Simultaneous Elections: The Indian Debate

RAHUL SHARMA

The Idea of Simultaneous elections has gained currency and traction in the recent past. The
need for simultaneous election was felt essentially because over the decades Indian
Democracy has been a victim of petty party politics for electoral gains which has resulted
into higher frequency of elections. As a result of greater number of elections which includes
16 general elections and more than a 100 state legislative assembly elections not only the
governance, economy of the country is disturbed it also has negatively impacted the essence
of democracy in the country which has been reduced to once in a five-year event. Present
dispensation at the centre under Prime Minister Modi has expressed its willingness to
generate discussion and broad-based consensus on the conceptualization and implementation
of simultaneous elections in the country. The arguments given in favour of the simultaneous
elections include the economic benefits of the simultaneous elections, curb on the black
money and corruption, effective governance among other. The NITI Aayog has brought out a
discussion paper developed by Shri Bibek Debroy and Kishore Desai. The discussion paper
has argued comprehensively for the implementation of the Simultaneous elections. Its major
argument hinges upon the issue of governance and virtual stalemate of day to day
administration in the one part or the other in the country by virtue of Model Code of Conduct
for most part of the year. This stalemate is reflected in the governance output as well.

Constituent Assembly Debates on Elections in India

The Constituent Assembly of India was the pivotal organization which not only wrote and
gave to the people of India their constitution declaring their sovereignty to the World.
Debates that took place in the Assembly also reflect the intention and vantage point of our
founding fathers. It gives us the idea as to what was hoped from the new nation to which this
assembly was giving birth to. In one particular debate regarding the elections in India, in the
Constituent Assembly not only the modus operandi of the future electoral processes were
discussed in details it also gives clarity regarding the importance and intentions for
democracy in India. For our present discussion on simultaneous elections it is of significance
because one prominent criticism of the simultaneous elections is that it will fundamentally
change the electoral apparatus of Indian democracy. In this light one must consider the
argument that K M Munshi gave in this particular debate. The larger debate was regarding the
formation of Election Commission in India to oversee the electoral process across the nation,
issue of impartiality of elections and the federal relations between the Centre and the states
and perceived threat to provincial autonomy at the hands of excessively powerful centre.
For our discussion, potent are the thoughts of K M Munshi because not only did he touched
on the nerve of the times he was addressing but also the need to recognize the fragility of the
situation at hand where the newly born nation was laying her democratic roots. In the
statement, he made in this particular debate he emphasized one aspect time and again and that
was to consider issues from the time and space to which we belong and he argued “We must
realise—and this is the general answer that I propose to give to my honourable Friends Mr.
Pataskar and Mr. Chaliha—we can only consider the problems before us from the conditions
as they exist today. We cannot forget the fact that some tenor eleven of the Indian States
which are not accustomed even to the little measure of democratic life which is enjoyed by
the provinces are coming into the Union on equal terms. We cannot ignore the fact there are
corners in India where provincial autonomy requires to be placed on a better footing. In these
conditions, it is but natural, apart from world conditions, that the Centre should have a larger
measure of control over the affairs which affect the national existence as a whole. Even in
America in which it was not a question of the Centre decentralising itself, but thirteen,
independent States coming together first in a sort of confederacy, and then in a federation
what do we find? After the depression of 1929, agriculture, education, industry,
unemployment, insecurity, all passed gradually by various means under the control or
influence of the Centre. There, the Constitution is water-tight and they had to go round and
round in order to achieve this result. There cannot be smaller units than a nation today; even a
nation is small unit in the light of the international situation. This Idea that provincial
autonomy is the inherent right of the provinces, is illusory. Charles Merriam one of the
leading political thinkers in America to his book called "The Need for Constitutional
Reform", with reference to the States of U.S.A., says, "Most States do not now correspond to
economic and social unities and their position as units of organisation and representation may
be and has been seriously challenged." In our country, the situation is different. From the
Councils Act of 1833 till the Government of India Act of 1935, there has been central control
over the provinces and it has proved wholesome. The strength, the power and the unity of
public life which India has developed during the last one hundred years is mainly due to
centralised administration of the country. I would warn the Members who are still harping on
the same subject to remember one supreme fact in Indian history that the glorious days of
India were only the days, whether under the Mauryas or the Moghuls, when there was a
strong central authority in the country, and the most tragic days were those when the central
authority was dismembered by the provinces trying to resist it. We do not want to repeat that
fatal mistake. We want that the provincial sphere should be kept intact that they should enjoy
a large measure of autonomy but only subject to national power. When national danger
comes, we must realise that the Centre alone can step in and safeguard against the chaos
which would otherwise follow. I therefore submit that this argument about Provincial
Autonomy has no a priori theoretical validity. We have to judge every subject or matter from
the point of view of what the existing conditions are and how best we can adjust the controls,
either Central or Provincial to secure maximum national efficiency.” 1

This argument was given almost seven decades ago and it resonates with our times as well. If
the time of India right after independence was such that we had to make electoral rules to suit
our needs and if the founding fathers had the wisdom to recognize the novelty of their
situation to bend the classical democratic practices because India was a unique case in terms
of the democratic polity, then how are our times today any different today? In contemporary
times Indian Democracy has been at the receiving end of the continuous electoral mode

http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/eci_publications/books/miscell/Debate_in_Constituent_Assembly_On_Elections.pdf
which has drastically affected quality of governance and not to mention rising costs as well as
use of extensive amounts of black money as well as security concerns. These put together beg
the question as to if there is a need to bring reforms into electoral politics in India and if the
simultaneous elections are the answer to it.

Report of Standing Committee on ‘Feasibility of Holding Simultaneous Elections to

House of People and State Legislative Assemblies’

There have been many committees which have suggested simultaneous elections as one of
the answers for electoral reforms in India. One among them is the Standing Committee on
Feasibility of Holding Simultaneous Elections to House of People and State Legislative
Assemblies headed by Dr E M Sudarsana Natchiappan. It noted that the need to hold
simultaneous elections to Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies was the need of the
hour for multiple reasons which included high frequency of elections and the case in point is
general elections where out of 16 elections to Lok Sabha, 7 times the lower house of
Parliament was prematurely dissolved due to exigencies of petty politics and with no party
getting clear majority. Committee also noted various developments which together paved the
way for more stable politics in the Country. Prominent among them were the Anti-Defection
Law which curbed the defection of members of legislature. And the S R Bommai Case of
1994, where “Supreme Court had held that the President can put the legislative assembly of a
State in suspended animation but cannot dissolve it without concurrence of Parliament.
Further the validity of the proclamation of the President’s rule may be examined by the
Judiciary. The Committee stated that this has strengthened the federal structure of the country
by striking a constitutional balance between the Central and state governments.”2

The major recommendations of the Committee regarding simultaneous elections covered the
whole apparatus of the simultaneous elections of Lok Sabha and the State legislative
assemblies. It argued for conducting elections in two phases whereby half the assemblies
could have elections conducted along with the Lok Sabha and the other half at the midterm of
the Lok Sabha. With regard to the bye elections the Committee recommended that “bye
elections to all seats that have become vacant during a year may be conducted together during
a pre-determined time period.”3

Discussion Paper by NITI AAYOG on Simultaneous Elections

NITI AAYOG takes forward the discussion on Simultaneous Elections from the Standing
Committee and discuss in detail the issues, modus operandi and the reservations around the
concept of Simultaneous Elections. The paper conceptualizes simultaneous elections as
“structuring the Indian election cycle in a manner that elections to Lok Sabha and the State
Legislative Assemblies are synchronized together. In such a scenario, a voter would normally
cast his/her vote for electing members of Lok Sabha and State Assembly on a single day.”4
That is conduction of Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections at the same time. Before
dabbling into the details regarding it, the paper points that historically, India has witnessed a

2
http://www.prsindia.org/administrator/uploads/general/1451885664_SCR%20Summary-
%20feasibility%20of%20holding%20simultaneous%20central%20and%20state%20elections.pdf
3
http://www.prsindia.org/administrator/uploads/general/1451885664_SCR%20Summary-
%20feasibility%20of%20holding%20simultaneous%20central%20and%20state%20elections.pdf
4
http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/Note%20on%20Simultaneous%20Elections.pdf
phase of simultaneous elections roughly from 1951 to 1967 which coincide with three terms
of general elections to Lok Sabha, by the virtue of independence electoral process started
from ground zero. Hence, simultaneity was implicit in this period. However, the
circumstantial simultaneity was hampered from the 1967 elections. From that point on not
only the cycle of elections for both Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies digressed,
but also the exigencies of Indian politics at federal and central level along with electoral
politics pressures took its toll on the Indian democracy.

The need for simultaneous elections was felt due to the long awaited and desired electoral
reforms. India is world’s largest democracy, a developing country which is developing her
own political culture. As a result of 70 years of democratic experiences, it is high time to do
course correction in order to introduce reforms. The concept of simultaneous elections need
to be viewed in this light and since we have certain amount of experience in simultaneous
elections it is hoped that it will address a number of anomalies of Indian electoral politics
which have emerged over a period of time.

In this light, the Discussion paper chart out a number of drawbacks which are roughly
clubbed under four heads, namely, issues related to development programmes and
governance issues, expenditure and black money issues, security issues and other issues.
With regard to the developmental programmes and governance issues the paper argues that
due to imposition of Model Code of Conduct of Election Commission governance in the
country in parts and as a whole is routinely affected. The paper gives crude data to
substantiate the point and argues that till 2021 the Country will witness imposition of MCC
for about 4 months. It argues “Assuming the average period of operations of MCC as 2
months during elections to a state assembly… it would be reasonable to expect applicability
of MCC for about 4 months or more every year till 2021.This means. Development projects
and programmes (that of the State Government going to polls and of Union Government in
those states) may potentially get hit every year and that too for about one-third of the entire
time available for implementing such projects and programmes.”5

With regard to the expenditure incurred in conducting elections the paper argues that with
the passage of time conducting elections is becoming more expensive. It gives the example of
expenditure incurred in general elections conducted in 2009 and 2014 which amounted,
roughly to 1115 crore and 3870 crore rupees respectively. If one adds the expenditure of 31
state assembly elections the expenditure becomes exorbitant. Also, the cost of elections and
the client patron relation between political parties and the electorate also pushes the
expenditure is the upwards which more often than not go unrecorded, Case in point is the
distribution of goods, liquor, and money. It has been argued that such incentives and bribes
given are the main source of black money in India. Former Chief Election Commissioner Dr
S Y Quarishi argue that “. Elections have become the root cause of corruption in the
country…after winning elections, the politician-bureaucrat nexus indulges in ‘recovering the
investment and that is where corruption begins.”6 As far as the security issues and
infrastructure required to conduct elections is concerned the paper argues that elections being
a mammoth exercise it also includes massive security concerns. The data provided by
Election Commission suggests that in 2014 General elections only 1349 Companies of

5
http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/Note%20on%20Simultaneous%20Elections.pdf
6
http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/Note%20on%20Simultaneous%20Elections.pdf
CAPF’s were deployed. Besides the force, state armed police, home guards and district police
personnel are also deployed. This only suggest not only the security concerns but also the
extensive security arrangements required to be in place for successful conduction of
elections. To add another dimension 31 assembly elections which are conducted across the
years only accentuates the security argument and the required physical infrastructure and
personnel.

Besides the above-mentioned issues frequent elections, for that matter electoral politics has
negative impact on our democracy as well. Frequent elections perpetuate politics of caste,
races and parochial politics. Since all political parties are in the fray to win, to play along the
restrictive, parochial identities becomes currency for vote banks. Former Chief Election
Commissioner S Y Quarishi points “elections are polarising events which have accentuated
casteism, communalism, corruption and crony capitalism. If the country is perpetually on
election mode, there is no respite from these evils. Holding simultaneous elections would
certainly help in this context.” One implication of electoral politics on India democracy has
been the centrality of elections, whereas essence of democracy is lost since the country is
invariably in “election-mode”. It is argued that simultaneous elections take this stress of
perpetual elections away and allows government to deliver on promises of development and
governance it has made.

Criticism

However, there have been reservations expressed by a number of scholars regarding the
feasibility of simultaneous elections. According to Dr S Y Quarishi “…elections have
become the root cause of corruption in the country.” He also emphasised that “caste, religion
and communal issues are perpetuated by constant elections”7 But at the same time since
elections are the only means through which politicians are held accountable, it is questionable
as to how simultaneous elections will facilitate the accountability aspect of state as well as
central level of political parties and stakeholders.

‘Dr MR Madhavan, president of PRS Legislative Research, explained that when the public is
deeply swayed towards a party, there might be more chances of the party winning not only
during the general elections but also any assembly elections held around the same time which
could drastically affect the role of the regional parties representing the marginalised
communities of the country.’8

Suhas Palshikar in his article “Polls Apart” makes a case for the unsuitability of simultaneous
elections in India. His major concern lies with the workability of the idea of simultaneous
elections especially if it would mean that the legislatures whose tenure is ending before the
Lok Sabha, they would be “prematurely dissolved”. Secondly, in the case of no confidence
motion, and midterm elections, the re-elected assembly will be given “remaining tenure” of
the previous assembly. These issues become problematic for Palshikar.

7
http://www.governancenow.com/news/regular-story/possibilities-challenges-simultaneous-elections
8
http://www.governancenow.com/news/regular-story/possibilities-challenges-simultaneous-elections
Conclusion

However, these criticisms take us back to the Constituent Assembly debates and what K M
Munshi had to say about elections that is we need to make rules to suit our times. And if this
is a dictum one can argue that at the first assembly of Rajya Sabha gives us an idea regarding
merging or not merging the tenures of assemblies considering the fact that for the first four
years of Rajya Sabha the elections were done through lottery because constitutionally the
house had to have a six-year term per member and elections every two years but there was no
possibility of conducting such elections since no member had a proper six-year term. Hence
the mechanism developed to address this anomaly was the lottery system, which is not even
prescribed in the constitution. It was an improvisation and wisdom of the legislators of that
time who understood the need of the hour. This improvisation goes back into Munshi’s
argument of developing mechanisms to suit our times and not at the cost of our democracy,
but rather to enhance it.

Reference:
 Austin, Granville : Indian Constiotution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University
Press, Delhi 1999).
 http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/eci_publications/books/miscell/Debate_in_Constituent_Asse
mbly_On_Elections.pdf
 http://www.prsindia.org/administrator/uploads/general/1451885664_SCR%20Summa
ry%20feasibility%20of%20holding%20simultaneous%20central%20and%20state%2
0elections.pdf
 http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/Note%20on%20Simultane
ous%20Elections.pdf
 http://www.governancenow.com/news/regular-story/possibilities-challenges-
simultaneous-elections
 http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/election-commission-simultaneous-
elections-in-india-lok-sabha-assembly-elections-4951569/