Alvero vs.
Dizon [GR L-342, 4 May 1946] papers and documents, as evidence for the prosecution against Alvero, at the trial of
En Banc, de Joya (J): 4 concur, 4 acting justices concur
Facts: On 12 February 1945, while the battle for Manila was raging, soldiers of the
United States Army, accompanied by men of Filipino Guerrilla Forces, placed Aurelio
S. Alvero under arrest, having been suspected of collaboration with the enemy, and
seized and took certain papers from his house in Pasay, Rizal. On or about 4 October
1945, Alvero was accused of treason, in criminal case 3 of the People's Court; after
which, on 1 December 1945, he filed a petition, demanding the return of the papers
allegedly seized and taken from his house. Alvero also filed a petition for bail, at the
hearing of which the prosecution presented certain papers and documents, which
were admitted as part of its evidence, and said petition was denied. At the trial of the
case on the merits, the prosecution again presented said papers and documents,
which were admitted as part of its evidence, and were marked as exhibits. On 26
February 1946, the judges issued an order denying the petition for the return of the
documents, and admitted as competent evidence the documents presented by the
prosecution. On the same date that said order was issued, denying the petition for the
return of said documents, Alvero asked for the reconsideration of said order, which
was also denied. Alvero filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether the documents seized by United States Army personnel at Alvero’s
home can be used as evidence against the latter.
Held: The right of officers and men of the United States Army to arrest Alvero, as a
collaborationist suspect, and to seize his personal papers, without any search warrant,
in the zone of military operations, is unquestionable, under the provisions of article 4,
Chapter II, Section I, of the Regulations relative to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land of the Hague Conventions of 1907, authorizing the seizure of military papers in
the possession of prisoners of war; and also under the proclamation, dated 29
December 1944, issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, as Commander in Chief of the
United States Army, declaring his purpose to remove certain citizens of the
Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy, in violation of the
allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, when apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence
in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war. The purpose
of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the
sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction,
and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. But it does not prohibit
the Government from taking advantage of unlawful searches made by a private
person or under authority of state law. Herein, as the soldiers of the United States
Army, that took and seized certain papers and documents from the residence of
Alvero, were not acting as agents or on behalf of the Government of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that those papers and documents came into
the possession of the authorities of the Commonwealth Government, through the
Office of the CIC of the United States Army in Manila, the use and presentation of said
his case for treason, before the People's Court, cannot now be legally attacked, on the
ground of unlawful or unreasonable searches and seizures, or on any other
constitutional ground, as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in
similar cases. (See Burdeau vs. McDowell, 256 U. S., 465; Gambino vs. United
States, 275 U. S., 310.)
People vs. Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January 1991]
Third Division, Bidin (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes,
went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino
Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes
(the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti informed
Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti
filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport
number, the date of shipment
and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II,
8052 Zurich, Switzerland." Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused,
who assured the former that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves
and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of Marti's representation, the 4 packages
were then placed inside a brown corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom
and on top of the packages, and sealed with masking tape. Before delivery of Marti's
box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and
husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes
for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and took several
grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the
shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he
extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti's packages was opened,
yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The NBI
agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof,
after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects. Thereupon, the
NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the latter's stated address
was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti
for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the
Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the
decision, convicting Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section
4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed.
Issue: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's
constitutional rights, be invoked against the State.
Held: In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having
come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing the
accused's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent
reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid
thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass
on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the
constitution. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the
State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the
search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment
for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum,
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.
Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz [GR L-32409, 27 February 1971]
En Banc, Villamor (J): 7 concur, 1 filed a separate concurring opinion to which 1
concurs, 1 concurs in result
Facts: On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
wrote a letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a
search warrant against Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for
violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in relation to
all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209,
and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application
for search warrant which was attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the following
day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Vera's letter-request; an
application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an
affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of
Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a
search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by Judge. At that time the
Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy
Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had
adjourned, the Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The
stenographer, upon request of the Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and
thereafter, the Judge asked Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his
deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for
perjury. The Judge signed de Leon's application for search warrant and Logronio's
deposition. Search Warrant 2-M-70 was then signed by Judge and accordingly issued.
3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR agents served the search warrant to the corporation
and Seggerman at the offices of the corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. The
corporation's lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or
transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless
proceeded with their search which yielded 6 boxes of documents. On 3 March 1970,
the corporation and Seggerman filed a petition with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search
warrant be declared null and void, and that Vera, Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be
ordered to pay the corporation and Seggerman, jointly and severally, damages and
attorney's fees. After hearing and on 29 July 1970, the court issued an order
dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on 16
April 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on the corporation
in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus
seized. The corporation and Seggerman filed an action for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus.
Issue: Whether the corporation has the right to contest the legality of the seizure of
documents from its office.
Held: The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs.
Diokno, et al. (GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the Supreme Court
impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to object against unreasonable
searches and seizures; holding that the corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of the corporate officers,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said
corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be; and that the corporate
officers therefore may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may
not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. The distinction between the Stonehill case and the present case is that: in
the former case, only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices
documents, papers and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners; while
in the latter, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and whose rights
have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score, the corporation herein
stands on a different footing from the corporations in Stonehill. Moreover, herein, the
search warrant was void inasmuch as First, there was no personal examination
conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio). The
Judge did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be
the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against Bache &
Co. and Seggerman. The participation of the Judge in the proceedings which led to
the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the
stenographer's readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the
commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his
witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. Second, the search warrant
was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant was issued for at
least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of Section 46(a),
Section 72 and
Section 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated. The second is the
violation of Section 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the
violation of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is
the violation of Section 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or
gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their
classification the 6 provisions are embraced in 2 different titles: Sections 46(a), 53, 72
and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Sections 208 and 209 are under Title V
(Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation). Lastly, the search warrant does not
particularly describe the things to be seized. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 tends to
defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general warrants,
for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records
of the corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative.
Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null and void.
Stonehill vs. Diokno [GR L-19550, 19 June 1967]
Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government, Special Prosecutors Pedro
D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Manases G.
Reyes; Judge Amado Roan (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Roman Cansino
(Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Hermogenes Caluag (Court of First Instance of
Rizal-Quezon City Branch), and Judge Damian Jimenez (Municipal Court of Quezon
City) issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against Harry S.
Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, HJohn J. Brooks, and Karl Beck, and/or the corporations
of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the said persons
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit: "Books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)" as "the subject of the offense; stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as
the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted
to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Alleging that the search warrants are
null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court, Stonehill, et. al.
filed with the Supreme Court the original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
and injunction. On 22 March 1962, the Supreme Court issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated 29 June 1962, the
writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things
seized from the offices of the corporations are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the
residences of Stonehill, et. al.
Issue: Whether Stonehill, et. al. can assail the legality of the contested warrants that
allowed seizure of documents, papers and other effects in the corporate offices, and
other places besides their residences.
Held: Stonehill, et. al. maintained that the search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof are
null and void. No warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with
in the contested warrants. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the
application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized. The warrants authorized
the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
Stonehill, et. al., regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the corporate officers and the
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of
our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. However, the
documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the corporations and (b) those found seized in the residences of Stonehill,
et. al. As regards the first group, Stonehill, et. al. have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for
the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever
the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,
and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. al. may not validly object to
the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the
offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to
whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. With respect to the documents,
papers and things seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al., the 29 June 1962
Resolution of the Supreme Court, denying the lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued by the Court on the documents, papers and things seized
in the residences, in effect, restrained the prosecutors from using them in evidence
against Stonehill, et. al. Thus, the Court held that the warrants for the search of 3
residences are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal;
that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the
documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences is made
permanent, that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the residences are concerned; and that the petition
herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers
and other effects seized in the 29 places, offices and other premises.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP [GR 64261, 26 December 1984]
En Banc, Escolin (J): 10 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano ̃ , Executive Judge of the then
CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books
and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos,
Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. A petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said
search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal
of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-
022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).
Issue: Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be
the basis of the issuance of search warrants.
Held: Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Probable cause for a search is
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In
mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce”; the Constitution requires no less than personal
knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance
of a search warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos "is
in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news
publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being
used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885,
as amended" is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant. Further, when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to
publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999]
En Banc, Davide Jr. (CJ): 13 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband,
Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began
patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of
Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m.
from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police
assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted, which looked
different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to
dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and 6 of his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1
Reynoso Badua, proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach, conferred with Almoite,
and observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. When the speedboat
landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a
multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. By this time, Almoite, Cid and
Badua, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became
suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon
seeing the approaching officers. Badua, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on
to his right arm. Although Cid introduced themselves as police officers, the man
appeared impassive. Speaking in English, then in Tagalog, and later in Ilocano, Cid
then requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. Cid then
resorted to "sign language," motioning with his hands for the man to open the bag.
The man apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag
yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline
substances. As Cid wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to
follow, but the latter did not comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his arm around the
shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. At the police
station, Cid then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain
silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man,
Cid ordered his men to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an
interpreter. In the meantime, Badua opened the bag and counted 29 plastic packets
containing yellowish crystalline substances. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally
arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional rights." When the
policemen asked the man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence
and merely showed his ID with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. Chua's bag
and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang,
Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination. In the meantime, Chua
was detained at the Bacnotan Police Station. Later, Police Chief Inspector and
Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid (wife of Cid), conducted a laboratory
examination of 29 plastic packets, and in her Chemistry Report D-025-95, she stated
that her qualitative examination established the contents of the plastic packets,
weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug. Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC (Criminal Case 4037). However,
pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San
Fernando, La Union, the information was subsequently amended to allege that Chua
was in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659 (illegal
transport of a regulated drug). At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, where the
amended complaint was read to him by a Fukien-speaking interpreter, Chua entered a
plea of not guilty. Trial finally ensued, with interpreters assigned to Chua (upon the
RTC's direct request to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines,
after its failure to acquire one from the Department of Foreign Affairs). Chua provided
a completely different story, claiming that the bags belong to his employer Cho Chu
Rong, who he accompanied in the speedboat; that they decided to dock when they
were low on fuel and telephone battery; that the police, with nary any spoken word but
only gestures and hand movements, escorted him to the precinct where he was
handcuffed and tied to a chair; that the police, led by an officer, arrived with the motor
engine of the speedboat and a bag, which they presented to him; that the police
inspected opened the bag, weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as
methamphetamine hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the
RTC convicted Chua for transporting 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride
without legal authority to do so. Chua prays for the reversal of the RTCs decision and
his acquittal before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other
contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing
boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chua’s illegal entry into the
Philippines, Chua’s suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the
police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and navigate
his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, constitute "probable
cause."
Held: No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and
person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said
right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary principle
which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure.
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute
and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence. The Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit:
(1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of
escaped prisoners. The prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent
versions of the incident, but the Court is certain that Chua was arrested and his bag
searched without the benefit of a warrant. There are no facts on record reasonably
suggestive or demonstrative of Chua’s participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise
that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC
never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on the
finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of shabu when
apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause. Persistent reports of rampant
smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan
seas, Chua’s illegal entry into the Philippines, Chua’s suspicious behavior, i.e. he
attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which
Chua can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the
high seas, do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or
package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, 20
confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited
drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious
demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist — accepted by the Court as
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in the case. There was no classified
information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited
drug on the date in question. Chua was not identified as a drug courier by a police
informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no
resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the
process of perpetrating an offense. The search cannot therefore be denominated as
incidental to an arrest. To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There
was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions
allowed by the Rules of Court as already shown. From all indications, the search was
nothing but a fishing expedition. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence,
the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chua’s conviction.
People vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19 February 2001]
En Banc, Ynares-Santiago (J): 14 concur
Facts: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City,
received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in
Davao City. The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was
during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when
a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula
y Malagura (@"Boboy"), as the pusher. As to Nasario Molina y Manamat (@
"Bobong"), SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him prior to 8 August 1996. At
about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the
alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time that morning.
Consequently, at around 8:00 a.m. he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct 3,
Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel
(team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1
Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would
wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 a.m., while the team were
positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying Mula and Molina
passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to Mula and Molina as the
pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." SPO1
Paguidopon was left in his house, 30 meters from where Mula and Molina were
accosted. The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, Mula,
who was holding a black bag, handed the same to Molina. Subsequently, SPO1
Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked Molina to open the bag.
Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona insisted on
opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and
Molina were handcuffed by the police officers. On 6 December 1996, the accused
Mula and Molina, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending
that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having
been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by the accused, but this was likewise denied. The accused waived
presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum. On 25 April 1997, the
trial court rendered the decision, finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and
sentenced both to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. Pursuant to Article 47
of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case
was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review.
Issue: Whether Mula and Molina manifested outward indication that would justify their
arrest, and the seizure of prohibited drugs that were in their possession.
Held: The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be
carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search
warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. Complementary to the
foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3,
paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not
without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the
evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation
of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search). The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest)
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest which must precede the search. Still, the law requires that there be
first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.
Herein, Mula and Molina manifested no outward indication that would justify their
arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, they could not be said to be committing,
attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that Molina responded
"Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the
bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers
that Mula and Molina were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which
standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, Mula and Molina could not be the
subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. Further, it would appear that the
names and addresses of Mula and Molina came to the knowledge of SPO1
Paguidopon only after they were arrested, and such cannot lend a semblance of
validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Withal, the Court holds that the
arrest of Mula and Molina does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules.
Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the
marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against
them.
People vs. Salanguit [GR 133254-55, 19 April 2001]
Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñias, Cavite, to search the residence of Robert
Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his
witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to
purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale took place in Salunguit's
room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet inside his
room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by
Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espano ̃ l. At about 10:30 p.m. of said day, a group of about
10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of Salunguit to
serve the warrant. The police operatives knocked on Salanguit’s door, but nobody
opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police
operatives then forced the door open and entered the house. After showing the search
warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the
house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white
crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance,
and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint
having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was
prepared, but Salanguit refused to sign it. After the search, the police operatives took
Salanguit with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the
items they had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the
confiscated evidence. The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77
grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were
found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two
bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found
to be marijuana. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act
(RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357
and Q- 95-64358, respectively) were filed on 28 December 1995. After hearing, the
trial court rendered its decision, convicting Salanguit in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357
and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively, RA 6425, and
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of 6 months of
arresto mayor and a maximum of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, and
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00, respectively. Salanguit appealed;
contesting his conviction on the grounds that (1) the admissibility of the shabu
allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the
warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the admissibility in evidence of the
marijuana allegedly seized from Salanguit to the "plain view" doctrine; and (3) the
employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
Issue: Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the
seizure of “drug paraphernalia”, and whether the marijuana may be included as
evidence in light of the “plain view doctrine.”
Held: The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause
to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the
conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug
paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by
virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only
insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the
seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented
showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of
shabu from Salanguit's residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such
warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under
oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the "plain view
doctrine," the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e.,
whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or
whether it was recovered on Salanguit's person or in an area within his immediate
control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the
shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his
deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-
95-64357 only.
G.R. No. 140946 September 13, 2004
MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioners,
vs.
MAXICORP, INC., respondent.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
This case involves the issuance of search warrant to the respondent MAXICORP Inc
for alleged violation of Section 29 of Intellectual Property and Article 189 of the RPC
(unfair competition).
Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of Maxicorp’s
premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants.
Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no
probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of "general
warrants." Where the RTC denied the motion and at the same time denied their
motion for reconsideration.
According to RTC they’ve found a probable cause to issue such warrant after
examining the NBI agent and the computer technician who visited Maxicorp.
Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside
the RTC’s order. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s order denying Maxicorp’s
motion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The
Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion on 29 November 1999.
The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the
preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the
counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt NBI
Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp
was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not there’s a probable cause on the part of CA to quash the
search warrants issued by RTC
2. Whether or not respondent violated the intellectual property right of the
petitioner.
RULING:
According to the SC the offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement
under Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair competition under Article 189 of the RPC. To
support these charges, petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI Agent Samiano,
computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian. The offenses that petitioners
charged Maxicorp contemplate several overt acts. The sale of counterfeit products is
but one of these acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how
they personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair competition.
Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will
warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in
prosecuting it are legally just and proper."Thus, probable cause for a search warrant
requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with
that offense are in the place to be searched.
The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary
evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause.
From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in
copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI
Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were
not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced,
packaged and in some cases, installed there.
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As
implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not
absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably
prudent man,24 not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.
No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No
formula or fixed rule for its determination exists.25 Probable cause is determined in the
light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.26 Thus, it was improper for the Court
of Appeals to reverse the RTC’s findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing
NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.
For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the only proof
that the sale of petitioners’ software occurred. During the search warrant application
proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge the computer unit that he
purchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed
petitioners’ software.
The Supreme Court held:
“xxx No provision of the law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective in
specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular with respect to the other
items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant remains valid as to
the items specifically described in the warrant. A search warrant is severable, the
items not sufficiently described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant.”
In addition the Highest Court stated:
“xxx The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the constitution renders
inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable searches
and seizures. Thus, all items seized under paragraph © after search warrants, not
falling under paragraphs a, b, c, d, e, f, should be returned to Maxico
Sta. Rosa Mining Company vs. Assistant Provincial Fiscal Zabala [GR L-44723,
31 August 1987]
En Banc, Bidin (J): 12 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 21 March 1974, Sta. Rosa Mining Company filed a complaint for attempted
theft of materials (scrap iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property at
Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte against Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed by Provincial Fiscal
Joaquin Ilustre. The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes
for preliminary investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued a
resolution dated 26 August 1974 recommending that an information for Attempted
Theft be filed against Garrido and Alapan on a finding of prima facie case which
resolution was approved by Fiscal Ilustre. Garrido and Alapan sought reconsideration
of the resolution but the same was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated 14
October 1974. On 29 October 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Camarines Norte an Information dated 17 October 1987 (Criminal Case 821),
charging Garrido aand Alapan with the crime of Attempted Theft. In a letter dated 22
October 1974, Garrido and Alapan requested the Secretary of Justice for a review of
the Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal dated 26 August 1974 and 14
October 1974. On 6 November 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered the
Provincial Fiscal by telegram to "elevate entire records PFO Case 577 against Garrido
et al., review in five days and defer all proceedings pending review." On 6 March
1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed the findings of
prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to
immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal case. The Company sought
reconsideration of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the
same in a letter dated 11 June 1975. A motion to dismiss dated 16 September 1975
was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal but the court denied the motion on the ground
that there was a prima facie evidence against Garrido and Alapan and set the case for
trial on 25 February 1976. Garrido and Alapan sought reconsideration of the court's
ruling but in an Order dated 13 February 1976, the motion filed for said purpose was
likewise denied. Trial of the case was reset to 23 April 1976. Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre
was appointed a judge in the CFI of Albay and Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge
of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines Norte. On 19 April 1976, Fiscal Zabala
filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the case. This second motion to dismiss was denied
by the trial court in an order dated 23 April 1976. Whereupon, Fiscal Zabala
manifested that he would not prosecute the case and disauthorized any private
prosecutor to appear therein. Hence, the Company filed a petition for mandamus
before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the fiscal can refuse to prosecute the case if the Secretary of Justice
reversed the findings of prima facie case by the fiscal.
Held: If the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he simply
cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the
same. He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action. He cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what he can do is to continue appearing
for the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of evidence to another fiscal or
a private prosecutor subject to his direction and control. Where there is no other
prosecutor available, he should proceed to discharge his duty and present the
evidence to the best of his ability and let the court decide the merits of the case on the
basis of the evidence adduced by both parties. The mere fact that the Secretary of
Justice had, after reviewing the records of the case, directed the prosecuting fiscal to
move for the dismissal of the case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to said
directive is denied by the trial court, is no justification for the refusal of the fiscal to
prosecute the case. Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with
the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should he addressed to
the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is
done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation.
.
Paderanga vs. Drilon [GR 96080, 19 April 1991]
En Banc, Regalado (J): 14 concur
Facts: On 16 October 1986, an information for multiple murder was filed in the
Regional Trial Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar
Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the
deaths on 1 May 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son
Renato Bucag II. Venue was, however, transferred to Cagayan de Oro City per
Administrative Matter 87- 2-244. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as
charged. The rest of the accused remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however,
escaped from detention and has not been apprehended since then. In an amended
information filed on 6 October 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas," "Fely Roxas"
and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas retained Atty. Miguel P.
Paderanga as his counsel. As counsel for Roxas, Paderanga filed, among others, an
Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the
Arraignment on 14 October 1988. The trial court in an order dated 9 January 1989,
denied the omnibus motion but directed the City Prosecutor "to conduct another
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the
opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has in support of his defense." In the
course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas
implicated Atty. Paderanga in the commission of the crime charged. The City
Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from further conducting the
preliminary investigation against Paderanga at the instance of the latter's counsel, per
his resolution dated 7 July 1989. In his first indorsement to the Department of Justice,
dated 24 July 1989, said city prosecutor requested the Department of Justice to
designate a state prosecutor to continue the preliminary investigation against
Paderanga. In a resolution dated 6 September 1989, the State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with the conduct of the preliminary
investigation against Paderanga, directed the amendment of the previously amended
information to include and implead Paderanga as one of the accused therein.
Paderanga moved for reconsideration, contending that the preliminary investigation
was not yet completed when said resolution was promulgated, and that he was
deprived of his right to present a corresponding counter-affidavit and additional
evidence crucial to the determination of his alleged "linkage" to the crime charged. The
motion was, however, denied by Gingoyon in his order dated 29 January 1990. From
the aforesaid resolution and order, Paderanga filed a Petition for Review with the
Department of Justice. Thereafter, he submitted a Supplemental Petition with
Memorandum, and then a Supplemental Memorandum with Additional
Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence Annexed, attaching thereto an affidavit of Roxas
dated 20 June 1990 and purporting to be a retraction of his affidavit of 30 March 1990
wherein he implicated Paderanga. On 10 August 1990, the Department of Justice,
through Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III, issued Resolution 648 dismissing the
said petition for review. His motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied,
Paderanga then filed the petition for mandamus and prohibition before the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether there is no prima facie evidence, or probable cause, or sufficient
justification to hold Paderangato a tedious and prolonged public trial.
Held: A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded
belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The
quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence
sufficient to "engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a
crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and
it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. The institution of a
criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court.
Hence, the general rule is that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal
prosecution. The case of Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et al. cites several exceptions to the
rule, to wit: (a) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused; (b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c) When there is a prejudicial question which is
sub-judice; (d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e)
Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) When
double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense; (h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (i) Where the
charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (j) When
there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied. A careful analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the
present case, however, will readily show that the same does not fall under any of the
aforesaid exceptions.
 search is an incident to an arrest, or is conducted in a vehicle or movable structure.
Pita filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Pita vs. Court of Appeals [GR 80806, 5 October 1989]
Issue: Whether the Mayor can order the seizure of “obscene” materials as a result of
an anti-smut campaign.
En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 10 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 on leave

Held: The Court is not convinced that Bagatsing and Cabrera have shown the
Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which
Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-
mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of
Narcotics Group, Auxiliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the
a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2)
Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors,
authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The
newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and
fact that the former Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to
other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later
seize property in disregard of due process. Presidential Decrees 960 and 969 are,
burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue,
arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by themselves, authorities for high-
Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of
handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the decree of the
various student organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was
twin presidential issuances, from the commandments of the Constitution, the right to
"Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by Leo Pita. On 7 December
due process of law and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
1983, Pita filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary
specifically. Significantly, the Decrees themselves lay down procedures for
injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of
implementation. It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a
Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin and or restrain
judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. The
Bagatsing, Cabrera and their agents from confiscating his magazines or from
Court finds greater reason to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence
otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a
of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the present case involves an obscenity rap
decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the
makes it no different from Burgos vs. Chief of Staff AFP, a political case, because
publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of
speech is speech, whether political or "obscene." Although the Court is not ruling out
the press. On 12 December 1983, Pita filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a
warrantless searches, the search must have been an incident to a lawful arrest, and
temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of
the arrest must be on account of a crime committed. Here, no party has been charged,
plaintiffs "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary
nor are such charges being readied against any party, under Article 201, as amended,
injunction in view of Mayor Bagatsing's pronouncement to continue the Anti-Smut
of the Revised Penal Code. There is no "accused" here to speak of, who ought to be
Campaign. The Court granted the temporary restraining order on 14 December 1983.
"punished". Further, to say that the Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a
On 5 January 1984, Pita filed his Memorandum in support of the issuance of the writ
result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his
of preliminary injunction, raising the issue as to "whether or not the defendants, and or
opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make the Mayor judge,
their agents can without a court order confiscate or seize plaintiff's magazine before
jury, and executioner rolled into one. Thus, the court mae a resume, to wit: (1) The
any judicial finding is made on whether said magazine is obscene or not." The
authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their
restraining order lapsed on 3 January 1984, Pita filed an urgent motion for issuance of
opinion, an obscenity rap is in order; (2) The authorities must convince the court that
another restraining order, which was opposed by Bagatsing on the ground that
the materials sought to be seized are "obscene", and pose a clear and present danger
issuance of a second restraining order would violate the Resolution of the Supreme
of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action; (3) The judge
Court dated 11 January 1983, providing for the Interim Rules Relative to the
must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the question is to be
Implementation of Batas Pambansa 129, which provides that a temporary restraining
resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion. (4) If, in the
order shall be effective only for 20 days from date of its issuance. On 11 January
opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the search warrant prayed for;
1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on 16 January 1984
(5) The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the Revised Penal
"for the parties to adduce evidence on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy
Code; and (6) Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess
Playboy Magazine' alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and or burned by the defendants,
whether or not the properties seized are indeed "obscene." The Court states, however,
are obscence per se or not." On 3 February 1984, the trial court promulgated the
that "these do not foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or applicable
Order appealed from denying the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and
statutes, or remedies against abuse of official power under the Civil Code or the
dismissing the case for lack of merit. Likewise, the Appellate Court dismissed the
Revised Penal code."
appeal, holding that the freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the state has
the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public
morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of
obscene publications; and that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
recognizes certain exceptions, as when there is consent to the search or seizure, or
Abdula vs. Guiani [GR 118821, 18 February 2000] Third Division, Gonzaga-Reyes prematurely filed and that the Abdulas intended to file a petition for review with the
(J): 4 concur Department of Justice. A petition for review was filed by the Abdulas with the
Department of Justice on 11 January 1995. Despite said filing, the judge did not act
upon the Abdulas' pending Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest. The Abdulas
Facts: On 24 June 1994, a complaint for murder (IS 94-1361) was filed before the
filed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Supreme Court.
Criminal Investigation Service Command, ARMM Regional Office XII against Mayor
Bai Unggie D. Abdula and Odin Abdula and 6 other persons in connection with the
death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Issue: Whether the judge may rely upon the findings of the prosecutor in determining
Maguindanao. The complaint alleged that the Abdulas paid the 6 other persons the probable cause in the issuance of search or arrest warrant.
total amount of P200,000.00 for the death of Dimalen. Acting on this complaint, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao, Salick U. Panda, in a Resolution dated 22
Held: The 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause
August 1994, dismissed the charges of murder against the Abdulas and 5 other
"personally," a requirement which does not appear in the corresponding provisions of
respondents on a finding that there was no prima facie case for murder against them.
our previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers to place a
Prosecutor Panda, however, recommended the filing of an information for murder
greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under previous
against one of the respondents, a certain Kasan Mama. Pursuant to this Resolution,
Constitutions. Herein, the Judge admits that he issued the questioned warrant as
an information for murder was thereafter filed against Kasan Mama before the sala of
there was "no reason for (him) to doubt the validity of the certification made by the
Judge Japal M. Guiani. In an Order dated 13 September 1994, the Judge ordered that
Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable
the case (Criminal Case 2332), be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further
cause was found to exist as against those charged in the information filed." The
investigation. In this Order, the judge noted that although there were 8 respondents in
statement is an admission that the Judge relied solely and completely on the
the murder case, the information filed with the court "charged only 1 of the 8
certification made by the fiscal that probable cause exists as against those charged in
respondents in the name of Kasan Mama without the necessary resolution required
the information and issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the
under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court to show how the investigating
prosecutor's findings and recommendations. He adopted the judgment of the
prosecutor arrived at such a conclusion." As such, the judge reasons, the trial court
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause as his own. Clearly, the judge,
cannot issue the warrant of arrest against Kasan Mama. Upon the return of the
by merely stating that he had no reason to doubt the validity of the certification made
records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Maguindanao, it was
by the investigating prosecutor has abdicated his duty under the Constitution to
assigned to 2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw for further investigation. In
determine on his own the issue of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest.
addition to the evidence presented during the initial investigation of the murder charge,
Consequently, the warrant of arrest should be declared null and void.
two new affidavits of witnesses were submitted to support the charge of murder
against the Abdulas and the other respondents in the murder complaint. Thus,
Prosecutor Dimaraw treated the same as a re-filing of the murder charge and pursuant
to law, issued subpoena to the respondents named therein. On 6 December 1994, the
Abdulas submitted and filed their joint counter-affidavits. After evaluation of the
evidence, Prosecutor Dimaraw, in a Resolution dated 28 December 1994, found a PEOPLE V MAMARIL
prima facie case for murder against the Abdulas and 3 other respondents. He thus GR 147607
recommended the filing of charges against the Abdulas, as principals by inducement, January 22, 2004
and against the 3 others, as principals by direct participation. Likewise in this 28
December 1994 Resolution, Provincial Prosecutor Salick U. Panda, who conducted Facts:
the earlier preliminary investigation of the murder charge, added a notation stating that  SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant
he was inhibiting himself from the case and authorizing the investigating prosecutor to authorizing the search for marijuana at the family residence of appellant
dispose of the case without his approval. The reasons he cited were that the case was Mamaril. During the search operation, the searching team confiscated
previously handled by him and that the victim was the father-in-law of his son. On 2 sachets of suspected marijuana leaves. Police officers took pictures of the
January 1995, an information for murder dated 28 December 1994 was filed against confiscated items and prepared a receipt of the property seized and certified
the Abdulas and Kasan Mama, Cuenco Usman and Jun Mama before Branch 14 of that the house was properly searched, which was signed by the appellant
the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, then the sala of Judge Guiani. This and the barangay officials who witnessed the search.
information was signed by investigating prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw. A notation was  The PNP Crime Laboratory issued a report finding the seized specimens
likewise made on the information by Provincial Prosecutor Panda, which explained the positive for the presence of marijuana. Moreover, the examination on the
reason for his inhibition. The following day, the judge issued a warrant for the arrest of urine sample of appellant affirmed that it was positive for the same.
the Abdulas. Upon learning of the issuance of the said warrant, the Abdulas filed on 4  Appellant denied that he was residing at his parent’s house, and that he was
January 1995 an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for the setting aside of the warrant of arrest at his parent’s house when the search was conducted only because he
on 4 January 1995. In this motion, the Abdulas argued that the enforcement of the visited his mother. He also said that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized
warrant of arrest should be held in abeyance considering that the information was
 for the first time during the trial, although he admitted that the signature on
the certification that the house was properly search was his.
Issue:
 Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant
Ruling:
 Yes. The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of
probable cause.
 Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
 In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that:
o The judge must examine the complaint and his witnesses
personally
o The examination must be under oath
o The examination must be reduced in writing in the form of
searching questions and answers
 The prosecution failed to prove that the judge who issued the warrant put
into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant.
 When the Branch Clerk of Court was required to testify on the available
records kept in their office, he was only able to present before the court the
application for search warrant and supporting affidavits. Neither transcript of
the proceedings of a searching question and answer nor the sworn
statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge
examined them in the form of searching questions and answers in writing
was presented. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not
sufficient.
 Such written examination is necessary in order that the judge may be able
to properly determine the existence and non-existence of probable cause.
Therefore, the search warrant is tainted with illegality by failure of the judge
to conform with the essential requisites of taking the examination in writing
and attaching to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
 No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be,
their seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. Consequently, the evidence
seized pursuant to an illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence
against appellant.
Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin [GR 45950, 20 June 1938]
First Division, Laurel (J): 6 concur
Facts: On 10 November 1934, Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board,
obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a search warrant commanding
any officer of the law to search the person, house or store of Leona Pasion Vda. de
Garcia at Victoria, Tarlac, for "certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other
papers relating to her activities as usurer." The search warrant was issued upon an
affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he has and there is just and probable cause to
believe and he does believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and conceals in her
house and store at Victoria, Tarlac, certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents,
and other papers relating to her activities as usurer, all of which is contrary to the
statute in such cases made and provided." On the same date, Almeda, accompanied
by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the office of Pasion de Garcia in
Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search warrant to the latter's bookkeeper,
Alfredo Salas, and, without Pasion de Garcia's presence who was ill and confined at
the time, proceeded with the execution thereof. Two packages of records and a locked
filing cabinet containing several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a
receipt therefor issued by him to Salas. The papers and documents seized were kept
for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned
over by it to the provincial fiscal Felix Imperial, who subsequently filed, in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, 6 separate criminal cases against Pasion de Garcia for
violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On several occasions, after seizure, Pasion de Garcia,
through counsel, demanded from the Anti-Usury Board the return of the documents
seized. On January 7, and, by motion, on 4 June 1937, the legality of the search
warrant was challenged by Pasion de Garcia's counsel in the 6 criminal cases and the
devolution of the documents demanded. By resolution of 5 October 1937, Judge
Diego Locsin (CFI) denied Pasion de garcia's motion of June 4 for the reason that
though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the latter's part. A motion
for reconsideration was presented but was denied by order of 3 January 1938. Pasion
de Garcia registered her exception.
Issue: Whether the lack of personal examination of witnesses renders the warrant
void.
Held: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right
and for a search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2)
the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant
or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter
may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized. These requirements are complemented
by the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly with reference to the duration of the
validity of the search warrant and the obligation of the officer seizing the property to
deliver the same to the corresponding court. Herein, the existence of probable cause
was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did
was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not decide for
himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any.
Even accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on
the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the
law, the properties seized were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as
required by law. Instead, they were turned over to the provincial fiscal and used by
him in building up cases against Pasion de Garcia. Considering that at the time the
warrant was issued there was no case pending against Pasion de Garcia, the
averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without
basis. The search warrant was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac,
Tarlac. In any event, the failure on the part of Pasion de Garcia and her bookkeeper to
resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of
constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but a submission to the authority
of the law. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of
the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law
Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas [GR 45358, 29 January 1937]
First Division, Imperial (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the
Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding
over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to
reliable information, Narciso Alvarez kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books,
documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as a moneylender, charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.
In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his
answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did
not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon
the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit the judge, on
said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the
search of the Alvarez's house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books
and documents and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in
accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board
entered Alvarez's store and residence at 7:00 p.m. of 4 June 1936, and seized and
took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933
to 1936, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order books, 4 notebooks, 4 check stubs,
2 memorandums, 3 bankbooks, 2 contracts, 4 stubs, 48 stubs of purchases of copra,
2 inventories, 2 bundles of bills of lading, 1 bundle of credit receipts, 1 bundle of stubs
of purchases of copra, 2 packages of correspondence, 1 receipt book belonging to
Luis Fernandez, 14 bundles of invoices and other papers, many documents and loan
contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of
used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). The search
for and seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of Alvarez who stated
his protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the
originals of the documents. As the articles had not been brought immediately to the
judge who issued the search warrant, Alvarez, through his attorney, filed a motion on
8 June 1936, praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered
immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that
said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court.
On said date the court issued an order directing Siongco to deposit all the articles
seized within 24 hours from the receipt of notice thereof and giving him a period of 5
days within which to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court.
On 10 June, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a
motion praying that the order of the 8th of said month be set aside and that the Anti-
Usury Board be authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of 30 days for the
necessary investigation. On June 25, the court issued an order requiring agent
Siongco forthwith to file the search warrant and the affidavit in the court, together with
the proceedings taken by him, and to present an inventory duly verified by oath of all
the articles seized. On July 2, the attorney for the petitioner filed a petition alleging that
the search warrant issued was illegal and that it had not yet been returned to date
together with the proceedings taken in connection therewith, and praying that said
warrant be cancelled, that an order be issued directing the return of all the articles
seized to Alvarez, that the agent who seized them be declared guilty of contempt of
court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority. On September 10,
the court issued an order holding: that the search warrant was obtained and issued in
accordance with the law, that it had been duly complied with and, consequently,
should not be cancelled, and that agent Siongco did not commit any contempt of court
and must, therefore, be exonerated, and ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in
Manila to show cause, if any, within the unextendible period of 2 days from the date of
notice of said order, why all the articles seized appearing in the inventory should not
be returned to Alvarez. The assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board of the Department
of Justice filed a motion praying, for the reasons stated therein, that the articles seized
be ordered retained for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the violation of
the Anti-Usury Law committed by Alvarez. On October 10, said official again filed
another motion alleging that he needed 60 days to examine the documents and
papers seized, which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10,
16, 23, 25-27, 30-31 , 34, 36-43 and 45, and praying that he be granted said period of
60 days. In an order of October 16, the court granted him the period of 60 days to
investigate said 19 documents. Alvarez, herein, asks that the search warrant as well
as the order authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles
seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be
returned to him.
Issue: Whether the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been
based upon the affidavit of agent Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no
personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the
warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a
person whom he considered reliable, and that it is illegal as it was not supported by
other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant.
Held: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of
General Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance
of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application
supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest
sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is
bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes
defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or
promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit
to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a
manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages
caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is
insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made,
and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books,
documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to
attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is
admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively
upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the
deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders 58
provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be
presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The
purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to
satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the
affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that
of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge
to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the
existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the
affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal
and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable
cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of
one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus
the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the
agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
Mata vs. Bayona [GR 50720, 26 March 1984]
Second Division, de Castro (J): 3 concur, 2 concur in result, 1 took no part
Facts: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended
by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and
arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as 'Masiao tickets'
without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from
the government authorities concerned." Mata claimed that during the hearing of the
case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found
the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same,
so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry
Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Jufe of the City Court of Ormoc replied, "it is
with the court". The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to
the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and
for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1
March 1979, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination
under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the
Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made
a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search
warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no
moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be
attached to the records. Mata's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order
having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari,
praying, among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its
alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court,
and that all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in
the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.
Issue: Whether the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath
or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits
presented to him.
Held: Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce". More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of
the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must before issuing the
warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in
writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able
to properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are
false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure
of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in
writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
Prudente vs. Dayrit [GR 82870, 14 December 1989]
En Banc, Padilla (J): 14 concur
Facts: On 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence
Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD), filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by Judge Abelardo
Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, an application for the issuance
of a search warrant (Search Warrant 87-14) for violation of Presidential Decree 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Nemesio
E. Prudente." On the same day, the Judge issued the Search Warrant, commanding
Dimagmaliw "to make an immediate search at any time in the day or night of the
premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, more particularly (a) offices of
the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at
the ground floor; (b) office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second
Floor and other rooms at the second floor, and forthwith seize and take possession of
the following personal properties, to wit: (a) M 16 Armalites with ammunition; (b) .38
and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols; (c) explosives and hand grenades; and (d)
assorted weapons with ammunitions." On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints
Day, the search warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col.
Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto,
Precinct 8 Commander. In his affidavit, dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y
Yusay, a member of the searching team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a
cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging brown envelope with 3
live fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with old newspapers. On 6
November 1987, Prudente moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that (1)
the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of
the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the
examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching questions and
answers; (3) the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not
particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific
offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular 19 of the
Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of
the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. On 9 March 1988, the Judge issued an
order, denying Prudente's motion and supplemental motion to quash. Prudente's
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the order dated 20 April 1988.
Prudente filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the allegations contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin
Dimagmaliw and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were
sufficient basis for the issuance of a valid search warrant.
Held: The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." This probable cause must be
shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he
may produce and not based on mere hearsay. Thus, for a valid search warrant to
issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined personally by the
judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection with
one specific offense,and the judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath,
the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to them
and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
Herein, in his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that
"he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the
firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the report and
found it to be a fact." On the other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C.
Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for several days,
they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of the said firearms
and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other words, the applicant and his
witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the
basis for issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only
through information from other sources or persons. While it is true that in his
application for search warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw stated that he verified
the information he had earlier received that petitioner had in his possession and
custody the firearms and explosives described in the application, and that he found it
to be a fact, yet there is nothing in the record to show or indicate how and when said
applicant verified the earlier information acquired by him as to justify his conclusion
that he found such information to be a fact. He might have clarified this point if there
had been searching questions and answers, but there were none. In fact, the records
yield no questions and answers, whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said applicant.
Evidently, the allegations contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw
and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were insufficient
basis for the issuance of a valid search warrant.
20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-76649-51, 19
August 1988]
Facts: In a letter-complaint dated 26 August 1985, 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
through counsel sought the National Bureau of Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the
conduct of searches and seizures in connection with the NBI's anti-film piracy
campaign. Specifically, the letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all
over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of
copyrighted films in videotape form which constitute a flagrant violation of Presidential
Decree 49 (Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property). Acting on the letter-
complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed
by the film corporation and subsequently filed 3 applications for search warrants
against the video outlets owned by Eduardo M. Barreto, Raul Sagullo, and Fortune
Ledesma. The applications were consolidated and heard by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, Branch 132. On 4 September 1985, the lower court issued the
desired search warrants, describing the articles sought to be seized as"(c) Television
sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories,
equipments and other machines used or intended to be used in the unlawful
reproduction, sale, rental/lease, distribution of the above-mentioned video tapes which
she is keeping and concealing in the premises above-described.". Armed with the
search warrants, the NBI accompanied by the film corporation's agents, raided the
video outlets and seized the items described therein. An inventory of the items seized
was made and left with Barreto, et. al. Acting on a motion to lift search warrants and
release seized properties filed by Barreto, et. al., the lower court issued an order dated
8 October 1985, lifting the 3 search warrants issued earlier against them by the court,
due to the failure of the NBI to deliver the articles to the Court, and thus ordered the
return of the articles to their respective owners. The lower court denied a motion for
reconsideration filed by the film corporation in its order dated 2 January 1986. The film
corporation filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the orders of
the lower court. The petition was dismissed. The 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the inclusion of certain articles of property which are usually
connected to legitimate business, and not involving piracy of intellectual property or
infringement of copyright laws, renders the warrant to be unreasonable.
Held: Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners are
articles which can be found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of
lending or renting out betamax tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are
generally connected with, or related to a legitimate business not necessarily involving
piracy of intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws. Hence, including these
articles without specification and/or particularity that they were really instruments in
violating an Anti-Piracy law makes the search warrant too general which could result
in the confiscation of all items found in any video store. In fact, this actually happened
in the present case. Although the applications and warrants themselves covered
certain articles of property usually found in a video store, the Court believes that the
search party should have confined themselves to articles that are according to them,
evidence constitutive of infringement of copyright laws or the piracy of intellectual
property, but not to other articles that are usually connected with, or related to, a
legitimate business, not involving piracy of intellectual property, or infringement of
copyright laws. So that a television set, a rewinder, and a whiteboard listing Betamax
tapes, video cassette cleaners video cassette recorders as reflected in the Returns of
Search Warrants, are items of legitimate business engaged in the video tape industry,
and which could not be the subject of seizure. The applicant and his agents therefore
exceeded their authority in seizing perfectly legitimate personal property usually found
in a video cassette store or business establishment. The search and seizure is
unreasonable.
Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano [GR L-69803, 8 October 1985]
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 7 concur, 1 concurs in the result, 1 took no part, 1
reserves his vote
Facts: Prior to 6 August 1984, Mila Aguilar-Roque was one of the accused of
Rebellion in Criminal Case SMC-1-1 before Special Military Commission 1, and also
one of the accused of Subversion in Criminal Case MC-25-113 of Military Commission
25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She
was then still at large. At around 9:00 a.m. on August 6, Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno
of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from the Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano ̃ , Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon
Street, Quezon City, determined to be the leased residence of Aguilar-Roque, after
almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected
underground house of the CPP/NPA." Aguilar-Roque has been long wanted by the
military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines,
particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Dona ̃ Andrea cases. At 11:30 a.m.,
Aguilar-Roque and Cynthia D. Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security
Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City.
The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously been issued
against Nolasco. At 12:00 noon on the same day, elements of the CSG searched the
premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. Willie C. Tolentino, a person then in
charge of the premises, was arrested by the searching party presumably without a
warrant of arrest. The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials,
and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all.
On August 10, Aguilar-Roque, Nolasco and Tolentino, were charged before the
Quezon City Fiscal's Office upon complaint filed by the CSG against the former for
"Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion. On August
13, the City Fiscal filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree (PD) 33
(Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) against Aguilar-Roque, et. al. before
Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Judge Antonio P. Santos,
presiding. On August 16, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the City Fiscal,
praying that Aguilar-Roque and Nolasco be charged with Subversion. The Motion was
denied on November 16. On September 10, the CSG submitted an Amended Return
in the Search Warrant case praying, inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the
seized 431 documents and articles, "in connection with cases that are presently
pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the
court." On December 13, Judge Paño admitted the Amended Return and ruled that
the seized documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case
against respondent." A day before that, Aguilar-Roque, et. al. filed a Motion to
Suppress, praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It
was claimed that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge
Santos denied the Motion on 7 January 1985 on the ground that the validity of the
Search Warrant has to be litigated in the other case, apparently unaware of the Order
issued by Judge Paño on December 13. Nolasco, Aguilar-Roque, and Tolentino filed
the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus to annul and set aside the (1)
Search Warrant issued by RTC Judge Pano ̃ ; (2) his Order admitting the Amended
Return and granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of MTC Judge
Santos denying Aguilar-Roque, et. al.'s Motion to Suppress.
Issue: Whether the description of the personalities to be seized in the search warrant
is too general to render the warrant void.
Held: The disputed Search Warrant (80-84) describes the personalities to be seized
as "Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes
of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters,
subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public, and
support money from foreign or local sources." It is at once evident that the Search
Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not
particularized. It is an all-embracing description which includes everything conceivable
regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front.
It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals
not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable
them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the
law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a
portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant
and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the
things to be seized. Search warrants of similar description were considered null and
void for being too general. Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search
Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search warrant
should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned to Aguilar-Roque. Some
searches may be made without a warrant. Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, is
declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a
person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an
arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was made can also be search without a
search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search must
be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the
application of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what
constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be searched". Considering
that Aguilar-Roque has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public
order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of
time; that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the
search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, the Court was of the
opinion that, in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did
not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public
order. Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained by CSG, for
possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to Aguilar-Roque to
object to their relevance and to ask Special Military Commission 1 to return to her any
all irrelevant documents and articles.
DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 142295, PARDO, J
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was found guilty of violation of P. D. No. 1866
of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos. Allegedly, sometime in May 1996, the police
received a report that accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was in possession of
certain firearms without the necessary licenses. Acting upon the report, the PNP
Criminal Investigation Group inquired from the PNP Firearms and Explosive Division
whether or not the report was true. The PNP Firearms and Explosives Division issued
a certification stating that per records in his office, the appellant is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. Armed with the said
certificationthe police applied for a search warrant to enable them to search the
house of appellant.
Upon the issuance of the warrant, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to
Norzagaray to serve the warrant. Before proceeding to the residence of the appellant,
the police officers requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay
Councilman Aurelio Panteleon to accompany them in the implementation of the
warrant. Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police officers introduced
themselves to the wife of appellant. When the appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique
informed him that they had a search warrant and that they were authorized to search
his house. After appellant gave his permission, the police officers conducted a search
of the house. The search yielded the following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial
No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits B and H) found at the master's
bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios (Exhibits C to C-4)
found in the room of appellant's daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver with Serial No.
48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of live ammunition (Exhibit M) found in the
kitchen of the house. When asked about his license to possess the firearms, the
appellant failed to produce any. This prompted the police officers to seize the subject
firearms.
For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol
recovered in his bedroom and that the other items seized during the search including
the caliber .22 revolver, were merely planted by the police officers. Appellant likewise
assails the manner in which the search was carried out, claiming that the police
officers just barged into his house without asking permission. Furthermore, he claimed
that the barangay officials arrived only after the police already had finished the search.
However, after trial the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction which decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was
illegal.
HELD:
The Supreme Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals and
ACQUITS petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of the charge of violation of P. D.
No. 1866.
Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant.
Searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure
is tainted and excluded for being the proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." In the
language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
in any proceeding
In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as
a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioner's house. This firearm, to
emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Thus, the seizure is illegal.
True that as an exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally possessed
firearm or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently found in plain view. However,
"[t]he seizure of evidence in 'plain view' applies only where the police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object."52 Specifically, seizure of evidence in "plain view" is justified when
there is:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are.
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
People v. Omaweng [GR 99050, 2 September 1992]
Third Division, Davide (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: In the morning of 12 September 1988, PC constables with the Mt. Province PC
Command put up a checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one going to Sagada and
the other to Bontoc. They stopped and checked all vehicles that went through the
checkpoint. At 9:15 a.m., they flagged down a cream-colored Ford Fiera (ABT-634)
coming from the Bontoc Poblacion and headed towards Baguio. The vehicle was
driven by Conway Omaweng and had no passengers. The Constables (Layong, et.al.)
asked permission to inspect the vehicle to which Omaweng acceded to. When they
peered into the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially
covered by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of the
vehicle. They asked permission to see the contents of the bag to which Omaweng
consented to. When they opened the bag, they found that it contained 41 plastic
packets of different sizes containing pulverized substances. The constable gave a
packet to his team leader, who, after sniffing the stuff concluded that it was marijuana.
The Constables thereafter boarded the vehicles and proceeded to the Bontoc
poblacion to report the incident to the PC Headquarters. The prohibited drugs were
surrendered to the evidence custodian. The PC Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa,
La Trinidad, Benguet conducted 2 chemistry examinations of the substance contained
in the plastic packets taken from appellant and found them to be positive for hashish
or marijuana. Omaweng was indicted for the violation of Section 4, Article II of RA
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, in a criminal complaint filed with
the MTC Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12 September 1988. Upon his failure to
submit counter-affidavits despite the granting of an extension of time to do so, the
court declared that he had waived his right to a preliminary investigation and, finding
probable cause against Omaweng, ordered the elevation of the case to the proper
court. On 14 November 1988, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Mountain Province
filed an Information charging Omaweng with the violation of Section 47 Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended (Crim Case 713). After his motion for
reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial Fiscal, Omaweng entered a plea of not
guilty during his arraignment on 20 June 1989. During the trial on the merits, the
prosecution presented 4 witnesses. Omaweng did not present any evidence other
than portions of the Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement, dated 23 December 1988, of
prosecution witnesses Joseph Layong and David Fomocod. On 21 March 1991, the
trial court promulgated its Judgment convicting Omaweng of the crime of transporting
prohibited drugs (Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended). Omaweng appealed
to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Omaweng was subjected to search which violates his Constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Held: Omaweng was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a
violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. He
willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted
on his vehicle and travelling bag. The testimony of the PC Constable (Layung) was not
dented on cross-examination or rebutted by Omaweng for he chose not to testify on
his own behalf. Omaweng waived his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures when he voluntarily submitted to a search or consents to have it made in his
person or premises. He is precluded from later complaining thereof right to be secure
from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly. Since in the course of the valid search 41
packages of drugs were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant
was necessary for such seizure.
People vs. Correa [GR 119246, 30 January 1998]
En Banc, Martinez (J): 12 concur
Facts: A week before 18 June 1994, Leonardo Dulay was placed under surveillance
by the Police Operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police
District Command (DEU-WPDC) on account of confidential and intelligence reports
received in said Unit about his drug trafficking around Bambang Street, Tondo, Manila.
The police surveillance brought forth positive results and confirmed Dulay's illegal drug
trade. On 17 June 1994, operatives were alerted that Dulay would transport and
deliver a certain quantity of drugs that night on board a owner-type jeep (FMR948).
Thereafter, the operatives, together with the informer proceeded to A. Bonifacio Street
on board 3 vehicles, and inconspicuously parked along the side of North Cemetery
and waited for the suspect. The police informant spotted Dulay’s vehicle at 3:00 am.
The operatives tailed the subject jeepney until they reached Bambang extension and
Jose Abad Santos Avenue, where they accosted the passengers of said jeepney. The
team inspected a cylindrical tin can of El Cielo Vegetable Cooking Lard, about two feet
high, loaded in the vehicle of the appellants. The can contained 8 bundles of
suspected dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in pieces of paper and plastic
tapes. The team seized the suspected contrabands and marked each bundle
consecutively. The 3 suspects were brought to the police headquarters at DEU-WPDC
for investigation. The packages of suspected marijuana were submitted to the NBI for
laboratory analysis to determine their chemical composition. The tests confirmed that
the confiscated stuff were positive for marijuana and weighed 16.1789 kilograms. The
defense, however, contends that the 3 accused were arrested without warrant in
Camarin D, Caloocan City, enroute to Dulay’s house to get the things of his child
allegedly rushed previously to the Metropolitan Hospital, for an alleged charge of
trafficking on 'shabu,' and were brought to the WPDC headquarters at U.N. Avenue,
where they were detained. On 12 July 1994, an Information was filed with the RTC
Manila (Branch 35) indicting Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y
Sesante @ "Dodong," and Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" for having violated
Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended. When arraigned, the 3 accused pleaded
not guilty. After trial and on 3 March 1995, the lower court found the appellants guilty
as charged and were sentenced to death and a fine of P10 million.
Issue: Whether the accused are precluded from assailing the warrantless search and
seizure, due to waiver on their part.
Held: Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante @ "Dodong," and
Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" are precluded from assailing the warrantless
search and seizure when they voluntarily submitted to it as shown by their actuation
during the search and seizure. They never protested when the police officer opened
the tin can loaded in their vehicle, nor when he opened one of the bundles, nor when
they, together with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were brought to the police
station for investigation and subsequent prosecution. When one voluntarily submits to
a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is precluded from
later complaining thereof The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like
every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly."
Further, they effectively waived their constitutional right against the search and seizure
by their voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when they entered a
plea of not guilty upon arraignment and by participating in the trial.
People v. Ramos [GR 85401-02, 4 June 1990]
Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 3 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 29 November 1982, a civilian informer came to the Narcotics Command
Office in Olongapo City and reported that a cigarette vendor by the name of "Mama
Rose" (Rosalinda Ramos) was selling marijuana at the corner of 3rd Street and Rizal
Avenue in Olongapo City. Tests buys were made using marked money. The Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) team proceeded to the place where appellant was selling
cigarettes, and arrested the latter for illegal peddling of marijuana. Ramos was
requested to take out the contents of her wallet. The four marked five-peso bills used
in the test buys were found among her possessions and were confiscated after the
serial numbers were confirmed. Search of Ramos’ stall yielded 20 sticks of marijuana
cigarettes in a trash can placed under the small table where Ramos displayed the
wares she was selling. Ramos was thereafter brought to the station. At the station,
Ramos executed a statement confessing to her crimes which she swore to before
Assistant City Fiscal. The marijuana sticks confiscated were sent to the Philippine
Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL) for analysis, and thereafter were confirmed to
be marijuana. The defense contends however that she assented to the invitation of the
NARCOM operatives for investigation, after search of her buri bags (which she stores
the fruits that she sells) were fruitless. She claimed that she was forced to affix her
signature on the four 5-peso bills by one Sgt. Sudiacal, purportedly to be the same
money which was used to buy marijuana from her, but which she insists was her
money being saved for the rentals. She was later brought to the Fiscal’s Office after
investigation, where she signed a document. She claimed she was not assisted by
any counsel during the investigation, neither during the time she signed the document
at the Fiscal’s Office. Two informations were filed against Ramos, one for sale
(Criminal Case 5991) and the other for possession of marijuana (Criminal Case 5990).
After trial, the RTC Olongapo City (Branch 73) found her guilty beyond reasonable
doubt in Criminal Case 5990 for violating Section 8 of RA 6425 and sentenced her to
imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day and a fine of P6,000. She was likewise found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5991 for violating Section 4 of RA 6425
and was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000. Ramos sought reversal
of the decisions with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Ramos waived her right against the warrantless search of the trash
can, where illegal drugs were found, under her control.
Held: The trash can (where the contraband were found) was found under the table
where her legitimate wares were being sold. Ramos he was the only person who had
access to the trash can. The same was under her immediate physical control. She had
complete charge of the contents of the trash can under the table to the exclusion of all
other persons. In law, actual possession exists when the thing is in the immediate
occupancy and control of the party. But this is not to say that the law requires actual
possession. In criminal law, possession necessary for conviction of the offense of
possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute may be constructive as
well as actual. It is only necessary that the defendant must have dominion and control
over the contraband. These requirements are present in the situation described,
where the prohibited drugs were found inside the trash can placed under the stall
owned by Ramos. In fact, the NARCOM agents who conducted the search testified
that they had to ask Ramps to stand so that they could look inside the trash can under
Ramos' papag. The trash can was positioned in such a way that it was difficult for
another person to use the trash can. The trash can was obviously not for use by her
customers. Therefore, the twenty sticks of marijuana are admissible in evidence and
the trial court's finding that Ramos is guilty of possession is correct.
People v. Barros [GR 90640, 29 March 1994]
Third Division, Feliciano (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 6 September 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both
members of the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing
Plate ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching
Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as
and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the back, saw Bonifacio Barros carrying a
carton, board the bus and seated himself on seat 18 after putting the carton under his
seat. Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and
S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being their station, called C2C [Fernando]
Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the
carton, he found out that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers who the
owner of the carton was but nobody answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with
the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao invited Barros to the detachment for
questioning as the latter was the suspected owner of the carton containing marijuana.
Upon entering the detachment the carton was opened in the presence of Barros.
When Barros denied ownership of the carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers called for
the bus conductor who pinpointed to Barros as the owner of the carton of marijuana.
Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972). After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of
Section 4 of RA 6425 as amended and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. Barros appealed.
Issue: Whether the failure of the carton bearer to object to the search made in the
moving vehicle, resulting to his warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver.
Held: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or
with a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable"
within the meaning of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The evidence
secured thereby — i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure — will be inadmissible in
evidence "for any purpose in any proceeding." The requirement that a judicial warrant
must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is, however, not
absolute. There are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to
the search of moving vehicles. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of
moving vehicles — automobiles, trucks, etc. — without need of a warrant, it not being
practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be
sought. In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace
officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really searched
nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the examination of the
vehicles being limited to visual inspection. When, however, a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law- offender or the
contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or
the proceeds of some criminal offense. The Court has in the past found probable
cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in
situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of
marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National
Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable
volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was
conducted; (3) Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an undercover "deep
penetration" agent that prohibited drugs would be brought into the country on a
particular airline flight on a given date; (4) Narcom agents had received information
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession
prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian,
because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and
other identification papers when requested to do so; and (5) Narcom agents had
received confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance
as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana. Herein, there is nothing in the
record that any circumstance which constituted or could have reasonably constituted
probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton box allegedly owned by
Barros. The testimony of the law enforcement officers who had apprehended the
accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan), and who had searched the
box in his possession, (C2C Fernando Bongyao), simply did not suggest or indicate
the presence of any such probable cause. Further, The accused is not to be presumed
to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless
arrest "simply because he failed to object." To constitute a waiver, it must appear first
that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry
into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein. As the
constitutional quaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority
by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful
submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is
merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that
we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. Accordingly, the
search and seizure of the carton box was equally non- permissible and invalid. The
"fruits" of the invalid search and seizure — i.e., the 4) kilos of marijuana — should
therefore not have been admitted in evidence against Barros.
Veroy v. Layague [GR 95630, 18 June 1992]
En Banc, Paras (J): 12 concur
Facts: Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroy are husband and wife residing in Davao City. the trial court, unless otherwise restrained by the court. The Veroys filed the petition
When Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.
Security System sometime in June 1988, he and his family transferred to Quezon City.
The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to 2 houseboys, Jimmy
Issue: Whether the permission granted by ma. Luisa Veroy for ascertaining thereat
Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises.
the presence of alleged “rebel soldiers” include the authority to conduct a room to
The Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soquilon for the salary of the
room search once inside the house.
said houseboys and other expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys
had the keys to the interior of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit
breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soquilon to give her access in case of Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
an emergency. On 12 April 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
PC/INP raided Veroy’s house in Davao City on information that the said residence was (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and
being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the
help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of
and they did not have a search warrant. Permission was requested by phone to Ma. a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing).
Luisa Veroy who consented on the condition that the search be conducted in the The necessity of the permission obtained from Ma. Luisa underlines the recognition of
presence of Major Macasaet. The following day, Capt. Obrero and Maj. Macasaet met Capt. Obrero of the need of a search warrant to enter the house. The permission
at the Veroy’s house to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by Ma. granted by was for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged
Luisa. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing 7 live "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to
bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer in the children’s room. 3 half- room search once inside the house. The police officers had ample time to procure a
full jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the search warrant but did not. Warrantless searches were declared illegal because the
children's room. A search of the children's recreation and study area revealed a big officials conducting the search had every opportunity to secure a search warrant. The
travelling bag containing assorted clothing, a small black bag containing a book items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their
entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions
a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was instituted against them. The offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum
found in the master's bedroom. Inventory and receipt of seized articles were made. prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se.
The case was referred for preliminary investigation to the Quezon City Assistant Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not
Prosecutor , who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City by the be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still
DOJ through Department Order 88 (16 May 1990). In a resolution dated 6 August necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable,
1990, the Fiscal recommended the filing of an Information against the Veroys for the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the
violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the Veroys in the
of Rebellion). Hence, on 8 August 1990, an Information for the said offense was filed criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. Besides, assuming that
by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the RTC Davao City). No bail there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of
was recommended by the prosecution. The fiscal’s resolution was received by the criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the
Veroys on 13 August 1990. The latter filed a motion for bail on the same day which knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime.
was denied for being premature, as they have not been arrested yet. The Veroys
voluntarily surrendered to Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, but who refused to receive them o
the ground that his office has not received copies of their warrants of arrest. In the
meantime, on 15 August 1990, the Veroys were admitted to the St. Luke's Hospital for
various ailments brought about or aggravated by the stress and anxiety caused by the
filing of the criminal complaint. On 17 August 1990, Gen. Dumlao granted their request
that they be allowed to be confined at the hospital and placed under guard thereat.
Upon arraignment on 1 October 1990, the Veroys pleaded not guilty and filed a motion
for hospital confinement, which was denied. The court ordered their commitment at
the Davao City Rehabilitation Center pending trial on the merits. At the conclusion
thereof, the court issued a second order denying their motion for reconsideration. The
Veroys were returned to the St. Luke's Hospital where their physical condition
remained erratic. Gen. Dumlao informed the Veroys that he had issued a directive for
their transfer from the St. Luke's Hospital to Camp Crame on the basis of the 2
October 1990 Order. They would proceed with their transfer pursuant to the order of