the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to
MARRIAGE, FAMILY LAW AND ADOPTION
1. Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43 (1922)
GR No.18081 March 3, 1922
FACTS:
Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands
on August 5, 1919 and left property worth nearly P100,000 which is
now being claimed by two parties –
(1) Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child by
marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Bit in China in 1985,
and
(2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to
Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands and had two
daughters with the deceased namely Payang and Rosalia. The
conflicting claims to Cheong Boo’s estate were ventilated in the
lower court that ruled that Cheong Seng Gee failed to sufficiently
establish the Chinese marriage through a mere letter testifying that
Cheong Boo and Tan Bit married each other but that because
Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the
son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child.
With reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters,
the trial court reached the conclusion that the marriage between
Adong and Cheong Boo had been adequately proven but that under
the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful
marriage and thus the daughter Payang and Rosalia would inherit as
natural children. The lower court believes that Mohammedan
marriages are not valid under the Philippine Island’s laws this as an
Imam as a solemnizing officer and under Quaranic laws.
ISSUES: ​Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo
and Tan Dit is valid?
Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo
and Mora Adong is valid?
HELD:
The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese marriage not proved and
Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child
while
(2) it found the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be
valid, thus giving to the widow Mora Adong and the legitimate
children Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to them under the
law. The Supreme Court held that marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract but it is a new relation, an instruction in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. The
presumption as to marriage is that every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency of the law. As to retroactive force, marriage laws is in the
nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by
legalizing prior marriages. Public policy should aid acts intended to
validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate
marriages. This as for public policy, the courts can properly incline
the scales of their decision in favor of that solution which will most
effectively promote the public policy. That is the true construction
which will best carry legislative intention into effect. Sec. IV of the
Marriage law provides that “all marriages contracted outside the
islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the
same were contracted, are valid in these islands. To establish a valid
foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first
necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of
prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. A
Philippine marriage followed by 23 years of uninterrupted marital
life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the
husband through an alleged prior Chinese marriage, “save upon
proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral
conviction of the existence of such impediment.” A marriage alleged
to have been contracted in China and proven mainly by a so-called
matrimonial letter held not to be valid in the Philippines
2. Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855 (1918)
FACTS: ​Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, a native of Switzerland, but for
many years a resident of Philippines, died testate in Iloilo on June
29, 1913. A few days after his death, the will was offered for probate
in CFI Iloilo and was subsequently admitted.
1. His widow, Dona Ana Ramirez, was named executrix. According
to the will, the decedent’s estate was bequeathed to his widow,
except for a property in Thun, Switzerland, which was devised to the
decedent’s brothers and sisters
2. It appears that while the decedent had no children with
Ramirez, he ignored possible claims of two sets of children, both to
his natural daughter, Leona Castro
3. Based on the baptismal entry in Bacolod, Leona Castro was
born on April 11, 1875, her mother Felisa Castro and father
“unknown.” On the margin of this record, there is additional
annotation (escritura or public document) that she was recognized
by Samuel Bischoff on June 22, 1877. Bischoff and his family raised
Leona and he treated her as his own.
4. Leona married Frederick von Kauffman in 1895 in Hong Kong.
From this marriage, 3 children were born: Elena, Federico and
Ernesto
5. Subsequently, Leona went with Frederick to Thun, Switzerland,
to improve her health and live there for a few years. Later she
informed her husband that she wanted a separation. As such,
Kauffman went to Paris, France to obtain a divorce from his wife
under French laws. A divorce decree was then issued on Jan 5, 1905
in favor of Kauffman against Leona, in default. Though the record
shows that Leona was residing in Paris, there is no evidence that she
had acquired permanent domicile in that city
6. Leona later cohabited with her physician, Dr. Ernest Emil Mory
(in charge of the sanatorium in Switzerland) in London. They later
married in London in 1905. It appears that Mory had previously
been married to one Helena Wolpman but later divorced. Prior to
Mory’s marriage to Leona, they had a daughter Leontina Elizabeth.
In 106, they had Carmen Maria and in 1909, Esther. Leona died on
Oct 6, 1910
7. Respondent Otto Gmur appeared as guardian of the 3 Mory
claimants, while Frederick von Kauffman appeared as the guardian
of his 3 children
8. Both sets of children anchor their claim on the contention that
Leona was the recognized natural daughter of Samuel Bischoff, as a
forced heir, the claimants are entitled to 1/3 interest in Bischoff’s
estate
9. On the other hand, Ramirez contended that Leona Castro had
never been recognized at all by the decedent during his lifetime
10. On the part of the Mory claimants, they argue that the marriage
between Leona and Kauffman was dissolved by the decree of
divorce granted by the Paris court in Jan 5, 1905 and that the
subsequent marriage between Leona and Mory was in all respects
valid and the children legitimate offspring of Leona
11. On the part of the Kauffman claimants, they insisted that the
decree of divorce was invalid and they alone are the legitimate
offspring of Leona who are entitled to participate in the division of
the estate of Bischoff
ISSUE: WON Leona is the recognized natural daughter of Samuel
Bischoff
HELD: Yes. It is proved that prior to her marriage with Kauffman,
Leona was in an uninterrupted enjoyment of the de facto status of a
natural child and was treated as such by Bischoff and his kindred.
The proof of tacit recognition is full and complete.
From the memorandum made by Padre Ferrero in the record of
birth as well as in his testimony, it appears that Bischoff executed a
notarized document recognizing Leona as his daughter. While the
note itself was not presented in evidence, it was shown that diligent
search was made to discover its whereabouts but without avail. This
was sufficient to justify the introduction of secondary evidence
concerning its contents; and the testimony of the priest showed that
the fact of recognition was therein stated. Furthermore, the
memorandum in the baptismal record itself constitutes original and
substantive proof of the facts therein.
The recognition of Leona as Samuel Bischoff’s daughter occurred
prior to the Civil Code and consequently, her rights as derived from
the recognition must be determined under the law when it existed.
Under the law, recognition could be established by proof of acts on
the part of the parent unequivocally recognizing the status of his
offspring. In other words, tacit recognition was sufficient.
ISSUE: WON Felisa Castro (Leona’s mother) was without legal
impediment
HELD: Yes. There is no evidence to show that Felisa Castro was
either a single woman or widow at the time of Leona’s birth. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, however, it must be presumed
that she was a single woman or a widow.
The contrary presumption would be that Felisa was guilty of adultery
cannot be entertained. If such had been the case, the burden of
proving it would have been upon the persons impugning the
recognition of the child by her father​.
ISSUE: WON Leona stands to inherit from the estate of Samuel
Bischoff
HELD: Yes. From the fact that Leona was an acknowledged natural
daughter of the decedent, it follows that had she survived him she
would have been his forced heir, he having died after the Civil Code
took effect; and as such forced heir, she would have been entitled to
1/3 of the inheritance.
ISSUE: WON the Kauffman claimants are entitled to participate in
the division of the estate
HELD: Yes. Since the Kauffman children were born during the
marriage of Leona and Kauffman, it follows that they are entitled to
participate in the inheritance which would have devolved upon their
mother, if she had survived the testator.
ISSUE: WON the divorce decree granted by the Paris court can be
recognized in the Philippines
HELD: No. The divorce decree in question cannot be recognized as
valid in the Philippines. The French tribunal has no jurisdiction to
entertain an action for the dissolution of a marriage contracted in
the Philippines by a person domiciled her; such marriage being
indissoluble under the laws then prevailing in this country.
The evidence shows that both Kauffman and Leona are domiciled in
Iloilo, Philippines and that their departure to Switzerland was for
medical purpose, and that Kauffman went to Paris in 1904 to obtain
a divorce without an intention to establish permanent residence in
that city.
A court, where neither of the spouses is domiciled, and to which one
or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a
divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status;
and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition
elsewhere.
ISSUE:​ WON the Mory claimants are entitled to the estate
HELD: No. With regard to the Mory claimants, their rights principally
depend upon the effect to be given by this court to divorce degree
granted to Kauffman in Paris. If divorce decree is valid, the
subsequent marriage of Leona and Mory is also valid.
Since the divorce granted by the French court cannot be recognized,
it follows that the marriage between Mory and Leona in London
could not legalize their relations. The claims of the Mory children to
participate in the estate of Bischoff must be rejected. The right to
inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated, and acknowledged
natural children.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the probate of a will upon the rights of
forced heirs who did not appear to contest the probate?
HELD: The rights of the forced heirs to their legitime are not
divested by the decree admitting a will to probate—this is regardless
of the fact that no provision has been made for them in the will, for
the decree of probate is conclusive only with regard to the due
execution of the will.
Under Sec 753 Code of Civil Procedure, forced heirs cannot be
prejudiced by the failure of a testator to provide for them in his will;
and regardless of the intention of the testator to leave all his
property to his wife, the will is intrinsically invalid insofar as it would
operate to cut off their rights.
DISPOSITIVE: The order allowing Leontina Mory to participate in the
estate of Samuel Bischoff is reversed; and instead the Kauffman
children will be admitted to share equally in 1/3 of the estate as
provided in the decision of Judge Powell dated Nov 14, 1916. In
other respects, the decision of Judge Mariano is affirmed.
3. Hix v. Fluemer, ​supra at 41
G.R. No. 32636 | March 17, 1930 | J. Malcolm
Doctrine:
The laws of foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in the
Philippine courts. Such laws must be proven as facts.
Facts:
A.W. Fluemer, as special administrator of Edward Randolph Hix’s
estate, appealed the decision of the CFI which denied the probate of
Edward’s last will and testament.
Anne Cousins Hix contends that Fluemer does not have the authority
to appeal the CFI decision as a special administrator.
Fleumer contends that Hix executed the alleged will in West Virginia,
had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West
Virginia govern.
ISSUE:
Whether the alleged will may be admitted to probate
RULING:
No. Fluemer failed to comply with the law. The Philippine courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice laws of the various States of
the American Union. They must be proved as facts. The
requirements of the law were not met.
● No showing that the book from which an extract was
taken was printed or published under the authority of the
State of West Virginia.
● The extract from the law was not attested by the
certificate of the officer having charge of the original,
under the seal of the State of West Virginia.
● No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from
the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the
alleged will was executed.
The due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence
is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. There was nothing
to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the
presence of two competent witnesses, or that these witnesses
subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other
as the law of West Virginia requires.
It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator
had his domicile in West Virginia and not in the Philippines.
4 – Manuela Barretto Gonzalez vs. Augusto Gonzalez
G.R. No. L-37048 | March 7, 1933 | Hull, J.
FACTS:
· Manuela and Augusto are citizens of the Philippines
and residents of Manila. They were married in Manila
in 1919, and lived together as man and wife until
1926. They voluntarily separated and since that time
have not lived together as man and wife.
· Of this union, 4 children were born who are now 11,
10, 8 and 6. Negotiations between the parties
continued for several months, where it was mutually
agreed to give Manuela support for her and her
children of 500 pesos, and the amount will increase in
case of illness or necessity, and the title of certain
properties to be put in her name.
· Shortly after this agreement, Augusto left the
Philippines and moved to Nevada, He secured an
absolute divorce on the ground of desertion, and was
granted. He then moved to California, and moved
back to the Philippines after 1 year.
· On the same date that he secured a divorce, he
married another Filipino citizen and had 3 children.
He also reduced the support of Manuela and the
children and has not made payments fixed in the
divorce as alimony.
· Shortly after his return, Manuela brought an action
before CFI Manila requesting to ratify the divorce
decree and enfore section 9 of Act No. 2710, which
reads as follows:
The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of
property as soon as such decree becomes final, but shall
not dissolve the bonds of matrimony until one year
thereafter.
The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as
dissolved with regard to the spouse who, having legitimate
children, has not delivered to each of them or to the
guardian appointed by the court, within said period of one
year, the equivalent of what would have been due to them
as their legal portion if said spouse had died intestate
immediately after the dissolution of the community of
property.
· It was also prayed to deliver to the guardian ​ad litem
the equivalent of what would have been due to their
children as their legal portion from the respective
estates. had their parents did intestate on November
28, 1927.
· Further, it is also prayed that the community existing
between Manuela and Augusto be declared dissolved
and Augusto be ordered to render an accounting and
 to deliver to Manuela her share of the community
property, that Augusto be ordered to pay the
alimony.
· A guardian ​ad litem was appointed for the minor
children, and they appear as intervenors and join
their mother in these proceedings.
· CFI granted judgment in favor of Manuela
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the CFI erred in not declaring that paragraph
2 of section 9 of the Philippine Divorce Law, is unconstitutional, null
and void.
HELD: ​While the parties in this action are in dispute over financial
matters, they are in unity in trying to secure the courts of this
jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the Reno divorce. On the
record here presented, this can not be done. The public policy in this
jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly set forth in Act No.
2710,
The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation
until the case was submitted to this court, in which they all prayed
that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a
purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding
divorce and to secure for themselves a change of status for reasons
and under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times the
matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine
Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the
husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide
residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that
State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which he had entered in
1919. While the decisions of this court in refusing to recognize the
validity of foreign divorce has usually been expressed in the negative
and have been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or
collusion, we have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code
now in force in these Islands.
Article 9 thereof reads as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity or persons, are binding
upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign
country.
And article 11, the last part of which reads:
. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and
their property, and those intended to promote public
order and good morals, shall nor be rendered without
effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything
done or any agreements entered into a foreign country.
It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce
relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this
jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which
the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a divorce. The lower
court in granting relief as prayed for frankly stated that the securing
of the divorce, the contracting of another marriage and the bringing
into the world of innocent children brings about such a condition
that the court must grant relief. The hardships of the existing
divorce laws of the Philippine Islands are well known to the
members of the Legislature. It is of no moment in this litigation what
he personal views of the writer on the subject of divorce may be. It
is the duty of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by
the Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say
that such laws are too strict or too liberal.
Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts to approve
of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the citizens
of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts in a
manner which our Government believes is contrary to public order
and good morals. Holding the above views it becomes unnecessary
to discuss the serious constitutional question presented by appellant
in his first assignment of error.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila
must therefore be reversed and defendant absolved from the
demands made against him in this action.
5. Arca v. Javier, 50 O.G. 3538 (1954)
Facts:
● Salud Arca and Alfredo Javier were married in Manila.
They begot one child named Alfredo Javier Junior. In 1938,
Alfredo left for the US to serve the US Navy. Salud stayed
with her in-laws but she did not get along with them so
she left her in-laws’s house.
● This caused a strain on the relationship of Salud and
Alfredo. Alfredo then filed for divorce in Mobile County,
State of Alabama. Salud answered the complaint for
divorce and claimed that Alfredo cannot file the complaint
since he was not a resident of that state 12 months before
the filing of the petition and that Alfredo was a resident of
Cavite.
● Salud also alleged that it was not true that it was her
action of leaving the home of her in laws that is a sufficient
ground to file a divorce on the ground of desertion. It was
Alfredo who had to leave since he was already enlisted in
the US Naval Force.
● The Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama granted the
complaint for divorce. Alfredo then married Thelma
Francis who was an american citizen but Thelma later on
obtained a divorce.
● Alfredo returned to the Philippines and then he married
Maria Odvina. Salud then filed a complaint for bigamy
against Alfredo. The CFI acquitted Alfredo since it
recognized the divorce decree obtained by Alfredo from
Mobile County.
Issue: ​WON the divorce decree obtained by Alfredo have a valid
effect in the Philippines
Held: ​No.
The foreign court was not able to obtain jurisdiction over the person
of Salud. It is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce
case instituted at the Mobile County in view of the summons served
upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action cannot be interpreted as
placing her under the jurisdiction of the court because its only
purpose was to impugn the claim of appellant that his domicile or
legal residence at that time was Mobile County, and to show that
the ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless and false. Such
answer should be considered as a special appearance the purpose of
which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over the case.
It cannot be said that the Mobile County Court of Alabama had
acquired jurisdiction over the case for the simple reason that at the
time it was filed appellant's legal residence was then in the
Philippines. He could not have acquired legal residence or domicile
at Mobile County when he moved to that place in 1938 because at
that time he was still in the service of the U.S. Navy and merely
rented a room where he used to stay during his occasional shore
leave for shift duty. That he never intended to live there
permanently is shown by the fact that after his marriage to Thelma
Francis in 1941, he moved to New York where he bought a house
and a lot, and after his divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his
retirement from the U.S. Navy, he returned to the Philippines and
married Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite, where he lived ever since. It
may therefore be said that appellant went to Mobile County, not
with the intention of permanently residing there, or of considering
that place as his permanent abode, but for the sole purpose of
obtaining divorce from his wife. Such residence is not sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on the court.
Private International Law prohibits the extension of a foreign
judgment, or the law affecting the same, if it is contrary to the law
or fundamental policy of the State of the forum. It is also in keeping
with our concept or moral values which has always looked upon
marriage as an institution. And such concept has actually crystallized
in a more tangible manner when in the new Civil Code our people,
through Congress, decided to eliminate altogether our law relative
to divorce. Because of such concept we cannot but react adversely
to any attempt to extend here the effect of a decree which is not in
consonance with our customs, morals, and traditions.
6. Wong Woo Yui v. Vivo, 13 SCRA 552 (1965)
Facts:
1. ​The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision
finding petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Blas and
admitting her into the country as a non-quota immigrant, which
was later on affirmed by the Board of Commissioners.
2. However, the same Board, composed of a new set of
members, reversed BSI No. 3 and ordered petitioner to be
excluded from the country.
3. ​Petitioner filed a motion for new trial but the same was
denied for lack of merit. She then filed the instant petition for
mandamus with preliminary injunction (considered as
certiorari) before the Manila CFI.
4. After the respondents filed their answer and the parties
submitted a written stipulation of facts, the court ​a quo
declared valid the original decision and restrained respondents
from excluding petitioner from the country. Respondents
interposed the present appeal.
5. ​It appears from the BSI proceeding that petitioner declared
that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time to
join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was married in
Chingkang, China on January 15, 1929; ​that their marriage was
celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader​; that the new set
of Board of Commissioners found that petitioner’s claim was
without basis, it appearing that in the entry proceedings of
Perfecto Blas had on January 23, 1947 he declared that he first
visited China in 1935 and married petitioner in 1936, it could
not possibly sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in
1929; that in an affidavit dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto Blas
claimed that he went to China in 1929, 1935 and 1941,
although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he first
went to China in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939, and lastly in
1941; and that Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit likewise
claimed that he first went to China when he was merely four
years old so that computed from his date of birth in 1908 it
must have been in 1912.
Issue: W/N petitioner presented sufficient proof to support fact of
her marriage and can thus be admitted as non-quota immigrant in
the country?
Held:
No. A lot of discrepancies were found in the statements made by
petitioner and her alleged husband in the investigations conducted
by the immigration authorities. Also, the only basis in support of
petitioner’s claim that she is Blas’ wife is a mass of oral and
documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife
relationship.
Article 15 of our new Civil Code also provides that ​laws relating to
family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is well-known
that in 1929 in order that a ​marriage celebrated in the Philippines
may be valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any court
inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a priest or
minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the
Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even if
we assume, therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto
Blas before a village leader is valid in China, the same is not one of
those authorized in our country.
But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No.
68, as reproduced in Section 19 of Act No. 3613, which is now ​Article
71 of our new Civil Code, a marriage contracted outside of the
Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which it
was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. But no validity can be
given to this contention because no proof was presented relative to
the law of marriage in China. Such being the case, we should apply
the general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a foreign
country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own.
Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of
the officers mentioned therein, and a village leader is not one of
them, it is clear that petitioner’s marriage, even if true, cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction.
Decision appealed from reversed.
7. Tenchavez v. Escano, G.R. No. L-19671 (29 November 1965)
15 SCRA 355
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino
Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with
Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer
before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a
culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered
in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their
match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship
with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where
she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to
renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s
parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad
, he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with
her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and
when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a
complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved
and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada.
She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the
Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an
American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired
citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against
Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded
Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and
binding upon courts of the Philippines.
HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine
courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of
the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of
rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The
adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is
enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In
the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married.
A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not
entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee
entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and
securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the
other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as
follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a
decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages
and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee,
Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena
Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
8. Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139 (1985)
FACTS: ​Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent, RIchard Upton, is a citizen of the United States; that
they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage,
they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot
two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United
States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that
petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a
conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be
ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared
as the administrator of the said property.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim
on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he
made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that
they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not
established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is
barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the
Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine
whether the property relations between petitioner and private
respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or
upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada
divorce of the parties.
ISSUE: ​Whether the Nevada divorce is valid
HELD: Yes. There can be no question as to the validity of the Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the US. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. Owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the
petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of
the petitioner. He has no standing to sue as husband of the
petitioner over their conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own
representation before his own country's court from asserting that
right to exercise control over their conjugal assets.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109 of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.
Petition Granted.
Note: This case was decided before August 3, 1988 when the
Family Code took effect. It became the basis for the codification of
Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
9. De Leon v. CA, 186 SCRA 347 (1990)
SYLVIA LICHAUCO DE LEON,​ ​petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MACARIA DE LEON AND JOSE
VICENTE DE LEON,​ ​respondents.
G.R. No. 80965| June 6, 1990 | MEDIALDEA, J.
Topic: Marriage
FACTS:
● 1969: Private respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and
petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were united in wedlock
before the Municipal Mayor of Binangonan, Rizal.
● 1971: A child named Susana L. De Leon was born from this
union.
● 1972: A de facto separation between the spouses occured
due to irreconcilable marital differences, with Sylvia
leaving the conjugal home.
● 1973: Sylvia went to the United States where she obtained
American citizenship. Same year, she field for divorce as
well as claims for support and distribution of properties
before the Superior Court of California.
○ However, that since Jose Vicente was then a
Philippine resident and did not have any assets
in the US, Sylvia chose to hold in abeyance the
divorce proceedings, and rather concentrated
her efforts to obtain property settlements with
Jose Vicente in the Philippines.
 ● 1977: Sylvia succeeded in entering into a
Letter-Agreement with her mother-in-law, private
respondent Macaria De Leon
○ Letter was a contractual undertaking in
consideration for a peaceful and amicable
termination of relations of the spouses, whereby
it obligates Jose Vicente to adjudicate certain
properties and sum of money to petitioner Sylvia
Lichauco De Leon. It also stated the obligations
of wife Sylvia
○ Par. 4 of letter states:
4.) This contract is intended to be applicable both in the Republic of
the Philippines and in the United States of America. It is agreed that
this will constitute an actionable document in both jurisdictions and
the parties herein waive their right to object to the use of this
document in the event a legal issue should arise relating to the
validity of this document. In the event of a dispute, this letter is
subject to interpretation under the laws of California, U.S.A
● In the same year, Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal a joint petition for
judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal
partnership
● 1980: After ex-parte hearings, the trial court issued an
Order approving the petition
● Jose Vicente moved for a reconsideration of the order
alleging that Sylvia made a verbal reformation of the
petition as there was no such agreement for the payment
of monthly support to commence from the alleged date of
separation in 1973 and that there was no notice given to
him that Sylvia would attempt verbal reformation of the
agreement contained in the joint petition
○ While pending resolution of MR, Macaria filed a
motion for leave to intervene alleging that she is
the owner of the properties involved in the case
and assailed the validity and legality of the
Letter-Agreement
● Trial Court: declared null and void the letter agreement
and affirmed the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
the spouses
● CA: affirmed
● On appeal, Sylvia insists that the consideration for her
execution of the Letter-Agreement was the termination of
property relations with her husband. On the other hand,
Macaria and Jose Vicente assert that the consideration
was the termination of marital relationship.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the Letter-Agreement is valid- NO
HELD:
(1) YES; Petition Denied and decision of CA Affirmed.
· This Court finds and holds that the cause or consideration for
the intervenor Macaria De Leon in having executed Letter
Agreement was the termination of the marital relationship
between her son Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia Lichauco de
Leon.
· In page two of the letter agreement, the parties contemplated
not only to agree to a judicial separation of property of the
spouses but likewise to continue with divorce proceedings. If
taken with the apparently ambiguous provisions regarding
termination of 'relations', ​the parties clearly contemplated not
only the termination of property relationship but likewise of
marital relationship in its entirety.
· Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms, and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy.
· If the stipulation is contrary to law, morals or public policy, the
contract is void and inexistent from the beginning:
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the
beginning:
Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy;
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
· These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set
up the defense of illegality be waived. But marriage is not a
mere contract but a sacred social institution. Thus, Art. 52 of
the Civil Code provides:
Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social
institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulations.​..
· From the foregoing provisions of the New Civil Code, this court
is of the considered opinion and so holds that intervenor's
undertaking under Exhibit 'E' (letter agreement) premised on
the termination of marital relationship is not only contrary to
law but contrary to Filipino morals and public Policy. As such,
any agreement or obligations based on such unlawful
consideration and which is contrary to public policy should be
deemed null and void.
· Additionally, Article 191 of the Civil Case contemplates
properties belonging to the spouses and not those belonging to
a third party, who, in the case at bar., is Macaria. In the petition
for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, it was made to
appear that the said properties are conjugal in nature.
However, Macaria was able to prove that the questioned
properties are owned by her.
[Other Discussions]
· Assuming arguendo that the consideration of the
Letter-Agreement was the termination of property relations, he
agreement nevertheless is void because it contravenes the
following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and
wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property between husband and wife;
DISPOSITIVE:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated June 30, 1987 and its resolution
dated November 24, 1987 are AFFIRMED.
10. HERALD BLACK DACASIN vs SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN
GR No. 168785| February 5, 2010 | Carpio, J. | I.E.B.Z.
DOCTRINE:
Separated parents cannot contract away the provisions of the Family
Code on the maternal custody of children below seven years.
FACTS:
On April 1994, petitioner and respondent got married here in the
Philippines. The following year respondent got pregnant and gave
birth to a baby girl whom they named Stephanie.
In June of 1999 respondent sought and obtained from the Illinois
Court a divorce decree against petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois
court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded
to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction
over the case for enforcement purposes.
On January 28 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a
contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie. Two years
after, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City. Petitioner claimed that respondent exercised sole
custody over Stephanie. Respondent sought the dismissal of the
complaint due to lack of jurisdiction, since Illinois Court hold the
jurisdiction in enforcing the divorce decree.
RTC:
The RTC sustained Sharon’s motion and dismissed Herald’s
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance
over the suit considering the Illinois court's retention of jurisdiction
to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole
custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is
binding on petitioner following the "nationality rule" prevailing in
this jurisdiction; 5 and (3) the Agreement is void for
contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code 6
prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the Trial Court have the jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
YES. The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's suit but
not to enforce the Agreement which is void.
At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, ​statutory law
vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over
civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for
specific performance, such as petitioner's suit to enforce the
Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions.
Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court​.
The Illinois Court did not strip the RTC of its jurisdiction over the
case. What the Illinois court retained was "jurisdiction for the
purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of its
Judgment for Dissolution."
Petitioner's suit seeks the enforcement not of the "various
provisions" of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement
on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the
Illinois court's so-called "retained jurisdiction."
OTHER ISSUE:
Whether the agreement or contract is valid?
HELD:
NO. The trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is contrary
to law.
Under Art. 213 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, it states that “no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother.”
And at the time that the Dacasins entered into the agreement,
Stephanie was still below seven-years-old.
Clearly then, the Agreement's object to establish a post-divorce joint
custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child
under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
Also, at the time of the writing of this SC decision, Stephanie is
already 15 years of age. Hence, removing the case outside of the
ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213
and bringing it within coverage of the default standard on child
custody proceedings — the best interest of the child.
The SC suggests that the Dacasins take advantage of the RTC’s
jurisdiction to decide as to who has legal custody of Stephanie.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23
June 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The
case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this
ruling.
11. Yao Kee, et al. v. Sy-Gonzales, G.R. No. L-55960 November 24,
1988
Doctrine: Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They
must be alleged and proved as any other fact.
Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in Caloocan City where he was then
residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the
Philippines.
Aida Sy-Gonzales together with her siblings, in said petition alleged
among others that, they are the children of the deceased with
Asuncion Gillego.
They do not recognize Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation
of her children to him; and they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the
deceased.
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee together with his children
alleged that she is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on in
China and has legitimate children. Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among
them and is competent to become the administratrix of the estate of
Sy Kiat.
After hearing, the probate court held if favor of the oppositors and
appointed Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix of the intestate estate
of the deceased.
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that
of the probate court
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita
Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the
deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman with
whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for
many years.chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun
Yen, the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with
his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of
the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China had not been
proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese People’s Republic of
China.
Sze Sook Wah was appointed by the lower court of as judicial
administratrix of the estate of the deceased.
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration,
which was however denied by respondent court. They thus
interposed their respective appeals to this Court.
Issues:
1st Issue:
Whether or not THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE has BEEN
PROVEN VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
❖ Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in
accordance with Chinese law and custom was conclusively
proven.
❖ Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat in
Fookien, China ​that she does not have a marriage
certificate because the practice during that time was for
elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and
in her case, her elder brother was the one who
contracted or entered into an agreement with the
parents of her husband; that the agreement was that she
and Sy Kiat would be married.
❖ She and Sy Kiat were married for 46 years already and the
document was left in China and she doubt if that
document can still be found now.
❖ They lived immediately together as husband and wife
❖ The certification issued in Manila by the Embassy of the
People’s Republic of China to the effect that "according to
the information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a
Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also
Chinese were married in Fukien, the People’s Republic of
China"
❖ They presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that
matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by the contracting
parties constitute the essential requisite for a marriage to
be considered duly solemnized in China.
Ruling:
No.
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between
Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish
the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or
custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts,
uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory"
On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom
as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice
unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence
like any other fact"
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish
a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the
alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of
Court. With respect to an unwritten foreign law, ​Rule 130 section 45
states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law. — The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled
therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign
country, as are also printed and published books of reports of
decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be
commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for
under Rule 132 section 25,
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an
entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence
like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written
foreign law
In the case at bar ​petitioners did not present any competent
evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The
testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of
China’s law or custom on marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing
that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For
failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the
validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.
Petitioners have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or
custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was
celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy
Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
2nd Issue:
II. Whether or not RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA
SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY KIAT
WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO
No
As petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat
according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status
of legitimate children but only that of acknowledged natural
children. Petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at the
time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified
by any impediment to marry one another
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased’s
acknowledged natural children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with
whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years with out the benefit of
marriage. They have in their favor their father’s acknowledgment,
evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and
between their parents and approved by the Court of First Instance
wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowledged them as his children by
Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and
future inheritance.
Accordingly, this Court finds no reversible error committed by
respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED
12. Eugenio v. Hon. Velez (RTC Judge Cagayan de Oro City), 185
SCRA 435 (1990)
FACTS: ​This case stemmed from a petition for habeas corpus filed by
Private Respondents Vargases (full blood bros and sissies of Vitaliana
Vargas) in September 27, 1988, to have her released by Tomas
Eugenio. The Vargases alleged that Vitaliana was forcibly taken by
Eugenio and was locked up in his residence in Misamis Oriental.
However, Vitaliana had already died back in August 28, 1988, thus,
despite of the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, it was returned
unsatisfied as Eugenio refused to surrender Vitaliana’s body because
a corpse cannot be a subject of habeas corpus proceedings and he
had already obtained the permits needed for Vitaliana’s burial.
● Eugenio then filed an urgent motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction for a petition for habeas
corpus only extends to cases of illegal
confinement/detention of a live person.
The Vargases amended their petition and claimed that they were the
ones of duty to bury her and as legal custodians and next of kin, they
should have the body of their sister.
● An exchange of pleadings ensued and a motion
to dismiss was finally submitted for resolution.
● Judge Velez viewed the coffin in which Vitaliana
was placed and moved for the denial of
Eugenio’s motion to dismiss and held that since
Vitaliana was already dead on August 28, 1988,
but only revealed to the court on September 29,
1988, it may entertain through the ​allegations in
the body of the petition on the determination as
to who is entitled to the custody of the dead
body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the
burial or interment (Sec. 19, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129).
● Judge Velez treated the petition as an action for
custody of a dead body WITHOUT the Vargases’
filing of a separate civil action and WITHOUT
dismissing the first petition for habeas corpus
that was filed; granted the Vargases the custody
of Vitaliana’s dead body.
Petition for review with application for a TRO and/or PI was filed by
Eugenio and was followed by another petition which he filed as well,
hence, the consolidation of cases.
● Eugenio failed to substantiate his claim over jthe
custody of Vitaliana’s dead body.
ISSUES:
1. Whether RTC has jurisdiction over proceedings concerning
an action for custody/possession/authority to bury the
deceased/recovery of the dead;
2. Whether Eugenio, as a common law spouse, has the right
to have custody of Vitaliana’s dead body and bury the
same.
HELD:
1. YES​, ​Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court, the writ of ​habeas corpus may be granted by a
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an
elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not the
caption of the complaint or petition; but the allegations
therein determine the nature of the action, and even
without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may
nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in
the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant.
2. NO​, while it is true that our laws do not just brush aside
the fact that such common law relationships are present in
our society, and that they produce a community of
properties and interests which is governed by law,
authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of
co-ownership requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. In any case, Eugenio r has a subsisting marriage
with another woman, a legal impediment which
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
Thus, the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was
correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters
(the Vargases).
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial​.
— The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased
person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense
thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow
specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or
woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall
devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be
adults and within the Philippines and in possession of
sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.
13. Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 (31
May 1991)
Facts
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William
Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native
born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother,
Marciana Gatchalian . Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board,
Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has five (5) children with his
wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian,
Francisco Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor,
arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco,
and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them
Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine
Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature
of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and
sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the
daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while
William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco. After investigation,
the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision admitting
William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens. As a
consequence thereof, William Gatchalian was issued Identification
Certificate by the immigration authorities on August 16, 1961.
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued
Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting to have
been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on
review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The
same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to review
all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant
was a Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William and
others.
On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review
motu proprio of the proceedings had in the Board of Special Inquiry,
reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of,
among others, respondent Gatchalian. A warrant of exclusion also
dated July 6, 1962 was issued alleging that "the decision of the
Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become
final and executory.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others
covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for
re- hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportion
case against them was assigned. On March 14, 1973, the Board of
Special Inquiry recommended to the then Acting Commissioner
Victor Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then
Board of Commissioners and the recall of the warrants of arrest
issued therein.
On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order
reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and
recalled the warrant of arrest issued against him.
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of
Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice recommending that
respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by
the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation
of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d) and (e)
of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known as the
Immigration Act of 1940.
On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the
recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of Immigration for
investigation and immediate action.
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation * issued a mission
order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian. The
latter appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990
and was released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash
bond.
CID contended that the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of
consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6,
1962
ISSUE​:
WON the arrest of the respondent is valid
HELD:
No, Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended,
otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940, reads:
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant
of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant
of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the
Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien.
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of
implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens
are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue
warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien.
In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a
final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as
in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional.
As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he
constitution does not distinguish warrants between a criminal case
and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having
committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable
cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a
violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is
not indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of
investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest
is to determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it cannot
pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same
(Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).
A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates that the same was
issued only for purposes of investigation of the suspects, William
Gatchalian included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order directs
the Intelligence Agents/Officers to:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of the Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para.
a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code;
xxx xxx xxx
3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately
conduct custodial interrogation, after warning the suspect that he
has a right to remain silent and a right to counsel; . . .
Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was
based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion has
obviously no leg to stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest
made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final order
of deportation or warrant of exclusion.
Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that
respondent's arrest came twenty-eight (28) years after the alleged
cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act
states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in
the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the
cause of deportation arises.
In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and
deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962. However, the
warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner
Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after. It is clear
that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by their
inaction could not now be validly enforced by petitioners against
respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of
exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the
Identification certificate of respondent, among others, was
revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner
Nituda.
Relevant argument of petitioners: Santiago Gatchalian’s
(grandfather) marriage with Chiu Gim Tee in China as well as
Francisco’s (father) marriage to Ong Chiu Kiok in China were not
supported by any evidence other than their own self-serving
testimony nor was there any showing of what laws of China were.
There being no showing of validity, they cannot be considered valid.
Therefore, citizenship of illegitimate children follow their Chinese
mothers’.
Issue​:
Whether the marriages are valid (YES)
Held​:
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim
and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, this Court held that in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed
to be the same as those of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating
to marriage, there arises the
presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law.
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to
the rule that a
marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere.
Referring to marriages
contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the
Family Code) provides that
"(a)ll marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force
in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this
country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial
unity and the extent as to
how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to the
consequences of the
coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this
manner: "In case of doubt, all
presumptions favor the solidarity of the family.
Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the
legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage,
the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of
defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful
aggression." Bearing in mind the "processual presumption"
enunciated in Miciano And other cases, he who asserts that the
marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to
present the foreign law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on
Santiago Gatchalian
much more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a
twelve-year old minor. The Fact is, as records indicate, Santiago
was not pressed by the Citizenship InvestigationBoard to prove
the laws of China relating to marriage, having been content
with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was
lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China.
Neither was Francisco Gatchalian testimony subjected to the same
scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the
testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian
before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities
regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each other are
not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as statements or
declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of
pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furthermore, this salutary rule of
evidence Hnds support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil
Code Provides: "Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth,
authentic document, Final judgment
or possession of status, legitimate Hliation may be proved by any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws."
Having declared the assailed themarriages as valid, respondent
William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco,
a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn,
is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago
Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose
Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration
In an order dated July 12, 1960. Finally, respondent William
Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated
under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:
"Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: "(1)
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution. . . ." This Forecloses any further
question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William
Gatchalian.
14. San Luis vs. San Luis 514 SCRA 294 (2007)
Doctrine​: ​Foreign divorce decree must be proven that they are
validly obtained under foreign laws.
FACTS:
● Involves settlement of estate of Felicisimo who contracted
3 marriages during his lifetime.
1​st​ marriage is with Sulit but she predeceased him
2​nd marriage is with Corwin celebrated in the US. Corwin
obtained divorce decree which was granted.
3​rd​ marriage is with Felicidad celebrated in LA.
● With that, Felicidad petitioned for letters of administration
of Estate before RTC Makati even though they live in
Alabang.
● Petitioner, as one of the heirs in 1​st marriage, moved to
dismiss Felicidad’s petition on the grounds of improper
venue and failure to state cause of action. He argued that
○ The proceedings should be filed in Laguna since
that was where the decedent last resided and
○ Felicidad has no legal personality because her
marriage was invalid, being Felicisimo still
married to Corwin
● RTC ruled in favor of Felicidad. This decision was
reinstated by CA.
ISSUES and HELD:
1. Whether venue is improperly laid - NO
○ Settlement of estate must be made at the place where the
decedent last resided if he is a resident. Resides mean the
actual and physical presence in the place. In this case,
 there were sufficient evidence proving that Felicisimo last
resided in Alabng before his demise. Among the evidence
presented are: Hospital billings indicating his address to be
Alabang, Membership on Alabang Villag Assoc and Ayala
Country club, Calling cards of deceased.
2. Whether Felicidad has legal capacity to petition for letters of
administration – YES under ROC but it cannot yet be
determined if she has legal capacity by virtue of their
marriage
○ Even though the 3​rd marriage was celebrated before
Family Code retroactivity must apply to Article 26, which
entitled a Filipino spouse to remarry after the alien
obtained divorce decree.
○ A foreign divorce decree is recognized here in the
Philippines so that the Filipino spouse would not be left
without remedy or choice. Making therefore the Filipino
spouse capacitated to remarry under Philippine laws.
○ This is pursuant to a non-discrimination principle. And
so, although Articles 15 and 17 of NCC which declares
divorce void under Philippine laws, Article 26 FC and
jurisprudence provided otherwise.
○ HOWEVER, foreign laws need be proven to attest that
foreign divorce decree is valid thereunder. Thus, this
case is remanded to trial court so that evidence may be
received to that effect.
○ NONETHELESS, even tho divorce of 2​nd marriage not
proven so as to render marriage to Felicidad valid, she is
still an interested person under ROC entitled to issuance
of letters of administration. This is premised on Article
148 FC which governs property relations of couples living
together but incapacitated to marry. During their
cohabitation, their properties are jointly owned by them.
And so, Felicidad is treated a co-owner of Felicisimo’s
properties.
PETITION DENIED
15 Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989
FACTS
Petitioner Imelda Pilapil (Filipino) and respondent Erich Geiling
(German) were married in Germany in 1979. Thereafter, marital
discord set in, followed by a separation ​de facto ​between them.
After about 3 ½ years of marriage, respondent initiated a divorce
proceeding against petition in Germany claiming failure of marriage.
This was granted.
More than five months after the divorce decree, respondent filed 2
complaints for adultery before City Fiscal of Manila alleging that,
while still married to him, petitioner had an affair with certain
William Chia in 1982 and Jesus Chua in 1983. Information were later
filed.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information for lack of
jurisdiction. Denied.
Hence, this SCA to annul the order of the lower court denying the
motion to quash on ground that court is without jurisdiction “to try
and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted ​de officio​, since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a
final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the
criminal complaint.
ISSUE
Whether respondent has capacity to sue even if at the time he filed
the complaint, he was already divorced petitioner
HELD
No.
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery, as well as four
other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a
sworn written complaint filed by the ​offended spouse​, ​and nobody
else​. ​Such is jurisdiction and not merely a formal requirement.
Unlike offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness where there is a specific provision on which allows
other person to file and prosecute, no provision relates to adultery
and concubinage. Thus, only the offended spouse, and no other, is
authorized by law to initiate the action.
Corollary to this, it is necessarily follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time
of the filing of the criminal action. This is an express rule in civil
actions. Lack of legal capacity to sue is a ground for a motion to
dismiss.
Absence of explicit rule in criminal case does not prevent the
application. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary
since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced
by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended
party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the
so-called “private crimes”, or those which cannot be prosecuted​de
oficio, ​and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the
offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right
to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter
exclusively within his power and option.
Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship
is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action
for adultery. This is a logical consequence since the ​raison d'etre ​of
said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended
party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the
time of the filing of the criminal case.
Case at bar, respondent has no more standing
The status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be
determined as of the time the complaint was filed. After a divorce
has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to
institute proceedings against the offenders.
Here, said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he
obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage
vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.

Reversed. Quashed.
16. Roeher vs. Rodriguez GR No. 142820, June 20, 2003
DOCTRINE: ​As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners
in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal
effects thereof, ​e.g. ​on custody, care and support of the children,
must still be determined by our courts.
FACTS
● Petitioner Wolfgang O Roehr, a German citizen and
resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen
Rodriguez, a Filipina, in Hamburg, Germany.
● Their marriage was subsequently ratified on Feb. 14, 1981
in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union, Carolynne
and Alexandra Kristine was born.
● Private respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage before RTC Makati.
● A motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioner, but was
denied by the RTC. Petitioner’s MR was also denied. Upon
appeal to the CA, the CA denied the petition and
remanded the case to RTC.
● Meanwhile, petitioner (father) obtained a decree of
divorce from CFI of Hamburg-Blankenese. The parental
custody of the children is granted to the father.
● By virtue of the said decree, petitioner (father) filed a 2nd
motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter as the decree of
divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the
marriage of petitioner and respondent.
● Judge Guevarra-Salonga issued an order granting the
motion to dismiss, while the private respondent (mother)
filed a motion for partial reconsideration with a prayer to
determine the issues of custody and distribution of
properties between petitioner and respondent.
● Respondent judge issued an order granting the prayer of
private respondent to tackle issues of property relations,
support, and custody of their children.
● Hence, this petition. Petitioner alleges lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the trial court.
Issue: W/N a trial court has no jurisdiction due to the fact of the
divorce decree validly obtained abroad; hence will constitute res
judicata.
Held: No.
In ​Garcia v. Recio, Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., ​and ​Llorente v. Court of
Appeals, ​we consistently held that ​a divorce obtained abroad by an
alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
Relevant to the present case is ​Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, ​where this
Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a
German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. We
held in ​Pilapil ​that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated
December 16, 1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties.
In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court
recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing
private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present
controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two
children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other
countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects
thereof, ​e.g. ​on custody, care and support of the children, must
still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the
effect of ​res judicata ​to a foreign judgment, such as the award of
custody to petitioner by the German court, ​it must be shown that
the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do ​so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50
of the Rules of Court.
Under the Rules of Court, in actions in personam, a foreign judgment
merely constitutes prima facie evidence of justness of claim of a
party and is subject to proof to the contrary.
In the present case, it cannot be said that the private respondent
was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German
court so that there is basis for declaring that the judgment as res
judicata as regards to the rights of petitioner to have parental
custody of their 2 children.
Furthermore, the proceedings in the German court were summary.
Neither does the divorce decree states that she had commented nor
given her opinion to the Social Services Office. Also, private
respondent had no counsel to assist her in the saif proceedings.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody
of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for
hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support
and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in
consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code
that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all
questions concerning his care and custody.
On the matter of property relations, the parties admitted in their
pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent
judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a
matter no longer deemed in controversy.
In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine
the issue regarding the custody of the two children born of the
union between petitioner and private respondent. Private
respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the
matter of property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.
17. Corpuz vs. Sto. Ytomas (626 SCRA 266 (2010)
GR No. 186571 | August 11, 2010 | J. Brion | Manao
DOCTRINE: An alien spouse may only file a judicial recognition of
divorce under Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. He cannot file
one under Art. 26 of the Family Code.
FACTS:
● Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship.
● Gerbert married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina.
● Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert
left for Canada soon after the wedding.
● He returned to the Philippines sometime to surprise
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man.
● Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and
filed a petition for divorce.
● Superior Court of Justice, Canada: Granted the petition.
● 2 years after, Gerbert has moved on and has found
another Filipina to love.
 ● Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved
● RTC: Denied the petition.
○ Explanation: Gerbert was not the proper party to
institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. Only the Filipino spouse can
avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph
of Art. 26, par. 2 of the Family Code.
RELEVANT ISSUE: ​Whether or not Gerbert may file a petition for
judicial recognition of divorce:
(1) Under Art. 26, par. 2 of the Family Code?
(2) Under other laws?
HELD:
(1) NO. Only Filipinos may file a petition for judicial
recognition of divorce under Art. 26, par. 2 of the Family
Code.
● The resolution of the issue requires a review of the
legislative history and intent behind Art. 26, par. 2.
○ Our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens. ​Divorce is
possible, however, in marriages between a
Filipino and an alien. Thus, there can be the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
Former President Cory Aquino amended Art. 26,
par. 2 of the Family Code to avoid this situation.
Said provision reads:
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Essentially, it provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to
the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry. ​The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse.
● Given the rationale and intent behind Art. 26, par. 2
of the Family Code, only the Filipino spouse can
invoke said Article of the Family Code; the alien
spouse can claim no right under this provision. The
RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
provision to Filipinos.
(2) YES. Gerbert may file a petition for judicial recognition of
the divorce under Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
● The said Section provides:
“SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. --
The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of
a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
xxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.”
● Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our
courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In
this case, therefore, Gerbert has legal standing to
institute a judicial recognition for his divorce.
● For recognition of divorce, however, the divorce must
be valid according to the national law of the alien. In
this case, Gerbert failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce.
DISPOSITIVE: ​Remanded to RTC to ascertain whether or not the
divorce is consistent with Canadian law.
18. Fujiki vs. Marinay GR No. 196049
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. ​MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, et.
al., ​RESPONDENTS.
Topic:​ Family Law
Doctrine:​ ​All bold in Held.
Facts:
1. Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines. The marriage did not sit well with Fujiki’s parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually,
they lost contact with each other.
2. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married in Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
3. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Marinay obtained a judgment
from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
4. Fujiki filed a petition for “Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).", praying that
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void
ab initio ​under the Family Code of the PH and (3) to direct the Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the foreign judgment on
the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the NSO.
5. The RTC dismissed the petition, stating that it was in
“gross violation” of Sec. 2[1] and 4[2] of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). It ruled that only “the husband or wife”
(either Maekera or Marinay), can file the petition to declare the
marriage void, and not Fujiki.
6. Fujiki moved to reconsider, arguing that A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC does not apply as it only applies to ordinary civil actions
for declaration of nullity of marriage, and the case he filed is a
special proceeding. Fujiki also argued that Sec. 2 only applies to void
marriages on the ground of psych incapacity. Applying the rule that
“a petition may only be filed by the husband or wife” in a bigamy
case would be absurd as only the guilty parties would be permitted
to sue.
7. RTC denied the MR, stating that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applies since the petition filed, in effect, prays for a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage. And under such law, Fujiki is considered
a “third person” in the proceeding since he was not the husband in
the decree of divorce issue by the Japanese court; hence, he lacks
personality to sue/file the petition. The RTC also held that under
Braza v The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, the trial court
has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages in a special proceeding for
correction of entry under Rule 108.
8. Upon direction of the Court, the SolGen filed its comment
and agreed with the petition, arguing that Fujiki, as the spouse of
the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage void. It contended that the petition to recognize
the Japanese court’s judgment may be made in a Rule 109
proceeding, as its object is precisely to establish a status or right of a
party or a particular fact. It also argued that the law requires the
entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status. Since the
Japanese court’s judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen, it should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108
proceeding.
Issue/s: [​included all the issues since one way or another, it touches
upon foreign judgments on divorce]
1. W/N A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable
2. W/N a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the
ground of bigamy
3. W/N the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108.
Held: No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where on of t he parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Also, the
rule that only husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason is bigamy.
A.M No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable in this case
1. For foreign courts to recognize a foreign judgment, the
petition only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact,
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment.
2. To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable is absurd
as it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is to limit repetitive litigation
on claims and issues.
3. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws. This is the rule of ​lex nationalii ​in private
international law, as embodied by Art. 15 of the Civil Code[3]. Thus,
the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the
status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
4. A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court
of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment ​as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.
5. The court merely exercises limited review on foreign
judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a
Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its
merits, ​i.e​. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."[4]
6. There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply
prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy.
While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under the
Family Code.
Fujiki has personality to file the petition to recognize the Japanese
court’s judgement
1. Once the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires
proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108. As correctly noted by the SolGen, "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."
2. There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also
no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a
bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the
public record of his marriage.
3. Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a
public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and
prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action, there is
more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife
of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the
public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
4. When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is
violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore
interested in the judgment of the suit. Being a real party in
interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void.
The RTC can recognize the petition in this case
1. In ​Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental​, this Court held that a "trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Thus, the "validity of marriage[ x x x can be questioned only in
a direct action" to nullify the marriage.
2. However, ​Braza ​does not apply as Braza does not involve a
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
3. In this case, there is neither circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of
the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition
of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and
decided under foreign law.
4. Article 26 of the FC confers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." In ​Republic v. Orbecido​, this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article
26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" under the laws of his or
her country.
5. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under
the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
spouse cannot remarry.
6. Notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment
does not contravene domestic public policy. In the recognition of
foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute
their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law.
7. ​For this purpose, ​Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding
public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party
is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment,
i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the
foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.
8. Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right
becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. Otherwise,
there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.
[1] Sec. 2. Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. –
(a) ​Who may file​. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
[2] Sec. 4. ​Venue​. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of
the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has
been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in
the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
[3] Art. 15. ​"[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
[4] Sec. 48, Rule 39. Xxx ​"the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
19. Ramirez Marcaida vs. Aglubat 21 SCRA 1033 (1962)
G.R. No. L-24006, November 25, 1967
DOCTRINE: ​[Adoption] An adoption created under the law of a
foreign country is entitled to registration in the corresponding civil
register of PH. It is to be understood, however, that the effects of
such adoption shall be governed by the laws of this country.
FACTS:
● Proceedings for adoption started in CFI of Madrid, Spain by
Maria Garnier Garreau (84 yrs old), adopting Josefina Ramirez
Marcaida (55 yrs old), a PH citizen. Both were residents of
Madrid, Spain.
● CFI Madrid granted the application for adoption and gave the
necessary judicial authority, once the judgment becomes final,
to execute the corresponding adoption document pursuant to
Art. 177 of the Civil Code.
○ A deed of adoption was necessary because under Article
177 of the Civil Code of Spain, “the grant by the Judge of
the adoption must be in writing, expressing in it the
conditions, and shall be registered in the corresponding
Civil Registry”
● In compliance, the notarial document of adoption, embodying
the court order of adoption, and where Maria formally adopted
Josefina, was executed before Notary Public Carrasquedo of
Madrid. In that document, Maria Gernier Garreau instituted
Josefina, amongst other conditions as her unique and universal
heir of all present and future assets, rights and actions.
● This escritura de adopcion (deed of adoption) was
authenticated by Philippine Vice Consul Martinez in Madrid,
who issued the corresponding certificate of authentication.
● The Deed of adoption was filed in the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila. The Registrar, however, refused to register
on the ground that under PH law, adoption can only be had
through judicial proceeding. Since the notarial document of
adoption is not a judicial proceeding, it is not entitled to
registration.
● When the Registrar denied the MR, a petition for mandamus
was filed in CFI Manila. CFI dismissed the mandamus, declaring
the escritura de adopcion as not registrable. Hence, petition.
Petitioner’s Contention:
1. Act 3753, Sec. 11 provides that a "civil register is established for
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered,"
amongst others, "(g) adoptions."
2. Art. 407 of PH Civil Code provides that "[t]he following shall be
entered in the civil register: (8) adoptions"
OSG’s Contention:
● The case does not come within the purview of Art. 409 of the
Civil Code, and Sec. 11 of Act 3753. These legal provisions refer
to adoptions effected in PH as they speak of adoption which
shall be registered in the municipality or city where the court
issuing the adoption decree is functioning.
ISSUE: ​WON CFI Manila erred in declaring that 'escritura de
adopcion' is not registrable in the Philippines ​(YES)
HELD:
The aforesaid provisions were incorporated into the statute books
merely to give effect to our law which required judicial proceedings
for adoption. Limitation of registration of adoptions to those
granted by Philippine courts is a misconception. For, if registration is
to be narrowed down to local adoptions, it is the function of
Congress, not SC, to spell out such limitation. The Court cannot
carve out a prohibition where the law does not so state. Excessive
rigidity serves no purpose. And, ​by Articles 407 and 408 of our Civil
Code, the disputed document of adoption is registrable​.
The record does not show that prejudice would ensure to State and
adoptee, or any other person for that matter, from the adoption
here involved. The validity thereof is not under attack. At any rate,
whatever may be the effect of adoption, ​the rights of the State and
adoptee and other persons interested are fully safeguarded by
Article 15 of our Civil Code which provides that: ​"Laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines
even though living abroad."
Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign
adoption. This rests on the principle that the status of adoption,
created by the law of a State having jurisdiction to create it, will be
given the same effect in another state as is given by the latter state
to the status of adoption when created by its own law. ​The status of
adoption, once created under the proper foreign law, will be
recognized in this country, except where public policy or the
interests of its inhabitants forbid its enforcement and demand the
substitution of the lex fori. ​Indeed, implicit in Article 15 of our Civil
Code just quoted, is that the exercise of incidents to foreign
adoption "remains subject to local law."
It is high time for this Court to formulate a rule on the registration of
foreign adoptions. We hold that ​an adoption created under the law
of a foreign country is entitled to registration in the corresponding
civil register of the Philippines. It is to be understood, however,
that the effects of such adoption shall be governed by the laws of
this country.
CFI decision ​REVERSED and the Local Civil Registrar of Manila is
directed to register the deed of adoption.
20. Republic vs. Miller 306 SCRA 183 (1999)
REPUBLIC v. MILLER
G.R. No. 125932 | April 21, 1999 | J. Pardo
FACTS
● Spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller are 38 and 40 years of
age, respectively, both American citizens. They were
childless and do not expect to have sibling out of their
union on account of a medical problem of the wife.
● Claude was a member of the US Air Force as airman first
class assigned at Clark Air Base and they maintain a
residence at Don Bonifacio Subdivision, Angeles.
● Michael Magno Madayag is the legitimate son of Marcelo
Madayag and Zenaida Magno. Due to poverty Michael’s
parents was prompted to have him adopted by the Millers.
They executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to
the adoption by Millers.
● Sps. Miller sought to adopt the minor Michael Magno
Madayag. They filed a petition to adopt Magno.
● DSWD recommended for approval of the petition on the
basis of its evaluation that the Millers were morally,
emotionally and financially fit to be adoptive parents and
the adoption would be the minor’s best interest and
welfare.
RTC: Granted the petition for adoption
● SolGen, in behalf of the Republic, filed an appeal to the CA
which certified the case to the SC
ISSUE
WON aliens are qualified to adopt despite the prohibition under the
Family Code
HELD
YES
● An alien who filed a petition for adoption before the
effectivity of the Family Code, although denied the right to
adopt under Art. 184 of the Code, may continue with his
petition under the law prevailing before the FC.
● The issue is not new. The Court has ruled than an alien is
qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth and Welfare
Code (CYWC). The petition was filed on July 29, 1988 prior
to the effectivity of the FC. It was still governed by the
CYWC which allowed aliens to adopt.
● The enactment of the FC will not impair the right of an
alien under the CYWC to adopt a Filipino child as this is a
vested right at the time of the filing of the petition for
adoption. The petition is governed by the law then in force
when it was filed.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the appealed decision of the Regional Trial
Court.
Succession
21. Allison G. Gibbs v. Government of the Philippine Islands, GR
No. L-35694, December 23, 1933
Facts:
Gibbs and his wife were American nationals, domiciled in
California. They acquired lands in the Philippines. The wife died in
California. Gibbs was appointed administrator of the intestate
proceedings instituted in Manila.
Gibbs asked the court to adjudicate to him lands acquired in
the Philippines not under our laws on succession but because in
accordance with the law of California, the community property of
spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife
previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving
husband without administration. CFI granted such to Gibbs upon
proof of California law.
The register of deeds refused to transfer such properties on
the ground of non-payment of inheritance tax. Gibbs argued that
the conjugal right of a California wife in a community property is a
personal right and even if this was a case of succession, California
law would still apply.
Issue​: Was Eva Gibbs, at the time of her death, the owner of a
descendible interest in the Ph?
Held:
Yes. The court held that it is principle firmly established that to
the law of the state in which the land is situated we must look for
the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for
the effect and construction of wills and other conveyances. This
fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of
our Civil Code(the old one) as follows:
"Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation of the
owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is
situated.(Lex rei sitae)
Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence
prevailing here, the wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal
property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title
therein equal to that of her husband, subject to the power of
management and disposition which the law vests in the husband.
Under the law of California(to which Mr.Gibbs anchors his
claim of exemption to the payment of inheritance tax), upon the
death of the wife, the entire community property without
administration belongs to the surviving husband; that he is the
absolute owner of all the community property from the moment of
the death of his wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue of her
death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of the wife
precedes that of the husband he acquires the community property,
not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his deceased wife, but because
she never had more than an inchoate interest or expectancy which
is extinguished upon her death.
"The decisions under this section (1401 Civil Code of
California) are uniform to the effect that the husband does not take
the community property upon the death of the wife by succession,
but that he holds it all from the moment of her death as though
acquired by himself.
The second paragraph of article 10, Civil Code, applies only
when a legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the
Philippines in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and
the foreign law is consulted only in regard to the order of succession
or the extent of the successional rights; in other words, the second
paragraph of Article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was
vested with a descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction
of the Philippine Islands.
The nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs. Gibbs
at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in
question must be determined in accordance with the ​lex rei sitæ.
(Following this line of reasoning, lex rei sitae muna in accordance
with par.1 of Art 10, then check the foreign law with regard doon sa
order of succession or extent of successional rights in accordance
with par.2) -sana tama yung pagkakaintindi ko
“Nevertheless,legal and testamentary successions, in respect
to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law ,of the person whose succession is
in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the
country in which it may be situated."(Art.10, second paragraph, OLD
CC)
The wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine
Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of her
husband, in the Philippine lands covered by certificates of title Nos.
20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date of their acquisition to the
date of her death. It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the
law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal
to that of her husband and the descendible interest of Eva Johnson
Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of
inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the language of
section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code
which levies a tax on inheritances.
It is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine the "order of
succession" or the "extent of the successional rights" (article 10, Civil
Code, ​supra) ​which would be regulated by section 1386 of the Civil
Code of California which was in effect at the time of the death of
Mrs. Gibbs.
22. Testate Estate of Amos G. Bellis v. Edward A. Bellis, ​supra at 4.​
FACTS:
● Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the
United States.
● By his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate
children (Edward Bellis et al), by his second wife, who
survived him, he had three legitimate children.
● He, however, also had three illegitimate children in the
Philippines (Maria Cristina Bellis et al).
● Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his
Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine
properties.
● In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given
anything.
● The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground
that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which
they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be
applied.
ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine law be applied in the case in the
determination of the illegitimate children’s successional rights. ​-NO.
Texas law will be applied.
RULING:
 ● The Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal
and void, for ​his national law (TEXAS LAW) cannot be
ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now
Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law
should govern.
● Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in
Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed
by his national law. ​Since Texas law does not require
legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate
children of the legitimes, is valid.
● The Supreme Court held that the ​illegitimate children are
not entitled to the legitimes under the Texas law, which
is the national law of the deceased.
23. In the Matter of the Estate of Emil H. Johnson, ​supra at 40​
FACTS:
1. Feb 4, 1916 - Johnson, a swedish native and a naturalized
citizen of the US, died in Manila leaving a will dated Sept
9, 1915 where he disposed of an estate with the value of
P231,800. The will was holographic (written in his own
handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses
only, instead of 3 as required by Sec 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. (will was not executed in conformity with
the provisions of law generally applicable to wills and
could not be have been proved under sec 618)
2. Feb 9, 1916 - A Petition was filed before the CFI of Manila
for the probate of his will on the ground that Johson was
a citizen of the state of Illinois, USA; the will was duly
executed in accordance with the law of Illinois; and thus
could be probated under Sec 636 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
3. Sec 636 provides: ​A will made within the Philippine Islands
by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is
executed in accordance with the law of the state or
country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which
might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state
or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the
Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if
executed according to the laws of these Islands.
4. Court found the document to be legal and was admitted to
probate. Victor Johnson was the sole administrator.
5. the will in question the testator gives to his brother Victor
one hundred shares of the corporate stock in the
Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother
in Sweden, the sum of P20,000; to his daughter Ebba
Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra Ibañez,
the sum of P75 per month, if she remains single; to
Simeona Ibañez, spinster, P65 per month, if she remains
single. The rest of the property is left to the testator's five
children — Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and
Alberto
6. Emil Johnson was born in sweden, migrated to the US and
lived in Chicago. In 1898, he married Rosalie, and then
went to the PH as a soldier for the US army. Rosalie and
Emil had a daughter named Ebba
7. After being discharged as a soldier, he contnued to live in
the PH. Rosalie got a divorce. Emil went back to Chicago
and got a certificate of naturalization. He then visited
Sweden, and live the rest of his life in the PH.
8. In the PH, he entered into marital relations with Alejandra
which resulted to 3 children. The other 2 were borne to
the deceased Simeona.
9. June 12, 1916 - Lawyers of Ebba entered an appearance
and opposed the will being admitted to probate. CFI
denied.
10. Ebba argues that ​Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city
of Manila and not a resident of the State of Illinois at the
time the will in question was executed; The will is invalid
and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the
State of Illinois; The order admitting the will to probate
was made without notice to the petitioner; and the order
in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
Issue:
Whether or not there was deprivation of due process on the part
of the petition
● Held: No. Due publication was made pursuant to this order
of the court through the three-week publication of the
notice in Manila Daily Bulletin. The Supreme Court also
asserted that in view of the statute concerned which reads
as “A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or
subject of another state or country, which is executed in
accordance with the law of the state or country of which
he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and
allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be
proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands,
and shall have the same effect as if executed according to
the laws of these Islands” the “state”, being not
capitalized, does not mean that United States is excluded
from the phrase (because during this time, Philippines was
still a territory of the US).
WON Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to
wills of aliens residing in RP?
● Section 636: authorizes probate by our courts of a will
made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject
of another ​state or country, when such will is executed in
accordance with the law of the ​state or country of which
the testator is a citizen of subject, and which might be
proved under the law of such ​state​ or country.
● IT IS APPLICABLE: the "state" would include US, and the
operation of law is not limited to wills of aliens.
● If Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of US and
of the state of Illinois, his will was provable under this
section in the courts of the Philippines, provided the
instrument was so executed as to be admissible to probate
under laws of the State of Illinois
WON Decedent a national of Illinois (to warrant the application of
Illinois law)
● YES. Proof adduced before TC showed he was indeed a
national of Illinois. Petition merely contests the residence
of the decedent to be in the Philippines, but not the
nationality
● Why contested residence: US naturalization laws require
residence of at least 5 years in US and 1 year w/n the State
or territory where the court granting the naturalization
papers is held to grant the certificate of naturalization
● -still, no other proof to rebut the presumption that he was
indeed naturalized as a US citizen (particularly of Illinois)
WON will executed in conformity with the State of Illinois
● NOT REALLY SURE, BUT THE PETITIONER CANNOT DO
ANYTHING ABOUT IT.
● Courts cannot take JN of Foreign laws: TC merely relied on
the ​presentation of Section 1874 of the Revised Statutes
of Illinois as exhibited in a volume of an annotation and
assumed that he could take JN of the laws of Illinois. But it
was mistaken
 ● Proper rule is to require proof of the statutes of the States
of the American Union whenever their provisions are
determinative of the issues in any action litigated in the
Philippine courts.
● Still, (1) petition does not state any fact from which it
would appear that the law of Illinois is different from what
the court found and (2)petition did not raise any
assignment of error to question the supposed taking of JN
of the court
24. Juan Miciano v. Andre Brimo, G.R. No. L-22595/50 Phil 867, 1
November 1927;
25. Francisco Carmelo Varela v. Miguel Varela Calderon, G.R. No.
L-36342 / 57 Phil 280, 8 October 1932;
26. Philippine Trust Co. v. Magdalena C. Bohanan​,supra.; ​
DOCTRINE: The validity of testamentary dispositions are to be
governed by the national law of the testator, provided that the law
must be proved incourts.
CONFLICT LAWS: Old CC Art. 10(2), now NCC Art. 16(2)
“Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the
order of succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights
to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the
person whose succession is in question.”Nevada Compiled Laws of
1925, Sec. 9905 “Every person over the age of 18 years, of sound
mind, may, by last will,dispose of all his or her estate, real and
personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the
testator’s debts.”
FACTS:
● Testator Bohanan was born in Nebraska and was a US
citizen. He has some properties in California. Despite his
long residence in the Philippines,his stay was found by the
CFI to be merely temporary, and he remained to be a US
citizen.
● The CFI declared his will as fully in accordance with the
laws of Nevada and admitted it to probate. The Philippine
Trust Co. was named executor of the will.
● Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company, named as the
executor of the will, was appointed to such executor and
upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00.The
executor filed a project of partition making, in accordance
with the provisions of the will, the following adjudications:
(1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and
Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, intrust only for
the benefit of testator's grandson which consists of several
mining companies; (2) the other half of the residuary
estate to the testator's brother and his sister(3) legacies of
P6,000 each to his (testator) son and his daughter to be
paid in three yearly installments; (4)legacies to *others
irrelevant to the case*Out of the total estate of
P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson
P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several
mining companies and to his brother and sister the same
amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000
each, or a total of P12,000.
● Respondent Magdalena Bohanan, his ex-wife, questions
the validity of the partition, claiming that she and her
children were deprived of their legitimes.
● (It must be noted that Magdalena and decedent C.O.
Bohanan were married in 1909 but he divorced her in
1922. She remarried in 1925 and this marriage was
subsisting at the time of the death of decedent
ISSUE:
WON the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children
which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the
Philippines, are valid?
RULING:
● The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because
the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that
successional rights to personal property are to be earned
by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question. Says the law on this point: Nevertheless, legal
and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the extent of the successional
rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may bethe nature of
the property and the country in which it is found.
● The testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because
he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent
residence. It does not appear that at time of the hearing of
the project of partition, the above-quoted provision was
introduced in evidence.
● During the hearing of the motion of Magdalena C.
Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 asher share, the
foreign law, especially Section 9905,Compiled Nevada
Laws was introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein)
counsel. Again said laws presented by the counsel for the
executor and admitted by the Court during the hearing of
the case.In addition, the other appellants, children of the
testator,do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the
laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above
circumstances,we are constrained to hold that the
pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the
Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial
notice of by us, without t proof of such law having been
offered at the hearing of the project of partition. As in
accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the
validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by
the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided
and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator
is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above,
which allows a testator to dispose of all his property
according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the
court approving the project of partition made in
accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as
it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants
27. Adolfo Aznar v. Helen Christensen Garcia​, supra.;
FACTS:
● Edward Christensen, a US citizen and domiciled in the
Philippines, left a will wherein he instituted an
acknowledged daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen, as his
only child.
 ● He also bequeathed P3,600.00 to Maria Helen Christensen,
who is a baptized Christensen, but is not related or has not
been adopted at any time by the testator.
● Helen opposed the partition as it deprives her of her
legitime as an acknowledged natural child and that the
distribution should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines.
○ Helen claims that under Art. 16, par. 2 of the
Civil Code, California law should be applied; that
under California law, the matter is referred back
to the law of the domicile.
● Maria averred that the national law of the deceased must
apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything
under California law.
ISSUE:
Whether the national law of the deceased should be applied in
determining the successional rights of his heirs
RULING:
The Court initially ruled that the national law applies but it was
referred back to domiciliary law.
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the intrinsic validity of
testamentary dispositions is governed by the national law of the
decedent, which in this case, California law. There are two
conflicting California laws regarding succession: one that does not
provide for legitimes and one that provides that the law of the
domicile applies (Art. 946 of the California Civil Code). Art. 946 as
the applicable law and in accordance therewith and following the
doctrine of renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary
provision in question should be referred back to the law of the
decedent’s domicile which is the Philippines. Thus, Helen is entitled
to her legitime.
28. Ramon N. Bilbao v. Dalmacio Bilbao, G.R. No. L-2200/87 Phil
144, 2 August 1950;
28 – Ramon Bilbao vs. Dalmacio, Cleofas, Eusebia, and Catalina
Bilbao, Filemon Abringe, and Francisco Academia
G.R. No. L-2200 | 1950-08-02 | Montemayor, J.
FACTS:
· This is an appeal from the CFI Negros Oriental denying the
petition for admission to probate of the last will and testament
of Victor S. Bilbao who died in 1943, which was filed by his
widow and co-testator Ramona Navarro.
· The will in question was executed in 1931, on a single page by
the deceased Victor Bilbao jointly with his wife Ramona M.
Navarro. The two testators in their testament directed that "all
of our respective private properties both real and personal, and
all of our conjugal properties, and any other property belonging
to either or both of us, be given and transmitted to anyone or
either of us, who may survive the other, or who may remain the
surviving spouse of the other."
· The petition for probate was opposed by Filemon Abringe, a
near relative of Victor Bilbao on the ground that the alleged will
was executed by the husband and wife for their reciprocal
benefit and therefore not valid, and that it was not executed
and attested to as required by law.
· After hearing, the trial court found the will to have been
executed conjointly by the deceased husband and wife for their
reciprocal benefit, and that a will of that kind is neither
contemplated by Act No. 190, known as the Code of Civil
Procedure nor permitted by article 669 of the Civil Code which
provides:
"Two or more persons cannot make a will
conjointly or in the same instrument, either for
their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a
third person."
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the lower court erred in finding that a joint
and reciprocal will particularly between husband and wife is void
under the present law. – NO, it really is invalid.
HELD: ​According to Ramona, sections 614 and 618 of Act No. 190
appear to be a complete enactment on the subject of execution of
wills and may thus be regarded as the expression of the whole law
thereon, and that it must be deemed to have impliedly repealed the
provision of the Civil Code. Joint and reciprocal wills are neither
regarded as invalid nor on the contrary they are allowed, then article
669 of the Civil Code prohibiting the execution of joint wills whether
reciprocal or for the benefit of a third party should be considered as
having been repealed and superseded by the new law. We cannot
agree to the contention of Ramona. In the study made on this
subject, We have found a number of cases decided by this court
wherein several articles of the Civil Code regarding wills have not
only been referred to but have also been applied side by side with
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Another contention of Ramona is that in the case of ​Ham vs.
Saavedra​, a will was executed jointly by husband and wife in a same
instrument, and it was admitted to probate. The decision was also
affirmed by the Supreme Court, thereby proving that this tribunal
has disregarded the prohibition regarding the execution of wills
conjointly under article 669 of the Civil Code, meaning that said
article has already been repealed. This is untenable. It is true that
the will already described was allowed probate by the trial court,
but there was no appeal from the order approving the will on the
ground of its invalidity, but only on the manner the properties
involved were to be distributed or otherwise disposed of. The
Supreme Court never touched this point of invalidity nor the
applicability of article 669 of the Civil Code.
The provision of article 669 of the Civil Code prohibiting the
execution of a will by two or more persons conjointly or in the same
instrument either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a
third person, is not unwise and is not against public policy. ​The
reason for this provision, especially as regards husbands and wife
is that when a will is made jointly or in the same instrument, the
spouse who is more aggressive, stronger in will or character and
dominant is liable to dictate the terms of the will for his or her own
benefit or for that of third persons whom he or she desires to
favor. And, where the will is not only joint but reciprocal, either
one of the spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous, wicked,
faithless or desperate, knowing as he or she does the terms of the
will whereby the whole property of the spouses both conjugal and
paraphernal goes to the survivor, may be tempted to kill or dispose
of the other.
The CA decision is affirmed.

30. Polly Cayetano vs. Hon. Tomas T. Leonidas, G.R. No.

29. Severina A. vda. De Enriquez v. Miguel Abadia, G.R. No.
L-7188/95 Phil 627 9 August 1954;
Facts:
● Father Sancho Abadia executed a document purpoting to
be his last will and testament. When Father Abadia died,
one of the legatees, Andres Enriquez filed a petition for
probate of the alleged will. This was opposed by the
nephews and nieces of the deceased who will be able to
inherit if there was no will.
● The trial court ruled that the document is a holographic
will. It was in the handwriting of the testator and that
although at the time it was executed and at the time of the
testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by
law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the
case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in
force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic
wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of
the testator which according to the trial court is the
controlling factor and may override any defect in form.
Issue: ​What law will govern? (old civil code v new civil code)
L-54919/129 SCRA 522, 30 May 1984;
FACTS:
1. Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United
States of America and a permanent resident of Philadelphia. She
executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of
Philadelphia,Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat, and
that while in temporary sojourn in the Philippines.
2​. Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila, leaving property
both in the Philippines and in the United States of America.
3. The Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was
admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the
Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A.
4. The letters of administration were issued in favor of Clement J.
McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign
country on procedure and allowance of wills. Nenita C. Paguia,
daughter or the testator, was appointed Administratrix of the estate
of said decedent.

5. This was opposed by Adoracion’s father, Hermogenes Campos​,

Held: Old Civil Code who earlier filed an Affidavit of Self-adjudication whereby he
Article 795 of the new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the
deceased Adoracion Campos, not being aware that Adoracion had
a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force
left a will. He later died and was substituted by Polly Cayetano as
at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or
petitioner in the instant case.
statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of
a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the
6​. A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of
testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in
the petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the
court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at
rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and
the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the
forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.
rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of
the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his
7. Cayetano alleged that the trial court erred in ruling that the right
estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn
of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree
expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy
admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the
or bequest then becomes a completed act.
forced heir​ incomplete disregard of Law of Succession.
There is the view that the intention of the testator should be the
ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and
ISSUE: Whether or not a forced heir is entitled to his legitime in
interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said
case the testator was a citizen of another country.
intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the
will and after the death of the testator lessen the formalities
RULING: NO.
required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes
should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed
The private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion
according to the law in force at the time of execution. However, we
was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent
should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if
resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under
he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it
Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively
becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of
provide:
the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding
Art. 16 par. (2).
new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate
xxx xxx xxx
such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a
will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal
requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the said property may be found.
Legislature can not validate void wills
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent.
Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not
provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by
the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such
law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound
and established public policy and would run counter to the specific
provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of
the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This
was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358)
wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or
good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was
a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and under the law
of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to
be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G.
Bellis.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was
correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she
had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the
time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of
Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner.
31. Dalton vs. Giberson 91 Phil 524 (1952)
FACTS
Lela G. Dalton presented on February 10, 1949 an application with
the Court of First Instance of Cebu for the probate of the
holographic will of William R. Giberson, a citizen of the State of
Illinois, United States, dated April 29, 1920 in San Francisco,
California. Spring Giberson, legitimate son of William R. Giberson,
presented an opposition alleging that the will is apocrypha (with
questionable authenticity), it does not represent the true will of
the late Giberson, and has not been granted according to the law.
ISSUE
Whether the wills executed outside the Philippines may be
probated without being first probated in the country of its
execution.
RULING
YES. Section 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure stating that “a will
made out of the Philippine Islands… may be proved, allowed, and
recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect
as if executed according to the laws of these Islands” is still in force
and has not been abrogated by Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. Here,
the will of William Giberson need not be probated first in the State
of Illinois, USA before it may be probated here in the Philippines.
The Court opined that Section 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
substantive in nature and therefore could not have been repealed
by the Rules of Court which are only procedural in nature.
32. Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil 867 (1927)
FACTS: ​The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G.
Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition.
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The
court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his
participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the
approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's
business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the
declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and
the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition
and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the
receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish
laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in
question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality,
for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of
the Civil Code
ISSUE: ​Whether the Turkish Law or Philippine Law be the basis on
the distribution of Joseph Brimo's estates. Will Andre Brimo forfeit
his inheritance?
HELD: Respondent did not prove that said testamentary dispositions
are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not
present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the
matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws
are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an
opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval
of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not
erroneous.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the
condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's
will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee
who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his
attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the
testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary
to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or
good morals shall be considered as not imposed and
shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner
whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the
testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code
above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern
his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is
considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is
unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the
law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the
legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and
requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said
clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed
that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to
include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and
the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is
approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to
costs.
33. Bohanan vs. Bohanan 106 Phil 1997 (1960)
TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST
CO., ​executor-appellee,
vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY
LYDIA BOHANAN,​ oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-12105 | January 30, 1960 | LABRADOR, J.
Topic: Succession
DOCTRINE: ​Successional rights to personal property are to be
earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question
FACTS:
● 1944: C.O. Bohonan executed his last will and testament
● 1950: CFI Manila, in an order, admitted to probate said
will. In the said order, the ff facts were established:
○ C.O. Bohanan was born in Nebraska therefore he
is a citizen of Nebraska and even though he lived
in the Philippines for a long period of time. he
still remained a citizen of the united states. C.O.
Bohanan eventually chose Nevada to spend the
rest of his days so therefore when he died. He
remained a citizen of the US.
· Meanwhile, (former) wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two
children question the validity of the testamentary provisions
claiming that they have been deprived of their legitime in
accordance with the law of the forum
○ Magdalena was not given in the will any share in
the estate left
○ Children received legacies in the amount of
P6,000 each only
· It is further argued that it was error for the trial court to have
recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his
Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce
should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction
· Lower court: refused to recognize the claim of the widow;
testamentary dispositions in the will
○ That the laws of Nevada US, of which the
deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of
all of his properties without requiring him to
leave any portion of his estate to his wife
○ Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925
provides: Every person over the age of eighteen
years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose
of all his or her estate, real and personal, the
same being chargeable with the payment of the
testator's debts.
○ That there is no right to share in the inheritance
in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of
Nevada and since the court below had already
found that there was no conjugal property
between the testator and Magdalena
· Note however that the most important issue is the claim of the
testator's children
ISSUES:
(1) ​WON the testamentary dispositions, especially hose for the
children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code
of the Philippines, are valid - YES
HELD:
(1) YES; Affirmed.
· The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the
testator died in 1944, expressly provides that ​successional
rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law
of the person whose succession is in question​. Says the law on
this point:
“Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the
order of succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights
and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property and the country in
which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as
par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)”
· In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out
and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of
Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his
permanent residence. Moreover, It is not disputed that the
laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties
by will.
o The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can
only be proved in our courts in the form and
manner provided for by our Rules, which
are as follows:
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an
entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy tested by the officer
having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).
· The foreign law (Nevada Laws) was introduced in evidence by
appellant's counsel and was admitted by the Court as Exhibit
"B" during the hearing of the case. In addition, the other
appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the
above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada.
Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold
that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the
Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of
by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the
hearing of the project of partition.
As in accordance with ​Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of
testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of
the testator​, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that
the ​national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada,
already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his
property according to his will​, as in the case at bar, the order of the
court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the
testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellants.