SSS Employee Asso. v CA (July 28, 1989)
CA (July 31, 1997)
Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act
upon the union’s demands concerning the implementation of
their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for
staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary
restraining order pending the resolution of the application for
preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible
error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the
jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations
Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS
contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the
Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to
strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the
court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike
Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human
Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers
with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted
activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No.
180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall
be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by
Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of
the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the
enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by
government employees enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other
forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage
or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of
any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are
prohibited from doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are
denominated as “government employees” and that the SSS
is one such government-controlled corporation with an
original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its
employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the
Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the
subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-
Management Council which is not granted by law authority to
issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction
thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance
of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
BANGALISAN vs.
Facts: Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the
800 public school teachers who staged “mass actions” on
September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances
concerning the alleged failure of the public authorities to
implement certain laws and measures intended for their
material benefit.
The Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners
failed to comply with said order, thus the Secretary charged
petitioners with “grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty;
gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations and
reasonable office regulations; refusal to perform official duty;
gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service; and absence without official leave in violation of
PD 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines.” They were simultaneously placed under
preventive suspension.
Petitioners failed to give their answer to the complaint filed
against them despite due notice. Thus, the DECS secretary
found them guilty of the offenses and ordered their dismissal
from service.
The secretary, acting on petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, modified its ruling. Instead of dismissal,
petitioners would be suspended from service for nine months
without pay.
Petitioners appealed to the Civil Service Commission. The
latter reduced the suspension period from nine months to six
months with automatic reinstatement in the service but
without payment of back wages.
Petitioners appealed the case to CA but dismissed the same for
lack of merit.
Petitioners’ main argument is that they were merely exercising
their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances.
Issue:
Whether or not Government employees can engage in a strike.
Held:
No. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in
the public service may not engage in strikes. While the
Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to
organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of
mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public services. The right of government
employees to organize is limited only to the formation of
unions or associations, without including the right to strike.
It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and
that petitioners’ purpose was to realize their demands by
withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term
“strike” was not used by the striking employees to describe
their common course of action is inconsequential, since the
substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be
deemed to be controlling.
“It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional
right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but the
manner in which they exercised such right which resulted in
the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and
classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed,
there are efficient but non-disruptive avenues, other than the
mass actions in question, whereby petitioners could petition
the government for redress of grievances.”
It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however
temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public, which is
one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government
employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid
grievances and noble intentions in staging the “mass actions,”
but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of
innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not
legalize an illegal work stoppage.
As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory
prohibition like Memorandum Circular No. 6, public employees
are denied the right to strike or engage in a work stoppage
against a public employer. The right of the sovereign to
prohibit strikes or work stoppages by public employees was
clearly recognized at common law. Indeed, it is frequently
declared that modern rules which prohibit such strikes, either
by statute or by judicial decision, simply incorporate or
reassert the common law rule.
To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike,
there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefor.
In the absence of any express legislation allowing government
employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or
regulating the exercise of the right, employees in the public
service may not engage in strikes, walkouts and temporary
work stoppages like workers in the private sector.
National Federation of Sugar Workers vs. Ovejera 1982
FACTS: National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) has
concluded with Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC) a CBA
effective February 16, 1981 to February 15, 1984 which
provided that the parties agree to maintain the present
practice on the grant of Christmas bonus, milling bonus, and
amelioration bonus to the extent as the latter is required by
law. The Christmas and milling bonuses amount to 1 ½ months'
salary. On November 28, 1981, NFSW struck allegedly, to
compel the payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851, in
addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses
being enjoyed by CAC workers. On January 22, 1982, NFSW
filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) a
notice of strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay.
Six days after, NFSW struck. One day after the commencement
of the strike, a report of the strike-vote was filed by NFSW with
MOLE. CAC filed a petition with the Regional Arbitration
Branch of MOLE to declare the strike illegal, principally for
being violative of BP 130, that is, the strike was declared before
the expiration of the 15-day cooling-off period for ULP strikes,
and the strike was staged before the lapse of seven days from
the submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-vote After
the submission of position papers and hearing, Labor Arbiter
Ovejara declared the strike illegal. On February 26, 1982, the
NFSW, by passing the NLRC filed the instant Petition for
prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strike declared by NFSW is illegal,
the resolution of which mainly depends on the mandatory or
directory character of the cooling-off period and the 7-day
strike ban after report to MOLE of the result of a strike-vote,
as prescribed in the Labor Code.
HELD: When the law says "the labor union may strike" should
the dispute "remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite
number of days (cooling-off period) from the filing of the
notice," the unmistakable implication is that the union may not
strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the
mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban after the report
on the strike-vote is manifest in the provision that "in every
case," the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the
voting "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike,
subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period." It must be
stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day
strike ban must both be complied with, although the labor
union may take a strike vote and report the same within the
statutory cooling-off period.
If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote report
would be deemed mandatory, but not the waiting periods so
specifically and emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes
for which the filing of the strike notice and strike-vote report
is required would not be achieved, as when a strike is declared
immediately after a strike notice is served, or when as in the
instant case the strike-vote report is filed with MOLE after the
strike had actually commenced Such interpretation of the law
ought not and cannot be countenanced. It would indeed be
self-defeating for the law to imperatively require the filing on
a strike notice and strike-vote report without at the same time
making the prescribed waiting periods mandatory.
Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc vs. NLRC (July 6, 1995)
Facts: Petitioner’s employees stopped working and gathered
in a mass action to express their grievances regarding wages,
thirteenth month pay and hazard pay. Said employees were all
members of the Macajalar Labor Union — Federation of Free
Workers (MLU-FFW) with whom petitioner had an existing
collective bargaining agreement.
Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and arrastre services at
the port of Cagayan de Oro. The strike paralyzed operations at
said port.
The strikers filed individual notices of strike (“Kaugalingon nga
Declarasyon sa Pag-Welga”) with the then Ministry of Labor
and Employment.
With the failure of conciliation conferences between
petitioner and the strikers, INPORT filed a complaint before
the Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike with prayer for a restraining
order/preliminary injunction.
The National Labor Relations Commission issued a temporary
restraining order. Thereafter, majority of the strikers returned
to work, leaving herein private respondents who continued
their protest.
For not having complied with the formal requirements in
Article 264 of the Labor Code, 3 the strike staged by
petitioner’s workers on April 30, 1985 was found by the Labor
Arbiter to be illegal. 4 The workers who participated in the
illegal strike did not, however, lose their employment, since
there was no evidence that they participated in illegal acts.
After noting that petitioner accepted the other striking
employees back to work, the Labor Arbiter held that the
private respondents should similarly be allowed to return to
work without having to undergo the required screening to be
undertaken by their union (MLU-FFW).
As regards the six private respondents who were union
officers, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they could not have
possibly been “duped or tricked” into signing the strike notice
for they were active participants in the conciliation meetings
and were thus fully aware of what was going on. Hence, said
union officers should be accepted back to work after seeking
reconsideration from herein petitioner. 5
The NLRC affirmed with modification 8 the Arbiter’s decision.
It held that the concerted action by the workers was more of a
“protest action” than a strike. Private respondents, including
the six union officers, should also be allowed to work
unconditionally to avoid discrimination. However, in view of
the strained relations between the parties, separation pay was
awarded in lieu of reinstatement.
Upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, public
respondent modified the above resolution.
The Commission ruled that since private respondents were not
actually terminated from service, there was no basis for
reinstatement. However, it awarded six months’ salary as
separation pay or financial assistance in the nature of
“equitable relief.” The award for backwages was also deleted
for lack of factual and legal basis. In lieu of backwages,
compensation equivalent to P1,000.00 was given.
Issue: Whether separation pay and backwages be awarded by
public respondent NLRC to participants of an illegal strike?
Held: Reinstatement and backwages or, if no longer feasible,
separation pay, can only be granted if sufficient bases exist
under the law, particularly after a showing of illegal dismissal.
However, while the union members may thus be entitled
under the law to be reinstated or to receive separation pay,
their expulsion from the union in accordance with the
collective bargaining agreement renders the same impossible.
Ratio: A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of
labor, 13 is defined as any temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or
labor dispute. 14 A labor dispute includes any controversy or
matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions
of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employers and
employees. 15
Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working
and held the mass action on April 30, 1985 to press for their
wages and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a
strike, for the cessation of work by concerted action resulted
from a labor dispute.
The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved the legality of
said strike. The Arbiter correctly ruled that the strike was illegal
for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 264 (now
Article 263) paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code. 16
The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not
conform to the notice required by the law to be filed since they
were represented by a union (MLU-FFW) which even had an
existing collective bargaining agreement with INPORT.
Neither did the striking workers observe the strike vote by
secret ballot, cooling-off period and reporting requirements.
A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike
and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in
the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared
to have lost their employment status. 20 An ordinary striking
worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an
illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal
acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be
terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an
illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an
illegal act during a strike.
In the case at bench, INPORT accepted the majority of the
striking workers, including union officers, back to work. Private
respondents were left to continue with the strike after they
refused to submit to the “screening” required by the company.
Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, a worker merely
participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from his
employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a
strike that he may be declared to have lost his employment
status. Since there appears no proof that these union
members committed illegal acts during the strike, they cannot
be dismissed. The striking union members among private
respondents are thus entitled to reinstatement, there being no
just cause for their dismissal.
However, considering that a decade has already lapsed from
the time the disputed strike occurred, we find that to award
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement would be more
practical and appropriate.
No backwages will be awarded to private respondent-union
members as a penalty for their participation in the illegal
strike. Their continued participation in said strike, even after
most of their co-workers had returned to work, can hardly be
rewarded by such an award.
The fate of private respondent-union officers is different. Their
insistence on unconditional reinstatement or separation pay
and backwages is unwarranted and unjustified. For knowingly
participating in an illegal strike, the law mandates that a union
officer may be terminated from employment. 34
Notwithstanding the fact that INPORT previously accepted
other union officers and that the screening required by it was
uncalled for, still it cannot be gainsaid that it possessed the
right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from
service. The law, in using the word may, grants the employer
the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an
illegal strike as having lost his employment. 35
Moreover, an illegal strike which, more often than not, brings
about unnecessary economic disruption and chaos in the
workplace should not be countenanced by a relaxation of the
sanctions prescribed by law.
The union officers are, therefore, not entitled to any relief.
UNION OF FILIPINO EMPLOYEES vs. NESTLE (Dec. 19, 1990)
Facts: UFE filed a notice of strike with the BLR against Filipro
(now, Nestle) and later filed a complaint for ULP for violation
of the Labor Code on Holiday Pay, non-implementation of the
CBA provisions and others. The Minister of Labor and
Employment Blas Ople assumed jurisdiction over the dispute.
UFE assailed the same by filing a petition for certiorari with a
prayer for the issuance of TRO. Notwithstanding the automatic
injunction and an absence of a restraining order, the union
members staged a strike and continued to man picket lines.
The union officers and members distributed leaflets to
employees and passers-by advocating a boycott. Hence, Nestle
filed a petition to declare the strike illegal. The Labor Minister
Ople issued another return to work order but the officers and
members of UFE continued with the strike.
Issue: Whether or not the strike is legal.
Held: No. A strike undertaken despite the issuance by the
Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order
becomes a prohibited activity and thus, illegal, pursuant to
Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code. Moreover, the union officers
and members who have participated in the said illegal activity,
are, as a result, deemed to have lost their employment status.
Thus, we held that:
UFE completely misses the underlying principle embodied in
Art. 263 (g) on the settlement of labor disputes and this is, that
assumption and certification orders are executory in character
and are to be strictly complied with by the parties even during
the pendency of any petition questioning their validity. This
extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is
aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor
disputes, without jeopardizing national interests.
Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their
claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any
and all acts that tend to, or undermine this authority of the
Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification
order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-
work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the
company, to justify their actions. . . .
One other point that must be underscored is that the return-
to-work order is issued pending the determination of the
legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to say that it
may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be
disregarded if the strike is illegal, for the purpose precisely is
to maintain the status quo while the determination is being
made. Otherwise, the workers who contend that their strike is
legal can refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill
on the company operations while retaining the positions they
refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill. Worse,
they will also claim payment for work not done, on the ground
that they are still legally employed although actually engaged
in the activities inimical to their employer's interest.
This is like eating one's cake and having it too, and at the
expense of the management. Such an unfair situation surely
was not contemplated by our labor laws and cannot be
justified under the social justice policy, which is a policy of
fairness to both labor and management. Neither can this
unseemly arrangement be sustained under the due process
clause as the order, if thus interpreted, would be plainly
oppressive and arbitrary.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR (1991)
FACTS: The 1986-1989 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between the Philippine Airlines (PAL) and the Philippine
Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) in addition to pay
increases also provided for the formation of a PAL/PALEA
Payscale Panel. Accordingly, the PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel
was formed in due time and went to work. During the
conferences of the panel however, there was no meeting of
minds between the parties.
As a result, PALEA accused PAL of bargaining in bad faith
and consequently filed with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike on account of: (1)
bargaining deadlock; and (2) unfair labor practice by
bargaining in bad faith.
The PAL filed with the NCMB a motion to dismiss
PALEA's notice of strike for being premature as the issues
raised were not strikeable since there still existed a PAL-PALEA
CBA which would not yet expire until September 30, 1989 or
with nine (9) more months to run.
On January 6, 1989, the NCMB-NCR Executive
Conciliator/Mediator, advised PALEA president, George
Pulido, that the issues raised in the notice of strike were
"appropriate only for preventive mediation," hence, not valid
grounds for a lawful strike. However, when subsequently a
representative of NCMB supervised the conduct of PALEA'S
strike vote, PAL's counsel was baffled for it was inconsistent
with the NCMB order treating the strike notice as preventive
mediation. PAL's counsel sought clarification from the NCMB.
He assured PAL that the NCMB representatives could not
certify the strike vote.
On January 12, 1989, PALEA submitted the strike vote results
to the NCMB. The next day, January 13, 1989, PAL petitioned
the Secretary of Labor Franklin Drilon to immediately assume
jurisdiction over the dispute in order to avert the impending
strike. Inexplicably, the Secretary failed to act promptly on
PAL's petition for his assumption of jurisdiction.
Seven (7) days passed with no reaction from Secretary
Drilon. Thus, on January 20, 1989, PALEA declared a strike
paralyzing PAL's entire operations the next day, resulting in
serious inconvenience to thousands of passengers who were
stranded in 43 airports throughout the country, and the loss of
millions of pesos in unearned revenue for PAL. Late in the day,
at 7:50 P.M., Secretary Drilon issued an order assuming
jurisdiction over the labor dispute which had already exploded
into a full-blown strike, ordering the strikers to lift their pickets
and return to work, directing management to accept all
returning employees, and resolving the issues subject of the
strike, by awarding the monetary benefits to the strikers, while
prohibiting the company from taking retaliatory action against
them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor has authority to
order the petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. to reinstate
officers and members of the union who participated in an
illegal strike and to desist from taking any disciplinary or
retaliatory action against them?
HELD: The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he
restrained PAL from taking disciplinary action against its guilty
employees, for, under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the
Secretary may enjoin is the holding of the strike, but not the
company's right to take action against union officers who
participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal acts. The
prohibition which the Secretary issued to PAL constitutes an
unlawful deprivation of property and denial of due process for
it prevents PAL from seeking redress for the huge property
losses that it suffered as a result of the union's illegal mass
action.
Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, the Labor Secretary's
authority to resolve a labor dispute within 30 days from the
date of assumption of jurisdiction, encompasses only the
issues in the dispute, not the legality or illegality of any strike
that may have been resorted to in the meantime.
SAN MIGUEL vs. NLRC (March 2, 1999)
Facts: San Miguel Corporation (SMC), which allegedly needed
to streamline its operations due to financial losses shut down
some of its plants and declared 55 positions as redundant.
Consequently, the private respondent union (SMCEU) filed
several grievance cases for the said retrenched employees,
praying for the redeployment of the said employees to the
other divisions of the company. During the grievance
proceedings, however, most of the employees were
redeployed, while others accepted early retirement. As a
result, only 17 employees remained when the parties
proceeded to the third level of the grievance procedure.
The private respondent filed with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) a notice of strike. Petitioner, on the other
hand, moved to dismiss the notice of strike, but the NCMB
failed to act on the motion. Petitioner SMC filed a complaint
with the respondent NLRC praying for the dismissal of the
notice of strike, and an order compelling the respondent union
to submit to grievance and arbitration the issue listed in the
notice of strike, and the recovery of the expenses of litigation.
Respondent NLRC came out with a minute resolution
dismissing the complaint. Aggrieved by the resolution,
petitioner found its way to this Court via the present petition.
In the case under consideration, the grounds relied upon by
the private respondent union are non-strikeable. Their
grounds appear more illusory than real. The Court held that
the violation of the CBA is chargeable against the private
respondent union.
The Supreme Court granted the instant petition.
SMCEUPTGWO was directed to complete the third level of the
Grievance Procedure and proceed with the Arbitration
proceedings if necessary.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of a no strike clause.
Held: Yes. Collective Bargaining Deadlock is defined as “the
situation between the labor and the management of the
company where there is failure in the collective bargaining
negotiations resulting in a stalemate.”
The situation is non-existent in the present case since there is
a Board assigned on the third level (Step 3) of the grievance
machinery to resolve the conflicting views of the parties.
Instead of asking the conciliation decide the conflict, petitioner
declared a deadlock, and thereafter, filed a notice of strike. For
failing to exhaust all the steps in the grievance machinery and
arbitration proceedings provided in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, the notice of strike should have been dismissed by
the NLRC and private respondent union ordered to proceed
with the grievance and arbitration proceedings.
In abandoning the grievance proceedings and stubbornly
refusing to avail of the remedies under the CBA, private
respondent (union) violated the mandatory provisions of the
CBA. Petitioner (employer) having evinced its willingness to
negotiate the fate of the remaining employees affected , there
is no ground to sustain the notice of strike of the union.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation and private respondent San
Miguel Corporation Employees Union - PTGWO are hereby
directed to complete the third level (Step 3) of the Grievance
Procedure and proceed with the Arbitration proceedings if
necessary.
PEPSI-COLA LABOR UNION vs. NLRC June 29, 1982
Facts: On December 11, 1979, a certification election was held
at the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company's (PEPSI) plant in Naga City.
Out of 131 votes which were cast, the UNION got 128 so it
regarded itself as the sole and exclusive bargaining unit. The
losing labor group contested the election at various levels but
it was unsuccessful. Meanwhile, on April 1, 1980, the UNION
filed a notice of strike with MOLE's Regional Office in Legaspi
City on the ground that PEPSI refused to bargain. PEPSI
countered that it was willing to bargain but there was yet no
final decision on the appeal of the other labor union as to who
is the EBR. Med-Arbiter Antonio B. Caayao issued a resolution
stating that the Notice of Strike under consideration, being
premature, is illegal and should, therefore, be dismissed. The
Union disregard the resolution and staged a strike.
On May 15, 1980, PEPSI filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice and illegal strike. Labor Arbiter Fulleros, declared that
the strike staged by the respondents herein was beyond doubt
illegal and therefore all officers and member of the union
whose names appear on the complaint be considered to have
lost their employment status effective May 7, 1890.
Issue: Whether or not Strike is illegal so as to declare that all
the officers and members of the union whose names and
positions appear on Annex "A" of the complaint except Romulo
Cal, Nilo Bariso and Mauro Nieto be considered to have lost
their employment status effective May 7, 1980. "
Held: No. It is now settled "that a strike does not automatically
carry the stigma of illegality even if no unfair labor practice
were committed by the employer. It suffices if such a belief in
good faith is entertained by labor as the inducing factor for
staging a strike." (Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant Employees,
Assn. vs. Tandayag, G.R. No. L-29217, May 11, 1978, 83 SCRA
56, 72. And it has also been held that the members of a union
cannot be held responsible for an illegal strike on the sole basis
of such membership or even on account of their affirmative
vote authorizing the same. They become liable only if they
actually participated therein. (ESSO Philippines, Inc. vs.
Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO (MME), G.R. No. L-36545,
January 26, 1977, 75 SCRA 73.)
In the case at bar, although the strike was indeed illegal, We
cannot discount the presence of good faith on the part of the
rank and file members of the UNION considering that in the
certification election the UNION obtained 128 out of the 131
votes cast so that they could justifiably consider it as their sole
bargaining representative. Moreover, there is no proof that
the members of the UNION all participated in the illegal strike.
The ones who deserve what Justice Barredo calls "capital
punishment" in the Esso Philippines case, supra, are the
officers of the UNION who staged the strike in defiance of the
ruling of Med-Arbiter Caayao WHEREFORE, the petition is
granted; the private respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate
all of those persons whose names and positions appear in
Annex "A" which is mentioned in the decision of the Executive
Labor Arbiter dated November 20, 1980, under the same
terms and conditions of employment existing prior to May 7,
1980, except for the officers of the UNION. No costs.
TIU AND HAYUHAY vs. NLRC (August 18, 1997)
Facts: RBS (company) had a CBA with GMAEU (union) which
took effect on July 2, 1989. RBS observed that a huge amount
of overtime expenses incurred which moved the president to
form guidelines on the availment of leaves and rendering of
overtime work. On June 11, 1991, RBS furnished GMAEU a
copy of the said guidelines and requested the latter to
comment thereon. The union did not file any comment. RBS
then implemented the said guidelines. GMAEU then send a
letter to the president. The union argued that, the union was
not consulted in the formulation of the said guidelines which
violates their CBA, the guidelines would render nugatory the
CBA provision of the same subject and the diminution of
benefits being enjoyed by all employees with respect to the
mid-year bonuses (from 2-1/2 months to 1-1/2 months
constitutes a withdrawal of an existing company policy). RBS
management and GMAEU officials met on 3 July 1991 and on
10 July 1991 to thresh out the issues raised by GMAEU in its 26
June 1991 letter. Both talks, however, were short lived as the
union refused to hold further talks with RBS. On 12 July 1991,
GMAEU filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB) based on unfair labor practices
allegedly committed by RBS on grounds of violation of existing
CBA, employees coercion, union interference and
discrimination. The NCMB set a conciliation meeting on 19 July
1991, but as early as 16 July 1991 the Union held a strike vote
among its members and submitted the results thereof to the
NCMB on 18 July 1991 which showed that majority of the
union members voted to go on strike.
During the conciliation meeting held on 19 July 1991, RBS,
through counsel, informed GMAEU’s officers that RBS did not
violate any provision in the collective bargaining agreement
since the issuance of the guidelines was a management
prerogative duly recognized in their agreement. As regards
GMAEU’s charges of coercion, union interference and
discrimination, RBS argued that these alleged unfair labor
practices were neither raised by the union in its 26 June 1991
letter nor during their 3 July and 10 July 1991 talks. RBS’
counsel requested GMAEU’s officers to name the persons or
officers of RBS involved in the alleged unfair labor practices
and to state the specific act or acts complained of so that RBS
management could adequately refute said allegations or
impose appropriate disciplinary actions against its erring
officers. GMAEU’s officers, however, ignored both RBS’ and
the labor conciliator’s requests for a bill of particulars.
In a second conciliation meeting held on 25 July 1991, RBS
reiterated its request to GMAEU’s officers to furnish RBS the
details of the alleged unfair practices committed by RBS’
officers. Again, the Union denied RBS’ request and refused to
hold any further talks with RBS management. On the same
day, RBS filed a motion to dismiss GMAEU’s notice of strike and
forewarned the Union about the consequences of an illegal
strike. On 2 August 1991, the union struck. On the same day,
RBS filed a complaint for illegal strike and unfair labor practice
against GMAEU and its fourteen (14) officers with the NLRC.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of Labor immediately assumed
jurisdiction over the case, issued a return-to-work order, and
certified the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. In
the certified case, the labor arbiter found no factual and legal
ground to hold RBS guilty of unfair labor practices against the
Union. On appeal (docketed as NLRC-NCR CC No 00076-01),
the NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision in a resolution
dated 31 July 1992.

Meanwhile, the labor arbiter continued to hear the illegal

strike case filed by RBS against GMAEU. On 18 February 1994,
the labor arbiter rendered judgment declaring the strike illegal
and the union officers who knowingly participated in the illegal
strike to have validly lost their employment status. 10 of them
did not appeal. Tiu and Hayuhay appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of

discretion when it upheld the labor arbiter’s decision that
petitioners staged an illegal strike.

Held: The notice of strike filed by the union before the NCMB
on 12 July 1991 contained general allegations that RBS
management committed unfair labor practices by its gross
violation of the economic provisions in their collective
bargaining agreement and by alleged acts of coercion, union
interference and discrimination which amounted to union
busting. It is the union, therefore, who had the burden of
proof to present substantial evidence to support these
allegations.
It is not disputed that prior to 12 July 1991, the union treated
RBS’ issuance of the “guidelines on the availment of leaves and
rendering of overtime services” as “gross” violations of the
existing collective bargaining agreement. In its talks with the
union, RBS painstakingly explained that the said allegation was
unfounded because the issuance of said guidelines was RBS’
management prerogative. Up to that point, the union never
raised the issue of unfair labor practices allegedly committed
by RBS’ official under Article 248 of the Labor Code. But in its
notice of strike filed two days later, the union raised issues of
coercion, discrimination, and union interference for the first
time.

Significantly, the union had two (2) conciliatory meetings

arranged by the NCMB at which it could have substantiated
these additional allegations. However, the fact that it had
submitted the results of the strike vote even ahead of the
conciliatory meetings, and continuously refused to
substantiate its allegations in its notice of strike thereafter,
lends credence to the NLRC’s observation that these charges
were indiscriminately hurled against RBS to give a semblance
of validity to its notice of strike.

The bottom line is that the union should have immediately

resorted to the grievance machinery established in their
agreement with RBS. In disregarding said procedure the union
leaders who knowingly participated in the illegal strike “have
acted unreasonably, and, as such, the law cannot interpose its
hand to protect them from the consequences of their
behavior.”