ALDE Book 2013 PDF

ThE LIBERAL PARTIES
IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE :
WEAKNESS AND POTENTIAL
FINAL REPORT
blagovesta cholova - prof. jean-michel de waele

ThE LIBERAL PARTIES
IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE :
WEAKNESS AND POTENTIAL
FINAL REPORT
BLAGOVESTA CHOLOVA - prof. jean-michel de waele

acknowledgements 3
Acknowledgements
This scientific report has been written by Professor Jean-Michel De Waele, Dean of the Political and Social
Sciences Faculty and Blagovesta Cholova, Teaching and Research Assistant at Université Libre de Bruxelles
(ULB, Belgium) with contributions of professors Grigorij Mesežnikov (Slovakia), Sergiu Mişcoiu (Romania),
Anna Pacześniak (Poland), Michel Perottino (Czech Republic) and Antony Todorov (Bulgaria). The research
within the framework of this project was conducted through two research reports per country, which
together constitute the basis for this final report.
While Political Adviser Joakim Frantz of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Party
has been responsible for the overall coordination of the entire project, the research has been done
independently in the five countries, and the views expressed as well as any findings and recommendations
are therefore entirely the responsibility of the respective researcher, not of the ALDE Party nor any of its
member parties in the concerned region.
The following persons have been the driving forces behind the publication:
Authors:
Jean-Michel De Waele, Dean, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
Blagovesta Cholova, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
Project Coordinator:
Joakim Frantz, Political Adviser, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Party
National Coordinators and Main Contributors:

Grigorij Mesežnikov, Insitute for Public Affairs (IVO), Bratislava, Slovakia
Sergiu Mişcoiu, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
Anna Pacześniak, Wroclaw University, Poland
Michel Perottino, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic
Antony Todorov, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
Contributors:
Bulgaria: Irena Todorova, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
Poland: Paulina Bilska-Marek, Wroclaw University, Poland
Mikołaj Cześnik, Warsaw University, Poland
Marzena Cichosz, Wroclaw University, Poland
Romania: Ovidiu Vaida, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
Slovakia: Zora Bútorová, Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), Bratislava, Slovakia
Ol’ga Gyárfášová, Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), Bratislava, Slovakia
Proof reading:
Penny Hopkins, Political consultant, United Kingdom
Possible questions can be directed to the ALDE Party on info@aldeparty.eu.

4 ThE LIBERAL PARTIES IN CENTR AL AND EASTERN EUROPE : WEAKNESS AND POTENTIAL
© 2013 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Party, aisbl
With the support of the European Parliament
All rights reserved
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system or transmitted,
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prior permission of the publisher. Requests for permission should be directed to ALDE Party Political Adviser
Joakim Frantz: jfrantz@aldeparty.eu, info@aldeparty.eu.
ISBN-Number : 9789090275048
Design Trinome.be
Printed in Belgium by Hayez Printers
Publication Coordinator: Enrico Portelli, Communication Adviser, ALDE Party
contents 5
contents
FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Main objectives of the project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Framework of the research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Structure of the final report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
I. The history of liberal parties before 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . 17
Stage I: the period before the World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
stage II: inter-war period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Stage III: communist rule and the dissidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
II. L iberal parties in CEE : electoral results, voters and general overview . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1. Development of Liberal parties after 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Slovakia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Czech Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2. Liberal electorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
The sociological profile of liberal voters in CEE countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
The electoral geography of liberal parties in CEE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Where do the liberal voters come from: vote transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
III. Liberal NGOs, think-tanks and media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Liberal NGOs and think-tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Liberal media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
IV. Perceptions of liberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Economic liberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Civic liberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Cultural liberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Lack of clarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
V. Evaluation of liberal parties and the reasons of their failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

1. Liberal voters and the potential for liberal parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Who are the liberal voters ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
The potential of liberal parties in CEE countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80
2. What strategy for liberal parties: expectations and recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
General strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Specific proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3. Reasons for the failure of liberal parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Political parties in general and their malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Reasons for the failure of liberal parties in general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Reasons for the failure of existing liberal parties in the four CEE countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
1. Political programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2. Leadership and personalities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3. Scandals of corruption and mismanagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4. Party strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4. Reasons for the failure of liberal parties: the insiders’ view . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Ideological perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Party strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Internal organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
General conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Vi. Potential for liberal parties: voters, values, personalities and milieu . . . . . . . . . 103
VII. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Abbreviations of party names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Fore word 7
Foreword
Sir Graham Watson MEP, ALDE Party President
Unemployment, the twin crises of bank
capitalisation and sovereign debt,
eurosclerosis. As this study is published,
Europe seems mired in difficulties. The
economic forecasts have long shown
little hope of rapid recovery, and in several
countries of the European Union (including
my native United Kingdom), there is debate
about future participation in the Union and
its benefits for the people.
Yet less than a decade ago, the great
belief in a re-united Europe - expressed
through the bold expansion of the Union,
to encompass countries in Central and
Eastern Europe previously stranded on the
wrong side of the Iron Curtain - seemed
unchallengeable.
The recent Nobel Peace Prize laureate sometimes seems more akin to a pensioner than a
teenager. Great achievements, but limited potential.
In some ways, the same could perhaps be said about the area-in-focus of this study. In
the crumbling years of communism, liberalism was among the driving forces within
the opposition movements which managed not only to shake, but finally also to free
themselves from the iron grip of the Soviet machinery which oppressed the lives of so
many ordinary citizens, depriving them of their liberty and their dignity.
People like Călin Tăriceanu in Romania, Bronisław Geremek in Poland or Janez Drnovšek in
Slovenia all put their lives at risk for a better future. Their efforts secured a peaceful transition
and then started the long and hard process of state building, eventually culminating in
EU membership. Central and Eastern Europe was fast heading towards Western Liberal
Democracy, or so we thought.
The last few years, however, have caused us to think again. Not only have liberal ideas
expressed through liberalism been declining in the region, but nationalist, populist and
far-right sentiments seem to be on the rise and democratic practices in decline. Look no
further than e.g. Bulgaria or Hungary, and you will find incumbent leaders who are playing
fast and loose with the rule of law, with eager support from extremist elements such as
Ataka and Jobbik.
Europe’s Liberal Democrats are deeply concerned by these tendencies. We have therefore
decided to act. But action without understanding can be dangerous. This scientific research
project is one of the first of its kind, and tries to analyse the weakness and potential of
liberal parties and liberalism in five countries in central and eastern Europe. While there are
natural differences between the countries, the findings of our professors and researchers
point towards some striking similarities – and most importantly, they point clearly towards
the future, if currently somewhat dormant, potential of liberalism in the broader region.
The countries which have made the transition best - Estonia and Poland - were both
guided from the start by Liberal economic principles, under people like Siim Kallas and
Leszek Balcerowicz. But each also had powerful neighbours with powerful economies
to help them. Each had, too, traditions of Liberalism which were lacking in Bulgaria or
Czechoslovakia, for example. They succeeded where Belarus, the Ukraine and others
failed. Of those which joined the EU, the country which suffered most under Communism,
Romania, had no such powerful neighbours, but it had a pre-Communist tradition of
Liberalism which has been crucial to its relative economic success.
While in Poland and in Hungary a section of the Liberals was swayed to the European
People’s Party by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, in other countries Liberals stayed true
to their ideological roots.
Liberalism was never strong in the core of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and indeed
in these countries or the Czech Republic or Slovakia it currently struggles as a minority
conviction of a mainly economic Liberal nature. Yet in other countries - including Moldova,
an EU hopeful - a more citizen-based and social variant of Liberalism can be catalogued.
That Liberalism has survived at all is, in a sense, remarkable. The First World War dealt it a
near fatal blow and the Second almost killed it stone dead. Between the Scylla of fascism
and the Charybdis of Communism the ship of Liberalism almost foundered, with its leading
proponents in the concentration camps or the gulags which few survived.
But Liberal ideas were nurtured in sufficient souls for their comeback to be assured.
In that of people like Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Simone Veil they made a significant
contribution to the wider Union we inhabit today. In Václav Havel and Wolf Biermann
and others behind the Iron Curtain the same ideas were kept alive. A study published
six years ago in Paris called L’Histoire du Libéralisme en Europe shows that our ideas are
Fore word 9
found across our continent. They are not some import from America or even just from
the United Kingdom.
If we are to get Europe back on track as a Liberal project, we will need to resist forces who
are calling for a Europe à la carte where the best parts can be cherry picked and the worst
parts left to others. Instead we must focus on strengthening liberal reforms throughout
Europe, be it in the area of human rights (the right to marry regardless of sexual orientation,
the right to abortion) or economics (the completion of the single market, making it easier
to move around Europe). The European Union works best when its members pull together.
And, dare I say, with liberals at the helm.
This study finds considerable potential for Liberalism in CEE. It may not have been grasped
by the philosophers who inspired the region’s Liberal revolutions, but it is or could be
developed by some of their successors. They will require further help from Liberals in
western Europe, and that is a noble task for the ALDE Party. I hope that this study will serve
as inspiration for the expansion of liberalism throughout Central and Eastern Europe.
Not only so that we might realise Victor Hugo’s vision of a continent where the only
battlefields are those of markets open for business and the human spirit open to ideas. But
so that we might realise Churchill’s vision of a wider patriotism and a common citizenship
for the distraught peoples of this powerful and turbulent continent.
Executive summary 11
Executive summary
The aim of this report is to assess the results of the project “Liberal parties in Central
and Eastern Europe: weakness and potential”, carried out in 2011-2012 in five countries
of Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Romania.
The report presents the results from two stages of the project. The first one is the desk
research on the history of liberal parties in these countries before the end of communism,
their electoral results during the last two decades and the liberal milieu: NGOs and Media
with which they interact in the respective countries. The second part concentrates on the
notion of liberalism in these countries and reasons for the failure of liberal parties, from the
perspective of voters and party members. In the last part the report presents conclusions
and recommendations.
From a historical perspective, the only country in the region where there was a strong and
influential liberal party before communism is Romania. In the other four countries, there is
hardly any tradition of liberalism and often it is related to a “foreign” German or Hungarian
legacy. The lack of historical roots makes the task of newly-created liberal parties more
difficult in the different countries, because they have to build their party identity without
any reference to a past model.
The electoral fate of liberal parties during the two decades after communism shows that
apart from the Romanian PNL, all the other parties are weak and often suffer numerous splits
and overall fragmentation. Nevertheless, in most of the countries there is a liberal electorate
(about 10-15%) which always votes for liberal parties at each election. This electorate has a
similar profile in all these countries (young, urban, well-educated voters). This means that
there is a clear potential for liberal parties in these countries but unfortunately the parties
cannot benefit from it because of their internal divisions and fragmentation.
Another reason for the weakness of liberal parties in these countries is the fact that the
voters do not have a very clear notion of liberalism and they cannot distinguish it clearly
from right-wing conservative ideology. Often the notion of liberalism remains very vague
and concerns general principles such as human rights and freedoms or the free market, but
there are no clear political visions or policy proposals.
Finally, the electorate’s disappointment in the liberal parties is also related to the scandals
of corruption and mismanagement involving existing liberal parties, especially the ones
which have been in government. In the view of voters, liberal parties failed to deliver
their promises and did not achieve any significant results in office, which explains their
lack of legitimacy. This tendency is not confined to liberal parties, but they are particularly
vulnerable because their electoral support is not built on a strong cleavage (contrary to
conservatives and socialists).
In conclusion, in order to overcome these difficulties, we recommend that the liberal
parties in the region should build a strong organisation and reinforce their links with the
liberal milieu (NGOs and other organisations, youth associations) in order to socialise the
voters and to facilitate the recruitment and the renewal of party elites. They should also
elaborate a clear electoral message and identity, based on concrete policies and cleavages
(defence of minorities and homosexuals, individual rights and abortion etc.) which can on
the one hand help to differentiate them from conservative parties and on the other hand
focus more on the everyday problems of voters.
introduc tion 13
introduction
Main objectives of the project

The project “The Liberal parties in Central and Eastern Europe: weakness and potential”
started in 2011 in five countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Poland, Romania and Slovakia. It had several objectives, related to the current development
of liberal parties in this region and their failure to consolidate stable electoral support
over time. The study takes into account the post-communist period starting with the first
(semi-)free elections after 1989 and continuing until 2012. This project focuses mostly on
parties that have parliamentary representation, but also takes into account small (marginal)
political actors in some countries. The project has several main objectives:
1) Firstly, the project aims at studying the development of liberal parties in Central and
Eastern Europe (members of ELDR (now ALDE Party)) in a comparative framework. This
scope includes not only the present members of the European liberal party family,
but also parties which used to belong to it but have gradually disappeared from the
political scene during the last two decades.
2) Secondly, the project focuses on the causes and the reasons for the success of some
liberal parties in the region (PNL in Romania) and the failure (in terms of electoral
support) of the rest. The basic idea behind this research is to grasp the specific features
of development of these parties and to compare the possible explanations for their
uneven success. We take into account both external factors (related to the electorate
and the overall political context) and internal factors (related to party management and
leadership, the rivalries and party organisation).
3) Thirdly, the project offers an assessment of the liberal milieu in the five countries:
associations, NGOs, liberal media and famous personalities with a liberal background,
in order to evaluate the potential of the liberal movement in the respective countries
(both existing and future parties and movements). These features allow us to grasp the
scope of the influence and the popularity of liberal circles within these societies, and
to seek possible solutions for the reinforcement of these networks and their direct links
with political parties.
4) Fourthly, the project assesses the level of liberal values in all the countries included and
will explain the weakness and the potential of liberal parties related to those values. The
research offers a special insight into the paradoxes inherent in the notion of liberalism
and its specific features in this geographical region. The purpose of analysing liberal
values is to find the most relevant topics and issues linked to liberalism, and to see if
liberal parties may use them in a more suitable manner. This evaluation also gives us an
idea of the profile of potential voters and their ideological and value orientations.
5) Fifthly, the objective of the project is to identify (with both in-depth interviews and
focus groups) the current problems inside existing liberal parties (from a member’s
perspective), and their image in the eyes of the voters. This evaluation includes both
an ideological dimension (is liberalism well represented by the existing parties) and the
organisational/political dimension (the distribution of power inside the party, the role
of the leader, the coalition potential) and allows us to draw valuable conclusions on the
weaknesses of these political actors.
6) Finally, this study formulates recommendations for the liberal parties on a national level
and will propose an overall strategy for the Central and Eastern European region on
the European level, based on the results and the conclusions of this report, taking into
consideration each aspect of the study.
Framework of the research

In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, the project included three main
stages: desk research, field research and seminars in all the respective countries. Each of
these stages ended with a detailed report on each country case and a final report on the
recommendations for the strategy for liberal parties in a given country. The desk research
included a short synthesis of the history of liberal parties before 1989 and during the last
two decades (using mainly secondary sources), an identification of the liberal milieu in
every country (who are the main actors and the main organisations in the network of liberal
parties) and a description of liberal media and their audience, as well as a short account of
the electorate of liberal parties.
The second stage of the project included fieldwork based on in-depth interviews and focus
groups with party members and liberal voters. Three focus groups and about 30 interviews
were conducted in each country, targeting different peer groups and profiles. The aim
of this stage was to grasp the individual perception of voters and party members of the
liberal ideology as such (identifying the main cleavages and salient issues for both) and to
understand the weaknesses of existing liberal parties in terms of organisation and strategy
(from the point of view of both voters and party members). This stage of the research
allowed us to revise and complete the previous findings with a deeper and more accurate
perception of the main problems in order to propose suitable and relevant solutions.
Final report 15
The seminars were aimed at attracting public attention on the issues of liberalism and specific
topics, and to allow discussion between scholars, party members and a larger audience on
concrete problems. After each stage, a country report presented the main findings.
As mentioned above, the project covered mainly parties with a clear liberal profile which
had been members of the European liberal party family during the last two decades
since 1989, and laid special emphasis on current parties in the stage of field research.
Other parties and political formations were mentioned only if they were relevant to the
present study (splinter parties etc). The project analyses mostly parties which succeeded in
entering the national parliament at least once during the whole period and therefore can
be considered as relevant.
Structure of the final report

The report gathers the main findings from all the country cases and presents a synthesis of
the results as well as recommendations for the liberal parties. It is divided into seven sections :
I. The history of liberal parties before the Second World War and the dissident
movements during communism;
II. Liberal parties in CEE 1 : electoral results, voters and general overview;
III. Liberal NGOs, think tanks and media;
IV. Perception of liberalism (voters and party members);
V. Evaluation of liberal parties and the reasons for their failure (the point of view of
the voters and the party members);
VI. Potential for liberal parties : potential voters and liberal milieu;
VII. Recommendations.
The first three sections present the results from the desk research and some
recommendations, the next two address the results of the field research in each country.
The final section gathers all the general recommendations for parties at both national and
European level.
1 CEE : Central and Eastern Europe

CHAPTER I
The history of
liberal parties
before 1989 in Central
and Eastern Europe
CHAPTER I
The history of liberal parties before 1989 in Central
and Eastern Europe
The history of liberal parties in Central and Eastern Europe before the Second World
War depends in the first place on national context and there is no clear-cut pattern of
development throughout the region. In some countries such as Romania and Bulgaria
there were strong liberal parties in the pre-communist period and liberalism could be
considered as a mainstream movement; in other countries, like Poland and Czechoslovakia,
these movements were much weaker and did not manage to play an autonomous role on
the political scene. Based on the political context and the pattern of development, we can
divide the period into two main stages: the pre-World War I period, which concerns mostly
the parties in Bulgaria and Romania, and also partly in the Czech Republic, and post-World
War I which is common for all the countries.
Stage I : the period before World War I

This is the initial stage of the creation of independent political parties in the countries of
the region. Two of those countries - Bulgaria and Romania - gained political independence
from the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the 19th century and began a process of
building political structures, using Western examples as a model. From the beginning of
their history as sovereign countries, two main groups dominated the political space: liberals
and conservatives (as in many other Western countries during that period). Liberal parties
were created by the “young” generation of political leaders, who wanted to introduce
political and civic freedoms opposed to the conservative bourgeoisie who defended a
more restrictive model. In Bulgaria and Romania, liberalism symbolised a fight for civil rights
for larger groups of citizens and was often combined with nationalistic elements.
In Czech lands, the profile of the liberal movement was rather similar - the younger
generation was fighting for more autonomy (also connected to patriotism or nationalism),
but these parties were less successful. In the Slovak territory during the same period these
movements were even less popular, partly due to the more conservative and religious
population, living mainly in villages and lacking urban culture. In all cases, the main ideals
of liberalism were copied from the Western models and often proved to be ill-adapted to
local realities, mainly because there was no strong bourgeoisie or aristocracy with whom
they could fight to reverse the status quo. Furthermore, in both the Czech and Slovak parts
CHAPTER I : The history of liberal parties before 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe 19
liberal parties were mainly represented by the German and Hungarian ethnic groups and
intellectuals, and were perceived as “foreign” by the local population. Due to the lack of
political independence and sovereignty, these parties were operating within the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and were addressing a mixed population, mostly the urban bourgeoisie,
which was of foreign origin.
In the other two cases, Bulgaria and Romania, liberal parties were much more successful,
partly because they were created after these countries’ independence and were not
perceived as “foreign”. In these two countries, liberal parties dominated the political
landscape and were the mainstream movements during the first stage. Apart from their
success, these parties also shared other common characteristics in both countries: once in
power they all suffered a number of splits and the liberal family became more fragmented
over time (especially in Bulgaria). In these circumstances some parties managed to resist
these centripetal tendencies and keep their consolidated core, like the Romanian PNL,
while others failed to overcome internal divisions and gradually lost their electorate to their
political rivals.
One of the possible reasons for this inherent internal weakness is the fact that these parties
were mainly leader parties (compared to the more “partisan” socialist movements) and
the transmission of power constantly faced the problem of overcoming the “personal”
influence in both cases. In Romania the liberals were represented by one family only (the
Bratianu family) throughout the whole period (with a short period of transition). In Bulgaria,
many of the liberal parties from that period were known by the name of their leader
(Kostovisti, Tonchevisti) and not by their ideological platform.
Another possible reason for the weakness of these parties after the First World War is that
many of them had been responsible for the involvement of their countries in the war. This
war represented heavy losses, especially in Bulgaria, which further discredited the liberal
parties, and they were obliged to opt for larger coalitions (including conservatives and
other centrist formations) during the post-war period. The situation was made even harder
by the series of authoritarian coups (or personal regimes of monarchs) during that period.
To conclude on the first period, we might say that the liberal movement was either quite
marginal (in the countries of Central Europe it was associated mostly with foreign rule
(Germans or Hungarians) or stronger but in some cases rather fragmented. The only strong
liberal tradition existed in Romania, even though this was a very personalised party, mostly
ruled by one family.
Stage II: inter-war period

During the inter-war period, liberal parties lost their initial influence because of the
consequences of the war (in Bulgaria and Romania), but also because new political actors
were emerging on the scene after the introduction of universal suffrage: the socialist,
social-democrat and the agrarian parties, which were not elite parties, but much more
“class-based” parties, representing the workers (or peasants) who were much more
numerous, and had a real grass-roots base outside the parliament.
In the newly-created countries of Central Europe (mainly Czechoslovakia and Poland),
liberal parties did not succeed in gaining considerable support, partly because they were
perceived as “foreign” by the local population, and also because after the war in these
countries nationalism and conservatism were much more popular, given the new quest
for national identity, and the traditional values of the rural areas where Catholicism was
stronger and liberal values could not find fertile ground. This feature is common to all liberal
parties during this period, which were mainly urban parties grounded in the bourgeois
milieu and smallholders.
Nevertheless, in some cases, like the Czech nationalist parties which were prominent
during this inter-war period, we can see a mixture of nationalist-conservative and liberal
values, especially if we turn to the political ideas of two of the most famous politicians
of those times: Masaryk and Benes. We cannot consider them as entirely liberal, but
this combination of liberal-conservative values is important in order to understand the
development of right-wing politics in the Czech lands after the end of communism.
This historical tradition proved to be very important in terms of reference for the post-
communist parties, and served as a basis for their legitimacy. We should point out that
even though in the Czech lands liberalism had some strong support, this was not true for
the Slovak part of the state, where conservatism and Catholicism were much stronger and
where Czech liberal ideas were not well received.
Another feature common to most of the countries in this period was the rise of authoritarian
regimes (with the exception of Czechoslovakia before 1938). In Poland, Romania and
Bulgaria there were undemocratic regimes during this period; in the latter two countries
the king established a personal regime and appointed the governing parties himself, after
which elections were organised. In this context, liberal parties were not able to compete
in a free election campaign and therefore they were extremely weak (as were all the other
parties in these countries). The only country resisting these authoritarian tendencies was
Czechoslovakia.
In conclusion, we can say that liberal parties in these countries were considerably weakened
during the inter-war period, mainly due to the authoritarian rule which was installed in most
of them and also because of the perception of liberalism as a distant and “urban” ideology,
which could not fit with the traditional conservative values of most of the population. As
regards Romania and Bulgaria, liberal parties were also weakened because of the role they
had played during the First World War, and they also lost ground after the introduction of
universal suffrage, which increased the electoral score of left-wing parties. These problems
would impede the reconstruction of liberal parties after the Second World War and would
lead to their inevitable decline after the introduction of communist regimes.
Stage III : communist rule and the dissidents

During communism liberal-minded personalities often joined the dissident movement
and expressed their criticism through organised demonstrations or strikes inside the
communist state. Another group, mainly those who had been active before and during
World War Two, went into exile in Western Europe and remained active, supporting the
dissident movement. These tendencies were much more significant in Central Europe, in
countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, than in South-Eastern Europe, where the first
real protest movements appeared shortly before 1989.
In both Poland and Czechoslovakia the dissident movements started from basic workers’
protests against increased prices (Poland) or a willingness to break away from authoritarian
practices and put democratic principles into practice (Czechoslovakia). Even though some
of their slogans defended liberal ideas, we cannot consider them as truly liberal, because
their core ideas related more to socialism than to liberalism. However, these groups
contributed to a certain awareness concerning liberal ideas in these countries, even if the
accent was elsewhere, on human and social rights.
The other part of the dissident movement (in exile) was also contributing to the spread of
liberal ideas, mainly through Radio Free Europe, where many of them could express their
opinions and ideas and criticise the communist regime. This was an important aspect,
because the dissidents in exile were known by the national public and this contributed to
their future popularity after the end of the communist regime.
Even if these movements were a significant element in the future re-establishment of
liberal parties, their contribution remains rather marginal. The most important feature
related to these political groups is the fact that after 1989, liberal ideas were already
spreading in the public space and many of the political actors emerging during that
period were actively participating in those movements. On the one hand, this “dissident
past” offered them more legitimacy, but on the other hand it weakened the newly-created
liberal parties for two reasons. The first one was that the dissident movements were quite
heterogeneous in terms of ideological views and gathered together mostly to fight a
common communist foe. After the first free elections, these political actors started fighting
each other and split into several smaller parties and movements (the best example of such
a split being the Solidarity movement in Poland). The second aspect weakening the new
parties was the fact that many of the dissident leaders shared a common distrust of political
parties as organisations. The unwillingness of Václav Havel or Lech Wałęsa to create a stable
and strong political party, defending the interests of a specific group of citizens, made their
parties weaker and worsened the internal conflicts even further.
We can say that in general, dissident movements offered some legitimacy to the new
parties (along with the revival of the pre-communist and some historical parties), but also
made their task more difficult in terms of consolidation and electoral performance. In the
countries where such movements did not exist before 1989 (Romania and Bulgaria), only
tradition and some past legacies could legitimise liberal parties and ideas, but on the other
hand there were no legacies in terms of cleavage and clashes inside the new parties.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we can say that the liberal tradition in the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe had little impact on their success after 1989 and could not offer a solid base for
legitimising the new parties. In most of these countries the liberal tradition was quite weak
(or nonexistent) before the Second World War. In South-Eastern Europe, where the tradition
was rather stronger, there was no direct link to the past, except for the symbolic legacy. This
feature proved to be crucial in the Romanian case, where the PNL would not only build
upon this legacy, but also gather some important figures who were active prior to the
communist regime and who could more easily transmit the legacy.
As underlined above, these personalities, and especially the ones coming from the
dissident movement, played an active role in the creation of the new liberal parties, but on
the other hand provoked some internal disputes and controversies due to their individual
preferences and visions of liberalism, as well as their resentment towards political parties as
such. In many ways, this constituted a strength as well as a weakness, especially in the first
years of post-communist politics, when these parties were fighting against well-organised
communist parties.
The second weakness of liberalism in this initial period was that it was a vague and
undefined ideology without any clear principles or proposals beyond the anti-communist
discourse. There was no clear cleavage dividing liberals from conservatives or other
post-communists during those years, which proved to be crucial for their survival on the
political scene. The only exception to this was Romania, where liberalism had a much
stronger tradition than in the other countries, and where this tradition could be revived and
maintained beyond the organisational and ideological difficulties.
In conclusion, we may say that even though the liberal tradition was weak and insufficient
in most of these countries, there was a clear potential for the emergence of new liberal
parties after 1989, because in the beginning of the transition liberal values were widespread
and accepted by the majority of the populations. This was not (only) part of a revival of
historical parties and movements but more a process of “modernisation” of politics, where
liberal values symbolised the return to Europe and the Western way of life. The legacies
proved to be important but also had a negative impact on the stabilisation and future
institutionalisation of young liberal parties.
CHAPTER II
Liberal parties in CEE :

electoral results, voters
and general overview
CHAPTER II
Liberal parties in CEE 1 : electoral results, voters and
general overview
After the historical overview, we would like to start this second section with an overview
of the results of liberal parties during the post-communist period in all the five countries
included in this study. The analysis of the electoral results and the fate of liberal parties in
each of the five countries will be followed by some conclusions at the end of this section.
1. Development of Liberal parties after 1989

Romania
Romania remains the only country with a strong and consolidated liberal party, which
was created at the beginning of the 90s and stayed strong and relevant throughout the
whole period. This party is the Romanian National Liberal Party: PNL. At the beginning of
the transition, the most important party in Romania was the National Salvation Front (NSF),
created by some members of the communist party and using organisational resources and
media. This party won 70% in the first elections and largely dominated the political space.
In contrast, the opposition was organised in several parties, one of which was the National
Liberal Party (PNL), gathered around some former communist party members but also
some historical figures like Radu Campeanu, who had been active in the liberal party as a
student before 1947. In the presidential elections of 1990, Mr Campeanu came second with
10%, and after the parliamentary elections the PNL established itself as the third party in
Romania, after the NSF and the Hungarian party, with 7% of votes.
Two years later, the opposition parties gathered together and created the Romanian
Democratic Convention (CDR), with the main goal of defeating the NSF. The liberal party
PNL belonged to this coalition, even though it had joined the NSF in the provisional
government for a short while, which enabled it to obtain some ministerial seats. The local
elections that followed were still won by the NSF, but the CDR won the major cities, and
the result indicated the possibility of coming into office in subsequent elections. The
relationship between the PNL and the CDR was ambiguous, because the liberals appointed
their own candidate to the Presidential elections of 1992 (ex-king Michael of Romania, who
1 CEE : Central and Eastern Europe

CHAPTER II : Liberal parties in CEE : electoral results, voters and general overview 27
refused the offer), which proved to be a mistake. In the parliamentary elections that year
the PNL suffered a huge defeat and was unable to enter parliament.
This period was also characterised by a number of splits from the PNL. Two new parties
were created: the National Liberal Party - Young Wing and the New Liberal Party. They both
achieved poor results. The National Liberal Party - Young Wing eventually re-merged with
the PNL in 2001.
Other liberal actors had also come to the fore of the political scene during this period,
including the Civic Alliance Party (PAC), created as a political wing of one of the important
NGOs in Romania in this period. Another fraction of the PNL, which was against the official
policy of the party and split in order to stay in the CDR coalition, was the PNL-CD. They
stayed within the CDR and later merged with the Young Liberals to create the “Liberal Party
- ’93” (PL93). These two parties - PAC and PL93 - stayed within the CDR until 1995, when
they left due to internal disputes. The efforts of the PNL to join these parties and present
common lists for the elections of 1996 failed. Nevertheless, the PNL returned to Parliament
in these elections and started a process of unification of liberal parties and movements. PAC
and PL93 failed to challenge the PNL, and PAC eventually merged with it in 1998.
The next decade of Romanian politics of the centre-right was marked by a division between
the liberal PNL and the Democratic Party (PD), created by mergers of some conservative
and smaller liberal fractions. The PNL and PD initially stood in a coalition (Justice and Truth
NLP-DP) in the elections of 2004 and won a landslide victory, but the growing conflict
between Basescu and the leadership of the PNL led to a confrontation, which marked
the second part of the decade after 2004. The PD (now PDL) made an alliance with the
social-democrats (PSD) after the 2009 elections, but the PSD soon left the coalition. The
PNL seized the opportunity and joined forces with the social-democrats against Basescu,
winning the last parliamentary elections.
As we can see from this short overview (Graph II.1, Romania), the PNL managed to
overcome the initial period of uncertainty and fragmentation and to attract most of the
small liberal-minded parties during the second decade. Their electoral support grew
steadily and they became the third largest party in Romania after the conservatives and
the social-democrats. After a series of coalitions with both the conservatives and the
social-democrats, the PNL established itself as an important factor in terms of coalition-
building, able to take opportunities when needed and use its coalition-building potential.
Graph II.1, Romania
2012
2007 PDL
2001
1998
1997
1995
PL 93 CDR
PNL-CD CDR Young liberals

1993
PAC CDR PD
New liberal party

1992
National liberal party young wing CDR
1990
PNL
YEAR
Table II.1, Romania
1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012

% seats % seats % seats % seats % seats % seats % seats
31,5 58,6
PNL 6,7 29 2,6 - CDR (27) 7,2 30 64 18,6 65 (100)
(+DP) Coal.
CDR 20 82 30,4 122 5,0 -
PL93 CDR (14) 1,6
In spite of the fragmentation of the first period, the party managed to stabilise and to keep
its loyal electorate, increasing it further through mergers with smaller parties (Table II.1,
Romania). The PNL remains the best example of a successful liberal party in the region,
which is due mostly to its ability to overcome internal crises and electoral failure, in contrast
to other liberal actors in other countries.
Slovakia
Liberal movements in Slovakia suffered a much greater fragmentation, compared to the
situation in Romania. As in other countries in the region, the initially broad civic movement
Public Against Violence (VPN) gained 29.35% of the vote and 48 seats in parliament (out
of 150) in the 1990 elections, forming a coalition government together with the Christian
Democratic Movement (KDH) and centre-right Democratic Party (DS). As elsewhere, this
broad coalition was too heterogeneous to survive and the conflict between some of the
hard-line nationalists (and also ex-party members as in Romania) led to a split, and the
leader of that group, Mečiar (who was also prime minister for a short period, but then
recalled by Parliament) established a new political party – Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia (HZDS). The split destabilised the VPN which transformed itself into the Civic
Democratic Union (ODU).
In the 1992 elections, none of these liberally-inclined parties managed to pass the electoral
threshold and obtain a seat in Parliament. Mečiar’s HZDS formed a government with the
radical-nationalist SNS and soon some of the moderate politicians from HZDS quit the
government, provoking splits. These politicians created the Alliance of Democrats of the
Slovak Republic (ADSR).
In 1994, another group of politicians left the HZDS and subsequently created a new
formation – Alternative of Political Realism (APR). Shortly afterwards, the two opposition
parties ADSR and APR merged and formed one party – Democratic Union (DU).
In the 1994 elections DU gained 8.57% of the vote and remained one of the main opposition
parties, together with the centre-right parties such as the Christian-Democratic Movement
(KDH) and the Hungarian Coalition (MK). Their main objective during this period was
to overthrow the HZDS government and Mečiar, and to offer a democratic alternative.
In 1997, these parties - DU, KDH and the civic-conservative DS as well as the left Social
Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS) and the environmentalist, ecological Green Party (SZ)
- created the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK). Shortly after the coalition was formed, the
Mečiar government passed a law banning electoral coalitions, and the SDK changed its
constitution to become a unified party. After the defeat of HZDS in 1998, SDK came into
office and formed a coalition government with the Party of the Democratic Left (SDĽ), the
Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK) and the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP).
Relations inside the SDK, which was itself a coalition of different parties, became more
difficult while in office. Inside the SDK, a group of political figures opted for the creation of
a union – SDKU - uniting Christian, conservative and liberal forces. Some of the members
of the DU did not accept this idea and split from the SDK to create the Liberal Democratic
Union (LDU), which turned out to be unsuccessful. The other members of the DU accepted
a merger with one wing of KDH and after this, the whole DU merged with SDKU.
Following this process, there was space on the political scene for a liberal formation, and
the Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) was founded in May 2001 by Pavol Rusko, a media
magnate who owned one of the most popular TV channels.
In the parliamentary elections of 2002 ANO obtained 8.01 % of the vote and 15 seats in
parliament and the SDKÚ 15.1 % of the vote and 28 seats. A new government was formed
uniting ANO, SDKÚ, KDH and the Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK). During this legislature,
2002-2006, some other small liberal-oriented parties were created: the Free Forum (SF) as
a result of a split from the SDKU, and Nádej [Hope], founded by some former members of
ANO. These two parties scored poorly in the 2006 elections, which were a catastrophe for
all the liberal parties. None of them managed to enter Parliament.
This failure is partly due to the emergence of a new political actor: the party Smer, founded
by Robert Fico, former vice-chairman of the post-communist Party of the Democratic Left
(SDĽ), which built its success mainly on a populist message. This party came into office and
introduced state regulations and other measures which were unacceptable to right-wing
parties. During this legislature, a new party emerged on the political scene: Freedom and
Solidarity (SaS), founded in February 2009 by the group of young politicians surrounding
libertarian economist Richard Sulik.
In the 2010 elections SaS gained 12.14% of the vote and 22 seats in parliament. It joined
the governing coalition of right-wing parties, uniting SDKÚ-DS, KDH and Most-Híd
(Bridge). In October 2011, however, this government lost a confidence vote in parliament
about the ratification of the EFSF. The main reason for this failure was the opposition of
SaS to this issue.
Table II.2, Slovakia
1990 1992 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010

VPN/
29,3 48
MNI
ODU 4,0 -
MOD 2,3 -
DU 8,6 15
MK 10,2 17
SMK 9,1 14 11,6 20 11,7 20 4,3 -
SDK 26,3 42
ANO 8,0 15 1,4 -
SF 3,5 -
SaS 12,1 22
Summarising the development of liberal parties in the Slovak context, we can see that
there has always been a liberal party, gaining between 10-15 % of the vote throughout this
period (Table II.2, Slovakia). The main reason for the weakness of these parties was their
internal fragmentation and splits which led to the general strategy of coalition-building by
the marginalised political actors. In contrast to the situation in Romania, there has been no
continuity between the emerging liberal parties, but they capture a similar electorate and
prove that in Slovakia the soil is fertile for the creation of a liberal formation (Graph II.2,
Slovakia). The fragmentation of the political space (especially right-wing) can also be seen
in other countries of the region, the main example being Bulgaria (which also suffers from
a similar “wave” of populism).
Graph II.2, Slovakia
2009
SAS
2006
Nadej (hope)
SF
2002
2001 ANO
SDKU LDU
1998 SDK
1997
KDH DS SDSS SZ
DU
1994 APR
1993
1992
ADSR
ODU MOS
HZDS
1990
VPN MNI
YEAR
Czech Republic
The Czech Republic displays a constant weakness of liberal movements and parties, partly
because they have to face a strong and consolidated liberal-conservative competitor:
the ODS. The first liberal movements in this country were created during the communist
regime in dissident circles, specifically a movement called Democratic Initiative (created
1989). This movement re-organised itself as a political party during the 1990s and called
itself the Liberal Democratic Party (LDS). It joined the movement Civic Forum (OF), which,
as in other countries in the region, was an umbrella organisation embracing most of
non-communist parties and movements. Within the OF there were mainly two groups,
advocating two different visions of politics. The first was around the dissident leader V.
Havel, which remained reluctant as regards the creation of a unified political party and
critical towards parties in general. The other group, around V. Klaus, opted for a stronger
and more unified organisation.
After a poor result in the 1990 elections, the Klaus group split and created the Civic
Democratic Party (ODS), while some of the LDS members joined the newly-created ODA.
The rest of the liberally-inclined OF members created the Liberal club within the OF and
afterwards the Civic Movement (OH), which was supposed to be a civic movement and
not a “classical” party. Thus the LDS disintegrated and left the political scene.
The OH was unable to reach the electoral threshold in the 1992 elections and transformed
itself into the Party of Free Democrats (SD) in 1993. After several years of independent
existence this party finally merged in 1996 with the Liberal National Socialist Party and
created the Free Democrats-Liberal National Socialist Party. The SD took control of this
new organisation and opted for a social-liberal profile. These transformations proved to
be unsuccessful, as several splits led to the creation of the Party for an Open Society (SOS)
in 1998. This party still supports the Greens in parliament but has little electoral impact.
The other group of liberals leaving the OF went to the ODA, a political movement
dating back to 1978, when one of its future key personalities, Daniel Kroupa, launched
a philosophy seminar. After 1989, this party was created by some members of the OF,
gathering both liberal and conservative-minded members. After the elections of 1992, the
ODA formed a coalition with ODS, KDU-CSL and KDS.
After the internal crisis of ODS in 1997 (during the so-called “Sarajevo attentat”), a new
liberal party emerged on the political scene: the Union of Freedom (US). This party was
founded notably by former leading ODS members Jan Ruml and Ivan Pilip. After obtaining
poor results in the 1998 elections, the US decided to join the Coalition of Four (K4) a
coalition of US, ODA, KDU- ČSL and a small right-wing party, the Democratic Union (DeU).
In 2001 the US amalgamated with it and became the US-DEU. All these efforts were made
essentially in order to overthrow ODS, which had become very strong and influential.
Nevertheless, this coalition collapsed in 2002, when ODA withdrew from it. Facing
inevitable defeat, some members of US-DEU finally returned to ODS.
As regards ODA, after the electoral failure, some of its members joined the Way of Change
(Cesta změny, CZ). This party had internal problems from the outset and faced poor results
in the elections of 2002. In the European elections in 2004 CZ formed a coalition with the
US and ODA, called the Union of Liberal Democrats and achieved just 1.7%.
Other members of ODA created the Liberal and Reformist Party (LiRa) after the defeat
in 2002. This party also achieved poor results and in the 2004 European elections
participated in a coalition with the Union of Liberal Democrats. In 2008 LiRa changed its
name to Liberalove.cz (Liberals.cz). In 2010 the party ran for election only in the region of
Central Bohemia with extremely poor results.
Another attempt to create a liberal party was the Liberal Social Union (LSU), a union of
several parties, including the Greens, the Liberal National Socialist Party and two other
small parties in 1992. This union proved weak and only the Greens managed to survive
and return to the political scene during the 2000s.
The last party we can in some way classify as “liberal” is the party Public Affairs (VV),
founded in 2001. The party remained marginal and did not achieve sufficient votes to pass
the threshold until the elections of 2010. These elections came as a breakthrough and
the party, benefiting from the popularity of its leader Radek John (a former investigative
journalist, and the author of the screenplays of some popular films), obtained 10% of
the vote. After the elections, VV accepted the proposal of ODS to form a coalition with
them and the newly-emerged conservative party TOP 09. Soon after coming to office
allegations of corruption and clientelism weakened the position of the party and its future
remains uncertain.
In conclusion, we can see that liberal parties in the Czech Republic were faced with
the difficult task of competing with the ever-stronger ODS for a liberal-conservative
electorate, and often they were unable to define a clear-cut cleavage which could help
them to distinguish themselves from ODS. All the parties of liberal and centrist orientation
during this period suffered both from the lack of a stable electoral base and internal
splits and quarrels, especially when they were in office (Graph II.3, Czech Republic).
The inherent weakness of Czech liberalism is precisely this lack of clear political
Graph II.3, Czech Republic
2012
LIDEM
2008
Liberals.cz
2007
LiRa
2002
2001
CZ
VV US-DEU
1998
SOS
1997 US
DeU
1996 Free Democrats Liberal National Socialist Party
1993 SD Liberal National Socialist Party
OH
1992
LSU
ODA
Havel Klaus ODS
OF
1990
LDS
YEAR
identity able to attract loyal voters and guarantee a stable place in the political system.
The development of liberal parties after 1989 in this country also shows that there is a
clear potential for a centrist-liberal party, but the structural weakness of their position
condemns them to cooperate with ODS and/or eventually be defeated by their right-
wing rivals (Table II.3, Czech Republic).
Table II.3, Czech Republic
1990 1992 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010

OH (OF) 49,5 127 4,6 -
ODA 5,9 14 6,4 13 0,5 -
LSU 6,5 16
DEU 2,8 - 1,5 -
CSNS
2,7 - LSU 2,1 - 0,3 0,8 - 0
(SD-LSNS)
SZ 4,1 - LSU 1,1 - 2,4 - 6,3 6 2,4 -
Nadeje 0,6 -
CZ 0,3 -
US-DEU 8,6 19 14,3* 8** 0,3 -
SNK-ED 2,1 -
LiRa 0 - 0
CSNS-2005 0 - 0
VV 10,9 24
*In coalition K4 with KDU-CSL
** US-DEU gained 8 seats, two independent candidates elected as KDU-CSL joined the US-DEU club.
Poland
In Poland, the liberal movement followed the pattern seen in other post-communist
countries in the region. At the start of the 1990s most anti-communist formations gathered
around the “Solidarność” (Solidarity) organisation, which was primarily a trade union, but
also a political actor. Inside this union there were two main liberal parties: the Liberal-
Democratic Congress (KLD) and the Democratic Union (UD). Soon after the first free
elections, the movements and parties inside Solidarity started to split, due mainly to
internal conflicts but also to the fact that they were quite heterogeneous both in terms of
ideological orientation and their perception of the role of the party. Just as in the Czech
Republic, one part of the dissident movement and its representatives would not accept the
classical model of a political party as the best model of organisation, and opted for a broad
civic movement, which turned out to be a mistake in the following elections.
The two liberal actors KLD and UD left Solidarity in 1990 and ran in the 1993 election as
independent parties. After obtaining poor results, the two parties eventually united in 1994
to create the Union of Freedom (UW). This new political formation was heterogeneous both
in terms of programme and ideology, and in 1997 the Christian-Democratic conservative
wing left the party. Before the next elections of 2001, KLD also left UW and became one
of the founders of the Civic Platform party (PO). UW was considerably weakened by these
splits and tried to unite some centre-left and right-wing parties, but achieved little success.
Its last high point was in the European elections of 2004, when the party obtained 4 seats
in the European Parliament. In order to solve the crisis, UW gradually turned to a more
left-wing ideology, not least because the centre-right representatives in the party refused
to collaborate with leftist politicians. In the end, only the left-wing former members of the
Union of a Democratic Left (SLD) joined UW and the party was renamed as Demokraci.pl
(PD). This new strategy did not succeed, and PD had to search for other solutions after it
failed to achieve any seats in the 2005 elections.
Before the local elections of 2006, several left-wing parties, facing decline, decided to form
a coalition under the name of Left and Democrats (LiD), which brought together SLD,
Social Democracy of Poland (SDPL) and the Labour Union (UP). PD decided to join this
coalition and present common lists. In the 2007 elections this coalition of left-wing parties
managed to enter parliament but none of the seats went to PD.
The other liberal wing, KLD, which participated in the creating of Civic Platform (PO), turned
out to be much more successful. Gradually PO became the second biggest party in Poland
and was the main opposition party in the 2001 and 2005 elections. After the early elections
of 2007, PO came into office and confirmed its position in the 2011 elections, forming a
government with the agrarian party PSL.
Even though the party was moderately successful this did not prevent internal conflicts
and splits. One of the most popular personalities in PO, Janusz Palikot, left the party in
2010 and formed his own party, Palikot’s Movement (RP), benefitting mostly from his own
popularity as a politician with an unusual style and criticising some of the government’s
Table II.4, Poland
1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007 2011

KLD 7,5 37 4,0 -
PD (UW) - - - - 13,4 60 3,1 - 2,5 - LiD LiD
PO 12,7 65 24,1 133 41,5 209 39,2 207
RP 10,0 40
LiD
13,2 53
(coalition)
policies. In the 2011 elections RP obtained the surprisingly high result of more than 10%
(Table II.4, Poland).
This new party had a much clearer liberal orientation than PO, which could be considered
as a liberal-conservative party. RP could be viewed as a revival of the liberal tradition after
the failure of UD/UW/PO, even though the organisational structure of the party and the fact
that it relies mainly on the popularity of its leader makes it more vulnerable, and its political
future is still uncertain.
As we can see from this short overview of liberal parties in Poland, there has always been
a party defending the liberal platform in this country, but they have never managed to
stabilise or to institutionalise their organisations (Graph II.4, Poland). This weakness is
partly due to internal fights and splits, provoked on the one hand by politicians and on the
other by the ideological heterogeneity and lack of clear stance of these parties. We should
underline that, unlike the Czech Republic, Romania or even Slovakia, Poland is unique
because the level of attachment to religious and other conservative values is much higher
than elsewhere. The Catholic Church has also played an important role in supporting
the conservative right and its influence (especially in the poorer, rural regions), further
weakening liberal movements.
The pattern seen in other CEE countries as regards liberal parties can be found in Poland,
combined with contextual factors. The internal weakness of these movements, the
in-fights between prominent personalities and the numerous splits (especially after an
electoral defeat (Graph II.4, Poland)) are combined with the general lack of popularity of
liberal ideas beyond the intellectual circles of the big cities. This tendency is also visible in
the development of the liberal milieu in these countries.
Graph II.4, Poland
RUCH PALIKOTA - 2011

(J. Palikot)
2010
PD SLD SDPL UP
(B. Kuzniak, A. Celinski)
LiD - 2006-2008
(A. Kwasniewski, J. Onyszkiewicz)
2005 PD - 2005 SLD SDPL UP

(B. Geremek, T. Mazowiecki ,J. Onyszkiewicz)
PO - 2001
(D. Tusk, A. Olechowski, M. Plazynski))
2000
1995
UW - 1994
(L. Balcerowicz ,D. Tusk, B. Geremek)
1990 KLD - 1990 UD - 1990

(D. Tusk, J.K. Bielecki, J. Lewandowski) (T. Mazowiecki, B. Geremek)
YEAR
Bulgaria
Liberal movements in Bulgaria followed the pattern of development of parties in the
other countries analysed in this report. At the beginning of the 1990s, most of the newly-
created liberal formations came together under the umbrella organisation of the Union of
Democratic Forces (SDS). Some of these movements were closely related to the president
of the SDS and future President of Bulgaria Zheliu Zhelev. Since the SDS was a large
organisation, many smaller parties cooperated with it and after the first elections, a series of
conflicts led to most left-wing and some centrist organisations splitting off. The SDS-centre
and SDS-liberals were two of the splinter parties which claimed to defend liberal values.
These two parties ran separately in the 1991 elections and achieved poor results.
Of those which stayed in the SDS, some of the liberal parties such as Bulgarian Party Liberals
and the “New Choice” Union left in 1992 after conflicts between the leadership and Zheliu
Zhelev. They all performed quite poorly in the 1992 elections and did not manage to pass
the threshold. After all these splits and the bad results achieved in the 1995 elections the
SDS started a process of unification under the leadership of I. Kostov. This process further
weakened the liberal wing of the party, and the new SDS party became more conservative
and right-wing in terms of its political orientation.
Another important actor on the political scene which can be considered as liberal is the
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS). This party was founded immediately after the
fall of communism in 1989 and its origins can be traced to the movements in defence
of the rights of the Turkish/Muslim population in Bulgaria in the period 1984-88, when
the communist regime introduced several laws to force Turks to change their names to
Bulgarian ones or to go into exile. Some of the members of the DPS were very active in
these movements and later joined forces to create the DPS. Even though this party does
not claim to be exclusively “ethnic”, most of its electorate is of Turkish origin and most of its
appeals are related to the defence of the interests of Bulgarian Turks.
The DPS initially had support of 5-6 % during the first elections in the 1990s, which steadily
grew to around 10% of support in the 2000s (Table II.5, Bulgaria). This can be explained
partially by the fact that during the second decade the party opened itself to non-Turkish
members and supporters, and produced a more “open” platform. Its electoral success, along
with stable support throughout the whole period, made it a valuable coalition partner, which
participated in all governments from 2001 to 2009 and also backed the SDS government
from 1997-2001. Even though there have been a number of splits, the party has kept most
of its support intact (the splinter parties did not achieve sufficient support) and its leader
A. Dogan is still unchanged. Along with the PNL, this is one of the most stable liberal
formations in CEE countries, mainly thanks to its ethnic origin (Graph II.5, Bulgaria).
After the failure of the small liberal formations in the SDS which then split into single
parties, another important liberal party emerged in the wake of the 2001 elections: the
National Movement Simeon the Second, later the National Movement for Stability and
Development (NMSS- NMSD). This party was created around the ex-king of Bulgaria
Simeon Saxe-Cobourg-Gotha, who returned from exile in 2001. He already enjoyed huge
popularity before his return, especially in monarchist circles. His charismatic character
and his promises to improve the situation in the country seduced voters and he achieved
astonishing success in the 2001 elections, gaining about 40% of the votes, and forming
a government with the DPS. After this first period in office, public support for the NMSS
started to wane and it lost half of its votes in the next elections (2005), but still managed to
remain the second biggest party in the country and to join the coalition of BSP and DPS.
This second period in office proved to be fatal for the support of the NMSS (now NMSD) and
the party failed to pass the threshold in the elections of 2009. Meanwhile, numerous splits
had weakened the party even further: the group “New Times”, which was founded in 1999
by young professionals, joined the party in 2001 but then left it before the elections of 2005
and ran in another coalition called Gergiovden. Another splinter party, created by some of
the NMSS former ministers who had quit the government, was Bulgarian New Democracy
(BND). Both splinter parties failed to achieve any significant results but weakened the NMSS
even further, before the fatal elections of 2009 when it lost its parliamentary representation
(Graph II.5, Bulgaria).
Table II.5, Bulgaria
1990 1991 1994 1997 2001 2005 2009

DPS 6,0 23 7,6 24 5,4 15 7,6 19 7,5 21 12,8 34 14,5 38
NMSS/NMSD - - - - - - - - 42,7 120 19,9 53 3,0 -
Graph II.5, Bulgaria
2009
Bulgarian New Democracy - BND
2005
New Times / Novoto vreme
NMSD
2001
NMSS
2000
1999
New Times / Novoto vreme
1995
New choice union

1992 Bulgarian party of liberals
DSD - liberals
1991
SDS - centre
1990
SDS
1989
DPS
YEAR
In sum, the development of liberal parties in the Bulgarian context only partly follows the
pattern of the rest of the CEE countries. After the initial large coalition, liberal parties could
not gather sufficient support. On the other hand, the presence of a specific liberal actor
- the DPS - based mostly on ethnic support is an exception (even though ethnic parties
exist in both Romania and Slovakia, but they do not belong to the liberal family). The other
exception in Bulgaria is the huge (but short-lived) success of NMSS, which was due to
several reasons, one of them the lack of institutionalisation of this party, which depended
(for both its success and failure) on the popularity of its leader. Nevertheless, some of the
patterns in the Bulgarian situation are similar to those of the other countries in terms of
the weakness of liberal parties: the numerous internal disputes and splits, the impossibility
of creating a strong organisation and a loyal electorate, and also the fact that the liberal
idea was rather vague and parties always positioned themselves in the political centre,
which turned out to be positive in terms of coalition-building but negative in terms of
long-term success.
Conclusion
The first conclusion of this brief overview of the development of liberal parties is that they all
follow a similar pattern of development. After initial participation in big umbrella movements
of anti-communists, liberal parties in most of these countries try to run independently in
elections and often the result falls well below their expectations. Following this, most liberal
movements try to reform, and the second period of their existence is marked by numerous
splits and mergers. In most of the countries a liberal party participates in a government
coalition as a minor partner in at least one legislature, but often this proves to be fatal for the
electoral support of the party in the next elections and few liberal parties survive this crisis
(specifically the PNL). There are several reasons for this:
1. In most CEE countries liberal parties fail to create a stable and consolidated organisation
which can survive more than two electoral cycles. Even though a liberal electorate
exists in all these countries, only in Romania have liberals managed to overcome the
splits and periods in opposition and to increase voter support over time. Everywhere
else liberal parties are rather weak (around 10-15%) and short-lived due to internal
disputes and to competition with stronger conservative rivals (as in Poland, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia).
2. Their centrist position proves to be a disadvantage in most situations, because they fail
to consolidate a specific electorate and to assure its loyalty over time. An ethnic party in
Bulgaria is the only exception to this, along with the Romanian PNL. The other specific
example, the liberal party NMSS in Bulgaria, which was the most successful of all liberal
parties in the region, proved to be short-lived after its initial success (and thus followed
the common pattern).
To conclude, the two main reasons for the failure of liberal parties are their lack of clear
political identity (lack of cleavage that can differentiate them from bigger conservative
challengers) and internal instability. In order to examine the reasons for this weakness, we will
turn to the liberal electorate (the demand-side of the political spectrum) in the next section.
2. Liberal electorate
The sociological profile of liberal voters in CEE countries
If we turn to the electoral profile of the liberal voter in most of the CEE countries analysed in
this report, we can see some strong similarities. First of all, the liberal electorate in all these
countries is more educated than the rest of the population. The percentage of voters with
higher education diplomas amongst liberal voters is much higher compared to other right-
wing or left-wing parties. The factor analysis in the Polish case proved that this is the most
important factor determining the liberal vote. This feature can be explained by the fact
that liberal ideas are more popular in intellectual or high-level circles, where freedom and
free enterprise, free circulation of goods and labour are seen as an advantage rather than
a disadvantage. This stratum of the population has much greater opportunities to profit
from a liberalised system where its competences and capacities will be an asset (the open
market) and is less preoccupied by secure employment or social benefits.
This first important conclusion can partially explain why this electorate is more volatile than
supporters of other parties. An educated person tends to be more interested in politics
than the average citizen and therefore is much more exposed to criticism in the media or
the aggressive campaigns of political competitors. The second important consequence is
that the educated elector is much more critical of the policies or the proposals of political
parties because he can forge his own opinion on the subject and therefore is much less
“loyal” than less educated voters.
The second characteristic of liberal voters, especially visible in Slovakia, but also elsewhere,
is that they are younger than the average voter. This characteristic is related partly to higher
education, as the younger generation is generally better educated than previous ones. The
same pattern of “acceptance” of liberal values can be seen in the younger generation, which
is less attached to the social security of the communist state and can see liberalisation as
an advantage. This sector of the population is also less nostalgic about the old regime than
their parents or grand-parents, because the youngest voters recall hardly anything of the
communist regime (first-time voters in 2009 had been born after the fall of communism).
The young age of the voters can also partly explain why they tend to vote more often
for new parties than the rest of the population. Being socialised in an ever-changing
environment, younger voters have no specific attachments to “traditional” parties and can
easily cast their vote for a newcomer. This feature makes them much more volatile than
older voters, because they do not share a strong conviction or attachment to a system of
values and references as the older generations did.
The third common feature of all liberal voters in these CEE countries is that they are urban
dwellers, living mostly in big cities. This is the case in most of the CEE countries we included
in the study, except for the Palikot Movement and the NMSS which attract voters in smaller
cities and not in the capital. This can be explained by two main factors. The first one is that
the population in smaller cities and villages is much more vulnerable if a liberal market is
introduced, because they depend mainly on subsidies by the state or small industries which
find it difficult to compete in a globalised market. Most voters living in these areas would
therefore opt for a socialist (Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia) or a conservative-protectionist
party because their interests are threatened by the liberal agenda. Exceptions to this can be
explained by the fact that in most of these countries the political scene includes a stronger
competitor on the right, usually with a more neo-liberal agenda.
The second reason for the “urban” profile of the voters is the fact that they are generally
much more secular and open to cultural change than voters in remote areas. This is
important especially in countries like Poland or Slovakia where ethical issues are on
the agenda and are defended mostly by liberal parties. In some cases, the liberal voter
can even be more left-wing than the traditional right-wing parties, especially on the
cultural axis. Basically, liberal voters are more secular and attached to modern values than
right-wing conservative voters, who are more religious and defend traditional values. This
is visible mostly in the countries where religious practices are still strong and influential
(Poland, Slovakia).
Nevertheless, there are some specific exceptions to this profile. One of the cases that does
not fit this framework is the DPS in Bulgaria, which is an ethnic-based party, with most of
its votes concentrated in areas with predominantly Turkish or Muslim populations in the
south and north-east of the country. Most of its voters have a low level of education and
are basically agricultural workers. The exception is due to the specific nature of this party
which does not fit the overall model of a liberal party, but is more an ethnic-regionalist one.
After the presentation of the sociological profile of the voters, we must turn to the
geographical distribution of votes for liberal parties in these countries.
The electoral geography of liberal parties in CEE

If we turn to the electoral geography of liberal parties in the CEE countries, we can see
that there are basically two tendencies. The first is that in most of the countries the liberal
electorate is situated in the big cities and regional centres. The second tendency, mostly
apparent in Poland and Slovakia, is that the liberal electorate is concentrated in the western
part of the country, encompassing the wealthiest regions. This can be explained not only
by the fact that the richest parts of the country have been able to benefit more from the
open market than more remote areas, where communist industries have not been replaced
by modern companies and where a larger percentage of the population is unemployed,
but also by specific historical factors. Looking first at Poland, it is apparent that the country
is divided into two parts, the western part which previously belonged to the Austrian
(Austro-Hungarian) Empire and the eastern part, which belonged to the Russian Empire
(Maps. II.1, Poland). This created inequalities after the First World War when the country
regained its independence, because the eastern territories were much less developed and
more rural, while the western ones were much richer and more urban in terms of culture.
After communism, surprisingly, this division reemerges in terms of electoral preferences.
The western part traditionally votes for liberal and more progressive movements, while
the eastern part is more conservative and votes for conservative-nationalist movements.
Turning to the liberal parties’ strongholds, a similar picture emerges (Maps. II.1. Poland).
This tendency can be explained partly in relation to the above-mentioned factors such
as education, urban culture etc. but also by the attachment to traditional (and especially
religious) values, which is much stronger in the rural areas in the east. Nevertheless, the
strongholds of RP are not an exact match for this division, which can be explained by the
fact that the “traditional” strongholds of liberal parties were occupied by the PO after 2001.
Map II.1.1, Poland : the above average results of PO in 2001 elections

Results marked in yellow
Map II.1.2, Poland : the above average results of UW in 2001 elections

Map II.1.3, Poland : the above average results of PD in 2005 elections

Map II.1.4, Poland : the above average results of LiD in 2007 elections
Map II.1.5, Poland : the above average results of RP in 2011

A similar situation is apparent in Slovakia (Maps II.2, Slovakia), where the western parts
of the country (around Bratislava) as well as the central area (around Banská Bystrica) are
more inclined to vote for liberal parties. However, electoral support for ANO was most
significant in the eastern part (around Prešov and Košice), but this may be due to the
leader’s personal support and should not be considered as a general tendency. In the
case of the other liberal parties, support is always concentrated in the more developed
western and central areas of the country, while the eastern part is much more reluctant
to vote for them (Maps II.2, Slovakia).
In the other countries included in this analysis, the geographical distribution is different,
because the vote is mainly concentrated in the bigger cities. In Romania, Bulgaria and
the Czech Republic, liberals are stronger in the capital and in the regional centres, as
underlined above. The exception to this rule is the support in the capital, which mainly
goes to a bigger challenger (for example the Bulgarian NMSS), but the tendency remains
similar (Maps II.3, Bulgaria).
Map II.2.1, Slovakia : territorial distribution of du electoral support in 1994

source: vladimír krivý – viera feglová – daniel balko: slovensko a jeho regióny: sociokultúrne súvislosti
volebného správania. nadácia médiá: bratislava 1996, p. 105.
Map II.2.2, Slovakia : territorial distribution of SDK electoral support in 1998

source: vladimír krivý: volebné výsledky in: martin bútora – grigorij mesežnikov – zora bútorová (ed.):
slovenske voľby ’98. kto? prečo? ako?. inštitút pre verejné otázky: bratislava 1999, p. 251.
Map II.2.3, Slovakia : territorial distribution of ANO electoral support in 2002

source: vladimír krivý: volebné výsledky a trendy in grigorij mesežnikov – oľga gyárfášová – miroslav
kollár (ed.): slovenské voľby ’02. výsledky, dôsledky. súvislosti. inštitút pre verejné otázky: bratislava
2003, p. 82.
Map II.2.4, Slovakia : territorial distribution of sas electoral support in 2010

source: vladimír krivý: voliči v parlamentných voľbách 2010 – analýza volebných výsledkov in: zora
bútorová – oľga gyárfášová - grigorij mesežnikov – miroslav kollár (eds.): slovenské voľby 2010: šanca
na zmenu. inštitút pre verejné otázky: bratislava 2011, p. 109.
The other important exception, as already mentioned, is the DPS in Bulgaria, which clearly
attracts a regionalist vote, situated in the southern and north-eastern parts of the country.
This is mainly due to the ethnic distribution of the population, and the vote corresponds
to the areas populated mostly by Bulgarian Turks (Maps II.3, Bulgaria). The fact that
these areas are rural and much less developed has an influence on the policy proposals of
the DPS and often on the distribution of Ministerial seats, because this party defends the
interests of its constituency, mainly with relation to the tobacco industry, which is the only
source of revenue in the area.
The fact that most liberal voters live in the richest parts of the countries and in the
cities can also explain why these parties not only defend economic liberalisation, but
also some controversial ethical issues (which, as we saw, are much more prone to be
defended by the urban middle class than the remote areas). On the other hand, as
already mentioned, this type of electorate is less loyal and much more volatile than the
leftists or the conservative electorate.
Map II.3.1, Bulgaria : NMSS in 2001 Parliamentary Elections
% of total voters
35 - 46 13 - 24
24 - 35 1 - 13
Map II.3.2 Bulgaria : NMSD in 2005 Parliamentary Elections
% of total voters
14 - 18 5-9
9 - 14 1-5
Map II.3.3, Bulgaria : NMSD in 2009 Parliamentary Elections
% of total voters
13 - 17 4-9
9 - 13 0-4
Map II.3.4, Bulgaria : DPS in 2001 Parliamentary Elections
% of total voters
47 - 63 16 - 31
31 - 47 0 - 16
Map II.3.5, Bulgaria : DPS in 2009 Parliamentary Elections
% of total voters
48 - 64 16 - 32
32 - 48 0 - 16
cartographic source: articque

Where do liberal voters come from: vote transfer

The last important question to be examined as regards the electorate of liberal parties is the
fact that it is very unstable and tends to vote for different parties over time. If we look at the
movement of votes, we can see that in most of the countries the volatility is relative because
the majority of those who have voted for a liberal party in a previous election still tend to
vote for the (new) liberal party in the next one. This is especially true in countries like Bulgaria
and Slovakia, where a new liberal party emerges at almost every election. If we take a closer
look, we can see that most new parties appeal to the voters of the previous ones.
In Slovakia, apart from the elections in 1994, when the majority of the voters of the DU
came from HZDS (and also because during this period the division and the identity of the
different right-wing parties and movements was not very clear), in all other elections the
majority of voters had previously supported another liberal party. In the 1998 elections,
40% of the voters of SDK had voted for KDH and DU in the 1994 elections (Graph II.6); in
the 2002 elections, half of the voters of ANO were either first-time voters or SDK voters in
1998 (Graph II.7); in the 2010 elections, 40% of the SaS voters had voted for SDKU-DS in
the previous election or were first-time voters (Graph II.8).
Graph II.6 : Composition of SDK voters in 1998 (in %)

Voted in elections 1994 for
3%
9% 10%
8%
Common Choice (SDL) SNS
DS ZRS
17% 10%
DU First-time voters
HZDS Non-voters
3%
2% KDH Others, no answer
10%
2%
MK
25%
Graph II.7: Composition of ANO voters in 2002 (in %)

3% 10%
HZDS
16%
8%
SDK
SDL
11% SNS
24%
SOP
13% First-time voters
15%
Non-voters
Others
Graph II.8: Composition of SaS voters in 2010 (in %)

4% 1% 2%
15%
KDH Do not know
23%
LS-HZDS First-time voters
SDKU-DS Non-voters
23% Smer SD Others
15% SNS
7% 10%
Source: focus polling agency.

There is a similar situation in Bulgaria regarding floating liberal voters. In the 2001 elections,
half of the NMSS voters had voted for the SDS in the previous elections. The paradox arises
from the fact that the majority of NMSS(D) voters then turned to the populist-conservative
party GERB in 2009. The other liberal party in Bulgaria, as we have seen, remained much
more stable over time and increased its support without losing voters (Graph II.9).
Graph II.9: Correlation between the results of NMSS in 2001
and of GERB in 2009
Each point is one municipality, characterised by the % of votes for NMSS in 2001 and for
GERB in 2009. The correlation is very strong.
50
40
30
NDSV-2001
20
10
R Sq Quadratic=0,625
0
0 10 20 30 40
GERB-2009
In Poland, where the liberal parties went through a series of transformations, there is
much clear continuity between the liberal movements in terms of political leadership
and structures. One of the wings of the liberal movement changed its name and ideology
several times, but the continuity with the previous parties was quite clear (UD became UW,
then PD; KLD entered UW then founded the PO, from which RP was created) which also
explains the continuity in terms of electoral support (Graph II.4, Poland).
In Romania, the situation is even more stable, because the PNL retained its initial support
(after the crisis of 1993) and even attracted new voters over time. There was also a clear
continuity in the splinter fractions, leaving the PNL and then re-entering several years later.
This also shows that when a liberal party is strong in terms of electoral support it can more
easily deal with all the splits and mergers, and can attract smaller movements sharing the
same ideology.
Conclusion
To summarise, there is stable support for liberal parties, especially among one particular
group of the electorate in all the five countries: young, well-educated, urban dwellers living
in the capital of the biggest regional centres and sharing similar values which are close
to those promoted by liberal parties (free market, secularism, tolerance). The structural
weakness comes from the fact that this electorate is not loyal to one political movement
and tends to be more volatile than the electorate of other parties. There are two main
reasons for this.
The first reason is that liberal parties have been unable to find a clear-cut cleavage to
differentiate themselves from other right-wing parties. They have often occupied the
centre of the political space, but the lack of a clear ideology made it harder for them to
build strong electoral support. Lacking this stable support, the liberal parties have been
unable to resist centripetal tendencies and internal in-fights, and have often declined
rapidly and disappeared completely from the political scene. The perception of voters as
regards liberalism is very significant in this respect (see section IV), because if there is no
clear cleavage, voters tend to have a very vague and imprecise notion of the ideology,
which can further lead to disparate support.
The second reason is that party elites often prefer to abandon a party which loses its
electoral support and found a new one, instead of remaining in the party and working for
its reconstruction and future success. This means that the lack of loyalty is also characteristic
of party elites. This tendency explains the variety of new parties emerging on the political
arena in those countries which also allows volatile voters to choose a different party at each
election. The Romanian situation provides a lesson in this respect, because when a party is
electorally strong over time, splinter parties which fail electorally may eventually return to
the main party.
Another important conclusion to be drawn from the study of the liberal electorate in CEE
countries is that new voters (mainly the youngest part of the population) tend to follow this
volatile tendency (and to reinforce it) because they have not been socialised in a context
of stable electoral support, and have not inherited a traditional political legacy from their
parents. This tendency can prove very destabilising over time, because these voters will
probably always remain volatile in their political choices. Consequently, liberal parties
must not only stabilise their internal structures and organisation, but also build a network
of associations and organisations which can transmit the liberal tradition to younger
generations and socialise younger voters in a stable party preference model.
CHAPTER III
Liberal NGOs,
think-tanks and media
CHAPTER III
Liberal NGOs, think-tanks and media
In this section, we will focus on the liberal “milieu”: all the non-political actors and
organisations in the CEE countries which are connected to the liberal tradition and could
serve as a potential ally in the socialisation of liberal voters or the popularisation of their
ideas, values and programmes.
Liberal NGOs and think-tanks

If we turn to the liberal NGOs and associations in CEE countries, we can distinguish three
main types of association, which are present in all the countries:
- NGOs founded at the beginning of the transition period with the support of major
European and American associations (Friedrich Naumann (all the countries), F.A. Hayek
(Slovakia, Czech Republic)) or the Open Society Foundation (all the countries);
- NGOs created at local level to support liberal parties directly or indirectly;
- NGOs and associations related to bigger organisations aimed at monitoring human
rights protection and other similar topics (Helsinki committees, American foundations).
Taking a closer look at their activities and the role they play in developing civil society
and promoting liberal values, it becomes apparent that they were more active during the
first decade after 1989 and are now confined to specific projects and have less visibility
in the media.
The other important feature of liberal foundations, especially those which are not directly
related to liberal parties, is that they tend to concentrate on specific issues of broader
interest and eventually contribute very little to the consolidation of the liberal milieu. The
projects they focus on are related to human rights and the protection of minorities but
do not deal with specific political topics (projects to establish new laws on these subjects
or debates on the reform of a certain sector of the economy). This “apolitical” and neutral
strategy cannot help liberal parties to benefit from their expertise in a tangible manner
and cannot bring the concrete issues to larger public debate. For this reason, the work of
these NGOs and associations remains on the margins of public opinion, and cannot help
to create a real liberal milieu. The topics they deal with are very broad and finally have
little impact on public opinion (human rights in general, some very specific issues of
CHAPTER III : Liberal ngos, think-tanks and media 61
minority protection, or ethical issues which are not of primary concern for most citizens
in these countries).
This conclusion can explain why some of these associations remain unknown to the public
in CEE countries and why they eventually confine their activities to a restricted circle of
people, most of whom are already connected to a political formation or activity in this
milieu. The role of these associations as think-tanks or big trusts which can review and
submit political proposals has not been achieved and is even less effective than at the
beginning of the 90s. There is a second important role they could play: creating a larger
circle of liberally-oriented people who could serve as a first step in the socialisation of
future party members and officials to be recruited from these circles.
Liberal media
There are basically two types of liberal media in these countries:
- TV channels or newspapers owned by personalities close to liberal parties which can
promote specific ideas and serve as a platform for the parties, but often lose their
significance once the party fails politically.
- Magazines and newspapers which are more independent and do not directly support
any party. They often appeal to liberal circles (intellectuals and businessmen) and can
either cover broader issues or can specialise in certain areas: culture, finance, human
rights etc.
- A similar conclusion to the one made on liberal NGOs and foundations can be drawn
regarding liberal media in these countries. The dependence on liberal parties can
often cause some difficulties for the media (party magazines) because when the party
cannot afford to subsidise them, they often face imminent failure and cannot sustain
their activities in the long term. The other major problem is that most of these channels
and magazines are not very popular in the first place and cannot engender broader
interest and attention beyond the party milieu (members and activists). This can
explain their financial difficulties and often their short-lived existence.
- The second type of liberal media (newspapers and magazines of general interest
which can promote liberal values) suffer from a similar lack of popularity because
their readership is very restricted and often covers only specific intellectual circles.
This failure to address the larger public can often cause similar financial problems,
and is another indicator of the general inability of liberal circles in these countries to
appeal to a mass public and to elaborate a clear and comprehensive strategy for the
popularisation of liberal ideas. Furthermore, political parties often concentrate only
on their “own” media, without making an effort to work together with this second
layer of independent liberally-oriented press. This lack of collaboration may be one of
the reasons for the vagueness of the message they deliver, and the gap between the
salient issues in society and the topics covered by these media (which increases their
elitism and makes them disconnected from day-to-day political and social life).
Conclusion
The work of both liberal NGOs and media has often been connected to a specific party and
could not continue once they lost its political (and mostly financial) support. This tendency
is even more significant in countries where liberal parties are not consolidated and tend to
be short-lived. The other major problem of these TV channels and journals is that they are
so politically oriented that the public they address barely extends beyond party members.
Other organisations and media not directly linked to political actors are still active and
can be a valuable resource for liberal parties as long as they all work together in the same
direction. The difficulty comes once again from the fact that often these organisations are
either too specialised in specific areas and cannot reach a broader audience (eg. human
rights), or they are too broad and cannot play an important role in consolidating the liberal
milieu, because they are oriented towards a restrictive group of intellectuals, and their
debates are often completely disconnected from the main concerns of the mass public.
Nevertheless, these organisations and media can be a very helpful tool for liberal parties,
because they maintain a section of the population united by liberal values and potentially
supporting them politically (if presented in a suitable way). The lack of trade unions or other
broader organisations which can recruit and socialise the public, and increase support for
liberal parties, is another striking feature in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, NGOs
and other associations must play a much more active role to compensate for this weakness
by creating liberal networks (beyond the intellectual or restricted professional milieu) and
preparing younger people for a future career in liberal parties. Even though most parties
included in this study have their own youth organisations, these are not very active and are
often concentrated only in the larger cities, with few contacts with the party base.
The NGOs and liberal media must therefore try to overcome this weakness by entering the
political debate and providing expertise on concrete issues (or helping parties to develop
CHAPTER III : Liberal ngos, think-tanks and media 63
some parts of their programmes through research and public debates on these issues).
They also have to serve as a broad network of potential voters, supporters and activists
which can help liberal parties to strengthen the loyalty of these groups of citizens and to
compensate for the lack of other liberally-oriented organisations such as trade unions or
other secular associations.
CHAPTER IV
Perceptions of liberalism
CHAPTER IV
Perceptions of liberalism
Having examined the development of liberal parties over time, their electoral support and
the liberal milieu in the five CEE countries considered in this study, we will now turn to
the perception of liberalism as seen by both liberal voters and liberal politicians. This part
of the report summarises the results of the second stage of the project, which included
three focus groups and 30 interviews with liberal voters and party officials in each of the
five countries. The objective of this second stage was to go beyond the statistical results
concerning the spread of these liberal values and the support for them, and to concentrate
on the meaning and interpretations of individual actors in order to distinguish the main
features of liberalism and the internal paradoxes or controversial stances on this ideology
in the CEE countries.
If we examine the results from this research we can find three main dimensions to the
perception of liberalism, which are present in all of the countries. These are economic
liberalism, civic and cultural liberalism. We will summarise the findings from the separate
countries taking the three dimensions separately.
Economic liberalism
The economic dimension of liberalism is understood as support for a free market and less
state regulation, lower taxes and the privatisation of state-owned companies. In some
countries this liberalism is viewed as somewhat negative, because it implies lack of state
support for the poorer and weaker segments of society (Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria). This
first insight is very important, because it leads to two conclusions:
First, liberalism is perceived as neo-liberal and radical by voters and part of the political
elites in Central and Eastern Europe. This view can be explained by the economic transition
(privatisation of the economy and restitution of goods) which these countries faced during
the 90s, and each individual’s personal experience of liberalism.
• “ Simplification of taxes and the repeal of various restrictions on business. A reduction
in bureaucracy, burdening companies by nonsensical decrees, incessant hampering
of companies. In my opinion, the party should focus on that and would gain a lot of
entrepreneurs.”(CZ)
• “ In particular, the possibility of employment in their fields. Support of business is related to it.
Creating jobs for young people.” (CZ)
CHAPTER IV : Perceptions of liberalism 67
• “Make it easier to set up a business. There is a useless amount of laws and permits which one
has to arrange before ever starting a business.” (CZ)
• “ Tax cuts. Simplify the tax system.” (CZ)
• “ To promote the idea of a limited state ... Privatisation, decentralisation, minimal taxes,
social benefits payments, protection of private property, and an effort to deliver the best
possible result for the money collected.” (SK)
It must be underlined that even though support for this type of liberal policy was widespread
and many voters (and the political elites) accepted it as the “only way” of modernising the
economy, the social cost was felt at the end of the first decades and this provoked a huge
backlash and disappointment. This fact is important when we turn to support for liberal
ideas in the region, which faced its first important decline at the end of the 90’s.
Furthermore, this process of liberalisation of the economy and privatisation provoked
nostalgia among part of the population, which was still very attached to state regulation
and social protection for workers, as well as the social benefits of the communist system
such as free education and medical care. These aspects were not compatible with the
radical neo-liberal ideas defended by liberal parties throughout this period, and produced
reluctance (especially among older voters or the socially fragile) even if they shared some
of the liberal ideas. This aspect is very important if we want to understand the “negative”
image of liberalism and liberal parties in some countries, especially in Poland, but also in
countries like Bulgaria or Slovakia.
• “ On the whole, the state arranges matters in such a way that ordinary people suffer, while
the big shots live a carefree life.” (BG)
• “... the government should regulate prices, for example when the price of gasoline goes up it
is followed by a rise in the price of bread, and when the price of bread goes up, other goods
follow…” (BG)
• “... our government produces some protective measures, and they are not in favour of
Bulgarian business but of foreigners…” (BG)
• “ We Bulgarians are like that! Freedom becomes a total free-for-all. If there is no order, control
and pressure… it’s not difficult to imagine what will happen…”(BG)
• “ If we leave businesses to determine that, they will become monopolies. It is not possible
for businesses to be in control, the government should decide… the government is there to
govern, isn’t it?” (BG)
• “ I think that there should be more control over money selected from taxes and redistribution.
More transparency for sure.” (CZ)
• “ With regard to money, it is this unlimited liberty, enjoying your life, but also rejecting values
– more ‘having’ than ‘being’, the cult of money, the pursuit of money.” (PL)
• “ Unfortunately, a sphere of poverty is created – some people are well off, but next to them
there are those awfully poor ones.” (PL)
• “Liberals – wheeler-dealers”, or a foreign, perverted element: “If someone is different from us,
and he is not a communist, he must be a liberal” (PL)
• “Liberalism first and foremost wants to weaken institutional manipulation of a citizen, be
it by the state, large multinational corporations or economic groups whose power is not
controlled.” (SK)
• “ I would distance myself from neo-liberalism per se, since I don’t think that liberalism should
rely at all costs on the dictates of the free market.”(SK)
• “ Liberalism plus solidarity – that is the principle which I identify with. So I consider myself to
be social liberal ...”(SK)
Another aspect related to the economic dimension of liberalism is the fact that many voters
cannot differentiate the process which their own country underwent in modernising their
economy from liberal ideology in its abstract form. The associations with liberalism are
often connected to the loss of social status or the failed privatisation of industries in the CEE
countries, leaving thousands of people unemployed and provoking economic disaster in
many regions. Since this is the voters’ only experience with liberalism, they tend to make a
connection between these policies and the ideology as such, and therefore express more
criticism and distrust.
• “On the other hand, I am not that impressed by economic neo-liberalism, particularly in
its Slovak interpretation, which ignores how the world has moved on in the past century
towards greater solidarity and cohesion.” (SK)
• “ Let’s not forget that for 45 years, Romania was under communist rule. The state (government)
was the one in charge of your education. After finishing school, the government offered you
a job, and also a home.”(RO)
• “ Unfortunately, society or people want to benefit from the abundance economic
liberalism brings, but on the other hand they would also like to have benefits offered by
the government.” (RO)
• “ Take privatisation, for instance. Liberals vigorously proposed this idea, yet once in power
were unable to implement it thoroughly (pseudo-privatisation). When privatisation failed,
many from outside saw it as a failure of liberalism, but we can hardly speak about a liberal
policy in this case.”(RO)
On the other hand, the general pro-liberal public in these countries tends to support
economic liberalism as the only possible and reasonable option, because in the modern
era of globalisation, there is no other possible model. This means that beyond the
disappointment and the criticism, voters accept the need for a liberal market and support
basic principles in the economic area, wishing only to set it within certain limits and to
protect weaker members of the population.
As regards liberal politicians, they express more classical views, related to the opportunities
of liberalism, the free market and foreign investment in the country.
Civic liberalism
Turning to civic liberalism, we can see that values such as human rights and the rule of
law are generally accepted and shared by most of those who vote for or support liberal
parties in this region. It is in fact noticeable that these values are not related to the
political platform as such, but are viewed as general values in modern society, shared
by the majority of the population. On the other hand, especially as regards respect for
those values in everyday life, there is a certain amount of scepticism in the public of these
countries. Liberal voters and supporters remain convinced that these values (especially
the rule of law) are still not being put into practice by the government and political
elites. We can say that there is a certain expectation for future liberal governments (or
politicians in general) to amend the current situation and to introduce an impartial and
non-corrupted political and judicial system.
• “ Freedom doesn’t merely mean the removal of barriers that prevent you from doing
something, but it also means the rules of the game...” (SK)
• “ Liberalism expresses a certain set of ideas and values of the modern era. It means freedom
of an individual, the division of power in politics and state, civic and human rights, starting
with the right to property and to dispose of that property, all the way to freedom of
expression, freedom of association.”(SK)
• “...the government is for controlling compliance with the law and for defining the law.” (BG)
• “Classical liberals always used to say that people should be equal before the law. A liberal
should not allow privileges for some group in either the economic or political areas.” (SK)
• “ In terms of liberalism I think primarily of the protection of human rights, respect for an
individual and his/her freedom which has to be protected, even against the state ...”(SK)
Secondly, individual freedom is perceived as one of the most important characteristics
of liberalism in these countries. This specific feature and its importance can be related to
the memory of authoritarian rule and its negative consequences in terms of freedom of
the individual or even the “right to be different”. For this reason, the emphasis on personal
freedom is one of the most important positive connotations of liberalism. At the same
time, this personal freedom is not directly related to responsibility. It comes as an idealised
image of personal self-fulfillment, but the accent is put only on the absence of limits and
not on how to face problems and find solutions without the help of society, the state or the
community. This paradox also explains the economic version of social liberalism expressed
by most respondents.
• “ We can see happy, content people who are free and able to realise their dreams and enjoy
their lives.” (PL)
• “Human’s first. A human being is the most important element.” (PL)
• “ For me it’s like this: if you don’t have a plan, you can easily get lost, but if you know what you
want, it’s the best possible place to be in. It gives you plenty of opportunities, but you have to
stay focused all the time.” (PL)
• “ If I was to go to that planet, I’d go there well prepared. If I didn’t take my whole family, I
wouldn’t be afraid, and I would know what I want because I would have freedom – I would
know that if it was up to me, I could handle it and I would be fine. I would have more than on
other planets. It’s not an easy place; you can’t be weak when you go there.”(PL)
• “ To me it is primarily the freedom of the individual, fewer rules and more reliance on human
reason.” (SK)
• “ To be a true liberal means to be a personality that is well aware of his abilities, limitations,
who has a moral creed, has a clearly defined hierarchy of values and priorities, and who acts
according to his conscience.”(SK)
• “Freedom from violence, from negative influences ... freedom as a right to protection of one’s
own life, property and the choice of one’s own path to happiness. Hence it is freedom from
something ...” (SK)
• “ In the political area it is mainly the provision of equality of opportunities for all, provision of
personal liberty.”(SK)
• “Liberty. The liberty to express oneself, one’s opinion, view.” (BG)
Along with this aspect of personal freedom, there is also a willingness to limit state authority
and to give the individual more space at both the personal and economic levels. Here,
authority is perceived in its negative aspects, as an obstructive power which impedes the
achievement of personal ambitions and which restricts the individual’s freedom of action.
This attitude is sometimes related to state security and control, while for other respondents
it is connected more with the economic redistribution of goods. Sometimes, this feature
of liberalism can even attain anarchist or libertarian levels in the expressed views of voters.
• “ Not to be a socialist. To adopt and promote such measures as will lead towards supporting
individuals – their activity and ability to take care of themselves and their own family. Thus
it means limiting the influence of the state and of the paternalistic model of the relationship
between the individual and the state.” (SK)
• “ The second component should be that the individual alone should decide on the bulk of
his money. This should not be taken away from him by the state deciding on it as if the state
knew better what is good for the citizen. ...”(SK)
• “...excessive security is not liberal – phone-tapping … serves other goals - of control.” (BG)
• “ If there is any defining feature of liberalism, it is a very reserved, even vigilant attitude to
power. A liberal sees power … as something that is dangerous, because it can be abused.”(SK)
As we have seen, both the economic and the civic aspects of liberalism have a positive
and a negative connotation. This ambivalence is one of the important characteristics of the
notion of liberalism in Central and Eastern Europe. This latter aspect is related to cultural
liberalism and more precisely to its ethical issues, which are particularly politicised because
they oppose liberals and conservatives.
Cultural liberalism
Cultural liberalism, on the other hand, is understood in two different ways. One part concerns
a general tolerance towards minorities and groups which do not share the common values
or who lead a different way of life. This aspect is more neutral and enjoys greater support
among liberal voters. The second dimension concerns ethics, in terms of respect for the
rights of sexual and ethnic minorities, same-sex marriage, euthanasia and soft drugs. These
issues are more politicised (notably by conservative parties) and more ambivalent in the
eyes of the voter. On these issues, an important difference is also apparent between those
countries where conservative parties build on traditional values (and religiosity) and where
the attitude is less supportive on these topics, and countries where the cleavage between
conservatives and liberals is not as strong. In some countries, such as the Czech Republic,
these issues are more acceptable, but do not constitute a cleavage between conservatives
and liberals (between ODS and the liberal parties). In other countries, such as Poland and
Slovakia, these issues are more important but lack wide-spread support (beyond the urban
intelligentsia). In countries such as Romania and Bulgaria the level of tolerance is rather low
and these topics cannot attract massive support.
• “ The conservatives say that a liberal is someone who likes to divorce, likes abortions and
euthanasia, but this isn’t true. An authentic liberal only thinks that these are matters in which
the state should not interfere so much.” (SK)
• “ To me liberalism is connected with a state of democratic plurality, not of exclusion of some
by others, but instead a state of dialogue for which liberals have been predetermined.”(SK)
• “ A liberal doesn’t impose his/her views on others and promotes legislation that aims to
leave as much as possible to people’s free decision, whether in dealing with money or one’s
own life.” (SK)
• “ In the political area it is mainly tolerance for minorities, not only ethnic ones. Simply
tolerance, respect for different views, attitudes and for otherness.” (SK)
• “ Liberalism has often been intentionally mistaken for libertarianism, nihilism, promiscuity,
permissiveness and everything else that the Church rejects and tries to protect its faithful
from.” (PL)
• “ Liberalism …means tolerance towards the different…to accept them, not to hinder them
(small businesses).” (BG)
• “... there should be freedom of choice for those who want it (or whose parents want it) - let
them study religion, but it seems to me that compulsory religious education is absurd...” (BG)
• “In my view it is correct that religion is studied in school. Liberal parties…have insisted on
that for some time.” (BG)
Cultural liberalism is mainly perceived in terms of tolerance toward the opinions of others,
and religious and sexual freedom. Part of this debate concerns education in schools and
the general attitude of certain societies towards minority groups and their inclusion.
Nevertheless, the opinions expressed by the respondents still remain fairly general and do
not focus on specific policies (apart from the question of religion in schools), which can
account for the lack of articulation of these basic values in a concrete context. This can also
be linked to the overall conservatism of these societies, which, even among liberal voters,
takes the form of general approval of these policies without engaging further in concrete
discussion. The last point might be further linked with the vagueness of liberalism as such
in many of these countries.
Lack of clarity
The last important aspect of the notion of liberalism is the fact that it remains rather
vague in the opinion of the voter. The fact that the civic aspect of these values is wide-
spread and shared by the majority of the population can be a very positive asset for
liberal parties, but on the other hand, as we have already mentioned, they are not always
perceived as distinctly “liberal” and therefore not politicised by the parties and used to
their own advantage.
• “ We need a true liberal party, not just words.” (BG)
• “ The liberals don’t formulate uncompromising thoughts; they’re not as clear-cut in their
expressions as the conservatives or traditionalists. They don’t shout about kids left on
the waste heap, plane crashes and so on. Therefore, they can’t get through to a broad
public.” (PL)
• “ We have reached a point of major social and attitudinal confusion, and it is difficult to find
a clear answer to this confusion in terms of a clear-cut, definitive orientation of ideas, as
it will soon turn out that such ideological orientation is removed from reality and cannot
effectively affect the world.” (SK)
This lack of clarity and of politicised issues makes liberalism weaker and a “victim of its
own success”. If the voters cannot clearly identify the principles and the notions liberalism
stands for, this means that the liberal parties in these countries have not translated them
into concrete policy proposals. This is especially true when we turn to the aspects which
can differentiate liberal parties from their conservative competitors or other centre-left
parties. Being “in the middle” between left and right and expressing a moderate vision can
prove very effective in terms of coalition-building but this cannot ensure stable electoral
support over time.
Conclusion
As we have seen from the overview of the perception of liberalism in Central and Eastern
Europe, there are three main dimensions to liberalism in these countries: economic
liberalism, related to the free market and less state regulation; civic liberalism, mostly
associated with human rights and individual freedom (or individualism) as well as a
certain lack of authority, and cultural liberalism, related to the protection of minorities and
tolerance, as well as some ethical issues like abortion, same-sex marriage and euthanasia.
In all three aspects of liberalism there is an ambiguous attitude towards the main principles
of liberal ideology. Economic liberalism is often associated with neo-liberal and radical
policies and voters tend to think of the negative consequences of these policies, especially
for the most fragile parts of the population. Most respondents prefer a limited liberalism
and some form of state regulation and welfare in order to reduce its negative impact on
poverty. This perception can be related to the experience of the beginning of the transition
period, when the social cost of all the economic transformations was felt by most citizens.
Civic liberalism is mostly associated with the rule of law and respect for the rights of
the individual. This is the most powerful aspect of liberalism in this geographical area,
because it comes as the opposite of authoritarian rule, and is shared by most citizens,
beyond the liberal electorate. Its negative aspect is that it often includes some more
radical aspects of rejection of all types of authority and an anarchistic vision of society.
Nevertheless, this feature of liberalism is widely shared by the public and therefore liberal
parties cannot fully benefit from it because it has not been politicised and does not form
part of the main cleavages.
The third aspect of the notion of liberalism is the cultural one, dealing with both tolerance
towards those who are different (and minorities) and some ethical issues such as gay
marriage and euthanasia. This aspect is the most controversial as regards the CEE countries
and represents the only strong cleavage between liberal and conservative parties. Its
importance can vary between the different countries and proves to be much more
important in countries with a strong attachment to traditional (or religious) values than in
more secular countries. The main problem with this aspect is that voters who really support
cultural liberal values are a minority even among the liberal electorate, and therefore it
should be used with some caution.
The last important aspect of liberalism as an ideology in CEE is its unclear and undefined
substance. For many voters, being liberal means being centrist, neither left nor right. This
can prove beneficial on the one hand, but on the other it shows that the identification with
liberalism is not sufficient to create a cleavage or a loyalty out of conviction. This problem
could partly explain the volatility of the liberal electorate which does not feel any strong
attachment to a concrete liberal party and can switch its votes quite easily.
CHAPTER V
Evaluation of liberal parties

and the reasons for their failure
CHAPTER V
Evaluation of liberal parties and the reasons
for their failure1
In this section we will return to the second part of the field research on liberal parties
included in this project. This section addresses the weaknesses of existing liberal formations
in the five countries and assesses the reasons and the consequences of this weakness from
the perspective of voters and also from the perspective of party members and officials.
It will also address the potential of liberal voters and the expectations of the electorate
towards them. The section is divided into three sub-sections, focusing on the potential for
parties and the profile of voters, expectations and recommendations for existing liberal
parties, and finally the reasons for their failure which will be analysed separately.
1. Liberal voters and the potential for liberal parties

In this sub-section we will present the results of the interviews and focus groups with
liberal voters, and their opinion of the potential of liberal parties in their respective
countries and the reasons for their failure. The first part of this study concerns the existence
and the profile of liberal voters (in a form of self-perception) as well as the potential and
need for liberal parties.
Who are the liberal voters?

This part of the report assesses the profile of liberal voters and the potential for liberal
parties in the eyes of voters and supporters, as well as representatives of the liberal milieu.
Respondents were asked to identify the ideal type of the liberal voter and which groups
in society correspond best to this profile. From the answers of most participants we
can conclude that the groups identified as potential liberal voters are basically two: (1)
independent businessmen and entrepreneurs and (2) intellectuals or young professionals.
The ideal liberal voter lives in a big city and is rather young.
This perspective on liberal voters partly covers the profile we found in the sociological
analysis: most strongholds of liberal parties are in the big cities and urban areas.
1 In this section we will examine the overall reasons for the weakness of liberal parties in CEE countries.
Even though the Romanian PNL is generally an exception to this and remains rather strong, some of these
aspects apply also in the Romanian case and for this reason we will speak of CEE countries as a whole.
CHAPTER V : Evaluation of liberal parties and the reasons for their failure 79
• “ They clearly know what they want to do with their money; they have a clear idea how to
raise their children; they have a clear idea of which charity they want to give their money to,
or what they want to join as volunteers. They have all this defined and don’t need anyone
to take them there, to teach them that; they simply hold their life firmly in their hands. They
especially want the state to leave them in peace.” (SK)
• “ Liberal ideas are not something you can impose on small towns and villages or very
traditional groups.”(PL)
• “ Despite appearances, liberalism draws a good response from officials, clerks. That’s where
the classic Polish intelligentsia is.”(PL)
On the other hand, the potential of liberal parties in the business sector is still underexploited
and should constitute a target group for future elections and campaigns. The idea that this
group has still not found suitable representation on the political scene reflects the fact that
the economic policies of right-wing parties (and liberals) have not focussed on protecting
the interests of local industry and have not been efficient enough in defending its interests.
• “ Liberals should become advocates for people with an enterprising bent. Not only those who
are already entrepreneurs – all enterprising people. It’s not some narrow group – nowadays
every other person runs some small business and all these people have lots of problems.” (PL)
• “ Maybe that’s a group that doesn’t take part in elections. The reasons why they don’t vote
change a lot, though. In the 1990s there were a lot of people who didn’t vote. Now, there are
many people who occasionally don’t vote because they don’t like something, but they might
go and vote the next time.”(PL)
In general, we can say that liberal voters are perceived as an existing category within all
the countries studied. This potential can be based on the general idea that each group
in society should have its own representation and therefore businessmen and the urban
intelligentsia can be best represented by liberal parties because entrepreneurs have
interests related to the free market and investment as well as low taxes, while intellectual
circles defend individual freedom and cultural tolerance. In spite of this potential, liberal
parties can barely exist in the current form in these countries according to this respondent:
• “ So far, probably, the intelligentsia and entrepreneurs have been a natural electorate for
the liberals, but I get the impression that after the Freedom Union’s demise it’s not so easy
any more. You can’t do it that way nowadays. You can’t build this kind of elite liberal party
composed of the more centre-left intelligentsia and proponents of the free market who
started in the Liberal Democratic Congress. You can’t do it any more. It’s been compromised.
I think it would have to be a party that can reach further than to one or two particular
interest groups.”(PL)
• “ This social environment is a bit headless – divided among different parties, different media,
different circles.”(PL)
This general overview of liberal potential voters basically corresponds to the real sociological
group supporting these parties in most of the countries. This first insight in terms of voters’
orientation shows us that they are quite aware of the role that should be played by a truly
liberal party, but for some reason, liberal parties are still not meeting expectations. This
demonstrates as well that the potential of these parties is still present but it might require
either the restructuring of existing movements or the creation of new parties. In order
to provide a better assessment of the existence of this potential, we will now turn to the
reactions concerning this particular issue.
The potential of liberal parties in CEE countries

On the question of the potential of liberal parties in their respective countries, most voters
confirm that such potential exists and can be further developed. In their opinion, the
presence of a liberal party on the political scene can be useful for the defence of specific
groups as well as a counterweight for conservative parties.
• “I think that people would vote for a party which looked so new that they would trust in it.” (CZ)
• “ I think it would probably have a chance ... Some celebrities would have to be there in order
for people believe in it. But the question is, would they thrive when everything is restricted by
European Union regulations?”(CZ)
• “ Slovakia needs such a party … because there is a need ... to cultivate the traditional
Slovak often one-sided conservatism, confessionalism, nationalism, left-wing extremism
or a tendency to authoritarian regimes; to strive not only for confessional tolerance, but
for overall tolerance, simply to respect otherness. That is missing on both sides – left and
right.” (SK)
• “ Slovakia needs a liberal party and particularly a party that is orientated towards the middle
class as the foundation of a functioning society.” (SK)
On the other hand, there are many obstacles preventing the creation of such a liberal party.
One of the main reasons for the current inability to create and maintain such a party is the
traditionalism of society and the lack of a strong and organised middle class. In the eyes of
many voters, the existence of a ‘‘real” middle class is the first and most important condition,
because otherwise these parties would not have a strong social base. On the other hand,
many respondents still find that this type of middle class does not exist in their societies.
This perception can be related to the consequences of the failure of the communist
regime, when many of those considered as middle class lost their social status and society
came to be perceived as divided between the “very rich” (who basically represent the
political elite and big business) and “the poor” ( representing the rest of society). Even
though many of the respondents in this study belong to the middle class they do not see
themselves as such.
• “ There are no democratic traditions there.” (BG)
• “ There is no developed middle class over here.” (BG)
• “ If there is a middle class to vote for that liberal party. But when there is no such middle
class...” (BG)
• “ The situation in Bulgaria is upside down. Abroad they create a party when a large group
has particular interests in a certain area… We do not have social strata with certain interests
and promoting their leaders… In Bulgaria we have only leaders, parties here do not even
have their own ideology…” (BG)
The other main problem perceived as quite important in many countries is the lack
of a historical tradition of liberalism, and the fact that most voters do not really grasp
the significance of liberal values. In many of these countries, the existing liberal parties
have failed to “educate” the public and promote those values in an efficient manner, so
disappointment with existing movements, combined with the lack of historical tradition
and legacy to serve as an example, lead to an ideological vacuum, especially when the
scene is dominated by strong conservative parties (with the notable exception of Romania).
• “.. It takes a long time for liberal values to become established in a society…”(BG)
• “ Other nations have liberal ideas, they recognise pure, open democracy, they recognise
freedom of speech and now they can afford extreme right policies… But in Bulgaria,
perhaps we have not reached that stage. We have a tremendous need, but we are still under
age. ”(BG)
• “ People are even afraid of liberalism because they have been indoctrinated against the idea
either by the church or their milieu. ”(SK)
• “ Society continues to be ultraconservative, and is affected by history and religion. History is
among the reasons why the word ‘liberal’ has negative connotations, since the cause can
also be found in the deficit of historical tradition. ”(SK)
• “I think that in our country, since the beginning of the nineties, the contest has been between
left and right. Nobody talks about conservatives or liberals. If someone is a liberal, I think 60%
of people have no idea what he is talking about. First they would have to explain what it
means to be liberal.” (CZ)
• “Liberal parties have no tradition here. ”(CZ)
We can add to this lack of tradition the weakness of liberal parties in putting their ideology
into practice and the “habit” of voters of voting either for conservative or socialist parties
which have clearer platforms and are much stronger on the political scene. This logic of
criticism, combined with the pragmatism of a rational vote, weakens existing parties and
makes the perspective of a strong liberal party appear less evident, especially in the short
term. Voters are also aware of the fact that the electoral system and the “rules of the game”
are established by existing rivals in order to block the access of a (potential) liberal party.
• “ Yes, there could be one, but hardly an influential one. There is unlikely to be a liberal
government again. Unlikely… at least not soon.” (BG)
• “So far there seems to have been an inability to create a credible liberal party. Even when
such parties emerge, they disqualify themselves over time. I get the impression that no more
rules apply beneath the label of liberalism and freedom. ”(SK)
• “ I think safety is crucial. They don’t give people the security offered by either the conservatives
or the left. They don’t reinforce what people want, what they want to lean on and take for
granted. ”(CZ)
• “ Once ODS, and CSSD the second time, and people are simply afraid. They come to vote,
throw in a ballot paper and don’t think about it at all.” (CZ)
• “ The problem is rather that our electoral system is bad, people are afraid to choose small
parties because they have no chance.” (CZ)
The insights from the evaluation of the potential of liberal parties in terms of voters and
general support show us that the public is aware of the need for a liberal party, but on the
other hand is quite pessimistic about the real success of these parties in the short term. The
lack of liberal tradition is underlined by most respondents, which confirms our analysis of
the historical background in those countries and also shows that most voters are aware of
this weakness.
It is however interesting to note the distance perceived by voters between them and the
political elites, and their passive attitude towards these processes. The electorate is “waiting”
for a new party to emerge, but does not necessarily consider itself as part of this process,
and society is viewed in a fatalistic manner: even where there is a need for such a party,
voters feel helpless to influence this process. This defeatist vision is very characteristic
of voters in CEE countries, who still perceive a gap between their own opinions and
desires and the development of society and politics, as if they have no possibility of really
participating in them or changing them. Partly because of this passive attitude, most
parties are created by the political elites in these countries. This attitude, however, does not
imply a lack of clear vision as regards liberal strategy or the concrete measures to be taken
by liberal parties both in terms of general politics and concrete proposals. We will examine
this in the next sub-section.
2. What strategy for liberal parties: expectations and

recommendations
In this second sub-section of the report, we will analyse the expectations of liberal voters
in terms of political strategy for liberal parties, and in terms of specific goals and proposals
which they consider crucial for the success of these political actors. We will start with the
general strategy as perceived by the electorate.
General strategy
The general strategy for liberal parties is composed of several different elements,
according to voters. The first important insights are related to the political behaviour and
communication of liberal parties. The first and perhaps most important recommendations
are to be honest and to keep political promises, to avoid corruption and to be transparent
and effective. These features can be related to any political party in these countries and do
not particularly concern liberal parties, but they are significant because they are the main
cause of disappointment and the subsequent decline of political parties (see chapter V.2).
• “far behind the moral principles, the ideals and the integrity of their ancestors.”(RO)
• “ To be open to the public, but honestly. Less glitz, and as few promises as possible. In today’s
society it is not possible to promise, that has to stop. An honest view of the party in society,
but that would be nearly utopia.” (CZ)
• “ Transparent behaviour. Behave morally, but if it happens, as in every other party, that there’s
someone who doesn’t, it’s important to face it and say that this is unacceptable. We don’t
want him, he should resign. No sweeping of problems under the carpet! ”(CZ)
• “Clear goals and a clear direction.” (CZ)

• “Learn how to speak in simple terms so that people understand what a liberal has to say.” (SK)
It is important to underline the fact that such attitudes and expectations often facilitate
the populist discourse in these countries and can also explain why voters often turn to
new parties emerging on the political scene. We will discuss this in more detail in the final
subsection, but it is essential to keep in mind that this “moral” aspect of politics is often
much more important to voters than concrete policies. The evaluation of governments and
parties is often based primarily on honesty, integrity and transparency.
The second part of the remarks on the general strategy liberal parties must follow is related
to their positioning on the political scene, and the general values on which liberal parties
should concentrate their efforts. In most cases, their place is perceived as centre-right, a
counter-weight for conservative parties, and as defenders of the free economy and human
rights. These principles correspond to the core idea of liberalism presented in the previous
section (on the perception of liberalism) and are consistent with the ideal type of liberal
movement as understood by voters in these countries.
• “ I believe that we ought to return to the idea of a small or weak state; not weak in the sense
of powerlessness, but in that it would not be a hypertrophic state and would not use its
regulatory mechanisms to interfere in with all spheres. ”(SK)
• “ All centrist parties, centre-left, centre-right, should be liberal. All parties outside the two
polarities.” (BG)
• “liberals ought to protect parliamentary democracy and the values linked to this political
system, as – typically for Slovakia – there is often an attitude that doesn’t respect the legal
state. ”(SK)
These proposals for the principles and the place to be occupied by liberal parties prove
that there is a basic understanding of the most important tasks of a liberal party, but no
clear vision in terms of more specific interests or issues that concern a substantial part of
the population. This overall evaluation partly explains why these voters have no strong
attachment to any existing party, because they do not have a precise idea of what they
expect apart from general integrity and a more centrist positioning on the political scene
(the respondents did not define the meaning of this position, which probably derives from
the dominance of conservative and left-wing parties and can be understood as the middle
ground between the two main ideologies).
The second conclusion we can draw from this is that voters are influenced in their views by
the development of existing liberal parties and they tend to think of liberalism in relation
to this past experience. Both the recommendations in terms of integrity and honesty and
the idea of a centrist movement are related to existing liberal parties and their positioning
and mistakes in the past. In order to understand more precisely the substance of their
expectations, we will now turn to the specific proposals for policies or strategies which
emerged in the general discussion.
Specific proposals
In this sub-section, we will turn to the concrete proposals formulated by liberal voters
during the interviews and focus groups. The areas on which most respondents focussed
are taxes and the regulation of the market, the stimulation of local business, solving
problems related to education and healthcare, and defending legislation on human rights
protection. Most of these issues are simply mentioned by the participants without a precise
idea of exactly what liberal parties should do, or what concrete measures should be taken.
Once again, we can conclude that these recommendations can be addressed to any party
and are not directly related to a specific political entity. They simply synthesise the most
important issues for liberal voters in general.
• “ Make it easier to set up a business. There is a useless amount of laws and permits which one
has to arrange before ever starting a business.” (CZ)
• “Simplify the tax system.” (CZ)
• “Liberals cannot be indifferent about politics, since such indifference means that individuals
surrender to the political forces and streams that threaten their freedom … I therefore
appreciate those people speaking up publicly and standing for liberal democratic values.” (SK)
• “ To solve the problems in the social and pension system, to deal with the long-term
commitments which we have towards future generations of tax payers.” “To reduce the
massive inequality ... There are entire areas that have been neglected – education, healthcare,
public services, etc. ”(SK)
The terms in which voters express their concerns on specific issues are quite vague and
related to the general strategy of liberal parties as viewed by voters (less state regulation,
human rights). The fact that they have no clear proposals also means that these issues
are not sufficiently politicised by liberals in the respective countries. This can lead us to
the conclusion that the lack of translation of liberal ideology into concrete vision and
strategy obstructs the clear differentiation of these actors from other political parties
(especially conservatives) and can eventually explain why voters lack attachment or
loyalty to specific parties.
This can also help us draw a general conclusion on the way politics is perceived in this
region. Apart from the passive attitude we have mentioned earlier, the only politicised
issues are not “political” as such, but more concerned with the personal behaviour
of politicians and good governance and integrity rather than concrete policies. This
weakness is part of the instability of liberal movements, and can also explain the lack of
initiative on salient issues from the electorate’s side: voters are not interested in specific
policies but tend to choose the right politician (on a personal basis) who will take the
right decisions for them and improve the situation in general. These primary conclusions
can lead us to ask about the failure of liberal parties and to see if voters are indeed
following the same logic when assessing this process.
3. Reasons for the failure of liberal parties

This section of the study focuses on the reasons for the weakness of liberal parties in the
CEE countries (while Romanian PNL remains an exception in terms of electoral success,
some of these features also apply to the Romanian case and were confirmed by the
Romanian respondents. For this reason, we will analyse these features in a common
framework, keeping in mind that they didn’t provoke the same negative effect in Romania
as elsewhere in the CEE). We can distinguish three different levels on which voters express
their disappointment and resentment, which are the main causes for parties failing:
political parties in general, the existing liberal parties in the country as a whole, and the
mistakes of specific parties. We will assess these three levels separately.
Political parties in general and their malfunction

These parts of the answers of the respondents concern a global evaluation of the
political system and the parties as main actors. Even if this perception is not directly
related to liberal parties, it can give us a general overview of the attitude towards parties
and the reasons for the general disappointment of voters. Most respondents point to
corruption scandals and the lack of effectiveness of political parties as well as the lack of
concern as regards the real problems of ordinary people. Parties are perceived as distant
organisations, created in most cases for the sake of their leaders’ ambitions and without
any connection with their constituency.
• “ We can’t speak any more of parties that truly follow their principles. Most of them are
interested in catching as many voters as they can and they propose many populist or
socialist policies. Yet inside every party, there are intellectual circles, discussion forums, that
discuss and even promote genuine political ideas, but these ideas or principles are difficult to
implement in real politics.” (RO)
• “ An association has recently been formed by people harmed by the state. These are people
who ran their own businesses and fell foul of different state bodies, such as the prosecutor’s
office or tax offices, mostly without it being their fault, just due to some negligence on the part
of those bodies. This group is very sizeable, and they could be significant because this freedom
is so basic. We’re not talking about big incidents. If a man is helpless against a tax office or
employment office or other such organisation then you can’t build liberalism, as the man is
exposed to persecution on the part of the state (...) They might be the true liberals.” (PL)
• “I would say there is one more thing that we lack quite substantially, in all parties: vision.
Here it basically does not exist. In the West, there are countries where politicians say that the
country will be such and such, and will carry this out, but here there’s just chaos and there is no
party which can say what will happen in twenty years, what will happen in thirty years.” (CZ)
• “ They have different platforms…all defending different goals. However…all go in for
jiggery-pokery... making us feel like idiots…” (BG)
• “Basically, if we read their election platforms, everything is absolutely one and the same. It’s
up to us who to believe.” (BG)
The second important aspect to be underlined in this general overview of voter
disappointment is their impression that politicians do not keep their promises. Even if
parties present a pertinent and persuasive political platform during the election campaign,
they do not put their promises into practice and therefore they are not worth voting for.
This voter perception can on the one hand be linked to the vague and unclear messages
delivered by political parties which promise to solve all the problems of society, but only in
very general terms, and which finally fail to achieve a significant result because they had no
clear idea (or proposal) of how to achieve it. On the other hand, voters consider that they
are being misled because they have very high expectations, due to their idealistic approach
to politics (see chapters V.1 and V.2).
This general lack of trust and the vicious cycle of high expectations and disappointment
can also explain the lack of loyalty to a specific political party and the tendency to vote for
different parties in each election. Since the vote is based on personal trust for one politician
and his promises (but not on specific proposals and policies), the whole responsibility then
lies with the party to implement its promises and achieve results, regardless of method.
This is part of the passive attitude to politics which we mentioned earlier. Furthermore,
this negative attitude towards parties in general explains the success of populist ideas in
many of these countries. If we turn to liberal parties in particular, we can supposedly find
the same logic.
Reasons for the failure of liberal parties in general

The first striking feature which appears when respondents are asked to identify the reasons
for the failure of liberal parties is the fact that many of them do not recognise any party
as truly liberal, according to their perception of liberalism (apart from Romanian voters).
This answer also means that even though the notion of liberalism remains vague to them
and is not related to any specific policies, most voters evaluate the parties under this label
in terms of ideals and principles of liberalism, and the fact that parties’ behaviour fails to
correspond to these principles disqualifies them as representatives of this ideology.
• “ Which of these parties are liberal? None in principle, given that liberalism represents certain
intellectual and value-based traditions. That is the key – we need certain traditions and time
to develop values so that we can consider them later to be a natural part of Slovak society.
However, what we experience is the absence of tradition and frequent experimentation. It is
logical that people involved in those experiments are not seen as true bearers of the idea of
liberalism.” (SK)
• “ I don’t see anyone among the current politicians who would be a liberal as I understand
it.” (SK)
• “Don’t consider any Slovak politician to be a liberal promoting liberal values.” (SK)
• “I don’t know about any Bulgarian liberal party...” (BG)
• “Even if there is such a thing (a liberal party), it has not explained these (liberal) values.” (BG)
This particular disappointment and the lack of identification with any liberal party is a
consequence of the idealised image of the “liberal party” in the perception of voters:
they base their evaluation on the policies of existing liberal parties and find a mismatch
between the ideological principles (even if parties do not always refer to them directly) and
the policies put in place. This vision is also partly related to the corruption scandals which
further delegitimise the political elite and confirm the conviction that in general politicians
defend only their own interests and liberal politicians are no exception to this rule. Even in
the case of Romanian PNL the voters point to the same “egocentric” logic.
• “ The primary objective of all the party activists in Romania – including the liberals – is to
make money from politics.” (RO)
• “ Well, it’s obvious that they are apathetic…No one cares what’s going on. No one tries to
change anything and that’s because everyone expects it to be extremely difficult. In Bulgaria
it is well known that everything happens due to nepotism.” (BG)
• “ Liberal today is just a label. To some it is very negative, but to some politicians it is quite the
opposite – they want to call themselves liberals and to join international liberal networks in
order to gain some legitimacy. Yet they aren’t very liberal in their politics.” (SK)
• “Everyone’s a liberal at election time.” (BG)
The last important element to be taken into account when analysing the weakness and
failure of liberal parties in the CEE countries is the lack of a clear and comprehensive
message and efficient policies. Parties either do not take part in political debate or fail to put
their promises into practice, and do not defend liberal values. This part of voters’ evaluation
concerns both electoral campaigns and the period spent in parliament or in office. These
two aspects are related to the poor image of politicians as corrupt and incapable, but are
more related to the results as such, or political communication in general.
• “ Liberals in Bulgaria do not have a clear position with regard to the role of the government
in regulating market relationships.” (BG)
• “And what did they do (the parties presenting themselves as liberal)? They did nothing. Tell
me at least one thing!” (BG)
• “...there is nothing about that which is liberal. I cannot see anything done to benefit
anyone… they talk about things that don’t happen.” (BG)
• “ The liberal right bankrupted itself in Slovakia particularly because it proved incapable of
dialogue, unable to compromise within the framework of values which it represented.” (SK)
• “ Liberal politics in Slovakia has mostly been carried out by people who were either outside
politics or were in other political parties.” (SK)
• “ In a number of economic areas as well as in politics they have promoted measures that
have conflicted with liberal principles. They have created oligopolies or cartel structures in a
number of sectors of the economy.” (SK)
This assessment leads us to the conclusion that the disappointment of liberal voters in
CEE countries is related to three aspects of the activities of liberal parties: their electoral
message, the implementation of their policies, and the personal qualities of politicians.
A strategy for reconstruction of these parties should therefore make a considerable effort
to construct a clear and understandable message and specific policy measures which
should further be implemented and prove to be effective, and to recruit and select leaders
who can inspire trust and loyalty in the voters, mainly by adopting responsible behaviour.
As underlined above, this disappointment is not restricted to liberal parties and can be
applied to other parties as well, but there are some specific features which are more
characteristic in the case of this political family. The first is the unclear political stance,
which is unique to liberal parties, since they often position themselves in the political
centre and in this area they have difficulty in distinguishing themselves from conservative
right-wing parties. This weakness further increases the confusion of voters in terms of party
positioning and evaluation. The second characteristic of the liberal family in the region
concerns the discrepancy between the principles of liberalism and the concrete policies
of some of the parties which tend to be leftist or inconsistent. The Romanian case can be
considered as an exception, even though many of these features are present and apply to
PNL as well. In order to understand the specific critiques addressed to existing parties, we
will analyse them separately in the next subsection.
Reasons for the failure of existing liberal parties in the four CEE
countries2
The reasons for the weakness (and decline) of existing liberal parties can be found in several
different aspects of their activities. Starting with the ideological level, respondents identify
a number of wrong moves, which can finally lead to a lack of trust and decline of the
party. The second aspect which should be taken into account concerns the personalities
in these parties (or the lack of personalities) and their weaknesses. The last two aspects
underlined by voters are mistakes in terms of strategy over specific issues, and performance
in government. As in the previous section, these aspects cover both the period of the
electoral campaign and political management when they are in office. We will present
each of these aspects separately in this subsection, in order to distinguish more precisely
the weaker points in each.
1. Political programme. There are basically three important dimensions to the criticism
regarding the programmes of liberal parties in these five countries. The three aspects
concern firstly the fact that many parties adopt a more left-wing orientation and
2 This part takes into account mostly the parties in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Poland and Czech Republic. The
Romanian case in an exception and only some of these insights are applicable to it.
therefore “betray” liberal values; secondly, the programmes of parties are often quite
vague and unclear to voters, and finally, in their political stance parties do not always
respect the basic values of liberalism as seen by their supporters.
The first aspect concerns the “crossing” of an important cleavage between left and right
by many parties in the region, which voters perceive as a mistake. This situation is often
related to a coalition with a left-wing party, but can also be related to a general strategy
of capturing the “centrist” voter from both the right and left of the spectrum. Despite
the potential gains of such a strategy, it can prove harmful in terms of support.
• “I put my faith in their leader (J. Palikot), when the left ceases to play its current role.
Now the RP is a party which is leaning in the direction of the extreme left. It’s a tactical
measure. Defining themselves in the centre is currently pointless for them. They aim
at achieving the same monopoly on the left as PiS has on the right. If RP destroys SLD,
then the liberal voices will perhaps be heard.” (PL)
• “ The Freedom Union and the ODA, they promised everything possible, but there was
no action. Simply, it was the same as today. The programme was bad.” (CZ)
• “ The DPS tries to win the greatest political and economic advantage by playing
the role of an appeaser and a strategic element in preserving ethnic peace. And by
positioning itself in the centre it becomes a pleasant courtship partner.” (BG)
The second criticism addressed to political programmes is their lack of clarity and the
fact that liberal parties cannot define their own specific political platform, and often
present programmes quite similar to those of other right-wing parties. This increases
the difficulty of understanding their true identity and the meaning of liberal values,
especially when the notion as such remains quite vague and does not build on a
specific cleavage or historical tradition. This aspect is important in order to understand
better the weakness of these parties in the long term, because it proves that their
communication strategy fails to elaborate a distinctive image and political identity.
The centrist orientation of liberal parties and their coalition-building strategy can
also confuse voters and give them the impression that these politicians have no real
ideology. If we turn back to the identification of liberal parties in each of the countries
(see above), this lack of a clear message can also account for the fact that many liberal
voters cannot identify any liberal party in their country.
• “ Basically they didn’t say anything different from ODS. They had the same
programme.” (CZ)
• “ They had an electoral stand here, and one of their representatives told me that
democracy is not really important; the only thing that is important is freedom. So I
do not think this is the indication of a liberal, but rather an inclination towards the
right.” (CZ)
• “ Their liberalism is quite artificial; it is attached to the surface in a few selected areas
which the party wants to – in a way – parasitise.” (SK)
• “... not Kuneva party. It is still impossible to know towards which side of the political
spectrum they will lean.” (BG)
• “ TOP 09, but their programme didn’t seem to me to be very revolutionary.” (CZ)
The third aspect in terms of criticism of specific parties is also related to a common
general feature of liberal parties, mentioned above. After emerging on the political
scene, liberal parties enter parliament (or government) and liberal voters expect them to
put into practice their promises and to implement a true liberal agenda. Unfortunately,
their supporters are often disappointed in the results and stop considering a given
party as truly liberal. This criticism also relates to what has already been discussed in
more general terms about liberal parties and political formations in this region. Voters
have high expectations (or share an idealistic view of possible outcomes) and then find
themselves disenchanted by the real situation after the elections. This process leads to
a de-legitimisation of political parties as credible actors as well as a weakening of self-
identification with a specific party, and puts its liberal identity into question.
• “ The problem with politicians is that … they can differentiate between three levels
of liberalism – economic, political and value-based. Yet I don’t think that is possible.
Someone who chooses only the economic aspect of liberalism and claims to be a
liberal, is not an authentic liberal to me. … There are many economic liberals in the
SaS.” (SK)
• “ The SaS declares itself to be a liberal party, but I think it is a party of economic
nationalism which is very non-liberal.” (SK)
• “ They left it too late. They made the same mistake as the Greens, when they were in
government. For a long time they made compromises. ”(CZ)
• “Of politicians within the recent decade it is perhaps Richard Sulík and his fellow party
members from the SaS – within our context they are no doubt liberally-oriented.
Western liberals, however, have a stronger European accent.” (SK)
2. Leadership and personalities. The second dimension to be found in the specific

critiques of certain parties is their lack of strong leaders with charismatic or well-known
personalities. In the opinion of the voter, a successful party should not only have a clear
and well-defined programme, but also a “face”, embodying the movement in the public
space and also ensuring internal stability and cohesion inside the group. Liberal parties
in CEE often lack personalities, especially in the first stages of their emergence on the
political scene. This is perceived by respondents as an important reason for their lack of
success. Personal charisma is important not only because liberal parties need to speak
with one voice in front of the public, but also because this can compensate for the lack
of a clear programme and statement (as seen in the previous section).
• “I know a guy who said he was liberal. He hasn’t said it for the last two years, though.
His name is Donald Tusk. Once I read his article entitled ‘I’m a liberal’.” (PL)
• “ I think Mr. Palikot, who is supposedly a liberal, is not entirely fair to everyone. He attacks
right-wing politicians strongly, and shows more support for left-wing ones.” (PL)
• “ They lacked personalities. They couldn’t achieve a break-through.” (CZ)
• “ They had some personalities, stronger than in other parties, but there were more of
them, while the ODS had a strong leader. It depends on what leader they had.” (CZ)
• “ Yet the VPN failed to transform itself into a political party and in political marketing,
where it showed a lack of political ability among the genuine intellectuals.” (SK)
Furthermore, we can see that the personalisation of politics as a distinctive feature of
this region has led not only to weakness in certain movements, but also to an over-
personalisation of politics (especially in some populist parties, which built very much
on the reputation and rating of their leader), which makes competition even harder
for new liberal parties with weak or unknown leaders. On the other hand, the mistakes
of a single person can often provoke the failure of the whole party (or government),
especially when the leader is involved, because he takes personal responsibility for the
matter in the view of voters.
3. Scandals of corruption and mismanagement. The third important aspect of voter
disappointment in specific liberal parties in the different countries is related to bad
management and scandals involving the abuse of power and clientelism or corruption.
This phenomenon is one of the main reasons for the lack of trust in political parties
and institutions in general in CEE countries. Liberal parties, especially those which
have already taken part in government, are involved in these scandals and often leave
office discredited (which can lead to a further rapid decline, especially for recently
created parties which have no strong roots in society). According to respondents, these
allegations of illegal activities can prove fatal in terms of trust and support. This aspect
once again proves that the general logic of parties losing legitimacy as outlined above
is valid also in specific cases.
• “Successful project. But which didn’t reach fulfilment. Scandals.” (CZ)
• “ To me it’s exciting, even today, because it was really the second attempt to bring
about the ‘velvet revolution’, and people were enthusiastic. It was a breath of fresh air
for young people. Such great expectations. The fact that there were unknown people,
except John, didn’t bother me particularly, I wanted to do away with those who
showed they could easily be bought, were power-hungry, or corrupt, etc.” (CZ)
• “ They (NMSS/D) were in government, but did they show anything important to prove
that they are a liberal party?… only declarations.” (BG)
• “ People are disappointed and will not vote for them, they will end up like the Greens.
They will just come to an end.” (CZ)
• “ We don’t have a genuine liberal political party in Slovakia today. All attempts have
failed. Today the SaS comes close, but in real politics the Sulíks have shown their
limitations and eventually contributed to the fall of the government.” (SK)
• “I believe it was the VPN that proved most genuine and honest at the very beginning.” (SK)
This logic of trust and deception can also account for the “rotation” of liberal parties in
these countries. If the liberal electorate exists and tends to vote for a liberal party - if
such exists on the political scene - then the leaders can profit from the failure of one
liberal party in order to create another which can further occupy this niche. The general
strategy of new parties can also include coalition with rivals or other bargaining, and
can sometime have a negative effect on support.
4. Party strategy. The last element of criticism expressed by supporters in the debate on
individual cases concerns the strategy of liberal parties (on a short-term basis). Some of
their decisions or moves are considered as a mistake by voters and possibly one of the
reasons for their failure. The examples cover both alliances and coalitions with another
party and the general strategy the party uses to gain votes and to maintain its internal
stability. This last aspect is very specific in each case and we cannot draw a general
conclusion, but we must underline that it is also present in the evaluation of supporters
and should be taken into consideration.
• “ The party was constructed as a managerial project, ingeniously constructed, it really

succeeded. One could not believe how they emerged. So it is admirable ...” (CZ)
• “It’s a difficult situation because if they want to stay in government, they have to leave
the VV. But they were elected as VV candidates, so should remain in that party.”(CZ)
• “ Today, in the narrower technocratic orientation, there are some politicians from the
SaS. In the past there was also a group of politicians from the Alliance of the New
Citizen … Some SDKÚ-DS politicians also belong to the liberal stream – the former
Prime Minister Iveta Radičová, particularly in terms of liberal constitutionalism.” (SK)
Assessment of the specific criticism addressed to liberal parties in each country
showed us that we can find the same topics and the same aspects of weakness as in
the general perception of liberal parties or political actors. There are no specific issues
on which liberal parties are more vulnerable than their rivals, apart from the vagueness
of their ideological stance and the fact that they often occupy a centrist position, which
leads them to compromise in terms of policy implementation, further weakening the
voter’s identification with them.
Conclusion
There are three important aspects on which supporters evaluate political parties and
which can be viewed as the main reasons for their failure. The first aspect is related to the
programme and the ideological stance of a party, which should not only correspond to the
global perception of liberalism (in the view of the voter), but should also be more specific
and propose tangible measures and policies in the most important areas. This aspect is
particularly important for liberal parties in this region, which seem to struggle to elaborate
a clear and distinctive message and to explain to their voters the core of their ideals and
principles. The ideological aspect is also important in reinforcing party identity, because
in these countries they face strong challengers from the right, who can benefit from this
weakness and position themselves as the main representatives of the right-wing electorate.
Therefore, the first and most important feature for voters is a clear and consistent political
message. This can also be related to the idea of what liberal parties must support and
implement as policies, which can lead voters to consider them as “false liberals” if they do
not correspond to this initial expectation.
The second important feature which provokes criticism and disappointment in supporters
is the lack of integrity and corruption among political elites. This is a tendency which is not
confined only to right-wing parties, but can be very harmful in their case as well, especially
given their weakness in terms of loyal support in the long term. The notion of integrity
means not only being honest and not profiting from public service in their own interests,
but also sticking to liberal principles and keeping electoral promises. This responsibility,
combined with accountability and transparency, is the second most significant weakness
of liberal parties in the region (and of all the other parties) and explains why often a
mandate in office can prove fatal for the image and support of one party (see all the liberal
parties in the four countries, with the notable exception of Romania).
The last significant element underlined by supporters as a reason for the failure of
liberal parties, is the wrong strategy and the lack of popular and well-known personalities.
This conclusion is especially important for newly-created parties which fail to achieve
significant success. An effort should be made not only to devise a coherent strategy,
but also to find the right person, able to communicate easily with the electorate and to
manage the party organisation. This last aspect will be further analysed in the final section
of this report, in which we turn to the views and perceptions of party members as to the
reasons for the failure of liberal parties in the region.
4. Reasons for the failure of liberal parties:

the insiders’ view3
The last section of this report builds on interviews with party members and officials on the
question of party weakness and failure. This self-assessment is very valuable, because it
can give an insight into how political elites and officials perceive the internal weakness of
their own parties, and be compared with the conclusions drawn from the interviews with
voters and supporters. This section is divided into three sub-sections, taking into account
the main aspects underlined in the interviews and also linked with the voters’ assessment
of weaknesses. The first sub-section deals with ideology, the second presents the strategy
of these parties and the last covers the issues of internal organisation.
3 In this sub-section, we present the results from the five countries included in the study. Even though
the Romanian PNL is a rather successful party, it suffers from similar “weaknesses” as the parties in the
other four CEE countries and that is why we will include it in the overall assessment.
Ideological perspective
The first striking feature of party members’ perception of liberalism is the fact that
they tend to speak in terms of strategy and not in terms of ideology. Their views are
often more related to specific issues than to a general political vision for the future of
the country, which can also explain why they have difficulty in constructing clear and
consistent programmes. When asked about their own convictions, they often respond in
very general terms, without elaborating on the significance of the ideas they convey. This
can leave the impression that ideological issues are not thoroughly discussed in party
circles and that their efforts are more concentrated on short-term electoral strategy,
which can result in vague and unclear programmes and policy proposals which hardly
go beyond common principles.
• “ We’re closer to a fresher line of thought, we’re carefully observing the Occupy Movements
around the whole world (…) we want to examine things in depth, not be blinkered(…) we
don’t want to be labelled just as defenders of the market economy, we have a feeling that
liberalism is becoming something entirely new today, during the crisis.” (PL)
• “ The change from a more ideological party actually started when Valeriu Stoica, a genuine
ideologist, stepped aside and let Theodor Stolojan become party leader. Stolojan turned the
party into more of a vote-gaining machine. This was helped by the fact that we allied at
some point with the DP (now the D-LP), which was a vote-seeking party, and this forced us
to behave the same.” (RO)
• “ We are the liberals among politicians (SaS).” (SK)
• “Liberal politicians can be divided between those within our party (the SaS) and politicians
from other parties.” (SK)
This first important conclusion also confirms our insights from the previous sections, not
only as regards the electorate and its disappointment at the lack of vision, but also more
generally that the education and recruitment of political elites is not linked to any sort
of ideological grounding and therefore they can be ill-prepared to face the challenges
of an electoral campaign and government responsibilities. If the notion of liberalism is
not clear even to politicians (apart from identification with the ideology) then we cannot
expect them to transmit it and explain it to their voters, or to recognise actions that do not
correspond to its principles. The general reasoning still remains confined around the short-
term strategy for many of the party members interviewed.
Party strategy
The mistakes in terms of party strategy follow a similar logic to the one identified when
considering the ideological aspect. The general assessment is linked more closely to
ineffectual communication with voters on certain issues (or in general), and fails to take
into account more important issues such as policy implementation or responsiveness.
Once again, the interesting aspect derives from the fact that even inside liberal parties,
strategy is made and thought of in the short term, as a sort of reaction to the political
moves of other parties or at best as a way of attracting voters for the next elections. This
confirms the previous conclusion as to the need to create internal structures uniting
experts who can elaborate a long-term vision and policy proposals or analysis, and not
simply immediate solutions in difficult periods.
• “everything is down to [their] power to mobilise the citizens against Băsescu.”(RO)
• “barely legal replacement of the chairs of both chambers and the ombudsman, and the
impeachment of the President in a blitzkrieg move.”(RO)
• “People need something new – they need us to notice that there are new social problems,
new phenomena (…) We have to talk about single people, single women and their
problems, about what’s going on now. Instead, we’re still talking as if it’s the mid 90s and
we’re trying to push the country into the EU.”(PL)
• “ We failed to grasp it in terms of communication and got steamrollered by the media.” (SK)
• “ We didn’t fight hard enough and have replaced this goal with something entirely
different.” (SK)
• “... In our case we didn’t leave enough time for the civil society to develop…. It simply doesn’t
exist.” (BG)
The lack of clear strategy is therefore confirmed by the way respondents treat this issue and
allows us to conclude that this should be one of the priorities for parties in this region if they
want to enjoy long-term success. Many big conservative parties in these countries face a
similar problem, but they do not suffer the lack of legitimacy because they can manipulate
existing cleavages better than liberal parties. The lack of long-term strategy also explains
why in periods of crisis the leadership of these parties seems overwhelmed, and is unable
to find a rapid solution and avoid splits or electoral decline. This leads us to the last point
in our internal assessment: the perception of weaknesses in terms of party organisation.
Internal organisation
In terms of internal organisation, the most common aspect shared by party members is the
feeling that the leadership does not allow individual members any personal initiative, and
the whole structure of relationships inside the party is dominated by the determination
of some members to have a rapid political career. This disappointment particularly
affects young party members, who face not only a strict and in some cases authoritative
hierarchy, but who are pessimistic as to their own career in the long term. The lack of future
perspective or objective evaluation of the capacities and abilities of each member of the
party can also provoke splits and internal crises, and explains why liberal parties in this
region are extremely weak in terms of party organisation. These tendencies become even
more tangible when the party is in office and therefore in a position to distribute the posts
of party officials.
• “No, because it’s awfully unrewarding. You need a strong stomach. You need to keep your
wits about you, and keep up.”(CZ)
• “door-knocking during electoral campaigns and carrying MPs’ briefcases.” (RO)
• “No one else will ever help you get where you want to go.” (RO)
• “ the most important thing you have to do is watch your back and get rid of all possible rivals,
as you’re in Romania.” (RO)
This internal weakness and mismanagement can be seen as one of the main problems
of liberal parties in the CEE countries. Even though some of them have very complex and
elaborate constitutions including intermediate bodies and with controls and checks, in
practice there are still many tangible problems and tensions between party members and
the leadership. This situation not only provokes splits and scandals inside the party, but
it can also have a very negative impact on the motivation of younger members, who are
indispensable for the longevity and stability of any organisation.
General conclusions
As underlined in the different sections of this report, the weakness of liberal parties in this
region can be explained by several factors. The first important factor is related to the lack
of a historical tradition of liberalism before the Second World War and therefore a lack of
clear reference to a specific model (or ideology) to serve as an example and legitimise the
new liberal parties after 1989. The only exception to this rule is Romania, which is also the
only country in which liberals found fertile ground to build a strong organisation. In other
countries, the liberal tradition was linked to fragmented and personalised movements
(Bulgaria) or a foreign tradition (Czech Republic and Slovakia). The legacy of dissident
movements (Poland and Czech Republic) proved to be more of an obstacle than an asset
for the new parties because it created internal tensions and cleavages as to the perception
of liberalism, democracy and the role of political parties in general. This context constitutes
the first structural factor which can explain the weakness of liberal parties in this region.
The second important factor is the perception of liberalism among voters and their
evaluation of parties’ political achievements. The notion of liberalism remains vague
and undefined to the public, and even though many of them are in favour of its basic
principles (such as human rights protection, free markets and tolerance), they have no
specific requirements or recommendations. This lack of clarity can account for voters’
disappointment after elections, because they believe that liberal parties have not kept
their promises, while evaluating their performance only on the basis of general principles.
Furthermore, the most important quality of a party and a politician in the view of the
voter turns out to be honesty and personal integrity. Most liberal formations in the region
suffer precisely from this form of de-legitimisation, because their members and MPs
become involved in scandals of corruption and bad management, resulting in a decline
in electoral support. Furthermore, this lack of a clear and comprehensive programme and
suitable behaviour provokes a backlash in voter identification; they cease to consider these
parties as liberal, because they do not correspond to their ideal of a liberal party. Apart
from coalition scandals, some policies or coalitions with left-wing parties can also provoke
similar distrust in voters.
The third important factor of decline amongst liberal parties in the region is their internal
instability and fragmentation. Looking at the development of parties belonging to this
political family in CEE during the last two decades, it is apparent that many fail to survive
more than two terms in office. Especially after being in office, and during a period of
electoral decline, these parties are unable to reform their internal structures (being in
opposition) and suffer also from numerous splits and fractions inside the party. The
internal weakness of liberal parties comes also from the fact that they do not develop
active structures beyond the party organisation (youth clubs, women’s associations, trade
unions), nor do they invest in recruitment and professionalisation of party elites capable
of replacing the “old’ and discredited personalities in the leadership and of specialising
in specific areas of competence. As this study has shown, many of the members of these
parties are disappointed by authoritative leadership and the lack of a long-term career
structure. On the other hand, their own inability to develop a clear message and a long-
term strategy comes from the fact that they have no tangible vision of how liberalism
can be implemented in terms of policy measures, and concentrate more on short-term
reactions to political stimuli.
CHAPTER VI
Potential for liberal parties :

voters, values, personalities
and milieu
CHAPTER VI
Potential for liberal parties: voters, values,
personalities and milieu
In spite of difficulties, there is a clear potential for strong liberal parties in the region. This
potential comes from several assets which are crucial for the future development of these
parties. We will assess them separately.
• There is a stable electorate for liberal parties in all CEE countries which shares the
same characteristics and similar values (young, well-educated, urban); this group
represents roughly 10-15% in all the countries included in this study and must be the
principal target group for liberal parties. This electorate is still volatile because of its
disappointment with existing liberal parties, but can be attracted and socialised via a
clear and sufficiently elaborate strategy for long-term commitment. Specific policies
addressing their problems and main concerns is one of the possible ways for creating
loyalty, because they would eventually feel represented by liberal parties.
• Liberal values still enjoy wider support (mostly as regards basic values such as
democracy, human rights, freedom of speech, a liberal market etc.) but the priorities
of liberal parties need to be clearly defined in order to focus on tangible issues and
to avoid the two paradoxes of liberalism in CEE: the conservative attitude of these
societies towards minorities and religious and ethical issues, and the latent support for
a stronger state involvement in liberal politics. This potential is visible in terms of voters’
identification with liberal ideology, but the articulation and instrumentalisation of this
attitude is crucial to attract the long-term support of the electorate. They need practical
solutions to their problems and not simply vague ideals and principles which prove to
be difficult to achieve.
• Liberal intellectuals can be mobilised in projects of education and the transmission
of liberal values, and can participate in the process of the re-legitimisation of liberal
movements together with other structures and external bodies related to those parties.
Many of these intellectuals are already popular and enjoy a reputation which can be
used for the benefit of liberal parties, because they share similar ideas. Even without
going so far as providing direct political support, these personalities can reinforce the
liberal milieu and inspire a new generation of young liberals, devoted to the cause and
willing to take part in political activities.
CHAPTER VI : Potential for liberal parties: voters, values, personalities and milieu 105
• The existing liberal milieu is ineffective and rather elitist in terms of background and
strategy; there is a potential in the existing structures (and for the development of
new ones) in terms of contacts and networks, but these structures and organisations
need to focus much more on the practical problems of citizens and not on theoretical
issues which are irrelevant for most voters. Their primary objective should be to
develop networks and stimulate public debate, but also to educate and spread liberal
ideas. These organisations can also be used for the education and recruitment of new
party members as well as serving as think-tanks to prepare policy proposals and offer
expertise to political parties.
This potential can be mobilised either by existing parties or by newly-created ones and
can constitute a beacon for the future revival of liberalism and liberal parties in the region.
CHAPTER VII
Recommendations
CHAPTER VII
Recommendations
For political parties in different countries

• Develop a clear liberal platform (opposed to conservatism and social “etatism”, focussing
on specific issues which are important for the liberal electorate). This liberal platform
needs to be developed in accordance with the specific features of the national political
scene and to focus on issues representing a “niche” for liberal parties (ethical issues
such as abortion or the defence of minority rights, multiculturalism or a pro-European
attitude, as opposed to conservative parties). This strategy needs to be constructed
while bearing in mind that there is opposition between liberals and other parties on
the political scene, and that the liberal programme needs to be different and distinctive
from that of other political parties.
• Develop specific policy proposals in important areas, where parties are not typically
active: freedom of the press and the media, independent institutions, the fight against
corruption etc. Clear and tangible proposals are lacking in general in the strategy of
political parties in the region. This can become a strength for liberal parties which
campaign on specific problems and then put their proposals into practice with
constructive policies, delivering results to the public. One of the main weaknesses of
parties in these countries has been their inability to stand out and to mobilise their
voters on specific issues.
• Invest in think-tanks and groups which can gather together specialists on specific
subjects and develop clear proposals on policies on the agenda. This needs to be
part of a long-term strategy by liberal parties to create a stable and loyal electoral
base, which is very important especially during an electoral crisis. The liberal milieu
(NGOs, associations etc.) can be used by parties not only to recruit party members
but also to gather expertise and to present policy proposals on specific issues. These
associations can also act as a link between party and voters and provide a valuable
input for policy decisions. The links between these parties and the media are also
very important because they can provide wider access to the public and promote
liberal ideas using debates, and inviting political leaders to discuss these issues on TV,
or by publishing interviews.
• Develop party apparatus (professionals, liberal circles close to the people). Often liberal
parties in the region suffer from a lack of sufficiently trained and prepared party officials
CHAPTER VII : Recommendations 109
who can also be recruited to administrative bodies and other state structures when
the party is in office. Having a well-trained and well-prepared team of party officials
can be a very good base for effective government, and can even help parties play their
role of active opposition in parliament. In most countries included in this study, one of
the biggest problems for liberal parties is the fact that they often split due to internal
quarrels and disagreements. In order to prevent this, a strong and stable party structure
is needed, with a clear division of tasks between officials, and the development of
specific areas of expertise, which can be further used in public administration.
• Prefer the strategy of minor opposition, even for parties joining a coalition in office, in
order to keep a “pure” and clear doctrine, even if compromises are needed. This strategy
is important because due to the centrist position of many liberal parties, they often
have to collaborate with both left and right-wing parties, which in many cases proves
fatal for their electoral support. Even if coalition-building is important, liberal parties
need to defend some of their main principles and policy proposals when they enter
a coalition (even as junior partner) because otherwise voters have the impression that
the most important thing for politicians is staying in office rather than defending their
voters’ interests. This type of behaviour is fatal for the future of liberal parties.
On the European level

• Try to establish a pre-accession period (or associate membership) for parties which
want to join the ALDE Party, in order to eliminate movements and parties which are
built on a personal or “opportunist” basis and serve only the interests of a smaller
group for a certain period. The coherence and defence of true liberalism should be an
important criterion for the admission of parties and for their behaviour as members
of the liberal family. If the admission is made without verification of the motives and
the core identity of the party, then there is the possibility of having small leader-
centred and short-lived parties which join because they are looking for external
legitimacy but which are not clearly defending liberal values; this can be damaging
in terms of image on a European level and there is a risk of potential problems and
scandals associated with this type of party.
• Urge national parties to develop clear strategies for party renewal when in opposition,
and to invest in creating stronger structures capable of resisting the centrifugal
tendencies which arise in this situation. Western parties with a stronger liberal tradition
can serve as an example for their counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe and
help them to build a comprehensive and coherent ideology, based on the common
principles of liberalism but also taking into account the specific country context and the
general lines of liberal politics at European level. Our study has shown that even party
officials and party members in CEE countries are not really aware of the dimensions of
liberal politics beyond the abstract ideas of individual freedom and human rights, and
they can benefit from the advice of other “older” liberal parties in other countries.
• Share the best practices from countries in which liberal parties are successful (Romania).
In some countries in the region liberal parties have succeeded in developing a stronger
and more successful party organisation and in increasing their support over time,
in spite of difficulties and obstacles. Some common seminars and meetings can be
organised between the parties in different countries in order to share knowledge
and good practice as regards party-building, campaigning etc. which can be useful,
because many of these countries share similar problems to which common solutions
can be found.
Abbre viations of part y names 111
Abbreviations of party names

Bulgaria DP (Демократическа партия)
ATAKA (Атака) Coalition Attack Democratic Party
BBB ( Български Бизнес Блок) Bulgarian DPS (Движение за Права и Свободи)

Business Bloc
Movement for Rights and Freedoms
BND ( Българска Нова Демокрация, БНД) (1997: Alliance of National Salvation,
Bulgarian New Democracy
ONS)
BNS
(Български Народен Съюз)
Bulgarian People’s Union DSB
(Демократи за Силна България)
Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria
BSD ( Българска социални демократи)
Bulgarian Social Democrats (1994: GERB (Граждани за Европейско Развитие
Democratic Alliance for the Republic,
на България) Citizens for the
DAR; 1997: Bulgarian Euro-Left, BE;
European Development of Bulgaria
2005: Rose Coalition, KR)
BSP
(Българска социалистическа KPB
(Българска комунистическа
партия) Bulgarian Socialist Party партия) Communist Party of Bulgaria
(1997: Bulgarian Left, BL; 2001-2009:
NMSD (Национално движение за
Coalition for Bulgaria, KB)
стабилност и възход (НДСВ))
BZNS Б ългарски земеделски народен
съюз) Bulgarian Agricultural People’s National Movement for Stability and
Union (1991: Bulgarian National Development
People’s Union - United, BZNS-O)
NMSS (НДСВ) National Movement Simeon
BZNS-AS (Български земеделски народен the Second
съюз- Александър Стамболийски)
Bulgarian Agricultural People’s Union NS (Народен съюз) People’s Union
- Aleksandar Stamboliyski
NSZ (Народен съюз- Звено) National
BZNS-NP (Български земеделски народен Union Zveno
съюз- Никола Петков) Bulgarian
Agricultural People’s Union - Nikola OF
(Отечествен фронт) Fatherland
Petkov Front
BZNS-NS (Български земеделски народен OPT (Отечествена партия на Труда)
съюз- Народен съюз) Bulgarian
Fatherland Party of Labour
Agricultural People’s Union - People’s
Union
PBSD ( Партия на българските социални Czech Republic

демократи) Party of Bulgarian ČMUS ( Českomoravská unie středu) Czech-
Social Democrats (1990+1997-2001: Moravian Centre Union
Bulgarian Social Democratic Party,
ČSNS ( Česká strana národně socialistická)
BSDP; 1991: Union of Democratic
Czech National Social Party (1946-
Forces-Centre, SDS-T)
1992: Czechoslovak Socialist Party,
PKE ( Политически клуб Екогласност) CSS)
Political Club Ecoglasnost
ČSSD ( Česká strana sociálně demokratická)
RDP
(Радикална Демократична партия) Czech Social Democratic Party
Radical Democratic Party
CZ (Cesta Změny) Way of Change
RZS ( Ред, законност, справедливост) DeU (Demokratická unie) Democratic
Order Lawfulness Justice (2001: Union
United Agrarian Forces, OZS; 2005:
HSD-SMS (Hnutí za samosprávnou demokracii
National League-Bulgarian National
- Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko)
People’s Union, NS-BZNS)
Movement for Autonomous
SDP (Българска социалдемократическа Democracy - Party for Moravia and
партия) Social Democratic Party Silesia
SDS ( Съюз на демократичните сили) KDS (Křesťanskodemokratická strana)
Union of Democratic Forces (1997- Christian Democratic Party
2005: United Democratic Forces,
KDU-ČSL (Křesťanská a demokratická unie
ODS; 2009: Blue Coalition, SK)
– Československá strana lidová)
SSD ( Съюз на свободните демократи) Christian and Democratic Union -
Union of Free Democrats Czechoslovak People’s Party (1990:
VMRO-BND ( ВМРО – Българско национално Christian and Democratic Union,
KDU)
движение) Internal Macedonian
Revolutionary Organisation - KSČM
(Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy)
Bulgarian National Movement (2001: Communist Party of Bohemia and
George Day - Internal Macedonian Moravia
Revolutionary Organisation - Bulgarian LDS ( Liberálně demokratická Strana)
National Movement, DG-VMRO) Liberal Democratic Party
ZPB (Зелена партия) Green Party of LIDEM (Liberální Demokraté) Liberal
Bulgaria (1991: Union of Democratic Democrats
Forces - Liberals, SDS-L) LiRa ( Liberální a reformní strana) Liberal
and Reformist Party
Liberals.cz Liberalove.cz TOP09 ( Tradice Odpovědnost Prosperita 09)

ODA ( Občanská demokratická aliance) Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09
Civic Democratic Alliance US-DEU
(Unie svobody - Demokratická unie)
ODS ( Občanská demokratická strana) Freedom Union - Democratic Union
Civic Democratic Party (1998: Freedom Union, US)
OF (Občanské fórum) Civic Forum VV (Věci veřejné) Public Affairs
OH (Obcanské hnutí) Civic Movement
RMS ( Republikáni Miroslava Sládka) Poland
Republicans Miroslav Sladek
AWS (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność)
SD
(Svobodní demokraté) Party of Free Solidarity Electoral Action
Democrats
AWSP
(Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy)
SD-LSNS
(Svobodní demokraté – Liberální
Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right
strana národně sociální) Free
Democrats - Liberal National Social KLD (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny)
Party Liberal-Democratic Congress
SDS (Strana demokratického KPEiR

(Krajowa Partia Emerytów i
socialismu) Party of Democratic Rencistów) National Party of
Socialism (1992-1996: Left Bloc, LB) Pensioners and Retireds
SNK-ED
(Strana nezávislých kandidátů KPEiR RP
(Krajowa Partia Emerytów i
– Evropští demokraté) Party of Rencistów Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej)
independent candidates - European National Party of Pensioners and
Democrats Retireds of Republic of Poland
SOS
(Strana pro otevřenou společnost) LiD (Lewica i Demokraci) Left and
Party for an Open Society
Democrats
SPR-RSC
(Sdružení pro republiku
LPR (Liga Polskich Rodzin) League of
- Republikánská strana
Polish Families
Československa) Association for
the Republic - Republican Party of MN
(Mniejszość Niemiecka) German
Czechoslovakia Minority
SZ (Strana zelených) Green Party NchDBdP (Narodowo-Chrześcijańsko-
SZV (Spojenectví zemědělců a venkova) Demokratyczny Blok dla Polski)
Alliance of Farmers and the National-Christian-Democratic Block
Countryside for Poland
NSZZ “Solidarność” (Niezależny Romania

Samorządny Związek Zawodowy
BPD ( Blocul Partidelor Democrate)
„Solidarność”) Independent Self-
Democratic Parties’ Bloc
governing Trade Union “Solidarity”
CDR
(Convenţia Democrată Română)
PD ( Partia Demokratyczna – demokraci.
Democratic Convention of Romania
pl) Democratic Party
(2000: CDR 2000)
PiS ( Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) Law and
Justice FER ( Federaţia Ecologistă din România)
Ecologist Federation of Romania
PJN ( Polska Jest Najważniejsza) Poland is
The Most Important FP
(Frontul Plugarilor) Ploughmen’s
Front
PO (Platforma Obywatelska) Civic
Platform MER ( Miscarea Ecologista din Romania)
PSL ( Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) Polish Ecological Movement of Romania
People’s Party NLP-DP ( Alianţa Dreptate și Adevăr PNL-PD)
PZPR
(Polska Zjednoczona Partia Truth and Justice Alliance PNL-PD
Robotnicza) Polish United Workers’ PAC ( Partidul Alianţa Civică) Civic Alliance
Party Party
RP (Ruch Palikota) Palikot’s Movement PC
(Partidul Conservator) Conservative
SdPl
(Socjaldemokracja Polska) Social Party (1995-2005: Partidul Umanist
Democracy of Poland Român, PUR; 1996: National Centre
SLD ( Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej) Union, UNC)
Democratic Left Alliance PCR ( Partidului Comunist Român)
SRP
(Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Romanian Communist Party
Polskiej) Self-Defense of the Republic
PDAR ( Partidul Democrat Agrar din
Poland
România) Democratic Agrarian Party
UD
(Unia Demokratyczna) Democratic of Romania
Union
PDL (Partidul Democrat-Liberal)
UP (Unia Pracy) Labour Union Democratic Liberal Party (1993-1996:
UPR ( Unia Polityki Realnej) Real Politics Democratic Party, PD; 1996: United
Union Social Democrats, USD; 1997-2007:
UW (Unia Wolności) Freedom Union Democratic Party, PD)
ZSL ( Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe) PER ( Partidul Ecologist Român) Romanian

United People’s Party Ecological Party
PL93 ( Partidul Liberal 1993) Liberal Party National Unity (1990: Alliance for
1993 (1996: National Liberal Alliance, Romanian Unity, AUR)
ANL) UDMR (Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din
PNL ( Partidul Național Liberal) National România) Democratic Alliance of
Liberal Party Hungarians in Romania
PNL-CD (Partidul Naţional Liberal - Convenţia UFD ( Uniunea Forţelor de Dreapta)
Democrată) National Liberal Party- Union of Righ-Wing Forces (1996:
Democratic Convention Alternative for Romania Party, PAR)
PNL-GT
(Partidul Naţional Liberal- Gheorghe UP (Uniunea Patrioţilor) Patriots’ Union
Tătărescu) National Liberal Party - UPM ( Uniunea Populară Maghiară)
Gheorghe Tătărescu Hungarian People’s Union
PNT-AA (Partidul Naţional Ţărănesc- Anton
Alexandrescu ) National Peasants’
Slovakia
Party - Anton Alexandrescu
ADSR ( Aliancia demokratov Slovenskej
PNT-CD
(Partidul Naţional Ţărănesc Creştin
republiky) Alliance of Democrats of
Democrat) Christian Democratic
the Slovak Republic
National Peasants’ Party
ANO ( Aliancia nového občana) Alliance of
PRM ( Partidul România Mare) Greater
the New Citizen
Romania Party
APR ( Alternatíva politického realizmu)
PSD ( Partidul Social Democrat) Social
Alternative of Political Realism
Democratic Party (1992: Democratic
National Salvation Front, FDSN; 1996- DS (Demokratická strana) Democratic
2001: Romanian Social Democracy Party
Party, PDSR) DS-ODS (Demokratická strana - Občianska
PSDI ( Partidul Social Democrat demokratická strana) Democratic
Independent) Independent Social Party - Civic Democratic Party
Democratic Party (Constantin Titel DU (Demokratická únia) Democratic
Petrescu) Union
PSDR ( Partidul Social Democrat) Romanian HZD ( Hnutie za demokraciu) Movement
Social Democratic Party for Democracy
PSM
(Partidul Socialist al Muncii) Socialist HZDS ( Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko)
Party of Labour Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
PUNR ( Partidul Unităţii Naţionale a KDH ( Konzervatívni demokrati Slovenska)
Românilor) Party of Romanian Christian Democratic Movement
KSČ (Komunistická strana SDKÚ-DS (Slovenská demokratická a

Československa) Communist Party of kresťanská únia – Demokratická
Czechoslovakia strana) Slovak Democratic and
KSS ( Komunistická strana Slovenska) Christian Union - Democratic Party
Communist Party of Slovakia SDSS (Sociálnodemokratická strana
LDU (Liberálnodemokratická únia) Liberal Slovenska) Social Democratic Party
Democratic Union of Slovakia
ĽS-HZDS (Ľudová strana - Hnutie za SF (Slobodné fórum) Free Forum

demokratické Slovensko) People’s Smer-SD
(Smer – sociálna demokracia) Smer -
Party - Movement for a Democratic Social Democracy
Slovakia SMK ( Strana maďarskej koalície)
MK
(Maďarská koalícia) Hungarian Hungarian Coalition Party
Coalition SNS
(Slovenská národná strana) Slovak
MKDH (Maďarské kresťansko-demokratické National Party
hnutie) Hungarian Christian SOP ( Strana občianskeho porozumenia)
Democratic Movement Party of Civic Understanding
MNI ( Maďarská nezávislá iniciatíva) SZ (Strana zelených) Green Party
Hungarian Independent Initiative
VPN ( Verejnosť proti násiliu) Public
MOS ( Maďarská občianska strana) Against Violence
Hungarian Civic Party
ZRS ( Zdruzenie robotníkov slovenska)
NDS–NA (Národnodemokratická strana - Nová Association of Workers of Slovakia
alternatíva) National Democratic
Party - New Alternative
ODÚ (Občiansko-demokratická únia) Civic
Democratic Union
SaS ( Sloboda a Solidarita) Freedom and
Solidarity
SDĽ ( Strana demokratickej ľavice ) Party
of the Democratic Left
SDK ( Slovenská demokratická koalícia)
Slovak Democratic Coalition
SDKÚ ( Slovenská demokratická a
kresťanská únia) Slovak Democratic
and Christian Union
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe seemed like fertile soil for liberal
ideas of freedom and human rights. Some twenty years later, the full potential of liberalism has only
been realised in a few countries, leaving many countries without a properly functioning liberal party
active in the respective parliaments and governments.
This publication – “Liberal Parties in Central and Eastern Europe: Weakness and Potential” – is the
result of a comprehensive research project which is one of the first of its kind in the area, done
jointly by the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Party and professors from leading
universities and research institutes in the region. It attempts to analyze both the successes and
missed opportunities of liberals in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as to point towards future
electoral potential for parties active in these countries and, more broadly, in the concerned region.
Inter alia, this publication attempts to answer the following questions:
What is the current potential for liberal parties in the region?
What are the main reasons for the failure of some liberal parties to reach their full potential?
What could liberal parties in the region improve?
Are there similarities between the countries in the region?
What do the insiders say?
The following persons have been the driving forces behind this publication:
Authors:
Jean-Michel De Waele, Dean, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
Blagovesta Cholova, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
Project Coordinator:
Joakim Frantz, Political Adviser, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Party
National Coordinators and Main Contributors:
Grigorij Mesežnikov, Insitute for Public Affairs (IVO), Bratislava, Slovakia
Sergiu Mişcoiu, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
Anna Pacześniak, Wroclaw University, Poland
Michel Perottino, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic
Antony Todorov, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria

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ThE LIBERAL PARTIES

blagovesta cholova - prof. jean-michel de waele

BLAGOVESTA CHOLOVA - prof. jean-michel de waele

National Coordinators and Main Contributors:

Possible questions can be directed to the ALDE Party on info@aldeparty.eu.

III. Liberal NGOs, think-tanks and media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

IV. Perceptions of liberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

V. Evaluation of liberal parties and the reasons of their failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

VII. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Main objectives of the project

Framework of the research

Structure of the final report

1 CEE : Central and Eastern Europe

Stage I : the period before World War I

Stage II: inter-war period

Stage III : communist rule and the dissidents

Liberal parties in CEE :

1. Development of Liberal parties after 1989

1 CEE : Central and Eastern Europe

Graph II.1, Romania

PNL-CD CDR Young liberals

New liberal party

Table II.1, Romania

1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012

Table II.2, Slovakia

1990 1992 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010

Graph II.2, Slovakia

Graph II.3, Czech Republic

Havel Klaus ODS

1990 1992 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010

Table II.4, Poland

1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007 2011

Graph II.4, Poland

RUCH PALIKOTA - 2011

2005 PD - 2005 SLD SDPL UP

1990 KLD - 1990 UD - 1990

Table II.5, Bulgaria

1990 1991 1994 1997 2001 2005 2009

Graph II.5, Bulgaria

New Times / Novoto vreme

New choice union

The electoral geography of liberal parties in CEE

Map II.1.1, Poland : the above average results of PO in 2001 elections

Map II.1.2, Poland : the above average results of UW in 2001 elections

Map II.1.3, Poland : the above average results of PD in 2005 elections

Map II.1.5, Poland : the above average results of RP in 2011

Map II.2.1, Slovakia : territorial distribution of du electoral support in 1994

Map II.2.2, Slovakia : territorial distribution of SDK electoral support in 1998

Map II.2.3, Slovakia : territorial distribution of ANO electoral support in 2002

Map II.2.4, Slovakia : territorial distribution of sas electoral support in 2010

Map II.3.1, Bulgaria : NMSS in 2001 Parliamentary Elections

Map II.3.2 Bulgaria : NMSD in 2005 Parliamentary Elections

Map II.3.3, Bulgaria : NMSD in 2009 Parliamentary Elections

Map II.3.4, Bulgaria : DPS in 2001 Parliamentary Elections

Map II.3.5, Bulgaria : DPS in 2009 Parliamentary Elections

cartographic source: articque

Where do liberal voters come from: vote transfer

Graph II.6 : Composition of SDK voters in 1998 (in %)

Graph II.7: Composition of ANO voters in 2002 (in %)

13% First-time voters

Graph II.8: Composition of SaS voters in 2010 (in %)

23% Smer SD Others

Source: focus polling agency.

• “Clear goals and a clear direction.” (CZ)

2. Leadership and personalities. The second dimension to be found in the specific

• “ The party was constructed as a managerial project, ingeniously constructed, it really

BBB ( Български Бизнес Блок) Bulgarian DPS (Движение за Права и Свободи)

PBSD ( Партия на българските социални Czech Republic

Liberals.cz Liberalove.cz TOP09 ( Tradice Odpovědnost Prosperita 09)

SDS (Strana demokratického KPEiR

NSZZ “Solidarność” (Niezależny Romania

ZSL ( Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe) PER ( Partidul Ecologist Român) Romanian

KSČ (Komunistická strana SDKÚ-DS (Slovenská demokratická a

ĽS-HZDS (Ľudová strana - Hnutie za SF (Slobodné fórum) Free Forum