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Ambush: Late Empire
PHILIP RANCE
In late Roman sources, the concept of an ambush
(Latin, insidiae; Greek, enedra) encompasses a
broader range of practices and circumstances
than any single English word adequately con-
veys, although concealment and surprise are
common elements. Ambushes were a routine
ingredient of low-intensity defensive operations
to contain barbarian inroads (Amm. Marc.
16.11.4–6; 28.5.1–7; Veg. Mil. 3.9–10, 22; Maur.
Strat. 10.2) and feature in guerrilla tactics
employed against superior enemy forces (Procop.
Wars 7.11.16–18; Agath. 3.7.1–2), but they were
also considered an integral component of pitched
battle. At its simplest, an ambush exploited
obstructed terrain to catch the enemy unawares
or at a disadvantage when traversing forests,
­rivers, or mountain defiles. On the battlefield,
Roman generals used hills, woodland, or hollows
to screen troops, usually cavalry, who emerged
unexpectedly at a critical moment to panic and/
or outflank the enemy (Procop. Wars 1.14.33,
39–43, 15.9–17; 8.31.2, 6–7; Agath. 2.8.3). Such
ambushes could be improvised even in open ter-
rain by concealing units close behind one wing of
the battle line, their flags and spears lowered to
avoid detection (Maur. Strat. 3.14).
Alternatively, a variety of ruses aimed to entice
opponents into making reckless attacks. Late
Roman cavalry were adept at feigning flight in
order to lure opposing forces into pursuit, then
suddenly wheeling about upon their disorganized
pursuers, sometimes in combination with con-
cealed ambushers (Zos. 1.50.3–4; Mal. 18.60, 65;
Agath. 1.22; Maur. Strat. 4.2–3; Th. Sim. 2.17.1;
Geo. Pis. Exp. Pers. 3.186–219; Zonar. 13.5).
Livestock or booty might similarly serve as bait
(Ps.-Josh. 75). In conjunction with such tactics,
commanders could utilize natural obstacles like
marshland (Th. Sim. 8.3.4–7) or engineer the
landscape with artificial obstructions or snares,
such as concealed trenches, pits, stakes, or cal-
trops, in order to block or channel the enemy’s
advance and render them vulnerable to flank
The Encyclopedia of the Roman Army, First Edition. Edited by Yann Le Bohec.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/9781118318140.wbra0068
attacks (Maur. Strat. 4.1–3; cf. Cass. Dio 76.6.3–6;
Procop. Wars 1.13.13–14; 2.25.9, 23–5; Greg. Tur.
Hist. 3.7). Units of “ambushers” (Greek, enedroi)
could also be deployed proactively to penetrate to
the rear of enemy positions, evading hostile scouts
and sentries, and launch diversionary raids, i­ deally
timed to coincide with the main attack (Maur.
Strat. 2.5; 3.16; 7.B.5). Nocturnal assaults against
enemy encampments were a subcategory of
ambush (Maur. Strat. 9.2). Organization, recon-
naissance, and, above all, timing were crucial in
negotiating the hazards of a night-march (Th. Sim.
2.15.3–11; Theoph. 258.10–21) and launching an
attack around dawn, when the enemy was off-
guard but unable to escape in the darkness
(Malchus fr. 20; Zos. 4.25; Procop. Wars 2.27.18,
30.42; 3.16.9–11; Joh. Eph. 6.28; Th. Sim. 1.7.5;
2.10.10, 15.4; 7.12.2–9; 8.3.11–12).
Historical sources rarely supply details of
ambushes, and it is not until the later 6th century
CE that military handbooks discuss operational
practicalities; in particular the Strategikon (4.1–
5; 9.1–2) contains in-depth procedural commen-
taries. The requirements of concealment and
maneuverability ordinarily called for small-scale,
compact, and nonlinear deployments, tradition-
ally characterized in classicizing Latin as cunei
(wedges), although late Roman technical writ-
ers  also employ Vulgar Latin drungus (Greek,
droungos), originally military argot ofofGaulishGallic
­origin, which denoted flexible groupings suited
to ambuscades, surprise attacks, and covert out-
flanking maneuvers (Veg. Mil. 3.16, 19; Maur.
Strat. 3.5.63–75, 14; 4.5). The Strategikon also
offers guidance on effective timing and coordi-
nation of ambushes and observations on the
training regime necessary to habituate cavalry
units to these combat techniques (4.4–5).
See also guerrilla warfare: principate;
­guerrilla warfare: late empire; intelli-
gence: principate; intelligence: late empire;
miles: principate; miles: late empire; non-
commissioned officers, ncos: principate; non-
commissioned officers, ncos: late empire;
order of march: principate; order of march:
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late empire; small war: principate;  small
war: late empire; stratagem: ­principate;
stratagem: late empire; tactics: principate;
tactics: late empire.
FURTHER READING
Breccia, G. (2007) Grandi imperi e piccole guerre.
Roma, Bisanzio e la guerriglia. MEG 7: 13–68.
Breccia, G. (2008) Grandi imperi e piccole guerre.
Roma, Bisanzio e la guerriglia (part 2). MEG 8:
49–131.
Rance, P. (2004) Drungus, drοungos and drοungisti:
A Gallicism and continuity in late Roman cavalry
tactics. Phoenix 58 (1): 96–130.
Traina, G. (1986–1987) Aspettando i barbari: Le origini
tardoantiche della guerriglia di frontier. RomBarb 9:
247–280.