CHAPTER 2

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED

A DECREE INSTITUTING A LABOR CODE THEREBY REVISING AND
CONSOLIDATING LABOR AND SOCIAL LAWS TO AFFORD PROTECTION
TO LABOR, PROMOTE EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT AND INSURE INDUSTRIAL PEACE BASED ON SOCIAL
JUSTICE

Art. 1. Name of Decree. This Decree shall be known as the "Labor Code of the
Philippines".

Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy. The State shall afford protection to labor,
promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall
assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.

NOTES AND COMMENTS:

PART 1: PURPOSE OF AFFORDING PROTECTION TO LABOR

 To place labor on equal plane with management with all its powers and influence in
negotiating for the advancement of his interests and the defense of his rights.

Under the POLICY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, the law bends to accommodate the interests
of the working class on the human justification that THOSE WITH LESS
PRIVILEGES IN LIFE SHOULD HAVE MORE PRIVILEGES IN LAW.

Case:
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO SANTOS, JR., HOUDIEL MAGADIA, GILBERT ANTONIO, REGINO
DURAN,PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, and THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION, respondents.G.R. No. 77875
February 4, 1993
Facts:
This was an instant petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of NLRC setting aside
the suspension of the complaints and directing Philippine Airline to pay complainants their
salaries.
Individual respondents were port stewards of catering sub-department on the passenger
services department of petitioner. Their salaries were deducted due to the mishandling of
company’s properties which the respondents resented.
On August 27, 1984, represented by the union, individual respondents made a formal
notice regarding the deductions thru Mr. Abad, Manager for care taking who was on
vacation leave but no action was taken.
They then filed a formal grievance pursuant to the collective bargaining
agreement. On his return, Mr. Abad on December 7, 1984, he informed the grievants and
scheduled meeting. Thereafter, the individual respondents refused to do ramp inventory
thinking that since there was no action taken by Mr. Abad five days after they filed the
petition, it shall be resolved in their favor. But Mr. Abad denied the petition and
suspended individual respondents.
He also pointed out that it was only proper that employees were charged for the
mishandling of company’s property. Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal
suspension to the labor arbiter. The decision was ruled in favor of the petitioner and the
complaint was set aside. The labor arbiter’s decision was appealed to the respondent
commission who rendered decision setting aside the labor arbiter’s order of dismissal.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Ruling:

Petitioner could at least have assigned an officer-in-charge to look into the

grievance and possibly make his recommendation to Mr. Abad. It is of no moment that
Mr. Abad immediately looked into the grievance upon returning to work, for it must be
remembered that the grievants are workingmen who suffered salary deductions and who
rely so much on their meager income for their daily subsistence and survival. Besides, it
is noteworthy that when these employees first presented their complaint on August 21,
1984, petitioner failed to act on it. It was only after a formal grievance was filed and after
Mr. Abad returned to work on December 7, 1984 that petitioner decided to turn an ear to
their plaints.
Clearly too much of an injustice if the employees be made to bear the dire effects
thereof. Much as the latter were willing to discuss their grievance with their employer,
the latter closed the door to this possibility by not assigning someone else to look into the
matter during Abad's absence. Thus, private respondents should not be faulted for
believing that the effects of the CBA in their favor had already stepped into the
controversy.
If the Court were to follow petitioner's line of reasoning, it would be easy for
management to delay the resolution of labor problems, the complaints of the workers in
particular, and hide under the cloak of its officers being "on leave" to avoid being caught
by the 5-day deadline under the CBA. If this should be allowed, the workingmen will
suffer great injustice for they will necessarily be at the mercy of their employer.

PRINCIPLE: EMPLOYMENT BE ABOVE ALL, DECENT, JUST AND

HUMANE.
 EXTENT AND LIMITS OF THE PROTECTION:

The principle of protection extends upon an employee who is abused either by the
employer or by the union leadership or their respective representatives. However, the
right is unavailing in the following instances:

1. PROTECTION TO LABOR IS NOT LICENSE TO CONDONE WRONG

DOINGS.

PHILIPPINE EDUCATION CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
UNION OF PHILIPPINE EDUCATION EMPLOYEES (NLU) and THE COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,

FACTS:
Ernesto Carpio and other employees of the company, members of the Union of
Philippine Education Employees (NLU) joined a strike. After the labor dispute was
settled, the Industrial Court ordered the reinstatement of the strikers, including Carpio.
The company, however, opposed the reinstatement of Carpio for the reason that a
criminal complaint had been filed against him in the Municipal Court of Manila for theft
of magazines allegedly belonging to the company. He was convicted and sentenced to
two months and one day. On appeal to the Court of First Instance, Carpio was acquitted
on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Issue: w/not Carpio can be reinstated

Ruling:

If said merchandise are lost and said loss is reasonably attributed to said employee, and
he is charged with theft, even if he is acquitted of the charge on reasonable doubt, when the
employer has lost its confidence in him, it would be highly unfair to require said employer to
continue employing him or to reinstate him, for in that case the former might find it necessary for
its protection to employ another person to watch and keep an eye on him.
In the present case, Carpio was refused reinstatement not because of any union affiliation or
activity or because the company has been guilty of any unfair labor practice. As already stated,
Carpio was convicted in the Municipal Court and although he was acquitted on reasonable doubt
in the Court of First Instance, the company had ample reason to distrust him. Under the
circumstances, we cannot in conscience require the company to reemploy or reinstate him.

2. The care and solicitude in the protection and vindication of the rights of workers
cannot justify disregard of relevant facts in the construction of the text of applicable
rules in order to arrive at a disposition in favor of employees.
  To disregard the employer’s own rights and interests solely on the basis of concern and
solitude for labor IS UNJUST AND UNACCEPTABLE

3. The constitutional policy to provide ful protection to labor is not meant to be a

sword to oppress employers.

AGABON vs. NLRC, November 17, 2004

Facts:
® Virgilio and Jenny Agabon were cornice installers of Riviera Home Improvements, a company
engaged in the business of selling ornamental construction materials.

® They were employed from January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999, when they were dismissed
for abandonment of work.

® The Agabons filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA, who ruled in their favor.
The NLRC reversed on appeal. The CA sustained the NLRC’s decision

® The Agabons further appealed to the SC, disputing the finding of abandonment, and claiming
that the company did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.

Issue: WON the Agabons were illegally dismissed

Held: NO

Ratio:
® Substantive due process (EEs must be dismissed for just or authorized cause): SC upheld the
finding of abandonment, because the act of the Agabons in seeking employment elsewhere
clearly showed a deliberate intent to sever the ER-EE relationship.

® Procedural due process (for just cause, there must be a written notice informing him of
grounds for termination, a hearing or opportunity to be heard, and a final notice of termination
stating the grounds therefor): There was no due process because ER did not send the requisite
notices to the last known address of the EEs. ER only gave a flimsy excuse that the notice would
be useless because the EEs no longer lived there. This is not a valid excuse; they should have still
sent a notice as mandated by law.

4. Protection to labor does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor
of the workers. The law also recognizes the employer’s rights which are entitled to
respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.

Duncan Assoc. of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Wellcome Phils., Inc.

 G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004
FACTS:

Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of
employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by the
existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and
should management find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign
from the company. Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation
that management may transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking
position or preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's
competition. Before getting married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of
the conflict of interest but marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors
informed him of conflict of intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that
either he or Betsy resign from their respective positions). Unable to comply with condition,
Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request
against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee and
while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that
Glaxo's policy was valid...

ISSUE:

Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying
employees of any competitor company is valid

RULING:

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and
other confidential programs and information from competitors. The prohibition against pesonal
or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot
be denied.

5. In affording full protection to labor, the State must ensure equal work opportunities
to all employees regardless of sex, race or creed.

Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation
of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be
resolved in favor of labor.
Notes and comments:

Interpretation of Labor Laws

Labor laws are generally construed liberally in favor of labor. The Labor Code of the
Philippines states: “All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the
Labor Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of
labor.”
Similar provision can be found in the New Civil Code, viz. “In case of doubt, all labor
legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living
for the laborer.”
However, the above provisions do not mean that courts has to blindly rule in favor of
labor. Capital and management are entitled to no less protection under the law. The law, while
protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither the oppression nor destruction of the
employer. When the law angles the scale of justice in favor of labor, the scale should never be so
tilted if the result is an injustice to the employer.

Interpretation of Labor Contract

Labor contracts are not ordinary contract. The relation between capital and labor are not
merely contractual in that the parties do not have complete freedom as to the terms of their
relationship. For example, an employee cannot agree to a wage below the minimum wage set by
law, or to waive his right to overtime pay for overtime work rendered. This agreement or waiver,
even if voluntarily entered into by the parties, is void for being contrary to public policy. Labor
contracts are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common
good. Hence, labor contracts must yield to laws on CBA, strikes and lockouts, etc.[

THE RULE OF LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION IN FAVOR OF LABOR APPLIES

ONLY WHEN IN CASE THERE IS DOUBT. IF THE CONTRACTUAL PROVISION IS
CLEAR, IT MUST BE APPLIED IN ITS EXPRESS TERMS.

APPLICABILITY OF LABOR CODE:

1. Government corporations with ORIGINAL CHARTER-- ---civil service law

Those created by law, by an act of congress or special law

2. Corporations incorporated under General Corporation law---labor code.

PART II. CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT

Article 82. Coverage. The provisions of this Title shall apply to employees in all
establishments and undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to government
 employees, managerial employees, field personnel, members of the family of the
employer who are dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the
personal service of another, and workers who are paid by results as determined by
the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.

As used herein, "managerial employees" refer to those whose primary duty consists
of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a
department or subdivision thereof, and to other officers or members of the
managerial staff.

"Field personnel" shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform

their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the
employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty.

WORKER’S RIGHTS

Predicated on EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP

FOUR FOLD TEST

1. Right to select
2. Right to pay wages
3. Right to fire
4. Right to control and supervise

Note:
The Control test assumes primacy in overall considerations. Under this test, an
employment relation obtains where work is performed or services is rendered under
the control and supervision of the party contracting the service, not only as the result
of the work but as to the manner and details of performance.

LEGEND HOTEL (MANILA), OLWNED BY TITANIUM CORPORATION

AND/OR, NELSON NAPUD, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDENT OF
PETITIONER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HERNANI S. REALUYO,
ALSO KNOWN AS JOEY ROA, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 153511, July 18, 2012

FACTS:
This labor case for illegal dismissal involves a pianist employed to perform in the
restaurant of a hotel. - August 9, 1999: Realuyo, whose stage name was Joey R. Roa,
filed a complaint for alleged unfair labor practice, constructive illegal dismissal, and
the underpayment/nonpayment of his premium pay for holidays, separation pay,
service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay. He prayed for attorney’s fees, moral
damages of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages for P100,000.00 - Roa averred that
he had worked as a pianist at the Legend Hotel’s Tanglaw Restaurant from September
1992with an initial rate of P400.00/night; and that it had increased to P750.00/night.
During his employment, he could not choose the time of performance, which had
been fixed from 7:00PM to 10:00pm for three to six times a week. - July 9, 1999: the
management had notified him that as a cost-cutting measure, his services as a pianist
would no longer be required effective July 30, 1999. - In its defense, petitioner denied
the existence of an employer-employee relationship with Roa, insisting that he had
been only a talent engaged to provide live music at Legend Hotel’s Madison Coffee
Shop for three hours/day on two days each week; and stated that the economic crisis
that had hit the country constrained management to dispense with his services. -
December 29,1999: the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit
upon finding that the parties had no employer-employee relationship, because Roa
was receiving talent fee and not salary , which was reinforced by the fact that Roa
received his talent fee nightly, unlike the regular employees of the hotel who are paid
monthly. -NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision on May 31, 2001.
- CA set aside the decision of the NLRC, saying CA failed to take into
consideration that in Roa’s line of work, he was supervised and controlled by the
hotel’s restaurant manager who at certain times would require him to perform only
tagalong songs or music, or wear barong tagalong to conform with the Filipinana
motif of the place and the time of his performance is fixed. As to the status of Roa, he
is considered a regular employee of the hotel since his job was in furtherance of the
restaurant business of the hotel
. Granting that Roa was initially a contractual employee, by the sheer length of
service he had rendered for the company, he had been converted into a regular
employee. - CA held that the dismissal was due to retrenchment in order to avoid or
minimize business losses, which is recognized by law under Art. 283 of the Labor
Code.

ISSUES:
- WON there was employer-employee relationship between the two, and if so, -
WON Roa was validly terminated

RULING:
-
YES. Employer-employee relationship existed between the parties.

Roa was undeniably employed as a pianist of the restaurant. The hotel wielded the
power of selection at the time it entered into the service contract dated Sept. 1, 1992
with Roa. The hotel could not seek refuge behind the service contract entered into
with Roa. It is the law that defines and governs an employment relationship, whose
terms are not restricted to those fixed in the written contract, for other factors, like the
nature of the work the employee has been called upon to perform, are also considered.
 The law affords protection to an employee, and does not countenance any attempt to
subvert its spirit and intent. Any stipulation in writing can be ignored when the
employer utilizes the stipulation to deprive the employee of his security of tenure

The inequality that characterizes employer-employee relationship generally tips the

scales in favor of the employer, such that the employee is often scarcely provided real
and better options.

The argument that Roa was receiving talent fee and not salary is baseless. There is no
denying that the remuneration denominated as talent fees was fixed on the basis of his
talent, skill, and the quality of music he played during the hours of his performance.
Roa’s remuneration, albeit denominated as talent fees, was still considered as
included in the term wage in the sense and context of the Labor Code, regardless of
how petitioner chose to designate the remuneration, as per Article 97(f) of the Labor
Code.

The power of the employer to control the work of the employee is considered the
most significant determinant of the existence of an employer-employee relationship.

This is the so-called control test and is premised on whether the person for whom
the services are performed reserves the right to control both the end achieved and the
manner and means used to achieve that end.

WORKERS' RIGHTS

A. NORMAL HOURS OF WORK

Art. 83. Normal hours of work. The normal hours of work of any employee shall not exceed
eight (8) hours a day.
Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a population of at least one million (1,000,000)
or in hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one hundred (100) shall hold regular
office hours for eight (8) hours a day, for five (5) days a week, exclusive of time for meals,
except where the exigencies of the service require that such personnel work for six (6) days or
forty-eight (48) hours, in which case, they shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at
least thirty percent (30%) of their regular wage for work on the sixth day. For purposes of this
Article, "health personnel" shall include resident physicians, nurses, nutritionists, dietitians,
pharmacists, social workers, laboratory technicians, paramedical technicians, psychologists,
midwives, attendants and all other hospital or clinic personnel.

Note and comments:

---- shall not exceed 8 hours a day..

a. does not preclude the employer to reduce the number of working hours, provided; there is no
diminution of benefits. (MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE)

PURPOSE OF LIMITING THE WORKING HOURS:

1. not only to safeguard the health and welfare of laborer but to minimize unemployment by
forcing employers, in cases, where more than 8 hour operation is necessary..TO UTILIZE THE
DIFFERENT SHIFTS OF LABORERS WORKING ONLY FOR 8 HRS.

SAN JUAN DE DIOS HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW et. al., petitioners,

vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et. al., respondents
G.R. No. 126383
November 28, 1997
FACTS:
Then Labor Secretary Franklin M. Drilon issued Policy Instruction No. 4 in line with
R.A. 5901 which “requires that the covered hospital workers who used to work 7 days a
week should be paid for such number of days for working only 5 days or 40 hours a
week”.
Petitioners filed a complaint for the expeditious implementation and payment by
respondent” Juan De Dios Hospital “. The Labor Arbiter and NLRC both dismissed their
complaints and MR was also denied. Hence, this petition.
In said Policy Instruction, it was provided that: “The Labor Code in its Article 83 adopts
and incorporates the basic provisions of RA 5901 and retains its spirit and intent which is
to shorten the workweek of covered hospital personnel and at the same time assure them
of a full weekly wage.”

ISSUE:
WON the intent of Art. 83, LCP, is that persons in subject hospitals and clinics who have
completed the 40-hour/5-day workweek in any given workweek are entitled to a full
weekly wage for seven days.

HELD:
No.
What Article 83 merely provides are: (1) the regular office hour of eight hours a day, five
days per week for health personnel, and (2) where the exigencies of service require that
health personnel work for six days or forty-eight hours then such health personnel shall
be entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty percent of their regular wage
for work on the sixth day.
There is nothing in the law that supports then Secretary of Labor’s assertion that
“personnel in subject hospitals and clinics are entitled to a full weekly wage for seven (7)
days if they have completed the 40-hour/5-day workweek in any given workweek”.
 Also, if petitioners are entitled to two days off with pay, then there appears to be no sense
at all why Section 15 of the implementing rules grants additional compensation
equivalent to the regular rate plus at least twenty-five percent thereof for work performed
on Sunday to health personnel, or an “additional straight-time pay which must be
equivalent at least to the regular rate” ” for work performed in excess of forty hours a
week.

Art. 84. Hours worked.

Hours worked shall include
(a) all time during which an employee is required to be on duty or to be at a prescribed
workplace; and
(b) all time during which an employee is suffered or permitted to work.

Rest periods of short duration during working hours shall be counted as hours worked

COMPENSABLE HOURS WORKED:

INSTANCES:
1. TRAVEL TIME: if in connection with the work of employee
2. WAITING TIME: a. if waiting is an integral part of his work
b. if he is required or engaged by the employer to wait
in effect: absolute control of Employer------employee is deprived of time to attend
other personal pursuits.

Arica vs. NLRC

“Waiting Time”

Facts:

Petitioners Teofilo Arica et al filed a complaint against Standard Fruits Corporation

(STANFILCO)Philippines for allegedly not paying the workers for their assembly time
which takes place everywork day from 5:30am to 6am

The assembly time consists of the following activities

1.Roll call of the workers;
2.Getting their assignments from the foreman;
3.Filling out the Laborer’s Daily Accomplishment Report;
4.Getting tools and equipments from the stockroom; and
5.Going to the field to work.

They contended that these activities are necessarily for private respondent’s benefit.

The private respondent averred that the thirty-minute assembly time has been a long time
company practice, thus, not considered as waiting time.
 The LA dismissed the complaint. The LA agreed that the the thirty-minute assembly time
long practiced cannot be considered waiting time or work time and, therefore, not
compensable.

The NLRC upheld the decision of the LA for the same reason.

Issue:
WON the 30-minute activity of the petitioners before the scheduled working time is
compensable under the Labor Code.

Held:

No. The thirty minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual
consent of the parties under Article IV, Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
cannot be considered as ‘waiting time’ within the purview of Section 5, Rule I, Book III of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.

The thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply-rooted, routinary practice of the employees,

and the proceedings attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to deprive the
workers the time to attend to other personal pursuits. In short, they are not subject to the
absolute control of the company during this period, otherwise, their failure to report in the
assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary measures.

Furthermore, their houses are situated right on the area where the farm are located, such
that after the roll call, which does not necessarily require the personal presence, they can
go back to their houses to attend to some chores. In short, they are not subject to the
absolute control of the company during this period
3. SEMESTRAL BREAKS FOR TEACHERS IS CONSIDERED AS COMPENSABLE
HOURS WORKED FOR IT IS A FORM OF AN INTERRUPTION BEYOND THEIR
CONTROL.

UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN FACULTY UNION, Petitioner, v. UNIVERSITY OF

PANGASINAN And NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-63122
February 20, 1984
FACTS:
University of Pangasinan did not entitle its faculty to ECOLA during the semestral break
and when it increased its tuition fee, it refused its faculty the salary increase 60% of the
incremental proceeds of increased tuition fees.
ISSUES:
WON faculty members of a university are entitled to ECOLA during semestral breaks.
 HELD:
Yes.
Per various PDs on ECOLA, ECOLA pay includes LOA without pay.The contention that
“the fact of receiving a salary should not be the basis of receiving ECOLA” is without
merit as per IRR of Wage Order No. 1: “Allowance for Unworked days: a) All covered
employees whether paid on a monthly or daily basis shall be entitled to their daily living
allowance when they are paid their basic wage.”
The intention of the law is to grant ECOLA upon the payment of basic wages. Hence the
principle, “No pay, no ECOLA”.
Also applied by analogy is the principle enunciated in the ORI-LCP: “Sec. 4. Principles
in Determining Hours Worked… d) The time during which an employee is inactive by
reason of interruptions in his work beyond his control shall be considered time either if
the imminence of the resumption of work requires the employee’s presence at the place of
work or if the interval is too brief to be utilized effectively and gainfully in the
employee’s own interest.”
B. Art. 85. Meal periods.
Subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe, it shall be the duty of
every employer to give his employees not less than sixty (60) minutes time-off for their
regular meals

C. Art. 86. Night shift differential.

Every employee shall be paid a night shift differential of not less than ten percent (10%) of
his regular wage for each hour of work performed between ten o’clock in the evening and
six o’clock in the morning.

Art. 87. Overtime work.

Work may be performed beyond eight (8) hours a day provided that the employee is paid
for the overtime work, an additional compensation equivalent to his regular wage plus at
least twenty-five percent (25%) thereof. Work performed beyond eight hours on a holiday
or rest day shall be paid an additional compensation equivalent to the rate of the first eight
hours on a holiday or rest day plus at least thirty percent (30%) thereof.

Art. 91. Right to weekly rest day.

a. It shall be the duty of every employer, whether operating for profit or not, to
provide each of his employees a rest period of not less than twenty-four (24)
consecutive hours after every six (6) consecutive normal work days.

b. The employer shall determine and schedule the weekly rest day of his employees
subject to collective bargaining agreement and to such rules and regulations as the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may provide. However, the employer shall
respect the preference of employees as to their weekly rest day when such
preference is based on religious grounds.
Art. 94. Right to holiday pay.
 a. Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except
in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10)
workers;
b. The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such
employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate; anD
c. As used in this Article, "holiday" includes: New Year’s Day, Maundy Thursday,
Good Friday, the ninth of April, the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of
July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and thirtieth of December and the
day designated by law for holding a general election.
Art. 95. Right to service incentive leave.
a. Every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a
yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay.
b. This provision shall not apply to those who are already enjoying the benefit herein
provided, those enjoying vacation leave with pay of at least five days and those
employed in establishments regularly employing less than ten employees or in
establishments exempted from granting this benefit by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment after considering the viability or financial condition of such
establishment.
c. The grant of benefit in excess of that provided herein shall not be made a subject
of arbitration or any court or administrative action.
Art. 96. Service charges. All service charges collected by hotels, restaurants and similar
establishments shall be distributed at the rate of eighty-five percent (85%) for all covered
employees and fifteen percent (15%) for management. The share of the employees shall be
equally distributed among them. In case the service charge is abolished, the share of the covered
employees shall be considered integrated in their wages.