PEOPLE v MORIAL
A policeman informed
FACTS:
Two of the three appellants herein were sentenced to death by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Southern Leyte for Robbery with Homicide. The other
was sentenced to suffer only the penalty of reclusion perpetua on account of
minority. The judgment of conviction is now before this Court on automatic
review. Victims were Paula Bandibas and Albert Bandibas. P11,000 was
stolen. Upon arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty. The
prosecution theorized that the accused committed the robbery in the early
evening of January 6, 1996 so they would have money to spend for the
dance later that night. To obtain the money or to silence any witnesses, the
accused killed the occupants of the house, Paula Bandibas and her three-
year old grandson Albert. In proving its theory, the prosecution offered the
testimonies of Gabriel Guilao, Benjamin Morial, SPO4 Antonio Macion and
Dr. Teodulo Salas.Outside the house, Benjamin (Paula Bandibas' common-
law husband) disclosed to the officers his three suspects, the accused in this
case. He advised them, however, to bring only Leonardo and Edwin Morial
into custody and not to include Nonelito Abion, who had many relatives in
Cagnituan. As a former barangay captain of 22 years, he knew that the
Abions were "most feared" in Cagnituan. Benjamin did not tell the police that
Gabriel Guilao had witnessed the incident. The police found Edwin and
Leonardo Morial in the house of Nonelito Abion and invited the two to the
police station, where they were turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez. The
investigation conducted by SPO4 Fernandez yielded an extra-judicial
confession from accused Leonardo Morial, who was assisted by Atty. Tobias
Aguilar. Leonardo Morial's Interrogation: "Leonardo was then seated and his
gag removed. The police told Leonardo to confess to the killings. Leonardo
professed that he did not witness the incident and could not tell them
anything about it. Again, they gagged his mouth and the same policeman
who had hit him then boxed him twice, this time on his right side. Thereafter,
they released their hold and advised him to confess so they would not kill
him. Leonardo repeated that he did not know anything about the incident.
When a policeman attempted to box him again, Leonardo finally admitted
that Nonelito Abion and Edwin Morial were responsible for the death of Paula
Bandibas. Leonardo's interrogation lasted one and a half to two hours.
Asked in court to identify the uniformed policemen who beat him up,
Leonardo said he could not recall their faces. He did not look at the
policemen during his interrogation and did not see their nameplates.
Leonardo did not ask the police for a physician to examine him nor did he tell
anyone about his injuries because he did not know he was permitted to do
so.
Leonardo's statements were then reduced into writing.
him that they were going to contact a lawyer to assist him during the
investigation. Leonardo was told that his counsel would be a certain Atty.
Aguilar whose office was very near the police station. Leonardo consented.
Having prepared Leonardo's statement, the police then told Leonardo to
come with them to Atty. Aguilar's office, which was about 50 meters from the
police station. There, he saw Atty. Aguilar for the first time. The lawyer read
to him the document and asked him whether its contents were true. The
police had instructed Leonardo to answer "yes" if he was asked that
question, and Leonardo heeded the instructions.
Leonardo denied that Atty. Aguilar examined his body for any injuries. Atty.
Aguilar did ask Leonardo if he was forced or intimidated to execute the extra-
judicial confession. Leonardo, however, did not tell his lawyer about his
injuries since a police officer had warned him that he would be mauled again
should he do so. Leonardo then signed the extra-judicial confession, after
which Atty. Aguilar affixed his. The signing over, Leonardo was brought back
to the police station. Later in court, Leonardo claimed that he merely made
up all the statements in the document because he was afraid. After trial, the
RTC rendered a decision convicting all the three accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Leonardo Morial was deprived of his right to counsel during
the custodial investigation, thus, making his extra-judicial confession invalid
HELD:
YES. The Court has stressed that an accused under custodial
interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the
very start thereof. In People vs. Lucero, where the suspect's counsel left
just when the interrogation was starting, this Court chastised both counsel
and the trial court for their lack of zeal in safeguarding the rights of the
accused.
SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify Atty. Aguilar's leaving by claiming that when
the lawyer left, he knew very well that the suspect had already admitted that
he (Leonardo) and his companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty.
Aguilar rationalize his abandoning his client by saying that he left only after
the latter had admitted the "material points," referring to the three accused's
respective participation in the crime. For even as the person under
custodial investigation enjoys the right to counsel from its inception,
so does he enjoy such right until its termination -indeed, "in every phase
of the investigation. An effective and vigilant counsel "necessarily and
logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his
client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession."
People vs Labtan
Facts:
Accused-Appellant Henry Feliciano, together with accused Orlando Labtan
and Jonelto Labtan, were convicted of highway robbery and robbery with
homicide. Feliciano was convicted on the basis of a sworn statement which
he repudiated during the trial. The prosecution’s case was mainly anchored
on the three-page sworn statement executed by Feliciano, originally in
Visayan dialect, before the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. According to
the prosecution, prior to the propounding of questions to the accused-
appellant, he was informed of his constitutional rights and he even signed the
confession in the presence of Atty. Pepito Chavez, Attorney de Officio
provided to the accused.
When the defense presented its case, only accused Henry Feliciano testified
for his behalf. His defense consisted of an alibi and a repudiation of his
sworn statement. He Testified that he was brought to the police station, was
mauled for two hours, and was forced to sign a document. He was also
brought to the office of Atty. Chavez and saw the latter sign the documents.
He did not know what was happening.Atty. Chavez did not even talk to him
before signing the document. Then he was brought back to Jail. He appealed
to the higher court alleging that the court a quo erred un admitting in
evidence the tainted extra-judicial confession he executed in the absence of
an effective and vigilant counsel.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the sworn-statement executed by accused Feliciano
in the absence of a competent counsel of his choice, is admissible in
evidence.
2. Did Atty. Chavez provide the accused the kind of counseling required
by the Constitution?
HELD:
The appeal is meritorious.
Under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, the rights of persons
under custodial investigation are provided.
In People vs Gamboa 13, the Court stated that:
" [T]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when
the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or
stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid
the pernicious practice extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an
offense. The moment there is a move or even urge of said investigators to
elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear
innocent or inocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there
be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be
made in writing and in the presence of counsel."cralaw virtua1aw library
We find that accused-appellant Feliciano had been denied of his right to have
a competent and independent counsel when he was questioned in the
Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez testified that he
started questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of April 22, 1993 regarding his
involvement in the killing of jeepney driver Florentino Bolasito,
notwithstanding the fact that he had not been apprised of his right to counsel.
In Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, 15 we said that a person is deemed under
custodial investigation where the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect
who had been taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.anrobles law
library : red
2.The right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not a mere
presence of the lawyer beside the accused.
Atty. Chavez did not provide the kind of counselling required by the
Constitution. He did not explain to accused-appellant the consequences of
his action — that the sworn statement can be used against him and that it is
possible that he could be found guilty and sent to jail.
"Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial
investigation (if the latter could not afford one) ‘should be engaged by the
accused (himself), or by the latter’s relative or person authorized by him to
engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or
person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by
the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and
supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the
relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be
symbiotic.’"
People vs Januario
- Vicente Pons story:
o March 1988: Cid went to the house of prosecution witness
Vicente Pons, Cid's cousin. He asked Pons if he wanted to
buy a jeep. Pons said he had no money but he could look for
a buyer who can pay 50,000.
o So Pons offered to look for a buyer provided that Cid would
entrust the jeep to him.
o He offered it to Myrna Temporas who agreed to buy it for
65,000, which later became 48,500 only.
- Myrna Temporas story:
o According to her, Pons told her that the jeep belonged to
her niece, Doris Wolf.
o Pons, upon Doris Wolf's instruction, borrowed from Myrna
48,500 and used the jeep as collateral.
o Pons failed to pay back the 48,500, and also failed to
produce a deed of sale covering the jeep. Myrna filed a
complaint. She just found out during the complaint that the
driver and the conductor of the jeep had been killed by
kidnappers.
- Upon NBI's investigation, they found that the carnapping of the jeep
and the killing of the driver and the conductor were done by
Januario, Canape, Sarita and Sarinos. The jeep was disposed of
through Cid.
- From an oral investigation of Januario and Canape, NBI found out
that the driver and the conductor were killed inside a sugar
plantation. A lawyer who was just around, Atty. Carlos Saunar, was
asked to assist the two during the investigation.
- Confession of Januario:
o Januario said that 2 weeks before September, he was in the
house of Canape to procure chicken and kalawit for his
business. He also went there because his new friends, Sarita
and Samera, with Canape, wanted him to look for a buyer of
a jeep. He asked for a photo of the jeep but he was told that
he'll have it later that night after they have drinks at Toto's
house.
o At about 5am, the group hailed a jeep. Here, Januario
described how Canape, Sarita and Sarinos tied up the
conductor and the driver of the jeep and took control of the
vehicle. The jeep stopped after a while, and brought the
conductor and driver down a sugar plantation. Januario
described how he heard growls, but did not witness what
happened. He also saw the bloodied hand Sarita and
Sarinos.
o Upon reaching Libmanan, Januario said they went to Cid
with whom Januario had earlier conferred regarding the
sale of the jeep. He got 1,000 cash and rice and eggs worh
600.
- Januario signed this statement and swore berfore NBI Executive
Director Salvador Ranin. Also signed by Atty. Carlos Saunar as
counsel.
- Confession of Canape:
o Sarita and Sarinos told him to look for a buyer of a jeep. He
looked for a buyer with Januario. They saw Cid as an
interested buyer.
o They told Sarita and Sarinos about it. They drank, then at
5am, hailed a jeep, wrote it and was asked by Sarita and
Sarinos to take out a knife and point at the driver and
conductor of the jeep.
o They stopped at a certain point. Januario, Sarita and Sarinos
brought the driver and the conductor down the jeep at a
sugar plantation, with Sarita later saying that everything
was already fixed "Ayos na".
o After this, they went to Cid and gave the jeep to him for
25,000.
o He also said that Cid and Pons knew that the jeep was just
going to be stolen. He also admitted that he himself knew
that when they were looking for a buyer, the jeep they will
be selling will also be just stolen.
- Canape signed, subscribed and swore to this statement.
 - 12 September 1989: Prosecution offered evidence, which the court
admitted.
- Defense manifested its intention to file a demurrer to evidence.
- 21 November 1989: Since defense has not presented Cid yet, the
court ordered the cancellation of his bail bond and gave his surety
30 days within which to show cause why judgement against the
bond should not be rendered.
- 22 December 1989: Court issued an order stating that the demurrer
to evidence may not be allowed anymore for failure to appear at
the scheduled hearings.
- 26 December 1989: Defense mailed a demurrer to evidence or
motion to dismiss on insufficiency of evidence.
- 10 January 1990: Trial Court dismissed the motion, since the
demurrer failed to contain a compelling reason to recall the
previous order.
- 6 February 1990: The court issued an order considering the cases
terminated against Januario and Canape, but granted a reservation
to present evidence as regards Cid.
- 9 March 1990: Defense presented Cid as witness. He said that a
certain Raul Repe, Toto Sarita and Digo Sarreal approached him
about the sale of a jeep. He referred them to Vicente Pons who he
thought would buy the jeep.
- 27 March 1990: The court denied defense counsel’s motion to
cancel the hearing that day. Since Atty. Saunar was present, the trial
court ordered that his testimony be heard that day. Here, Saunar
said that Atty. Vela, an NBI agent, approached him. Vela, along with
Atty. Toribio told him that Januario, Canape and Sid verbally
confessed to participation in a crime, and they were about the
execute their sworn statements, so they needed his assistance.
Saunar agreed and explained to the three the consequences of their
confession. He told them their constitutional rights, the Miranda
rights, specifically. Prosecution reminded the court that Saunar
can’t be presented as witness, so they consider him only as
“additional evidence for the prosecution and/or rebuttal”
testimony.
- 11 May 1990: Defense manifested that it was closing its case.
Issue:
1. Was the admission of the testimony of Atty. Carlos Saunar proper?
2. Were the extra judicial confessions of Januario and Canape
admissible as evidence?
Held Rationale:
-Rule 119 of the Rules of Court shows the order of trial.
The order is followed, but strict observance of the rules
depends upon the circumstances of the case, at the
1. Yes. discretion of the trial judge. Therefore, the court may
allow the prosecutor to still present involuntarily
omitted evidence. Saunar's testimony was considered
as a rebuttal witness with respect to Cid, so it was
considered.
- Atty. Saunar was not the choice of Januario as his
custodial investigation counsel.
- Even if he can be considered as a competent counsel,
he is not independent because at that time, he was
applying for a position in the NBI, so his loyalty would
not be to the accused but to NBI.
- Section 12(1) of Article II of the Constitution states that
admission of facts related to a crime must be obtained
with assistance of counsel, otherwise it would be
inadmissible. An admission, under Section 26 of Rule
130 is "an act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact". This is different from a confession, which
2. No.
is defined in Section 33 as a "declaration of an accused
acknowledging guilt of he offense.
- Januario and Canape made verbal admissions of
complicity in the crime. But such verbal admissions
must be made with assistance of counsel. They were
not made with assistance of counsel when they made
it in Naga City.
- People vs Alicando: There is a "libertarian exclusionary
rule known as the fruit of the poisonous tree, where
once the primary source (the ‘tree’) is shown to have
been unlawfully attained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the ‘fruit’) derived from it is also
inadmissible.
Judgement: Judgement: Januario and Canape are acquitted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs EDNA MALNGAN y MAYO
FACTS:
On or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila,the said accused, with
intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO
SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden materials, by lighting crumpled
newspaper with the use of disposable lighter inside said house knowing the
same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and
as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building,
together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by
fire; that by reason and on the occasion of the said fire resulted to the death
of Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa together with their four (4)
children whom sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their
death immediately thereafter.
Brgy. Chairman Bernardo and his tanods apprehended Edna and they
immediately brought her to the Barangay Hall for investigation. At the
Barangay Hall, Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and
whose house was also burned, identified the woman as accused-appellant
EDNA who was the housemaid of Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon inspection, a
disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant EDNA’s bag.
Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Brgy. Chairman Bernardo
in the presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the Barangay Hall
that she set her employer’s house on fire because she had not been paid her
salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home to her province but
her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home.
Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators
headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire
Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where she was further investigated and then
detained. When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to
give her sworn statement, she had the opportunity to ask accused-appellant
EDNA at the latter’s detention cell why she did the burning of her employer’s
house and accused-appellant EDNA replied that she set the house on fire
because when she asked permission to go home to her province and
narrated how she did the burning of her employer’s house.When interviewed
by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN Network, accused-appellant
EDNA while under detention was heard by SFO4 Danilo Talusan as having
admitted the crime and even narrated the manner how she accomplished it.
SFO4 Danilo Talusan was able to hear the same confession, this time at his
home, while watching the television program “True Crime” hosted by Gus
Abelgas also of ABS-CBN Network.
When arraigned, accused-appellant with assistance of counsel de oficio,
pleaded “Not Guilty” to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued. However,
she was held guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Due to the death penalty
imposed by the RTC, the case was directly elevated to this Court for
automatic review. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
W/N the court erred in allowing and giving credence to the hearsay evidence
and uncounselled admissions allegedly given by the accused.
HELD:
We have held that the provision of Art. Section 12 (1) and (3) applies to the
stage of custodial investigation – when the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular
person as a suspect. Said constitutional guarantee has also been extended
to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has
merely been “invited” for questioning.
To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial
confessions made must satisfy the following requirements: (1)it must
be voluntary;(2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel;(3) it must be express; and(4) it must be in
writing.
The barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular
instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officers for purpose of
applying by Article III, Section 12. When accused-appellant was brought to
the barangay hall in, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the
fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed the whole family of
Separa. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the
rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have
already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to
Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the
“interrogation” made by the latter – admittedly conducted without first
informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in
the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-
appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the
lighter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her
as such were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.
However, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay
Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not automatically
lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that the constitutional
safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited
through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the accused verbally admits to having committed the
offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant
admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa,
Sr., to having started the fire in the Separas’ house. The testimony of
Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for accused-
appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is not covered by the
aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of
Rights, solely governs the relationship between the individual on one hand
and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another private individual – as both
accused-appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly
are.[44] Here, there is no evidence on record to show that said witness was
acting under police authority, so appropriately, accused-appellant’s
uncounselled extrajudicial confession to said witness was properly admitted
by the RTC.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, is hereby

AFFIRMED insofar as the conviction of accused-appellant EDNA MALNGAN
Y MAYO is concerned. The sentence to be imposed and the amount of
damages to be awarded, however, are MODIFIED. So ordered.
YAP vs. CA
Right to Bail, Section 13 (Excessive if equal to civil liability)
FACTS
Petitioner was convicted of estafa for misappropriating amounts
equivalent to P5,500,000.00. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be
allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the
proceedings. The motion was denied by the RTC.
Petitioner filed with the CA a Motion to Fix Bail for the Provisional
Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. The Solicitor
General opined that the petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount
of P5.5 million and be required to secure a certification/guaranty from the
Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that
he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers
residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.
The CA upheld the Solicitor General’s recommendation. A motion
for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail
fixed by CA, but was denied.
ISSUES
1) W/N the CA committed GADLEJ in fixing the bail in the amount of
P5.5 million based on the petitioner’s civil liability
2) W/N the CA unduly restricted petitioner’s constitutional liberty of
abode and travel in imposing the other conditions for the grant of
bail.
holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by
imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions.
Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure advises courts to consider the following factors in the
setting of amount of bail:
a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail
b) Nature and circumstances of the offense
c) Penalty for the offense charged
d) Character and reputation of the accused
e) Age and health of the accused
f) Weight of the evidence against the accused
g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial
h) Forfeiture of other bail
i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested
j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail
2) No.
The condition imposed is simply consistent with the nature
and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will
make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his
presence. Besides, petitioner is not prevented from changing abode,
he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so.

HELD
1) Yes.
The Rules of Court never intended for the civil liability of
the accused to be a guideline or basis for determining the amount of
bail. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to
fulfil this purpose. To bail at an amount equivalent to the civil
liability of which petitioner is charged is to permit the impression
that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that
accused is charged of. Bail is not intended as a punishment nor as a
satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the
judgment of the appellate court.
Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render
meaningless the right to bail. The Court will not hesitate to exercise
its supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, Accused-Appellant.
HELD: Negative.
Principle: The extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups,
without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence. as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local
FACTS: government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of
peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the
Appellant Lauga was charged of qualified rape by his daughter. legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific
Testimonies revealed that the victim was left alone at home while his scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan,"
father was having drinking spree at the neighbor’s place. Her mother particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any
decided to leave because appellant has the habit of mauling her mother inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective
every time he gets drunk. Her only brother also went out with some insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights
neighbors. provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution,
At around 10pm, appellant woke up the victim, removed his otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
pants and slid inside the blanket covering the victim and removed her Even if the extrajudicial confessions were not admitted as
pants and underwear. Appellant had warned the victim not to shout for evidence, it does not warrant the acquittal of the accused. The
help. He proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her daughter by appellant’s conviction is upheld because of the strong evidence
threatening her with his fist and a knife. Soon after, the victim’s showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
brother arrived and saw her crying. Appellant claimed he scolded the
victim for staying out late. The two decided to leave the house.
While on their way to their maternal grandmother’s house,
victim recounted to her brother what happened to her. They later told
the incident to their grandmother and uncle who sought the assistance
of Moises Boy Banting. Banting found appellant in his house wearing
only his underwear. He was invited to the police station to which he
obliged. Appellant admitted to Banting that he indeed raped her
daughter because he was unable to control himself.
The trial court convicted the accused for qualified rape. Upon
appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s extrajudicial confession without

counsel admissible in evidence?