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Federal
/ Construction
BUILDING RESEARCH ADVISORY BOARD
Council
Technical Report No . 69
Prepared by
the Task Group T-59
of the
Federal Construction Council
Building Research Advisory Board
Commission on Sociotechnical Systems
National Research Council
FEB 15 1978
LIBRARY
NOTICE: The project that is the suhject of this report was approved by
the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are
drawn from the Councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National
Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the
Committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special compe
tences and with regard for appropriate balance.
This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according
to procedures approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members
of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering,
and the Institute of Medicine.
This report was prepared under the following contracts between the National
Academy of Sciences and the supporting federal agencies: Department of the
Army, N00014-76-A-0013 ; Department of Commerce, 700476; Energy Research and
Development Administration, EA-77-C-01-2641 ; General Services Administration,
GS-00-B-871; Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, HEW-100-76-00051 ;
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASW-2988; Department of the
Navy, N00025-77-C-0001; Veterans Administration, V101 (031C) P-322.
The Federal Construction Council serves as a planning, coordinating, and operating body to encourage
continuing cooperation among federal agencies in advancing the science and technology of building as
related to federal construction activities.
In this pursuit, its specific objectives include: Assembly and correlation of available knowledge
and experience from each of the agencies; elimination of undesirable duplication in investigative
effort on common problems; free discussion among scientific and technical personnel, both within
and outside the government, on selected building problems; objective resolution of technical prob
lems of particular concern to the federal construction agencies; and appropriate distribution of
resulting information.
The Council as such comprises ten members appointed by the BRAB Chairman from among BRAB membership,
plus one member from the senior professional staff of each of the supporting federal agencies (cur
rently nine), also appointed by the BRAB Chairman on nomination from the Individual agencies; all
appointments are subject to approval by the President of the National Academy of Sciences.
The Council directs the conduct of technical investigations and surveys of practice, holds symposia/
workshops, arranges for interchanges of information and for monitoring of research and technical
projects.
Page
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. RECOMMENDATIONS 3
A. General 3
B. Technical Requirements 3
C. Cost Factors 7
D. Experience Requirements 8
III. DISCUSSION 9
A. General 9
B. Technical Requirements 11
C. Cost Evaluation 18
D. Experience Requirements 20
APPENDIXES
B. SCOPE
The report deals with technical criteria and policy relating to federal
agency procurement of stationary diesel engines for electric -power genera
tion. The report does not include criteria for the generator and related
electrical components of diesel -generator sets or for the design of electric-
power generating plants or their air-pollution or noise control equipment.*
The study on which this report is based was conducted by Federal Construction
Council Task Group T-59, composed of engineers from several federal construc
tion agencies concerned with the procurement of stationary diesel engines
used for electric-power generation. During its study the Task Group sent a
questionnaire (see Appendix A) to major manufacturers of diesel engines
requesting technical information on diesel engines and comments on the cri
teria previously published by the Federal Construction Council. After analyz
ing the responses to this questionnaire, the Task Group arranged to meet with
all manufacturers indicating a desire to do so, and during these conferences,
the Task Group members discussed possible criteria with manufacturers. The
information and views thus acquired and the collective technical experience
of the Task Group members are the basis for the recommendations made in this
report .
1
II
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GENERAL
To obtain stationary power plant diesel engines that offer adequate output,
low life-cycle cost, and high reliability, federal agencies should employ
procurement documents that include both technical and experience requirements
and provide for consideration of operating costs in the award of contracts.
B. TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS
1. Specified Output
Federal agencies should not accept diesel engines that have rotational
speeds which exceed the values presented in Table 1 for the appropriate
class of engine and specified output.
3
Rotational Speed
(rpm)
Maximum
000 00 90 75 aFor
0-Hz
ispeed
the
limits
be
should
reduced
nthe
dto
power
niecatredst
EClass
Cngine
00
5
less
(kW)
Output
Specified
>00
00
to
000
>00
to
powera)
RSpeed
0
TABLE
Limits
5-Hz
(for
eoctoamtienodeadl >00
Rotational Speed
(rpm)
Maximum
000 00 90 75 00
EClass
Bngine
00
less
§
(kW)
Output
Specified sspeed
for
frequency.
that
ynchronous
>00
00
to
>00
00
to >00
00
to
>00
Rotational Speed
(rpm)
Maximum
500
000 00 90 75
EClass
Angine
§
00
less
(kW)
Output
Specified
>00
00
to >00
70
to >70
000
to
>00
3. Brake Mean Effective Pressure Limitation
Federal agencies should not accept diesel engines that have a brake mean
effective pressure (bmep) at the specified output which exceeds the
values presented in Table 2 for the appropriate engine class and rota
tional speed. Agencies also should not accept an engine if its bmep at
the specified output exceeds the manufacturer's published bmep for the
engine with the same output in a similar application.
4. Torsional Stress
5. Engine Auxiliaries
c. Disposable air and oil filter elements should meet Military or Federal
Specifications if obtaining other types would present a supply problem.
5
Supercharged
w/co ling"
aThe
ifor
speeds
0-Hz
00-Hz
the
should
be
ndare
power;
ipower,
cated
Supercharged coolingG
w/o
4Cycle
2-Stroke
NatAsp6
85 90 95 90 95 95 95
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EBrake
Maximum
PMean
fresctuirve
reduced
sthe
frequency.
that
for
speed
ynto
ecahreosntous
Supercharged
Limits
RMean
EBrake
P2
eTABLE
frcoemscetunidrved
cooling"
w/
Supercharged
cooling0
w/o
00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0 00 00 00 00 00 0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cTwithout
uinrtbeorcohlaerg.ed
"^Tuwith
irntbeorcohalerg.ed
NatAsp*
85 85 85 85 85 85 90 90
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 9 9 0
(rpm)a
Speed 400
less
S 400
less
& less
&
400
Rotational ^Naturally
aspirated.
004
000 020 90 72 90 004 004
000 00 90 72 90 000 020 90 72 90
Engine
Class
A B C
(5) Automatic alarm and shutdown for overspeed, low lubricating-oil
pressure, and high cooling-water temperature.
Federal agencies should require that all class A and class B diesel engines
and all class C engines for which fuel guarantees are required be tested
for fuel consumption at full load, three-quarter load, and one-half load
(or such other loads as may be appropriate) in accordance with Power Test
Code No. 17 of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. Wherever
possible all fuel consumption tests should be performed in the field and
witnessed and certified by a representative of the contracting officer.
Where several identical units are being installed, a test of one engine
may be considered applicable to all.
C. COST FACTORS
b. Calculate the cost of the fuel expected to be used over the antici
pated useful life of each engine on the basis of the bidder's guar
anteed maximum fuel consumption rate for full load, three-quarter
7
load, and one-half load operation; the number of hours the unit is
expected to operate annually at the various loads; and the projected
cost of fuel over the anticipated useful life of the unit.*
D. EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS
**The procurement documents should specify the basis on which any financial
adjustment will be calculated (i.e., the assumed number of operating hours
per year at the various loads, the assumed anticipated useful life of the
unit, the assumed cost of fuel, and the assumed discount rate if used).
8
Ill
DISCUSSION
A. GENERAL
Most federal agencies purchase electric power from public utilities whenever
possible, and they appear to be quite satisfied with this approach. However,
for a number of reasons (e.g., to obtain the extra precise electric power
required by some computers and highly sophisticated military and scientific
equipment, to generate electricity at remote facilities not served by electric
utilities, or to provide an emergency power source for critical installations),
agencies have had to build hundreds of electric-power generating plants of
their own during the past 30 years.
Although such federally owned plants generate only a small fraction of the
total power used by the federal government, the annual investment in such
plants runs into many millions of dollars. In addition, this investment
probably will increase significantly in the future since the recent increases
in power and fuel costs have made it economically advantageous for agencies
to build and operate generating plants in some situations (e.g., when the
waste heat from such plants can be used effectively) even when power from a
public utility is available.
Given the high initial investment involved and the fact that, once built, a
plant usually will be operated for many years at considerable expense, federal
agencies try to ensure that their plants are outfitted with the proper equip
ment. Among the many pieces of equipment installed in a generating plant,
none is more important than the prime mover. It, more than any other item,
affects the reliability of the plant and its maintenance and operating costs.
Although many different prime movers can be used for electric -power generation
(including gas and steam turbines) , diesel engines have been used most often
in the past and most likely will continue to be for plants of the size required
by federal agencies. Diesel engines are selected for use in such plants pri
marily because: (1) they are efficient and reliable, (2) their first cost is
relatively low, (3) they are manufactured in a very wide range of sizes, (4)
spare parts usually are readily available, and (5) trained operators and
mechanics are in good supply.
Because diesel engines are used so frequently and are such key items in
generating plants, federal agencies try to obtain units that offer high
reliability, adequate output, and low life-cycle cost (i.e., total owning
and operating cost, which is the sum of the first cost of the unit and its
auxiliary equipment and the cost of operating, maintaining, and repairing
the unit over its economic life) . Since these objectives are basically the
same for all types of mechanical equipment it might appear that developing
satisfactory diesel engine procurement documents would not be particularly
difficult, but federal agencies have found that this is not the case.
9
A major source of difficulty is that a very wide variety of diesel engines
are available from different manufacturers and, in some cases, from the same
manufacturer. To further complicate the situation, a manufacturer frequently
will offer the same basic engine, with possibly a different output rating
and/or a different model number, for various applications, and while virtually
all currently available engines will give satisfactory service in the applica
tion for which they are particularly suited, many will give less than satis
factory service in some other application.
Thus, the problem for the agencies is to ensure that the engine procured is a
good one (and hopefully the best one) for the job. This is not an easy task
for any purchaser, but it is particularly difficult for federal agencies
because they are required by federal procurement regulations to purchase most
items on the basis of competitive bids. For this reason federal agencies
must take special care in the preparation of their diesel engine procurement
documents and, in fact, they have done so over the years.
10
engine he needs for his application. Moreover, most manufacturers identify
only two classes, which the Task Group believes is too few for the many dif
ferent operating conditions that federal agencies (and probably other owners
as well) must consider.
In order to clarify the situation and to provide a more precise basis for
establishing and applying its specific recommendations, the Task Group has
defined three classes of engine, basically in terms of the number of hours
the engine is expected to operate per year or to average annually over a
10-year period (see page 2) . While the Task Group realizes that in some
cases an agency will find it difficult to predict the number of hours an
engine will operate, it believes that it is better to base decisions on con
sidered, although possibly imperfect, estimates than to rely on vague terms
subject to different interpretations.
B. TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS
In the course of its study the Task Group wrote to all known U.S. diesel
engine manufacturers requesting suggestions for updating and improving the
criteria currently used by federal agencies in the procurement of diesel
engines. In their responses, many manufacturers indicated that technical
requirements relating to the design of engines should not be included in
agency procurement documents because such requirements restrict the manu
facturers' design freedom, something they maintained is necessary: (1) because
engines are complex machines that cannot be designed on the basis of rules of
thumb, and (2) to permit them to continue to improve the state of the art.
In subsequent meetings with manufacturers, the Task Group explained that most
technical requirements were included in agency procurement documents primarily
to ensure that the engines purchased by the agencies would operate reliably
and would not require excessive maintenance and repair. The Task Group also
indicated, however, that it recognized the desirability of not restricting the
manufacturers' design freedom, and it invited discussion of alternative means
for achieving the purpose for which the technical requirements have been used.
A number of possibilities were considered including: (1) having manufacturers
provide long-term warranties for their products relative to reliability and
repair, and (2) having manufacturers provide verifiable equipment -reliability
and -repair cost data that agencies could use in awarding contracts. After
considerable discussion with the various manufacturers, the Task Group rejected
these and other alternatives because almost all of the concepts proposed
required that the manufacturers have good data on the operating histories of
their engines and most manufacturers indicated either that they did not have
such data and could not afford to collect them or that they would hesitate to
draw conclusions about the probable repair and maintenance costs of a particu
lar prospective owner on the basis of the experience of a group of previous
owners .
11
anxious to maintain the good will of their customers. Without disputing that
diesel engine manufacturers are highly reputable firms, the Task Group con
cluded that it had to reject this suggestion for several reasons:
On the basis of its analysis of the situation, the Task Group concluded that
agency procurement documents must include technical requirements to ensure
that the engines purchased by the agencies give reliable service without
requiring undue maintenance and produce the amount of power required. The
Task Group therefore has recommended that the technical requirements discussed
below be included in agency procurement documents. However, in the interest
of minimizing restrictions on the design freedom of the manufacturers, the
number of technical requirements recommended has been held to a minimum.
1. Specified Output
12
striking this balance is a somewhat subjective one, and various
manufacturers view the matter differently; some, for example, strive
for high output and low first cost, while others emphasize high reli
ability and long life.* Obviously, if only output ratings were com
pared, manufacturers in the latter category would be at a disadvantage.
The earlier FCC task groups studying diesel engines tended to accept the
argument that engine reliability and longevity decrease as rotational speed
increases, and they recommended limitations on rotational speed depending
on the capacity and application class of the engine. However, these task
groups also recommended further investigation of the matter.
*For obvious reasons, few if any manufacturers will admit to having sacrificed
anything in the design of their engines.
13
Prior to initiating the study on which this report is based, Task Group
T-59 made an extensive survey of federal facilities in an effort to deter
mine the facts of the matter. Unfortunately, all the Task Group could
learn was that the data available from federal facilities are insufficient
to permit any conclusions to be drawn, one way or another. A review of
data available from other sources also failed to provide a definitive
answer. Therefore, in addressing the matter in this study, the Task Group
had to rely primarily on the experience and engineering judgment of its
members and the views of the various manufacturers with whom it met.
On the basis of its investigation the Task Group reached essentially the
same conclusion that other FCC task groups had reached; namely, that there
is a relationship between wear and rotational speed. Accordingly, the
Task Group developed Table 1 (page 3) which presents its recommended limi
tations on rotational speed. The limitations are similar to those recom
mended by earlier FCC groups in that less stringent limitations are recom
mended both for engines in lighter duty applications and for smaller
engines. The Task Group believes that higher speed engines should be
permitted for lighter duty applications because, by definition, such
engines are expected to operate fewer hours per year and, hence, can be
expected to experience less wear than an engine operating almost continu
ously. The Task Group has recommended that higher speeds be permitted in
the smaller capacity ranges because it believes that stress and wear rates
decrease as the mass of the moving elements of the engine decreases. (The
fact that no small low-speed engines currently are manufactured in the
United States was, of course, also a factor in the Task Group's decision.)
In making its recommendation, the Task Group was aware that, in terms of
initial cost, a high-speed engine is less expensive than a low-speed
engine of the same capacity. The Task Group nevertheless opted in favor
of lower speeds in the belief that the higher first cost of a low-speed
engine would be offset by savings in maintenance and repair costs and by
the somewhat intangible benefits of higher reliability.
. bhp • 33,000
bm6P = L • A • N »
14
In a physical sense, bmep is increased by increasing the charge of fuel
and air supplied to the engine cylinders. The most direct way of accom
plishing this is through supercharging (i.e., using a compressor or a
blower to compress the combustion air being supplied to the cylinders) .
In most modem engines, superchargers are powered by turbines driven by
engine exhaust gases, in which case the process is known as turbocharging.
Some manufacturers have objected to any limits being placed on bmep. They
have contended that, in the interest of economy, bmep should be as high as
the engine can comfortably withstand and that this value is a function of
the design of the engine, which of course is the province of the engine
manufacturers .
Task Group T-59 recognizes the economic advantages of higher bmep values
(i.e., higher output without a corresponding increase in engine size);
however, for the reasons mentioned in the first section of this discussion
the Task Group does not believe it would be practical or desirable for
federal agencies to eliminate bmep restrictions. The Task Group there
fore has recommended bmep limits for various classes, rotational speeds,
and types of engine (see Table 2, page 5). In most cases, these limits
are significantly higher than those recommended in earlier FCC reports,
reflecting advances in engine technology over the intervening years. The
limits are not, however, as high as the bmep values currently used by
some manufacturers. If the recommended limits are adopted by government
agencies, manufacturers of such engines in some cases would be forced to
supply a larger engine than they ordinarily would supply to meet the mini
mum output specified. This situation will result because bmep is directly
related to engine output, and by adopting bmep limits, agencies would be
placing an upper limit on the maximum output of an engine of a particular
size and type. This, in effect, would force a manufacturer who has assigned
his engine an output rating higher than that permitted by the applicable
bmep limit to derate his engine. Although forcing a manufacturer to
derate his engine might seem unfair, blanket acceptance of manufacturer-
assigned ratings could be even more unfair as discussed previously. On
the other hand, the Task Group does not believe that a manufacturer should
be permitted to supply a federal agency with an engine having a bmep
at the specified output that exceeds the maximum bmep that the manufac
turer would permit at the same output. In other words, when dealing
15
with agencies, a manufacturer whose engines are conservatively designed
with lower bmep levels than those indicated in Table 2 should not be
permitted to raise their bmep levels up to those in the table thereby
permitting them to provide an agency a smaller engine than they would
any other purchaser.
4. Torsional Stress
Not all critical speeds are of equal importance and, in fact, the majority
are of no importance at all. In general, the most significant speeds are
those whose torque components act cumulatively to twist the crankshaft,
in its normal mode of vibration, to a degree causing excessive torsional
stresses. Torsional vibrations usually do not shake the framing of the
engine and may not be noticeable to the operator (i.e., crankshafts have
broken without warning when the mass elastic system has not been safely
designed to limit fatigue stresses) ; therefore, it is important that the
degree and nature of existing stresses in an engine crankshaft be deter
mined by torsional analysis.
16
SPEED (rpm)
FIGURE 1 Typical graph of vibratory stress vs. speed for a 4 -stroke- cycle
diesel engine.
17
With materials currently available and current technology, there is a low
incidence of failures of the type just described. However, because of
the potential seriousness of this type of failure and the cumulative
effect of torsional stresses on the acceleration of metal fatigue, the
Task Group believes that conservative limits should be observed. In the
opinion of the Task Group, the torsional stress limitations established
in MIL-STD 167B will provide engines of satisfactory reliability.
C. COST EVALUATION
18
Suppliers to subordinate all design considerations and performance goals to
first cost (within the limits permitted by the specification) and can result
in engine operating costs that are unnecessarily high.
Recognizing the realities of the situation and the fact that low first cost
can seldom be achieved without sacrificing either fuel economy or engine life
or both, most agencies have tried to develop diesel -engine specifications that
serve to establish a minimum level of quality, and such specifications generally
have served their purpose. There is, however, one serious drawback to speci
fying minimum quality levels in a competitive bidding situation, and that is
that the minimums tend to become the maximums since there is no incentive for
a supplier to offer a unit that exceeds the minimums.
In the case of minimum values relating to fuel economy this shortcoming can
be very expensive for the owner since the cost of the fuel consumed by a class
A engine in just two years can more than exceed the first cost of the unit.
Given rising fuel prices, the economic penalty for having an inefficient
engine grow larger yearly.*
To overcome this problem the Task Group has proposed that federal agencies
either:
(2) specify very stringent fuel consumption rates and impose a financial
penalty equal to the estimated extra cost of fuel consumed over the
projected life of the unit on any successful bidder whose engine cannot
meet the specified consumption rate.**
*A similar problem exists with regard to the maintenance and repair costs,
but the amount of money involved is much less than in the case of fuel con
sumption and the solution is much more complex. For these reasons the Task
Group concluded that the problem did not lend itself to the types of solution
proposed for fuel costs.
**The penalty can be imposed either by requiring the contractor to refund money
to the government or by withholding money from his final payment.
19
The first alternative is considered the more straightforward of the two since
it would not involve payment of a penalty by the supplier (except in those
rare cases when a supplier could not meet the fuel consumption rate he has
guaranteed) and is generally in accord with common commercial practice. How
ever, agencies would have to contract separately for engine-generator sets
and for any other work associated with the project, and federal contracting
officers prefer to have just one contract for a particular project. The
second alternative is intended to be used only when it is impractical to pur
chase engine-generator sets directly from a manufacturer or supplier (e.g.
when the sets are part of a much larger project and the contracting officer
refuses to permit multiple contracts for the project) and is considered less
desirable than the first because it assumes that successful bidders fre
quently will be required to refund money to the government, a situation that
could lead to disputes between the contracting agency and the contractor
whenever the contractor does not fully understand the rationale behind the
requirement. The Task Group believes, however, that this approach can be
used successfully (i.e., can be used without generating disputes) if agencies
clearly indicate to prospective bidders that the specified fuel rate is not
necessarily expected to be met but rather that it should be considered as a
reference point which will be used to determine the amount of any financial
penalty to be imposed, thereby to equalize the bids of various suppliers on
the basis of fuel consumption. Thus, bidders should include in their bids
money to cover any penalty that they will have to pay.
D. EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS
Given the complexity of diesel engines, Task Group T-59 also believes as did
the earlier groups, that the soundness of a particular design can be proven
only through operation of the engine under field conditions over a period of
time. Several federal agencies have included experience clauses in their
contract documents for a number of years, and it appears that such clauses
have been useful .
20
Most engine manufacturers recognize the desirability of experience requirements
and have voiced few objections to the use of experience clauses. A few, how
ever, have recommended that they not be used because they sometimes prevent
manufacturers from supplying agencies with their most modern designs. This,
the Task Group believes, is a small price to pay for the peace of mind that
comes from knowing that an engine of proven reliability is being purchased.
Moreover, the Task Group believes it is not a common problem since manufacturers
develop a totally new engine design very infrequently.
The second criticism voiced by manufacturers was that some experience clauses
have precluded use of satisfactory experience gained in one application (e.g.,
in a locomotive) as evidence that the engine will perform satisfactorily in
another application (e.g., for electric -power generation). The manufacturers
maintained that such experience data should be accepted if the application on
which it is based is more demanding than the anticipated application, but the
Task Group is not persuaded by these arguments. It believes that each appli
cation, in its own way, is usually as demanding as another application; electric-
power generation, for example, is frequently more demanding than almost any other
application in terms of the number of hours the engine must operate continuously
and efficiently. The Task Group therefore believes that agencies should require
that experience data for diesels to be used for electric -power generation be on
diesels used for the same purpose.
21
APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO
DIESEL ENGINE MANUFACTURERS
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26
APPENDIX B
a. Engines : Each of two diesel engines of the same model, speed, bore,
stroke , number of cylinders and cylinder configuration as the equipment
proposed hereunder and operating at the same or higher brake mean effec
tive pressure (bmep) , and rating than the equipment proposed hereunder
shall have performed satisfactorily in a stationary electric -power plant,
independent of the contractor's facilities, for a minimum of 8,000 hours
of actual operation. For at least 400 of these 8,000 hours, the load
carried shall be equal to or in excess of the full load rating required
under this invitation and it shall have produced not less than 5,000 kilo
watt hours (kWh) of electricity for each kW of generator nameplate capa
bility. This operating experience (8,000 hours total, 5,000 kWh per kW
of nameplate capability, 400 hours full load) shall have been accumulated
within a consecutive calendar period of 2 years. Except for auxiliaries
and attachments on the engine, the two engines cited for experience shall
be essentially identical with each other and with the engine being pro
posed hereunder. Where individual components in the engine being pro
posed are not identical to the similar components in the engine cited for
experience, the component being proposed must have at least 4,000 hours
of experience with the particular model of engine being offered. Opera
tion during the 2-year period described above will not be considered
satisfactory if:
(1) The availability of the engine together with its auxiliaries was
less than 95 percent. Availability as used herein is defined as
the operating time divided by the operating time plus downtime due
to repair and maintenance time. In making this calculation, all of
the operating times (irrespective of load), repair times, and main
tenance times within the 2-year period will be included. Administra
tive downtimes will be excluded from both the numerator and denominator.
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satisfactory operating experience associated with diesel -electric
generating service (within a consecutive calendar period of 2 years) .
Operation during the 2-year period described above will not be considered
satisfactory if:
(1) The availability of the engine auxiliary was less than 95 percent.
c. Fuel System: Engines cited for experience shall have accumulated all of
the required operating time using the particular type or types (and grades
as applicable) of fuel specified herein. Where the specified fuel system
requires the engine to be started on one type or grade of fuel and then
run on another type or grade of fuel, the cited engines shall have accumu
lated all of the required operating time in this manner. In addition,
where the specified fuel system requires dual fuel operation, minimum
operation on each fuel shall be 400 hours on at least one of the engines
cited for experience. The automatic fuel transfer function for the cited
dual -fuel engines shall have occurred a minimum of 10 times during the
required operating time without any significant deviation in the quality
of the power produced.
A diesel engine of the same model, speed, bore, stroke, number of cylinders,
and cylinder configuration as the equipment proposed hereunder and operating
at the same or higher brake mean effective pressure (bmep) , and rating than
the equipment proposed hereunder shall have performed satisfactorily in
electric-generator service, in the manufacturer's plant or independent of
the contractor's facilities, for a minimum of 2,000 hours of actual operation.
For at least 100 of these 2,000 hours, the load carried shall be equal to or
in excess of the full load rating required under this invitation. Except for
auxiliaries and attachments on the engine, the engine cited for experience
shall be essentially identical with the engine being proposed hereunder. Where
individual components in the engine being proposed are not identical to the
similar components in the engine cited for experience, the component being
proposed must have at least 1,000 hours of experience with the particular model
of engine being offered. Auxiliaries and attachments on the engine proposed
hereunder, such as governors, superchargers, pumps, filters, etc. may be dif
ferent from the same item on the engine cited for experience, provided such
devices meet the detailed requirements of these specifications. In addition,
each such device shall have had a minimum of 1,000 hours of satisfactory
operating experience associated with diesel -electric generating service. Oper
ation during the operating period described above will not be considered
satisfactory if any failure of the engine or an engine auxiliary resulted in
a downtime for repairs in excess of 72 hours.
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