (DI, 10) after the Incarnation. Such views
are incompatible, DI asserts, with the Catholic faith. We can, however, note
that the presence of the logos in creation and in the First Covenant are not
incompatible with a distinction, not a separation, between the logos as logos
and the logos as incarnate in Jesus. While asserting a separation of the logos
from the incarnate logos or a splitting of the salvific activity of the logos into
two spheres would be incompatible with Catholic faith, so would failure to
distinguish the logos as a person of the Trinity and Jesus as a person with
divine and human natures (hence, the important qualifier in DI, 11, “after
the Incarnation”).7
(a4) “The salvific economy is unique and undivided” (cf. DI, 11).
DI asserts in this context that Jesus is the universal redeemer and media-
tor and rejects an economy of salvation in and through the Spirit that is
“more universal” (DI, 12) than the economy of salvation in and through the
Word. Since the universality of Jesus’ mediation is often asserted in DI, the
key opposition here is to theories that have two or more economies of sal-
vation. Hence, in forming (a4), I have substituted “unique and undivided”
as the key attribute of the economy of salvation for the unwieldy “unicity”
at this point because uniqueness and universality is what the document
asserts and envisions. The Spirit “extends” the salvific economy “to all
humanity and the entire universe” (DI, 12), but this is inseparable (though
not indistinguishable) from salvation in and through Jesus. If it is not indis-
tinguishable, then the Annunciation and the Incarnation are not significant
events in the economy of salvation.
(a5) “The salvific economy in and through Jesus is universal.”
(a5) is the complement of (a4). Whatever diversity there may be in the
means or realization of salvation—and DI is little concerned with that diver-
sity—those means are essentially bound to Christ. There are no independent
saviors or economies of salvation. But the ordo essendi is not the ordo actuandi.
Just as other religious traditions may enable us to understand better the
perfect and final revelation given in Jesus, so the other religious traditions
may enable those who are not Catholic Christians to participate in the salvific
economy given in Jesus. Just as the Logos actuated the salvific economy of
salvation before the Incarnation and the actualization of the hypostatic
union, so the logos may actuate the one and universal salvific economy
essentially realized in Jesus in various ways even today for those who may
not be Catholic Christians. These actualizations must not be separate, but
may be distinct, modes of actualization of salvation which God uses for those
members of other, or no, religious traditions who have no concept of salva-
tion in and through Jesus and could not respond to God’s gift of faith in
Christian terms, but must use terms of their own traditions to respond to
and accept the divine gift of grace.
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 Christian Orthodoxy and Religious Pluralism 57

(a6) “The economy of salvation in Christ is final.”

(DI, 14) reiterates the points of (a5) and (a6). “It must therefore be firmly
believed as a truth of Catholic faith that the universal salvific will of the one
and triune God is offered and accomplished once for all in the mystery of
the incarnation, death and resurrection of the Son of God” (DI, 14). DI 14
further recognizes the distinction introduced above between the ordo essendi
and the ordo actuandi in quoting Lumen Gentium 62 while acknowledging
“participated forms of mediation” that are not separate from Christ. The
point of this proposition is that Christ is not to be surpassed, superseded, or
supplemented any more than the sacrifice of the cross is superseded, sur-
passed or supplemented by the repeated sacrifice of the Mass. What is
accomplished in Christ (ordo essendi) is actualized, extended, and made avail-
able in the Eucharistic sacrifice (ordo actuandi) most centrally. This does not
preclude it being actualized in other ways.
(a7) “The unique, undivided Church founded by Christ subsists in the
Catholic Church and is necessary for salvation” (cf. DI, 16, 20).
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss intra-Christian, ecumenical
issues. For present purposes, the relevant issue is the relationship of the
church and the kingdom of God. DI, 19 cites Redemptoris Missio at length in
order to warn of the dangers of separating Christ from the church or either
from the kingdom of God. Nonetheless, Christ, the church, and the kingdom,
however inseparable, are not indistinguishable or identical. Each is related
to and distinguished from the other. DI warns of theological confusion and
one-sidedness in this area and cites Lumen Gentium 48 in affirming the church
as the universal sacrament of salvation.
(a8) “The Church is the instrument for the salvation of all of humanity”
(DI, 22).
This claim, according to DI, is both willed by God and a truth of faith.
“Indifferentism”, by which the document means forms of egalitarian reli-
gious relativism (i.e., one religion is as good as another) is the defining oppo-
site here.8 DI makes useful distinctions regarding both the mission of the
church ad gentes, the respect due other religious traditions and the proper
presumptions for engaging in the practice of interreligious dialogue. But
again, we must distinguish here the ordo essendi with the ordo actuandi. It may
indeed be the case that God wills the salvation of humanity and the cosmos
through the church, but it is not at all clear that the church can be relevant
to those who have never heard of it. To assert that all of those are damned,
of course, is not DI’s intention. Hence, some distinction such as that between
the essential nature of the church and the way it is actualized in the salvific
plan of God must be made. What distinction that should be, however, seems
beyond the concerns of DI. DI is concerned to rule out certain forms of plu-
ralism as compatible with the Catholic faith.
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58 Terrence W. Tilley

Formulating a Central Claim of “de jure” Religious Pluralism

Fortunately, it is easy to formulate a version of “de jure” religious pluralism,
Jacques Dupuis, S.J., has identified the key element. I would summarize the
claim as follows:

(b) “Religious traditions other than Christianity have a positive salvific

significance for their followers, in accordance with the eternal plan of
God for humanity.”9

The advantage of this claim is it simplicity and clarity. It does not require a
theory of how God has planned this plurality. Perhaps many theological the-
ories incorporating this claim can be formulated that are in accord with the
truths identified from DI as “of the faith.” But even if no theory of “inclu-
sivist pluralism” can be constructed that is in accord with the truths of
Catholic faith as elaborated in DI, that does not mean that this claim is
incompatible with DI. The question is whether it is compatible with DI,
which remains a logical issue.
Theories of pluralism are not necessary, and may even be harmful. Con-
sider an analogy with the problem of evil.10 Theories of why God allows evil
in the world tend to make God into a sadist or child-abuser (“I’m hurting
you or allowing you to suffer for your own good”), a destroyer (“If the world
didn’t turn out well, God would destroy it and start again”), or impotent
(“God could do nothing about the holocaust or any other large evil in the
world”). Theodicies, that is, theories about why God allows evil in the world,
tend to make things worse. This has led some philosophers, e.g., D. Z.
Phillips, to reject all philosophical work regarding God and evil. I agree with
Phillips in part: Theodicies do more harm than good.
However, a philosophical defense of the compatibility of two beliefs,
based, perhaps, on different bases or evidence or experiences, is a different
issue. Defenses do not seek to give explanations—recognizing that there is
a realm of mystery which we cannot always penetrate—but rather seek to
show that two beliefs are compatible and that the appeal to mystery in this
realm is not self-contradictory (an indicator of “self-deception” or a “cover
story” or other forms of obfuscation). A defense does not do the harm that
theodicies do because it does not seek to solve the problem of evil, but to
recognize its depth and to affirm that the hope that God will bring good
out of evil in ways we do not fathom is not a belief or hope that is self-
contradictory wishful thinking.
Similarly, a defense of the compatibility of “de jure” religious pluralism
with the truths of Catholic faith does not try to say how God will utilize other
traditions for the salvation of humans or what status they have in the divine
plan, but simply to show that one can believe that they are part of God’s
eternal plan and that Jesus is the savior that Catholics are to confess He is.
It may be that in attempting to build theories in this area, as in the attempts
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 Christian Orthodoxy and Religious Pluralism 59

to construct theodicies, theologians try to do too much, to explain away what

is ultimately a mystery. But because we do not have a fully satisfactory theory
of religious pluralism to explain its compatibility with Catholic faith is no
more an argument against the key claims of religious pluralism “de jure” than
an argument that we do not have a satisfactory theodicy rules out belief in
God and simultaneously that there are genuine evils in the world.

Are (a1–8) and (b) compatible?

How can we show these propositions compatible? What is needed is a pos-

sibly true proposition that is consistent with series (a) and combined with
one of the (a) propositions entails (b). It is important to remember that we
do not have to accept this proposition as actually true, or to assert it as true,
but only to recognize that it is possibly true. Consider the following:

(c) “Because the revelation and the salvation effected in Jesus Christ by
God would not be known and accepted through the medium of the
church by all people in the history of the world, God eternally planned
that other religious traditions would have a positive salvific significance
for their followers.”

(c) clearly is compatible with (b). Is it compatible with (a1–8)? (a1) asserts the
definitiveness and completeness of the revelation of Jesus Christ. While
clearly we do not fully understand that revelation—and will not understand
it fully in this world—we cannot deny its definitiveness and completeness.
Indeed, we should even assert it. Therefore, to be explicit, we should
substitute:

(c1) “Because the complete and definitive revelation and the salvation
effected in Jesus Christ by God would not be known and accepted
through the medium of the church by all people in the history of the
world, God eternally planned that other religious traditions would have
a positive salvific significance for their followers.”

(a2) states a technical theological issue. Moreover, it needs to be carefully

nuanced as suggested above. What cannot be said is that these traditions
operate as “sacraments” or have an “ex opere operato” efficacy (DI, 21).
However, DI goes on to say also that rituals in other traditions cannot have
a “divine origin”.11 Obviously, DI is not denying the primary causality of
God; in some sense, all things have God as their primary cause. The context
suggests that DI means to say that these cannot be equated with sacraments.
If God has the power to give grace and bring people to faith as God wills,
God can use whatever means God wishes. A claim that these paths have a
divine origin like the sacraments is simply unnecessary for the form of plu-
ralism here envisioned. It is equally possible that God, in his eternal knowl-
edge, knew the contingent facts about the spread of the awareness of
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60 Terrence W. Tilley

salvation and planned to use whatever means God wished of those ways
that humans originated to convey salvation to them.
There is another structural analogy with the problem of evil here. Despite
the risk that some might take this analogy as suggesting that the other reli-
gious traditions are in some way “evil”, that is a position I do not hold and
do not find warranted. I argue in The Evils of Theodicy that Augustine did not
have a theodicy in the modern sense, but was the author of a defense.12 For
Augustine, the key theological claim was a redemptive one, that God chose
to bring good out of evil, rather than allow it to come to nothing.13 God is
not the author of evil; evil does not have a divine origin. But that does not
mean that God cannot do something with it. Other religious traditions are
not evils to be redeemed by God, but it is possible that God can use them as
extraordinary means to effect the salvation of those who participate in those
traditions. God clearly uses means other than sacraments to bring grace to
the world. To recognize the possibility that God uses other traditions as such
means to actualize the salvation realized in Christ to the world is not to deny
the necessity and universality of the economy of salvation in Jesus Christ or
the necessity and universality of the church as God’s instrument. If one were
to deny that it was possible for God to make salvation available this way for
participants in other traditions, then one would be denying God’s omnipo-
tence. And one does not have to assert that this point is actually true, but
only that it is possibly true to show the compatibility of (a1–8) and (b). At the
risk of being flippant, we could say that God eternally planned to make the
best of the situations which God knew would be actualized.
Similarly, (a3) is not relevant to the present issue; no one need claim that
there are other mediators or incarnations of the logos or spirit of God to
assert (c1).
(a4–6) assert the unique, undivided, universal, and final economy of salva-
tion in Christ. This requires an amendment of (c1) to read:
(c2) “Because the complete and definitive revelation and the unique,
undivided, universal and final salvation effected in Jesus Christ by God
would not be known and accepted through the medium of the church
by all people in the history of the world, God eternally planned that
other religious traditions would have a positive salvific significance for
their followers.”
How God has used these other traditions would have a positive salvific
significance for their members is not at issue here, but only that God could
do so. But because salvation in Jesus would not be known by others, God
could plan to use those other vehicles not as sacramental means of divine
grace, but as other forms of aid and, perhaps, even grace, for others.
(a7–8) have to do with the church (subsisting in the Catholic Church) as
unique, undivided, universal, and necessary instrument of salvation for all
people. This requires modifying (c2) to read:
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 Christian Orthodoxy and Religious Pluralism 61

(c3) “Because the complete and definitive revelation and the unique,
undivided, universal and final salvation effected in Jesus Christ by God
would not be known and accepted through the church as the unique,
undivided, universal and necessary instrument of salvation for all
people by all people in the history of the world, God eternally planned
that other religious traditions would have a positive salvific significance
for their followers.”

Just as there is one mediator and one revelation, so there is one instrument
of salvation. Just as those who know not the one mediator or the final and
definitive revelation in him may still be saved, such as those Jews who lived
and died before the Incarnation, so those who are separated from the one
instrument may still be saved if God so wills. To claim that only baptized
Christians could be saved, that is, to consign the vast majority of the people
of the world to eternal damnation, cannot be asserted. So, to assert that God
could save others who know not and cannot belong to the church as
described is certainly possible (and presumably a truth of faith unless one is
to deny the Sinaitic covenant as salvific or redemptive). That God could have
used means that are not visibly part of the universal instrument of salvation,
or whose relationship to the universal instrument of salvation we cannot
fathom, is at least possible. Hence, (c3) is possibly true, is not inconsistent
with (a1–8) and asserted with the relevant propositions of that set entails (b).
Therefore, we have demonstrated that (b) is compatible with the truths
affirmed by DI, despite DI’s claim to the contrary.

Conclusion
This demonstration has important implications not only for the compatibil-
ity of some theories of religious pluralism with Catholic faith, but also for
more modest (less theoretically based) proposals about the relationships
between Christ and the world religions. For example, in a recent article,
Avery Dulles, S.J. has called for a model of “toleration” as the way in which
religious traditions should relate to one another (rather than patterns of coer-
cion, convergence, or pluralism).14 Dulles calls for a number of dialogical and
cooperative strategies among representatives of the various traditions. What
Dulles does not call for is a “theory” of how those traditions should relate
or a theory to “ground” those relationships. Rather, we should engage in
educating each other interactively, developing joint programs supporting
basic moral values, bearing common witness regarding common religious
and moral convictions, praying occasionally together, healing our memories
of each other through acts of repentance, forgiveness, and reconciliation, and
engaging in theological dialogue.
However, for Dulles’s position to be viable, it must be consistent with
Christian faith. Dulles asserts, “Christians are tolerant of other religions not
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62 Terrence W. Tilley

in spite of but in part because of their certainty about revelation.”15 I agree.

But Christians are not to be tolerant of evils or anything that goes against
God’s plan. If the other religious traditions must be believed to be against
God’s plan, a position of tolerance is intolerable. If they are supportable only
because they are anonymously Christian or unwitting outposts of the
church, then “tolerance” is not the proper attitude, for these positions could
properly be described as heretical or so “gravely deficient” as to be intoler-
able. “Tolerance” in this instance would be hypocritical, for either they are
unaware Christians (and do not need “tolerance” but correction) or are
outside of God’s plan (and do not need “tolerance” but strenuous opposi-
tion and rejection, not just evangelization).
The present defense, while not offering a theory of “de jure” religious plu-
ralism, thus also helps show the viability of Dulles’s view. The present
defense has demonstrated that it is possible for those who accept the truths
propounded by DI can accept the other religious traditions as part of God’s
eternal plan for the world. Hence, we have shown not only that some theo-
ries of religious pluralism are compatible with Catholic faith as expressed in
DI, but also that Dulles’ position is defensible and does not entail cooperat-
ing with and tolerating evils.
The more general point, then, is that some theories of de jure pluralism,
not just the acknowledgments of de facto pluralism in religion, are compati-
ble with orthodox Christian belief as represented by an officially orthodox
document, DI. There are some theories that are not compatible with ortho-
dox belief, but, if the argument here is correct, there is at least one seriously
pluralist account (and presumably others in the same family) that are com-
patible with orthodox Christianity, despite protestations exemplified in DI
to the contrary.

NOTES
1 Quotations from Dominus Iesus will be indicated parenthetically in the body of the text by
paragraph number, e.g., (DI, 4). For a representative sampling of moderately critical and
moderately supportive responses, see Stephen J. Pope and Charles Hefling, editors, Sic et
Non: Encountering Dominus Iesus (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002); quotations from pages
in this volume will be indicated parenthetically in the body of the text, e.g. (SN, p. xx).
2 See William A. Christian, Oppositions of Religious Doctrines (New York, NY: Herder and
Herder, 1964) for a discussion of the ways in which religious positions can be contradic-
tory to or incompatible with each other.
3 Philosophers spill much ink to show what other conditions must obtain for these proposi-
tions to be contradictory and the views they express incompatible. For present purposes
we can postulate that such conditions are met and that the views under consideration are
not formulated ambiguously.
4 For the most extensive statement of his theory, see John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).
5 The parenthetical items in q are not always found in formulations of the problem but are
usually simply assumed. I simply place them in q for the sake of clarity. The “omnibenev-
olent” of p is meant to capture God’s love for all creatures in a way that is compatible with
all the recent theological reflections on God’s love.

© 2006 The Author

Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
 Christian Orthodoxy and Religious Pluralism 63

6 For a discussion of the “free will defense,” see Terrence W. Tilley, The Evils of Theodicy (Wash-
ington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1991), pp. 130–132. For a now-classic exposition
of the free will defense, see Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (New York, NY: Harper
and Row, 1974). Since Plantinga first formulated his version of the free will defense in 1965,
it has withstood all attacks from anti-theistic philosophers so that the discourse has shifted
away from the issue of compatibility to the issue of “credibility” or “plausibility”, debated
under the rubric of the “evidential problem of evil”. In effect, then, the “logical problem of
evil” has been solved.
7 All of the great religious traditions of the world (save, arguably, Islam) have roots that ante-
date the Incarnation. What relevance these historical facts have to the theological assertions
of DI is unclear.
8 Although DI seems not to recognize it, “indifferentism” has acquired an important new
meaning in a “postmodern” world. Not only does it refer to relativism, but also to the epi-
demic of “je m’en fichisme” that afflicts many with regard to any and all religious traditions.
This lack of yearning for the divine may be a more serious religious problem than the rel-
ativism of some philosophical accounts of religious pluralism. Qamar-ul Huda (SN, p. 156),
for example, uses “indifferentism” with this new meaning.
9 This formulation is derived from Jacques Dupuis, S.J., “Inclusivist Pluralism as a Paradigm
for the Theology of Religions”, an unpublished paper presented to the conference, “Reli-
gious Experience and Contemporary Theological Epistemology: Leuven Encounters in
Systematic Theology IV” (Katholicke Universiteit Leuven, 7 November 2003), p. 6. Similar
formulations could be derived from his published works or the works of some other the-
ologians. This inclusivist form of pluralism could be found analogously in other religious
traditions. Neither DI nor Dupuis’ work denies the possibility that some Buddhists might
say, on the basis of their tradition, that other traditions bring one closer to Enlightenment
because of the universality of the Buddha-essence which the Buddha in his divine wisdom
wills or allows because not all can in any one life participate in the tradition of Buddhism.
Christians should find this assertion to be actually false, but also recognize that it is a pos-
sibly true claim expressive of a Buddhist inclusivist pluralism. Analogous formulae might
be developed for other living religious traditions.
10 The following paragraph summarizes the conclusions reached in Tilley, The Evils of
Theodicy.
11 At this point, DI cites D 1608 (Council of Trent, Canons on Sacraments in general, canon 8:
“Si quis dixerit, per ipsa novae Legis sacramenta ex opere operato non conferri gratiam,
sed solam fidem divinae promissionis ad gratiam consequendam sufficere: anathema sit.”
No one is denying that the sacraments of the church give grace or asserting that other reli-
gious traditions function ex opere operato. This citation simply does not buttress the argu-
ment at this point.
12 Tilley, The Evils of Theodicy, pp. 113–140.
13 Ibid., p. 125.
14 Avery Dulles, S.J., “Christ Among the Religions”, America Vol. 186 no. 3 (February 4, 2002),
pp. 8–15.
15 Ibid., p. 14.

© 2006 The Author

Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd