DANIEL ALROY

INNER LIGHT

ABSTRACT. Neural impulses from the senses to the brain convey information, not sen-
sation. The direct electrical stimulation of the cortex produces sensations. Hence, such
sensations are evoked in the brain, and not received from the senses, nor from the outside
world through the senses. More specifically, the experience of light is evoked in the brain
and not received from the eyes. Consequently, the born blind, too, would experience light in
response to electrical brain stimulation. The luminosity of light is not a property of electro-
magnetic radiation. If the experience of light is private, then so are the visual observations
it makes possible.

Consider light. Its original and still ordinary meaning relates to the way it
contrasts with darkness. It is something which a person born sighted knows
by acquaintance, while a person born blind knows neither by acquaintance
nor by description. I refer to this property simply as "light", or at times as
"luminosity". Since Maxwell (1865), it has been taken to be a property of
the segment of the electromagnetic spectrum in the wavelength range of
400-700 nm. As a consequence, the term "light" has shifted to its presumed
physical substrate, the segment of the spectrum in the 400-700 nm range,
and then extended to the non-visible part of the spectrum, as reflected by
the phrase "the speed of light" referring to the entire spectrum.
There is virtual unanimity that light is an aspect of the external world.
That unanimity underlies the conviction that visual observations may be
shared and are thus public. This paper presents evidence, amounting to
a proof, that light in its original and still ordinary meaning, is evoked in
the brain and is not a property of the electromagnetic spectrum. Hence the
ascription of the term "light" to a segment of that spectrum is based on an
error of fact.
If light is evoked in the brain and not received from the eyes, nor from
the outside world through the eyes, then it is private, and so are the visual
observations of objects in space which it makes possible.

I. SENSATIONS ARE NOT RECEIVED FROM THE SENSES

The following is a brief review of considerations that lead to the conclusion

that the brain does not receive sensations from the senses. The examina-
tion excludes a variety of factors, such as chemical neurotransmitters, the

Synthese 104: 147-160, 1995.

@ 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
148 DANIELALROY

influence of electrical fields, the projection of neurons from receptors to

areas other than the primary sensory cortices, and graded diffuse signaling
in local circuits. I believe this approach is necessary in this context, and
that it does not affect the validity of the conclusion.

1.1
Receptors transduce physical stimulation to which they are selectively
responsive into neural impulses. Four synapses mediate between a receptor
in the eyes or the skin and the respective primary sensory cortex.

1.2
Each neuron has a single output extension - the axon (which often branch-
es). The electrochemical spike discharged by the neuron is an "all or
nothing" binary signal, and there can be no more than one impulse in an
axon at any one time.

1.3
The amplitude of an impulse is largely unrelated to the strength and type
of the stimulus. The speed of the impulse is fixed to a given neuron, and is
thus also unrelated to the strength and type of stimulus.

1.4
The net result is that what is conveyed by a sense receptor to the brain is
a change in the firing rate, or frequency modulation, of neural impulses.
Such an impulse pattern conveys information which is qualitatively the
same from one kind of receptor or another, and thus is not sense modality
specific. Roger Sperry (1952: 405) writes: "... nerve impulses are essen-
tially homogenous in quality and are transmitted as 'common currency'
throughout the nervous system. Impulses traveling in the optic, auditory,
proprioceptive, and other sensory pathways are, accordingly, believed to
be similar in nature". Hence, neural impulses from sense receptors to the
brain convey information, not sensations. Consequently, luminosity is not
received from the eyes.

2. SENSATIONS ARE EVOKED IN THE BRAIN

2.1
As the work of Wilder Pen field (1958) and others demonstrates, the direct
electrical stimulation of the cortex of a conscious person can evoke sen-
sations. The sense modality evoked is determined by the area stimulated.
 INNER LIGHT 149

Sperry (1952: 406) writes: °'When an electric stimulus is applied to a given

sensory field of the cerebral cortex in a conscious human subject, it pro-
duces a sensation of the appropriate modality for that particular locus, that
is, a visual sensation from the visual cortex, an auditory sensation from the
auditory cortex, and so on".

2.2
These empirical considerations may be contrasted with a basic tenet in
the philosophy of David Hume ([1739], 1967), according to which all
sensations ("impressions") are received from the senses. He called the
recollection of such sensations "ideas". He rejected the notion that there
are any "innate ideas" and considered the mind to be a "tabula rasa", except
for the association of ideas based on contiguity and similarity.

2.3
Giles Brindley and Walpole Lewin (1968) stimulated the visual cortex of
persons who became blind after birth and evoked sensations of light in
them. These results, like those of Penfield, are interpreted, according to
Hume's assumption, as the vivid recall of sensations previously received
from the senses. Under Hume's interpretation, the direct electrical stim-
ulation of the visual cortex of a person born blind will not, and cannot,
produce the sensation of light, tn Principles of Neural Science, John Martin
writes (1991: 330): "Color, tones, smells, and tastes are mental construc-
tions created by the brain out of sensory experience. They do not exist,
as such, outside the brain. Thus, we can answer the traditional question
raised by philosophers: Does a sound exist when a tree falls in a forest,
if no one is near enough to hear it? We now believe that the fall causes
vibration in the air but not a sound". Thus all sensations am innate - none
are received from the senses. The experience of light, and other sensations
evoked by direct electrical brain stimulation are not the vivid recollections
of sensations previously received from without.

2.4
Would, then, the brain stimulation of persons born blind give rise to the
experience of light? The reasons for blindness from birth are usually related
to the eyes or optic nerve, and not to the visual cortex or the brain. In
other words, congenital blindness is typically non-cortical. Experiments
on persons who were born blind and subsequently gained sight show
that long term sensory deprivation causes severe perceptual problems, but
the modality of visual sensation remains unchanged (von Senden [1932],
1960).
150 DANIEL ALROY

2.5
What follows is that the direct electrical stimulation of the visual cortex
of a person with congenital, non-cortical, blindness would give rise to
the experience of light, Similarly, the born blind would experience visual
hallucinations under the same circumstances that normal seeing persons
do - for example, after ingesting "mind altering" drugs such as LSD
or mescalin, prior to epileptic seizures, or prior to migraine headaches
(aura).

3. AN ANALOGY WITH PHANTOM LIMBS

3.1
Let's consider, with regard to tactile sensations, the general thesis that
sensations are not received from the senses but are evoked in the brain.
Suppose your toe is touched. Under Hume's interpretation, the sensation
of touch would be conveyed from the toe to the brain. Based on this
assumption, a person who is born without a leg could not have a phantom
sensation in their toe. The view that sensations are received from the senses
leads to the conclusion that a phantom limb can be experienced only by
a person who had a limb and then lost it. The considerations presented in
prior sections lead to a diametrically opposite conclusion: All sensations
are evoked in the brain; none are received from the senses. Therefore no
sensation is conveyed from the toe to the brain - only information. The
sensation is evoked in the part of the somatosensory cortex representing
that toe. We are unaware that the evoked sensation is in the brain. Instead,
we experience the sensation as if it were in the toe. Thus, a person born
without an arm or leg could have phantom limb experiences even though
he or she never had that limb.

3.2
Ronald Melzak, in "Phantom Limbs" (1992: 126), reports, "my colleagues
and I have encountered many people who were born without an arm or a
leg and yet experience a vivid phantom", which means that those persons
experienced sensations of limbs they had never had. Melzak concludes,
"Phantoms become comprehensible once we recognize that the brain gen-
erates the experience of the body. Sensory inputs merely modulate that
experience; they do not directly cause it". This report supports the gen-
eralized thesis that sensations are not received from the senses but are
evoked in the brain. It further confirms, indirectly, the specific thesis that
luminosity, likewise, is evoked in the brain.
 INNERLIGHT t 51

4. BRAIN CORRELATES OF MENTAL STATES

4.0
One methodological problem in considering tests on the born blind is that if
such persons are made to experience light, they will not be able to identify
or give a proper verbal description of it. This problem can be obviated if
means are avail/~ble to detect the brain correlates of such an experience.
What are the brain correlates of mental states? What is the brain correlate
of light?

4.1
In the study of cognition, the brain is commonly taken to be a biological
information processing system. The initial version of this model treated
the brain as a single sequential processor; the current version treats it as
numerous processors connected in a parallel network. According to both
versions of the model, the brain is nothing but a universal Turing machine
(Churchland, 1990). An outcome of a computation depends on the input
and the algorithm applied to it, but not on any particular design of a
computer that can carry out such a computation. Similarly, if the brain is
nothing but a universal Turing machine, then the algorithms it computes
are intrinsically independent of brain anatomy.
Such a model takes mental states to be a by-product of computing
a given algorithm. The resulting mental states are deemed not to have
a reciprocal effect on the computation - they are causally inert. As an
epiphenomenon, a mental state cannot be allowed independent existence
as an outcome, or be the temporal end-point of computation. Rather, like
a shadow of a moving object, it is a contemporaneous by-product of the
computing process. In the following three subsections, I consider the appli-
cability of the Turing model of the brain to sensation in terms of (1) the
information-content of the input stimulus, (2) temporal relations between
processing and sensations, and (3) the relation between sensations and
brain anatomy.

4.2
A direct electrical brain stimulation of the visual cortex produces sensa-
tions of light spots (phosphenes) and color spots (chromatophenes) in the
conscious, awake, normal human subject (Penfield, 1958). This is extraor-
dinary in view of the fact that such a stimulus is information-pool: The
stimulus contains no information from the eyes, nor is it processed in the
lateral geniculate nucleus. In this case, the brain is deprived of the informa-
tion that ordinarily goes from the eyes to areas other than the visual cortex.
152 DANIELALROY

Finally, the same stimulus that would evoke color spots in the visual cortex
would evoke sensations of tones in the auditory cortex.
Zeki reports of an experiment by K. and G. Beckers in which sensations
of color were produced in subjects by stimulating visual area V4 (1993:
297). Since V4 is a tertiary visual cortex, such direct stimulation also by-
passes the primary and secondary visual cortices. It proves that neither
the information processing that ordinarily takes place between the eyes
and V4, nor the information content of the input stimulus, are necessary
conditions for evoking sensations.

4.3
Assume you are looking at a red ball thrown toward you. Information
about its form, color, and movement is processed in parallel in the tertiary
visual areas V3, V4 and V5, respectively. The visual percept is an end-
point of these three separate processes that precede it. For this reason the
united appearance of form, color and movement in the visual percept is
not contemporaneous with the information processing giving rise to it.

4.4
What remains as the determinant of sensations is local anatomic specificity.
David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel (1979: 152) write: "What is common to
all regions is the local nature of the wiring", adding that "The implications
of this are far reaching. Whatever any given region of the cortex does, it
does locally".
Local anatomic specificity, in terms of cell architecture, has been the
basis for the most commonly used map of the brain (Brodmann, 1909);
it defines gross functional areas. Remarkably, in the sensory cortex, cell
architecture differentiates among the various sensory modalities. More
recently, submodalities in the visual cortex were identified by their local
anatomic specificity in terms of metabolic architecture and myelin archi-
tecture (Zeki, 1993: 70, 100). Thus, in the sensory cortex, local anatomic
specificity determines not only function but also sensory modalities and
submodalities.

4.5
The Turing machine model of the brain, then, does not apply to sensations.
The evocation of color by applying an information-poor stimulus to V4
proves that the production of color is not based on the information-content
of the input stimulus. Moreover, the Turing model of the brain implies
that mental states take place during the information processing, and not
 INNER LIGHT 15 3

subsequent to it. But the appearance of the visual percept is an end-point of

the separate parallel processing in tertiary areas V3, V4, and V5. According
to the Turing model of the brain, mental states are intrinsically independent
of anatomic specificity. However, it is local anatomic specificity which is
the determinant of sensations. Thus, no computer, regardless of speed and
memory capacity, can pass the Turing Test (Turing: t950) if the questions
pertain to sensations. If the Turing model of the brain does not apply to
sensations, then the proposition that the brain is nothing but a universal
Turing machine is false.

4.6

The above suggests the prospect of finding the neural correlate of color
in terms of local anatomic specificity. Francis Crick (1994: 10) makes a
somewhat similar point: "If it turns out that the neural correlate of red is
exactly the same in your brain as in mine, it would be scientifically plausible
to infer that you see red as I do". Such a prospect would make it possible
to assess the color sensation of another individual. The Inverted Spectrum
problem (Dennett, 1993: 389), is thus, in principle, subject to an empirical
resolution. Since the experience of light as "brightness" is taken to be an
attribute of color, finding the neural correlate of color would also disclose
neural correlates of the experience of light. In addition, discovering the
local anatomic specificity of aspects of submodalities (sub-submodalities)
would provide some ground for assessing sensations in other species.
Phylogenetically, sensations appeared first, and their integration into
perception, later. The perceptual process, deemed computational, modu-
lates but does not cause sensation. This may be tested by observing the
response characteristics of sensory brain structure, such as a part of V4, in
an experimental animal, and comparing them with the response character-
istics of that brain structure isolated, either as a slice in vitro (Ortel et al.,
1988) or a brain slab in situ (Libet, 1993: 397). Crick (t994: 222) makes
reference to the possible existence of "awareness neurons". Zeki (1993:
300) uses the term "experiential cells", in reference to neurons such as
the ones in V4 that produce the sensation of color spots when stimulated.
He adds that, "The term 'experiential' is fraught with difficulties and will
undoubtedly excite the fury of philosophers". One reason that such a reac-
tion may be expected is that the popular information processing model of
the brain is incompatible with evidence which indicates that brain anatomy
is the determinant of sensations.
154 DANIELALROY

5. THE DETECTION OF BRAIN CORRELATES OF EXPERIENCE OF LIGHT

The experimental test of the thesis need not await further progress in the
study of neural correlates of sensations. Electroencephalography (EEG),
Magnetoencephalography (MEG), Positron Emission Topography (PET)
and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) can detect gross correlates of
mental states. The Appendix proposes three experiments on the born blind,
and one involving animals brought up in the dark to indicate the feasibility
of testing the thesis.
EEG recording has long been accepted in practice as a physical correlate
of mental states. It can readily differentiate Visual Evoked Potentials from
the response of other modalities. Within the visual modality, EEG can fur-
ther differentiate responses to dots, shapes and colors (Clynes, 1967; Beck,
1975). An increase in the activity of any brain area involves an increase
in sugar and oxygen consumption and a production of waste materials
in that localized area. This finds a prompt expression in increased local
blood flow. Such changes in regional blood flow can be detected by MRI
and by PET. This localized increase in blood flow in the sensory cortex
of a conscious person is accepted as a correlate of subjective experience
(Phelps and Mazziota, 1983; Raichle, 1994). Purely subjective states, in
the modality of hearing, for example, can be detected by MEG. A complex
tone, produced by frequencies that are the integral multiples of a missing
frequency, evokes sensations of those tones, as well as the tone correspond-
ing to the absent frequency. Remarkably, in such cases, MEG demonstrates
that the part of the tonotopic map in the auditory cortex that is most active
is not of tones of frequencies produced but instead the tone of the absent
frequency (Pantev et al., 1989).

6. LUMINOSITY IS NOT A PROPERTY OF THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM

6.1.1
There is no physically detectable clue in electromagnetic radiation as to
why red, for example, is visible to us, while the adjacent infrared is not.
When infrared falls on the skin, it feels warm. Yet warmth may not be
ascribed to infrared radiation, nor to any other part of the electromagnetic
spectrum. Similarly, electromagnetic radiation has no physically detectable
properties that explain why violet is visible, while the adjacent ultraviolet
is not. Photoreceptors in the human eye, like those in bees, respond to near
ultraviolet. The only reason we don't see the near ultraviolet is that the
yellow pigment in the lenses filters it out (Wald, 1950: 36). What is true
for color is equally true for luminosity. There is no physically detectable
 INNERLIGHT 155

clue in electromagnetic radiation as to why the segment in the range of

400--700 nm is luminous and the rest of the spectrum is not.

6.1.2
One consequence of Maxwell's electromagnetic theory has been the predic-
tion of the propagation velocity of electromagnetic radiation. This velocity
turned out to be about the same as the then known propagation velocity
of light. Consequently Maxwell postulated light to be an electromagnetic
phenomenon ([1891 ], 1954).
That theory, however, is silent on whether color and luminosity are
properties of the etecromagnetic spectrum. In fact, in "On Colour Vision"
(1872: 260-1), Maxwell explicitly stated that color is not a physical proper-
ty, and by implication, neither is luminosity: '°It seems almost a truism that
colour is a sensation ... The science of colour must therefore be regarded
as essentially a mental science". If color is mental, and brightness is a
property of color, then brightness, too, is mental.

6.1.3
Erwin Schr6dinger ([ 1958], 1992:154) stated that, "the sensation of colour
cannot be accounted for by the physicist's objective picture of light-waves".
Louis de Broglie (1985: 288) expressed the same position regarding lumi-
nosity: "We clearly understand how, for instance, light may be collected
by our eyes, act on the retina, and induce in our optic nerve an electric
influx which excites certain nerve cells in our brain. But the transforma-
tion of these purely physical phenomena into a conscious perception of a
luminous sensation remains astounding and almost inconceivable".

6.2

The presence of electromagnetic radiation in the wavelength of 400-700

nm is neither a necessaD, nor sufficient condition for the experience of
luminosity, and therefore only contingently related to luminosity. Elec-
tromagnetic radiation and luminosity are separated by the eyes, the optic
nerves, and the brain.

6.3

If physics is silent on the assumption that luminosity is a property of a

segment of the electromagnetic spectrum, then it does not provide grounds
for rejecting such an assumption. That assumption can be neither confirmed
nor disconfirmed; it is superfluous. If Occam's Razor is accepted as an
aspect of the scientific method, then it provides grounds for rejecting the
156 DANIELALROY

assumption that luminosity is a property of the electromagnetic spectrum

in the wavelength range of 400-700 nm.

7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

7.1
Light is the primary means for the visual description of the physical
world.

7.2
Luminosity is evoked in the brain. When it is brought about by the direct
electrical stimulation of the visual cortex, it is not observable by the exper-
imenter. All that can be observed are physical correlates of luminosity.
However, it is directly accessible by the subject. In other words, lumi-
nosity is private. As such, it is outside the domain of physics. Changing
the locus of light from outside to inside does not change its ontological
status.

7.3
It is said that the assumption that we have visual images in our heads
ought to be rejected because it produces the problem of infinite regress
(Dennett, 1991: 52). The problem is due to positing out-of-body existence
of visual images in the external world, and to the assumption that visual
sensations are then conveyed from the eyes to the brain. This paper rejects
those assumptions, and therefore this version of infinite regress does not
arise.

7.4
Since neither electromagnetic radiation in the 400-700 nm wavelength
range, nor the use of the eyes, is necessary for us to experience light, it
is possible to develop a visual prosthesis for the born blind (leaving aside
considerations of practicality and desirability). To stimulate sensations
of light, such a prosthesis may utilize reflected, incident electromagnetic
radiation either in the 400-700 nm range, infrared, ultraviolet, or reflected
ultrasound. Information from such reflected, incident energy would activate
an electrode array that would selectively stimulate the visual cortex.

7.5
If light is taken to be a property of the external world, then the description
of the physical world in terms of it can be deemed observer-independent,
 INNER LIGHT 157

and in this sense, public. But if light is evoked in the brain then it is private,
as is the description of the physical world in terms of it. Put differently,
the description of the macroscopic physical world is observer-dependent.
Visual observations that are ordinarily taken to be public are a certain subset
of observations that are private. George Wald ([1984], 1990: 71) writes:
"Consciousness is not just an epiphenomenon, a strange concomitant of
neural activity that we project onto the physical reality. On the contrary,
all that we know, including all of our science, is in our consciousness. It is
a part, not of the superstructure, but of the foundations".
At present, microphysics is taken to be observer-dependent, while
macrophysics observer-independent. The empirical considerations pre-
sented here point to the conclusion that physics, at any scale, and our
knowledge of the external world, are observer-dependent.

APPENDIX: ON THE EXPERIMENTAL CONFIRMATION OF THE THESIS

If one eye is not used from birth, part of its representation in the visual
cortex may be taken by the other eye. Similarly, the loss of a finger causes
the part representing it in the somatosensory cortex to be partially taken
over by the representation of the adjoining fingers. This poses the question
of whether prolonged sensory deprivation of a person born blind would
atrophy or otherwise modify the sensory modality of their visual cortex.
Such modification of the brain does not appear to extend to the change
from one sensory modality to another, such as visual to auditory or
somatosensory to visual. These changes typically take place within sub-
modality and the integration of this sensory element into perception. All
visual submodalities involve luminosity. It is involved in the black and
white sensation that relates to the rods, which make up over 90% of the
photoreceptors in the eye. And, since Newton, light has been subsumed
under the concept of color as "brightness". Thus, luminosity is an attribute
of any sensory response of the visual cortex. The preservation of the sense
modality despite long term sensory deprivation is supported by Melzak's
report (1992:124) in the case of a person who was born without a leg below
the knee but continued to experience the leg he never had, even though he
was 32 years old at the time. Von Senden ([1932], 1960) investigated some
sixty congenitally blind persons who later regained sight through opera-
tions. He reports that the subjects experienced severe spatial perceptual
problems, but not a loss of any sensory submodality.
Further confirmation that sense modality remains unchanged is provid-
ed by Gregory ([1966], 1990: 202) in his study of the case of S.B., who
became blind at the age of ten months and regained sight through surgery
158 DANIELALROY

at the age of 52. Gregory writes: "When the bandages were first removed
from his eyes, so that he was no longer blind, he heard the voice of the
surgeon. He turned to the voice, and saw nothing but a blur", and then,
"But within a few days he could use his eyes to good effect. He could walk
along the hospital corridors without recourse to touch; he could even tell
the time from a large wall c l o c k . . . " . The above observations prove that
the visual sense deprivation of the born blind is not a bar to experimental
confirmation that the sensation of light is evoked in the brain.
That long-term sensory deprivation does not change sense modality is
also supported by the evocation of sound by the electrical stimulation of
the auditory nerve of a 57-year-old deaf woman who became deaf in early
childhood (Pellizone et al., 1986).
The following are four types of possible experiments: One is an exper-
iment on animals brought up in the dark, while the other three involve
persons born blind. Take an experimental animal that was brought up in
complete darkness. Attach four electrodes arranged as a dense square array
to one quadrant of the primary visual cortex, and another group of four
electrodes arranged as a spaced square array to another quadrant. Train the
animal so that stimulation of the dense array precedes a mild electric shock
from electrical wire mesh on the floor, and stimulation of the spaced array
precedes food. If the animal can be trained to make consistent differential
responses to the two stimuli, it would constitute evidence that the animal
was able to differentiate sensations between the two types of stimuli. In a
follow-up experiment, still in the dark, four light spots would be projected
on the wall in front of the animal, either in a dense or in a spaced square
array. A transfer of learning from the first stage of the experiment would
constitute a confirmation that the experimental animal, in response to the
electrical stimulation, had the experience of light.
The experience of light is correlated with increased blood flow in the pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary visual cortices in the awake, normal persons.
While the visual cortex responds to stimulation even when the subjects are
asleep, it is different than the response of an awake subject (Livingston
and Hubel, 1981 ). Consider the direct electrical stimulation of the primary
visual cortex of a person born blind who is conscious and awake. If a Fast
MRI detects an increase in localized blood flow in the visual cortices, it
would indicate that the person had experience of light.
The thesis implies that the born blind would "see stars" in situations
where a normal seeing person would; that is, when struck over the back of
the head. If the strike of the head does not result in "seeing stars", only the
somatosensory cortex would show increased blood flow. If experiments on
normal seeing subjects demonstrate a correlation between increased blood
 INNERLIGHT 159

flow in the visual cortex and "seeing stars", then such tests would apply
also to the born blind. Such increase in local blood flow in the the primary,
secondary and tertiary visual cortices is detectable by an MRI.
Heinrich Klaver (1966) discovered that visual hallucinations are based
on a limited repertoire of innate form-constants such as honeycombs, stars,
cobwebs, and spirals. Richard Siegel was able to train a group of sighted
volunteers to recognize these inborn form-constants in drug-induced visual
hallucination experiments (Siegel and Jarvik, 1975). This makes it possible
to design experiments with the born blind where tactile recognition would
replace visual recognition. In this case, three different methods can be
used: EEG recording, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, and overt responses
(including verbal) by the subjects.

REFERENCES

Beck, Edward C.: 1975, 'Electrophysiology and Behavior', Annual Review of Psychology
26, 233-62.
Brindley, Giles S. and Walpole, S. Lewin: 1968, 'The Sensations Produced by Electrical
Stimulation of the Visual Cortex', JournalofPhysiotogy 196, 479-93.
Brodmann, Korbinian: 1909, Vergleichende Lokalisationslehre der Grosshirnrinde in ihren
Prinzipien dargestellt auf Grund des Zellenbaues, Barth, Leipzig.
Broglie, Louis de: 1985, 'The Scientist at His Last Quarter of an Hour', in Sir John Eccles
(ed.), Mind and Brain, Paragon House Publishers, New York.
Churchland, Paul and Patricia Churchland: 1990, 'Could a Machine Think?', Scientific
American 262(1), 32-7.
Clynes, M., M. Kohn, and J. Gradijan: 1967, 'Computer Recognition of the Brain's Visual
Perception Through Learning the Brain's Physiologic Language', 1EEE International
Convention Record, Part 9, 125-42.
Crick, Francis: 1994, The Astonishing Hypothesis, Charles Scribner's & Sons, New York.
Dennett, Daniel C.: 1991, Consciousness Explained, Little, Brown and Company, Boston.
Gregory, Richard L.: [1966] 1990, The Eye and the Brain, Princeton University Press,
Princeton.
Hubel, David H. and Torsten No Wiesel: 1979, 'Brain Mechanisms of Vision', Scientific
American 241, 150-62.
Hume David: [I 777], 1975. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Introduction
and index by L. A. Selby-Biggs. Third Edition by R H. Nidditch, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Kltiver, Heinrich: 1966, Mescal and Mechanisms of Hallucinations, Chicago University
Press, Chicago.
Libet, Benjamin: 1993, "A Testable Field Theory of Mind-Brain Interaction', in B. Libet.
Neurophysiology of Consciousness, Birkhauser, Boston, pp. 393-404.
Livingston, Margaret S. and David H. Hubel: 1981, 'Effects of Sleep and Arousal on the
Processing of Visual Information in the Cat', Nature 291,554--61.
Martin, John H.: 1991, "Coding and Processing of Sensory Information', in E. R. Kandel,
J. H. Schwartz, and T. M. Jessel (eds.), Principles of Neural Science, 3rd ed., Elsevier
Science Publishing Company, New York.
160 DANIEL ALROY

Maxwell, James Clerk: [1891], 1954, 'Electromagnetic Theory of Light', A Treatise on

Electricity and Magnetism, 3rd ed., Clarendon Press, Dover Publications, Inc., New
York.
Maxwell, James Clerk: 1872, 'On Colour Vision', Proceedingsofthe Royal Society Institute
6, 260-71.
Ortel, D., S. H. Wu, and J. A. Hirsch: 1988, 'Electrical Characteristics of Cells and Neuronic
Circuitry in the Cochlea Nuclei Studied from Intracellular Recordings in Brain Slices', in
G. M. Edelman, W. E. Gall, and W. M. Cowan (eds.), Auditory Function: Neurobiological
Bases for tlearing, Wiley, New York, pp. 313-36.
Pantev, C., M. Hoke, B. Lutkenhoner, and K. Lehnertz: 1989, 'Ibnotopic Organization of
the Auditory Cortex: Pitch Versus Frequency Representation', Science 246,486-8.
Pellizone, M., R. Hari, J. E Makela, E. Kaukoranta, and E Montandon: 1986, 'Activation
of the Auditory Cortex by Cochlear Stimulation in a Deaf Patient', Neurosci. Lett. 68:
192-6.
Penfield, Wilder: 1958, The Excitable Cortex in Conscious Man, Liverpool University
Press, Liverpool.
Phelps, Michael E., John C. Mazziota, and S. C. Huang: 1982, 'Study of Cerebral Functions
with Positron Computed Tomography', Journal of CerebralBlood Metabolism 2, 113-
62.
Raichle, Marcus E.: 1994, 'Visualizing the Mind', Scientific American 270(3), 58-64.
Schr6dinger, Erwin: [1958], 1992, 'The Mystery of the Sensual Qualities', Mind and
Matter, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Senden, M. von: 1990, Space and Sight: The Perception of Space and Shape in the Con-
genitally Blind Before and After Operation, Peter Heath, trans. The Free Press, Glencoe,
II.
Siegel and Jarvik: 1975, 'Drug Induced Hallucinations in Animal and Man', in R. K. Siegel,
and L. J. West (eds.), Hallucinations: Behaviol, Experience and Theory, John Wiley and
Sons, New York, pp. 81-161.
Sperry, Roger: 1952, 'Neurology and the Mind-Body Problem', American Scientist 40,
291-312.
Turing, Alan M: 1950, 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence', Mind LIX 236,443-60.
Wald, George: [1984], 1990, 'Life and Mind in the Universe', International Journal of
Quantum Chemistry, 11, 1-15. Reprinted in Pickering and Skinner (eds.), From Sentience
to SymboLs', Toronto University Press, Toronto.
Wald, George 1950, 'Eye and Camera', Scientific American.
Zeki, Semir: 1993, A Vision of the Brain, Blackwell Scientific Publications, Oxford.