PEOPLE vs.

MAPALO Case Digest

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNARD MAPALO

G.R. No. 172608 February 6, 2007

FACTS: Appellant, together with Peter Doe, John Doe and Peter Doe, Jr., was charged before the
RTC of Agoo, La Union with the crime of Murder. During trial, the lone eyewitness for the prosecution,
Calixto Garcia, established that in the early morning of 13 February 1994, at around 3:00 a.m., a fight
erupted between Manuel Piamonte and the group of Lando Mapalo, Jimmy Frigillana, and the
appellant. He saw the appellant club Piamonte with a lead pipe from behind, hitting him on the right
side of the head. At that time when the appellant struck Piamonte with a lead pipe, he saw Jimmy
Frigillana and Lando Mapalo standing in front of Piamonte. Later, he saw the dead body of Piamonte,
which had suffered multiple stab wounds. Garcia disclosed that he neither witnessed how Piamonte
was stabbed, nor did he see the act of stabbing Piamonte. He does not know who stabbed the latter.
Apellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. The lower court, thereafter, convicted appellant of
the crime of murder and ruled that conspiracy was established by the prosecution. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals modified the decision of the lower court, convicting appellant of the crime of
frustrated murder and saying that conspiracy was not properly established.

ISSUE: Whether appellant is guilty of frustrated murder.

HELD: We cannot convict appellant of Attempted or Frustrated Murder or Homicide. The principal
and essential element of attempted or frustrated homicide or murder is the assailant's intent to take
the life of the person attacked. Such intent must be proved clearly and convincingly, so as to exclude
reasonable doubt thereof. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or
number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds
inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender
at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.

In the case at bar, no motive on the part of appellant to kill Piamonte was shown either prior or
subsequent to the incident. Nor can such intent to kill be inferred from his acts. It bears reiterating that
no injury on the body of the deceased was attributed to the appellant's act of hitting the victim with a
lead pipe.

Homicidal intent must be evidenced by the acts that, at the time of their execution, are unmistakably
calculated to produce the death of the victim by adequate means. We cannot infer intent to kill from
the appellant's act of hitting Piamonte in the head with a lead pipe. In the first place, wounds were not
shown to have been inflicted because of the act. Secondly, absent proof of circumstances to show
the intent to kill beyond reasonable doubt, this Court cannot declare that the same was attendant.
 PeOPLE V BONOAN

11FEB
L-45130 | February 17, 1937 | J. Laurel
Imbecility
Facts:
Celestino Bonoan is charged with the crime of murder for stabbing Carlos Guison with a knife, which
caused his death three days afterwards. An arraignment was then called, but the defense objected on
the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined at the
Psychopatic Hospital. After several months of summons for doctors, production of the defendant’s
complete record of mental condition from the hospital and defendant’s admission to the hospital for
personal observation, assistant alienist Dr. Jose Fernandez finally reported to the court that Bonoan
may be discharged for being a “recovered case”. After trial, the lower court found Bonoan guilty and
sentenced him to life imprisonment.

The defense now appeals, claiming the lower court made errors in finding Bonoan suffered dementia
only occasionally and intermittently, did not show any kind of abnormality, that the defense did not
establish the defendant’s insanity and finding accused guilty.

Issue:
W/N the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty

Held:
Yes. The Court finds the accused demented at the time he perpetrated the crime, which consequently
exempts him from criminal liability, and orders for his confinement in San Lazaro Hospital or other
hospital for the insane. This ruling was based on the following evidence:
1. Uncontradicted evidence that accused was confined in the insane department of San Lazaro Hospital
and diagnosed with dementia praecox long before the commission of the offense and recurrence of
ailments were not entirely lacking of scientific foundation
2. Persons with dementia praecox are disqualified from legal responsibility because they have no
control of their acts; dementia praecox symptoms similar to manic depression psychosis
3. Accused had an insomnia attack, a symptom leading to dementia praecox, four days prior to act
according to Dr. Francisco
4. Accused was sent the Psychopatic hospital on the same day of crime and arrest, indicating the
police’s doubt of his mental normalcy
5. Defendant suffered from manic depressive psychosis according to Dr. Joson

Dissenting (Justices Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion):

 1. The dissenting opinions pose that the accused committed the crime when he was sane, or at
least, during a lucid interval.
2. The legal presumption is always in favor of sanity; no positive evidence of accused mental state was
established
3. Based on expert testimonies, accused was cured of dementia praecox and later manic depressive
psychosis
4. Based on observance of arresting officer Damaso Arnoco, corrobating statement of Benjamin Cruz,
and other witnesses, accused appear sane at the time immediately after commission
5. There is a motive of aggression on part of accused is real and positive fact: deceased’s failure to pay
borrowed money

PEOPLE v. FORMIGONES

August 3, 2012 § Leave a comment

PEOPLE v. FORMIGONES
November 29, 1950 (G.R. No. L-3246)

PARTIES:
plaintiff-appellee: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
defendant-appellant: ABELARDO FORMIGONES

FACTS:
From November to December 1946, defendant Abelardo Formigones together with his wife Julia
Agricola, and his five children lived in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones to find
employment as harvesters. One afternoon, the accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation
whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife at the back, the blade
penetrating the right lung which latter caused her death. When she fall ont he ground the defendant
carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. He
was convicted of parricide and was sentenced to prison. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty.
His counsel presented testimonies of two guards of the provincial jail where defendant was confined.
They said that he behaved like an insane person, that sometimes he would remove his clothes in
front of others, would not take a bath, and remained silent and indifferent to his surroundings. His
counsel claimed that e is an imbecile therefore exempt from criminal liability. Dr. Francisco Gomez
told that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could
distinguish right from wrong. An imbecile so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be
deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the
crime.

ISSUE: WON the defendant who is suffering from feeblemindedness is exempt from criminal liability.

HELD:
No. In order that an exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be
a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of
reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment;
that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of
freedom of the will. As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that
it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or
eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. He could
distinguish right from wrong.

PEOPLE v. GIMENA

August 3, 2012 § Leave a comment

PEOPLE v. GIMENA

February 16, 1934 (G.R. No. L-40203)

PARTIES:

plaintiff-appellee: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

defendant-appellant: SANTIAGO GIMENA

FACTS:

On the night of May 9, 1933, Felipe Ferolino, brother in law of the deceased, commented a frank or
sarcastic remark to the defendant. Ferolino moved backward and the appellant, taking that attitude as
an acceptance of his challenge, gave him a blow on the head with the cane he carried and later
stabbed him on the hip and on the back. The deceased, Casimiro Mahinay, , completely unarmed,
approached the two for the purpose of separating them or helping Ferolino, his brother-in-law, the
appellant gave him a blow with his cane on the right eyebrow and later mortally wounded him on the
left side of the abdomen with his knife. The defendant said that it was an act of self defense because
the deceased held him by the neck, chioking him in such a way that he could hardly breathe. The CFI
later convicted him of homicide.

ISSUE: WON the defendant may validly invoke self defense as an exempting circumstance.

HELD:

No. The defendant’s claim of self defense is unfounded. He was the one who provoked the fight
between him and Felipe Ferolino and likewise he was the aggressor. Under the circumstances
surrounding the commencement and development of the fight, there was not at least necessity of his
having used the knife in wounding Casimiro Mahinay inasmuch as he was already armed with a cane,
much less taking into consideration that the deceased was entirely unarmed. The justifying
circumstance of self-defense, once the act against which it is invoked is proven, should be
satisfactorily established, and without proof, it should necessarily be rejected.

J I ME NE Z V S. RE PUBLI C O F THE P HI LI P P I NES

1 0 9 P HI L 27 3

FACTS:

Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed a complaint praying of a decree annulling his marriage with
Remedios Canizares. He claimed that the orifice of her genitals was too small to allow the penetration
of a male organ or penis for copulation. He also claimed that the condition of her genitals existed at
the time of marriage and continues to exist. The wife was summoned and served with a copy of the
complaint but she did not file an answer. The court entered an order requiring defendant to submit to
a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for
copulation. Defendant did not submit herself to the examination and the court entered a decree
annulling the marriage. The City Attorney filed a Motion for Reconsideration, among the grounds that
the defendant’s impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had not
been physically examined because she refused to be examined.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of
the husband who claimed and testified that his wife is impotent.

HELD:

The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable
evidence to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was
decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or
aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really
impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established because from the commencement
of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein.

Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her
part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise
or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not
submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority.

A physical examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She is not charged with any
offense . She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself.

“Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor
of potency.” The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and
wife.

Ruling: The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.

JOSELITA SALITA vs. HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS

G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994

FACTS:
Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married at the Roman Catholic Church in Ermita, Manila. A
year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment
on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity which incapacity existed at the time of the
marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter. Dissatisfied with the allegation in the
petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted. Subsequently, in his Bill
of Particulars, Edwin specified that at the time of their marriage, Joselita was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable
to understand and accept the demands made by his profession — that of a newly qualified Doctor of
Medicine — upon his time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her
even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
Still petitioner was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She insists that the allegations in the Bill
of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of ultimate facts, and fail to point out the
specific essential marital obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of
Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action. She rationalizes that her
insistence on the specification of her particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding
circumstances of time, place and person does not call for information on evidentiary matters because
without these details she cannot adequately and intelligently prepare her answer to the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations in the petition for annulment of marriage and the subsequent bill of
particulars filed in amplification of the petition is sufficient.
HELD:
Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either directly from the basis of the primary
right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omission of the defendant. It refers to
acts which the evidence on trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the
existence of those facts. The Supreme Court ruled that on the basis of the allegations, it is evident
that petitioner can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has
already alleged that petitioner was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his
profession. To demand for more details would indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts —
facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. The additional facts called for by petitioner
regarding her particular acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is
not the function of a motion for bill of particulars.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the instant petition is DENIED and the questioned
Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA

GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997

FACTS:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they
proceed to the house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during
their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon
in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with them. Again, there was no
sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a
rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same
bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves
for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical
examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the
medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to
maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi
and want their marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand,
the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no
defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still
young, they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical
examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.

ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes
psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a

serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article
36 of the Family Code.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital
obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes
to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.

AURELIO V. AURELIO

G.R. No. 175367, [June 06, 2011]

DOCTRINE:

The following are the guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving psychological
incapacity: (1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) The root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision; (3) The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage; (4) Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) Such illness
must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage; (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision; (7) Interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts; (8) The trial court must order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted
in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition.

FACTS:

Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23,
1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of QuezonCity, Branch 94, a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and
petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective
essential marital obligations. Inaddition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological
incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent
prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. It alleged
among others that said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the
husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband
exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile
defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the maintenance of the family.

On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her
feelings change very quickly – from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day
experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot
stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when she
cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each
other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of
marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage.

On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally argued
that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the
Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage shall be declared null and void?

HELD:

Petition denied. Marriage is null and void.

RATIO:

First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity
was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the
family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root
causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically
identified the same as the root causes.

Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to
bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist
reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features.
Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality
Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave,
incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were
alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondent’s
allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that “the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.”

Te vs Te
Te vs. Te

GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-
Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close friend but, as the
latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which happened in January
1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young
and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that
month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.

They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and
Edward to his parents’ home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license. Edward
was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her
uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edward’s
parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a
separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they
then parted ways.

After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena
on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped
in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided
expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls
under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic
and antisocial personality disorder

There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally

examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.

Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for
he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make most
of his important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no
sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear
direction in life.

As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her
abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others.
Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in
manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
AGUSTIN V CA

7NOV
G.R. No. 162571 | June 15, 2005 | J. Corona

Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an
intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnel’s
insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The baby’s birth
certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital
expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial
capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having
fathered the child.

On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country
Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This incident was
reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then,
been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support.

Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to
DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.

The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing
at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.

Issue:
W/N the respondent court erred in denying the petitioner’s MTD

W/N the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of
unreasonable search

Held:
1. No. The trial court properly denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss because the private
respondents’ complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s corresponding
primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary
right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the
complaint but by the facts alleged.
2. No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized
identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by
proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement
of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue.
Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-
incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.

JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS

G.R. No. 190710, [June 6, 2011]

FACTS:

Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his
mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted
documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b)
petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated from
Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation
from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of
Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical
prodigy.

Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition
was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a
Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence
set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be
had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.

Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed
to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case
of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima faciecase, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing was
scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant
petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four
significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not
be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE:

Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order

HELD:

Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing
since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.

RATIO:

Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The statement
in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant proceduralaspects in a traditional paternity case
which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is
confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their
respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of
the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that
petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a
party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.

Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that areaimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may, at any time, either
motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order
a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of
the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biologicalsample: (i)
was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA
testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce
new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other
factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the
DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the
behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during
the hearing, the said conditions are established.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or
a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a court
order for blood testing is considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie
case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable
cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be
made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. Weagree,
and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood
testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily
undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order
for blood testing The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the
putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing,
the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.”

Case Digest: Perla vs Baring and Perla

G.R. No. I72471: November 12, 2012

ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner, v. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA, Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and petitioner Antonio Perla (Antonio) were allegedly neighbors.
Eventually, they became sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio allegedly assured
her that he would support her. However, Antonio started to evade her.

Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a Complaint for support
against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy. During
the trial, Mirasol presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her
and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in
the said certificates. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Antonio to support Randy, which was
affirmed by CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not Randy is entitled for support from Antonio.

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

CIVIL LAW: support

Mirasol and Randys Complaint for support is based on Randys alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio.
Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with sufficient certainty.
The Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An
order for x xx support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the
lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.

In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The
Certificate of Live Birth and baptismal certificate of Randy have no probative value to establish
Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. A certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while a
baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to
the childs paternity. Thus, x xx baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of
filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

REMEDIAL LAW: questions of fact

Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court.
However, this rule admits of certain exceptions such as when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures or when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension
of facts. As this case falls under these exceptions, the Court is constrained to re-examine the factual
findings of the lower courts.

Petition is GRANTED.