PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M.

DACANAY,
PETITIONER

FACTS:

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated
to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied
for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was
approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he
gave up his Philippine citizenship

RULING:

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited
to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement
for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of
law is a privilege denied to foreigners.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of

another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated
his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.

KHAN VS. SIMBILLO, A.C NO. 5299, AUGUST 19, 2003

FACTS:

A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads: “Annulment of
Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the
number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was
an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided
the case will not involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar
advertisements were also published. An administrative complaint was filed which was referred
to the IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for
1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he
admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he should not be charged. He said that
it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against advertisement because the interest of the
public isn’t served in any way by the prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELD:

Yes! The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public
service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service
and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary
interest. Worse, advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” he erodes and
undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages
people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond. Solicitation of business is not
altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s name appears must be a reputable law list
only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor
may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure
the public or the bar.

IN RE: ARGOSINO, 270 SCRA 26

FACTS:
Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking the Lawyer’s
Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of “reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide” from a hazing incident. Later in his sentence, he was granted probation by the
court. He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying that he be allowed to take the Lawyer’s
Oath and sign the Rolls of Attorneys. As a proof of the required good moral character he now
possess, he presented no less than fifteen (15) certifications among others from: two (2) senators,
five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious order. In addition, he, together with
the others who were convicted, organized a scholarship foundation in honor of their hazing
victim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath, sign the Rolls of
Attorneys, and practice law.

HELD:
YES. Petition granted.

RATIO:
Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he possessed the required
good moral character as required before taking the Lawyer’s Oath and to sign the Rolls of
Attorneys, the Supreme Court considered the premises that he is not inherently in bad moral
fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Argosino was finally reminded that the Lawyer’s Oath
is not merely a ceremony or formality before the practice of law, and that the community
assistance he had started is expected to continue in serving the more unfortunate members of
the society.

FERDINAND A. CRUZ v. JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, GR No. 154464, 2008-09-11

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with
this Court assailing the Resolutions dated May 10, 20021 and July 31, 20022 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied the appearance of the plaintiff
Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of the public respondent,
Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for
and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-
0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court3 that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and
conduct his litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission
from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a
party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss
instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to
Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, "Hay naku,
masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to
Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit,4 praying for the
voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of
the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks
of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark,
reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served.5

In an Order6 dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that
throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her
voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration 7 of the said order.

On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. 8 In the same Order, the trial
court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and
jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.

In a motion for reconsideration,9 petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not
Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are
applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking
Rule 138-A, in an Order10 dated July 31, 2002.

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition and assigns
the following errors:

I.

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE
LATTER’S BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34
OF THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A
PARTY LITIGANT;

II.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID
NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH
AN INHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLE’S FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE
COURTS.

The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether
the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge
refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.

This Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is
not exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to
choose the court where the application therefor will be directed. 11 A becoming regard of the
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of Appeals.12 The hierarchy of courts is
determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in
exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues
reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. 13

Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the
petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly before this Court petitions
under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We
will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays
more important concerns before us.

In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is
necessary.

Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his
3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal,
board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be
under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other
papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal
clinic.

The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf
because of his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioner’s appearance, the court
a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No.
19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is
enrolled in a recognized school’s clinical legal education program and is under supervision of an
attorney duly accredited by the law school.

However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138,
which provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.

and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the
contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself
in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation
personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or by
a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the
course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the litigation. 14Considering that
a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and
procedure as those qualified to practice law, 15 petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the
risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at
his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then
be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must,
therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule
138-A, when the basis of the petitioner’s claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides
for conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the
appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.

The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No.
19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for
limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the instances when a
non-lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-
A.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard
by himself and counsel,16 this Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot
be waived.17 The rationale for this ruling was articulated in People v. Holgado, 18 where we
declared that "even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he
is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence."

The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern
that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain
in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyer’s
assistance, effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to
do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has
the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this
decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule
138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the
supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant,
wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias
and partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her
alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: "Hay naku, masama ‘yung
marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the respondent judge
already manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioner’s and
his co-plaintiff’s loss of faith and confidence in the respondent’s impartiality.

We do not agree.

It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative
case19 against the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed
for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court’s findings of fact in the
administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge
Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and
convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial, 20 as voluntary
inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge.
The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical
assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her.21 Absent clear and convincing
proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108,
Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-
0410 as a party litigant.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
 IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO,
PETITIONER. (DIGEST)
B.M. No. 2540
September 24, 2013

TOPIC:

Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing of the Roll of Attorneys

FACTS:

Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the
Attorney’s Oath at the PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980, but failed to do so allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging through his things, he found said Notice. He
then realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of
the PICC was probably just an attendance record.

He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as
important. The matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.

In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll number for
his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable
to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither
willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s
gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that petitioner could offer no
valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition
of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the
ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions.
In this case, said action is not warranted.

The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition himself, albeit
after the passage of more than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses the character
required to be a member of the Philippine Bar; and that he appears to have been a competent
and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at different firms and companies.

However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.

A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to

know the law and its consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what
he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys.
However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was just an attendance record, he
could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, he should
have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it was the act of
signing therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to
continue practicing law, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the
unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As
aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to conduct themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession.

Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. However, the Court imposed
upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1)
year after receipt of the Resolution. He was also made to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the
one-year period, petitioner was not allowed to engage in the practice of law.

[ G.R. No. L-23959, November 29, 1971 ]

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA &
VICTORIANO TENAZAS, PETITIONERS, VS. BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY,
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented
in this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8
December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-
Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning, a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional
services in the said case.
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, entitled, "PAFLU, et
al. vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., etal." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered
a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants
Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October
1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice
of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963,
Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable
amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas, on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation
indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on
the same day, QuintinMuning filed a "Petition for Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20%
of the backwages. Muning's petition was opposed by CiprianoCid & Associates on the ground
that he is not a lawyer.
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid &
Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and
appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently
by respondent Quintin Muning.
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as
compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates----10%
Quintin Muning-------------------------- 10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis------------------- 5%
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning, who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be
voided in the present petition.
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late
filing but his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.[1] He asked for reconsideration, but,
considering that the motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court
admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer
to the petition for review.[2]The case was considered submitted for decision without respondent's
brief.[3]
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers'
Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,[4] that an
agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is
allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is
immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in
the absence of a contract, as in the present case.
The provision in Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 875 that --
"In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required
to be represented by legal counsel. . . . . . . ."
is no justification for a ruling that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of
Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section
adds that ?
"it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine
witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence ",
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified
members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court
on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such
representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing --
"Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be entitled to
have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, . . . .
. ."
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's
fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a
lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship
with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover
attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties
litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to
observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary
control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:
"But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons not
licensed or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great
weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for strictly legal services cannot be
recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction
where the services were rendered."[5]
"No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has been
duly admitted to practice. . . . .and is an attorney in good standing at the time."[6]
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated[7]; that acting as an
attorney without authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both[8], and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an
unlawful act or an act done in violation of law[9]; and that if fees were to be allowed to non-
lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity
and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not
amenable to disciplinary measures.[10]
"And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers)
cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an 'agent'
and not as an attorney."[11]
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees
should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court
of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special
jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not outweigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify
an exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees
which are deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was
the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review;
union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were
included as petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently filed, it being contended
that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was
belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees
which are deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization
is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court[12], on behalf of its members; and the
union was organized "for the promotion of the employees' moral, social and economic well-
being"[13]; hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an
appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:
"Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice Cases - Appeals. - Any person aggrieved by any order of the Court
may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines. . . . . . .",
since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden
of litigations.
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the
Court of Industrial Relations, and many others like him who are not licensed to practice,
registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If
true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should
actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not
brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners,
however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice
of law.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of
the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all
other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 11078

VERLITA V. MERCULLO and RAYMOND VEDANO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. MARIE FRANCESE RAMON, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This case concerns the complaint for the disbarment of Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon for
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath for
deceiving the complainants in order to obtain the substantial amount of P350,000.00 on the
pretext of having the foreclosed asset of the latter's mother redeemed.

Antecedents

In the period from 2002 to 2011, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
sent several demand letters to Carmelita T. Vedaño1 regarding her unpaid obligations secured
by the mortgage covering her residential property in Novaliches, Caloocan City. 2 To avoid the
foreclosure of the mortgage, Carmelita authorized her children, Verlita Mercullo and Raymond
Vedaño (complainants herein), to inquire from the NHMFC about the status of the obligations.
Verlita and Raymond learned that their mother's arrears had amounted to P350,000.00, and
that the matter of the mortgage was under the charge of respondent Atty. Ramon, but who was
not around at that time.

On June 20, 2012, Carmelita received a letter from the sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Caloocan City, stating that her property would be put up for auction in July 2013. Verlita and
Raymond thus went to the NHMFC to see the respondent, who advised them about their right to
redeem the property within one year from the foreclosure.3

In August 2013, Verlita and Raymond called up the respondent, and expressed their intention
to redeem the property by paying the redemption price. The latter agreed and scheduled an
appointment with them on August 30,2013.
On August 30, 2013, the respondent arrived at the designated meeting place at around 1:30
p.m., carrying the folder that Verlita and Raymond had seen at the NHFMC when they inquired
on the status of their mother's property. After the respondent had oriented them on the procedure
for redemption, the complainants handed P350,000.00 to the respondent, who signed an
acknowledgment receipt.4 The respondent issued two acknowledgment receipts for the
redemption price and for litigation expenses, 5 presenting to the complainants her NHMFC
identification card. Before leaving them, she promised to inform them as soon as the documents
for redemption were ready for their mother's signature. 6

On September 4, 2013, the respondent met with Verlita and handed a letter 7 that she had signed,
along with the special power of attorney (SPA) for Carmelita's signature.8 The letter reads:

Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff

Regional Trial Court
Caloocan City

Re: Redemption of the property covered by EJF No. 7484-2013

Dear Atty. Dabalos,

Please assist Ms. Carmelita Vedano, through her Attorney-in-Fact in redeeming the property
covered by EJF No. 7484-2013. Please provide the necessary computation as to the full
redemption amount in order for Ms. Vedano to redeem the same.

Thank you.

Truly yours,

(Sgd.) rances E. Ramon

Verlita and Raymond went to the NHMFC on September 9, 2013 to follow up on the redemption,
but discovered that the respondent had already ceased to be connected with the NHMFC. On
September 20, 2013, they met with her at Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City
where she was attending a hearing. She informed them that the redemption was under process,
and that the certificate of redemption would be issued in two to three weeks time.9

After communicating through text messages with the respondent, Verlita and Raymond finally
went to see the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City On November 27,
2013 to inquire on the status of the redemption. There, they discovered that the respondent had
not deposited the redemption price and had not filed the letter of intent for redeeming the
property.10

On December 5, 2013, Verlita and Raymond again went to Branch 145 of the Regional Trial
Court in Makati City where the respondent had a hearing, and handed to her their demand letter
requiring her to return the amount she had received for the redemption. 11 She acknowledged the
letter and promised to return the money on December 16, 2013 by depositing the amount in
Verlita's bank account. However, she did not fulfill her promise and did not show up for her
subsequent scheduled hearings in Branch 145.12

With their attempts to reach the respondent being in vain, V erlita and Raymond brought their
disbarment complaint in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).1âwphi1

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

The respondent did not submit her answer when required to do so. She also did not attend the
mandatory conference set by the IBP despite notice. Hence, the investigation proceeded ex
parte.13

IBP Commissioner Arsenio P. Adriano submitted his Report and Recommendation, 14 whereby he
found the respondent to have violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
engaging in deceitful conduct, and recommended her suspension from the practice of law for two
years, and her return to the complainants of P350,000.00. with legal interest from December 2,
2013.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted Commissioner Adriano's recommendation as stated in its
Resolution No. XXI-2014-929,15 viz.:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and applicable laws, and for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years and Ordered to Return the amount of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand
(P350,000.00) Pesos to Complainant.

Ruling of the Court

The Court declares the respondent guilty of dishonesty and deceit.

The Lawyer's Oath is a source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer. Any violation of the
oath may be punished with either disbarment, or suspension from the practice of law, or other
commensurate disciplinary action.16 Every lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and
moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his admission to the Bar, but are also
essential for his continued membership in the Law Profession. 17 Any conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer constitutes a violation of his oath.

The respondent certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving money from the
complainants after having made them believe that she could assist them in ensuring the
redemption in their mother's behalf. She was convincing about her ability to work on the
redemption because she had worked in the NHFMC. She did not inform them soon enough,
however, that she had meanwhile ceased to be connected with the agency. It was her duty to
have so informed them. She further misled them about her ability to realize the redemption by
falsely informing them about having started the redemption process. She concealed from them
the real story that she had not even initiated the redemption proceedings that she had assured
them she would do. Everything she did was dishonest and deceitful in order to have them part
with the substantial sum of P350,000.00. She took advantage of the complainants who had
reposed their full trust and confidence in her ability to perform the task by virtue of her being a
lawyer. Surely, the totality of her actuations inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal Profession.

As a lawyer, the respondent was proscribed from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct in her dealings with others, especially clients whom she should serve with
competence and diligence.18 Her duty required her to maintain fealty to them, binding her not to
neglect the legal matter entrusted to her. Thus, her neglect in connection therewith rendered her
liable.19 Moreover, the unfulfilled promise of returning the money and her refusal to
communicate with the complainants on the matter of her engagement aggravated the neglect
and dishonesty attending her dealings with the complainants.

The respondent's conduct patently breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and for legal processes.1âwphi1

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful act or omission of the respondent
within the coverage of Rule 1. 01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 20The Code exacted
from her not only a firm respect for the law and legal processes but also the utmost degree of
fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted by them pursuant to
their fiduciary relationship.21

Yet another dereliction of the respondent was her wanton disregard of the several notices sent to
her by the IBP in this case. Such disregard could only be wrong because it reflected her
undisguised contempt of the proceedings of the IBP, a body that the Court has invested with the
authority to investigate the disbarment complaint against her. She thus exhibited her
irresponsibility as well as her utter disrespect for the Court and the rest of the Judiciary. It
cannot be understated that a lawyer in her shoes should comply with the orders of the Court
and of the Court's duly constituted authorities, like the IBP, the office that the Court has
particularly tasked to carry out the specific function of investigating attorney misconduct.22
The respondent deserves severe chastisement and appropriate sanctions. In this regard, the IBP
Board of Governors recommended her suspension for two years from the practice of law, and her
return of the amount of P350,000.00 to the complainants. The recommended penalty is not
commensurate to the gravity of the misconduct committed. She merited a heavier sanction of
suspension from the practice of law for five years. Her professional misconduct warranted a
longer suspension from the practice of law because she had caused material prejudice to the
clients' interest.23 She should somehow be taught to be more ethical and professional in dealing
with trusting clients like the complainants and their mother, who were innocently too willing to
repose their utmost trust in her abilities as a lawyer and in her trustworthiness as a legal
professional. In this connection, we state that the usual mitigation of the recommended penalty
by virtue of the misconduct being her first offense cannot be carried out in her favor considering
that she had disregarded the several notices sent to her by the IBP in this case. As to the return
of the P350,000.00 to the complainant, requiring her to restitute with legal interest is only fair
and just because she did not comply in the least with her ethical undertaking to work on the
redemption of the property of the mother of the complainants. In addition, she is sternly warned
against a similar infraction in the future; otherwise, the Court will have her suffer a more severe
penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS ATTY. MARIE FRANCES E. RAMON guilty of
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's
Oath; SUSPENDS HER FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS
EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the
future will be dealt with more severely; ORDERS her to return to the complainants the sum of
P350,000.00 within 30 days from notice, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the
finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS her to promptly submit to this Court
written proof of her compliance within the same period of 30 days from notice of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty.
Marie Frances E. Ramon's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice