LIMITATIONS N THE RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP

*If you are the owner you don t have the absolute right to enjoy your property.
- Enjoy your property in a manner that you will not injure the rights of
others.

a. Imposed by the State

i. POLICE POWER - The power of promoting the public welfare by restraining

and regulating the use of liberty and property. Property condemned under
police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose.

City Govt of Quezon City vs. Ericta

Ordinance of QC: …stop further transactions of memorial park lots where
owners have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers
burial; police power was invoked as just compensation was not given

Police power although illimitable is subject to requisites: (1) lawful subject (2)
lawful means (reasonable connection; not unduly restrictive; least intrusive)

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of

the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased
paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the
general welfare of the people.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area
from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

City of Manila, et al. vs. Hon. Laguio, et al

Ordinance of Manila: prohibition of businesses of certain entertainment in the
Ermita-Malate area (prohibition included hotels and motels for being contrary
to public morals); businesses asked to relocate or convert businesses to other
kinds of allowable business. Malate Tourist Development Corporation
contested that LGU can only regulate not prohibit.

An ordinance banning establishment of motels in the Malate area is an invalid

exercise of police power.
Ordinance contravenes Constitution:
(1) infringes due process clause
(2) Requisites for police power are not met
(3) means employed are constitutionally infirm
(4) modality employed is unlawful taking (ordinance which permanently
restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose
goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as taking of the property
without just compensation; possessory and regulatory taking or where no
reasonable economically viable use of the property is available)

The OSG vs. Ayala Land, Inc.

The National Building Code requires malls to provide parking spaces. The
Committees believe that the reasonable and logical interpretation of the Code
is that the parking spaces are for free. Figuratively speaking, the Code has
"expropriated" the land for parking. Senate Committee Report No. 225 – an
action to enjoin SM Prime and similar establishments from collecting parking
fees, and to impose upon said establishments penal sanctions under PD No.
1096, (National Building Code), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR).

WON there was a valid exercise of police power? NO

Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. Police power does not involve the
taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases where
there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the
purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare.
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the
State is no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers,
namely, eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly
acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner. Although in the present case, title to and/or
possession of the parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition
against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of said
facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties.
The State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the their
properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the
public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive
intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are they being
deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are
further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom
the expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required parking
facilities.

MMDA vs. Trackworks

Trackworks contracted with MRTC; installed commercial billboards, etc. in
different parts of the MRT 3 premises. MMDA requested Trackworks to
dismantle pursuant to MMDA Regulation wherein the MMDA prohibits the
posting, installation, and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs,
posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center-island, posts,
trees, parks and open spaces. Trackworks refused. MMDA dismantled.
 WON the MMDA has the power under its mandate to cause the dismantling of
respondents’ advertisement materials. NO

MMDA had no power on its own to dismantle, remove or destroy the

billboards and other advertising materials installed on the MRT3 structure by
Trackworks. The MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installing a system and administration. Under the BLT agreement,
MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC
would transfer ownership of theMRT3 to the Government. Considering that
MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this
case, and until this date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising
services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership. MMDA also may
not invoke that it is implementing the Buliding Code rules and regulations
because the power to enforce this lies with the DPWH and not in the MMDA.
The DPWH has not delegated the MMDA to implement such Code.

ii. EMINENT DOMAIN - Inherent power of the State enabling it to forcibly

acquire private lands for public use upon payment of just compensation.
Applicable only where the owner is unwilling to sell.

Air Transportation Office and Mactan-Cebu Int’l Airport vs. Antonio Gopuco,
Jr.
Lahug Airport; RA 6958 creating the Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA) and in part providing for the transfer of the assets of the
Lahug Airport thereto; Gopuco maintained that by virtue of the closure of the
Lahug Airport, the original purpose for which the property was expropriated
had ceased or otherwise been abandoned, and title to the property had
therefore reverted to him.

WON Gopuco has the right to reclaim ownership over the subject
expropriated. NO

The terms of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings granted title in fee
simple to the Republic of the Philippines If the land is expropriated for a
particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or
abandoned, the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course,
when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires
the property so expropriated. However, in this case, such agreement is
absent.

Heirs of Moreno vs. MCIAA

NAC as the predecessor agency of MCIAA wanted to acquire the questioned
lots for the proposed expansion of Lahug Airport. To entice the landowners to
cede their properties, the government assured them that they could
repurchase their lands once Lahug Airport was closed or its operations
transferred to Mactan Airport. Some of the landowners executed deeds of
sale with right of repurchase in favor of the government but many others,
including the owners of the questioned lots refused the offer because the
payment was perceived to be way below the market price. Expropriation
proceedings were commenced. Lahug Airport ceased operations as the
Mactan Airport was opened. The questioned lots were not utilized; no
expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken. Petitioners filed a complaint for
reconveyance and damages against MCIAA to compel the repurchase of
such lots.

WON a private land expropriated for a particular public use, and that use is
abandoned, return to its former owner. YES, apply the Fery Doctrine

Fery Doctrine provides that if land is expropriated for a particular purpose,

with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned, the
property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is
terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so
expropriated (unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary).
However, when land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the
former owner retains no rights in the land. Consequently, the public use may
be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former
owner.

MCIAA as representative of the State is obliged to reconvey the lots to

petitioners who shall hold the same subject to existing liens thereon, i.e.,
leasehold right of DPWH. In return, petitioners must restore to MCIAA what
they received as just compensation. Petitioners must likewise pay MCIAA the
necessary expenses it may have incurred in sustaining the properties and the
monetary value of its services in managing them to the extent that petitioners
will be benefited thereby. The government however may keep whatever
income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of land, in the same
way that petitioners need not account for the interests that the amounts they
received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime. As a
matter of justice and convenience, the law considers the fruits and interests
as the equivalent of each other.

Mactan-Cebu Intl Airport Authority vs. Lozada, et al

Original owner was Deiparine; expropriation proceedings for the expansion
and improvement of the Lahug Airport; During the pendency of the
expropriation proceedings, Lozada, Sr. acquired; TCT was issued in Lozada’s
name. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Republic and ordered
the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of the lot. Compromise
settlement – the owners of the lots affected by the expropriation proceedings
would either not appeal or withdraw their respective appeals in consideration
 of a commitment that the expropriated lots would be resold at the price they
were expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the Lahug
Airport. Lozada did not pursue his appeal. The expansion of the airport was
never actually initiated; Instead, converted into a commercial complex.

WON a private land expropriated for a particular public use and that use is
abandoned, return to its former owner. YES

The taking of private property, consequent to the Government’s exercise of its

power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property
be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if
this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek
the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just
compensation received. Unlike in MCIAA v. CA, where respondent therein
offered testimonies which were hearsay in nature, the testimony of Lozada
was based on personal knowledge as the assurance from the government
was personally made to him. The Statute of Frauds, invoked by petitioners to
bar the claim of respondents for the reacquisition of Lot No. 88, cannot apply,
the oral compromise settlement having been partially performed. By reason of
such assurance made in their favor, respondents relied on the same by not
pursuing their appeal before the CA.

iii. TAXATION - Power to raise revenue in order to support its existence and
carry out its legitimate objectives.

b. Imposed by law

Lunod vs. Meneses

The defendant is the owner of a fishpond and a strip of land, adjoining a lake on
one side, and the River Taliptip on the other. From time immemorial, and for
more than 20 yrs before 1901, there existed and still exists in favor of the rice
fields of Lunod and others a statutory easement permitting the flow of water over
the land. Meneses, however, converted the land into a fishpond and prevented
the free passage of the water. In consequence, the lands of the plaintiffs became
flooded and damaged by the stagnant waters. Their plantation was destroyed.

The owner of the lower lands cannot erect works that will impede or prevent such
an easement or charge, constituted and imposed by the law upon his estate for
the benefit of the higher lands belonging to different owners; neither can the latter
do anything to increase or extend the easement. According to Article 530 of the
Old Civil Code, easement is a charge imposed upon one estate for the benefit of
another estate belonging to a different owner, and the realty in favor of which the
easement is established is called the dominant estate, and the one charged with
it the servient estate. Lands of Paraanan are lower – subject to easement of
receiving and giving passage to waters from higher lands, and Calalran lake.
Easement is not constituted by agreement. It is of a statutory nature, imposed for
the common public utility.

Article 552: Lower estates must receive the waters which naturally and without
the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stone or
earth which they carry with them. “Neither may the owner of the lower estate
construct works preventing this easement, nor the one of the higher estate works
increasing the burden.

Article 563: The establishment, extent, form, and conditions of the easements of
waters to which this section refers shall be governed by the special law relating
thereto in everything not provided for in this code.

Special Law: Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, Art. 111

Lands situated at a lower level are subject to receive the waters that flow
naturally, without the work of man, from the higher lands together with the stone
or earth which they carry with them.

Meneses had no right to construct the works, nor the dam which blocks the
passage, through his lands and the outlet to the Taliptip River, of the waters
which flood the higher lands of the plaintiffs; and having done so, to the detriment
of the easement charged on his estate, he has violated the law. While Art 338
authorizes every owner to enclose his estate by means of walls, ditches, fences
or any other device, this right is limited by the easement imposed upon his
estate. His right to construct necessary works for fishpond subject to obligation to
respect statutory easement of waters upon his property.

Valisno vs. Adriano

Valisno is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a land. He bought the land
from Adriano’s sister. The land which is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn,
tobacco, and other vegetables adjoins that of Adriano on the bank of the
Pampanga River. Both parcels of land had been inherited by the Adriano
siblings. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by
water from the Pampanga River through a canal about 70 meters long, traversing
Adriano’s land. Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno
would be deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his land.
Valisno filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for
deprivation of water rights.

WON Valiano has water rights over the irrigation canal. YES

The existence of the irrigation canal on defendant's land for the passage of water
from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale
of Honorata's land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the
land to continue using it, as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code. Water
rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
 appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although
not specifically
mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water
ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is
supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have
qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its permanency as
property right, which survives the determination of the necessity.

c. Imposed by the Grantor

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, et al vs. CA

In 1930, the Sps De Castro executed the deed of donation to the Archbishop,
allegedly providing that the latter cannot dispose or sell the property within 100
years from execution, otherwise it would render the donation ipso facto null and
void. However such was transferred to the Bishop of Imus in 1962. And in 1980,
subsequently sold to Sps Ignao. The Ignao’s were then able to transfer the TCT
under their names. The administrators of the estate then filed a complaint to
nullify the deed of donation, rescind the sale, and reconvey the property. The
Ignaos and the Bishops contend that the cause of action had already prescribed,
relying on Art. 764 which provides that the donation shall be revoked at the
instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions
and that such shall prescribe after 4 years from the non-compliance with the
condition.

WON the action for reconveyance of real property may prosper. NO

Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation, the
same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public
policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation in the case before us
constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue restriction on the right of the
donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is an indispensable
attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation, in order to be valid,
must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.

d. Imposed by the Owner

Owner may, by reason of his right to dispose, for the time being part with some
attributes of his ownership, thereby restricting and abridging his right [i.e. lease,
commodatum, and usufruct].

Prohibition to Alienate – must not be forbidden by law or against public policy; i.e.
prohibition to sell must not be more than 20 years
Deed of Restrictions – restrictions imposed on a lot owner such as being an
automatic member of the homeowner’s association; easement; requirement to
use lot for residential purpose and stated that no more than one single family
residential building will be constructed thereon are VALID.
 e. Constitutional Prohibition

Article XII, Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands

shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Inherent Limitations

 Easements – common example is right of way

Right of way

EX: You happen to be the owner of a lot but you don’t have access to the public
highway because of a land owned by your neighbour. You can ask for the declaration
for the right of way because you have no adequate access to a public highway.
And you can compel your neighbor.

EX2: You own a room and you have a neighbor constructing a wall on the
boundary, that has an opening directly by the window of your room.
Makapamuso sya nmu, kaon2 popcorn. You can ask the court to close that opening.
What ‘s your cause of action? Easement of light and view. That your ownership
is only up to the boundary line. If you decide to have an opening,
backtrack for about 2 meters from the boundary line.

 NUISANCE – anything that disturbs or annoys the senses

EX: Your neighbor in the business of providing sound systems testing his
speakers. Or a gasoline station situated in a heavily resided area.