SENATOR ESTRADA V.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUSDMAN

G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015

Facts: Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen.
Estrada two (2) criminal complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen.
Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9
December 2013 and 14 March 2014. On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to
be furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of
New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made
“pursuant to the right of a respondent to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court) and to have access to the evidence on record (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman). The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s
Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case.

Issue: What is the quantum of evidence necessary during preliminary investigation?

Ruling: The quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in

administrative proceedings. Probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence,
as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is
admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such
investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations
of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally
adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even
partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence
because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can
include hearsay evidence.

LUIS UY vs. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA MENDOZA

G.R. No. 206220 August 19, 2015

FACTS: Luis Uy filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents with Damages against respondents Petra Rosca and spouses Jose
Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana). Uy alleged that he was the
lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as husband and wife from
the time they were married in until they separated and lived apart. Uy contends that the
Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone in favor of Spouses Lacsamana over a property
he alleges to be a part of their marital property regime is not valid for being simulated or
fictitious for lack of consideration and consent. Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and
claimed that she and Uy cohabited and attempted to formalize their marital union with
a marriage ceremony. However, the celebration was not consummated because of the
bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were unable to
secure a marriage contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent,
in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.
RULING: Yes, the sale is valid. The main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the
property by Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage.
There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage."
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. However, this
presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.
Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. Consequently, with
the presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant
Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he
and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy
therefore to submit additional proof to show that they were legally married. He, however,
dismally failed to do so.

SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA vs. VICENTE CERCADO, JR.

G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015

FACTS: Petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga and Ligaya Cercado-Belison claimed that they
are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo, who were married last
9 October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. In support of the existence thereof, petitioners presented a
copy of the Contrato Matrimonial which was issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente
church. Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document because it
is required by law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office (NSO). Petitioners claim to have in their possession a duplicate original of the
Contrato Matrimonial which should be regarded as original. Granting that the Contrato
Matrimonial is a private document, petitioners maintain that said document should be
considered an ancient document which should be excluded from the requirement of
authentication.


ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial is sufficient to prove
the fact of marriage.

RULING: Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is
admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it,
the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present
and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or
the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution
thereof. As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners failed to present any one of
such witnesses.
While petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now
argue that it is an ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’
argument still has no merit. Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one
that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally
be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of
suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly
more than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of alteration.
The
marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNABE P. PALANAS ALIAS “ABE"
G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015

FACTS: At around 6:40 in the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2 Borre took his five (5)-
month-old grandson outside his residence at Block 14, Eusebio Avenue, Pasig City. PO3
Leopoldo Zapanta, who slept at SPO2 Borre's residence, was watching television when 4
successive gunshots rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked through the open door of SPO2
Borre's house and saw two 2 men armed with .38 calibre revolvers standing a meter away
from SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas deliver the fourth shot to SPO2 Borre, but he could not
identify the other shooter. Thereafter, the two (2) assailants fled on a motorcycle.


PO3 Zapanta, together with SPO2 Borre's stepson Ramil Ranola, brought SPO2
Borre to the Pasig City General Hospital. On the way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre told Ramil
and PO3 Zapanta that it was "Abe or "Abe Palanas" - referring to his neighbor, Palanas -
who shot him. This statement was repeated to his wife, Resurreccion Borre, who followed
him at the hospital. At around 11 o'clock in the morning of even date, SPO2 Borre died.

ISSUE: Whether Palanas’ conviction for the crime of Murder should be upheld on the basis
of Dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.

RULING: Yes. SPO2 Borre's statements constitute a dying declaration, it may be

reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his own death
was already imminent. This declaration is considered evidence of the highest order and
is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would
make a careless and false accusation. In the same vein, SPO2 Borre's statements may
likewise be deemed to form part of the res gestae. In this case, SPO2 Borre's statements
refer to a startling occurrence. While on his way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time
to contrive the identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HON.JESUS M. MUPAS

G.R. No. 181892 September 08, 2015

FACTS: Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Government for the construction and development of the NAIA-IPT III under a build-
operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement. The DOTC and the MIAA invited the public to
submit competitive and comparative proposals to AEDC's unsolicited proposal in
accordance with the BOT Law and its implementing rules. Both AEDC and Paircargo
offered to build, however, DOTC awarded the project to Paircargo (PIATCO).
PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka, as well as, Asahikosan, both foreign
corporations organized in Japan, for the construction of the NAIA-IPT, however, PIATCO
defaulted on its obligations, and to settle the problem Takenaka and Asahikosan agreed
to defer PIATCO’s payments until June 2003. Trial ensued, there has been an issue as to
the attendant costs of the construction, PIATCO was required to submit the original
documents to the court. However, PIATCO argues that his non-submission is justified under
Sec. 3 rule 130 of the ROC, referring to the submission of numerous accounts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the non-submission of original documents is justified.

RULING: The court held in the negative, that although the contention of non-submission
due to numerous accounts of the document is justifiable under the rule. Under the best
evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms
of a written document, the original of the document must be produced in court.—Under
the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the
terms of a written document, the original of the document must be produced in court.
Thus, PIATCO having failed to establish that the photocopied documents he presented
in courts are authentic, theses photocopied documents are deemed as hearsay, and
shall not be admissible as evidence, or reference to the claimed attendant costs of the
project.

MARIA PAZ FRONTRERAS y ILAGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 190583.
December 7, 2015.

FACTS: An Information for Qualified Theft was filed before the RTC against the petitioner,
Salazar, and Carpon. The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that
the petitioner unlawfully deprived Cebuana of cash/ money when she took out pawned
items and released them to redeeming pledgers in exchange for redemption payments
which she, however, did not turnover to the pawnshop, and instead pocketed them for
her own gain. She gravely abused the confidence concurrent with her sensitive position
as a vault custodian when she exploited her exclusive and unlimited access to the vault
to facilitate the unlawful taking.
The accused submitted pawn tickets which were surrendered, together with the
redemption payment by their respective pledgers. She submitted them during the spot
audit along with a confession letter stating that portions of the ₱1,250,800.00 missing value
of jewelry were actually already redeemed.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial written confession was admissible.

RULING: Yes. A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made,
constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that
no sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to
be the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. The admissibility
and validity of a confession, thus hinges on its voluntariness, a condition vividly present in
this case.
The language of the confession letter was straightforward, coherent and clear. It
bore no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity and it was
replete with details which could only be known to the petitioner. Moreover, it is obvious
that losing one’s job in an administrative case is less cumbersome than risking one’s liberty
by confessing to a crime one did not really commit.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA

G.R. No. 195244 June 22, 2015

FACTS: Accused-appelant, Alvin Esugon was charged with Robbery with Homicide,
allegedly for robbing cash money amounting to P13,000 from one Josephine Castro and
in the process killing the same. Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that
on the night of the incident, he, his younger sister Cheche, and his mother and father,
were sleeping on the ground floor of their house. He saw appellant, whom he calls
"Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped
through a chair.
The RTC found appellant guilty for the crime charged. On appeal, the appellant
argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
composite crime of robbery with homicide based solely on the testimony of Carl, a 5-
year old witness whose recollections could only be the product of his imagination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the identification of the perpetrator was credible and competent
considering that the witness was a 5 year old child.

RULING: YES. Anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can
communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness.
Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social stat us are not
necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the
disqualifications as listed the rules. That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason
for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were
treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified
to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party
challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the
ability of the child to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth from
falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or
on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.