SUIT AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS

VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 91359, September 25 1992, 214 SCRA 286

FACTS: Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) alleges that the provisions under
Section 4 and 17 of Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law violate the 1987
Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to
favour and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc.
(PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency.
Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying
Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying
Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col.
Sabas V. Edades, requiring that “all private security agencies/company security forces must register as
members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are located...”.
As such membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and
constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade.
A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum
monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro
Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila.
Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by
undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in
the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition; hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline
recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a
security agency. The PC-SUSIA affirmed the findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of
VMPSI’s license. As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI.
VMPSI made a request letter to the PC Chief to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO and
consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of membership from
PADPAO.

ISSUE:
Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without
its consent.

HELD: Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in
bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC
Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed as part of their official
duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their
private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the
Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State to
be sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a legislative
act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction
over the public respondents. Petition for review is denied and the judgment appealed from is affirmed
in too.

Larkins vs NLRC

Facts:
1. On August 12, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. III
of the NLRC, San Fernando, Pampanga for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages.
2. Charges were against petitioner T/Sgt Aldora Larkins who was a member of the United States Air
Force (USAF) assigned to oversee the dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation Squadron (3 AGS) at
Clark Air Base, Pampanga., Lt. Col. Frankhauster, and Joselito Cunanan, the new contractor (JAC
Maintenance Services) employed for 3 AGS.
3. Petitioner and Lt. Col. Frankhauser failed to answer the complaint and to appear at the hearings.
They, likewise, failed to submit their position paper , which the Labor Arbiter deemed a waiver on their
part to do so. The case was therefore submitted for decisionon the basis of private respondents'
position paper and supporting documents which therefore on November 21, 1988, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision granting all the claims of private respondents. He found both Lt. Col. Frankhauser
and petitioner "guilty of illegal dismissal" and ordered them to reinstate private respondents with full
back wages, or if that is no longer possible, to pay private respondents' separation pay.
4. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over her
person because no summons or copies of the complaints, both original and amended, were ever served
on her. In her "Supplemental Memorandum of Appeal," petitioner argued that the attempts to serve her
with notices of hearing were not in accordance with the provisions of the R.P.–U.S. Military Bases
Agreement of 1947.

Issue: Petitioner's contention that the questioned resolutions are null and void because respondent
Labor Arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction to entertain and decide the case. Petitioner alleges that she
never received nor was served, any summons or copies of the original and amended complaints, and
therefore the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over her person under Article XIV of the R.P. –U.S.
Military Bases Agreement.
For Reference:
R.P.–U.S. Military Bases Agreement.
". . . [N]o process, civil or criminal, shall be served within any base except with the permission of the
commanding officer of such base; but should the commanding officer refuse to grant such permission he
shall forthwith take the necessary steps . . . to serve such process, as the case may be, and to provide
the attendance of the server of such process before the appropriate court in the Philippines or procure
such server to make the necessary affidavit or declaration to prove such service as the case may
require."
Ruling: Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case as summonses and other processes issued by
Philippine courts and administrative agencies for United States Armed Forces personnel within any U.S.
base in the Philippines could be served therein only with the permission of the Base Commander. If he
withholds giving his permission, he should instead designate another person to serve the process, and
obtain the server's affidavit for filing with the appropriate court. Respondent Labor Arbiter did not
follow said procedure. He instead, addressed the summons to Lt. Col. Frankhauser and not the Base
Commander. Respondents do not dispute petitioner's claim that no summons was ever issued and
served on her. They contend, however, that they sent notices of the hearingsto her BUT as contended
notices of hearing are not summonses. The provisions and prevailing jurisprudence in Civil Procedure
may be applied by analogy to NLRC proceedings (Revised Rules of the NLRC, Rule I, Sec. 3). It is basic that
the Labor Arbiter cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without the latter being
served with summons (cf. Vda. de Macoy v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 244 [1992]; Filmerco
Commercial Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 149 SCRA 193 [1987]). In the absence of service of
summons or a valid waiver thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter are null
and void. Petitioner, in the case at bench, appealed to the NLRC and participated in the oral argument
before the said body. This, however, does not constitute a waiver of the lack of summons and a
voluntary submission of her person to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. She may have raised in her
pleadings grounds other than lack of jurisdiction, but these grounds were discussed in relation to and as
a result of the issue of the lack of jurisdiction. In effect, petitioner set forth only one issue and that is the
absence of jurisdiction over her person. If an appearance before the NLRC is precisely to question the
jurisdiction of the said agency over the person of the defendant, then this appearance is not equivalent
to service of summons (De los Santos v. Montera, 221 SCRA 15 [1993]). Be that as it may, on the
assumption that petitioner validly waived service of summons on her, still the case could not prosper.
There is no allegation from the pleadings filed that Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner were being sued
in their personal capacities for tortious acts (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]).
However, private respondents named 3 AGS as one of the respondents in their complaint. Indeed,
assuming that jurisdiction was acquired over the United States Government and the monetary claims of
private respondents proved, such awards will have to be satisfied not by Lt. Col. Frankhauser and
petitioner in theirpersonal capacities, but by the United States government (Sandres v. Veridiano II, 162
SCRA 88 [1988]).
 SHAUF vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of CA

FACTS:

• 1990: Petitioner, Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the
US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air
Base. She boasts of related working experience and being a qualified dependent locally available.
• By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment
opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and
Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her sex (female), color
(brown) and national origin (Filipino by birth).
• Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day
period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy.
But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if
she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate
her position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said
position. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as
retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a
joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation.
• Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service Commission,
Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.
• RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages + 20% of such
amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages.
• Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected from
defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune from suit
for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental functions
pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have
jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They
likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should be
dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.
• Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit against
the US government w/c would require consent.
• Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits
against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines
& is not part of international law.

ISSUE: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces

HELD: Respondents ordered, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100K as moral
damages, P20K for atty’s fees.
 No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all its acts or the acts of
its agents in the Phils. Private respondents are personally liable in indemnifying petitioner Shauf. While
the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against state officials, it only
contemplates acts done in their official capacity. This does not cover acts contrary to law & injurious to
the rights of the plaintiff. When an official acts in a manner that invades or violates the personal &
property rights of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official & such suit will not be a suit against
the state. (Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen) The doctrine of immunity from
suit will not apply where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary
citizen.

The discrimination is very evident. Shauf was not considered for the position even if she was previously
employed as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Airbase. She was not granted an interview. The person
appointed was not even qualified for that position and that person kept the position despite orders from
the US Civil Service Commission for his removal. Extension of Abalateo’s services is another proof. She
was not appointed even if US officials found her highly qualified for the position (letters from the
Director of the US Civil Service Commission, Staff Judge Advocate of the Department of Air Force). Shauf
has proven that discrimination did occur whereas respondents merely denied allegations.

The US Constitution assures everyone of equality in employment & work opportunities regardless of sex,
race, or creed. The Philippine Constitution has a similar provision. Persi & Detwiler violated Shauf’s
constitutional right to earn a living, an integral aspect of her right to life. Thus, they should be
accountable. Though Shauf is entitled to damages, she should not be paid for the supposedly unearned
income had she been hired as a Guidance Counselor. She never acquired rights over that amount
because she was never appointed. Shauf followed the proper procedure in seeking relief for the
defendants’ discriminatory acts. The Department of Air Force in Washington told her that one of her
appeal rights would be to file a civil action if a final decision has not been rendered after 180 days from
the dated of the initial appeal to the Commission. The appeal was lodged on Sept. 30, 1978 and it has
not been decided up to the time SC has decided. Shauf is entitled to choose the remedy, not otherwise
prohibited, which will best advance & protect her interests.
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval, RTC of Manila, Branch 9, Caylao
et.alG. R. No. 84607, March 19, 2003

FACTS:

The doctrine of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in the Constitution
under Article XVI, Section 3. It is provided that the State may not be sued without its
consent. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are: (1) When the Republic is
sued by name; (2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency; (3)
When the suit is, on its face, against a government officer but the case is such that
ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government. W i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e
incident that happened in Mendiola on January 22, 1987 that befell twelve
rallyists, the case filed against the military officers was dismissed by the lower
court. The defendants were held liable but it would not result in financial responsibility to the
government. The petitioner (Caylao Group) filed a suit against the State that for them
the State has waived its immunity when the Mendiola Commission recommended the
government to indemnify the victims of the Mendiola incident and the acts and utterances of
President Aquino which is sympathetic to the cause is indicative of State's waiver of immunity
and therefore, the government should also be liable and should be compensated by
the government. The case has been dismissed that State has not waived its immunity. On the
other hand, the Military Officer filed a petition for certiorari to review the orders of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 9.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit and therefore should the State
be liable for the incident.

(suit against public officials)

2. Whether the State or the public officials will be liable for the incident.

HELD:

1. No. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission regarding the

indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident
does not in any way mean liability automatically a t t a c h e s t o t h e S t a t e .
The purpose of which is to investigate of the disorders that took
p l a c e a n d t h e recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State. The acts
and utterances of President Aquino do not mean admission of the State of its liability.
Moreover, the case does not qualify as suit against the State. While the Republic in
this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the
government. The military officials are held liable for the damages for their official
functions ceased the moment they have exceeded to their authority. They were deployed
to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly and should guarantee the safety of
 the people. The court has made it quite clear that even a “high position in the government
does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another.” The court rules that
there is n o r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r a n d n o g r a v e a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n
c o m m i t t e d b y t h e r e s p o n d e n t J u d g e i n i s s u i n g t h e questioned orders.

2. The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths
that followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants in the
lower court. In line with the ruling of this court in Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 24 herein
public officials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may
be held liable for damages.
CONSENT TO BE SUED
EXPRESS CONSENT

G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., respondents

In this petition for certiorari, the Department of Agriculture seeks to nullify the Resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), denying the petition for injunction, prohibition
and mandamus that prays to enjoin permanently the NLRC's Regional Arbitration Branch X and
Cagayan de Oro City Sheriff from enforcing the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter and
from attaching and executing on petitioner's property.
Facts:
The Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security
services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. A year after, several guards
of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of
13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay,
as well as for damages.
The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding herein petitioner liable with Sultan
Security Agency for the payment of money claims, The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency
did not appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final and executory.
The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and
execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents. Forthwith, the City Sheriff
levied on execution the motor vehicles of the petitioner. A petition for injunction, prohibition and
mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Cagayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia, that the
writ issued was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the
petitioner, and that, therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and all actions
pursuant thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner also
pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize
petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.
Issue:
1. Whether Department of Agriculture impliedly waived its immunity from suit when it entered
contract with Sultan Security Agency.
2. Whether NLRC has the jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
The petition is GRANTED. The resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of
execution directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the
public respondents are hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any
and all writs of execution issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against
said petitioner.

Notes:
✓ The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made
through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the
State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a
contract
✓ A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to
have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contracts relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
✓ Act No. 3083, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied, pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act
("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim should
first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
 Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands
34 Phil 311 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Liability of the State for acts of special
agents
Political Law – Non-Suability of the State – Waiver of Non-Suability is Not Admission of
Liability

The facts of the case took place in the 1910’s. E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at
his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped
by a government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have been negligent.
Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond
rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his job the way he used to and that he
cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized
Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act
authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then
determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the
ambulance.

HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its
liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of
law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts
performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because
neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of
branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable if it
acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are
employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise
of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being
bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer
acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government. “The Government
does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it
employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties
and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.”
 Case of People of the R.P. vs. Purisima
GR Nos. L-42050-66 20November1978

FACTS OF THE CASE: There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of
the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one
Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash
filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before
them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the
Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one
essential element of the crime.

ISSUES OF THE CASE: Are the informations filed by the People sufficient in form and
substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under
Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9?

There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any
bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood;
and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in
connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or
public disorder. The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous
weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory
construction.

HELD: COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND

AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON: The problem of determining what acts fall within
the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree
and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the
facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction
of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence.