CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST B.
CAUSE OF ACTION
A. ACTIONS
1. MANALO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 141297, OCTOBER 8, 2001
FACTS: Villanueva Enterprises, represented by its president,
Therese Villanueva Vargas, obtained a loan of three million
pesos and one million pesos from the respondent PAIC Savings
and Mortgage Bank and the Philippine American Investments
Corporation (PAIC), respectively. To secure payment of both
debts, Vargas executed in favor of the respondent and PAIC a
joint first mortgageover two parcels of land registered under her
name. One of the lots is the subject of the present case. S.
Villanueva Enterprises failed to settle its loan obligation.
Accordingly, respondent instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged lots and acquired
the same as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year, title
was consolidated in respondent’s name for failure of Vargas to
redeem. The Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for
assistance in the liquidation of the respondent PAIC with the
Regional Trial Court. After a few years, respondent petitioned
the RegionalTrialCourtofPasayCity for the issuance of a writ of
possession for the subject property. However, during the
pendency of civil case for the issuance of a writ of possession,
Vargas executed a deed of absolute sale selling, transferring, and
conveying ownership of the disputed lot in favor of a certain
Armando Angsico. Notwithstanding this sale, Vargas, still
representing herself to be the lawful owner of the property,
leased the same to petitioner Domingo R. Manalo. Later,
Armando Angsico, as buyer of the property, assigned his rights
therein to petitioner. The court subsequently issued the writ of
possession but Villanueva Enterprises and Vargas moved for its
quashal. Petitioner, on the strength of the lease contract and
deed of assignment made in his favor, submitted a permission
to file an ex-parte motion to intervene. Both motions were
denied by the court. Court of Appeals upheld the order of the
lower court. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the jurisdiction for the issuance of the
writ of possession filed by the respondent bank is vested solely
on the liquidation court.
HELD: No. The exclusive jurisdiction of the liquidation court
pertains only to the adjudication of claims against the bank. It
does not cover the reverse situation where it is the bank which
files a claim against another person or legal entity.
Although the law provides that all claims against the
insolvent bank should be filed in the liquidation proceeding,
such legal provision only finds operation in cases where there
are claims against an insolvent bank. In fine, the exclusive
jurisdiction of the liquidation court pertains only to the
adjudication of claims against the bank. It does not cover the
reverse situation where it is the bank which files a claim against
another person or legal entity. Moreover, a bank which had been
ordered closed by the monetary board retains its juridical
personality which can sue and be sued through its liquidator.
The only limitation being that the prosecution or defense of the
action must be done through the liquidator. Otherwise, no suit
for or against an insolvent entity would prosper. In such
situation, banks in liquidation would lose what justly belongs to
them through a mere technicality.
___________________________________________
2. MALLION VS. ALCANTARA, G.R. NO. 141528;
OCOTBER 31, 2006
Facts:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed
with the regional trial court seeking a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was
dismissed in the Court of Appeals.
After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with the regional trial court
alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due
to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage
license.
Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on
the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.
Issue:
Is the action of the husband tenable?
Ruling:
No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
pertains as “bar by prior judgment” or “estoppels by verdict,”
which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of
the second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of
action. In Section 47(c) of the same rule, it pertains to res
judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or the
rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually
and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in
any futurecase between the same parties involving a different
cause of action. Therefore, having expressly and impliedly
concealed the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is
now deemed to have waived any defects therein. The
Court finds then that the present action for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
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3. SELGA VS. BRAR, SEPTEMBER 21, 2011
G.R. NO. 175151
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS
Francisco Entierro died instestate, leaving a parcel of
land to his spouse Basilia and their children. On May 1985,
Basilia and her children executed a Deed of Sale with
Declaration of Heirship to declare themselves to have inherited
the parcel of land, and sell the said land in favor of Petitioner
Spouses Tobias and Ceferina Selga.
Seven years later, Responded Sony Brar, represented
by her sister-in-law, Marina Entierro, filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Sales against the Petitioners. She claimed that she
was one of the children of Francisco and Basilia, and the she was
unlawfully deprived of her rightful share in the subject property
when it was sold to the Selgas. The case, docketed as Civil Case
No. 276, declared the annulment of the Deed of Sale with
Declaration of Heirship and adjudicating Brar as one of the
heirs. Unsatisfied with the decision, Brar filed an appeal before
the Court of Appeals, which she eventually withdraw. Thus, the
decision of Civil Case No. 276 attained finality.
In 1997, Brar informed the Selgas that she was
exercising her right to redeem her share in the subject property
in property. However, the Selgas, through counsel, rejected
Brar’s demand stating that the decision of the Trial Court did not
include to grant her the right of redemption. This prompted Brar
to file a Complaint for Legal Redemption with Damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 573. The Trial Court dismissed the
case because the case constituted forum shopping and that the
decision was silent as to her right to redeem the subject
Page 1 of 24
property. However, the Court of Appeals reversed its decision
stating that the right of redemption is a statutory right provided
by law, hence, mere silence does not mean that the same is
denied.
ISSUE
Whether or not Brar’s right to redemption of the subject
property is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
RULING
Yes. The Court ruled that the case (Civil Case No. 573) satisfies
the four essential requisites of res judicata: (1) finality of the
former judgement (Civil Case No. 276); (2) court rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3)
judgment on the merits; and (4) identiy of parties, subject
matter and causes of actions. It was not disputed that the first
three requisites were present in the Civil Case No. 573. With
regard the fourth requisite, a close study of the said complaint
reveal that Brar’s right to redeem the Selga’s share in the subject
property also arose from its sale to the Selgas by the co-heirs and
co-owners of Marina, alleged to be without her knowledge or
consent. Therefore, it is the same cause of action as in Civil Case
No. 276.
Even if Brar argue that the decision in Civil Case No.
276 was silent about his right to redeem, the silence of the
decision does not mean that the Court then did not take
cognizance of the same, rather, it did not deem him entitled to
the said right. If at all, any error committed by the said Court
could only be reviewed or corrected on appeal. Albeit Brar filed
initially an appeal of its judgement, Brar withdrew the same
eventually, which made the decision in Civil Case No. 276 final
and executory. Hence, Civil Case No. 573 is dismissed, being
barred by res judicata.
___________________________________________
4. FLORES VS. LINDO, APRIL 13, 2011
G.R. NO. 183984, [APRIL 13, 2011]
FACTS:
Respondent Edna Lindo obtained a loan from
Petitioner Arturo Flores amounting to P400,000 and secured it
with a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. The mortgage covered
property in the name of Edna and her husband, co-respondent
Enrico Lindo, Jr. Edna likewise signed a Promissory Note and
the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.
She issued three checks as partial loan payments, all of
which were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Flores
therefore filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage with
damages. The RTC ruled that petitioner was not entitled to
judicial foreclosure as the Deed was without consent and
authority of Edna’s husband. The Deed was executed on October
31, 1995, while the Special Power of Attorney was executed by
Enrico only on November 4, 1995. Accordingly, the mortgage is
void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code. The RTC,
however, ruled that petitioner may still recover the loan through
a personal action against Edna, but that it had no jurisdiction
over the said personal action which should be filed where
plaintiff or defendant resides.
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and
damages. The respondents alleged that Enrico was not a party
to the loan because it was contracted by Edna without Enrico’s
signature. They also prayed for the dismissal of the case on
grounds of improper venue, res judicata and forum-shopping.
The RTC ruled that res judicata will not apply to rights, claims
or demands which, though growing out of the same subject
matter, constitute separate or distinct causes of action.
The Court of Appeals set aside the RTC ruling. It noted
that petitioner allowed the earlier decision of the RTC to become
final and executory without asking the courts for an alternative
relief. The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied
on the declarations of these courts that he could file a separate
personal action and thus failed to observe the rules and settled
jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioner’s
avenue for recovery of the loan.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the promissory note and deed of mortgage are void
(2) Whether there remains an available remedy for petitio
ner
HELD:
(1) NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of
the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date
of contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies
to conjugal partnership property, is a reproduction of Article 96
of the Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that
the powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent shall be void.
However, both provisions also state that “the transaction shall
be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as
a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse x x x beforethe offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.”
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special
Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November
1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance
by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer
as a binding contractbetween the parties, making the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
(2) YES. In Chieng v. Santos, this Court ruled that a mortgage-
creditor may institute against the mortgage-debtor either a
personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the
mortgage. The Court ruled that the remedies are alternative and
not cumulative and held that the filing of a criminal action for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was in effect a collection
suit or a suit for the recovery of the mortgage-debt. In that case,
however, this Court prohac vice, ruled that respondents could
still be held liable for the balance of the loan, applying the
principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another.
The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under
Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of
Page 2 of 24
 something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.
There is unjust enrichment “when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience.” The principle
of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person
is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that
such benefit is derived at the expense of another. The main
objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent
one from enriching himself at the expense of another without
just cause or consideration. The principle is applicable in this
case considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan from
petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid without just
cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the instance
of Edna, first when she raised it as a defense before the RTC,
Branch 33 and second, when she filed an action for declaratory
relief before the RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not be
expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an alternative remedy,
as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have done,
because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no
jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner might have
against Edna.
Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself
because of the erroneous decisions of the two trial courts when
she questioned the validity of the Deed.
___________________________________________
C. PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTION
5. MANESE VS. SPS. VELASCO, ANUARY
29, 2009
6. TANJUATCO VS. JUDGE GAKO,
MARCH 23, 2009
___________________________________________
7. SOQUILLO VS. TORTOLA, JULY 23, 2012
FACTS:
 On March 8 1966, a parcel of land lacated in Alubijid,
Misamis Oriental originally owned by Lorenzo Coloso,
Jr was sold to Ramon Jamis through execution of
notarized deed of conditional sale.
 The sale became definite the day after. Subsequently,
Jamis sold the subject property to Jorge Tortola( herein
respondent)
 Tortola took possession of the property, paid its realty
taxes due from 1975-2002. However, the receipts for
the payments still stated Coloso, Jr.’s name, withthe
exception of Tax Declaration Nos. 942443, indicating
“Lorenzo Coloso, Jr. c/o Mr. Tortola” and 026083,
bearing the name of “Jorge Tortola”
 Tortola moved to Bukidnon and left the subject lot
under the care of Godofredo Villaflores
 Later, Atty. Pacana was informed of the desire of the
heirs of Coloso to recover the subject lot and notified
Tortola through letter
 Tortola sent, in reply, copy of the notarized deed of
definite sale executed between the latter and Jamis
 On September 22 1993, application for free patent was
filed by the Colosos with Commnity of Environmental
and Natural Resources in Cagayan De Oro City to
obtain title over the subject land
 After survey was conducted, it was reported by the land
investigator that the Colosos had been in possession
and cultivating the subject land
 Colosos were recommended to be issued free patent
 On December 14, 1994, Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-20825 covering the disputed property was
issued in favor of the Heirs of Coloso, Jr
 Colosos subsequently sold the land to Santiago Soquillo
through execution of absolute deed of sale
 Soquillo, knowing there were other people in
possession of the land, filed a complaint for illegal
detainer against spouses Villaflores
MTC Ruling
• For failure of Villaflores to file an answer, the
case was decided in favor of Soquillo. Hence the
former was ejected from the subject land
 Upon knowing of the ejectment, Tortola filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Branch 44, Initao, Misamis
Oriental a complaint against Coloso, the Heirs
ofColoso, Jr., Soquillo, and the MTC of Alubijid,
Misamis Oriental for annulment of title/sale/judgment
with prayers for the issuance of injunctive reliefs and
award of damages
RTC Ruling
• The trial court ruled in favor of Tortola
• Accordingly, it can be established that [Tortola]
acquired a right over the subject parcel of land
under a Deed of Definite Sale dated March 29,
1966, which was registered on September 5, 2002
in the Registry of Deeds, and by the cancellation
of Tax Declaration No. 023086 by Tax
Declaration No.026083 in the name of Jorge
Tortola.
• Registration of the instrument in the Office of the
Register of Deeds constitutes constructive notice
to the parties of the transfer of ownership over the
subject property.
• The respondent occupied the said property and
constructed his house and resided thereon until he
left for Maramag, Bukidnon sometime in the late
1960’s, leaving the occupation of the said
property to Spouses Villaflores, with his
permission, continuously until 2002.
• The ownership and possession of the land was
admitted and acknowledged by the herein
defendants Heirs of Coloso, Jr. in their letters to
[Tortola]. Likewise, defendant Soquillo, admitted
the actual occupation of the land by Spouses
Villaflores by the fact of his filing a civil action
against them in court.
• Under the law, if the property has not yet passed
to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for
reconveyance is still available.
• Defendant Soquillo cannot be considered as an
innocent purchaser for value or that he acquired
the subject property through mistake and fraud.
• He can only be considered a trustee by
implication, for the benefit of Tortola, who is the
true and lawful owner of the litigated land,
pursuant to Article 1456 of the New Civil Code.
• Laches cannot prejudice the lawful right of
Tortola in its ownership and possession of the
subject litigated property. There was no failure or
neglect on the part of Tortola]in asserting his
rights after knowing defendant’s conduct,
evidenced by all the letters sent to the defendants
Page 3 of 24
 resulting to their knowledge of the actual
ownership and occupation of the subject land.
• The principle of indefeasibillity of title does not
apply where fraud attended the issuance of title,
as in this case. The settled rule is that a free patent
issued over aprivate land, which in this case the
subject litigated land belonged to plaintiffTortola,
is null and void, and produces no legal effects
whatsoever (Heirs of Simplicio Santiago vs.
Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, 404 SCRA
193).
 Soquillo appealed to Court of Appeals, averring that the
RTC erred in not finding that Tortola’s complaint
stated no cause of action. He alleged that since Tortola
sought the cancellation of a free patent, not him but the
State, was the real party-in interest.
 He also argued that he was a purchaser in good faith
and for value, thus, the RTC’s order to reconvey the
disputed property and award damages in Tortola’s
favor was improper.
Ruling of Court of Appeals
• The appellate court denied the petition
• According to the lower court, the defense that the
Complaint failed to state a cause of action must be
raised at the earliest possible time.
• Petitioner cannot be considered a purchaser in
good faith and for value because defendant
Arthur Coloso as Attorney-in-fact of the heirs of
Lorenzo Boy Coloso did not have the right to sell
the disputed land to the former.
• Knowledge that Villaflores was the agent of
Tortola serves as prior knowledge and despite
that, Colosos still filed application for free patent
made false declaration that they have been
cultivating and in possession thereof
• Such false declarations in the Application,
however, constituted concealment of material
facts, which amounted to fraud. This, therefore,
inevitably resulted to the cancellation of title.
• Public policy demands that one who obtains title
to a public land through fraud should not be
allowed to benefit therefrom.
• “Indeed, the general rule is that a purchaser may
rely on what appears on the face of a certificate of
title. An exception to this rule is when there exist
important facts that would create suspicion in an
otherwise reasonable man (and spur him) to go
beyond the present title and to investigate those
that preceded it. One who falls within the
exception can neither be denominated an
innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in
good faith, hence, does not merit the protection of
the law.” (Eagle Realty Corporation vs.
Republic of the Philippines, et al.,)
 Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA erred in:
 not finding that the complaint states no cause of action;
 not finding that the petitioner is a purchaser in good
faith and for value;
 awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees.
THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
 The Court DENIED the petition
 Questions of law and not of facts are the proper
subjects of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule45. In the case at bar, Soquillo raises factual
questions which were already resolved in the
proceedings below. Further, the factual findings of the
RTC and the CA were in accord with each other and
were supported by substantial evidence.
 Even if we were to resolve the first issue raised by
Soquillo relative to the alleged lack of standing of
Tortola as the real party-in-interest, there is still no
ground to dismiss the latter’s complaint. The action
filed by Tortola was not for reversion, but for the
declaration of nullity of a free patent and a certificate
of title.
 The second and third issues raised by Soquillo were
exhaustively discussed by the RTC and the CA. Soquillo
was not a purchaser in good faith. He and the heirs of
Coloso, Jr. who were his predecessors-in-interest knew
about the sale made to Tortola and the possession of
the disputed property by Villaflores. Besides, Tortola
registered the sale, albeit with much delay, in 2002. As
of the time Tortola's complaint was filed, no
registration was effected by Soquillo.
___________________________________________
8. ANG VS. ANG, AUGUST 22, 2012
FACTS:
 Spouses Alan & Em Ang (respondents) obtained a loan
($300k) from Theodore & Nancy Ang (petitioners),
also, a promissory note was executed in favor of the
petitioners wherein they promised to pay the latter the
said amount, with interest at the rate of 10% per year,
upon demand.
 However, despite repeated demands, the respondents
failed to pay the petitioners.
 Since the loan already amounted to almost $720k,
inclusive of interest, petitioner, who were then resident
in LA, executed their SPA in favor of Atty. Aceron for
the purpose of filing an action in court against the
respondents.
 A complaint for collection of sum of money was then
filed with the RTC-QC.
 Respondent moved for the dismissal of the complaint
in the grounds of improper venue and prescription
asserting that the complaint against them may only be
filed in the court of the place where either they or the
petitioners reside. Respondent reside in Bacolod while
petitioner reside in LA.
RTC: denied respondent’s motion to dismiss. Since Atty. Aceron
is the duly appointed attorney-in-fact of petitioners, venue of the
action may lie where re resides as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 4, of
the 1997 RoC.
 Respondents claim that Atty. Aceron, being merely a
representative of the petitioners, is not a real party in
interest in the case; hence, his residence should not be
considered in determining the proper venue of the said
complaint.
CA: Complaint should have been filed in Bacolod City.
ISSUE: WON the complaint must be dismissed on the ground
that venue was not proper.
Page 4 of 24
HELD: Yes.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions
are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and their
witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that
choosing the venue of an action is not left to a plaintiff’s caprice;
the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. The petitioners’
complaint for collection of sum of money against the
respondents is a personal action as it primarily seeks the
enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the plaintiff the option
of choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place
(1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The
plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place where
the action has been instituted at the time the action is
commenced.
If the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint
in such case may only be filed in the court of the place where the
defendant resides. In Cohen and Cohen v. Benguet Commercial
Co., Ltd., 34 Phil. 526 (1916), this Court held that there can be
no election as to the venue of the filing of a complaint when the
plaintiff has no residence in the Philippines. In such case, the
complaint may only be filed in the court of the place where the
defendant resides.
nterest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about
the question involved. A real party in interest is the party who,
by the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced.
At this juncture, it bears stressing that the rules on venue, like
the other procedural rules, are designed to insure a just and
orderly administration of justice or the impartial and
even-handed determination of every action and proceeding.
Obviously, this objective will not be attained if the plaintiff is
given unrestricted freedom to choose the court where he may file
his complaint or petition. The choice of venue should not be left
to the plaintiff's whim or caprice. He may be impelled by some
ulterior motivation in choosing to file a case in a particular court
even if not allowed by the rules on venue.
___________________________________________
9. GUIZANO VS. VENERACION
SEPTEMBER 12, 2012
FACTS:
Lucia Santos and her brother, Nicasio Bernardino,
inherited from their mother two parcels of land. Nicasio sold his
share to Dr. Eugenio and his wife Carmencita. The property was
registered in the name of their son, Emmanuel Guizano. Lucia
and her husband, for their part, sold a portion of their land to
Reynaldo. When Carmencita discovered that the property sold
to Reynaldo was actually part of the property that had already
been registered in Emmanuel’s name, she placed the word
“HOLD” on the subdivision plan signed by the geodetic
engineer. Reynaldo then filed a complaint against Carmencita
for the reconveyance of the land. In her Answer, Carmencita
claimed that the complaint was without merit since the property
subject of the sale between Reynaldo and the Santos spouses is
part of the property owned and registered in the name of her son
Emmanuel, thus Reynaldo, had no cause of action against her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Carmencita is a real party-in-interest
HELD:
Carmencita’s name does not appear anywhere on the
title. While Reynaldo alleged that Carmencita was the owner of
the property subject of dispute, with Emmanuel acting as a mere
nominal owner, a Torrens certificate is the best evidence of
ownership over registered land, and serves as evidence of an
indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears on the title. Absent any evidence to the contrary,
Emmanuel is the real party-in-interest in any action that seeks
to challenge ownership of the registered property. Reynaldo
should thus have filed his complaint for reconveyance against
him.
_______________________________________
10. CRISOLOGO VS. JEWM AGRO-IND. CORP.,
MARCH 3, 2014
FACTS: On October 19, 1998, RTC-Br. 8, Davao City rendered
its decision in favor of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in a
collection case, against defendants Robert Limso, So Keng Koc,
et al. The defendants were directed to transfer the subject
properties in favor of Sy Sen Ben. The latter subsequently sold
the subject properties to one Nilda Lam who, in turn, sold the
same to JEWM on June 1, 2000. TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676
were then eventually issued in the name of JEWM, both of which
still bearing the same annotations as well as the notice of lis
pendens in connection with the other pending cases filed against
So Keng Kok. A year thereafter, Spouses Jesus G. Crisologo and
Nannette B. Crisologo prevailed in the separate collection case
filed before RTC-Br. 15, Davao City against the same defendants.
Thus, on July 1, 1999, the said defendants were ordered to
solidarily pay the Spouses Crisologo. After the issuance of writ
of execution, the Branch Sheriff issued a notice of sale
scheduling an auction the properties covered by TCT Nos.
325675 and 325676, now, in the name of JEWM. To protect its
interest, JEWM filed a separate action before RTC-Br. 14 for
cancellation of lien with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction, cancellation of all the annotations on the back of the
pertinent TCTs; and the issuance of a permanent injunction
order after trial on the merits. The counsel then of spouses
Crisologo questioned the authority of the said court to restrain
the execution proceedings in RTC-Br. 15. But JEWM opposed it
on the ground that Spouses Crisologo were not parties in the
case. No motion to intervene was, however, filed as the Spouses
Crisologo believed that it was unnecessary since they were
already the John and Jane Does named in the complaint of
JEWM.
ISSUE: Whether or not Spouses Crisologo are considered as
indispensable parties in the case for cancellation of lien.
RULING: In an action for the cancellation of memorandum
annotated at the back of a certificate of title, the persons
considered as indispensable include those whose liens appear as
annotations pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529. In
Southwestern University v. Laurente, the Court held that the
cancellation of the annotation of an encumbrance cannot be
ordered without giving notice to the parties annotated in the
certificate of title itself. It would, thus, be an error for a judge to
contend that no notice is required to be given to all the persons
whose liens were annotated at the back of a certificate of title.
Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologo’s liens were
indeed annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676.
Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they stand to be
benefited or injured by any order relative to the cancellation of
annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other words, they are as
indispensable as JEWM itself in the final disposition of the case
for cancellation, being one of the many lien holders. As
indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should have been
joined as defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court. The reason behind this compulsory joinder
of indispensable parties is the complete determination of all
possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also
as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment.
Page 5 of 24
In this case, RTC-Br. 14, despite repeated pleas by Spouses
Crisologo to be recognized as indispensable parties, failed to
implement the mandatory import of the aforecited rule.
_______________________________________
11. Pacana – Contreras vs. Rovila Water Supply,
December 2, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioners Rebecca Pacaña-Contreras and Rosalie
Pacaña, children of Lourdes Teves Pacaña and Luciano Pacaña,
filed the present case against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and
Marisa for accounting and damages. The petitioners filed the
complaint in their own names although Rosalie was authorized
by Lourdes through a sworn declaration and special power of
attorney (SPA).
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds, among others, that the petitioners are not the real
parties in interest to institute and prosecute the case and that
they have no valid cause of action against the respondents.
The RTC denied the respondents’ motion to dismiss as well as
respondents’ motion for reconsideration.
The respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, invoking grave
abuse of discretion in the denial of their motion to dismiss. The
CA granted the petition and ruled that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion as the petitioners filed the complaint and the
amended complaint as attorneys-in-fact of their parents. As
such, they are not the real parties in interest and cannot bring
an action in their own names.
The petitioners filed the present petition and argued,
among others, that in annulling the interlocutory orders, the CA
unjustly allowed the motion to dismiss which did not conform to
the rules. Specifically, the motion was not filed within the time
for, but before the filing of, the answer to the amended
complaint, nor were the grounds raised in the answer. Citing
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the respondents are
deemed to have waived these grounds, as correctly held by the
RTC.
The respondents argued that the grounds invoked in
their motion to dismiss were timely raised, pursuant to Section
2, paragraphs g and i, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. Specifically,
the nature and purposes of the pre-trial include, among others,
the dismissal of the action, should a valid ground therefor be
found to exist; and such other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the action. Finally, the special civil action of
certiorari was the proper remedy in assailing the order of the
RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a
proper remedy for a denial of a motion to dismiss attended by
grave abuse of discretion.
RULING: YES.
We find the petition meritorious.
In Barrazona v. RTC, Branch 61, Baguio City, the Court
held that while an order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari and prohibition are
proper remedies to address an order of denial made without or
in excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is granted to keep
an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to
prevent it from committing grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The motion to dismiss in the present case based on
failure to state a cause of action was not timely filed and was thus
waived.
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which states that defenses
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived, except for the following grounds:
1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2) litis
pendencia; 3) res judicata; and 4) prescription. Therefore, the
grounds not falling under these four exceptions may be
considered as waived in the event that they are not timely
invoked. As the respondents’ motion to dismiss was based on the
grounds which should be timely invoked, material to the
resolution of this case is the period within which they were
raised. Both the RTC and the CA found that the motion to
dismiss was only filed after the filing of the answer and after the
pre-trial had been concluded.
The Court cannot uphold the dismissal of the present
case based on the grounds invoked by the respondents which
they have waived for failure to invoke them within the period
prescribed by the Rules.
Therefore, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed orders denying the
respondents’ motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration.
___________________________________________
12. BANDA VS. ERMITA, G.R. N. 166620, APRIL 20,
2010
FACTS: The petitioners filed this action as a class suit on their
own behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at the
National Printing Office. They challenge the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 378 issued by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo which amended Sec. 6 of Executive Order No. 285,
removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing
services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities. They perceive it as a threat to their security of
tenure as employees of the NPO contending that it is beyong the
executive powers of Pres. Arroyo to amend or repeal EO No. 285
issued by former Pres. Aquino when the latter still exercised
legislative powers and that EO No. 378 violates petioners’
security of tenure because it paves the way for the gradual
abolition of the NPO.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is indeed qualified as a class
suit.
Whether or not Pres. Arroyo can amend or repeal EO
No. 285 by the mere issuance of another executive order.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that an action does not
become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the
pleadings. Under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons so numerous that it is
impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the
court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to
fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for
the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to
intervene to protect his individual interest. From the foregoing
definition, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter
of controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties
bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or
representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of
all concerned.
Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO
employees who would be affected by the assailed Executive
Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was
the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, who pointed
out that there were about 549 employees in the NPO. The 67
petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO
employees whom they claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32 of
the original petitioners executed an Affidavit of Desistance,
while one signed a letter denying ever signing the petition,
ostensibly reducing the number of petitioners to 34. We note
that counsel for the petitioners challenged the validity of the
Page 6 of 24
desistance or withdrawal of some of the petitioners and
insinuated that such desistance was due to pressure from people
"close to the seat of power." Still, even if we were to disregard
the affidavit of desistance filed by some of the petitioners, it is
highly doubtful that a sufficient, representative number of NPO
employees have instituted this purported class suit. A perusal of
the petition itself would show that of the 67 petitioners who
signed the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping,
only 20 petitioners were in fact mentioned in the jurat as having
duly subscribed the petition before the notary public. In other
words, only 20 petitioners effectively instituted the present case.
As to the merits of the case, it is a well-settled principle
in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize
the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with
the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over
executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the
legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing
statutes.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part
of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has
been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press
Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information
Agency), is part of the Office of the President.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the President (a) to
restructure the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common
Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another,
and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the Office of the
President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive
Branch, and vice versa.
In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the
NPO nor a removal of any of its functions to be transferred to
another agency. Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the
NPO remains the main printing arm of the government for all
kinds of government forms and publications but in the interest
of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability,
it must now compete with the private sector for certain
government printing jobs, with the exception of election
paraphernalia which remains the exclusive responsibility of the
NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the
Commission on Elections may determine. At most, there was a
mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the
exclusivity of its printing responsibility to election forms.
Pursuant to Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book
III of the same Code, the power of the President to reorganize
the Executive Branch under Section 31 includes such powers and
functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be sure,
an inclusive and broad interpretation of the President’s power
to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported
by specific provisions in general appropriations laws.
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that the acts of
"scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only and
does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions.
Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included
in the subsequent provision of Section 62 which evidently
shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational
changes including the creation of offices in the department or
agency concerned.
Notably, in the present case, the 2003 General
Appropriations Act, which was reenacted in 2004 (the year
of the issuance of Executive Order No. 378), likewise gave the
President the authority to effect a wide variety of organizational
changes in any department or agency in the Executive Branch.
Sections 77 and 78 of said Act recognize the power of the
President to reorganize even executive offices already funded by
the said appropriations act, including the power to implement
structural, functional, and operational adjustments in the
executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or realign
appropriations of funds as may be necessary under such
reorganization. Thus, insofar as petitioners protest the
limitation of the NPO’s appropriations to its own income under
Executive Order No. 378, the same is statutorily authorized by
the above provisions.
In the present instance, involving neither an abolition
nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is a mere
reorganization under the general provisions of the law
consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of
simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the
authority of the President motivated and carried out, according
to the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual
assessment that this Court could only but accept.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been
regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a
general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it
is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or
separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to
exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese
wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else
but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good
faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition"
is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where
there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where
claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
In sum, the Court finds that the petition failed to show
any constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyo’s
issuance of Executive Order No. 378.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
___________________________________________
13. Saligumba vs. Palanog, December 4, 2008
NOTE:
The issue in this case is WON the failure of the counsel to inform
the court of the death of his client binds the latter’s successors-
in-interest and WON the execution of judgment can be issued
against petitioners who claim that they are not bound by the
RTC-Branch 3 Decision dated 7 Au-gust 1987 in Civil Case No.
2570.Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court likewise
expressly provides:
SEC. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity or
incompetency of party. - Whenever a party to a pending
case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall
be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly
of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give
the name and residence of his executor, administrator,
guardian or other legal represen-tative.
ACTIONS:
Original Action in Civil Case No. 2570: quieting of title with
damages
2nd action: Action for Revival of Judgement on Civil Case No.
2570: quieting of title with dam-ages (1st action)
PARTIES
Plaintiff: Monica Palanog and her husband Avelino Palanog
(spouses Palanogs)
Defendant: Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba (both
died while case was pending)
PARTIES IN 2ND ACTION:
Page 7 of 24
Plaintiff: Monica Palanog only since widowed (her being widow
is irrelevant on this case)
Defendant: Generoso Saligumba and Ernesto Saligumba, the
heirs and children of the spouses Saligumbas ( Children of the
deceased Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba)a
TOPIC: REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT ON MONEY
CLAIMS; REVIVE, THEN FILE AS MONEY CLAIM
NATURE OF THE CASE: This is an appeal to the decision by
the RTC ruling against the Saligumbas in a petition for revival of
an earlier judgment also ruled against them.
FACTS: Spouses Monica and Avelino Palanog filed a complaint
for quieting of title with damages against spouses Valeria
Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. with the RTC. The spouses
Palanogs alleged that they have been in actual, open, adverse
and continuous possession as owners for more than 50 years of
a land in Aklan. Allegedly, the spouses Saligumbas prevented
them from entering and residing on the said property and had
destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land. Thus, spouses
Palanogs prayed that they be declared the true and rightful
owners of the same.
During the proceedings, Eliseo Saligumba Sr. died in
1984, while Valeria Saligumba also passed away the following
year. However, Atty. Miralles, failed to inform the court of the
said events. Further, he was appointed as an MCTC judge and
told the court that he would withdraw as counsel for the spouses
Saligumbas because of it. But, on the date of the presentation of
evidence of the spouses Saligumbas, only spouses Palanogs and
their counsel appeared. Thus, upon motion of the spouses
Palanogs, the spouses Saligumbas were deemed to have waived
the presentation of their evidence.
On August 7, 1987, the RTC rendered jugment declaring
the spouses Palanogs as the righful owners of the land and
ordering the spouses Saligumbas to vacate the premises. The
trial court also directed that a copy of its decision be furnished
to Monica Palanog and Valeria Saligumba. Later, a motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision was filed.
However, on May 8, 1997, the trial court ruled that since more
than 5 years had elapsed after the date of the decision's finality,
the decision could no longer be executed by mere motion.
So, on May 9, 1997, Monica Palanog, who is now a widow,
filed an action to revive and enforce the RTC decision on 1987
which she claimed has not been barred by the statute of
limitations. Eliseo Saligumba Jr. and Eduardo Saligumba who
are heirs and children of spouses Saligumbas were also
impleaded in the new action. Apparently, Eliseo Saligumba Sr.
died in 1984, while Valeria died in 1985. Further, no motion for
the substitution of the spouses was filed nor did an order issue
for the substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas in the
complaint filed by spouses Palanogs. Accordingly, Atty. Miralles
and Eliseo Saligumba Jr. never confirmed the death of the
spouses despite notices sent to them to appear. Moreover, the
siblings were declared in default for failure to file any responsive
pleading.
RTC: On The trial court ruled in favor of Monica Palanog and
ordered the revival of the 1987 judgment. It also ruled that the
non-substitution of the deceased spouses did not have any legal
significance as it was solely the negligence of the spouses
Saligumba's counsel by failing to inform the court of the death
of his client. Hence this present petition filed by the siblings
Saligumba.
Heirs of Spouses Saligumbas: The 1987 decision should be
rendered void since there was no proper substitution of the
deceased spouses Saligumbas despite the trial court's knowledge
that the deceased spouses Saligumbas were no longer
represented by counsel. Thus, they were deprived of due
process.
Moreover, since the trial court acknowledged in its ruling
that the lack of substitution was the fault of Atty. Miralles of the
spouses Saligumbas, thus, the 1987 decision has no legal effect
because their parents were not duly represented by the said
counse. Further, they contend that they have never taken part in
the proceedings of the case which was decided in 1987,
therefore, “[i]t’s unfair to bind them in a decision rendered
against their deceased parents.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the revival of judgment in this case was
proper considering that the defendants in the action for revival
were not the original contending party in the original case.
Held: Yes. "An action for revival of judgment is no more than a
procedural means of securing the execution of a previous
judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five
years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing
party. It is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits
of the judgment debtor’s case nor the propriety or correctness of
the first judgment.
An action for revival of judgment is a new and
independent action, different and distinct from either the
recovery of property case or the reconstitution case, wherein the
cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of the
action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is
rendered. Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption
that the decision to be revived, either by motion or by
independent action, is already final and executory."
In the instant case, the 1987 judgment of the RTC had
been rendered final and executory by the lapse of time with no
motion for reconsideration nor was an appeal having been filed.
Furthermore, there was no formal withdrawal received and
approved by the court from Atty. Miralles as the counsel of the
spouses Saligumbas at that time, thus, since there was no such
formal withdrawal, he remained the counsel for the spouses
Saligumbas until the RTC rendered judgment. His acts bind his
clients and the latter’s successors-in-interest. Additionally, it
was shown on record that Eliseo Saligumba Jr.was also
furnished copies of the trial court’s orders and notices. It is also
clear that in the present case for revival of judgment, the other
petitioners have not shown much interest in the case
It is also important to take note that the complaint filed
at that time was an action for quieting of title with damages
which is an action involving real property. It is an action that
survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 as the claim is not
extinguished by the death of a party. And when a party dies in
an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides for the procedure, thus:
Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is
not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper
notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and
to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30)
days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may
order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by
the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for
and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges
involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or
Page 8 of 24
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the express terms of Section 17, in case of death
of a party, and upon proper notice, it is the duty of the court to
order the legal representative or heir of the deceased to appear
for the deceased. In the instant case, it is true that the trial court,
after receiving an informal notice of death by the mere notation
in the envelopes, failed to order the appearance of the legal
representative or heir of the deceased. There was no court order
for deceased’s legal representative or heir to appear, nor did any
such legal representative ever appear in court to be substituted
for the deceased. Neither did the respondent ever procure the
appointment of such legal representative, nor did the heirs ever
asked to be substituted.
___________________________________________
14. REGALADO VS. REGALADO, JUNE 6, 2011
___________________________________________
D. VENUE
15. SPS. SARAZA VS. FRANCISCO, NOVEMBER 27,
2013
SUMMARY: The Sarazas and Francisco entered into an
agreement by which the spouses Saraza would execute a deed
of sale of a property in Makati in Francisco’s favor if he pays
them P1.2M and when he has paid their P2M indebtedness to
PNB. Towards the fulfillment of Francisco’s obligation to pay
the debt, the Spouses renege on one of the conditions of the
Agreement. Francisco filed a complaint for specific
performance/sum of money and damages. The RTC decides
in Francisco’s favor. The petitioners question the jurisdiction
of the Imus RTC because the property involved in the
Agreement is located in Makati. The CA holds that the
jurisdiction of the Imus RTC is proper and the SC affirms.
DOCTRINE: A case for specific performance with damages
is a personal action which may be filed in a court where any
of the parties reside.
ROC Rule 4, sec 1&2
FACTS:
1. On September 1, 1999, Francisco and Fernando executed an
Agreement. The Agreement provides that Fernando was to sell
his 100-sqm share in a lot in Bangkal, Makati City (Makati
property) to Francisco which at that time was still registered in
the name of one Emilia Serafico for a total consideration of
P3.2M.
2. The amount of P1.2M was paid upon the Agreement’s
execution, while the balance of P2M was to be paid on
installments to the PNB, to cover a loan of Spouses Saraza,
Fernando’s parents, with the bank. A final deed of sale conveying
the property was to be executed by Fernando upon full payment
of the PNB loan.
3. It was also agreed upon that should the Sarazas fail for any
reason to transfer the subject property to the Francisco, Rosario
and Fernando’s 136-sqm property (2nd property) and mortgaged
to PNB to secure the loan to be paid by the respondent shall be
collateral in favor of the Francisco. Francisco was also allowed
to take immediate possession of the 2nd property through a
contract of lease.
4. When the remaining balance of the PNB loan reached
P226,582.13, the respondent asked for the petitioners’ issuance
of a Special Power of Attorney that would authorize him to
receive from PNB the owner’s duplicate copy of the 2nd property
upon full payment of the loan. The petitioners denied the
request.
5. Upon inquiry from PNB, the respondent found out that the
petitioners had instead executed an Amended Authority, which
provided that the owner’s copy of the 2nd property title should
be returned to the mortgagors upon full payment of the loan.
Spouses Saraza also caused the eviction of the respondent from
the 2nd property. These prompted the respondent to
institute the civil case for specific performance, sum of
money and damages with the RTC of Imus, Cavite on
December 7, 2004.
6. The petitioners admitted the existence of the Agreement and
the Authority which was addressed to PNB. They, nonetheless,
opposed the respondent’s complaint on the ground that the
respondent did not pay the P1.2M he had to pay at the execution
of the Agreement. They nonetheless did not formally demand
payment from him but merely waited for him to pay the amount.
7. The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent.
8. Fernando questioned the RTC Decision before the CA. In
addition to the defenses which he raised during the proceedings
before the RTC, he argued that the RTC of Imus lacked
jurisdiction over the case as it involved an adjudication
of ownership of a property situated in Makati City.
9. The CA affirmed the RTC rulings. On the issue of
jurisdiction, the CA cited Fernando’s failure to
seasonably file before the lower court a motion to
dismiss stating that the action should have been filed in
Makati City. More importantly, the Court explained
that the case was a personal action since it did not
involve a claim of ownership of the subject property,
but only sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of sale
in the respondent’s favor. Thus, the venue for the
action was the residence of the plaintiff or the
defendant, at the plaintiff’s option.
ISSUE:
Whether the action was a personal or real action.
PERSONAL
Whether the proper venue for the action is in Makati or
in Imus. IMUS
RULING:
The Decision and Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the award of Pl00,000.00 as damages
in favor of respondent William Francisco is deleted.
RATIO:
Although the end result of the respondent’s claim was the
transfer of the subject property to his name, the suit was still
essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because
it sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of absolute sale based
on a contract which he had previously made.
A case for specific performance with damages is a personal
action which may be filed in a court where any of the parties
reside.
RULE 4 Venue of Actions
Section 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title
to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated.
Page 9 of 24
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and
tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated.
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. — All other actions
may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Considering the respondent’s statement in his complaint that he
resides in Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of
Imus was proper.
_______________________________________
16. PHIL. BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS VS. LIM
APRIL 12, 2005
FACTS:
PBCom filed a complaint against respondents in the
RTC of Manila for the collection of a deficiency. Petitioner
alleged therein that respondents obtained a loan from
it and executed a continuing surety agreement in favor of
petitioner for all loans, credits, etc that were extended or may be
extended in the future to respondents. Petitioner granted a
renewal of said loan upon respondent’s request. It was expressly
stipulated threrein that the venue for any legal action that
may arise out of said promissory note shall be Makati
City, “to the exclusion of all other courts…” Respondents
allegedly failed to pay said obligation upon maturity. Thus,
petitioner foreclosed the real estate mortgage executed by
respondents, leaving a deficiency balance.
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of improper venue, invoking the
stipulation contained in the last paragraph of the
promissory note with respect to the restrictive/exclusive
venue.
The trial court denied said motion asseverating that
petitioner had separate causes of action arising from the
promissory note and the continuing surety agreement. Thus,
[under] Rule 4, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, x x x venue was properly laid in Manila. An
MR of said order was likewise denied.
On appeal, the CA ruled that respondents’ alleged debt was
based on the Promissory Note, which had provided an
exclusionary stipulation on venue “to the exclusion of all other
courts.” The parties’ Surety Agreement, though silent as to
venue, was an accessory contract that should have been
interpreted in consonance with the Promissory Note. Hence,
this Petition
ISSUE: WON the action against the sureties is covered by the
restriction on venue stipulated in the PN
HELD: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED.
YES; Since the cases pertaining to both causes of action are
restricted to Makati City as the proper venue,
petitioner cannot rely on Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court.
**
Section 2 of Rule 4 of the ROC provides
that personal actions must be commenced and tried
(1) in the place where the plaintiff resides, or
(2) where the defendant resides, or
(3) in case of non-resident defendants, where they may be
found, at the choice of the plaintiff.
This rule on venue does not apply when the law
specifically provides otherwise, or when — before the filing
of the action — the contracting parties agree in writing
on the exclusive venue thereof. Venue is not jurisdictional
and may be waived by the parties. A stipulation as to venue does
not preclude the filing of the action in other places, unless
qualifying or restrictive words are used in the agreement.
**
In enforcing a surety contract, the “complementary-
contracts-construed-together” doctrine finds
application. According to this principle, an accessory contract
must be read in its entirety and together with the principal
agreement[ This principle is used in construing contractual
stipulations in order to arrive at their true meaning; certain
stipulations cannot be segregated and then made to
control. This no-segregation principle is based on Article 1374 of
the Civil Code, which we quote:
“Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a
contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to
the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all
of them taken jointly.”
The aforementioned doctrine is applicable to the
present case. Incapable of standing by itself, the SA can be
enforced only in conjunction with the PN. The latter documents
the debt that is sought to be collected in the action against the
sureties. The circumstances that related to the issuance of the
PN and the SA are so intertwined that neither one could be
separated from the other. It makes no sense to argue that the
parties to the SA were not bound by the stipulations in the PN.
NOTES:
A cause of action is a party’s act or omission that violates the
rights of the other. Only one suit may be commenced for a single
cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis
of the same cause of action, only one case should remain and the
others must be dismissed.
_______________________________________
17. PAGLAUM MGT. CORP VS. UNION BANK, JUNE
18, 2012
Doctine:
Rule 4, Section 1 states that: Venue of real actions.
Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper
court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be
commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the
municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated.
Sec. 3. When Rule not applicable. This Rule shall not
apply
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law
provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in
writing before the filing of the action on the
exclusive venue thereof.
Facts:
On 3 February 1994, respondent Union Bank extended
HealthTech a credit line in the amount of ₱10,000,000. To
secure this obligation, PAGLAUM executed three Real Estate
Mortgages on behalf of HealthTech and in favor of Union
Bank. It must be noted that the Real Estate Mortgage, on the
provision regarding the venue of all suits and actions arising out
of or in connection therewith, originally stipulates:
Section 9. Venue. The venue of all suits and actions arising out
of or in connection with this Mortgage shall be in Makati, Metro
Manila or in the place where any of the Mortgaged Properties is
located, at the absolute option of the Mortgagee, the parties
hereto waiving any other venue.
Page 10 of 24
 However, under the two Real Estate Mortgages dated
February 11, 1994, it stated that the venue shall be in Cebu City,
Metro Manila or in the place where any of the mortgaged
properties is located, at the absolute option of the Mortgagee.
Meanwhile, the same provision in Real Estate Mortgage date
April 22, 1998 contains a blank space for the venue or in the
place where any of the mortgaged properties is located.
HealthTech and Union Bank agreed to subsequent
renewals and increases in the credit line, with the total amount
of debt reaching ₱36,500,000. Unfortunately, according to
HealthTech, the 1997 Asian financial crisis adversely affected its
business and caused it difficulty in meeting its obligations with
Union Bank. Thus, on December 11, 1998, both parties entered
into a Restructuring Agreement, which states that any action or
proceeding arising out of or in connection therewith shall be
commenced in Makati City, with both parties waiving any other
venue. Despite the Restructuring Agreement, HealthTech failed
to pay its obligation, prompting Union Bank to send a demand
letter dated 9 October 2000, stating that the latter would be
constrained to institute foreclosure proceedings, unless
HealthTech settled its account in full. Since HealthTech
defaulted on its payment, Union Bank extra-judicially
foreclosed the mortgaged properties. The bank as the sole
bidder, was then issued a Certificate of Sale. Consequently,
HealthTech filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Titles
with Damages and Application for Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Injunction, which the RTC ruled in favor of
them and issued the said writ. Thereafter, Union Bank filed a
Motion to Dismiss, which the RTC granted and resulted to the
dismissal of the case, as well as the dissolution of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. It likewise denied the subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration filed by PAGLAUM and
HealthTech. PAGLAUM and HealthTech elevated the case to the
CA, which affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied the
Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether Makati City is the proper venue to assail the
foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court rules in the affirmative. According to
the Rules, real actions shall be commenced and tried in the court
that has jurisdiction over the area where the property is situated.
In this case, all the mortgaged properties are located in the
Province of Cebu. Thus, following the general rule, PAGLAUM
and HealthTech should have filed their case in Cebu, and not in
Makati. However, the Rules provide an exception, in that real
actions can be commenced and tried in a court other than where
the property is situated in instances where the parties have
previously and validly agreed in writing on the exclusive venue
thereof. In the case at bar, the parties claim that such an
agreement exists. The only dispute is whether the venue that
should be followed is that contained in the Real Estate
Mortgages, as contended by Union Bank, or that in the
Restructuring Agreement, as posited by PAGLAUM and
HealthTech. This Court rules that the venue stipulation in the
Restructuring Agreement should be controlling.
The said provisions of the Real Estate Mortgages and the
later Restructuring Agreement clearly reveal the intention of the
parties to implement a restrictive venue stipulation, which
applies not only to the principal obligation, but also to the
mortgages. The phrase waiving any other venue plainly shows
that the choice of Makati City as the venue for actions arising out
of or in connection with the Restructuring Agreement and the
Collateral, with the Real Estate Mortgages being explicitly
defined as such, is exclusive.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The
Decision dated 31 May 2007 and Resolution dated 24 July 2007
in CA-G.R. CV No. 82053 of the Court of Appeals, as well as the
Orders dated 11 March 2003 and 19 September 2003 issued by
the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 134,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Case
No. 01-1567 is hereby REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
_______________________________________
18. OCHOA VS. CHINA BANK, MARCH 23,
2011
_______________________________________
E. PLEADINGS
19. GSIS VS. CABALLERO
OCTOBER 4, 2010
FACTS:
Fernando and his wife, Sylvia Caballero, secured a
mortgage secured by their residential lot from petitioner
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in the amount of
P20,000.00. However, Fernando defaulted on the payment of
his loan with the GSIS. GSIS wrote a letter to Fernando,
informing him of the consolidation of title in its favor, and
requesting payment of monthly rental in view of Fernando's
continued occupancy of the subject property. Negotiation as to
repurchase also takes place.
GSIS scheduled the subject property for a 2nd public
bidding after a failed negotiation with Fernando to buy back his
property. In this bidding, Jocelyn Caballero, Fernando’s
daughter submitted a bid but unfortunately defeated by CMTC.
With this, Fernando, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint against CMTC, the GSIS and
its responsible officers Fernando prayed, among others, that
judgment be rendered: declaring GSIS Board of Trustees
Resolution No. 199, dated May 16, 1989, null and void for the
irregularities in the conduct of the bidding.
GSIS and its officers filed their Answer with
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim. GSIS alleged that
Fernando owed of P130,365.81, representing back rentals,
including additional interests from January 1973 to February
1987, and the additional amount of P249,800.00. Caballero, on
the other hand, alleged that GSIS's counterclaim is permissive
and its failure to pay the prescribed docket fees results into the
dismissal of its claim.
After trial, the RTC, in its Decision, 1994, ruled in favor of GSIS
and dismissed the complaint. In the same decision, the trial
court granted GSIS's counterclaim and directed Fernando to pay
GSIS the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount of P249,800.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in
holding that GSIS’s counterclaim of rentals collected by the
Caballero’s against CMTC is in the nature of a permissive
counterclaim which required the payment of GSIS of docket fees
before the Trial Court can acquire jurisdiction over the said
counterclaim.
HELD: (Permissive Counterclaim)
YES. The test was also established by the Supreme
Court in this case to determine whether a counterclaim is
compulsory or not. The Court has devised the following tests: (a)
Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a
subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence
support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's
counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the
claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four
questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.
Page 11 of 24
 Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, the SC
agreed with the CA's view that GSIS's counterclaim for the
recovery of the amount representing rentals collected by
Fernando from the CMTC is permissive. The evidence needed by
Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of
absolute sale and TCT is different from that required to establish
GSIS's claim for the recovery of rentals.
The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity
of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of
CMTC, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim,
i.e., whether GSIS is entitled to receive the CMTC's rent
payments over the subject property when it (GSIS) became the
owner of the subject property by virtue of the consolidation of
ownership of the property in its favor.
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to
pay the prescribed docket fees. This, GSIS did not do, because it
asserted that its claim for the collection of rental payments was
a compulsory counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the
docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its
permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC,
insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay GSIS the rentals which he
collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck
down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.
___________________________________________
20. Calibre Trading Inc. vs. Bayer Philippines,
October 13, 2010
FACTS
 Calibre Traders, Inc. (Calibre) was one of Bayerphils
distributors/dealers of its agricultural chemicals
within the provinces of Pangasinan and Tarlac. Their
last distributorship agreement was effective from June
1989 to June 1991. However, Bayerphil stopped
delivering stocks to Calibre on July 31, 1989 after the
latter failed to settle its unpaid accounts in the total
amount of P1,751,064.56.
 As Bayerphils authorized dealer, Calibre then enjoyed
discounts and rebates. Subsequently, however, the
parties had a disagreement as to the entitlement and
computations of these discounts. Calibre, although
aware of the deadline to pay its debts with Bayerphil,
nevertheless withheld payment to compel Bayerphil to
reconcile its accounts.
 In a letter dated August 16, 1989, Calibre requested
Bayerphil for a reconciliation of accounts. It
enumerated claims that amounted to P968,265.82.
 Calibre sent follow-up letters dated September 17,
October 13, and November 16, 1989.
 On September 29, 1989, Bayerphils credit and
collection officer, Leon Abesamis, conferred with
Calibres General Manager Mario Sebastian
(Sebastian). The attempt to settle failed. Again,
Bayerphils Sales Manager of the Agro Division, Vidal
Lingan, met with Sebastian. The results of their
discussion were put in writing in Bayerphils letter
dated November 10, 1989 and granted some of their
claims.
 In his letter, Sebastian expressed discontent in
Bayerphils refusal to credit his claims in full and
underscored the alleged inaction of Bayerphil in
reconciling Calibres accounts.
 This was followed by a demand letter requiring
Bayerphil to pay the sum of P10,000,000.00 for the
damages it had allegedly caused to Calibre. Bayerphil
replied, reminding that Calibre owed it P1,272,103.07
as of December 31, 1989.
 Accusing Bayerphil of maliciously breaching the
distributorship agreement by manipulating Calibres
accounts, withholding discounts and rebates due it,
charging unwarranted penalties, refusing to supply
goods, and favoring the new distributors/dealers to
drive it out of business, Calibre, on March 14, 1990,
filed a suit for damages before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)
 In its Answer with Counterclaim, Bayerphil denied its
alleged wanton appointment of other distributors,
reasoning that it could not be faulted for a difference in
treatment between a paying dealer and a non-paying
one. It maintained that Calibre filed the damage suit to
avoid paying its overdue accounts. Considering that
those purchased on credit remained unpaid, Bayerphil
had to refuse to further supply Calibre with its
products. Bayerphil also averred that the dealership
agreement provides that rebates and discounts would
only be granted if the previous purchases had been first
fully paid. It denied that it failed to reconcile Calibres
accounts since it conferred with Calibre, and even
acceded to a number of deductions demanded by
Calibre subject to the latters settlement of accounts.
Bayerphil thus prayed for collection with interest
 Bayerphil also moved that Mario Sebastian and his wife
Minda (Sebastians) be impleaded as co-defendants,
considering that the Sebastians bound themselves as
solidary debtors under the distributorship/dealership
agreement.
 Calibre opposed Bayerphils motion to implead the
Sebastians and moved to strike out the counterclaim,
reasoning that the spouses are not parties in its suit
against Bayerphil and thus are not the proper parties
to the counterclaim. It stressed that the issues between
the damages suit it filed and Bayerphils counterclaim
for collection of money are totally unrelated.
 On the other hand, Bayerphil contended that both
causes of action arose from the same contract of
distributorship, and that the Sebastians inclusion is
necessary for a full adjudication of Bayerphils
counterclaim to avoid duplication of suits.
 The trial court rejected Calibres arguments and
granted the motion to implead the Sebastians as co-
defendants in the counterclaim. The spouses then filed
their answer to Bayerphils counterclaim, adopting all
the allegations and defenses of Calibre. They raised the
issue that the counterclaim against them is permissive,
and since Bayerphil failed to pay the required docket
fees, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
counterclaim.
 The trial court rendered judgment favoring Calibre. It
held that Calibre was justified in withholding payment
because there was deliberate inaction/employment of
dilatory tactics on the part of Bayerphil to reconcile
accounts making it liable for damages for abuse of
rights and unfair competition under Articles 19, 20,
and 28 of the Civil Code. As for Bayerphils
counterclaim, the court a quo adjudged that aside from
being unmeritorious for lack of valid demand, the
counterclaim was permissive in character. Therefore, it
must be dismissed for Bayerphils failure to pay the
required docket fees.
 The CA reversed the trial courts factual findings. It
found no reason to award Calibre anything as it has no
cause of action against Bayerphil. the CA favored
Bayerphils counterclaim. It ruled that Bayerphils
counterclaim was compulsory hence it need not pay the
docket and filing fees. It noted that it arose out of the
same dealership agreement from which the claims of
Page 12 of 24
 Calibre in its complaint were likewise based. Finding
that Calibre never denied that it owes Bayerphil, and
that the evidence of Bayerphil regarding the amount
owed by Calibre was unrebutted, the CA deemed
justified the award of actual damages.
ISSUE/S
a) Whether or not Calibre is entitled to an award of damages
b) the propriety of granting relief to Bayerphils counterclaim.
RULING
a) To justify a grant of actual or compensatory damages, the
amount of loss must be proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty, based upon competent proof and the best evidence
obtainable by the injured party. The projected sum of P10
million sales cannot thus be the proper base in computing actual
damages. Calibre computed its lost income based only on its
capability to sell around P10 Million, not on the actual income
earned in the past years to properly compute the average
income/profit. At any rate, since Calibre had no cause of action
at all against Bayerphil, there can be no basis to award it with
damages.
b) It is a settled doctrine that although the payment of the
prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-
payment should not result in the automatic dismissal of the case
provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable
prescriptive period. The prescriptive period therein mentioned
refers to the period within which a specific action must be filed.
It means that in every case, the docket fee must be paid before
the lapse of the prescriptive period. Chapter 3, Title V, Book III
of the Civil Code is the principal law governing prescription of
actions.
In accordance with the aforementioned rules on payment of
docket fees, the trial court upon a determination that Bayerphils
counterclaim was permissive, should have instead ordered
Bayerphil to pay the required docket fees for the permissive
counterclaim, giving it reasonable time but in no case beyond
the reglementary period. At the time Bayerphil filed its counter-
claim against Calibre and the spouses Sebastian without having
paid the docket fees up to the time the trial court rendered its
Decision on December 6, 1993, Bayerphil could still be ordered
to pay the docket fees since no prescription has yet set in.
Besides, Bayerphil should not suffer from the dismissal of its
case due to the mistake of the trial court.
___________________________________________
21. SPS. MENDIOLA VS. CA, JULY 18, 2012
FACTS:
 1987, Ms. Norma S. Nora convinced Rogelio Mendiola
to enter into a joint venture with her for the export of
prawns. As proposed by Ms. Nora, they were to secure
financing from private respondent Philippine National
Bank. The credit line was to be secured by collaterals
consisting of real estate properties of the petitioner,
particularly two (2) parcels of land, situated in
Marikina.
 1988, Mendiola signed a Special Power of Attorney
authorizing Ms. Norma S. Nora to mortgage his
aforementioned properties to PNB in order to secure
the obligations of the joint venture with the said bank
of up to 5 Million Pesos.
 The planned joint venture became a failure even before
it could take off the ground. But, in the meantime, Ms.
Norma S. Nora, on the strength of the special power of
attorney issued in her favor, obtained loans from PNB
in the amount of P8,101,440.62 for the account of
petitioner and secured by the parcels of land
hereinabove described.
 1988, Mendiola belatedly revoked the special power of
attorney in favor of Ms. Nora and requested PNB to
release his properties from mortgage. Petitioner was
notified that PNB had initiated forecloseproceedings
against the properties of the petitioner.
 1989, Mendiola filed injunction case against PNB. PND
moved to dismiss.
 RTC RULED:
o Granted PNB’s motion to dismiss because the
complaint does not state a sufficient cause of
action, it follows therefore that the prayer, for
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
has no leg to stand on.
 CA dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the petition?
Whether or not res judicata has already set in the case?
HELD:
No.
Yes.
RATIO:
 The instant petition has now become moot and
academic, because the first case, which is an
application for injunction filed by herein petitioner
Regional Trial Court, Pasig City against private
respondent PNB to prevent the latter from foreclosing
his real properties, and which was then pending appeal
before the court a quo at the time the second action was
filed, has now been finally dismissed by the respondent
Court of Appeals.
 Consequently, the instant petition which prays for the
declaration of nullity of the auction sale by PNB of
private respondent's properties becomes dismissible
under the principle of res judicata.
 There is "bar by former judgment" when, between the
first case where the judgment was rendered, and the
second case where such judgment is invoked, there is
identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action. When the three identities are present, the
judgment on the merits rendered in the first
constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent action. It is
final as to the claim or demand in controversy,
including the parties and those in privity with them,
not only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but
as to any other admissible matter which might have
been offered for that purpose. But where between the
first case wherein judgment is rendered and the second
case wherein such judgment is invoked, there is no
identity of cause of action, the judgment is conclusive
in the second case, only as to those matters actually and
directly controverted and determined, and not as to
matters merely involved therein. This is what is
termed conclusiveness of judgment.
_______________________________________
22. PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES VS.
PARAS, APRIL 25, 2012
Facts:
Felix Paras is engaged in the buy and sell of fish
products. Sometime on his way home to Manila from Bicol
Page 13 of 24
Region, he boarded a bus owned and operated by Inland
Trailways, Inc. and driven by its driver Calvin Coner.
While the said bus was travelling, it was bumped at the
rear by another bus owned and operated by Philtranco Service
Enterprises, Inc. As a result of the strong and violent impact,
the Inland bus was pushed forward and smashed into a cargo
truck parked along the outer right portion of the highway and
the shoulder. Consequently, the said accident bought
considerable damage to the vehicles involved and caused
physical injuries to the passengers and crew of the two buses,
including the death of Coner.
Paras was not spared from the effects of the accident.
He was taken for an emergency treatment in the nearby hospital
and thereafter taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital in
which underwent several operations.
In view of financial constraints, Paras filed a complaint
for damages based on breach of contract of carriage against
Inland to which it denied responsibility, by alleging, among
others, that its driver Coner had observed an utmost and
extraordinary care and diligence to ensure the safety of its
passengers. In support of it, Inland invoked the Police
Investigation Report which established the fact that the
Philtranco bus driver, Apolinar Miralles was the one which
violently bumped the rear portion of the Inland bus, and
therefore, the direct and proximate cause of Paras’ injuries.
The RTC ruled in favor of Paras and held that
Philtranco and Apolinar Miralles jointly and severally liable for
actual and moral damages including attorney’s fees.
On appeal to the CA, it affirmed the RTC’s ruling that
no trace of negligence at the time of the accident was attributable
to Inland’s driver, rendering Inland not guilty of breach of
contract of carriage.
Issue:
1. Whether or not moral damages is availing in view of the fact
that the complaint had been anchored on a breach of
contract of carriage
2. Whether or not the award of temperate damages is proper
Held:
1. The SC held that Paras can recover moral damages based on
a quasi-delict. As a general rule, moral damages are not
recoverable in an action predicated on a breach of contract.
This is because such action is not included in Article 2219
of the Civil Code as one of the actions in which moral
damages may be recovered. By way of exception, moral
damages are recoverable in an action predicated on a
breach of contract: (a) where the mishap results in the
death of a passenger, as provided in Article 1764 in relation
to Article 2206, (3) of the Civil Code; and (b) where the
common carrier has been guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
2. In awarding temperate damages in lieu of actual damages,
the CA did not err, because Paras and Inland were definitely
shown to have sustained substantial pecuniary losses.
Article 2224 of the Civil Code expressly authorizes the
courts to award temperate damages despite the lack of
certain proof of actual damages. When the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty, temperate damages may be recovered. Temperate
damages may be allowed in cases where from the nature of
the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced,
although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party
suffered some pecuniary loss.
___________________________________________
23. SORIENTE VS. ESTATE OF CONCEPCION,
NOVEMBER 25, 2009
Soriente vs Estate of the late Concepcion (GR 160239)
The Court notes that the ejectment case filed by respondent against
petitioner was docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 17973, the
case against Alfredo Caballero was docketed as Civil Case No. 17974,
while the case against Severina Sadol was docketed as Civil Case No.
17932. These cases were consolidated by the trial court.
Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, if a
sole defendant shall fail to appear in the preliminary conference, the
plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 of the
Rule, that is, the court shall render judgment as may be warranted by
the facts alleged in the Complaint and limited to what is prayed for
therein. However, [t]his Rule (Sec. 7) shall not apply where one of two
or more defendants sued under a common cause of action, who had
pleaded a common defense, shall appear at the preliminary
conference. Petitioner claims that the preceding provision applies to her
as a defendant, since the ejectment cases were consolidated by the trial
court, and she and Caballero filed the same Answer to the Complaint;
hence, the trial court should not have rendered judgment against her
when she failed to appear in the preliminary conference.
The Court holds that the italicized provision above does not apply in the
case of petitioner, since she and Caballero were not co-defendants in the
same case. The ejectment case filed against petitioner was distinct from
that of Caballero, even if the trial court consolidated the cases and, in the
interest of justice, considered the Answer filed by Caballero in Civil Case
No. 17974 as the Answer also of petitioner since she affixed her signature
thereto.
Considering that petitioner was sued in a separate case for ejectment
from that of Caballero and Sadol, petitioners failure to appear in the
preliminary conference entitled respondent to the rendition of judgment
by the trial court on the ejectment case filed against petitioner, docketed
as Civil Case No. 17973, in accordance with Section 7 of the 1991 Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure.
FACTS:
Respondent Nenita S. Concepcion established that she
was the registered owner of the lot occupied by petitioner
Angelina Soriente at No. 637 Cavo F. Sanchez Street,
Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila. During the lifetime of Arsenio
E. Concepcion, who acquired the lot in 1978, he allowed and
tolerated the occupancy of the lot by petitioner, who was already
staying on the property. Petitioner was allowed to stay on the
lot for free, but on a temporary basis until such time that
Concepcion and/or his family needed to develop the lot. After
Arsenio E. Concepcion died on December 27, 1989, his family
initiated steps to develop the lot, but petitioner’s occupancy of
the lot prevented them from pursuing their plan.
Elizabeth Concepcion-Dela Cruz, daughter of
respondent, sent petitioner a demand letter dated September
22, 2000 by registered mail, demanding that she peacefully
surrender the property and extending financial assistance for
her relocation. Despite receipt of the demand letter, petitioner
did not vacate the premises. On April 27, 2001, respondent filed
against petitioner a Complaint for unlawful detainer with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 59 (trial
court).
Petitioner Soriente, as a defendant in the lower court,
did not file a separate Answer, but affixed her signature to the
Answer filed by defendant Alfredo Caballero in another
ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case No. 17974, which was
filed by respondent against Caballero. Hence, respondent,
through counsel, filed a Motion to Render Judgment under
Section 7, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
for Soriente’s failure to file an Answer to the Complaint.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Render
Judgment.
The trial court denied the Motion to Render Judgment.
It stated that the allegations of the Complaint in Civil Case No.
17973 and 17974 are similar, the only substantial difference
being the time when defendants occupied the subject property
Page 14 of 24
allegedly through the tolerance of Arsenio Concepcion. The trial
court believed that in signing the Answer filed in Civil Case No.
17974, Soriente intended to adopt the same as her own, as both
defendants Caballero and Soriente had a common defense
against plaintiff’s (respondent’s) separate claim against them.
The trial court denied the Motion to Render Judgment in the
interest of justice and considered that the two cases, including
Civil Case No. 17932 against Severina Sadol, had been
consolidated.
Pursuant to Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, the trial court set a preliminary conference
on October 9, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. The preliminary conference was
reset to November 15, 2001, and then to December 18, 2001
because the Motion to Render Judgment was still pending
resolution. The preliminary conference was reset several times
due to absences of the parties and their counsels.
In the scheduled preliminary conference held on
February 18, 2003, only plaintiff’s (respondent’s) counsel and
defendants Severina Sadol and Alfredo Caballero were present.
In view of the absence of defendant Angelina Soriente or her
authorized representative, plaintiff’s (respondent’s) counsel
moved that the case be submitted for decision, and that he be
given 15 days within which to submit his position paper.
The trial court granted the motion of plaintiff’s
(respondent’s) counsel and considered the case against
defendant (petitioner) Angelina Soriente submitted for decision
in accordance with Section 7 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure. The trial court eventually rendered a decision against
Angelina Soriente.
Here, petitioner contends that the lower court erred in
deciding this case in accordance with Section 7 of the Rules on
Summary Procedure, asserting that considering that the cases
against her, defendants Caballero and Sadol were consolidated,
and she and defendant Caballero signed and filed one common
Answer to the Complaint, thus, pleading a common defense, the
trial court should not have rendered judgment on her case based
on Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
when she failed to appear in the preliminary conference.
HELD:
SEC. 6. Effect of failure to answer.
– Should the defendant fail to answer the
complaint within the period above provided,
the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the
plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for
therein: Provided, however, That the court
may in its discretion reduce the amount of
damages and attorney’s fees claimed for being
excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This
is without prejudice to the applicability of
Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if
there are two or more defendants.
SEC. 7. Preliminary conference;
appearance of parties. – Not later than thirty
(30) days after the last answer is filed, a
preliminary conference shall be held. The
rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be
applicable to the preliminary conference
unless inconsistent with the provisions of this
Rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear
in the preliminary conference shall be a cause
for the dismissal of his complaint. The
defendant who appears in the absence of the
plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his
counterclaim in accordance with Section 6
hereof. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If a sole defendant shall fail to
appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to
judgment in accordance with Section 6
hereof. This Rule shall not apply where one
of two or more defendants sued under a
common cause of action who had pleaded a
common defense shall appear at the
preliminary conference
The Court holds that Soriente and Caballero were not
co-defendants in the same case. The ejectment case filed against
petitioner was distinct from that of Caballero, even if the trial
court consolidated the cases and, in the interest of justice,
considered the Answer filed by Caballero in Civil Case No. 17974
as the Answer also of petitioner since she affixed her signature
thereto.
Considering that petitioner was sued in a separate case
for ejectment from that of Caballero and Sadol, petitioner’s
failure to appear in the preliminary conference entitled
respondent to the rendition of judgment by the trial court on the
ejectment case filed against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case
No. 17973, in accordance with Section 7 of the 1991 Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure.
___________________________________________
24. HEIRS OF RETUYA VS. CA, APRIL 6, 2011
FACTS:
 Severo Retuya (Severo) and Maxima Mayol Retuya
(Maxima) were husband and wife without any children.
 Severo left several parcels of land registered under his name
which are located in Mandaue City.
 Severo died intestate, survived by his wife Maxima and by
Severo's full blood brothers and sisters, namely, Nicolas,
Francisco, Quintin, Eulogio, Ruperto, Epifania, Georgia
and the Heirs of Juan Retuya (Severo’s brother who had
died earlier), as well as Severo's half-blood siblings, namely,
Romeo, Leona, Rafaela, Fidela, Severina and Martina.
 Sometime in 1971, Maxima also died intestate, survived by
her siblings, namely, Fructuoso, Daniel, Benjamin,
Lorenzo, Concepcion and Teofila.
 In 1996, Severo and Maxima's siblings and their nephews
and nieces, herein petitioners, filed with the RTC of
Mandaue City, an action for judicial partition of the real
properties registered under the names of Severo and
Maxima, and the accounting of the rentals derived there
from against Severo's two other brothers, respondents
Nicolas and his son Procopio Villanueva, and Eulogio, who
was represented by the latter's heirs.
 RTC declared the heirs of EULOGIO Retuya as owners of
1/16 share of Severo to the ½ of the subject properties
representing the shares of Severo, which he inherited from
his father and later on sold to Eulogio.
 Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for annulment of
Judgment of the RTC, claiming that the question order was
a patent nullity for want of jurisdiction and lack of due
process.
 CA dismissed the petition.
o Three of the petitioners did not sign the certificate of
non-forum shopping.
o Payment of docket fee was short of P480.00.
 Parties filed for a motion for reconsideration but was
dismissed by the CA on the ground that the petitioners
failed to comply with the certification of non-forum
shopping due to their alleged dishonesty by claiming that
on of the principal parties signed the said certification when
if fact he passed away before the petition was filed.
Page 15 of 24

ISSUE:
WON CA erred in dismissing the petition(s).
HELD/RATIO:
NO. The decisions of the CA are AFFIRMED.
 Petitioners’ actuation showed their lack of forthrightness to
the CA which the latter correctly found to be a dishonest act
committed against it.
o There was a signature above the typewritten name of
Quintin.
o Written below the signature of Quintin was CTC No.
06570132, issued on January 8, 2003 in Mandaue City.
o It would appear that Quintin, who was already dead at
the time the petition was filed, had signed the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping
and he was even in possession of a CTC.
 CA correctly denied the motion for Reconsideration on the
ground that the Atty. Dela Cerna, representative of the
party had no right to represent the petitioners.
o Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court on the
requirements of a valid substitution of counsel:
 The filing of a written application for substitution;
 The client’s written consent;
 The consent of the substituted lawyer if such
consent can be obtained;
 and, in case such written consent cannot be
procured, a proof of service of notice of such
motion on the attorney to be substituted in the
manner required by the Rules.
o In this case, petitioners failed to comply with the above
requirements.
___________________________________________
25. IN RE: REONSTITUTION OF TCTS 3031684 &
303169, G.R. NO. 156797, JULY 6, 2012
___________________________________________
26. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA-
LAKAS VS. SAMMA CORP., MARCH 13, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Samma–
Lakas sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi ng Alyansa (SAMMA-
LIKHA) filed a petition for certification election on July 24, 2001
in the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional
Office IV.4 It claimed that: (1) it was a local chapter of the
LIKHA Federation, a legitimate labor organization registered
with the DOLE; (2) it sought to represent all the rank-and-file
employees of respondent Samma Corporation; (3) there was no
other legitimate labor organization representing these rank-
and-file employees; (4) respondent was not a party to any
collective bargaining agreement and (5) no certification or
consent election had been conducted within the employer unit
for the last 12 months prior to the filing of the petition.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition
arguing that (1) LIKHA Federation failed to establish its legal
personality; (2) petitioner failed to prove its existence as a local
chapter; (3) it failed to attach the certificate of non-
forum shopping and (4) it had a prohibited mixture of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees.
Med-arbiter ordered the dismissal. , Acting Secretary
Manuel G. Imson, treating the motion for reconsideration as an
appeal, rendered a decision reversing the order of the med-
arbiter. He ruled that the legal personality of a union cannot be
collaterally attacked but may only be questioned in an
independent petition for cancellation of registration. Thus, he
directed the holding of a certification election among the rank-
and-file employees of respondent, subject to the usual pre-
election conference and inclusion-exclusion proceedings. CA
reversed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether a certificate for non-forum shopping is
required in a petition for certification election
HELD: NO
In ruling against petitioner, the CA declared that under
Administrative Circular No. 04-94,16 a certificate of non-forum
shopping was required in a petition for certification election.
The circular states:
The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred
to and subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint,
or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or applicationwherein
a party asserts his claim for relief. (Emphasis supplied)
According to the CA, a petition for certification election asserts
a claim, i.e., the conduct of a certification election. As a result, it
is covered by the circular.
We disagree.
The requirement for a certificate of non-forum
shopping refers to complaints, counter-claims, cross-claims,
petitions or applications where contending parties litigate their
respective positions regarding the claim for relief of the
complainant, claimant, petitioner or applicant. A certification
proceeding, even though initiated by a “petition,” is not
a litigation but an investigation of a non-adversarial
and fact-finding character.
Such proceedings are not predicated upon an
allegation of misconduct requiring relief, but, rather,
are merely of an inquisitorial nature. The Board’s
functions are not judicial in nature, but are merely of an
investigative character. The object of the proceedings is not the
decision of any alleged commission of wrongs nor asserted
deprivation of rights but is merely the determination of proper
bargaining units and the ascertainment of the will and choice of
the employees in respect of the selection of a bargaining
representative. The determination of the proceedings does not
entail the entry of remedial orders to redress rights, but
culminates solely in an official designation of bargaining units
and an affirmation of the employees’ expressed choice of
bargaining agent.
Under the omnibus rules implementing the Labor
Code as amended by D.O. No. 9,22 it is supposed to be filed in
the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal
office of the employer or where the bargaining unit is principally
situated.23 The rules further provide that where two or more
petitions involving the same bargaining unit are filed in one
Regional Office, the same shall be automatically
consolidated.24 Hence, the filing of multiple suits and the
possibility of conflicting decisions will rarely happen in this
proceeding and, if it does, will be easy to discover.
Notably, under the Labor Code and the rules pertaining
to the form of the petition for certification election, there is no
requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping either in
D.O. No. 9, series of 1997 or in D.O. No. 40-03, series of 2003
which replaced the former.
Considering the nature of a petition for certification
election and the rules governing it, we therefore hold that the
requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping is
inapplicable to such a petition.
___________________________________________
Page 16 of 24
 27. BROWN-ARANETA VS. ARANETA, OCOTBER 9,
2013
SV:
After 7 years of marriage, Juan and Michelle
separated and Michelle had custody of their 2 children.
Juan filed a PETITION FOR CUSTODY of their
children with the Makati RTC. After initially failing to
file an answer Michelle filed a Motion to Admit Answer
and with a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance
of Protection Order. The Makati judge was disinclined
to grant Michelle’s motion for a TPO and declared her
in default. Subsequently, she interposed a Motion to
Withdraw her Motion for TPO. Subsequently, Michelle
initiated a PETITION FOR TEMPORARY AND
PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER with the
Muntinlupa RTC, which granted the same. Juan filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia and
arguing that this constitutes forum shopping, which
the RTC only partially granted. He then filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the CA. CA ruled that although the
Petition for Certiorari is a prohibited pleading under
RA 9262, the case can’t be dismissed because it would
in effect “reward” the forum shopping done by
Michelle.
Court said that Michelle committed forum
shopping. Forum shopping is the institution of 2 or
more actions involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,
on the supposition that one or the other court would
come out with a favorable disposition. Litis pendentia
refers to the situation wherein another action is
pending between the same parties for the same cause
of action, such that the second cause of action becomes
vexatious and unnecessary. Applying the rules,
Michelle committed forum shopping because, as a
result or in anticipation of the adverse ruling of Makati
RTC, she sought the favorable opinion of Muntinlupa
RTC. PETITION FOR TEMPORARY AND
PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER in
Muntinlupa RTC is dismissed.
RTC, Michelle went to the CA on certiorari
FACTS:
- Juan Ignacio and Michelle were married and had 2
children, Ara and Ava. After 7 years, they separated
and their 2 children remained in Michelle’s custody.
- Juan filed a PETITION FOR CUSTODY of his
children1 with prayer for visitation rights with the
Makati RTC against Michelle and her mother, Glenda
Santos, claiming that they have completely barred him
from seeing or getting in touch with his daughters
despite repeated requests.
- The process server attempted to serve summons upon
both of them, but only Santos was served. In Santos’
answer, she disclaimed knowledge of Michelle’s
whereabouts and she raised the court’s jurisdiction
over Michelle and rattled off negative habits and traits
of Juan.
- After a visiting grant was granted to Juan later on,
Michelle filed a Motion to Admit Answer and an
Answer (With Affirmative Defenses and With Very
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Protection
Order), acknowledging that she heard about the
delivery of summons, but she disregarded it because
1
Pursuant to A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC or The Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus In relation to Custody of
Minors
she claimed she thought that it was improperly served
upon her person.
- [RTC Makati] In a hearing for the issuance of a TPO,
the judge expressed her bent to maintain jurisdiction
over the PETITION FOR CUSTODY and her
disinclination to issue the TPO. Juan was granted
visitation rights for one Saturday and Sunday because
he was previously unable to see his children.
 Subsequently, the RTC resolved to deny
admission of Michelle’s answer to the
PETITION FOR CUSTODY and declared her
in default.
 Michelle interposed a Motion to Withdraw
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Protective Order
- Michelle initiated a PETITION FOR TEMPORARY
AND PERMANENT PRTECTION ORDER before RTC
Muntinlupa. In the verification portion of her petition
for protection order, Michelle stated that there was a
pending petition for custody of their children in
Makati.
- [RTC Muntinlupa] granted Michelle’s prayer for a
TPO which ordered Juan to stay away at a specified
distance from Michelle and the children and to desist
from communicating with Michelle.
 Juan filed a MOTION TO DISMISS
PETITION WITH PRAYER TO LIFT TPO
anchored on, among others, litis pendentia,
since Makati RTC is competent to grant the
very same reliefs Michelle sought from
Muntinlupa RTC. Thus, Michelle’s act of filing
her PETITION FOR PROTECTION ORDER
constitutes forum shopping.
 RTC conceded the exclusionary effect of RTC
Makati assuming the jurisdiction on the issue
of custody first, so it PARTIALLY GRANTED
the Motion to Dismiss and modified the
protection order to exclude from its coverage
the orders issued by Makati RTC in the
exercise of its jurisdiction on the pending
custody case.
- Meanwhile in relation to the custody case in Makati
- [CA] ruled partly in favor of Michelle, and decided
that Makati RTC erred in not admitting her answer and
in holding that she is in default.
- From the adverse orders of Muntinlupa RTC, Juan
also went to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari, praying
to enjoin the Muntinlupa RTC from further taking
cognizance of Michelle’s protection order petition since
it will intrude upon Makati RTC’s disposition of the
custody case.
 Michelle opposed and sought the dismissal of the
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI on the ground that
it is a prohibited pleading under RA 9262.
- [CA] found Michelle guilty of forum shopping, but
also said that Juan’s PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is
a prohibited pleading which renders it dismissible.
Nonetheless, it ruled in favor of Juan, declaring void
the issuances made by Muntinlupa RTC.
 It said that the rule that a petition for certiorari
against any interlocutory order issued by a family
court is a prohibited pleading is not absolute.
 On the other hand, Michelle initially recognized
the jurisdiction of Makati RTC to issue a TPO, but
Page 17 of 24
 it was only after it denied her prayer for a TPO
when she filed a petition before Muntinlupa RTC.
 Dismissing this petition on the ground that it is a
prohibited pleading would in effect, “reward”
Michelle for this negative act.
- Michelle sought to set aside the Decision of the CA.
ISSUE: Did Michelle commit forum shopping? (YES)
HELD:
- Michelle argues that:
 She withdrew her petition for protective order in
the custody case. Besides, the CA decided that
Makati RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her
so all its issuances were void
 There was no forum shopping because there is no
identity of parties and the rights asserted and the
reliefs prayed for aren’t the same
 It wasn’t possible for her to apply for a protection
order under RA 9262 in the custody case because
she wasn’t a petitioner in the Makati case and the
venue for the application for a protection order
under the law is the place where the offended party
resides, which is Muntinlupa.
- Court pointed out that Michelle only withdrew her
petition for protective order in the Makati Court after
it was denied. Also, there is nothing in the CA decision
declaring that all issuances of the Makati RTC were
void for lack of jurisdiction over Michelle—the Court
said that this posture was meant to deceive and mislead
the court.
- Forum shopping is the institution of 2 or more actions
involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, on the
supposition that one or the other court would come out
with a favorable disposition.
 The test for determining whether there is forum
shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia
are present or where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in the other case.
 Litis pendentia refers to the situation wherein
another action is pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action, such that the
second cause of action becomes vexatious and
unnecessary. For this to apply, the ff. requisites
must be present:
o 1. Identity of the parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in
both actions
o 2. Identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts
o 3. Identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the pending case, regardless
of which party is successful would
amount to res judicata in the other
 Thus it has been held that there is forum shopping:
o 1. Whenever as a result of an adverse
decision in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable decision (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another;
o 2. If, after he has filed a petition before
the SC, a party files another before the CA
since in such case said party deliberately
splits appeals “in the hope that even as
one case in which a particular remedy is
sought is dismissed, another case
offering a similar remedy would still be
open; or
o 3. Where a party attempts to obtain a
preliminary injunction in another court
after failing to obtain it from the original
court.
- Applying the rules, Michelle committed forum
shopping because, as a result or in anticipation of the
adverse ruling of Makati RTC, she sought the favorable
opinion of Muntinlupa RTC.
 The cases have identical parties. In a long
line of cases, the SC has held that absolute identity
of parties isn’t required, it being enough that there
is substantial identity of the parties or at least such
parties represent the same interests in both
actions. The fact that the identities of parties are
reversed doesn’t negate the identity of parties for
the purpose of determining whether the case is
dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.
 The rights asserted and reliefs prayed for
are based on the same facts. Both courts will
have to make a finding on Michelle’s allegations of
abuse and whether granting visitation rights will
be in the children’s best interest.
 Elements of litis pendentia are present and
any any judgment rendered in the pending
cases, regardless of which party is
successful, will amount to res judicata. In
the custody case, Juan asserted his right to visit his
children and enjoy custody over them. In the
Petition for Protection Order filed by Michelle, on
the other hand, she asserts that the grant of
visitation rights in Juan’s favor will not be in the
best interest of the children. A favorable decision
in one case would amount to res judicata in the
other.
- The evil sought to be avoided by the rule against
forum shopping is the rendition by 2 competent
tribunals of 2 separate and contradictory decisions,
thereby causing confusion, is present in this case.
Petition for TPO filed by Michelle in
Muntinlupa RTC should be dismissed with
prejudice since this is a clear case of forum
shopping.
CA Decision AFFIRMED.
_______________________________________
28. METRO BANK VS. ABAD SANTOS, DECEMBER
15, 2009
SUMMARY: Metrobank foreclosed and purchased a
condominium unit owned by De Koning after the latter failed to
pay for a loan to the former. After De Koning’s refusal to turn
over possession of the condo unit, Metrobank filed an ex parte
petition for a writ of possession over the property. De Koning
filed an MTD on the ground that Metrobank did not attach a
certification against non forum shopping to its petition.
Metrobank argued that its petition is not an initiatory pleading
asserting a claim, and therefore does not require such
certification. Court agreed with Metrobank and held that
although the ex parte “petition” of Metrobank was a petition in
form, it was, in substance actually a motion (neither a complaint
nor an initiatory pleading), making a ceritification against forum
shopping unnecessary.
DOCTRINE:
A certification against non-forum shopping is required only in a
complaint or in any other initiatory pleading asserting a claim
for relief. An ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
Page 18 of 24
possession is neither of the two - it is merely a motion.
Therefore, it does not require such a certification.
FACTS:
1. De Koning obtained a P2M loan from Metrobank evidenced
by a promissory note and secured by a real estate mortgage
over a condominium unit.
2. After De Koning’s failure to pay, Metrobank foreclosed the
mortgage and bought the condo unit, being the highest
bidder in the auction sale.
3. The redemption period lapsed, so Metrobank demanded
that De Koning turn over possession of the condo unit.
4. De Koning refused, prompting Metrobank to file an ex
parte petition for a writ of possession over the foreclosed
property with the RTC of Makati.
5. Counsel of De Koning filed an MTD on the ground that the
petition of Metrobank violated S5 R7 ROC, which requires
attachment of a certification against forum shopping to a
complaint or other initiatory pleading. Thus, the petition of
Metrobank was dismissed.
6. CA affirmed, adding that S5, R7 is not limited to actions,
but covers any initiatory pleading that asserts a claim for
relief. Also, Metrobank failed to disclose in the verification
and certification that there are already 2 cases filed by De
Koning (one with the RTC, the other a petition for certiorari
with the CA), both of which involve the same issues and
subject matter as that of Metrobank’s petition: its right to
foreclose, and consequently, its right to a writ of
possession.
7. Metrobank argues that its petition is not covered by S5, R7
ROC
1. ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
is not an initiatory pleading asserting a claim
2. it is a mere incident in the transfer of title over the real
property acquired
3. therefore, a certification against forum shopping is not
required
ISSUES/HELD
1. WON an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession is an initatory pleading asserting a claim, which
is covered by the rule on certification against non-forum
shopping (Sec. 5, Rule 7 ROC). NO
RATIO:
The certification against forum shopping is required
only in a complaint or other initiatory pleading. An ex
parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is
neither of the two.
One of the ways a writ of possession may be issued is in an
extrajudicial foreclosure of a REM.
In accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135 as amended by Act
No. 4118, in order to obtain a writ of possession, the purchaser
in a foreclosure sale must file a petition, in the form of an ex
parte MOTION, in the registration or cadastral proceedings of
the registered property.
This pleading, although denominated as a petition is actually
considered as a MOTION.
Reason (Sps. Arquiza v. CA):
A motion is not an independent right or remedy; its purpose is
not to initiate new litigation. It is confined to material but
incidental matters in the progress of a case. It refers to a
collateral issue and is dependent upon the principal remedy.
An application for a writ of possession is a mere incident in
the registration proceeding.
Therefore, although it may a petition in form, it is in substance
merely a motion.
In an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, the
basis of the purchaser’s right to possession is his/its
right of ownership. There is no need to file a
separate and independent suit for possession –
the mere filing of an ex parte motion for the
issuance of the writ of possession is enough.
Since the ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession filed by the respondent is neither a
complaint nor an initiatory pleading, a certificate
against non-forum shopping is NOT required.
Case remanded to RTC.
___________________________________________
29. Monasterio-Pe vs. Tong, March 23, 2011
___________________________________________
30. COSCO PHILS. SHIPPING VS. KEMPER
INSURANCE CO., APIL 23, 2012
SUMMARY:
Kemper (a insurance corporation based in the US) sued Cosco
(shipper) because of the spoilage of Genosi Inc’s beef
(consignee). Problem: Kemper’s Filipino lawyer did not attach
any proof that he was authorised by Kemper to sign the
Certificate Against Forum Shopping.
SC: A certification against forum shopping must be signed by
(1) the principal parties or
(2) authorized individuals, with proof of such authority
If the plaintiff is a corporation, the authority must be through a
valid board resolution
FACTS OF THE CASE:
• An insurance case. Genosi Inc (consignee) tried to ship
imported beef thru Cosco (shipper) but a portion was spoiled
so Genosi claimed the insurance proceeds from Kemper
(insurer) which paid it.
• Kemper is an insurance corporation based in the US
• It instituted an action in the Philippines thru Atty
Rodolfo Lat
• THE PROBLEM: Atty Lat signed the
Certificate Against Forum Shopping (CAFS) without
showing his authority to bring suit
• There was a SPA made by Brent Healy for
Atty. Lat, but it also does not show that Healy was
authorised by Kemper
• Cosco filed a MTD, arguing that the CAFS is fatally
defective
• RTC: dismissed without prejudice
• CA: reversed. Liberal application of the rule on CAFS.
ISSUE:
Whether the Certificate Against Forum Shopping (CAFS) is
fatally defective. YES.
RATIO:
(1) Atty Lat was not properly authorised by Kemper to
sign the CAFS
• Who may sign a CAFS (Rule):
• (a) A certification against forum shopping must be signed
by the principal parties. If, for any reason, the principal
party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his
behalf must have been duly authorized.
• (b) With respect to a corporation, the certification
against forum shopping may be signed for and on its
behalf, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has
Page 19 of 24
 personal knowledge of the facts required to be
disclosed in such document.
• only individuals vested with authority by a valid board
resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping on behalf of a corporation…
• Req’d: proof of such authority (must) be presented
• Effect if there is no proof of authority: petition is subject to
dismissal
• EXCEPTION (Republic v Coalbrine): “special
circumstance or compelling reason” + “subsequent
compliance by the submission of the proof of authority “
• Applied: There is no proof that (Kemper), a private
corporation, authorized Atty. Lat, through a board
resolution, to sign the verification and certification against
forum shopping on its behalf. Accordingly, the
certification against forum shopping appended to the
complaint is fatally defective, and warrants the
dismissal of respondent's complaint for Insurance Loss
and Damages.
• Relaxation of the rule is unjustified:
• there is no proof of authority submitted, even belatedly
• there is no copy of the board resolution or the secretary’s
certificated attesting to Atty Lat’s authority
• the SPA by Healy is fatally defective (it does not show
Healy’s authority to act in behalf of Kemper)
(2) Cosco is not estopped by laches from raising the
issue with the CAFS
• Rule: if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the
plaintiff who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is
not deemed filed. The court should dismiss the complaint
on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the
complaint and the plaintiff.
• Applied: since no valid complaint was ever filed with the
RTC… the same did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of respondent… (therefore) Cosco is not estopped
from challenging the RTC’s jurisdiction.
• Note: the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver
or by estoppel;
• Exception: estoppel by laches (Tijam v Sibonghanoy)
• But Sibonghanoy does not apply here because “the trial
court's jurisdiction was questioned by the petitioner
during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, and it cannot
be said that considerable length of time had elapsed for
laches to attach"
___________________________________________
31. HEIRS OF MESINA VS. HERIS OF FIAN, APRIL 8,
2013
DEFINITION OF TERMS:
Non-joinder - failure to bring a person who is a necessary party
or in this case an indispensable party into a lawsuit.
Indispensable party - is a party-in-interest without whom no
final determination can be had of the action, and
who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant.
Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The late spouses Mesina, during their lifetime, bought from the
spouses Fian two parcels of land on installment. The properties
described:
Parcel 1 – A parcel of land, Cadastral Lot No. 6791-
Rem. Albuera, Leyte; Containing an area of ONE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY TWO (1,632)
SQUARE METERS.
Parcel 2 – A parcel of land, Cadastral Lot No. 6737-
Rem, Albuera, Leyte; Containing an area of THREE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY (3,730).
Upon the death of the spouses Fian, their heirs––
whose names do not appear on the records, claiming ownership
of the parcels of land and taking possession of them––refused
to acknowledge the payments for the lots and denied that their
late parents sold the property to the spouses Mesina.
Notwithstanding repeated demands, the Heirs of Fian
refused to vacate the lots and to turn possession over to the heirs
of the spouses Mesina, namely: Norman, Victor, Maria and
Lorna. Thus, on August 8, 2005, Norman, as attorney-in-fact of
his siblings, filed an action for quieting of title and damages
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14 in Baybay,
Leyte against the Heirs of Fian, naming only Theresa Fian Yray
(Theresa) as the representative of the Heirs of Fian. The case,
was docketed as Civil Case No. B-05-08-20.
On September 5, 2005, respondent Theresa filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint, arguing that the complaint
states no cause of action and that the case should be dismissed
for gross violation of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, which state in part:
“Section 1. Who may be parties;
plaintiff and defendant. – Only
natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be
parties in a civil action.”
She claims that the "Heirs of Mesina" could not be
considered as a juridical person or entity authorized by law to
file a civil action. Neither could the "Heirs of Fian" be made as
defendant, not being a juridical person as well. She added that
since the names of all the heirs of the late spouses Mesina and
spouses Fian were not individually named, the complaint is
infirmed, warranting its dismissal.
On November 24, 2005, petitioners filed their
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.
RTC RULING:
The Rules of Court is explicit that only natural or
juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in
a civil action (Section 1, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court).
Certainly, the Heirs of Faurstino s. Mesina and Genoveva S.
Mesina, represented by Norman Mesina as plaintiffs as well as
Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. represented by Theresa Fian Yray as
defendants, do not fall within the category as natural or juridical
persons as contemplated by law to institute or defend civil
actions. Said heirs not having been individually named could not
be the real parties in interest. Hence, the complaint states no
cause of action.
Accordingly, the case is hereby dismissed.
RULING OF THE CA
In affirming the RTC, the CA, on April 29, 2011,
rendered its Decision, ruling that all the heirs of the spouses
Fian are indispensable parties and should have been impleaded
in the complaint. The appellate court explained that this failure
to implead the other heirs of the late spouses Fian is a legal
obstacle to the trial court’s exercise of judicial power over the
case and any order or judgment that would be rendered is a
nullity in view of the absence of indispensable parties. The CA
further held that the RTC correctly dismissed the complaint for
being improperly verified.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the court correctly dismissed the complaint for
lack of cause of action.
Page 20 of 24
 2. W/N the court correctly dismissed the complaint for
being improperly verified.
RULING OF THE SC
1. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the
insufficiency of the pleading. A complaint states a
cause of action if it avers the existence of the three
essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;
(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said right.9
By a simple reading of the elements of a failure to state
a cause of action, it can be readily seen that the
inclusion of Theresa’s co-heirs does not fall under any
of the above elements. The infirmity is, in fact, not a
failure to state a cause of action but a non-joinder of an
indispensable party.
As such, this is properly a non-joinder of indispensable
party, the indispensable parties who were not included
in the complaint being the other heirs of Fian, and not
a failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.
Thus, the dismissal of the case for failure to state a
cause of action is improper. What the trial court should
have done is to direct petitioner Norman Mesina to
implead all the heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as
defendants within a reasonable time from notice with
a warning that his failure to do so shall mean dismissal
of the complaint.
2. Verification, like in most cases required by the rules of
procedure, is a formal requirement, not jurisdictional.
It is mainly intended to secure an assurance that
matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are
true and correct and not of mere speculation. Thus,
when circumstances so warrant, as in the case at hand,
"the court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict
compliance with the rules in order that the ends of
justice may thereby be served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
April 29, 2011 Decision and April 12, 2012 Resolution
of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 01366, and the November
22, 2005 Order and February 29,2006 Resolution of
the RTC, Branch 14 in Baybay, Leyte, dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 8-05-08-20, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Norman
Mesina is ORDERED to implead all the Heirs of
Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants in said civil case
within thirty (30) days from notice of finality of this
Decision. Failure on the part of petitioner Mesina to
comply with this directive shall result in the dismissal
of Civil Case No. B-05-08-20. Upon compliance by
petitioner Mesina with this directive, the RTC, Branch
14 in Baybay, Leyte is ORDERED to undertake
appropriate steps and proceedings to expedite
adjudication of the case.
___________________________________________
32. MID-PASIG LAND DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS.
TABLANTE, FEBRUARY 4, 2010
FACTS:
Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation (Mid-
Pasig) is the registered owner of a piece of land in Pasig City,
bounded by Meralco Avenue, Ortigas Avenue, Julia Vargas
Avenue, and Valle Verde Subdivision.
On Dec. 6, 1999, Mid-Pasig, represented by its
Chairman and President Ronaldo Salonga, and ECRM
Enterprises (ECRM), represented by its proprietor Mario
Tablante (Tablante), executed an agreement whereby Mid-Pasig
would lease to ECRM 1 hectare of the subject land for 3 months,
to be used as the staging area for the Home and Garden
Exhibition Fair. On the date of the expiration of the Lease
Agreement (March 6, 2000), Tablante assigned all his rights and
interests under the said agreement to respondents Laurie M.
Litam and/or Rockland Construction Company, Inc. (Rockland)
under a Deed of Assignment of the same date. Mid-Pasig
eventually learn that Tablante had executed a Deed of Lease with
respondent MC Home Depot (MC) over the same parcel of land.
MC constructed improvements on the land and subdivided the
area into 59 commercial stalls which it leased to various entities.
Upon the expiration of the lease, Mid-Pasig demanded that
respondents vacate the land. Final demand was made in a letter
dated Dec. 20, 2000.
Rockland filed a case for Specific Performance with the
Pasig RTC to forestall the ejectment.
Mid-Pasig then simultaneously filed for: (1) unlawful
detainer against the respondents, which was raffled to the Pasig
MTC, Branch 70 and (2) a supplemental motion to dismiss
Rockland’s case on the ground of litis pendentia. The motion to
dismiss was denied. The denial was questioned and eventually
elevated to the SC.
On the other hand, the MTC ruled that it has no
jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case because it
held that the real issue of the case was whether or not ECRM had
the right to exercise an option to renew its lease contract. Such
issue is incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus the RTC has
jurisdiction. MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Pasig RTC Branch 160 affirmed the decision in toto.
The CA dismissed Mid-Pasig’s petition for certiorari on
the following grounds:
1) The verification and certification against non-forum shopping
was signed by a certain Antonio A. Merelos as General Manager
of the petitioner-corporation without attaching therewith a
Corporate Secretary’s certificate or board resolution
that he is authorized to sign for and on behalf of the
petitioner; and
2) Lack of pertinent and necessary documents which are
material portions of the record as required by Section 2, Rule 42
of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Thus, this case.
ISSUE:
1.
W/N failure to attach the Secretary’s Certificate is a
valid ground for the dismissal of Mid-Pasig’s case
HELD/RATIO:
1. NO, dismissal on a purely technical ground is
frowned upon by the Court. (frowned upon )
The court has recently recognized the authority of
corporate officers or representatives to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping. Thus, it is clear that the
failure to attach the Secretary’s Certificate, attesting to General
Antonio Merelos’s authority to sign the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping should not be considered
fatal to the filing of petition. Moreover, the requisite board
resolution was subsequently submitted to the CA together with
Page 21 of 24
the pertinent documents. Considering that Mid-Pasig
substantially complied with the rules, the dismissal was ISSUE: Whether the document containing the Terms and
unwarranted. The dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical Conditions is an actionable document?
ground is frowned upon especially if it will result in unfairness.
The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, RULING: Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
technical sense for they have been adopted to help secure, not provides:
override, substantial justice. SEC. 7. Action or defense based on document. —
Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written
After a finding that the CA erred in dismissing the instrument or document, the substance of such
petition before it, a remand of the case is in order. instrument or document shall be set forth in the
pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be
The petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be
Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. However, deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may
in view of the expiration of the lease in question which has with like effect be set forth in the pleading.
rendered the issue of the right of possession over the
subject property moot and academic, the main case is Clearly, the above provision applies when the action is
hereby considered CLOSED AND TERMINATED.
based on a written instrument or document.
___________________________________________ In this case, the complaint is an action for collection of
sum of money arising from Ledda’s default in her credit card
33. LEDDA VS. BPI, NOVEMBER 21, 2012 obligation with BPI. BPI’s cause of action is primarily based on
Ledda’s (1) acceptance of the BPI credit card, (2) usage of the
FACTS: BPI credit card to purchase goods, avail services and secure cash
As one of BPI’s valued clients, Ledda was issued a pre- advances, and (3) non-payment of the amount due for such
approved BPI credit card. The BPI Credit Card Package, which credit card transactions, despite demands.11 In other words,
included the Terms and Conditions governing the use of the BPI’s cause of action is not based only on the document
credit card, was delivered at Ledda’s residence on 1 July 2005. containing the Terms and Conditions accompanying
Thereafter, Ledda used the credit card for various purchases of the issuance of the BPI credit card in favor of Ledda.
goods and services and cash advances. Therefore, the document containing the Terms and
Ledda defaulted in the payment of her credit card Conditions governing the use of the BPI credit card is
obligation, which BPI claimed in their complaint amounted to not an actionable document contemplated in Section 7,
P548,143.73 . Consequently, BPI sent letters6 to Ledda Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, it is
demanding the payment of such amount, representing the not required by the Rules to be set forth in and attached to the
principal obligation with 3.25% finance charge and 6% late complaint.
payment charge per month. At any rate, BPI has sufficiently established a cause of
Despite BPI’s repeated demands, Ledda failed to pay action against Ledda, who admits having received the BPI credit
her credit card obligation constraining BPI to file an action for card, subsequently used the credit card, and failed to pay her
collection of sum of money with the Regional Trial Court. The obligation arising from the use of such credit card.12
trial court declared Ledda in default for failing to file Answer ___________________________________________
within the prescribed period, despite receipt of the complaint
and summons. Upon Ledda’s motion for reconsideration, the 34. TOTAL CONSTRUCTION CORP. VS.
trial court lifted the default order and admitted Ledda’s Answer DAVID, MARCH 15, 2010
Ad Cautelam. ___________________________________________
While she filed a Pre-Trial Brief, Ledda and her counsel
failed to appear during the continuation of the Pre-Trial. Hence,
the trial court allowed BPI to present its evidence ex-parte.
The trial court ruled in favor of BPI.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected Ledda’s
argument that the document containing the Terms and
Conditions governing the use of the BPI credit card is an
actionable document contemplated in Section 7, Rule 8 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals held that
BPI’s cause of action is based on "Ledda’s availment of the
bank’s credit facilities through the use of her credit/plastic
cards, coupled with her refusal to pay BPI’s outstanding credit
for the cost of the goods, services and cash advances despite
lawful demands."
Citing Macalinao v. Bank of the Philippine Islands,8 the
Court of Appeals held that the interest rates and penalty charges
imposed by BPI for Ledda’s non-payment of her credit card
obligation, totalling 9.25% per month or 111% per annum, are
exorbitant and unconscionable. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals reduced the monthly finance charge to 1% and the late
payment charge to 1%, or a total of 2% per month or 24% per
annum.
The Court of Appeals recomputed Ledda’s total credit
card obligation. Leaving a difference of P322,138.58 as the
principal amount, on which the reduced interest rates should be
imposed.
The Court of Appeals awarded BPI P10,000 attorney’s
fees, pursuant to the ruling in Macalinao.

Page 22 of 24
 35. Pacana-Contreras vs. Rovila Water Supply,
December 2, 2013
36. Diona vs. Balangue, January 7, 2013
37. Otero vs. Tan, August 15, 2012
38. Sheker vs. Estate of Sheker, G.R. No. 157912,
December 13, 2007
F. SUMMONS
39. Sps. Dela Cruz vs. Concepcion, October 1,
2012
40. Elice Agro-Industrial Corp. vs. Young,
November 21, 2012
41. NM Rothschild & Sons [Aus] Ltd. Vs. Lepanto
Consolidated ining Co., November 28, 2011
42. Sansio vs. Sps Mogul, K=July 14, 2009
43. UCPB vs. Ongpin, G.R. No. 146593, October
26, 2001
44. Robinson vs. Miralles, G.R. N. 163584,
December 12, 2006
45. Sagana vs. Francisco, October 2, 2009
46. Gentle Supreme Phil. Inc. vs. Consulta,
September 1, 2010
47. Macasaet vs. Co, June 5, 2013
48. Palma vs. Galvez, March 10, 2010
49. Bank of the Philippines Islands vs. Sps.
Santiago, G.R. No. 169116, March 26, 2007
G. MOTIONS
50. Home Development Mutual Fund vs. Sps.
See, June 22. 2011
51. Aqualab Phils. Inc. vs. Heirs of Pagob, G.R.
No. 182673, October 5, 2009
52. Palmiano-Salvador vs. Angeles, September 3,
2012
53. Sps. Rasdas vs. Estenor, G.R. No. 157605,
December 13, 2005
H. DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
I. PRE-TRIAL
54. Pacana-Contreras vs. Rovila Water Supply,
Inc., December 2, 2013
55. Polanco vs. Cruz, February 13, 2009
56. Espiritu vs. Lazaro, November 25, 2009
57. PNB vs. Perez, june 15, 2011
58. Perkin Elmer Singapore vs. Dakila Trading,
August 14, 2007
J. INTERVENTION
59. PNB vs. Aznar, G.R. No. 171805, May 30, 2011
60. Heirs of Medrano vs. De Vera, August 9, 2010
61. Board of Regents of MSU vs. Osop, February
22, 2012
62. Malvar vs. Kraft Foods Phils. Inc., September
9, 2013
63. Pacana-Contreras vs. Rovila Water Supply,
Inc. G.R. No. 168979, December 2, 2013
K. SUBPOENA
L. MODES OF DISCOVERY
64. Sales vs. Sabino, December 9, 2005
65. Sps. Afulugencia vs. Metrobank, February 5,
2014
66. Air Philippines Corp. vs. Pennswell, Inc., G.R.
No. 172835, December 13, 2007
67. Eagleridge Development Corp. vs. Cameron
Granville 3 Asset Mgt., April 10, 2013
M. TRIAL
68. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, December 16,
2011
N. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
69. Gonzales vs. Bugaay, February 22, 2012
O. JUDGEMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS
70. Shimizu Phils Contractors vs. Magsalin, June
20, 2012
71. Pacific Rehaus vs. Export & Industry Bank,
October 13, 2010
72. Philippine Business Bank vs. Chua,
November 15, 2010
P. POST-JUDGEMENT REMEDIES
73. Neypes vs. CA., G.R. No. 141524, September
14, 2005
74. National Power Corp. vs. Sps. Laohoo, July
23, 2009
75. Pates vs. COMELEC, June 30, 2009
76. De Grano vs. Lacaba, June 16, 2009
77. Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corp vs.
CA, April 23, 2010
78. Palma vs. Galvez, March 10, 2010
79. Adora vs. Zamora, May 30, 2011
80. Cruz vs. MIAA, September 9, 2013
81. Gonzales vs. Pe, August 9, 2011
82. Landbank vs. CA, April 11, 2011
83. Brgy. Sangalang vs. Brgy. Maguihan,
December 23, 2009
84. Esteves vs. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 182374,
ovember 11, 2008
85. Metro Bank vs. CA, February 18, 2009
86. Sps. Manila vs. Sps. Manzano, September 7,
2011
Q. EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECT OF
JUDGEMENTS
87. JP Latex vs. Ballons Granger Balloons Inc.,
March 16, 2009
88. Geologists vs. Getaway Electronics, March 25,
2009
89. Top Management Programs Corp. vs.
Fajardo, June 15, 2011
90. Sps. Topacio vs. Banco Filipino, November 17,
2010
91. Ting vs. Heirs of Lirio, G.R. No. 168913,
March 14, 2007
92. Central Surety & Insurance Co. vs. Planters
Products, Inc. G.R. No. 149053, March 7,
2007
93. Raymundo vs. Galen Realty, October 16, 2013
94. Sps. Buado vs. Court of Appeals, April 24,
2009
95. Esguerra vs. Holcim, September 2, 2013
96. Duetsche Banl vs. CIR, August 19, 2013
R. PRVISIONAL REMEDIES
97. Lim vs. Sps Lazaro, July 3, 2013
98. Lukang vs. Pagbilao Development Corp.,
March 10, 2014
99. Buyco vs. Baraquia, December 21, 2009
100. Lui Enterprises vs. Zuellig Pharma, March
12, 2014
101. Republic vs. Roque, September 24, 2013
102. Dagan vs. Office of the Ombudsman,
November 19, 2013
103. Republic vs. Cantor, December 10, 2013
104. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. vs. Mondejar,
January 22, 2014
Page 23 of 24
 105. Galang vs. Geronimo, February 22, 2011
106. GSIS vs. De Leon, November 17, 2010
(mandamus)
107. Rodriguez vs. CA, June 13, 2013
(Mandamus)
108. Rimando vs. Naguilian Emission Testing
Center, July 23, 2012 (Mandamus)
109. Pascual vs. Robles, June 22, 2011

S. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

110. Crisologo vs. JEWM Agro-Industrial Corp.,
March 3, 2014
111. Sps. Dacudao vs. Secretary of Justice,
January 8, 2013
112. Cuyo vs. People, October 12, 2011
113. HDMF vs. Sps. See, June 22, 2011
114. Mis-Islands Power Generation corp., vs.
CA, February 29, 2012
115. Eusebio vs. Luis, G.R. No. 162474, October
13, 2009
116. Marinduque Mining and Ins. Corp. vs.
NAPOCOR, G.R. No. 161219, October 6,
2008
117. Lee vs. Dela Paz, October 27, 2009
118. Unin Bank vs. Maunlad Homes, Inc.,
August 15, 2012
119. Delos Reyes vs. Sps. Odones, March 23,
2011
120. Sps. Dela Cruz vs. Sps Capco, March 17,
2014
121. Optimum Development Bank, Sps.
Jovellanos, December 4, 2013
122. Estate of Macadangdang vs. Gaviola, March
4, 2009
123. Leonidas vs. Judge Supnet, A.M. N. MTJ-
02-1433, February 21, 2003
124. Regalado vs. Go, G.R. No. 167688,
February 6, 2007
125. Baculi vs. Belen, September 24, 2012
126. Habawel vs. CTA, September 7, 2011

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