this country, belonging to no State, much less to the present
Government of the land of his birth to which he is
PERSONAL LAW: NATIONALITY, RESIDENCE AND
DOMICILE
1. Eremes Kookooritchkin v. Solictor General
FACTS​: In August, 1941, appellee filed with the lower court a
petition for naturalization, accompanied with supporting
affidavits of two citizens, copy of a declaration of intention
sworn in July, 1940, and proper notice of the hearing.
It was established at the hearing that the petitioner is a
native-born Russian, having first seen the light of day on
November 4, 1897 in the old City of St. Petersburg, Russia.
When the revolution broke out in Russia in 1917, he joined the
White Russian Army at Vladivostok and fought against the
Bolsheviks until 1922 when the White Russian Army was
overwhelmed by the Bolsheviks. As he refused to join the
Bolshevik regime, he fled by sea from Vladivostok to Shanghai
and from this Chinese port he found his way to Manila, arriving
at this port as a member of a group of White Russians under
Admiral Stark in March, 1923. He stayed in Manila for about
seven months, then moved to Olongapo, Zambales, where he
resided for about a year, and from this place he went to Iriga,
Camarines Sur, where he established his permanent residence
since May, 1925. He has remained a resident of this
municipality, except for a brief period from 1942 to July, 1945,
when by reason of his underground activities he roamed
mountains of Caramoan as a guerrilla officer. After liberation
he returned to Iriga where again he resides up to the present
time.
The applicant is married to a Filipino by the name of
Concepcion Segovia, with whom he has one son named
Ronald Kookooritchkin. He is at present studying in Saint
Agnes Academy, at Legaspi, Albay, a school duly recognized
by the Government.
The applicant is shop superintendent of A. L. Ammen
Transportation Company, with about eighty Filipino employees
working under him. He receives an annual salary of P13,200
with free quarters and house allowance. He also owns stocks
and bonds of this and other companies.
The applicant speaks and writes English and the Bicol dialect.
Socially he intermingles with the Filipinos, attending parties,
dances and other social functions with his wife. He has a good
moral character and believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution. He has never been accused of any
crime. On the other hand, he has always conducted himself in
a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire period of
residence in Camarines Sur, in his relations with the
constituted authorities as well as with the community.
Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of Soviet
Russia. He disclaims allegiance to the present Communist
Government of Russia. He is, therefore, a stateless refugee in
uncompromisingly opposed. He is not suffering from any
mental alienation or incurable contagious disease.
ISSUE:
1. ​Appellant claims that the lower court erred in
not finding that the declaration of intention to
become a Filipino citizen filed by appellee is
invalid and insufficient as a basis for the petition
of naturalization.
2. Appellant contends that the lower court erred in
finding appellee stateless and not a Russian citizen
and in not finding that he has failed to establish that
he is not disqualified for Philippine citizenship under
section 4 (h) of the Revised Naturalization Law.
HELD:
1. The question calls for the application of the
following provision of section 5 of the Revised
Naturalization Law:
No declaration shall be valid until entry for
permanent residence has been established and
a certificate showing the date, place and
manner of his arrival has been issued.
Appellant alleges that no documentary or testimonial evidence
was introduced to establish the fact that appellee had lawfully
been admitted into the Philippines for permanent residence.
The records of the Bureau of Justice, where the declarations of
intention to become a Filipino citizen were filed, had been lost
or destroyed during the battle for the liberation of Manila, and
the certificate alluded to has not been reconstituted.
Appellant's contention that attachment of the certificate of
arrival is essential to the validity of a declaration finds no
support in the wordings of the law, as the above-quoted
section 5 of Commonwealth Act no. 473 uses the words "has
been issued.
Appellee suggests that we would not consider the question
here raised by appellant, the latter having failed to raise it in
lower court and points out that there is testimonial evidence
showing appellee's arrival March, 1923, and that he was
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and the testimony
of petitioner has not been refuted. Appellee's alleges that the
office of the President has certified that it is a matter of record
that petitioner was one of the Russian refugees who entered
the Philippines under the command of Admiral Stark, the facts
regarding arrival of the latter fleet being a matter of common
knowledge, widely publicized in the newspapers at the time, of
which this Court may properly take judicial notice under section
5 of Rule 123. When the fleet entered the Philippine waters, it
was met by a Governor General Wood who, later, took the
matter up with the authorities in Washington in lengthy
correspondence, and the 1,200 persons manning the fleet
were allowed to land and to remain in the Philippines or
proceed to other countries, except about 800 who were
allowed to go to the United States and given free transportation
on the naval transport "Merritt." The ships of the fleet were sold
in the Philippines.
The undisputed fact that the petitioner has been continuously
residing in the Philippines for about 25 years, without having
been molested by the authorities, who are presumed to have
been regularly performing their duties and would have arrested
petitioner if his residence is illegal, as rightly contended by
appellee, can be taken as evidence that he is enjoying
permanent residence legally. That a certificate of arrival has
been issued is a fact that should be accepted upon the
petitioner's undisputed statement in his declaration of July,
1940, that the certificate cannot be supposed that the receiving
official would have accepted the declaration without the
certificate mentioned therein as attached thereto.
We conclude that petitioner's declaration is valid under section
5 of the Naturalization Law, failure to reconstitute the certificate
of arrival notwithstanding. What an unreconstituted document
intended to prove may be shown by other competent evidence.
2. It is contended that petitioner failed to show that
under the laws of Russia, appellee has lost his
Russian citizenship and failed to show that Russia
grants to Filipinos the right to become a naturalized
citizens or subjects thereof. The controversy centers
on the question as to whether petitioner is a Russian
citizen or is stateless.
Petitioner testified categorically that he is not a Russian citizen
and that he has no citizenship. His testimony supports the
lower court's pronouncement that petitioner is a stateless
refugee in this country.
Appellant points out that petitioner stated in his petition for
naturalization that he is citizen or subject of the Empire of
Russia, but the Empire of Russia has ceased to exist since the
Czars were overthrown in 1917 by the Bolshevists, and the
petitioner disclaims allegiance or connection with the Soviet
Government established after the overthrow of the Czarist
Government.
We do not believe that the lower court erred in pronouncing
appellee stateless. Appellee's testimony, besides being
uncontradicted, is supported by the well-known fact that the
ruthlessness of modern dictatorship has scattered throughout
the world a large number of stateless refugees or displaced
persons, without country and without flag. The tyrannical
intolerance of said dictatorships toward all opposition induced
them to resort to beastly oppression, concentration camps and
blood purges, and it is only natural that the not-so-fortunate
ones who were able to escape to foreign countries should feel
the loss of all bonds of attachment to the hells which were
formerly their fatherland's. Petitioner belongs to that group of
stateless refugees.
Knowing, as all cultured persons all over the world ought to
know, the history, nature and character of the Soviet
dictatorship, presently the greatest menace to humanity and
civilization, it would be technically fastidious to require further
evidence of petitioner's claim that he is stateless than his
testimony that he owes no allegiance to the Russian
Communist Government and, is because he has been at war
with it, he fled from Russia to permanently reside in the
Philippines. After finding in this country economic security in a
remunerative job, establishing a family by marrying a Filipina
with whom he has a son, and enjoying for 25 years the
freedoms and blessings of our democratic way of life, and after
showing his resolution to retain the happiness he found in our
political system to the extent of refusing to claim Russian
citizenship even to secure his release from the Japanese and
of casting his lot with that of our people by joining the fortunes
and misfortunes of our guerrillas, it would be beyond
comprehension to support that the petitioner could feel any
bond of attachment to the Soviet dictatorship.
Appealed Resolution is Affirmed.
2. Cu vs. Republic of the Philippines
G.R No. L-3018 July 18, 1951 Tuason J.
In the matter of petition of Robert Cu to be admitted as a
citizen of the Philippines vs Republic of the Philippines
Doctrine: As to the statute adopted from another country​.
A rationale rule of statutory construction is that a statute
adopted from another state or country will be presumed to be
adopted with the construction placed upon it by the courts of
that state or country before its adoption. Such construction is
regarded as of great weight, or at least persuasive, and will
generally be followed if found reasonable and in harmony with
justice and public policy and with other laws of the adopting
jurisdiction on the subject.
As to the nationality (according to the law when this petition
filed) Section 7 of the Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act
No. 473) provides that the petition for citizenship, must state
the following:
1.) Petitioner’s qualification as enumerated in the Act
2.) Petition must be signed by the applicant in his own
handwriting and
3.) Be supported by affidavit of atleast two (2) credible
persons stating that they are citizens of the
Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a
resident of the Philippines for the period of time
required by this Act and a person of good repute and
morally irreproachable and that said petitioner has in
 their opinion all the qualifications necessary to
become a citizen of the Philippines and is not any way
disqualified under the provisions of the Act.
4.) The petition shall also set forth the names and post
office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner
may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case
Facts: Robert Cu filed a petition for naturalization. During the
hearing, he stated that he was a citizen of the Philippines, CFI
Rizal found him to be a “Filipino citizen both by right of birth
and by right of selection” and dismissed the petition for
naturalization. It impliedly held that being already a Philippine
citizen he did not have to be naturalized.
According to his testimony, he is a Filipino born of a Filipino
mother. But when his mother died when he was about 5
months old, he was brought to China by his father. When he
was 5 yrs old, he and his father left China and then was given
to the care of Dona Mangahas.
The counsel for the Government opposed Cu’s claim that he is
a Filipino. Cu continued with this testimony: “I consider myself
a Filipino Citizen on account of the fact that my mother is (was)
a Filipino and I was born in the Philippines. My only fault was
that I failed to file my application to elect Philippine Citizenship.
That is why I am now asking this court to make a judgement on
that”
Consequently, he was asked by the court whether he knew if
his parents were legally married but he was unsure thereof.
Issue:
Is Cu entitled to be admitted to Philippine citizenship
under the law at the time of his application?
Ruling:
No. He is not entitled to be admitted Philippine
Citizenship.
Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth
Act. 473) provides that the witnesses must be citizens of the
Philippines and “personally know the petitioner to be a resident
of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act. If
petitioner is born in the Philippines, time required is 5 years
and if not, 10 years.
The witness provided by Cu did not meet these qualifications
Witness Dr. Jose Ku Yeg Keng admitted that his father was a
Chinese national and his mother a Filipina but he did not
actually elect Philipine citizenship.
The other witness Dr. Gomez, he testified that “he had known
Mr. Cu since liberation about August 1945.” Dr. Gomez
eventually withdrawn as witness upon the objection of the
counsel for the Government
In “United States vs Mortorana, “a petition not so verified by at
least two persons who are citizen is not merely voidable but
void”
In the case of In re Kornstain, A witness who is incompetent
renders an application void. The question of a witness’
qualifications in naturalization proceedings is therefore a
matter of more than usual importance.
The above decisions are not binding upon Philippines Courts,
but it is a rational rule of statutory construction that a statute
adopted from another state or country ​will be presumed to be
adopted with the construction placed upon it by the courts
of that state or country before its adoption. Such
construction is regarded as of great weight, or at least
persuasive and will generally be followed if found
reasonable ​and in harmony with justice and public policy and
with other laws of the adopting jurisdiction on the subject .
The Supreme Court finds the United States courts’ reasoning
to be sound and reasonable and we make it our own.
3. Talaroc vs. Uy
G.R. No. L-5397 September 26, 1952
LAURETO A. TALAROC, petitioner-appellee, vs.
ALEJANDRO D. UY, respondent-appellant.
Author’s Note: ​THE FACTS ARE IN SPANISH!! ANG LALA
PO. I would like to thank Google Translate for making life a
little easier for students who have professors who gives
jurisprudence with facts in Spanish.
Doctrine: it would neither be fair nor good policy to hold the
respondent an alien after he had exercised the privileges of
citizenship and the Government had confirmed his Philippine
citizenship on the faith of legal principle that had the force of
law. On several occasions the Secretary of Justice had
declared as Filipino citizens persons similarly circumstanced
as Alejandro.
Facts:
1. The election of Alejandro D. Uy to the office of municipal
mayor of Manticao, Misamis Oriental, on November 13, 1951,
brought the instant action of quo warranto in the CFI by the
petitioner Laureto A. Talaroc, one of the defeated candidates
for the same office. The grounds of the petition were that the
respondent is a Chinese national and therefore ineligible.
2. Alejandro D. Uy was born on January 28, 1912, in the
municipality of Iligan, Lanao, of Chinese father, Uy Piangco,
and of Filipina mother, Ursula Diabo, when they lived together
as husband and wife.
3. Uy Piangco was a native of China, and has never
been absent since he arrived in 1893 in the Philippines until his
death on February 17, 1917, in Lanao, where he was
continuously residing. Ursula Diabo without contracting a new
marriage, died later, on August 29, 1949.
4. Alejandro also never went to China and has voted in
the previous elections in the country, and has served as
Inspector of the "Bureau of Plant Industry" in 1943, teacher
under the Bureau of Public Schools, filing clerk at the Municipal
Treasury of Initao from 1935 to 1945, and acting Municipal
Treasurer from 1942 to 1943, besides having served the 120th
Infantry Regiment of the guerrilla, and some time "tax collector"
of the Government of Japanese occupation.
5. The records also show that Alejandro's brothers have
been occupying public positions for the past several years. All
his brothers married Filipino girls and they were never
identified with any Chinese political or social organization.
Alejandro's father acquired properties in Lugait. His mother,
who never remarried, campaigned for woman and voted in the
subsequent elections.
6. Alejandro contended, that his father was a subject of
Spain on April 11, 1899; that his mother ​ipso facto reacquired
her Filipino citizenship upon the death of her husband on
February 17, 1917, and the child followed her citizenship; and
that Alejandro is a citizen of the Philippines by the mere fact of
his birth therein.
7. The lower court noted that, while under the ​Roa doctrine
(​Roa vs. Insular Collector of Customs​)[1], Alejandro would be a
Filipino citizen regardless of the nationality of his parents, this
doctrine was abandoned in ​Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor​.
Hence, the lower court found the petition for quo warranto
well-founded and declared the position in question vacant.
Issue: ​W/N Alejandro was a Filipino citizen, eligible to hold the
office of the municipal mayor
Held:​ YES!
1. ​Citing various decisions, authorities, and opinions of the
United States Attorney General, it found that the marriage of
an American woman with an alien conferred his nationality
upon her; that upon the dissolution of the marriage by death of
the husband, the wife reverted, ​ipso facto​, to her former status,
unless her conduct or acts showed that she elected to retain
the nationality of her husband, and that where the widowed
mother herself thus reacquired her former nationality, her
children, she being their natural guardian, should follow her
nationality with the proviso ​that they may elect for themselves
upon reaching majority.
2. The ​Roa decision, and a long line of decisions applied the
principle of ​jus soli up to September 16, 1947, when that
principle was renounced in the case of ​Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor​. However, the ​Tan Chong case not
controlling in this case.
3. Under Sec. 1, Art. IV of the Constitution, one kind of PH
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
4. On the strength of the ​Roa doctrine, Alejandro
undoubtedly was considered a Philippine citizen on the date of
the adoption of the constitution, when jus soli ​had been the
prevailing doctrine.
5. The members of the Constitutional Convention were also
aware of this rule. In making the jus sanguinis the
predominating principle in the determination of Philippine
citizenship, they did not intend to exclude those who were
citizens of the Philippines by judicial declaration at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution.
6. Unlike the ​Tan Chong case, Alejandro had attained the
age of majority when the Constitution went into effect, and had
been allowed to exercise the right of suffrage, to hold public
office, and to take the oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth
Government or Republic of the Philippines.
7. The ​Tan Chong decision itself makes this express
reservation: "Needless to say, this decision is not intended or
designed to deprive, as it cannot divest, of their Filipino
citizenship, those who have been declared to be Filipino
citizens, or upon whom such citizenship had been conferred by
the courts because of the doctrine or principle of ​res
adjudicata​."
8. Certainly, it would neither be fair nor good policy to hold
the respondent an alien after he had exercised the privileges of
citizenship and the Government had confirmed his Philippine
citizenship on the faith of legal principle that had the force of
law. On several occasions the Secretary of Justice had
declared as Filipino citizens persons similarly circumstanced
as Alejandro.
9. Deserving of the same consideration is the proposition
that Alejandro D. Uy became a Philippine citizen at least upon
his father's death.
10. It has been seen that, a Filipino woman married to
Chinese ​ipso facto ​reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon her
husband's demise and that there after her minor children's
nationality automatically followed that of the mother's. This rule
was not changed by the adoption of the jus sanguinis ​doctrine,
and was in force until Commonwealth Act No. 63 went into
effect in 1936, by which the legislature, for the first time,
provided a method for regaining Philippine citizenship by
Filipino women in such cases.
The decision of the lower court is reversed and Alejandro
declared a Filipino citizen and eligible to the office of the
municipal mayor. The petitioner and appellee will pay the costs
of both instances.
1. [1] It may be recalled that in the case of ​Roa vs. Insular Collector
of Customs, the petitioner was born in lawful wedlock in the Philippines
on July 6, 1899, his father being a native of China and his mother a
Filipina. His father was domiciled in this country up to the year 1895
when he went to China and never returned, dying there about 1900. In
May, 1901, Roa, was then a minor, was sent to China by his widowed
mother for the soul purpose of studying and returned in October, 1910,
being then about 21 years and 3 months of age. He was denied
admission by the board of special inquiry, whose decision was affirmed
by the Court of First Instance in ​habeas corpus​ proceedings.
4. Uytengsu v. Republic of the Philippines
GR No. L-6379 | September 29, 1954 | J. Concepcion | Manao
DOCTRINE: The Philippine residency commitment required
under the Naturalization Act refers to actual/physical
residence, and not just the establishment of a domicile.
FACTS:
● Wilfred Uytengsu was born of Chinese parents in
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental.
● He studied in the Philippines up to the 1st semester of
his college education. Thereafter, he went to the U.S.,
where he completed his college degree.
● He returned to the Philippines for a vacation.
● July 1950: While in the Philippines, he filed an
application for naturalization.
○ The hearing for this case was scheduled on
July 1951.
● While the case was pending, he returned to the U.S.
to pursue a postgraduate course.
● He returned to the Philippines on October 1951.
● CFI: Granted.
● The Solicitor General appealed.
○ Argument: Uytengsu stated in his
application: "I will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the date of the filing of my
petition up to the time of my admission to
Philippine citizenship", as required under the
Naturalization Law. Uytengsu reneged in this
commitment when he pursued graduate
studies in the U.S.
● Uytengsu’s argument: "Residence", as used in the
Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile,
which, once acquired, is not lost by physical absence,
until another domicile is obtained. In his case, he
continued to be domiciled in, and hence a resident of,
the Philippines, since his purpose in staying in the
U.S. at that time was merely to study.
RELEVANT ISSUE: Whether or not Uytengsu should be
naturalized?
HELD:
NO. Uytengsu reneged in his commitment of residing
continuously in the Philippines while his application for
naturalization was pending. His “residence” commitment refers
to actual and physical residence, and not merely his domicile.
● Although the words "residence" and "domicile" are
often used interchangeably, each has, in strict legal
parlance, a meaning distinct and different from that of
the other.
Residence Domicile
Place of abode, whether Fixed permanent residence
permanent or temporary, for to which, when absent, one
business or other purposes has the intention of
returning​||
Since Uytengsu obliged himself to “reside” in the
Philippines, actual/physical residence of the applicant
in the Philippines is needed, and not just his domicile
being in the Philippines.
● Dy Chinco v. Republic: Actual and substantial
residence is required in order to dispense with the
requirement of a declaration of intention required in
naturalization proceedings.
If said actual and substantial residence — not merely
legal residence — is necessary to dispense with the
filing of a declaration of intention, it is even more
necessary during the period intervening from the filing
of the petition for naturalization to the date of the
hearing thereof, for the government to draw its own
conclusions on these matters if its officers could
personally observe the behaviour of the applicant and
confer with him if necessary.
DISPOSITIVE: CFI reversed; application for naturalization
dismissed.
5. In re Petition of Zita Ngo Burca vs. Republic of the
Philippines
IN RE petition to declare ZITA NGO to possess all
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for the
purpose of cancelling her alien registry with the BUREAU
OF IMMIGRATION.
ZITA NGO BURCA, petitioner and appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellant.
G.R. No. L-24252| January 30, 1967 | Sanchez, J. | K. Olivete
DOCTRINE:
There is no law or rule which authorizes a declaration of
Filipino citizenship. Citizenship is not an appropriate subject for
declaratory judgment proceedings. Citizenship of an alien
woman married to a Filipino must be determined in an
"appropriate proceeding."
(1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a
citizen of this country must apply therefor by filing a petition for
citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set
forth in Section 2, and none of the disqualifications under
Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law;
(2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance
where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately
preceding the filing of the petition; and
(3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official,
administrative or otherwise — other than the judgment of a
competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an
alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is
hereby declared null and void.
FACTS:
● The case is a petition to declare Zita Ngo Burca —
"as possessing all qualifications and none of the
qualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth
Act 473 for the purpose of cancelling her Alien
Registry with the Bureau of Immigration.”
● Petitioner Zita avers that she has all the qualifications
required under Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications required under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473.
● Uncontroverted facts are:
○ Petitioner Zita Ngo was born in Gigaquit,
Surigao on March 30, 1933.
 ○ Her father was Ngo Tay Suy and her mother
was Dee See alias Lee Co, now both
deceased and citizens of Nationalist
Republic of China.
○ She holds Native Born Certificate of
Residence and Alien Certificate of
Registration.
○ She married Florencio Burca a native-born
Filipino, on May 14, 1961.
● Solicitor General opposed and moved to dismiss the
petition on two main grounds:
(1) that "there is no proceeding established by law, or
the rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship
of an individual"
(2) that as an application for Philippine citizenship,
"the petition is fatally defective for failure to contain or
mention the essential allegations required under
Section 7 of the Naturalization Law" (i.e. petitioner's
former places of residence, and the absence of the
affidavits of at least two supporting witnesses, among
others)
● During trial, petitioner was the sole witness.
● Lower Court: ​dismissed opposition
○ ZIta Ngo Burca as having all the
qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a Filipino Citizen
and that she being married to a Filipino
Citizen is hereby declared citizen of the
Philippines, ​after taking the necessary oath
of allegiance
● Hence, this appeal by Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
(1) [RELEVANT] WON an alien woman (petitioner) who
marries a Filipino citizen automatically becomes a Filipino
citizen. - NO
(2) WON petitioner is lawfully naturalized and deemed to be a
Filipino citizen. – NO
HELD:
(1) NO.
· By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who
marries a Filipino citizen, ​does not — by the mere fact of
marriage - automatically become a Filipino citizen.
· Thus, by Article IV of the Constitution, citizenship is limited
to:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents
who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been
elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
· An alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the
status of a citizen of the Philippines unless there is proof
that she herself may be lawfully naturalized​. Section 15
(Par. 1) of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:
“Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.”
· Thus, in line with the national policy of selective admission
to Philippine citizenship, the wife must possess the
qualifications under Section 2, ​and must not be laboring
under any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4,
of the Revised Naturalization Law.
· NOTE: ​The qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the
Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in
its section 4, are not mutually exclusive
· If an alien woman married to a Filipino does not become
ipso facto a citizen, then ​she must have to file a "petition
for citizenship" in order that she may acquire the status of
a Filipino citizen. The determination of whether said alien
wife should be given the status of a citizen should fall
within the area allocated to competent courts. The ​proper
forum is the Court of First Instance of the province where
the petitioner has resided "at least one year immediately
preceding the filing of the petition"​.
· We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or,
in the words of law, a "petition for citizenship".
(2) NO.
· Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that ​a petition
for naturalization should state petitioner's "present and
former places of residence"​. Residence encompasses all
places where petitioner actually and physically resided.
· 1​st fatal flaw: Petitioner avers that she was born in
Gigaquit, Surigao that her former residence was Surigao,
Surigao, and that presently she is residing at Regal St.,
Ormoc City. In court, however, she testified that she also
resided in Junquera St., Cebu, where she took up a
course in home economics, for one year. Thus, failure to
allege a former place of residence is fatal because the
State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to
petitioner's fitness to become a citizen.
· The Naturalization Law also provides for the petition to be
supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons​,
"stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and
personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the
Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a
person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and
that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications
necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not
in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act".
Importance: These witnesses should indeed prove in court
that they are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner.
· 2​nd fatal flaw: petition is not supported by the affidavit of at
least two credible persons. Petitioner likewise failed to "set
forth the names and post-office addresses of such
 witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the
hearing of the case"
DISPOSITIVE:
Upon the view we take of his case, the judgment appealed
from is hereby reversed and the petition dismissed, without
costs. So ordered.
6. Board of Commisioners vs. Go Callano
BOARD OF IMMINIGATION v. BEATO GO CALLANO, ET.
AL.
GR No. L-24530 | October 31, 1968 | J. Dizon | Quintana
DOCTRINE:
On Conflicts issue - ​It has been a settled rule of international
law, affirmed by The Hague Convention on Conflict of
Nationality Laws and by the ICJ, is that “Any question as to
whether a person possess the nationality of a particular state
should be determined in accordance with laws of that state”.
On Citizenship - ​Recognition by an alien father is not among
the ground of losing PH citizenship under PH law. In addition,
renunciation does not include the act of living in a foreign
country for several years. There must be an express
renunciation of PH citizenship.
FACTS:
● Beato, Manuel, Gonzalo and Julio Go Callano (Go
Callano brothers) are the illegitimate children of one
Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, with her
common-law husband Go Chiao LIn, a Chinese
citizen. They were all born in Leyte
● In 1946, the family went to China for vacation but Go
died there. In 1948, Emilia returned to the PH to work
and left her children behind.
● The children were able to go to Hong Kong and
sought employment.
● In 1961, the Go Callano brothers applied with the PH
Consul General in HK for entry into the PH as Filipino
citizens. ​The DFA sent a cablegram to the
Consulate to investigate the Go Callano brothers
whether they are illegitimate children of Emilia​.
The said investigation was conducted as authorized
by the cablegram.
● The Consulate issued a certificate of registration and
identity to the effect that they submitted sufficient
evidence of their citizenship and identity and had
been allowed to register in the Consulates as Filipino
citizens and to travel directly to the PH.
○ Basis: Sworn statement of applicants, their
birth certificates and blood test reports.
● In 1961, they arrived in Manila by plane from HK. The
Immigration Inspector at the airport was of the opinion
that the travel documents did not constitute
conclusive proof of citizenship and referred the issued
to the Board of Special Inquiry No. 2. The
investigation was conducted and the Board
promulgated a decision finding the Go Callano
brothers to be the illegitimate children of Emilia and
are entitled to admission as Filipino citizens.
● In 1962, the DFA informed the Commissioner of
Immigration that on the basis of the finding of the NBI,
the signatures of the former Sec. of Foreign Affairs
Felixberto Serrano, on certain documents, including a
cable authorization No. 2230-V, which authorized the
documentation of the Go Callano brothers, were not
authentic.
● DFA declared the documents, including the ​cable
authorization (the cablegram), ​as null, void and of
no effect and the documentation made by the PH
Consulate General at HK pursuant to the said cable
authorization consist of certificates of registration and
identity issued to the Go Callano brothers are
cancelled. These were all done without notice nor
hearing.
● On August 21 of the same year, the Board of
Immigration Commissioners, issued without notice
and hearing, an order reversing the decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry, which admitted the brothers
as PH citizens. The Board ordered that they are
excluded as aliens not properly documented for
admissions.
○ The order included a warrant of exclusion
commanding the deportation of the brothers.
● The warrant of exclusion was not served immediately
and the brothers were able to file before the CRI an
action for injunction to restrain the order of the Board.
● Go Callano brothers’ stand – There was a deprivation
of due process and the acts of the Board are beyond
their jurisdiction
● Board’s stand – The cable authorization is a forgery
and all the proceedings connected to it are void and
as a result the brothers must be deported; granting
they were Filipino citizens, they lost it for living in
China for 15 years.
● CFI:​ Dismissed the case
○ It initially issued a writ of preliminary
injunction.
○ They found that they
are PH citizens being born to a Filipino
mother. However, ruled that they
became citizens of the Republic of China.
The grounds were:
■ They stayed in China
for a period of 15 years before
returning
■ They were recognized by
their father and became Chinese
citizens under the Chinese law on
nationality.
○ The cable authorization was a forgery.
 ● CA: Reversed the lower court decision. The appellate
court deemed the Go Callano brothers as Filipino
citizens
○ (The discussion of the appellate court will be
in the held as the SC adopted most of its
ruling)
RELEVANT ISSUE 1:
WON the Go Callano brothers lost their Filipino citizenship
HELD:
NO. The Go Callano brothers did not do any act which is a
recognized mode of losing one’s Filipino citizenship.
● The Go Callano brothers are admittedly Filipino
citizens at birth and are governed by Article 15, NCC
which provides: “Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, conditions and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the PH, even
though living abroad.”
● Under Article IV, Sec. 2 of the PH Constitution,
“Philippine
citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner
provided by law,” which implies that the question of
whether a Filipino has lost his PH citizenship shall be
determined by no other than PH law.
● Filipino citizens may lose his citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country; express
renunciation of citizenship, subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a
foreign country; rendering
service to, or accepting a commission in, the armed
forces of a foreign country; cancellation of the
certificate of naturalization; declaration by competent
authority that he is a deserter of the PH armed forces
in the time of care; in case of a woman by marriage to
a foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her
husband’s country, she acquired his nationality.
● Recognition by an alien father is not among the
ground of losing PH citizenship under PH law. Thus,
the brothers cannot be said to have lost their former
status by reason of such recognition.
● Closest to their act was that of a renunciation but it
does not apply as the law requires an express
renunciation, which is not present in this case.
● In addition, as ruled by the court in ​US v. Ong Tianse​,
the act of staying for years in a foreign country does
not amount to renunciation. In this case, the brothers
were all minors and only Beato attained the age of
majority upon return in the PH and even applied for
registration as a PH citizen and sought entry into the
country. These shows that the Go Callano brother
have not lost their PH citizenship.
RELEVANT ISSUE 2:
WON ​the brothers acquired citizenship under the Chinese Law
of Nationality by reason of recognition or prolonged stay in
China
HELD:
NO. This is a matter best resolved by the Chinese courts
● It has been a settled rule of international law, affirmed
by The Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality
Laws and by the ICJ, is that “Any question as to
whether a person
possess the nationality of a particular state should be
determined in accordance with laws of that state”.
OTHER ISSUE:
WON the cable authorization was forged
HELD:
NO.
● There was insufficient evidence presented by the
Board to prove the alleged forgery, as found by the
CA.
● The cablegram is deemed authentic. Further, the SC
agrees with the CFI and CA that even assuming that it
was forged, this would not automatically render void
all the proceedings before the PH Consulate in HK
and the Board of Special Inquiry.
● The proceedings and findings from this two bodies
cannot be nullified by the DFA summarily without
giving the parties concerned an opportunity to be
heard.
7. Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration
GR No. L-21289|Oct 4 1971| Sanger
FACTS:
This is a case filed to enjoin the Commissioner of Immigration
from causing the arrest and deportation of the petitioner herein
- Lau Yuen Yueng.
Petitioner herein applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant. She is a Chinese residing in
Kowloon, Hongkong and that she desired to take a pleasure
trip to the Philippines and to visit her great grand uncle for a
period of one month.
When she arrived in the Philippines, Asher Y Cheng filed a
bond in the amount of PHP1, 000 to undertake among others
that Lau Yuen Yueng would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period
of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion
the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized
representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, petitioner was allowed to stay until
Feb. 13, 1962. But on January 25, 1962, she contracted
marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim
an alleged Filipino Citizen.

Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of
Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she
brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction.
During the hearing, it was admitted that Lao Yuen Yueng could
not write either English or Tagalog. Except a few words she
could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not even
name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one,
Rosa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not marriage by Lao Yuen Yueng made her ipso
facto a citizen of the Philippines.
HELD:
Pertinent part of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No 473,
upon which petitioners rely, reads.
Any woman who is not or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalised shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.
Citing several cases decided by the Supreme Court, the
phrase, "who might herself be lawfully naturalised," refer to a
class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and that
compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws
was not required.
Being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be
lawfully naturalised," what should be required is not only that
she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but she must also
possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as
those of age, residence, good moral character, adherence to
the underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution,
irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of
real estate, capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and
one of the principal local languages, education of children in
certain schools, etc.
In Philippine jurisprudence it was held that an alien wife is
required to prove only that she may herself be lawfully
naturalized, that she is not one of the disqualified persons
enumerated in the Section 4 of the law, on order to establish
her citizenship status as a fact.
Section 15 of the Naturalization law (Commonwealth Act 473),
an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalised,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to
be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who i
subsequently naturalised here follows the Philippines
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of
the disqualifications under said Section 4.
Seciton 4 reads:
1. Person opposed to organised government or affiliate
with any associations or group of persons who uphold
and teach doctrines opposing all organised governments.
2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity
of propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination
for the success and predominance of their ideas.
3. Polygamists, or believers in the practice of polygamy.
4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases.
6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the
Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos,
or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the
Filipinos.
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the
Philippines are at war, during the period of such war.
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than
United States, whose laws does not grant Filipinos the
right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
8. Mateo Caasi v. Court of Appeals
MATEO CAASI v. THE HON. CA and MERITO C. MIGUEL
G.R. No. 88831| November 8, 1990 | GRIÑO-AQUINO, J |
Soledad
FACTS:
● These are 2 consolidated cases with same objective:
the disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code of respondent Miguel for the position of
municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he
was elected on January 18, 1988, on the ground that
he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent
resident of the United States of America, not of
Bolinao.
○ G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on
certiorari of the decision dated January 13,
1988 of the COMELEC First Division,
dismissing the three (3) petitions for the
disqualification of Miguel filed prior to the
local elections on January 18, 1988.
○ G.R. No. 88831, Caasi vs. CA et al., is a
petition for review of the decision dated June
21, 1989, of the dismissing the petition for
quo warranto filed by Caasi, a rival candidate
for the position of municipal mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify
Miguel on account of his being a green card
holder.
● Miguel’s Answer: Admitted that he holds a green
card to conveniently enter the US for medical
examination and to visit his children, but denies being
a permanent resident of the US; he alleged that he is
 a permanent resident of Bolinao and voted in all prior
elections including the plebiscite for the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution on 2 February 1987; and during
the Congressional elections on 18 May.
● COMELEC: ​Dismissed the consolidated petitions
ruling that Miguel’s holding of a green card does not
mean he abandoned his residence in Bolinao, and
he’s indicated intention to continuously reside therein
by voting in previous elections; and he has met
Sec.42 of the LGC’s requirements of citizenship and
residence for candidates to local office.
● Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner Badoy, Jr:
Under Sec. 68 of OEC, respondent has to prove that
he’s waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of the US to qualify to run in Bolinao, which
he failed to do.
● RTC: ​It denied Miguel’s MTD the petition for quo
warranto filed by Caasi.
● CA: ​It ordered the RTC to dismiss and desist from
further proceeding in the quo warranto case because
it is pointless for the RTC to hear the case
questioning the qualification of Miguel as resident of
the Philippines after COMELEC has ruled that Miguel
has met the requirements of citizenship and
residence; and that there is no legal obstacles (sic) for
the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that
decisions of the RTC on ​quo warranto ​cases under
the OEC are appealable to the COMELEC.
ISSUES and RULINGS:
(1) Whether a green card is proof that the holder is a
permanent resident of the United States (YES)
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines
(B.P. Blg. 881) provides: ​Disqualifications ... Any person who is
a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
the residence requirement provided for in the election laws
Miguel's immigration to the US in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
He did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or
his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention
to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for
an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that
application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the
requisite green card or authority ​to reside there permanently.
As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and
local allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he resides.
This is in return for the protection given to him during the
period of his residence therein.
(2) Whether Miguel disqualified to run as municipal mayor.
(YES)
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides​: ​Public
officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution
allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who
seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt
with by law. ​This law does not apply to Miguel because he
acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States ​before
he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as
mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is the applicable law to
him. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for
elective office for at least 1 year at the time of filing his
certificate of candidacy is one of the qualifications that a
candidate for elective public office must possess. He resided in
Bolinao for only 3 months after his return to the Philippines and
before he ran for mayor. The law is clear in excluding from the
right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who
possess dual loyalties and allegiance, as such are incapable of
the entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their
homeland.
To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines,
the law requires that the candidate who is a green card
holder must have “waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country.
● His act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective
office in the Philippines did not of itself constitute a
waiver of his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of US.
● The waiver of green card should be manifested by
some act or acts independent of and done prior to
filing his candidacy for elective office.
● Without such prior waiver, he was “disqualified to run
for any elective office.
Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent
residence in the US and his possession of a green card
attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of US despite his occasional visits to the
Philippines. Miguel filled up his application for Immigrant Visa
in his own handwriting, answering “Permanently” on the
question of his length of intended stay. On its face, the green
card identifies Miguel in clear bold letters as a Resident Alien.
DISPOSITIVE: ​The appealed orders of the COMELEC and the
CA are hereby set aside. The election of respondent Merito C.
Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby
annulled.
NOTES:
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the
act of immigrating the entering into a country with the intention
of residing in it.
An ​immigrant ​is a person who removes into a country for the
purpose of permanent residence. As shown infra 84, however,
statutes sometimes give a broader meaning to the term
"immigrant."
9. Djumantan vs. Domingo
DOCTRINE: There is ​no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino
citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent
residency, in the Philippines
FACTS:
● Bernard Bañez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as
a contract worker. Later on, he embraced and was converted to
Islam. He married Djumantan (2​nd marriage) in accordance with
Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.
● Djumantan and her 2 children with Bañez, (2 yr old Marina and
9-month old Nikulas) arrived in Manila as "guests" of Bañez.
● When Djumantan and her children arrived at NAIA, Bañez,
together with Marina Cabael, met them. Bañez executed an
"Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his "guests," stating that
he is the guarantor for the entry into PH of Mrs. Djumantan, and
her 2 minor children, all Indonesian citizens, who are coming as
temporary visitors; that it is out of gratitude to their family for the
hospitality they accorded him during his stay in Indonesia in
connection with his employment thereat. He guaranteed that they
are law abiding citizens, their behavior while they are in PH, and
their voluntary departure upon end of the authorized stay.
● As "guests", Djumantan and her children lived in the house of
Bañez. They were admitted to PH as temporary visitors under
Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
● Later on, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of Bañez
and Djumantan, and filed a complaint for "concubinage" with the
MTC against them. However, it was dismissed for lack of merit.
● The Immigration status of Djumantan was changed to permanent
resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. Djumantan was
issued an alien certificate of registration.
● Not accepting the set-back, Bañez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a
letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred
the letter to the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
(CID). On that basis, Djumantan was detained at the CID
detention cell. She was later released pending the deportation
proceedings after posting a cash bond.
● Djumantan manifested to the CID that she be allowed to depart
voluntarily from the PH and asked for time to purchase her airline
ticket. However, she had a change of heart and moved for the
dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was
validly married to a Filipino citizen.
● CID ruled that the 2​nd marriage of Bañes to Djumantan was void.
It revoked the visa previously granted to her. It also denied
Djumantan’s motion for reconsideration.
● Hence, this petition. TRO was issued for the implementation of
Order. SolGen argues that the power of CID to deport has
prescribed.
ISSUE:
(1) ​WON Djumantan was legally admitted into the PH ​(NO)
(2) ​WON the change of status from temporary to permanent resident is
valid ​(NO)
(3) ​WON the power to deport has prescribed ​(YES)
HELD:
No need to resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, since
under the law, the CID can validly deport Djumantan as an
"undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
ISSUES (1) and (2)
There was a blatant abuse of immigration laws​. All such privileges
were obtained through misinterpretation.
(1) ​Marriage of Djumantan to Bañez was never disclosed to the
immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor's visa
and for permanent residency.
● Civil status of an alien applicant is a matter that may influence the
exercise of discretion of the immigration authorities. ​They would
be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims to have
entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is married to
another woman​.
(2) ​Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose
presence is ​deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute
and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the
country.
● Since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission
into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple
tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the
government to permit them to stay.
(3) ​The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to
continue to reside in the country, ​protected only so far as Congress
may choose to protect it​.
(4) ​There is ​no law ​guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens
the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent
residency, in the Philippines​.
● The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her
from the operation of the immigration laws governing the
admission and exclusion of aliens.
● Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband ​does not
ipso facto ​make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse
her from her failure to depart from the country upon the
expiration of her extended stay here as an alien​.
● Sec. 9 of the Immigration Act​: it is not mandatory for the CID to
admit any alien who applies for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into
the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay.
● Sec. 13 of the same law​: ​An alien allowed to stay temporarily
may apply for a change of status and "​may be admitted" as a
permanent resident​. ​Among those considered qualified to apply
for permanent residency is the wife or husband of a Philippine
citizen. The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as
immigrants is ​not a matter of right​, even if they are legally
married to Filipino citizens​.
ISSUE (3)
Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the Philippines
after the effective date of this Act ​by means of false and misleading
statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration
authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a
designated port of entry" ​is subject to deportation​.
The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has
a prescriptive period and "shall not be effected ... unless the
arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years
after the cause for deportation arises"​.
Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien
from the country.

In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa​: under Section 37(b)
of the Immigration Act, the deportation of an alien may be barred after
the lapse of five years after the cause of deportation arises.
● Dissenting opinions of J. Feliciano and J. Davide in that case
qualified the statement of law: ​5-year limitation is applicable
only where deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of
Sec. 37 (a) ​other than clauses ​2, 7, 8, 11 and 12​; In respect to
clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12, the limitation does not apply. (​NOTE:
in this case, the clause applicable is clause #1)
The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has
prescribed​. Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the
Philippines on January 13, 1979 on the basis of false and misleading
statements in her application and in the other supporting documents
submitted to the immigration authorities. Leonardo Bañez first
complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about the manner
petitioner was admitted into the country and asked for her deportation.
After the EDSA Revolution, he sent a follow-up letter to the CID
requesting action on his 1980 letter-complaint.
Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when
Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner
into the country, ​more than five years had elapsed before the
issuance of the order of her deportation on September 27, 1990​.
In their Comment, respondents urged that what is barred under Section
37(b) is the deportation of an alien and claimed that what they ordered
was not the deportation of petitioner but merely the revocation of
Section 13(a) which refers to the visa previously granted her.
However, the ​"arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the
arrest for the purpose of carrying out an order for deportation and
not the arrest prior to proceedings to determine the right of the
alien to stay in the country​. ​When public respondents revoked the
permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect,
ordered her arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien.
WHEREFORE​, the petition is ​GRANTED and the temporary restraining
order issued on June 4, 1991 is ​MADE PERMANENT​.
10. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 119976|September 18, 1995| Kapunan| Tutanes
Doctrine:
Facts:
1. Petitioner Imelda filed her COC for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the
Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995.
2. According to her COC, she specified that she only
resided in Leyte for only 7 months
3. Private Respondent Montejo, the incumbent Rep of
the 1st District of Leyte and a candidate for the same
position filed a Petition for Cancellation and
DIsqualification with the COMELEC alleging that
Imelda did not meet the constitutional residency
requirement, which is one year. He prays that Imelda
be Disqualified
4. Imelda filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy changing the entry “seven” to “since
childhood”
5. Prov Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner
that they cannot accept the amended certificate
because it was filed out of time.
6. Imelda then filed the Amended COC with COMELEC
in Manila on March 31, 1995. She countered the
petition of private respondent that it was an honest
misinterpretation. She maintains that Tacloban City is
her residence and domicile. In addition, Imelda
argues that private respondent has ill intent.
7. COMELEC found the petition to be meritorious,
striking off the amendment on the certificate and
cancelled her original COC. COMELEC found that
she was also registered voter in Tolosa and not
Tacloban, which she claims she is a resident of.
Based from this, there was no honest mistake. She
also just transferred residence from Manila to Tolosa
seven months prior. Because she has not complied
with the residency requirement, she is disqualified to
run
8. Upon MR, COMELEC en banc denied the MR.
9. May 11, 1995, COMELEC allowed Imelda’s
proclamation because she obtained the highest
number of votes. But COMELEC reversed itself and
suspended the proclamation
10. Imelda filed a supplemental petition that she was the
winner and looks to relief.
ISSUE: WON Imelda was a resident for election purposes of
the First District of Leyte for a period of One Year at the time of
May 9, 1995 Elections?
Held:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election
purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months
residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became
Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father
brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal
or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence
of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile
because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the
same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late
President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her
marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the
death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile
of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close
ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.
11. Mercado vs. Manzano
G.R. No. 135083 | May 26, 1999 | J. Mendoza | Cess
Umbalin
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
● Petitioner Mercado and private respondent Manzano
were candidates for vice mayor of Makati in the May
11, 1998 elections. Manzano got the highest number
of votes.
● However, the proclamation of Manzano was
suspended in view of a pending petition for
DISQUALIFICATION filed by Mamaril who alleged
that Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines but
of the United States.
● The COMELEC (Second Division) granted the petition
of Mamaril and ordered the CANCELLATION of the
certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the ground
that he is a DUAL CITIZEN and, under §40(d) of the
Local Government Code, ​persons with dual
citizenship are disqualified ​from running for any
elective position.
● Manzano, in his answer, admitted that he is registered
as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under
an Certificate of Registration and alleged that he is a
Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a
Filipino father and a Filipino mother. ​He was born in
the United States, San Francisco, California, on
September 14, 1955, and is considered an American
citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his
registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his
Filipino citizenship.
● The facts provide that Manzano is both a Filipino and
a US citizen. He holds dual citizenship, thus,
disqualified to run.
● The board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast but
suspended the proclamation of the winner, pursuant
to COMELEC’s Omnibus Resolution.
● On August 31, 1998, the COMELEC ​enbanc reversed
the ruling of its Second Division and declared
Manzano QUALIFIED to run for vice mayor of Makati
in the May 11, 1998 elections.
● The pertinent portions of the resolution of the
COMELEC enbanc read:
○ Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship
by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of
jus soli.
○ He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by
operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution,
as his father and mother were Filipinos at the
time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his
parents brought him to the Philippines using
an American passport as travel document.
His parents also registered him as an alien
with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration.
He was issued an alien certificate of
registration. This, however, did not result in
the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he
did not renounce Philippine citizenship and
did not take an oath of allegiance to the
United States.
○ It is an undisputed fact that when respondent
attained the age of majority, he registered
himself as a voter, and voted in the elections
of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively
renounced his US citizenship under
American law. Under Philippine law, he no
longer had U.S. citizenship.
○ At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections,
the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final.
Respondent Manzano obtained the highest
number of votes among the candidates for
vice-mayor of Makati City.
○ In applying election laws, it would be far
better to err in favor of the popular choice
than be embroiled in complex legal issues
involving private international law which may
well be settled before the highest court.
○ The Commission directs the Makati City
Board of Canvassers to ​proclaim Manzano
as the winning candidate for vice-mayor
of Makati City. ​The board of canvassers, on
the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed
Manzano as vice mayor of the City of Makati,
pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC
enbanc.
● Thus, Mercado filed this petition.
ISSUE #1
Whether Manzano possesses dual citizenship. ​NOT
ANYMORE.
HELD:
Before the filing of certificate of candidacy, he was a dual
citizen. However, his act of filing a COC tantamount to his
election of Phil. citizenship – meaning he forswears allegiance
to the other country and thereby terminating his status as dual
citizen.
The record shows that Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the
Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the
United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree
that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines
and of the United States.
The COMELEC ​enbanc held that, by participating in Philippine
elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent
“effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American
law,” so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
ISSUE #2
Whether Manzano is disqualified from being a candidate for
vice mayor of Makati City. ​NO.
HELD:
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is
inimical is not dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. ​Hence, the phrase “dual
citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to
“dual allegiance”. ​Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
DUAL CITIZENSHIP arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when ​a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows
the doctrine of jus soli ​(This was Manzano’s situation)​. Such
a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part,
is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual’s volition. With respect to ​DUAL ALLEGIANCE​,
Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: “Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law.”
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
12. Valles v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 137000| August 9, 2000 | J. Purisima | Trish
Veluya
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
● Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Australia to
Telesforo Ybasco and Theresa Marques. Her father
Telesforo was a Filipino citizen and her mother was an
Australian. At the age of 15 Rosalind left Australia and
resided in the Philippines.
● In 1952 Rosalind married Leopoldo Lopez who was a
Filipino citizen. Since then, she has continuously
participated in the electoral process not only as a voter
but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial
Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Davao Oriental.
● In 1992, Rosalind ran for and was elected governor of
Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her
opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto,
docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground
therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However,
finding no sufficient proof that Rosalind had renounced
her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections
en banc dismissed the petition.
● The Comelec in EPC No.92-54 ruled that there were
no evidence presented that Rosalind renounced her
Filipino citizenship. Rosalind was able to prove that
she was a Filipino since her father was a Filipino this is
in line with the principle of jus sanguinis.
● In 1995, Rosalind ran for re-election as governor and
her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for
disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before
the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino
citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed
by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision
in EPC 92-54.
● In 1998, Rosalind ran for re-election as governor once
again and her citizenship was again put in issue. Her
candidacy was questioned by Valles. On July 17, 1998,
the COMELEC 1st division came out with a resolution
reiterating their previous rulings. Valles filed an MR but
this was denied by the COMELEC En Banc.
COMELEC:
COMELEC ruled that Rosalind is a Filipino citizen and
therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her
father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of
the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under
the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a
Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure
under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she
renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992
before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of
Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly
cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila;
and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in
EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a
Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of
Davao Oriental governor.
Claim of Valles:
● Valles claims that Rosalind renounced her Filipino
citizenship when she registered herself in 1988 with
the Bureau of Immigration and she indicated that her
nationality is Australian and she was issued an Alien
Certificate of Registration. Rosalind also applied for
 an Immigrant Certificate of Residence and that she
made use of an Australian Passport.
● Valles further claimed that the act of Rosalind in
renouncing her Australian citizenship and the
cancellation of her Australian Passport does not
automatically make her a Filipino Citizen. Valles
alleged that Rosalind must first comply with the
requirements for repatriation according to R.A. 8171.
Valles alleged that Rosalind is at present a stateless
person.
RELEVANT ISSUE: ​WON Rosalind is a Filipino Citizen
HELD:
YES ​because the Philippines follows the principle of jus
sanguinis and she is born from a Filipino father.
● The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows
the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless
of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or
citizenship on the basis of place of birth. At the time
that Rosalind was born, the governing law was the
Jones Law and the Philippine Bill of 1902.
● The Philippine Bill of 1902 provides that: SEC. 4 xxx
all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to
reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninetynine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain signed
at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight.
● Jones law provides that: SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands xxx.
● Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents
father, Telesforo
Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet,
Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified
true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus,
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine
citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the
laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos
daughter, Rosalind, is likewise a citizen of the
Philippines.
● Even if the laws of Australia follow the jus soli
principle, it does not mean that Rosalind will lose her
Filipino citizenship. At best, she will be considered as
a dual citizen. Furthermore, the act of renunciation of
the Philippine citizenship must be expressed. The SC
made mention of the Aznar case and the Manzano
case. Stating that the application of an Alien
Certificate of REgistration and the usage of a foreign
passport were just assertions of one’s other
citizenship.
● The mere fact that Rosalind was a holder of an
Australian passport and had an alien certificate of
registration are not acts constituting an effective
renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against
her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same
must be express. Thus, at the most, private
respondent had dual citizenship - she was an
Australian and a Filipino, as well.
OTHER ISSUE 1: ​WON Rosalind may run for public office
HELD:
YES ​since she was not disqualified by the law to run for office.
● Commonwealth Act 63 did not provide as a ground for
losing one’s Filipino citizenship that the fact that a
child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country.
● The law does not disqualify one to run for office only
because one holds a dual citizenship. What the law
prohibits is dual allegiance and not dual citizenship.
DISPOSITIVE: ​WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17,
1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336
AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged
qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
13. ​Maria Jeanette Tecson et al vs COMELEC, Ronald
Allan Kelly Poe and Victorino X. Fornier
GR No. 161434/161634/161824 | March 3, 2004 | Vitug, J. |
I.E.B.Zapanta
DOCTRINE:
The adoption of the 1935 Philippine Constitution follows
jus sanguinis as the basis of citizenship by birth.
FACTS:
· [December 31, 2003] Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (FPJ) filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of
the Republic of the Philippines.
· FPJ represented himself as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines with his date of birth as August 20, 1939 and
born in Manila.
· [January 9, 2004] Victorino Fornier (Fornier) initiated a
petition (Docket Number: SPA No. 04-003) before the
COMELEC to disqualify FPJ upon the thesis that FPJ
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by stating that he is a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
· Fornier claims that FPJ’s parents were foreigners: His
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe (Kelley), being an American,
and his father, Allan Poe (Poe), was a Spanish national.
· Fornier claims that a.) FPJ is an illegitimate child of Poe;
b.) Poe had a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Kelley; and c.) Even if no prior
marriage to Paulita Gomez existed, Poe and Kelley only
got married a year after FPJ was born.
· [January 19, 2004] In a hearing before the Third Division
of the COMELEC, Fornier supported his claim by
presenting several documentary evidence:
1) A copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ;
2) A certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by
Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for
bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent,
Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with
Bessie Kelley;
3) An English translation of the affidavit aforesaid;
4) A certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F.
Poe;
5) A certification issued by the Director of the Records
Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that
there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo
Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before
1907; and
6) A certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives
Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available
information could be found in the files of the National Archives
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
· FPJ countered by providing documentary evidence:
a) A certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives
Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no
available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the
registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan;
b) A certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that no available
information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez could be found;
c) A certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe;
d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo
Pou;
e) Copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477
and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou;
f) A copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou;
g) A copy of the purported marriage contract between
Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley; and h) A certification issued
by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan,
stating that the records of birth in the said office during the
period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed
during World War II.
· [January 23, 2004] The Third Division of Comelec
dismissed SPA No. 04-003.
· [February 6, 2004] The Comelec En Banc denied
Fornier’s Motion for Reconsideration.
· [February 10, 2004] Fornier assailed the February 6
decision of the Comelec before the Supreme Court with
docket number 161824.
· G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634 was later consolidated
with Fornier’s complaint.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
WON FPJ is a natural-born Filipino?
HELD:
YES. It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe,
would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of FPJ
prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his
putative father.
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could
only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at
84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the
year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule. And
that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could
have well been his place of residence before death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ.
The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ
was born, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are
Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate. Also, the 1935 Constitution follows the
theory of jus sanguinis.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate
in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74,
of the Omnibus Election Code.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS —
1. G.R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and
Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on
Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,)
and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G.R. No. 161634,
entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of
jurisdiction.
2. G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner,
versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No.
04-003.
14. ​Nestor Jacot vs. Rogen Dal and COMELEC
G.R. No. 179848 | 2008-11-27 | CHICO-NAZARIO, J. | Aves
DOCTRINE: The law categorically requires persons seeking
elective public office, who either retained their Philippine
citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a
public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous
with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
FACTS:
· Nestor Jacot sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship
under RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act.) He filed a request for the administration of his Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the
Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles,
California. The LA PCG issued an Order of Approval, and
on the same day, Jacot took his Oath of Allegiance. The
Bureau of Immigration issued an Identification Certificate
recognizing him as a citizen of the Philippines.
· Six months after, Jacot filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of
Catarman, Camiguin.
· Rogen Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the
COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin, arguing that
Jacot failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required
under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225, which reads
as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and
Liabilities.-Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, ​make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
· In his Answer, Jacot countered that his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made
before the Los Angeles PCG and the oath
contained in his Certificate of Candidacy operated
as an effective renunciation of his foreign
citizenship.
· When the elections were held, Jacot garnered
the highest number of votes for the position of
Vice Mayor.
· COMELEC Second Division finally issued its
Resolution disqualifying Jacot for failure to make
the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship,
ruling that the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225 does not automatically
bestow upon any person the privilege to run for
any elective public office. MR denied for lack of
merit.
· Jacot filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari
under R65, where he presented for the first time
an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States and Any and All Foreign
Citizenship." He avers that he executed an act of
renunciation of his US citizenship, separate from
the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines he took before the Los Angeles PCG
and his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy,
thereby changing his theory of the case during the
appeal. He attributes the delay in the presentation
of the affidavit to his former counsel, Atty.
Marciano Aparte, who allegedly advised him that
said piece of evidence was unnecessary.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not Jacot is disqualified from running as a
candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to
make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.
- YES
HELD: ​Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before
the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not
substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are
distinct requirements to be complied with for different
purposes.
Section 3 of RA 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign
country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their
Philippine citizenship:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of
the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
 reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I __________ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
By the oath dictated, the Filipino swears allegiance to the
Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of
foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under
RA 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by also
reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his
foreign citizenship.
The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially
similar to the one contained in the Certificate of
Candidacy which must be executed by any person
who wishes to run for public office in Philippine
elections. Such an oath reads:
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that
I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Republic of the Philippines; and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. I hereby certify that
the facts stated herein are true and correct of my own
personal knowledge.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public
office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those
who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer
authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before
the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels
natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of
a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking
elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to
qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making
of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the
benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other
than that which they have presumably complied with under
Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines).
By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the
Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the
one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not
constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize
that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all
those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections;
while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional
requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who
seek elective public posts, considering their special
circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
On Dual Citizenship
Jacot also erroneously invoked the doctrine in Valles and
Mercado, wherein the filing by a person with dual citizenship of
a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, was
already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship.
-- With regard to the "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to
the United States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship," the
Court did not entertain because it was only raised on appeal.
Appeal is dismissed.
15. Cordora vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 176497 February 19, 2009
Gaudencio Cordora vs COMELEC and Gustavo
Tambunting
FACTS:
● Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false
assertions in his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001
elections.
● Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to
run for local public office because Tambunting lacked
the required citizenship and residency requirements.
● Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration which stated that, in two instances,
Tambunting claimed that he is an American.
● Tambunting maintained that he did not make any
misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. He
presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed
that he was born of a Filipino mother and an
American father. Tambunting further denied that he
was naturalized as an American citizen.
 ● Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the
Philippines since birth.
Ruling of COMELEC Law Department
● Recommended dismissal of Cordora’s complaint
because he failed to substantiate his charges against
Tambunting. The reliance on the certification of the
Bureau of Immigration that Tambunting traveled on an
American passport is not sufficient to prove that he is
an American citizen.
Ruling of COMELEC En Banc
● Affirmed the resolution of COMELEC Law Department
● Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting
could be considered a dual citizen.
● Moreover, Tambunting effectively renounced his
American citizenship when he filed his certificates of
candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office.
Issues:
1. Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on its ruling
2. Whether Tambunting was qualified to hold a local
public office
Ruling:
1. No. There is no sufficient and convincing evidence to
support a finding of probable cause to hold
Tambunting for trial for violation of Sec. 74 in relation
to Sec. 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.
2. Yes. Tambunting possesses dual citizenship.
Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no
longer necessary for him to undergo the naturalization
process to acquire American citizenship. The fact that
he had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from
running for public office. Dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance.
Dual citizenship Dual allegiance
Arises when, as a result of A person simultaneously
the concurrent application of owes, by some positive act,
the different laws of two or loyalty to two or more states.
more states, a person is It is the result of an
simultaneously considered a individual’s volition.
national by the said states
The twin requirements in R.A. 9225 (Oath of
Allegiance and an execution of Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship) do not apply to Tambunting for
the reason that he is a natural-born Filipino. The
requirements only apply when a Filipino who
becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is
allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to
the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines.
The petition filed by Cordora was dismissed.
16. Japson vs. COMELEC
· Japzon and Ty ran for the position of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
· June 15 2007 - Japzon filed a Petition to disqualify
and/or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Ty on the
ground of material misrepresentation, alleging the following:
Ø ​Ty was a former natural-born Filipino of a
Chinese father and Filipino mother who was born
in Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar).
Ø ​Ty migrated to USA, became a citizen and had
been residing there for the last 25 years.
Ø ​Ty falsely represented in his COC that he was
a resident of ​Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year prior the
election, and was not a permanent resident or
immigrant of any foreign country.
Ø ​While Ty may have applied for the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he
never actually resided in ​Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period
of one year immediately preceding the date of
election as required under the Local Government
Code.
Ø ​Ty continued to make trips to the US and
continued to present himself as an American
Citizen, even after he filed his COC and even
after taking his oath of allegiance.
Ø ​Ty failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as
required by the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003.
· Ty admitted being natural-born Filipino had
acquired American citizenship but countered the allegations
saying:
Ø ​He had validly reacquired his Philippine
citizenship and renounced his American
citizenship, and
Ø ​He had been a resident of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than
one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections.
Ø​ ​He had performed the following acts:
a. ​Prior to his filing of COC, he filed
with the Philippine Consulate General in
LA California, USA, an application for
the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship;
b. ​He already executed an Oath of
Allegiance to the RP before the Vice
Consul of the Philippine Consulate
General in LA California, USA.
c. ​He applied for a Philippine
passport indicating in his application
that his residence in the Philippines was
at A. Mabini St., ​Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar and
was approved.
 d. ​He personally secured his
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) in
Gen. Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
e. ​He was registered as a voter in
Precinct 0013A, ​Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar;
f. ​He secured another CTC again
stating therein his address as ​Barangay
6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar;
g. ​He executed on 19 March 2007 a
duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship.
· While the case is pending, elections pushed
through and Ty was declared the Mayor.
· COMELEC then rendered a Resolution in favor of
Ty saying that he complied with the requirements of
Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired
his Philippine citizenship.
Ø ​Ty did not commit material misrepresentation
in COC because his reacquisition of his
citizenship proved his residency.
Ø ​And the term “residence” is to be understood
not in its common acceptation as referring to
dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or
legal residence or the place where a party actually
or constructively has his permanent home, where
he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is
acquired by every person at birth until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile
(domicile of choice).
· MR was filed by Japzon
a. When Ty became a naturalized American citizen, he lost his
domicile of origin.
b. Ty did not establish his residence in Gen Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, just because he reacquired his Philippine citizenship. He
failed to prove that he established a new domicile of choice.
c. Ty did not become a resident of Gen. Macarthur by merely
executing the Oath of Allegiance under Republic Act No. 9225.
d. Ty did not meet the one-year residency requirement for running as
mayor.
a. ​Japzon is the only placer in the elections and should be declared
as the duly elected mayor
· MR was denied the ground that the act of
reacquisition of Filipino citizen qualified him to run in any
local post.
ISSUE: ​Whether Ty complied with all requirements needed to qualify
for public office
HELD​: YES
· ​Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic before the Vice Consul in Los Angeles,
California in accordance with RA No. 9225. Then, he renounced
his American citizenship before a notary public and became a
pure Philippine citizen again.
· ​RA No 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it
mention any effect of reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the natural-born Filipino.
Citizenship and residence are independently treated in RA No
9225.
· ​Residency only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino
with dual citizenship runs for public office.
Ø​ ​In that case, he must:
(1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws; and
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Ø​ ​This second requisite has been complied with.
Proceeding now to tackle requirements under Special Laws: Local
Government Code
· ​Under Section 39 of the Local Government Code (RA No 7160), it
is required that an elective official be a resident of the
independent component cities, component cities, or municipalites
where he intends to be elected for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
· ​Ty admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, which
meant he must have abandoned Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar
as his domicile of origin and transferred to the USA as his
domicile of choice.
· ​His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship however did not
automatically mean he regained his domicile in Gen. Macarthur.
But he had the option to establish his domicile of choice therein.
· ​The length of his residence shall be determined from the time he
made it his domicile of choice and shall not retroact to the time of
his birth.
·​ ​In order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur
(1) Residence or bodily presence in the new locality,
Ø ​Under ​Papandayan Jr., vs COMELEC, ​it is the fact of
residence that is the decisive factor. The principle of ​animus
revertendi has been used to determine whether a
candidate has an intention to return to the place where he
seeks to be elected. Thus, it is important to determine
whether there has been an abandonment of his former
residence. Absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice his profession does not constitute loss of
residence.
(2) An intention to remain there
Ø ​Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice became
apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine
citizenship on October 2, 2005, he applied for a Philippine
passport indicating his address at A. Mabini St., Barangay
6, Poblacion, Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar. He paid his
community tax, securing CTCs and stating his address in
Gen Macarthur. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was
registered as a voter on July 17, 2006 in the same town. He
has also been bodily present in the municipality since his
arrival on May 4, 2006. His trips abroad are further
manifestations of his ​animus manendi ​and ​animus
revertendi​. Even with his trips to other countries, Ty was
actually present in Gen Macarthur, for at least 9 of the 12
months preceding the local elections.
(3) An intention to abandon the old domicile.
Ø ​There must be ​animus manendi coupled with ​animus non
revertendi​. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change
of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
There is nothing wrong in an individual changing residences so he
could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove that he To her defense, she denied being a dual citizen and averred
has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the
that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian
period required by law.
citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of
Ty has proven that he had established residence/domicile a little over a
year prior to the local elections, in which he ran for Mayor and in which Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently
he garnered the most number of votes. complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of
The COMELEC found that Ty had been a resident of Gen Macarthur 1 running for public office is a clear abandonment of her
year prior to the elections. Factual findings of administrative agencies, Australian citizenship.
such as the COMELEC, are binding and conclusive on the SC, most
especially since the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC on a RTC​: rendered Condon ineligible to continue holding public
level higher that other administrative organs.
office for failing to comply with the requirements of Section 5(2)
of R.A. No. 9225, as the law clearly mandates that the
17. Teodora Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC
document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship
must be sworn before any public officer authorized to
DOCTRINE: ​Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in
administer oath.
accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and
COMELEC: ​Upon Condon’s appeal, it was dismissed and
thus hold any elective public office.
granted the Motion for Execution filed by the Private
Respondents.
FACTS
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON (Condon) is a natural-born
ISSUE: ​Whether Condon is ineligible to continue holding public
Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August
office by failing to execute a sworn renunciation of foreign
8, 1944. She became a naturalized Australian citizen in 1984
citizenship pursuant to Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225​. (YES)
owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
HELD: ​YES, under the provisions of the aforementioned law,
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire
Condon has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when
Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in
she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225
Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual
otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and
citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought
It was approved and she took her oath of allegiance to the
elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian
Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the
same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of
On September 18, 2006, she filed an unsworn Declaration of
Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department
sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia,
which in turn issued the Order, within the same month,
Condon’s argument that the requirement was a mere
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
pro-forma requirement fails. The "sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" must be deemed a formal requirement only with
Condon ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in
respect to the re-acquisition of one’s status as a natural-born
the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She tried in 2010
Filipino so as to override the effect of the principle that
running for the position of Vice-Mayor and she succeeded. She
natural-born citizens need not perform any act to perfect their
took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
citizenship. Never was it mentioned or even alluded to that,
those who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and thereafter
Soon thereafter, Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and
run for public office has the option of executing an unsworn
Luis M. Bautista, (private respondents) all registered voters of
affidavit of renunciation.
Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto
questioning the Condon’s eligibility before the RTC.
It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5 was
intended to complement Section 18, Article XI of the
The petitions similarly sought to disqualify Condon from
Constitution on public officers’ primary accountability of
holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual
allegiance and loyalty, which provides:
citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
Sec. 18. – Public officers and employees owe the State and
officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section
this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or
5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the
status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure
shall be dealt with by law.
18. Rommel Jalosjos vs. COMELEC
18 Rommel Jalosjos vs. COMELEC, Dan Erasmo
G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012
FACTS
Rommel Jalosjos was born in QC in 1973. Migrated to
Australia and acquired Australian citizenship at 8. In
2008, he returned to PH and lived with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay. 4 days later, he took an oath of
allegiance to RP and was issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of PH Citizenship by BOI. In 2009, he
renounced Australian citizenship in compliance with RA
9225.
From there, he acquired a residential property in
Zamboanga Sibugay. Applied to register as voter in Ipil,
but respondent Dan Erasmo (Brgy. Captain) opposed
the same. Application was approved. Thus, Erasmo field
with MCTC a petition for exclusion of Jalosjos’ name
from the official voters list. Denied. RTC affirmed. Final.
In 2009, Jalosjos filed a COC for Governor of
Zamboanga Sibugay for the 2010 elections.
Erasmo filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel
Jalosjos COC’s on ground of material misrepresentation
having failed to comply with RA 9225 and 1-year
residency.
COMELEC 2​nd​division ruled that while Jalosjos regained
PH citizenship under RA 9225, he failed to prove
residency requirement. He failed to present ample proof
of a ​bona fide ​intention to establish his domicile in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. COMELEC ​En Banc ​affirmed
ruling that Jalosjos had been a mere guest or transient
visitor in his brother’s house and, for this reason, he
cannot claim Ipil as his domicile.
ISSUE
Whether Jalosjos has complied with the residency
requirement under the LGC
HELD
Yes.
LGC requirement: a resident of the province for at least
one year before the election for Governor.
Residence is synonymous with domicile in election
laws
For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of
residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a
person must not only intend to reside in a particular
place but must also have personal presence in such
place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile
There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s
compliance with residency requirement since the
question of residence is a question of intention. Still,
jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a)
every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;
(b) where once established, that domicile remains until
he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but
one domicile at a time.
Case of Jalosjos
·​ Q
​ C is domicile of origin, the place of birth.
· ​Australia became his domicile by operation of law
and by choice.
· ​When he came to PH, Jalosjos did intend to change
his domicile for good by virtue of his reacquisition
and renunciation.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in
Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of
origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by
operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled
maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence
somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to
settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been
staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance
alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court
has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to
have a house in a community to establish his residence
or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he
should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the
house of a friend or relative. ​To insist that the candidate
own the house where he lives would make property a
qualification for public office.​What matters is that
Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence
in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
Qualified.
19. Svetlana Jalosjos vs. COMELEC
20. REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, ​Petitioner​, ​v​.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH
SOCORRO B. TAN, ​Respondents​.
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013
Facts:
This case is a Motion for Reconsideration of the ​En Banc
Resolution of 25 June 2013. The first sentence below refers to the
petition first filed by Reyes.
The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari
with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction resolution of the Commission on Election ordering the
cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the
position of the Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.
On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec
an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner,
on the ground that it contained material representations.On March
27, 2013, the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of
the petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2013,
COMELEC en banc denied her MR.
However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner
of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June 5, 2013, COMELEC
declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the
same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano
Belmonte, the Speaker of the House of Representatives. She has
yet to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at
noon of June 30, 2013.According to petitioner, the COMELEC was
ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed because
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the
HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of the
Members of the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who
is proclaimed as winner and who has already taken her oath of
office for the position of member of the House of Representative
of Marinduque.
Held:
Hindi to relevant sa discussion natin, pero isinama na lang.
Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the
HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of
the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution. For one to be considered a Member of the
House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of these
requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2) proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office.
Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet
as she has not assumed office yet. Also, the 2​nd requirement was
not validly complied with as a valid oath must be made (1) before
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open
session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker
Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary
or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the
required oath of office was indeed complied.
Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave
abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. For an act to be
struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion,
the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.
Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and
substantially show that grave abuse of discretion exists.
Relevant Discussion:
Petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her case before
the COMELEC when from the time the petition against her was
filed until the First Division of the COMELEC rendered its
resolution. Petitioner Tan’s submission of newly discovered
evidence establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an
American passport which she continued to use until June 2012
puts the burden upon respondent Reyes to prove that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. Thus, leading to the conclusion that
Reyes misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had
availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual
Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter made a valid sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be an
American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold
any elective public office in the Philippines.
Aside from her bare allegation that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen, Reyes did not submit any proof to support such
contention. Neither did she submit any proof that RA 9225 does
not apply to her.
------------------------------------
In her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC ​En Banc​,
petitioner admitted that she is a holder of a US passport, but she
averred that she is only a
dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No.
9225 do not apply to her. Still, attached to the said motion is an
Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship dated 24 September 2012. Petitioner explains that she
attached said Affidavit “if only to show her desire and zeal to
serve the people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity.”
We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner’s explanation. If
petitioner executed said
Affidavit “if only to comply with the rules,” then it is an admission
that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that she
executed it to address the
observations by the COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were
promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in
September 2012. Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner
added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial Administrator,
to this effect: “This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to
her taking her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, take her
oath of allegiance for purposes of re acquisition of natural-born
Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper
proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office is in
order to make reference to what is already part of the records and
evidence in the
present ca
se and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of
fact that was not previously passed upon by Respondent
COMELEC.” This statement raises a lot of questions — Did
petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for reacquisition of
natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it
at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an
admission that she has indeed
lost her natural-born Filipino status? To cover-up her apparent
lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225,
petitioner contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in
connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of
Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in
natural -born Filipino citizen. This contention is misplaced. For the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this
● Balua likewise presented a certification from the
Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another,
Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010,
said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with
Sec. 3 of certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel
R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file
known as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. as of 21 April 2010, using the same US passport.
No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular ● Arnado failed to answer the complaint and
No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Comelec also failed to act on Balua’s motions.
Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus,
Hence, the elections ensued and Arnado won.
petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be
considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance
● After his proclamation, he filed an answer with
with R.A. No. 9225. These circumstances, taken together, show documents stating his renunciation of US
that a doubt citizenship.
was clearly cast on petitioner’s citizenship. Petitioner, however, ● COMELEC-Arnado appears to have substantially
failed to clear such doubt. complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225,
Arnado’s act of consistently using his US
passport after renouncing his US citizenship on
03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation. Granted the cancellation of cert. Of
21. Maquiling vs. COMELEC- De Guia
candidacy/disqualification.
Facts:
● MR Comelec en banc was filed by arnado.
● Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However,
● Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another
as a consequence of his subsequent
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of
garnered the second highest number of votes in
America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and
applied for repatriation under Republic Act No.
filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
9225 before the Consulate General of the
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the
Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Maquiling argued that while the First Division
Philippines on July 2008 and April of 2009. On the
correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship
succession under Section 44 of the Local
Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his
Government Code is not applicable in this case.
favor.
Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of
● By November of 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate
Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his
of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate
Norte.
candidate who obtained the highest number of
● Subsequently, Linog C. Balua (Balua), another
lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify
● COmelec en banc- granted Mr. Reversed and set
Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of
aside first div decision.
candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Reason: By renouncing his US citizenship as
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May
imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his
2010 local and national elections.
Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen
● Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of
of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a
the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.
foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert
by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation
indicating the nationality of Arnado as
as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of
"USA-American." To further bolster his claim of
a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he
Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his
has earlier on renounced.
Memorandum a computer-generated travel record
dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado
● Hence, an appeal under rule 65 was filed to the sc.
has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in
Issue: Won arnaldo is eligible to be the mayor?
entering and departing the Philippines. The said
record shows that Arnado left the country on 14
Held: SC-No. the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of
April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and
the COMELEC En Banc is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is
disqualified from running for any local elective position.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the
duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan.
● The use of foreign passport after renouncing
one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s
nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it
recants the Oath of Renunciation required to
qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines
shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before
any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
● The act of renunciation as a legal presumption
does not operate permanently and is open to
attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts
showing his continued possession of a foreign
citizenship.
● The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a
hollow oath that can simply be professed at any
time, only to be violated the next day. It requires
an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil
and political rights granted by the foreign country
which granted the citizenship.
● We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such
act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he
acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen,
Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his
earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion
was not retroactive; it took place the instant
Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport.
● Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a
badge of identity that comes with attendant civil
and political rights accorded by the state to its
citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant
duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and
country. While those who acquire dual citizenship
by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those
who seek election or appointment to public office
are required to renounce their foreign citizenship
to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public
office demands full and undivided allegiance to
the Republic and to no other.
● The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate. The ballot cannot
override the constitutional and statutory
requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law
requires certain qualifications to be possessed or
that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public
officials, those qualifications must be met before
one even becomes a candidate.
● Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates. We have ruled in the recent cases of
Aratea v. COMELEC and Jalosjos v. COMELEC
that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible
candidate are not considered at all in determining
the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate
are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in
favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute
the sole and total expression of the sovereign
voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and
legitimate candidates form part of that voice and
must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules
that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to
participate as players. When there are participants
who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is
voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in
rank who does not possess any of the
disqualifications nor lacks any of the
qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates.
22. Arnado vs. Comelec
Doctrine: With regard to the qualification to run for public
office of a natural- born Filipino citizen who was naturalized
abroad and subsequently availed of the privileges under RA
9225. The use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or
recantation of the oath of renunciation..
Facts​:
· ​Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost
his Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as
citizen of the USA.
· ​Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for
public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for
repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consul General of
the Philippines in San Franciso, USA.
· ​He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on even date, an Order
of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re​ acquisition
was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
· ​On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local
elections.
· ​Balua, another mayoralty candidate filed a petition to
disqualify Petitioner Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on
the ground that Arnado remained a US citizen because he
continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from
the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of
Renunciation.
· ​While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010
elections proceeded where Arnado garnered the highest
number of votes and was proclaimed the winning
candidate.
· ​On October 5, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued
held that Arnado's continued use of his US passport
effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run for public
office for failure to comply with the requirements of RA
9225. The COMELEC First Division accordingly nullified
his proclamation and held that the rule on succession
should be followed.
· ​In the meantime, Maquiling, another mayoralty candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes,
intervened in the case. He argued that the COMELEC
First Division erred in applying the rule on succession.
· ​The COMELEC En Banc reversed the ruling of the
COMELEC First Division. It held that Arnado's use of his
US passport did not operate to revert his status to dual
citizenship; that he continued to use his US passport
because he did not yet know that he had been issued a
Philippine passport at the time of the relevant foreign trips;
and that, after receiving his Philippine passport, Arnado
used the same for his subsequent trips.
· ​Maquiling then appealed to the SC. While Maquiling’s
petition was pending (which was the decision in the
previous case), the period for the filing of CoCs for local
elective officials for the May 13, 2013 elections officially
began.
On October 1, 2012, Petitioner Arnado filed his CoC
for the same position for the 2013 elections​.
Respondent Capitan also filed his CoC for the
mayoralty post of Kauswagan.
· ​Before the May 2013 elections, the SC ruled on the
Maquiling petition. (previous case). It set aside the
COMELEC en banc’s resolution and disqualified Petitioner
Arnado from running for elective position, and declared
Maquiling as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
Del Norte in the May 2010 elections and that the
subsequent use of his US passport, Petitioner Arnado
effectively disavowed or recalled his April 3, 2009 Affidavit
of Renunciation. The issuance of the Maquiling Decision
sets the stage for the present controversy.
· ​Shortly after the Maquiling Decision, ​on May 9, 2013​,
Petitioner Arnado ​executed an Affidavit Affirming
Rommel C. Arnado's "​Affidavit of Renunciation Dated
April 3, 2009.”
· ​Private Respondent Capitpan, Petitioner Arnado’s lone
rival in the May 2013 elections, filed a Petition seeking to
disqualify him from running for municipal mayor of
Kauswagan and/or to cancel his CoC based on the ruling
of this Court in Maquiling.
Arguments​:
· ​Petitioner​: That the Maquiling case is not on all fours with
the present controversy; that Capitan's Petition was filed
beyond the 25-day reglementary period reckoned from the
filing of the CoC sought to be cancelled; and, that the
Comelec must uphold the sovereign will of the people of
Kauswagan who expressed, thru the ballots, their
overwhelming support for him as their mayor. Arnado
prayed that the Comelec Second Division's September 6,
2013 Resolution be reversed and that he be declared as
eligible to run for mayor of Kauswagan. Petitioner Arnado
avers that his former counsel, revealed that he executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance on
November 30, 2009. Hence, at the time he filed his CoC
on October 1, 2012, he is a citizen of the Philippines who
does not owe allegiance to any other country and,
therefore, is qualified to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the
May 13, 2013 elections.
· ​Respondent COMELEC​: It disqualified Petitioner Arnado
from running in the May 2013 elections. That at the time
he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed to
comply with the requirement of RA 9225 of making a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship. While he executed the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation, the same was deemed withdrawn or
recalled when he subsequently traveled abroad using his
US passport, as held in Maquiling case.
Issue​: Whether Petitioner Arnado is qualified to run
Held​: No. The Petition is devoid of merit. COMELEC’s decision
is affirmed.
Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person
with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from running for any
elective local position. The phrase "dual citizenship" in said
Section 4(d) must be understood as referring to "dual
allegiance.''
RA 9225 allowed natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to
enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with the
requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in
the Philippines provided that they:
(1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws; and,
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.
In this case, Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite
because, as held in ​Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, his
April 3, 2009 ​Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed
withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing
said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed ​his CoC on
October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections,
Arnado had ​yet to comply with said second requirement.
The Comelec also noted that ​while Arnado submitted an
affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not suffice for
having been belatedly executed.
It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado's disqualification to
run for public office during the 2010 elections — being a
candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines - still subsisted when he filed his
CoC for the 2013 elections on October 1, 2012. The Comelec
En Banc ​merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in ​Maquiling
lest it would be committing grave abuse of discretion had it
departed therefrom.
The ruling in ​Maquiling ​is indeed novel in the sense that it was
the first case dealing with the effect of the use of a foreign
passport on the qualification to run for public office of a natural-
born Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and
subsequently availed of the privileges under RA 9225.
It is well-settled that the ​use of a foreign passport amounts
to repudiation or recantation of the oath of renunciation​.
Yet, despite the issue being novel and of first impression, plus
the fact that Arnado could not have divined the possible
adverse consequences of using his US passport, the Court in
Maquiling ​did not act with leniency or benevolence towards
Arnado. Voting 10-5, the Court ruled that matters dealing with
qualifications for public elective office must be strictly
complied with. Otherwise stated, the Court in ​Maquiling ​did
not consider the novelty of the issue as to excuse Arnado from
strictly complying with the eligibility requirements to run for
public office or to simply allow him to correct the deficiency in
his qualification by submitting another oath of renunciation.
The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to
run for public office during the May 10, 2010 and May 13, 2013
elections, to reiterate for emphasis, are the same. In this case,
Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009 invalidated his
oath of renunciation resulting in his disqualification to run
for mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then
and up to the time he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections,
Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification​.
Maquiling​, therefore, is binding on and applicable to this case.
Since then and up to the time he filed his CoC for the 2013
elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification.
Maquiling​, therefore, is binding on and applicable to this case
following the salutary doctrine of ​stare decisis et non quieta
movere​, which means to adhere to precedents, and not to
unsettle things which are established.
At any rate, the execution of an Oath of Allegiance is required
by Section 3 of RA 9225. For those who avail themselves of
RA 9225 and intend to run for public office, Section 5(2)
thereof provides the additional requirement of making a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.
Definitely, the provisions of Section 5(2) are not useless or
meaningless surplusage. When the law expressly requires an
explicit renunciation, an implicit one would be insufficient.
Furthermore, even assuming that Arnado’s 2008 implied
renunciation is sufficient, the same has also been negated by
his use of his US passport in 2009, following the ruling in
Maquiling​.
In ​Maquiling​, this Court emphasized that popular vote does not
cure the ineligibility of a candidate. Thus, while in this case
Arnado won by landslide majority during the 2013 elections,
garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same cannot
override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications.
In ​Velasco v. COMELEC​, 575 SCRA 590 (2008), this Court
pronounced that election victory cannot be used as a magic
formula to bypass election eligibility requirements;
otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will
become toothless. One of which is Section 39 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which specifies the basic positive
qualifications of local government officials. If in ​Velasco ​the
Court ruled that popular vote cannot override the required
qualifications under Section 39, ​a fortiori​, there is no reason
why the Court should not follow the same policy when it comes
to disqualifications enumerated under Section 40 of the same
law. After all, „[t]he qualifications set out in [Section 39] are
roughly half of the requirements for election to local public
offices. The other half is contained in the succeeding section
which lays down the circumstances that disqualify local
candidates.
ARNADO DISQUALIFIED.
23. David vs. Agbay
FACTS:
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a
Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement,
petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines.
In 2000, they purchased a beach lot in Tambong, Gloria,
Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house.
However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion
where they built their house is public land and part of the
salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease
Application (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner
indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Private respondent Editha
A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner,
a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a
criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under
Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under
the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. In his defense,
petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he
had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he
had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare
himself as a Filipino.
Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public
Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest
was issued against the petitioner. Since the crime for which
petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been
committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was
at that time still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC denied the
motion for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
and for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
WON David may be indicted for falsification for representing
himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his
subsequent re-acquition of Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225? (YES)
HELD:
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and
3 of said law read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to
have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic: xxx Natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who
have become citizens of another country shall be deemed “not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the
phrase “under the conditions of this Act.” Section 3 lays down
such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos
referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first
paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall
re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second
paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The
taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of
natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign
country, but the terminology used is different, “reacquired” for
the first group, and “retain” for the second group. The law thus
makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A.
9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is “Retention of
Philippine Citizenship”, the authors of the law intentionally
employed the terms “re-acquire” and “retain” to describe the
legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law
using both re-acquisition and retention. Considering that David
was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of
R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural born
Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As
the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire
his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of
allegiance. For the purpose of determining the citizenship of
petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to
discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity
of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of
his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in
contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words,
Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who
became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second
paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases
after the new law’s effectivity. Falsification of documents under
paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the RPC
refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer
or employee who did not take advantage of his official position,
of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of
falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the
RPC are: (1) that the offender is a private individual or a public
officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and (3) that the
falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial
document. David made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a
public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the
filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a
Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time
he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a
foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born
citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the
falsification was already a consummated act, the said law
having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship
status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding
probable cause for falsification of public document under
Article172, paragraph 1
ISSUE:
WON the MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for
re-determination of probable cause on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the (petitioner)? (NO)
HELD:
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner accused as ground for denying petitioner’s motion for
re-determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed
prior to his arrest.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between
custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of
the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of
other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the
law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,
while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.
As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As
we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance. To recapitulate
what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative
relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction
of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his
motion for re-determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly
erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person.
Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the MTC’s
order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion
was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack
of merit.
24. Poe-Llamanzares vs. Comelec
FACTS:
· September 3, 1968- Mary Grace Natividad S.
Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain
Edgardo Militar. Custody over petitioner was passed on by
Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife.
· September 6, 1968- Emiliano Militar reported and
registered petitioner as a foundling with the OCR-Iloilo
· 1973- When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity
spouses FPJ and Susan Roces filed a petition for her
adoption with the MTC of San Juan City.
· May 13, 1974- The Poe spouses’ petition for adoption was
granted by the trial court and ordered that petitioner's
name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."
· December 13, 1986- Having reached the age of 18,
petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC
Office in San Juan City.
· April 4, 1988- Petitioner applied for and was issued
Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the Department of
Foreign Affairs
· 1988-1991- Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a
degree in Development Studies at the University of the
Philippines but opted to continue her studies abroad and
left for the U.S. in 1988.
· Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in
Chestnuts Hill
· July 27, 1991- Petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and the
U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City.
· July 29, 1991- Desirous of being with her husband who
was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the
U.S.
· April 16, 1992- Petitioner gave birth to her eldest child
Brian Daniel
· April 5, 1993- Renewed her Philippines passport.
· May 19, 1998- Renewed her Philippines passport.
· July 10, 1998- Petitioner gave birth to daughter Hanna
MacKenzie.
· October 18, 2001- Petitioner became a naturalized
American citizen
· April 8, 2004 – July 8, 2004- Petitioner came back to the
Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's
candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was
during this time that she gave birth to her youngest
daughter Anika.
· Dece​mber 13, 2004 – February 3, 2005- Petitioner rushed
back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's
deteriorating medical condition who died shortly.
· 2005- Petitioner and husband began preparing for their
resettlement including notification of their children's
schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools
· May 24, 2005- Petitioner came home to the Philippines
and without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number
from the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
· March 2006- The petitioner's husband officially informed
the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and
abandonment of their address in the U.S. petitioner and
her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home.
· July 7, 2006- Petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003.
· July 18, 2006- The Bureau of Immigration acted favorably
on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed
to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship.
· August 31, 2006- Again, petitioner registered as a voter of
Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City. She also secured
from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No.
XX4731999.
· October 6, 2010- President Benigno S. Aquino III
appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).
· October 20, 2010- Before assuming her post, petitioner
executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City.
· October 21, 2010- Petitioner submitted the said affidavit to
the Bureau of Immigration and took her oath of office as
Chairperson of the MTRCB. From then on, petitioner
stopped using her American passport.
· July 12, 2011- The petitioner executed before the Vice
Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States" and stated that she in the Philippines, from
3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to
present.
· December 9, 2011- The U.S. Vice Consul issued to
petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United
States" effective 21 October 2010.
· October 2, 2012- The petitioner filed with the COMELEC
her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the
2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6
months" to the question "Period of residence in the
Philippines before May 13, 2013."
· October 15, 2015- Petitioner filed her COC for the
Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, the
petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and
that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9
May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from
May 24, 2005.
ISSUE:
1. Whether it can be concluded that Poe’s parents are
Filipino
2. Whether as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Citizen
3. Whether Poe’s repatriation resulted to reacquisition of
natural born citizenship
4. Whether Poe is a resident of the Philippine for 10 years
HELD:
1. Presumption regarding paternity is neither unknown nor
unacceptable in Philippine Law. There is more sufficient
evidence that Poe has ​The Solicitor General offered
official Statistics from the Philippine Statistics office that
from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in
the Philippines was 15,985. While the Filipinos born in the
country were more than 10 Million. On this basis, there is
a 99% chance that the child born in the Philippines would
be a Filipino which in turn, would indicate more than ample
probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of
Poe’s parents are the fact that:
1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church
in Iloilo
2. She has typical Filipino features.
There are disputable presumptions that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature.
On this basis, it is safer to assume that Poe’s parents
are Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept the
absurd.
2. Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens. While the
1935 Constitution is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language that would exclude them either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration,
there is a need to examine the intent of the framers.
The amendment to the Constitution proposed by
constitutionalist Rafols to include foundlings as
natural born citizens was not carried out, not because
there was any objection to the notion that persons of
unknown parentage are not citizens, but only because
their number was not enough to merit specific
mention. There was no intent or language that would
permit discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic
right to equal protection of the laws. Likewise,
domestic laws on adoption support the principle that
foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide
that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee,
rather, the adoptee must be Filipino in the first place
to be adopted. Recent legislation all expressly refer to
“Filipino children” and include foundlings as among
Filipino children who may be adopted.
 The argument that the process to determine that the
child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a
foundling certificate are acts to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship is without merit. Hence, the
argument that as a foundling, Poe underwent a
process in order to acquire or perfect her Philippine
citizenship, is untenable.
“Having to perform an act” means that the act must be
personally done by the citizen. In this case, the
determination of foundling status was done by
authorities, not by Poe. Second, the object of the
process is to determine the whereabouts of the
parents, not the citizenship of the child and lastly, the
process is not analogous to naturalization
proceedings.
Under international law, foundlings are citizens.
Generally accepted principles of international law
which include international customs form part of the
laws of the land. The common thread of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and the International Convent on
Civil and Political Rights obligates the Philippines to
grant nationality from birth and to ensure that no child
is stateless. The principles stated in the:
a) Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the
Conflict of Nationality laws (that a foundling is presumed to
have the nationality of the country of birth)
b) Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (foundling
is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is
found) bind the Philippines although we are not signatory
to these conventions.
Although we are not a signatory to the Hague
Convention, we are a signatory to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which affirms
Article 14 of the Hague Convention. Likewise, the
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness affirms
Article 15 of the UDHR. By analogy, although the
Philippines has not signed the International
Convention for the Protection of Persons from
Enforced Disappearance, we (the Supreme Court)
ruled that the proscription against enforced
disappearance was nonetheless binding as a
generally accepted principle of international law.
Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in
Asia, North and South America and Europe have
passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its
citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept that
foundlings are recognized as citizens. Hence, there is
a generally accepted principle of international law to
presume foundlings as having been born and a
national of the country in which it is found.
Hence, as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Filipino
citizen.
3. The COMELEC arrogantly disregarded jurisprudence on
the matter of repatriation which states that repatriation
results in the recovery of the original nationality. A natural
born citizen before he lost his Philippine nationality will be
restored to his former status as natural born Filipino after
repatriation (Benson v. HRET, Pareno v. Commission on
Audit etc). In passing R.A. 9225, Congress saw it fit to
decree that natural born citizenship may be reacquired
even if it has been lost. It is not for the COMELEC to
disagree with the Congress’ determination.
Neither is repatriation an act to ‘acquire or perfect’ one’s
citizenship. In the case of Bengson, the Court pointed out that
there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 constitution:
natural born and naturalized. There is no third category for
repatriated citizens. The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial
precedent. Hence, COMELEC’s decision is wrapped with
grave abuse of discretion.
4. Poe alleged that her residency should be counted from
May 24, 2005 when she returned for good from the US.
There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile 1.
Residence or bodily presence in a new locality 2. Intention
to remain (animus manendi) and 3. Intention to abandon
the old domicile (animus non-revertendi). The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time, the change of residence must be
voluntary and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.
Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her
family abandoned their US domicile and relocated to the
Philippines for good. These evidence include former US
passport showing her arrival on May 24, 2005 and her return to
the Philippines every time she travelled abroad, email
correspondences with freight company to arrange for the
shipment of household items as well as with the pet Bureau;
school records of her children showing enrolment in the
Philippine to the Philippine schools starting on June 2005 etc.
COMELEC refused to consider the petitioner’s domicile has
been timely changed as of May 24, 2005 and maintained that
although there is physical presence and animus manendi,
there is no animus revertendi. Respondents contend that the
stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she
obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquired Philippine
citizenship since she is still an American until July 7, 2006 on
the basis of previous cases ruled upon by the Supreme Court.
SC held that the other cases previously decided by the court
wherein residence was counted only from the acquisition of
permanent residence were decided as such because there is
sparse evidence on establishment of residence. These cases
cannot be applied in the present case. In the case at bar, there
is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to other conclusion
that Poe decided to permanently abandon her US residence
and reside in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005.
These evidence, coupled with her eventual application to
reacquire Philippine citizenship is clear that when she returned
in May 2005, it was for good.
The stamp in her passport as a balikbayan does not make Poe
an ordinary transient.
Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2012 COC
was only a mistake in good faith. Such a mistake could be
given in evidence against her but it was by no means
conclusive considering the overwhelming evidence submitted
by Poe. Considering that the COMELEC failed to take into
consideration these overwhelming evidence, its decision is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The decision of the
COMELEC is hereby annulled and set aside. Poe is thus
declared qualified to be a candidate for President in the
National and Local Election on May 9, 2016.
25. In Re: Petition to Re-acquire the Privilege to Practice
Law in the Philippines
In re: Petition to Reacquire the Privilege to Practice Law in
the Philippines, Epifanio B. Muneses
BM No. 21112; July 24, 2012
FACTS:
● Petitioner became a member of the IBP in 1966 but
lost his privilege to practice law when he became an
American citizen in 1981.
● In 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 or the “Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003” by taking his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate in Washington, D.C.
● He intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted,
to resume the practice of law.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner, if after reacquiring Philippine
citizenship, can practice law in the Philippines
Ruling:
Yes. ​The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. Under R.A. No.
9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice
his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.
In pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the
practice of law, the OBC required, and in compliance thereof,
petitioner submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine
Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the
IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City
Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his
updated payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd
compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria
Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance
with the MCLE.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his
compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the
requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that
the petitioner has met all the qualifications, the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his
practice of law.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is
so delicately affected with public interest that it is both the
power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.