SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

1.Spouses Butong v. Plazo

G.R. No. 187524, May 08, 2015

Facts:
Pedro L. Rinoza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with his two
marriages, as well as several properties including resort, the land where it was located and a family
home. In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Possession, respondents alleged that Pedro’s second wife and his other children had sold the said
properties to petitioners spouses Villafria without their knowledge and consent.
Subsequently, respondents learned that a notice of extra-judicial settlement of estate of their
late father was published. Because of this, they caused the annotation of their adverse claims over the
properties and filed their complaint for the annulment of all documents conveying the subject
properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.
Petitioners, substituted by their son, Ruel Villafria, question the trial court's lack of jurisdiction.
It was alleged that when the Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Possession was filed, there was yet no settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as to the nature
thereof, nor was there an identification of the number of legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court ruled
on the settlement of the intestate estate of Pedro in its ordinary jurisdiction when the action filed was
for Judicial Partition. Considering that the instant action is really one for settlement of intestate estate,
the trial court, sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon the
issues of forgery and ownership.
Issue:
Whether or not the action filed by the petitioners is one of an action for settlement of estate
and whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case?

Held:
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action pertaining to the
properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their
interests thereon, may fall under an action for settlement of estate. However, a complete reading of the
complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the
reliefs prayed for, the action is clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of
possession.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed
to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or. fails to
furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in
Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.[29] An exception to this rule, however, is found in the
aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due
from his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for partition without
submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an... administrator
by the court.[30] The reason is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no
necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the
real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled.
2. Spouses Santiago v. Tulfo
G.R. No. 205039, October 21, 2015

Facts:
Spouses Rozelle Raymond Martin (Raymart) and Claudine Margaret Santiago were in the airport
awaiting for the arrival of their baggage but were informed t h a t i t w a s o f f l o a d e d a n d
t r a n s f e r r e d t o a d i f f e r e n t f l i g h t . W h i l e t h e y w e r e lodging a complaint before the
complaint desk, Raymart saw a man takingphotos of his wife. He then approached him and found
out that it was Ramon “Mon” Tulfo. The confrontation then escalated to a brawl which came
to a stop because of the interference of the airport security personnel.
Days after the incident, the brother of Mon Tulfo aired on their on their TV
program comments and expletives together with a threat that they will retaliate against the Santiagos.
Terrified by the gravity of the threats hurled, petitioners filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
amparo against respondents.

Issue:
Whether or not the motion for the issuance of a writ of amparo should be granted?

Held:
In our jurisdiction, the contextual genesis, at least, for the present Amparo Rule has limited the
remedy as a response to extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.
"Extrajudicial killings," according to case law, are generally characterized as "killings committed without
due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings,"27 while "enforced
disappearances," according to Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 9851,28 otherwise known as the
"Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against
Humanity," "means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support
or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the
intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners' amparo petition before the RTC does not allege any
case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the senses above-
described. Their petition is merely anchored on a broad invocation of respondents' purported violation
of their right to life and security, carried out by private individuals without any showing of direct or
indirect government participation. Thus, it is apparent that their amparo petition falls outside the
purview of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail. Hence, the RTC, through Judge Singh, properly
exercised its discretion to motu proprio dismiss the same under this principal determination, regardless
of the filing of the May 23, 2012 Motion. The court, indeed, has the discretion to determine whether or
not it has the authority to grant the relief in the first place. And when it is already apparent that the
petition falls beyond the purview of the rule, it has the duty to dismiss the petition so as not to prejudice
any of the parties through prolonged but futile litigation.
3. IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALAN SALIBO V. WARDEN, ET. AL.,
G.R. No. 197597, August 8, 2015

Facts:
Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the Maguindanao massacre, had a pending warrant of
arrest issued by the trial court in People vs Ampatuan Jr. et. al. When Datukan Malang Salibo learned that the
police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang, he
presented himself to clear his name. Salibo presented to the police pertinent portions of his
passport,boarding passes and other documents tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in
Saudi Arabia when the massacre happened. The authorities, however, apprehended and detained him. He
questioned the legality of his detention via Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA,
maintaining that he is not the accused Batukan S. Malang. The CA issued the writ, making it returnable
to the judge of RTC Taguig. After hearing of the Return, the trial court granted Salibo’s petition and
ordered his immediate release from detention.
On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA held that even assuming Salibo was
not the Batukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, orderly course of trial must be pursued
and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ of habeas corpus may be involved. Salibo’s proper
remedy, according to the CA, should have been a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest.

Issue:
Whether or not Salibo properly availed the remedy of a petition for writ of habeas corpus?

Held:
Yes. Habeas corpus is the remedy for a person deprived of liberty dueto mistaken identity. In such cases,
the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained. First, it was
Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was charged and accused in the Information and Alias Warrant
of Arrest issued in the case of People vs Ampatuan. Based on the evidences presented, Salibo
sufficiently established that he could not have been Butukan S.Malang. Therefore, Salibo was not arrested by
virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense, nor restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. Second,
Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. When he was in the presence of authorities, he was neither
committing nor attempting to commit an offense, and the police officers had no personal knowledge of
any offense that he might have committed. Salibo was also not an escape prisoner. The police officers have
deprived him of his liberty without due process of law. Therefore, Salibo correctly availed himself of a Petition
for Habeas Corpus.
4. CALLO V COMMISSIONER JAIME H. MORENTE
G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017

Facts:
Danielle Tan Parker is a holder of Philippine Passport issued by the Department of
Foreign Affairs on March 5, 2010 and valid until March 4, 2015. On January 15, 2013, she
was charged for deportation for being an undesirable alien. It was alleged that Danielle
Nopuente was a fugitive from USA with an outstanding arrest warrant issued against her.
Subsequently, on January 24, 2013, a Summary Deportation Order was issued against
Nopuente, also known as Isabelita Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker, for overstaying.
Parker was not in the list of approved applications of the DFA for dual citizenship and her
American Passport had been revoked by the United States Department of State.
Nopuente was arrested and was taken to the Immigration Detention Facility in
Bicutan, Taguig City. She is still currently detained as the deportation was not carried out
due to the fact that Parker is charged with falsification and use of falsified documents
before the MTC of Davao City. On September 12, 2014, she filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus which was dismissed by the RTC. On March 23, 2017, Callo filed this petition for
writ of amparo with prayer to issue Interim Reliefs of Immediate Release of Danielle Tan
Parker from Detention. Callo argues that Parker is a natural-born Filipino Citizen and
thus, there is no reason for her to be detained by the Bureau of Immigration.

Issue:
Whether or not the right to life, liberty and security of Parker is threatened by the
respondents to warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo and subsequently the award
of the interim reliefs?

Held:
The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to violations of
a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to address the problem
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

It is clear that the elements of enforced disappearance are not attendant in this case. There is
also no threat of such enforced disappearance. While there is indeed a detention carried out by the
State through the Bureau of Immigration, the third and fourth elements are not present. There is no
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of freedom or refusal to give information on the whereabouts of
Parker because as Callo admits, Parker is detained in the Immigration Detention Facility of the Bureau of
Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration also does not deny this. In fact, the Bureau of Immigration had
produced the body of Parker before the RTC in the proceedings for the writ of habeas corpus previously
initiated by Parker herself.[9] Similarly, there is no intention to remove Parker from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time. As the Bureau of Immigration explained, Parker has a pending
criminal case against her in Davao City, which prevents the Bureau of Immigration from deporting her
from the country.
5. CAPABLANCA V. HEIRS OF PEDRO BAS
G.R. No. 224144, June 28, 2017

Facts:
Andres Bas and Pedro Bas acquired Lot and was registered under their names.
Pedro sold to Faustina Manreal, married to Juan Balorio, his portion which was evidence
by a notarized Deed of Sale. After the death of spouses Balorio, their heirs executed a
notarized Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Absolute Sale. One of the heirs,
Alejandra Balorio sold her portion to Edith Deen which was subsequently sold to
Norberto Bas, who took possession of and built a house on it. Bas died intestate leaving
Lolita Bas, his niece, as his only heir.
Lolita then filed a complaint before the RTC of Cebu for the cancellation of the
titles. Having been in long possession, it was not necessary for her to be first declared as
his heirs before the filing the complaint. The RTC decide in favour of Lolita A motion to
dismiss on the ground that Lolita should be first be declared an heir. On appeal, the CA
reversed the RTC’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a need of declaration of Heirship before the filing of a
complaint for the cancellation of title of the said property?

Held:
This Court grants the petition. This Court finds no need for a separate proceeding for a
declaration of heirship in order to resolve petitioner's action for cancellation of titles of the property.
The dispute in this case is not about the heirship of petitioner to Norberto but the validity of the
sale of the property from Pedro to Faustina, from which followed a series of transfer transactions that
culminated in the sale of the property to Norberto. For with Pedro's sale of the property, it follows that
there would be no more ownership or right to property that would have been transmitted to his heirs.
Petitioner's claim is anchored on a sale of the property to her predecessor-in-interest and not on
any filiation with the original owner. What petitioner is pursuing is Norberta's right of ownership over
the property which was passed to her upon the latter's death.no judicial declaration of heirship is
necessary in order that an heir may assert his or her right to the property of the deceased.
The pronouncement in the Heirs of Yaptinchay is misplaced in this case, wherein it was declared in this
case that a declaration of heirship must be made only in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary civil
action for reconveyance of property was based on Litam, etc., et al. v. Rivera[55] and Solivio v. Court of
Appeals,[56] which involved different factual milieus.
Here, as stated, the main issue is the annulment of title to property, which ultimately hinges on
the validity of the sale from Pedro to Faustina. Petitioner does not claim any filiation with Pedro or seek
to establish her right as his heir as against the respondents. Rather, petitioner seeks to enforce her right
over the property which has been allegedly violated by the fraudulent acts of respondents.
EVIDENCE
1. ZABALA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 210760, January 26, 2015

Facts:
Alas and Zabala were neighbors. Alas would call Zabala to repair his vehicle and
allow Zabala to follow him to his bedroom to get cash for needed spare parts. One day,
when Alas returned home, he discovered that his money, P68,000.00, which he kept in an
envelope was missing. Pinon testified that on the same day, she and Zabala, her
boyfriend, were together and she saw him climb the fence and enter Alas’ house. When
he returned, she noticed that he had a bulge in his pocket. Zabala bought two Nokia
phones.
Zabala testified that on the same day, he was with his conductor plying the route
of his driven jeepney. They did not drop by the house of Alas. Neither did he meet Pinon,
of whom he regarded only as an acquaintance.
Zabala was then charged with theft. The evidence of the prosecution purports to
establish the following narrative: (1) that Alas hides P68,000 in cash in his closet; (2) that
Zabala is aware that Alas hides money in his bedroom closet; (3) that on the night of the
incident, Zabala was with his then girlfriend; (4) that Zabala climbed through the fence
of Alas’ house and successfully gained entrance; (5) that Zabala later went out of the
house with a bulge in his pocket; and (6) that day, Zabala and Pinon went shopping for a
cellphone. The trial court held that these series of circumstances are sufficient to support
conviction.

Issue:
Whether or not the circumstantial evidence in the case warrants the conviction of
Zabala for theft?

Held:
No.It is a settled rule that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction,and that
direct evidence is not always necessary. Circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive
evidence, is that which goes ” to prove a fact or series of facts other than the facts in issue, which, if
proved, may tend by inference to establish a fact in issue.”
The prosecution failed to present suffcient circumstantial evidence to convict thepetitioner of
the offense charged. First, nobody saw Zabala enter the bedroom of Alas, where the money was hidden.
Second, the evidence is insufficient to determine without reasonable doubt that the cash was lost due
to felonious taking. Third, Pinon testimony fails to establish that Zabalas’ pocket indeed contained the
stolen money. And fourth, the prosecution failed to prove, or even allege, that it was impossible for
some other person to have committed the crime of the theft against Alas. The prosecution failed to
adduce evidence that at the time the theft was committed, there was no other person inside the house
of Alas, or that no other person could have taken the money from the closet of Alas. Thus, Zabala should
be acquitted.
2. GUILBEMER FRANCO V PEOPLE
G.R. No. 191185, January 02, 2016

Facts:
On November 3, 2004 at around 11:00 a.m., Benjamin Joseph Nakamoto (Nakamoto) went to
work out at the Body Shape Gym located at Malong Street, Tondo, Manila. After he finished working
out, he placed his Nokia 3660 cell phone worth PI8,500.00 on the altar where gym users usually put
their valuables and proceeded to the comfort room to change his clothes. After ten minutes, he
returned to get his cell phone, but it was already missing. Arnie Rosario (Rosario), who was also working
out, informed him that he saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the altar. Nakamoto requested
everyone not to leave the gym, but upon verification from the logbook, he found out that Franco had
left within the time that he was in the shower.
Nakamoto then filed a complaint with the barangay but no settlement was arrived thereat;
hence, a criminal complaint for theft was filed against Franco before the City Prosecutor's Office of
Manila.In his defense, Franco denied the charge, alleging that if Nakamoto had indeed lost his cell phone
at around 1:00 p.m., he and his witnesses could have confronted him as at that time, he was still at the
gym, having left only at around 2:45 p.m.[11] He also admitted to have taken a cap and cell phone from
the altar but claimed these to be his. RTC convicted Franco and it was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution has presented proof beyond reasonable... doubt to establish the
corpus delicti of the crime?

Held:
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court provides that the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance
to convict; (2) the facts on which the inference of guilt is based must be proved; and (3) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to the
third requisite, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken
chain, which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of
others, as the guilty person it was only Rosario who saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the
altar. His lone testimony, however, cannot be considered a positive identification of Franco as the
perpetrator.
Rosario's testimony definitely cannot fall under the first category of positive identification.
While it may support the conclusion that Franco took a cell phone from the altar, it does not establish
with certainty that what Franco feloniously took, assuming that he did, was Nakamoto's cell phone.
Rosario merely testified that Franco took "a cell phone."
The testimony of Ramos shows that the logbook, indeed, was not identified and authenticated
during the course of Ramos' testimony.The logbook or the particular page referred to by Ramos was
neither identified nor confirmed by him as the same logbook which he used to log the ins and outs of
the gym users, or that the writing and notations on said logbook was... his.
The circumstantial evidence proven by the prosecution in this case failed to pass the test of
moral certainty necessary to warrant Franco's conviction.