Case 245

President Clinton’s Haiti Dilemma:

Trial by Failure

Curtis H. Martin

ISBN 1-56927-375-8
Copyright © 1997 by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

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Part A
President Clinton’s Haiti Dilemma: Trial by
Failure
CUR TIS H . MAR TIN
MER R IMAC K CO L L EG E
Over Labor Day weekend, 1994, President Bill Clinton
managed to sneak away for a brief vacation on Martha’s
Vineyard. Beautiful, late summer weather gave him
ample opportunity to relax, play golf in the sun, and for-
get some of the burdens of the Oval Office. When he
returned to work in Washington on September 6, how-
ever, he knew the political weather would be much less
congenial. The centerpiece of his domestic program, a
national health care bill, was all but dead in Congress.
At the same time, the Senate’s summer hearings on the
Whitewater scandal, which dated to Clinton’s days as
governor of Arkansas, had raised new questions about
his “character.”
In foreign affairs, an area where public confidence
in the President’s performance had fallen precipitously
over the past year, Clinton had reacted unsteadily to a
variety of crises: North Korea’s nuclear program, the
war in Bosnia, a surge of Cuban refugees, and the esca-
lating crisis in Haiti. For eighteen months, he had
watched in frustration and anger as Haiti’s brutal mili-
tary junta defied his efforts to cajole or push them from
power, as he had pledged to do. UN resolutions,
threats, and sanctions had all been fruitless. In the
meantime, the Haitian people’s suffering increased,
driving more and more refugees to the United States in
rickety, overcrowded boats and rafts. The steady flow
of refugees strained U.S. resources and raised questions
about Clinton’s credibility. Images of desperate Hai-
tians, many of whom died at sea, were regular fare on
the evening news. The President of the United States
seemed paralyzed by events in a poor, tiny nation.
Republicans were having a field day and anticipated big
gains in the 1994 mid-term congressional elections,
then less than two months away.
HIGH HOPES . . .
In December 1990, few in the United States foresaw that
Haiti would cause such a fuss. Its political future had
rarely looked brighter. Two-thirds of Haitian voters had
given Jean-Bertrand Aristide an overwhelming man-
date as the new President, but his task would not be
easy. Haiti’s per-capita gross domestic product (GDP)
of $250, 10 percent infant mortality rate, 15 percent lit-
eracy rate, and average life expectancy 30 years less
than America’s, made it one of the poorest nations in
the hemisphere. Still, Haitians could take pride in what
were widely regarded as the country’s first free and fair
elections. From the U.S. point of view, Haiti’s election
confirmed the tide of democracy sweeping the globe
1
2 Curtis H. Martin
from East Europe to Latin America. The Bush Adminis-
tration warmly praised the results of the December
election and quickly pledged economic and political
support to the Aristide government. Despite their grati-
fication with these events, American officials did, how-
ever, continue to perceive Haiti as a marginal concern.
During the Cold War, Aristide—a populist deeply
distrusted by the social and military elites with whom
the United States had been accustomed to dealing—
would have been an unlikely candidate for U.S. support.
While in office, he had acquired a reputation in conser-
vative Washington circles as an “anti-American dema-
gogue, an unsteady left-wing populist who threatened
private enterprise and condoned violence against his
opponents.”1 It was a far cry from the Cold War to have
the United States lining up behind a man who had
denounced “the deadly economic infection called capi-
talism.”2 With the end of the Cold War, however, it was
possible to weigh Aristide’s virtues more favorably. He
had, by all accounts, drastically reduced human rights
abuses and all but ended the flight of refugees to the
United States. In the new international environment,
Bush’s Secretary of State could conclude, “if you sup-
port democracy, you support what democracy brings
you.”3
. . . DASHED EXPECTATIONS
On September 30, 1991, a coup led by Lieutenant Gen-
eral Raoul Cedras, Lieutenant Colonel Michel François,
and Brigadier General Philippe Biambi ended Aris-
tide’s brief tenure and forced him out of the country.
Calling events in Haiti a “threat to the national security,
foreign policy, and economy of the United States,” Bush
demanded “an immediate halt to the violence and the
restoration of democracy.” Secretary of State Baker
believed that “if the coup in Haiti were allowed to suc-
ceed, a chain reaction could easily ensue throughout
the region. Haiti had to be the object lesson of our pol-
icy—the singular example that the United States gov-
ernment was not prepared to allow other coups to
succeed.”4 Both the United States and the Organization
of American States (OAS) called for the return of Presi-
dent Aristide and a trade embargo on all products
except food and medicine.
The American policy did not translate into a com-
mitment to restore Aristide by force. Because the prin-
cipal purpose of the policy was to deter other coups, it
was thought sufficient to impose a high and, if neces-
sary, prolonged cost on the coup leaders. When asked
about the possibility of using force to restore democ-
racy, Bush replied, “I am disinclined to use American
force. We’ve got a big history of American force in this
hemisphere, and so we’ve got to be very careful about
that.”5 No issue was more sensitive in inter-American
relations than the subject of U.S. intervention. In this
century alone, the United States had intervened with
force or covert action in Guatemala, the Dominican
Republic, Mexico, Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua, Panama,
El Salvador, and Haiti, which U.S. troops had occupied
from 1915 to 1934. Historical sensitivities aside, the
actions of Haiti’s dictators did not measure up to Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait, or even Panama’s defiance in the
late 1980s, as a threat to U.S. interests. In any case, Aris-
tide himself strongly opposed a U.S. invasion. He did
not trust the United States and recognized that his legit-
imacy would be questioned if he were restored to
power by U.S. forces.
While Bush professed support for the Haitian peo-
ple’s quest for democracy, he was determined to pre-
vent an influx of thousands of poor Haitians who might
flee in the wake of the coup and subsequent sanctions.
In 1992 at least, his forcible repatriation policy for “eco-
nomic” refugees made clear that sympathy for Haiti had
its limits. By the time Clinton took office, the Bush
Administration had become disenchanted with Aris-
tide and shifted to pressuring him to negotiate a com-
promise with the junta.
PRESIDENT CLINTON INHERITS THE
HAITI PROBLEM
During the presidential election of 1992, Bill Clinton
promised to be the “domestic affairs” President, focus-
ing like “a laser beam” on the economy. Nevertheless,
during the campaign, he staked out an activist position
on foreign policy to shore up what had been the Demo-
crats Achilles’ heel since the Vietnam War. Clinton’s
foreign policy promised a program of “extravagant
internationalism” that would end Chinese human rights
abuses, stop Serbian aggression against Bosnia, halt
nuclear proliferation, and “bring democracy to Haiti
and Cuba by tightening the trade embargoes against
both.”6
 President Clinton’s Haiti Dilemma
Clinton demanded a reversal of what he called the
Bush Administration’s “cruel” policy toward Haiti and
pledged, “I would turn up the heat and try to restore
the elected government and meanwhile let the refugees
stay here.” Even before taking office, he would regret
and reverse that “open door” policy toward refugees.
Evidence that thousands of Haitians were poised to flee
the moment he took office convinced the President-
elect that he, like Bush, would forcibly repatriate the
boat people.7 The price of this reversal was a loss of
credibility in the Haitian and human rights communi-
ties and a growing reputation for expediency.
Though he was now in line with Bush on the refu-
gee question, Clinton moved toward an affirmative
commitment to restore President Aristide—something
Bush had scrupulously avoided. Like Bush, however, he
strongly opposed military intervention and linked his
policy to multilateral diplomacy and sanctions. From
the start, Clinton had personal reasons to be wary of
military solutions to foreign policy problems. First, his
avoidance of military service during the Vietnam War
had been a major campaign issue, which undercut his
authority as commander-in-chief. Second, he was phil-
osophically uncomfortable with the use of force. Third,
the fight over easing restrictions on gays in the military,
a social rather than security issue, had further under-
mined the his reputation with the military.
DIPLOMACY AND SANCTIONS
Clinton delegated the Haiti problem to a newly
appointed special envoy, Lawrence Pezzullo, former
U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua during the Carter
Administration. In March 1993, Pezzullo was instructed
to deliver “a very tough message” to the Haitian lead-
ers.8 At the same time, the United States moved with
other countries and the United Nations to step up sanc-
tions.
The Governors Island Accord
The escalation of international sanctions in the first half
of 1993 appeared to produce quick and positive results.
Under pressure from Haitian business leaders, Cedras
agreed to participate in UN/OAS-sponsored talks on
Governors Island, New York, to consider restoring Aris-
3
tide to power in exchange for lifting the sanctions.9 On
July 3, 1993, all parties signed an agreement providing
for the departure of and amnesty for the coup leaders,
resumption of the presidency by Aristide, and expan-
sion of the humanitarian United Nations Mission in
Haiti (UNMIH) to oversee modernizing the armed
forces and establishing a new police force. Sanctions
would be removed by October 30, 1993, the scheduled
date for Aristide’s return. Clinton later referred to the
plan as “a comprehensive framework for achievement
of our policy objectives in Haiti.”10 As a result of Haitian
compliance with the initial terms of the accord during
the summer, the UN, OAS, and United States condi-
tionally eased sanctions.
The accord raised hopes only to dash them. Haiti’s
government may never have intended to carry out its
commitments as deadlines for compliance came and
went.11 A turning point occurred in October, when the
U.S.S. Harlan County arrived in Haiti carrying U.S. and
Canadian military engineers to help implement the
Governors Island Accord.12 When an angry mob
assembled on the dock to block the landing, the admin-
istration huddled to consider options. UN Ambassador
Madeleine K. Albright argued against a retreat, express-
ing her concern that American prestige would suffer
unless the United States were willing to use force to put
its troops ashore. More cautious advice from Secretary
of Defense Aspin and others won the day, however, and
Clinton ordered the Harlan County to turn back.13 The
President was reeling from a debacle in Somalia only
days earlier that had left eighteen U.S. soldiers dead and
the administration looking for a way out of that war-
torn country. On October 28, as the Governors Island
Accord was unraveling, a frustrated President con-
fessed his fear that the Haitian military leaders were
convinced they could
just wait out Aristide and everything will be all
right and that the international community will put
up with the re-establishment of a Duvalier like
regime there, in plain violation of the overwhelm-
ing majority of the people of Haiti, I think they’re
just wrong.
To underline his concern, he added, ”we are look-
ing at what our other options are.14 Despite this veiled
threat, the President sent other, more cautious signals:
4 Curtis H. Martin
“We have to try to reach another agreement so that the
country can go back to normal.”15
It had taken serious arm-twisting by Pezzullo and
UN envoy Dante Caputo to convince Aristide to sign
the Governors Island Accord; by the end of 1993, the
administration was said to be “growing weary” of him.16
Those who blamed Aristide for the impasse believed
the military leaders would be more responsive to car-
rots than sticks alone. As a result, they resisted pressure
from Aristide and others to escalate sanctions. In the
past, providing dictators like Marcos, Somoza, and
even Baby Doc Duvalier with “golden parachutes” had
eased their way out of power—the same approach
might again work. A draft agreement, worked out
under UN auspices with Haitian parliamentarians in
February 1994, seemed to reflect a more conciliatory
approach. It offered the coup leaders an amnesty and
gradual retirement. Despite the view of the UN Secre-
tary General that the plan was “a significant develop-
ment,” Aristide would not accept it and continued to
insist on a no-strings-attached return to power. At the
same time, he remained suspicious of U.S. military
intervention.17 Aristide’s supporters were angry that
the United States seemed to be treating him, not the
Haitian military, as the enemy. Even as late as June
1994, senior officials believed that “to avoid an invasion
of Haiti, the United States [was] trying to induce the
three top military leaders of the Caribbean nation to
leave for a comfortable life in exile, perhaps by arrang-
ing for them to be paid off.”18
Economic Sanctions
One reason to consider diplomatic “carrots” was that
using the “stick” of sanctions was fraught with difficul-
ties. Indeed, U.S. intelligence had concluded sanctions
would not work.19 The problem was twofold: First,
sanctions caused increasing hardship for ordinary Hai-
tians—and thus increased pressures on Haitians to flee
their country. At one point, Ambassador Albright can-
didly admitted that the refugee problem was “what this
was all about in the first place.”20 Clinton resisted Aris-
tide’s call for tougher sanctions saying they would “be
more painful to average Haitians who are already suffer-
ing.”21
Second, despite the suffering of the common peo-
ple, the upper classes experienced relatively little hard-
ship.22 Throughout the crisis, Haiti’s border with the
Dominican Republic remained porous. A small number
of Haitian families were even enriching themselves by
trading in food, one of the items exempted from the
embargo. Success in evading the sanctions convinced
Haitian leaders that they could withstand “any measures
short of intervention,” and that when the crisis was over
“they would still be on top.”23 Even with those draw-
backs, Clinton was reluctant to abandon sanctions,
which were the only visible proof that his administra-
tion was doing something about Haiti.
ASSESSING THE USE OF FORCE
Throughout the spring of 1994, the administration
remained opposed to using force. Special Representa-
tive Pezzullo, Defense Secretary Aspin, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell, and Director of
Central Intelligence James Woolsey consistently
warned against using force in Haiti.24 The Pentagon was
prone to see hawkish administration officials as lacking
“a seasoned understanding of the difficulties involved in
using force.”25 Pentagon officials opposed the militari-
zation of U.S. policy, seeing the potential for disaster in
a drawn-out and inconclusive occupation. Unpleasant
experiences in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia rein-
forced a cautious attitude toward placing U.S. forces in
harm’s way. Defense Department thinking reflected the
“Weinberger Rules” for using military force. Under
those rules—named for Caspar Weinberger, President
Reagan’s defense secretary—force should only be used
(1) when all other alternatives had been exhausted, (2)
when there was a clear threat to vital national interests,
(3) with prior congressional and public support, (4)
when accompanied by a clear military mission, and (5)
with a clear exit strategy. To administration doubters,
none of these conditions seemed likely to be met.
Aside from touting the military risks, opponents of
force argued that internal obstacles to democracy in
Haiti were simply too entrenched for the United States
to overcome. Corruption was endemic and institution-
alized, while democratic values and attitudes were
embryonic at best. Haiti would also be a financial sink-
hole. Finally, as in the 1920s, a sustained American pres-
ence, fueling xenophobia and nationalism, could prove
counterproductive to democracy in the long-run.
 President Clinton’s Haiti Dilemma
On the other hand, diplomacy was at a stalemate
and sanctions had failed. The coup leaders showed no
sign of stepping down, while Aristide refused to make
the concessions that the United States thought would
induce them to do so. Even the dwindling number of
administration optimists put the odds of Aristide ever
returning at no better than “50/50.”26 U.S. embassy offi-
cials in Haiti were reported to “share a sense of fail-
ure.”27
To President Clinton, however, the potential cost
of failure was intolerable. Time and again he had tied
his and the country’s prestige to success in Haiti. More-
over, he was deeply troubled by the deteriorating
human rights situation there. The State Department’s
human rights report claimed that
Haitians suffered frequent human rights abuses
throughout 1993, including political and extra judi-
cial killings by the security forces and their allies,
disappearances, beatings and other mistreatment
of detainees, arbitrary arrest and detention, execu-
tive interference in the judicial process, and contin-
ued infringement of the rights of citizens to change
their government.28
At least 4,000 Haitians had been killed and up to
300,000 forced into hiding in Haiti since 1991; 40,000
refugees had fled and the costs of processing them was
rising toward $200 million. Starvation was a serious
threat and violent protests had ignited among the
14,000 refugees interned at the U.S. base at Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba.
PONDERING OTHER OPTIONS:
THE PLAYING FIELD CHANGES
The intransigence and cruelty of the Haitian leaders
and the unending exodus of refugees were strengthen-
ing the voice of administration “hawks.” This group
consisted of Vice President Gore and his security
adviser Leon Fuerth, Secretary of State Christopher,
National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, Deputy
National Security Adviser Samuel Berger, Deputy Sec-
retary of State Strobe Talbott, UN Ambassador Made-
leine Albright, and Presidential Adviser George
Stephanopoulos.29 To some in this group, Haiti was “a
golden opportunity to make good on President Clin-
5
ton’s promise to promote democracy around the
world.”30
To others, it came down to a matter of maintaining
credibility with America’s friends and foes abroad and
with domestic constituencies vital for the success of the
President’s political program at home. With the depar-
ture of strong political figures like General Powell and
Defense Secretary Aspin, the opponents of force lost
influence.31 Another ardent opponent of a military
solution, Special Envoy Pezzullo, resigned in March
1994, warning that “we are heading irrevocably down a
path toward unilateral military intervention.” Aspin and
Powell’s replacements, William Perry and General John
Shalikashvili, respectively, continued their predeces-
sors’ opposition, but without their clout.
Though many were saying an invasion would
repeat the failures of the 1915–34 period, other voices
were calling for intervention. Former U.S. Ambassador
to El Salvador Robert White argued that Americans
would be welcomed as liberators and that pacification
would be a relatively easy task.32 The forty-member
Congressional Black Caucus was pushing hard for
action in Congress and their support was expected to be
crucial on several important votes that autumn. In an
open letter to the President, the Caucus called Clin-
ton’s Haiti policy “a series of machinations on the part
of the world’s sole superpower to derail the democratic
program so painfully and movingly embraced by our
hemisphere’s poorest people”—the policy, they
declared, “must be scrapped.” A coalition of caucus
members, the Florida congressional delegation (whose
state bore the brunt of the refugee crisis), religious lead-
ers, and celebrities demanded tougher enforcement of
the embargo, including punishment of sanction-bust-
ing countries. Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) warned,
“There’s a great sentiment here [in Congress] that we’re
not living up to a commitment to restore democracy in
Haiti.”33 In March 1994, Randall Robinson of TransAf-
rica began a hunger strike, proclaiming that the admin-
istration’s policy was “cruel, grossly discriminatory and
profoundly racist.”34 President Aristide charged that
the administration’s policies were contributing to a
“holocaust.”35
Clinton was stung by these accusations. How could
his own political constituency charge him not only with
lack of compassion, but also with racism? What was
more, hunger strikes were a tool used against brutal dic-
6 Curtis H. Martin
tators and warmongers, not Bill Clinton. The President
was convinced that his heart was in the right place, but
admitted privately that “we ought to change our policy.
It hasn’t worked.”36 Accordingly, on May 3, 1994, he
told journalist Judy Woodruff,
We have worked for months since Governors Island
was abrogated to try to find other solutions. Mean-
while, innocent civilians are being killed and muti-
lated. We are doing our best to avoid dealing with
the military option. . . . But given how many people
are being killed and the abject misery of the Haitian
people and the fact that democracy was implanted
by the people and then uprooted by the military
rulers there, I think that we cannot afford to dis-
count the prospect of a military option. . . . The
people who are now in control in Haiti have
thwarted democracy; they have brought down the
economy; they have visited abject misery on their
people. And they are now once again killing and
mutilating not just sympathizers of Aristide but
other innocent civilians. And it is wrong, and we’ve
got to do what we can to try to stop it.37
Again, the President’s words had escalated his com-
mitment to restoring Haiti’s democratic and human
rights. To demonstrate a clear change of direction, he
announced a package of new policy moves. First, he
appointed William H. Gray, a hawk likely to have the
confidence of the Black Caucus, to replace Pezzullo as
special adviser for Haiti. Second, he ordered a further
tightening of sanctions on Haitian leaders. On May 6,
1994, the UN Security Council imposed a ban on all but
humanitarian imports and restricted travel by the junta
members and their families. Third, he announced yet
another change in his refugee policy: hence forward,
refugees would be given an asylum hearing either
aboard U.S. ships or in foreign processing stations.38 As
these steps were implemented, he quietly ordered the
Pentagon to prepare invasion contingencies.
In the wake of these actions, the President offered a
wide-ranging justification for the U.S. commitment to
Haiti:
First, it’s in our backyard. Second, we’ve got a mil-
lion Haitian-Americans. Third, we’ve got several
thousand Americans in Haiti. Fourth, we believe
drugs are coming through Haiti to the United
States.39 Fifth, we face . . . the continued possibility
of a massive outflow of Haitian migrants to the
United States. . . . Sixth, Haiti and Cuba are the only
two nondemocracies left in our hemisphere.40
A few weeks later, he added that “we have an inter-
est in seeing that the United Nations and its work is
upheld” and that “there was an agreement [the Gover-
nors Island Accord]” that should be enforced.41 Clinton
insisted that, taken together, these amounted to “signif-
icant” if not “vital” interests.
Intended to mollify critics, the President’s new pol-
icies seemed to only multiply his problems. Critics on
the right derided Clinton for caving in to pressure from
a web of liberal moralists “knotted together during the
administration of President Jimmy Carter [who] all
speak the same language, the Carteresque ‘human
rights first’ policy.”42 To make matters worse, the Presi-
dent’s new refugee policy only stimulated a new flight
of desperate people from Haiti. So serious was the
problem that Clinton was forced to switch course yet
again a few weeks after his May announcement: the
United States would attempt to find “safe havens” for
refugees in third countries such as Panama and Domi-
nica.
On the diplomatic front, the President set out to
build international support for the force option. The
Cedras regime gave U.S. diplomacy a boost by commit-
ting a series of outrages, including the murder of Jean-
Marie Vincent, a key Aristide ally, and the expulsion of
UN human-rights monitors. By June, most Western
Hemisphere countries had pledged their support for
military intervention if sanctions failed.43 Ambassador
Albright pressed hard at the United Nations for a reso-
lution authorizing the use of force. On July 31, the Secu-
rity Council passed Resolution 940, expressing “grave
concern” for the “deterioration of the humanitarian sit-
uation in Haiti.” The resolution also authorized a U.S.-
led force to use “all necessary means to facilitate the
departure of the military leadership” and to “establish
and maintain a secure and stable environment.” When
such an environment had been created, a UN peace-
keeping force would take over. It would be the job of
that force, not the Americans, to keep order, retrain and
reorganize the army and police, and monitor elections.
Another key precondition for an invasion seemed to be
satisfied when Aristide called for “prompt and decisive
action.”
 President Clinton’s Haiti Dilemma
By August 1994, invasion plans had been com-
pleted, and the forces to carry them out were nearly in
place. UN Ambassador Albright warned the junta, “You
have a choice. You can depart voluntarily and soon, or
you can depart involuntarily and soon.”44 Still, the junta
would not go. In early September, they refused to
accept a proposal to meet with a low-level U.S. delega-
tion for the purpose of finding an end to the crisis. The
regime was counting on scheduled November parlia-
mentary elections in Haiti to strengthen its claim to
legitimacy and undercut the U.S. case. It may have also
calculated that, until then, the impending American
congressional elections would tie Clinton’s hands. In
defiance of the UN resolution, Haiti’s President Jonas-
saint declared a state of siege and vowed, “we will fight
with all our might and means.”
THE U.S. DOMESTIC FRONT: CONGRESS AND
THE PUBLIC WEIGH IN AGAINST FORCE
The Pentagon was ready and America’s allies had given
their assent. Clinton’s problems, however, were both at
home and substantial. While some political interests
were pushing the President to act, more were warning
him not to. Clinton had no chance of achieving what
Bush had before the Gulf War—a congressional resolu-
tion of approval for military action. The “great senti-
ment” in Congress for rescuing Haiti, to which Tom
Harkin had alluded, never materialized. More to the
point, as early as October 21, 1993, the Senate had
approved a nonbinding resolution that all military
activities in Haiti should have prior approval of Con-
gress. Since then, Congress had approved several more
nonbinding resolutions calling on the President to con-
NOTES
1. Newsweek, 26 September 1994, p. 26. Elliott Abrams,
assistant secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs under
Reagan, had called Aristide “democratically elected”—but
“not a democrat.” Louis Ortmayer and Joanna Flinn, Ham-
strung Over Haiti: Returning the Refugees, Pew Case Studies in
International Affairs, Case 355 (Washington, D.C., Institute
for the Study of Diplomacy, 1993), p. 15.
2. Newsweek, 19 September 1994, p. 41.
3. James Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York,
1993), p. 601.
7
sult Congress before ordering an invasion, and legisla-
tion was in the works for late September that would
have prohibited expenditures for military action in
Haiti. Democrats warned the President that an unau-
thorized invasion would do great harm to democratic
candidates in the upcoming elections. On September
12, Representative Lee Hamilton urged the President to
send a high-level envoy to Haiti before ordering an inva-
sion.45 Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D-NY) bluntly told
Clinton that Congress would “explode” if he acted on
his own.
Opinion polls during the summer confirmed public
distaste for military action in Haiti. In one poll, only 38
percent believed U.S. national interests were at stake
there. In mid-September, a New York Times/CBS poll
registered opposition to using force at 66 percent, and
other polls put opposition even higher. A solid major-
ity believed the President should get congressional per-
mission in advance of any military action. Former Vice
President Quayle accused Clinton of planning action
against Haiti in order to boost his standing in the polls.
It would only take a few televised evacuations of U.S.
dead and wounded to undercut the President’s already
tenuous standing and jeopardize his agenda. Some
members of the President’s own team believed that
without public support, and in the face of congressional
opposition, he faced political disaster if he went ahead
with an invasion.
Even with America’s military might poised for an
invasion, Clinton hesitated, insisting at a press confer-
ence on September 14 that “[the dictators] can still
leave. They do not have to push this to a confrontation.”
The President scheduled a televised address on Haiti
for September 15—but what would he say?
4. Ibid., p. 602.
5. Public Papers of the Presidents: Administration of
George Bush, Book II (Washington, D.C., 1991), p. 1247.
6. David C. Hendrickson, “The Recovery of Internation-
alism,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 5 (1995): p. 26.
7. Wall Street Journal, 19 September 1994, p. A1.
8. Christian Science Monitor, 7 April 1993: p. 3.
9. PBS, “Showdown over Haiti,” Frontline, 13 June 1994.
10. White House, Letter to Congressional Leaders on
Haiti, 13 November 1993.
8 Curtis H. Martin
11. White House, “Remarks Announcing William H. Gray
III as Special Adviser on Haiti,” 8 May 1994.
12. Publicly, Cedras justified action against the U.S.S. Har-
lan County by claiming that the troops on board were secretly
armed with offensive weapons, which he based on a public
statement by Defense Secretary Aspin. PBS, “Showdown
over Haiti,” 13 June 1994.
13. New York Times, 15 October 1993, p. A8. According to
one report, Deputy Under Secretary For Defense for Policy
Walter Slocombe boasted of his support for turning back the
U.S.S. Harlan County and vowed that the military “would not
risk American soldiers’ lives to put that psychopath back in
power.” New York Times, 29 April 1994, p. A1.
14. White House, Press Conference, 28 October 1993.
“Papa Doc” and his son, “Baby Doc” Duvalier, ruled Haiti
from 1957 to 1986.
15. White House, Press Conference, 10 November 1993.
The State Department argued that, “we need to take another
run at the peace accords and cannot let a single morning’s dis-
turbance force us back off our involvement.” New York Times,
15 October 1993, p. A8.
16. PBS, “Showdown over Haiti,” June 1994; Elizabeth
Drew, On the Edge (New York, 1995), p. 335.
17. New York Times, 16 February 1994, p. A8.
18. Ibid., 20 June 1994, p. A1.
19. Ibid., 4 September 1994, Sec. I, p. 1.
20. Drew, On the Edge, p. 334.
21. New York Times, 29 April 1994, p. A1.
22. Christian Science Monitor, 1 August 1994, p. A3.
23. New York Times, 26 May 1994, p. A8. Anthony P.
Maingot, “Haiti: The Political Rot Within,” Current History
94, No. 589 (February 1995): p. 64.
24. New York Times, 15 October 1993, p. A8. Colin Pow-
ell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995),
p. 303.
25. Drew, On the Edge, p. 333.
26. New York Times, 7 April 1994, p. A9.
27. Ibid., 1 April 1994, p. A8.
28. Critical as this report was, some believed it was toned
down in keeping with the hope that the military leaders
would prove more tractable if the United States showed some
restraint.
29. Drew, On the Edge, p. 141. Drew calls Lake a Wilso-
nian “moralist.” See also, “Inside Mr. Inside,” New York Times
Magazine, 20 August 1995, pp. 34-35.
30. New York Times, 15 October 1993, p. A8.
31. Newsweek, 26 September 1993, p. 26.
32. Michael Wines, “Clinton Covers Himself,” New York
Times, 18 September 1994, Sec. IV, p. 1. Representative David
Obey (D-WI), normally an opponent of force, believed that
“Haiti is one place where something like this [an invasion] is
achievable at minimum cost.” New York Times, 15 April 1994,
p. A2.
33. New York Times, 15 April 1994, p. A2.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 22 April 1994, p. A1.
36. Ibid., 29 April 1994, p. A1.
37. CNN, “A Global Forum with President Clinton,” 3
May 1994.
38. Until then, boat people were returned to Haiti where
all asylum hearings were held.
39. Clinton was undoubtedly aware of the effectiveness of
the drug issue in legitimizing the 1989 U.S. intervention in
Panama, even though U.S. drug agencies did not see Haiti as a
significant source of the drug trade.
40. White House, Press Conference, 8 May 1994.
41. White House, Press Conference, 8 July 1994.
42. Newsweek, 26 September 1994, p. 26.
43. New York Times, 13 June 1994, p. A10.
44. Christian Science Monitor, 2 August 1994, p. 1.
45. Former President Jimmy Carter, a strong opponent of
using force, let it be known that he was prepared to go to
Haiti. He believed that Cedras was ready to step down.
Case 245, Part B
President Clinton’s Haiti Dilemma: Trial by Fire?
CUR TIS MAR TIN
MER R IMAC K CO L L EG E
For eighteen months, president Bill Clinton had ago-
nized over how to keep his oft repeated pledge to
restore democracy to Haiti. The junta that had seized
power from the lawful President, Bertrand Aristide in
1991, refused to be cajoled or threatened into relin-
quishing power. Now, on September 15, 1994, the Pres-
ident appeared on national television to announce that
the United States would invade Haiti: “Your time is up,”
he told the Haitian leaders; “Leave now or we will force
you from power.” To accomplish this end, the United
States would lead a multinational force into Haiti to
unseat the military and restore President Aristide.
Emphasizing the brutality of the regime and the costs of
the refugee crisis, Clinton made his case:
Haiti’s dictators, led by General Raoul Cedras, con-
trol the most violent regime in our hemisphere. For
three years they have rejected every peaceful solu-
tion that the international community has pro-
posed. . . . Now the United States must protect its
interests to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten
thousands of Haitians, to secure our borders and
preserve stability and promote democracy in our
hemisphere, and to uphold the reliability of the
commitments we make and the commitments oth-
ers make to us. . . . Cedras and his armed thugs have
conducted a reign of terror, executing children,
raping women, killing priests. As the dictators have
grown more desperate, the atrocities have grown
ever more brutal. Recent reports have docu-
mented the slaying of Haitian orphans by the
nation’s deadly police thugs. . . . International
observers uncovered a terrifying pattern of soldiers
and policemen raping the wives and daughters of
suspected political dissidents. . . . When brutality
occurs close to your shores, it affects our national
interests and we have a responsibility to act.1
Privately, the President set midnight on Sunday,
September 18, as H-hour. The planned invasion would
finally accomplish what candidate Clinton had prom-
ised, but despite having decided to send American
forces into action, it was still the last thing he wanted to
do. The arguments against using force had not lost their
relevance.
THE CARTER MISSION
Even as he announced the invasion plan, President
Clinton decided on one last diplomatic gambit to free
9
10 Curtis Martin
Haiti without bloodshed.2 Only hours after announcing
that diplomacy had been exhausted, he overrode his
advisers’ objections and telephoned former President
Jimmy Carter and instructed him to go immediately to
Haiti for talks with the government.3 Scorned by many
Republicans for his liberal views, and by some Demo-
crats as a loose cannon, Carter had earlier been turned
down when he offered his assistance. Now, on Friday,
September 16, Carter, Colin Powell, and Senator Sam
Nunn (D-GA) flew to Port-au-Prince as official presi-
dential emissaries. During his Saturday radio address,
Clinton explained his decision “to make one last best
effort to provide a peaceful, orderly transfer of power,
to minimize the loss of life, and to maximize the
chances of security for all Haitians.” He argued that it
was the responsibility of any President to pursue every
possible alternative to the use of force in order to avoid
bloodshed and the loss of life.” If the generals did not
quickly agree to depart, Clinton told Carter, the inva-
sion was going ahead—both Carter and the Haitians
would be negotiating under the gun.
AN AGREEMENT AT THE “ELEVENTH” HOUR
Throughout the two days of tense negotiations, Carter
treated the Haitian leaders with “dignity,” trying to find
them a face-saving means of departing.4 It seemed at
several points that talks had broken down and the inva-
sion would begin on schedule Sunday night. Clinton
even gave the orders setting the invasion in motion. Just
as troop transports were taking off from their bases, a
worried Carter telephoned Clinton to announce that he
had a deal in hand.
In brief, the agreement resembled the Governors
Island Accord of 1993—though it was vague and, per-
haps, too generous to the junta. Under its terms, the
military and the civilian government would relinquish
power by October 15, though exile was not an explicit
condition. In return, sanctions against Haiti would be
lifted, and the Haitian Parliament would be granted a
general amnesty. The generals would face no inquest
NOTES
1. To sweeten what was a bitter pill to some of his oppo-
nents, Clinton announced that President Aristide had agreed
and would even be allowed to keep their substantial
financial assets. In another concession to the outgoing
leaders, as well as to meet the very pragmatic need for a
functioning administration, it was agreed that U.S.
forces would “work closely” with the existing police
and military for a transitional period. Because Haiti’s
leaders had agreed to their presence, the troops in
Operation Restore Democracy would find themselves
charged with maintaining order and ensuring compli-
ance with the terms of the Carter agreement—not
shooting at an enemy army. The bottom line of the
agreement, however, was that Aristide would return as
President by October 15 and “free and democratic” leg-
islative elections would soon follow. To persuade Clin-
ton to accept the agreement, General Powell told him
over the telephone that he could have “15,000 troops on
this island without having fired a shot in anger. You can
use this power to impose any result you want.”5
After listening to General Powell’s persuasive sell,
Clinton gave his assent to the terms. The invasion was
off. American forces would still begin to land in Haiti
the next day, but not as invaders. The press would dub
Operation Restore Democracy an “intervasion.”
Ebullient from his diplomatic coup, the President
declared that “American steadfastness” had won the
day. General Powell could have been speaking for the
President when he said, “The image that we were all
afraid we would see sometime this week has been
avoided, and that image was of American youngsters
killing Haitian youngsters and Haitian youngsters kill-
ing American youngsters.”6 Mindful of the public’s
widespread fear of an open-ended military commit-
ment, Clinton publicly explained that “the goals of the
international coalition are clear and limited. Once the
military regime is removed from power, the coalition
will help the democratic government establish basic
security. . . . Then, in months, not years, the coalition
will pass the baton on to the United Nations.”7
When American troops went ashore on September
19, instead of gunfire, they met an enthusiastic and
widespread welcome.
to step down in 1996, when his term ended.
2. New York Times, 19 September 1994, p. A1.

3. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Radio
Address by the President to the Nation, 17 September 1994.
At his insistence, Carter was accompanied by Senate Armed
Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn of Georgia and for-
mer Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Pow-
ell.
11
4. New York Times, 19 September 1994, p. A1.
5. Joe Klein, “Empathy for the Devil,” Newsweek, 3 Octo-
ber 1994; see also Powell, My American Journey, p. 602.
6. New York Times, 19 September 1994, p. A14.
7. Radio Address by the President to the Nation, 17 Sep-
tember 1994.