Sayson vs.

People
“Right to be Heard and to Counsel and Present Evidence;Waiver of such Right”
Facts:
An information for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of a Commercial Document was filed
against petitioner, Ramon F. Sayson. The said accused having come in possession of a blank US
dollar check, with intent to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of America.
Accused wrote certain words in figures in the check. Among others, he forged the signature of
the Asst. Cashier, Manager of the Bank of America, made it appear that the said check was duly
issued by the said bank, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, that it did not; that
thereafter, said accused wrote or affixed; the signature “Norberto Perez” on the back of said
check as indorser: and that by means of false and fraudulent representations he also made it
appear that he is “Atty. Norberto Perez” who is the payee of the said Check.
The appellant has raised the issue of due process, alleging denial of his right to be heard and to
present evidence. Petitioner claims though that he was not waiving such right; on the contrary,
he was vigorously asserting his right to be heard by counsel and to present evidence in his verbal
motion for postponement due to absence of his counsel de parte. He thus assails the denial of
his motion as it in effect deprived him of his day in court.

Issue: Whether or not the right to be heard by counsel and to present evidence is waived.

Ruling:
Yes.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Waiver of Rights of the Accused; Case at bar.—The right to be
heard by himself and counsel is one of the constitutional rights of the accused. But while the
accused has the right to be heard by himself and counsel and to present evidence for his defense
by direct constitutional grant, such right is not exempt from the rule on waiver as long as the
waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial
to a third person with a right recognized by law [Article 6, Civil Code.] There is nothing in the
Constitution nor in any law prohibiting such waiver. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made, as in this case.
Petitioner’s plea that it was incumbent upon the trial judge to appoint a counsel de oficio for him
when he appeared without his counsel, utterly without merit.- The duty of the court to appoint a
counsel de oficio when the accused has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services
of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment [Rule 116, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court.]
This is no longer so where the accused has proceeded with the arraignment and the trial with a
counsel of his choice but when the time for the presentation of the evidence for the defense has
arrived, he appears by himself alone and the absence of his counsel was inexcusable. His failure
to appear with counsel of his choice at the hearing of the case, notwithstanding repeated
postponements and warnings that failure to so appear would be deemed a waiver on the part of
the appellant to present his evidence and the case would be deemed submitted for decision upon
the evidence presented by the prosecution.

A counsel de officio (counsel de oficio) is an attorney appointed by the court to defend an indigent
defendant in a criminal action or to represent a destitute party in a case. The term connotes little
or no other choice than the acceptance by the indigent party of whoever is appointed as his
counsel and unless excused therefrom by the court, the discharge by the designated attorney of
the duty to faithfully and conscientiously render effective legal assistance in favor of such party.
(Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 3)

A counsel de parte is an attorney retained by a party litigant, usually for a fee, to prosecute or
defend his cause in court. The term implies freedom of choice either on the part of the attorney
to decline or accept the employment or on the part of the litigant to continue or terminate the
retainer at any time. (Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 3-4)
People vs. Quitlong

“Right to be informed of the Nature of the Accusation”

Facts:
An information of murder was filed against Ronnie Quitlong and his co-accused. The Victim here
is Jonathan Calpito.
On the night of the incident, Calpito was with his friends Gosil and Adjaro when they walked
home along Harrison Road. They bought fishballs, but when Calpito received the change from his
100 peso bill, he felt that he was shortchanged by the vendor. A jeep driven by Soriano passed
by and was hailed by one of Calpito’s friends, but Calpito was still having an argument so they
ignored boarding. Moments later, the jeepney driver and Adjaro saw eight men rushing towards
Gosil and Calpito from the direction of the taxicab-stand behind his jeep. Four men succeeded in
cornering Calpito. Soriano saw Calpito fall to the ground and thought that the latter had just been
weakened by the men’s punches but, when Calpito was carried on board his jeep, Soriano
realized that Calpito had been stabbed. Police officers were attracted by the commotion along
Harrison Road. One of the policemen drew out his service firearm and told the attackers to
freeze. Seeing that the victim had bloodstains on his left chest, Patacsil advised the victim’s
companions to rush him to the hospital. Soriano, Gosil and Adjaro took Calpito to the Baguio
General Hospital on board Soriano’s jeep. Nevertheless Calpito died on the same night.

One of the accused in the case contends that the trial court has erred in finding conspiracy among
them and argues upon their liability whether or not they are guilty as co-principals.

Issue: WoN the nature and accusation of the offense in the information was valid

Ruling:
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Informations; Conspiracy; Right to be Informed;
Rationale of; Due Process; Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no person
shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all its grave
legal consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been apprised when the charge
is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural requirements.

“When is an information valid? What should the information contain?”

An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state the name of the accused; the
designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time
and date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense has been committed
the information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability
and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his
defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is
that of conspiracy.
Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can
aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of
evidence that may be required to prove it.
People vs. Manalo

“Right to a speedy, impartial and public trial”

“Right to Counsel”
“Convict committing offense while serving sentence”

Facts:
Accused here is Ruben Manalo and he was convicted for murder. Ruben Manalo is a prisoner
serving sentence in the National Bilibid Prison, was at the visiting area of the prison waiting for
transfer to the San Ramon Penal Colony. Alfredo de la Cruz, Jolly Hilario and Reynaldo Cariso, all
convicted prisoners serving their respective sentences, were similarly waiting in the same visiting
area for transfer to the same penal colony. While at the visiting area, appellant engaged another
convict in a betting game called "honkiang,". During this conversation, appellant attacked dela
Cruz with a knife, inflicting two fatal stab wounds on the latter's back. Immediately after the
stabbing, appellant voluntarily surrendered to the prison authorities and handed over the fan
knife (balisong) he used in killing dela Cruz.

“Right to Impartial trial”

Appellant contends that he was deprived of his constitutional right to due process, to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to an impartial trial and to counsel, by reason of
the lower court's partiality, bias and lack of objectivity during the trial. The appellant urges that
since the trial court was not an impartial tribunal, all the proceedings before it should be set aside
as null and void.
The lack of impartiality and of objectivity on the part of the trial judge was clearly shown when
he intervened in the cross-examination of the physician who had carried out the autopsy of the
victims as witnesses for the prosecution.
That the judge had already concluded that appellant was guilty of murder and had resolved to
convict him; that the trial court had functioned "both as judge and prosecutor" asking questions
of witnesses "calculated to establish treachery, premeditation and motive”.

“Right to Counsel”
The appellant also claims that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel. The appellant
admits that he was assisted by counsel de oficio from the time of arraignment and throughout
the trial of the case. However, he asserts that his right to counsel was "but a sham," that by
appointing multiple counsel de oficio the trial court did not effectively provide him with the
assistance and protection required by the Constitution.

Issue/s: 1. WoN the accused was denied of the right to impartial trial by the trial judge
2. WoN he was denied of the right to counsel.

Ruling: No and No.

1st Issue: No.

Trial judge's intervention in the cross-examination does not constitute lack of impartiality and
objectivity.- A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may seek to draw out relevant
and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken
by one or the other party. In the first instance, the court has pointed out, "the extent to which
such examination may be conducted rests in the discretion of the judge, the exercise of which
will not he controlled unless his discretion has clearly been abused to the prejudice of either party
It appears to us that the judge merely sought to clarify to himself whether or not treachery and
evident premeditation had indeed attended the killing of Alfredo dela Cruz, as alleged by the
prosecution. All that the questions propounded by the judge indicates to us is that he was not
particularly skillful in cross-examination and that he found it difficult to operationalize words
which themselves imported conclusions.
The questions raised by the trial judge sought to draw forth answers which did not relate to
whether or not the appellant had in fact killed dela Cruz. The appellant had not only entered an
intelligent and valid plea of guilty; that he had killed his fellow convict dela Cruz was established
by independent and overwhelming evidence.
2nd Issue: No.
Right to counsel; The fact that several different counsels de officio were appointed during the
different hearings is not a denial of the constitutional right to counsel.—The appellant's argument
is novel and interesting but, once more, we are not persuaded that there has here been a
deprivation of a constitutional right which requires annulment of all the proceedings before the
trial court. We do not believe that the fact that a particular counsel de officio did not or could
not consistently appear in all the hearings of the case, is effectively a denial of the right to
counsel, especially so where, as in the instant case, there is no showing that the several appointed
counsel de officio in any way neglected to perform their duties to the appellant and to the trial
court and that the defense had suffered in any substantial sense therefrom.

People vs. Tampus

“Venue and arraignment in prison”

“Can venue of arraignment and trial be in prison?”
“Right to remain silent and when is there is a valid waiver?”
“During trial, who should be the one to appraise accused of his rights? Judge? Prosecution? His
parents?”

Facts:

Accused Jose Tampus and his co- accused were convicted of murder.
The evidence shows that in the morning Celso Saminado a prisoner in the national penitentiary
at Muntinlupa, Rizal went to the toilet to answer a call of nature and to fetch water.

The accused, Tampus and Avila, prisoners in the same penal institution followed Saminado to the
toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Saminado died on that same
morning in the prison hospital.

After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives.

The motive of the killing was revenge. Tampus and Avila, both members of the Oxo gang, avenged
the stabbing of their gang mate by a member of another gang that were hostile to theirs.

Two days after the killing, the prison guard investigated Tampus and Avila and obtained their
extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado
with the assistance of counsel de oficio, they pleaded guilty to the charge of murder.
defendant Tampus, contends that he was denied his right to a public trial because the
arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary.
The other contention of counsel de oficio is that the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of
Article III of the Constitution He points out that before the confession was taken by investigator at that
alleged custodial interrogation, Tampus was not informed as to his rights to have counsel and to remain
silent.
Issues: 1. WoN the venue for arraignment and trial can be in prison and; 2. WoN the accused is denied of
the Right to remain silent
Ruling: Yes. And No.
Can venue of arraignment and trial be in prison?
1st issue: Yes.
Criminal Law; Murder; Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Venue; Venue of arraignment and
hearing of a criminal case at the New Bilibid Prison valid; Reasons.—The New Bilibid Prison
was the venue of the arraignment and hearing, and not the trial court’s session hall at Makati,
Rizal, because this Court in its resolution where Rodolfo Avila was one of the accused-
appellants, refused, for security reasons, to allow him to be brought to Makati. So, this Court
directed that the arraignment and trial in the instant case, where Avila was a co-accused of
Tampus, be held at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The record does not show that the
public was actually excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the accused was
prejudiced by the holding of the trial in the national penitentiary. There is a ruling that the fact
that for the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid Prison without any objection
on the part of the accused is not a ground for reversal of the judgment of conviction (U.S. vs.
Mercado, 4 Phil. 304).

“Right to remain silent and when is there is a valid waiver?”

2nd issue: No.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to remain silent and to counsel; Waiver of right of the
accused to remain silent and to counsel due to spontaneous statement admitting their guilt.—The
two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of the moment without any
urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the right to counsel. That
admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court.
They did not appeal from the judgment of conviction.

“During trial, who should be the one to appraise accused of his rights? Judge? Prosecution? His
parents?”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts; Courts not duty bound to apprise accused of his
constitutional right to remain silent, but such duly devolves upon his counsel to claim the rights
considering the accused’s confession and plea of guilty.—It is further contended that after the
fiscal had presented the prosecution’s evidence and when counsel de oficio called upon Tampus
to testify, the trial court should have advised him of his constitutional right to remain silent. That
contention is not well-taken considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an
extrajudicial confession (U.S. vs. Binayoh, 35 Phil. 23). The court during the trial is not duty-
bound to apprise the accused that he has the right to remain silent. It is his counsel who should
claim that right for him. If he does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand,
when he waives that right.
People vs. Dela Cruz, 124 SCRA 229

“Right to confrontation of witnesses.”

Facts:

An information for murder was filed on against six (6) accused persons including Accused Abundio Dela
Cruz, For killing the victim Pedro Sorreta, a lawyer. One of the Accused went to Sorreta for legal advice
concerning the wife of the other co- accused. He casually asked Atty. Sorreta where he was going that
afternoon and Atty. Sorreta said that he was going to the sea to fish. Sorreta’s family got worried that that
he did not return and searched for him, the search lasted 3 days. Eventually they found the body of Atty.
Sorreta washed ashore and was already decomposing. The motive behind the killing was because the
appellants accused Atty. Sorreta for being a “land grabber”.
Years have passed since the case. The accused-appellant was at the scene of the crime during its
commission and that, contrary to his protestations, he had something to do with the killing. However,
because of unavoidable difficulties or unfortunate lapses on the part of the prosecution, the only evidence
directly the incriminating the appellant — confession of the convicted earlier — happens to be
inadmissible against him.

Issue:
WoN the extrajudicial confession of an accused in implicating another co-accused is valid enough to
convict him.

Ruling: No.

An extrajudicial confession of a co-accused which the lower court used not as circumstantial
evidence of the guilt of appellant, but as principal evidence thereof cannot be used against the
latter unless repeated in court.—If the above confession were merely corroborative of other facts
which tend to establish the guilt of the appellant, then it could be admitted against him. (People v.
Puesca, 87 SCRA 130), It could also be allowed as circumstantial evidence to show the probability
that the appellant actually participated in the commission of the crime. (People v. Lumahang, 94
Phil. 1048). The confession of Eriberto Cenon, however, is not simply corroborative but is the
principal evidence against Abundio de la Cruz. It was not utilized by the lower court merely as
circumstantial evidence.
Same; Same.—Consequently, we apply the rule that extra-judicial statements of an accused
implicating a co-accused cannot be used against the latter unless repeated in open court.
The right to confrontation of witnesses found in Section 19, Article IV, Constitution is violated.