6. GEN RAZON VS.
S. TAGITIS Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise
FACTS:
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant
for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB)
Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu.
Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB
scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early
morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in
Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY
Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a
boat ticket for his return trip the following day to
Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this
errand, Tagitis was no longer around. The receptionist
related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around
12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key
with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even
sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based
secretary who did not know of Tagitis’ whereabouts
and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply
wait.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad
Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies
and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB,
reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police
Station. On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a
sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the
circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007),
Mary Jean Tagitis filed a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-
in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.The petition was
directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano,
Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino
I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen.
Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation
and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A.
Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director,
ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror
Task Force Comet.
Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached
some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in
1
petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-
sought help from some of their friends in the military
who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of
her husband. All of her efforts did not produce any
positive results except the information from persons
in the military who do not want to be identified that
Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men.
According to reliable information she received, subject
Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence
operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP
Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an
earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect
Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups
particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.
She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police
Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, seeking
their help to find her husband, but was told of an
intriguing tale by the police that her husband was not
missing but was with another woman having good
time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the
refusal of the PNP to help and provide police
assistance in locating her missing husband.
Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to
the different police headquarters namely Police
Headquarters in Cotabato City, Davao City,
Zamboanga City and eventually in the National
Headquarters in Camp Crame in Quezon City but her
efforts produced no positive results. These trips
exhausted all of her resources which pressed her to
ask for financial help from friends and relatives.
She has exhausted all administrative avenues and
remedies but to no avail, and under the
circumstances, she has no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy to protect and get the release of
her husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis, from the illegal
clutches of his captors, their intelligence operatives
and the like which are in total violation of the
subject’s human and constitutional rights, except the
issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA
immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case
for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the
two (72) hours from service of the writ.
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of
January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any
involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged
abduction. They argued that the allegations of the
petition were incomplete and did not constitute a
cause of action against them; were baseless, or at
best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay
evidence. In addition, they all claimed that they
exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active
measures to investigate, search and locate Tagitis and
to apprehend the persons responsible for his
disappearance.
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its
decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis
was an "enforced disappearance" under the United
Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA held
that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great
weight" in the intelligence world. It also labeled as
"suspect" Col. Kasim’s subsequent and belated
retraction of his statement that the military, the
police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of
Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and
unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police
theories painting the disappearance as "intentional"
on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes
with the law or any record of overstepping the
bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to
him; no student of the IDB scholarship program ever
came forward to complain that he or she did not get
his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the
police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from
the clutches of his second wife," on the basis of the
respondent’s testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who
could have many wives under the Muslim faith, and
that there was "no issue" at all when the latter
divorced his first wife in order to marry the second.
Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom
by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the
cause for Tagitis’ disappearance, since the
respondent, the police and the military noted that
there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis’ abduction
or demand for payment of ransom – the usual modus
operandi of these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended
the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and
directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP
Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen.
Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief
Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary
diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and
security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide
monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the
same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the
then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander
Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding
that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was
involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to
reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the
motion in its Resolution of April 9, 2008.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo
should be extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
RULING:
The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is
classified as an enforced disappearance, thus the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo applies.
Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as
"the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation
of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place
such a person outside the protection of the
law." Under this definition, the elements that
constitute enforced disappearance are essentially
fourfold:
2
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or
groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
detention, or a concealment of the fate of the
disappeared person;
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the
protection of the law.
There was no direct evidence indicating how the
victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at
hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY
Pension House after depositing his room key with the
hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again.
The undisputed conclusion, however, from all
concerned – the petitioner, Tagitis’ colleagues and
even the police authorities – is that Tagistis
disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was
never seen again.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and
verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of
the portions the petitioners cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any,
specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct
of the investigation, together with any
report;(e) The actions and recourses taken by the
petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission.
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended
Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating
the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights.
As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must
of course state the ultimate facts constituting the
cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details.76 In
an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must
be read in light of the nature and purpose of the
proceeding, which addresses a situation of
uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to
describe with certainty how the victim exactly
disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct
or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained,
because these information may purposely be hidden
or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the
level of specificity, detail and precision that the
petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo
Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial
concern for violations of the constitutional rights to
life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings
while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the
test in reading the petition should be to determine
whether it contains the details available to the
petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a
cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s
rights to life, liberty and security through State or
private party action. The petition should likewise be
read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated
component parts, to determine if the required
elements – namely, of the disappearance, the State or
private action, and the actual or threatened violations
of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present.
The properly pleaded ultimate facts within the
pleader’s knowledge about Tagitis’ disappearance, the
participation by agents of the State in this
disappearance, the failure of the State to release
Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his
whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his
right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted
for any failure in its statement of a cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this
defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by
Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the
summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and
to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo
Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting
affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used
as the affiant’s direct testimony. This requirement,
however, should not be read as an absolute one that
necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not
strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner
has substantially complied with the requirement by
submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the
facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn
statement that an affidavit represents is essentially
fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the
required affidavits was fully cured when the
respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally
testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17
and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the
allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point,
the petition cannot be faulted.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising
from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s
Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of
December 7, 1941. The Third Reich’s Night and Fog
Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in
occupied territories "endangering German security";
they were transported secretly to Germany where
they disappeared without a trace. In order to
maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy
prohibited government officials from providing
information about the fate of these targeted persons.
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally
fall within the first two categories, and 855 cases
were recorded during the period of martial law from
1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained
missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead.
During former President Corazon C. Aquino’s term,
820 people were reported to have disappeared and of
these, 612 cases were documented. Of this number,
407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were
found dead. The number of enforced disappearances
dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos’ term
when only 87 cases were reported, while the three-
year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada
yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-
governmental organization, reports that as of March
31, 2008, the records show that there were a total of
193 victims of enforced disappearance under
incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyo’s administration.
The Commission on Human Rights’ records show a
3
total of 636 verified cases of enforced disappearances
from 1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406 remained
missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and
76 still have undetermined status.Currently, the
United Nations Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearance reports 619 outstanding
cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances
covering the period December 1, 2007 to November
30, 2008.
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ
shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof."We note that
although the writ specifically covers "enforced
disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor
penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the
Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules
(Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo
Rule initially considered providing an elemental
definition of the concept of enforced disappearance:
Justice Puno stated that, “as the law now stands,
extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in
this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately
from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry
out these killings and enforced disappearances and
are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
special laws.”
Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and
as such does not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court
can provide can be very meaningful through the
procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its
procedural rules, can set the procedural standards
and thereby directly compel the public authorities to
act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional
rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can
make a difference – even if only procedurally – in a
situation when the very same investigating public
authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or
actual violations of constitutional rights.
The burden for the public authorities to discharge in
these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all
efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken
under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when
governmental efforts are less than what the individual
situations require. The second is to address the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is
preserved and his or her liberty and security restored.
In these senses, our orders and directives relative to
the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly
terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced
disappearance is fully addressed by the complete
determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the
victim, by the production of the disappeared person
and the restoration of his or her liberty and security,
and, in the proper case, by the commencement of
criminal action against the guilty parties.
During the International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (in Paris,
France on February 6, 2007, "enforced
disappearance" is considered to be the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation
of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or
groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person
outside the protection of the law.
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, we held
that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international
law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. The incorporation method applies
when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force
of domestic law.
The right to security of person in this third sense is a
corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full
respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11
of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the
chief guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty
and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights
especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective
investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances
(or threats thereof) and/or their families, and
bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The
duty to investigate must be undertaken in
a serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique
Nature of an Enforced Disappearance
The unique evidentiary difficulties presented by
enforced disappearance cases; these difficulties form
part of the setting that the implementation of the
Amparo Rule shall encounter. These difficulties largely
arise because the State itself – the party whose
involvement is alleged – investigates enforced
disappearances. Past experiences in other
jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties are
generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the
identities of the direct perpetrators. In addition, there
are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are,
these witnesses are usually afraid to speak out
publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear
for their own lives.
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence
of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the
central piece of evidence in an enforced
disappearance
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the
State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced
disappearance ever occurred. "Deniability" is central
to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the
absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier
4
to escape the application of legal standards ensuring
the victim’s human rights.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid
judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding
that requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not
an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the
consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the
Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases,
Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a
Child Witness is expressly recognized as an
exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows
the admission of the hearsay testimony of a
child describing any act or attempted act of
sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal
proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites
and the right of cross-examination by the
adverse party.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col.
Kasim’s disclosure, made in an unguarded moment,
unequivocally point to some government complicity in
the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded
denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but
point to this conclusion. For why would the
government and its officials engage in their chorus of
concealment if the intent had not been to deny what
they already knew of the disappearance? Would not
an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least
credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in
the government’s cap under the circumstances of the
disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence
and developments, particularly the Kasim evidence,
already establish a concrete case of enforced
disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the
prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and
quoted, evidence at hand and the developments in
this case confirm the fact of the enforced
disappearance and government complicity, under a
background of consistent and unfounded government
denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance
as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the
protection of the law – a situation that will subsist
unless this Court acts.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials
and members were the ones who were remiss in their
duties when the government completely failed to
exercise the extral.'
To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this
case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings
directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-
CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of
their results through hearings the CA may deem
appropriate to conduct.
7. marcosEDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA
CABRERA, YOLANDA DACUNES,
VIOLETA SEVILLA, QUERUBIN
BILLONES, ESTELITA BILLONES,
GORGONIA MACARAEG, LAUREANA
JOAQUIN, CRESTITA LICUP, SOLIDAD
ABURDO, ROSALINA VILLARDA,
CONRADA HOBALANE, ERLINDA
RESTORAN, VERIDIAN FLORA, ROSELA
CONDE, SOSIMA COSTO, JOSEFINA
ALDIANO, ROSALINA DOMINGO,
ARESTIO YANGA, MILAGROS
GONZALES, ESTRELITA ESTARES,
BONIFACIA ANTIVO, PATRIA VALLES,
ERLINDA LEE, MELANIO GAROFIL,
ERIBERTO MATEO, FRANCISCO
HORTILLANO, ANATALIA PESIMO,
LOSENDO GARBO, VIRGINIA LORESTO,
LYDIA ELA, RAFAEL VILLABRILLE, MA.
RECHILDA SABALZA, EDITHA MAAMO,
ELENIETA BANOSA, ALEXANDER
LABADO, ANDREW GO, WYNEFREDO
 REYES, ROSARIO SESPENE, ROSA
MARTIN and JAIME BONGAT,
petitioners, vs.
MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN. RAMON
MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL.
JESUS GARCIA,
respondents.
G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990
Ponente: Gutierrez, J.
FACTS
Guazon and forty other petitioners, who of legal age,
bona fide residents of Manila, and have a common or
general interest in the preservation of the rule of
law, question the conduct of military and police
officers in conducting “Areal Target Zonings” or
“Saturation Drives” in Manila.
According to them, the police and military officers
have a common pattern of human rights abuses
stating that: 1) the police have no search warrant and
warrant of arrest; 2) the raiders rouse residents by
banging on the walls or windows and ordering the
residents within to come out of their residence; 3) the
residents are herded like cows and were stripped
down half-naked and examined for tattoo marks; 4)
the raiders ransacked their houses and that their
money and valuable belongings have disappeared; 5)
and that some arrested were detained without
charges and that they were subject to physical and
mental torture. The respondents stressed that they
have legal authority to conduct saturation drives, and
that the accusations of the petitioners are total lies.
ISSUE/s of the CASE
Whether the Saturation Drives violate the
constitutional rights of the residents.
ACTION OF THE COURT
SC: The petition is DISMISSED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE CASE
No. Absent proper party/parties that are directly
affected by the operation, the Court has no authority
to pass upon the issue for it falls under the execution
of the Executive and the RTCs. The Constitution
grants the government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements. However, all police actions
are governed by the limitation of the Bill of Rights. It
is significant to point out that it is not police action
per se which is impermissible and which should be
5
probited. Rather, it is the procedure used or the
methods which offende even hardened sensibilities.
In this case, not one of the several thousand persons
treated in the illegal and inhuman manner appears as
petitioner or as come before the trial court to present
evidence. The Court believes it is highly probable that
some violations were actually committed. But the
remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the
essential and legitimate ones. A show of force is
sometimes necessary as long as the rights of the
people are protected and not violated.
Under the circumstances of this taxpayers’s suit,
there is no erring soldier or policeman who can be
prosecuted. As such absence of facts, no permanent
relief can be given.
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
8. Marcos v. Manglapus
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand Marcos petitions the SC
for mandamus and prohibition asking to order
respondents to issue travel documents to him and his
immediate family and to enjoin the implementation of
the President "s decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.
Issue:
WON the President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines, in the exercise of the
powers granted in her by the Constitution.
Ruling:
Affirmative. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally
considered as within the scope of "executive power ".
The powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has
to be executive. Even the members of the Legislature
has recognized that indeed Mrs. Aquino has the
power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses
from returning, as per House Resolution No. 1342.
Marcos v Manglapus, et. al.
Facts: Same as above, except that Ferdinand has
died.
Held: Among the duties of the President under the
Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of
office, is to protect and promote the interest and
welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return
of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr.
Marcos at the present time and under present
circumstances is in compliance with this bounden
duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had
acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of
discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will
not enjoin the implementation of this decision.
eMARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
Facts:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and
prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a "travel
documents "to former Pres. Marcos and the
immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their
return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the
right of the Marcoses "to return "in the Philippines is
guaranteed by "the Bill of Rights, specifically "Sections
"1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without
power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits
prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right
to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under "international law, their
right "to return "to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on "Civil "and
Political Rights, which has been ratified by the
Philippines.
Issue:
"Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers
granted by "the constitution, the President (Aquino)
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.
Held:
"It must be emphasized that the individual right
involved is not the right to "travel from "the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.
These are what the right to travel would normally
connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at
bar is the right "to return "to one's country, a distinct
right under "international law, independent from
although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on "Civil "and Political Rights
treat the right to freedom of "movement "and abode
within the territory of a state, the right to leave the
country, and the right to enter one's country as
separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration
speaks of is the "right to freedom of "movement "and
residence within the borders of each state". On the
other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to
liberty of "movement "and freedom to choose his
residence and the right to be free to leave any
country, including his own. Such rights may only be
restricted by laws protecting the "national security,
public order, "public health "or morals or the separate
rights of others. However, right to enter one's country
cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore
inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right
"to return "to ones country in the same context as
those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right
to travel.
The Bill of rights "treats only the liberty of abode and
the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that
the right "to return "may be considered, as a
generally accepted principle of "International Law
6
"and under our Constitution as part of the law of the
land. "
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the
return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family
poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare. President Aquino has determined that the
destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past
few years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and
therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines,
the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Clyde E. Tan 2011-17748
9. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan
Facts
:On June 5, 2014 Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was
charged by the Office of the Ombudsman with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his
purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF). The case is apetition for
certiorari to annul the decision of the Sandiganbayan
denying his Motion to fix bail and Motion for
Reconsideration on the following grounds: (a) The
prosecution failed to show conclusively that Enrile, if
ever convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua;
(b) The prosecution failed to show that evidence of
Enrile’s guilt is strong; (c) Enrile is not a flight risk.
Issue
:Whether or not Enrile can bail -YES
Ruling
:1.The purpose of the bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial.2.It is the
Philippine’s responsibility in the international
community under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
“….of protecting and promoting the right of every
person to liberty and due process…under the
obligation to make available to every person
underdetention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail”. 3.Enrile is not a flight
risk because of his social and political standing and
his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon being charged in court.4.The currently fragile
state of Enrile’s health is a compelling justification for
his admission to bail. (Chronic hypertension, diffuse
atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, Atrial and
Ventricular Arrhythmia, etc.
10. PEOPLE VS CASIO (G.R. NO. 211465
DECEMBER 3, 2014)
People of the Philippines vs Casio
G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014
Facts: On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission
(IJM), a nongovernmental organization, coordinated
with the police in order to entrap persons engaged in
human trafficking in Cebu City. Chief PSI George
Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar,
PO1 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso
composed the team of police operatives, Luardo and
Veloso were designated as decoys, pretending to be
tour guides looking for girls to entertain their guests.
IJM provided them with marked money, which was
recorded in the police blotter. The team went to
Queensland Motel and rented adjacent Rooms 24 and
25. Room 24 was designated for the transaction while
Room 25 was for the rest of the police team. PO1
Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem
Street in Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light
district where the accused noticed them and called
their attention. Negotiation occured and upon the
signal, the accused was arrested and the two minors
were taken into custody by the DSWD officials.
Issue: Whether or not accused is liable for trafficking
of persons.
Held: Yes. Under Republic Act No. 10364, the
elements of trafficking in persons have been
expanded to include the following acts:
(1) The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring,
providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or
without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or
across national borders;”
(2) The means used include “by means of threat, or
use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person,
or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person”
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs”
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were
recruited by accused when their services were
peddled to the police who acted as decoys. AAA was a
child at the time that accused peddled her services.66
to work as a prostitute because she needed money.
AAA also stated that she agreed Accused took
advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as a child and as one
who need money, as proven by the testimonies of the
witnesses.
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense
under Republic Act No. 9208.
“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring,
adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of
7
exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any
form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall
also be considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if it
does not involve any of the means set forth in the
preceding paragraph.”
Accused is further guilty of qualified trafficking. SEC.
6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons.— The following are
considered as qualified trafficking:
When the trafficked person is a child;
When the adoption is effected through Republic Act
No. 8043, otherwise known as the “Inter-Country
Adoption Act of 1995” and said adoption is for the
purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation,forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude or debt bondage;
11. Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No.
179267, 25 June 2013
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of
Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a
petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus,
pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing
for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She
claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional,
psychological and economic violence, being
threatened of deprivation of custody of her children
and of financial support and also a victim of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to
faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the
said TPO, private-respondent filed another application
for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
issued a modified TPO and extended the same when
petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should
not be modified. After the given time allowance to
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the
required comment as it would be an “axercise in
futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition
with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning
the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the
due process and equal protection clauses, and the
validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted
product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO
but however, denied the petition for failure to raise
the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before
the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul
protection orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition
on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was
not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the
petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity
of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to
conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and
violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding
that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause
of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does
violence to the policy of the state to protect the family
as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as
invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an
undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC
has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family
Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not
be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial
court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal
protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that
is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions
only; and apply equally to each member of the class.
Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification
and did not violate the equal protection clause by
favouring women over men as victims of violence and
abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause
of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
any evidence one may have in support of one’s
defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be
impugned as violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is
justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing
mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to
protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In
a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court
shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a
mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject
for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to
Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
8
enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any
branch of the Government while executive power is
the power to enforce and administer the laws. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor
is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same
holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by
Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is
consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack
of merit.
12. Human Rights Law Case Digest: Philippine
Blooming Mills Employment Organization V.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co. (1973)
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
Lessons Applicable: Nature and Definition of Human
Rights, Human Right is superior to property rights,
Social justice, jurisdiction over violation of
constitutional right
Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights on rights of free
expression, rights of free assembly and rights of
petition
FACTS:
• March 2, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills
discovered that Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration as a valid exercise of their
constitutional right of freedom expression in general
and of their right of assembly and petition for redress
of grievances in particular before appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive, alleged
abuses of the police officers of the municipality of
Pasig at Malacañang on March 4, 1969 to be
participated in by the workers in the first, second and
third shifts (6am-2pm, 7am-4pm. and 8am-5pm
respectively)
• March 3, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills held 2
meetings in the morning and afternoon where PBMEO
confirmed the demonstration which has nothing to do
with the Company because the union has no quarrel
or dispute with Management. That Management, thru
Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the
Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation thus whoever fails to
report for work the following morning shall be
dismissed for violation of the existing CBA Article
XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE amounting to an
illegal strike
• March 3, 1969 9:50 am: Wilfredo Ariston, adviser
of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company:
REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4,
1969
• The Company filed for violation of the CBA.
PBMEO answered that there is no violation since they
gave prior notice. Moreover, it was not a mass
demonstration for strike against the company.
• Judge Joaquin M. Salvador: PBMEO guilty of
bargaining in bad faith and PBMEO officers directly
responsible for ULP losing their status as employees
• September 29, 1969: PBMEO motion for
reconsideration – dismissed since 2 days late
ISSUE:
1. W/N to regard the demonstration against police
officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad
faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of
the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for
the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is an inhibition of the
rights of free expression, free assembly and petition
HELD: YES. Set aside as null and void the orders of
CFI and reinstate the petitioners.
• In a democracy, the preservation and
enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality is the central core as well as the cardinal
article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable
character of man as an individual must be "protected
to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in
his beliefs as the citadel of his person
• The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the
ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the
assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the
passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments,
and the scorn and derision of those who have no
patience with general principles.
• The freedoms of expression and of assembly as
well as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people
• The rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition, are not only civil rights but also political
rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment.
Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not
merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the
discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is
accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the
appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of
the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
• While the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized.
o Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.
9
o a constitutional or valid infringement of human
rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent
o Rationale: Material loss can be repaired or
adequately compensated. The debasement of the
human being broken in morale and brutalized in
spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms.
The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate
him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for
retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on
bruised tissues.
o injunction would be trenching upon the freedom
expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to
be illegal picketing or strike
• The pretension of their employer that it would
suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock
in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely
of their property rights.
o There was a lack of human understanding or
compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the
request of the Union for excuse from work for the day
shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration.
And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass
demonstration held against the Pasig police, not
against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the
part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is
unconstitutional.
o The most that could happen to them was to lose
a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on
the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means
much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family
to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-
day salary hoping that their demonstration would
bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But
management was adamant in refusing to recognize
the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech,
free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
o the dismissal for proceeding with the
demonstration and consequently being absent from
work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly
employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution
imposes upon the State "the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security
of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized
by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the
Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to
labor ...". Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of
Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of
the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest
by encouraging and protecting the exercise by
employees of their right to self-organization for the
purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion
of their moral, social and economic well-being."
• The respondent company is the one guilty of
unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in
relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875,
otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section
3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees
the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual
aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an
unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their
rights guaranteed in Section Three."
• violation of a constitutional right divests the court
of jurisdiction. Relief from a criminal conviction
secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may
be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even
long after the finality of the judgment. There is no
time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right
to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one
speech, the printing of one article or the staging of
one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be
invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient
whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to
be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned.
Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would
be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the
period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced
to a race for time. And in such a contest between an
employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses
because he cannot employ the best an dedicated
counsel who can defend his interest with the required
diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial
resources with which to pay for competent legal
services
• enforcement of the basic human freedoms
sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
compelling reason to deny application of a Court of
Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such
human rights. It is an accepted principle that the
Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend
its own rules or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require."
13. INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF
EDUCATORS VS QUISUMBING (2000)
4 Feb 2018
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF
EDUCATORS (ISAE) vs.
HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING as the
Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO as the Acting
Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR.
BRIAN MACCAULEY as the Superintendent of
International School-Manila; and
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC.
[G.R. No. 128845; June 1, 2000] Constitutional
Law| Equal Protection Clause
FACTS:
Private respondent International School, Inc. is a
domestic educational institution established primarily
for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and
other temporary residents. To enable the School to
continue carrying out its educational program and
improve its standard of instruction, the School hires
10
both foreign and local teachers as members of its
faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-
hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not
accorded local-hires. These include housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave
travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary
rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification
employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos
and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires
constitutes racial discrimination.
ISSUE:
Whether there is indeed a discrimination thus a
violation of Equal Protection Clause.
HELD:
Public policy abhors inequality and discrimination. The
Constitution directs the State to promote “equality of
employment opportunities for all.” Similarly, the Labor
Code provides that the State shall “ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed.”
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is
frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for
example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of
lesser compensation to a female employee as against
a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248
declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize
in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of
“equal pay for equal work.” Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its
“international character” notwithstanding. In this
case, employees should be given equal pay for work
of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this
jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on
fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle
we uphold today.
14. BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULO
MARCH 30, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
Bayan Muna vs Romulo
G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list
group established to represent the marginalized
sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now
deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during
the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto
Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then
Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the
Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court (ICC) with “the power to exercise its jurisdiction
over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern x x x and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.”
The serious crimes adverted to cover those
considered grave under international law, such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
crimes of aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge
d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute
which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval” by the signatory states. As of
the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the
139 signatory countries appear to have completed the
ratification, approval and concurrence process. The
Philippines is not among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J.
Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the
terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement
(Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the
RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May
13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP,
represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with
and accepted the US proposals embodied under the
US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the
Agreement with the US government. In esse, the
Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and
defines as “persons” of the RP and US from frivolous
and harassment suits that might be brought against
them in international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the
increasing pace of the strategic security and defense
partnership between the two countries. As of May 2,
2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected
by and between the US and 33 other countries.
The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:
1. For purposes of this Agreement, “persons” are
current or former Government officials, employees
(including contractors), or military personnel or
nationals of one Party.
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the
other shall not, absent the express consent of the first
Party,
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to
any international tribunal for any purpose, unless
11
such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to
any other entity or third country, or expelled to a third
country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to
any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council.
3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise
transfers a person of the Philippines to a third
country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or
transfer of that person by the third country to any
international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been
established by the UN Security Council, absent the
express consent of the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines [GRP].
4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or
otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a third
country, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or
transfer of that person by the third country to any
international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been
established by the UN Security Council, absent the
express consent of the Government of the [US].
5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year
after the date on which one party notifies the other of
its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions
of this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect
to any act occurring, or any allegation arising, before
the effective date of termination.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General
Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-
surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied
in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of
diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding
agreement under international law; and that, under
US law, the said agreement did not require the advice
and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of
discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying
the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as
unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force
and effect.
Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER
AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting
obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at
variance with universally recognized principles of
international law.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement
relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N
BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding
the Agreement.
Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken unaware of
certain well-recognized international doctrines,
practices, and jargons––is untenable. One of these is
the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section
2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law and international jurisprudence as
part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy
of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An
exchange of notes falls “into the category of inter-
governmental agreements,” which is an
internationally accepted form of international
agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections
(Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:
An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine
agreement, that has many similarities with the private
law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange
of two documents, each of the parties being in the
possession of the one signed by the representative of
the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting
State repeats the text of the offering State to record
its assent. The signatories of the letters may be
government Ministers, diplomats or departmental
heads. The technique of exchange of notes is
frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy
procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of
legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms “exchange of notes”
and “executive agreements” have been used
interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered
a form of executive agreement that becomes binding
through executive action. On the other hand,
executive agreements concluded by the President
“sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and
at other times that of more formal documents
denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’” As former
US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B.
Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of
Trade Agreement Acts:
The point where ordinary correspondence between
this and other governments ends and agreements –
whether denominated executive agreements or
exchange of notes or otherwise – begin, may
sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. x x x
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that
E/N BFO-028-03––be it viewed as the Non-Surrender
Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of
acceptance thereof or as consent to be bound––is a
recognized mode of concluding a legally binding
international written contract among nations.
Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance
with Principles of International Law
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down
as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations
and/or being at variance with allegedly universally
recognized principles of international law. The
immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the
Agreement, as petitioner would put it, “leaves
criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity; x x x it precludes our country from
delivering an American criminal to the [ICC] x x x.”63
The above argument is a kind of recycling of
petitioner’s earlier position, which, as already
12
discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the
Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in
the process undermined its treaty obligations under
the Rome Statute, contrary to international law
principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this
regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly
described by the Solicitor General, “is an assertion by
the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes
under its national law. x x x The agreement is a
recognition of the primacy and competence of the
country’s judiciary to try offenses under its national
criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and
judiciously.”
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous
impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos
and Americans committing high crimes of
international concern to escape criminal trial and
punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who
may have committed acts penalized under the Rome
Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the
Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP
or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce,
that all the formalities necessary to bind both
countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For
perspective, what the Agreement contextually
prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals
to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the
consent of the other party, which may desire to
prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the
view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or
violative of international law concepts in the act of the
Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant
to the non-surrender agreement over an offense
considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the
Rome Statute.
15. ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents
the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It
filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to
moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To
buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical
and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated
that since their ways are immoral and contrary to
public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact,
their acts are even punishable under the Revised
Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner
filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65
of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation,
insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against
the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed
that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well
as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination based
on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that
petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds.
It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector
is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its
national existence contrary to actual verification
reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment
clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners
application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang
Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only
those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or
related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals) may be registered under
the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that
“[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly,
“governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have
a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are
sought to be prevented, or why special protection is
required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported
violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines a nuisance as “any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
13
morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution
under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance,
a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It
hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation
of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a
judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without
more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in
the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to
a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest.
TOPIC: right to informational privacy, writ of habeas
data
16. RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS.
MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA,
Petitioners v.
ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T.
ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.
PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.
PREFATORY:
The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute,
since participation in society is an equally powerful
desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in
a personal adjustment process in which he balances
the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure
and communication of himself to others, in light of
the environmental conditions and social norms set by
the society in which he lives.
– Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
FACTS:
Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high
school students at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu
City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into
their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to
attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others,
took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their
undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded
by Angela on her Facebook profile.
At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at
STC’s high school department, learned from her
students that some seniors at STC posted pictures
online, depicting themselves from the waist up,
dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her
students if they knew who the girls in the photos are.
In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne,
among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in
to their respective personal Facebook accounts and
showed her photos of the identified students, which
include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor
and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and
Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of
clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black
brassieres.
Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were
times when access to or the availability of the
identified students’ photos was not confined to the
girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by
any Facebook user.
Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other
students involved were barred from joining the
commencement exercises.
Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the
minors, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the petition for habeas
data on the following grounds:
Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual
or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy,
one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ
of habeas data.
The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook
without restrictions as to who may view them, lost
their privacy in some way.
STC gathered the photographs through legal means
and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of
the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was indeed an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life,
liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
(Is there a right to informational privacy in online
social network activities of its users?)
HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary
discussions and check the ruling at the latter part)
Nature of Writ of Habeas Data
It is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
It is an independent and summary remedy designed
to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a
person’s right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means
in order to achieve unlawful ends.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court
aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational
privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar
has, in fact, defined habeas data as “a procedure
14
designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse
in the information age.”
Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements
The existence of a person’s right to informational
privacy
An actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim (proven
by at least substantial evidence)
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of
an alleged unauthorized access to information about a
person.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an
independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy,
more specifically the right to informational privacy.
The remedies against the violation of such right can
include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files in
possession or in control of respondents. Clearly then,
the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be
availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information
Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or
omissions of public officials and of private individuals
or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing
data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such
individual or entity need not be in the business of
collecting or storing data.
To “engage” in something is different from
undertaking a business endeavour. To “engage”
means “to do or take part in something.” It does not
necessarily mean that the activity must be done in
pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person
or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said
data or information about the aggrieved party or his
or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the
element of regularity, as when one pursues a
business, and is in the nature of a personal
endeavour, for any other reason or even for no
reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent
the writ from getting to said person or entity.
As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued
against a school like STC.
Right to informational privacy
Right to informational privacy is the right of
individuals to control information about themselves.
Several commentators regarding privacy and social
networking sites, however, all agree that given the
millions of OSN users, “in this Social Networking
environment, privacy is no longer grounded in
reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.”
So the underlying question now is: Up to what extent
is the right to privacy protected in OSNs?
Facebook Privacy Tools
To address concerns about privacy, but without
defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with
different privacy tools designed to regulate the
accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information
uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng
High Court recognized this ability of the users to
“customize their privacy settings,” but did so with this
caveat: “Facebook states in its policies that, although
it makes every effort to protect a user’s information,
these privacy settings are not foolproof.”
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the
visibility and accessibility of digital images (photos),
posted on his or her personal bulletin or “wall,” except
for the user’s profile picture and ID, by selecting his
or her desired privacy setting:
Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can
view the photo;
Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends
and their friends can view the photo;
Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view
the photo;
Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular
friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the
user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook
users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit
the visibility of his or her specific profile content,
statuses, and photos, among others, from another
user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook
extends its users an avenue to make the availability of
their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to
“when and to what extent to disclose facts about
themselves – and to put others in the position of
receiving such confidences.”
LONE ISSUE:
NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not
violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy as the
subject digital photos were viewable either by the
minors’ Facebook friends, or by the public at large.
Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’
statement that the images were visible only to the
five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s
claim that the other students were able to view the
photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving,
thus deserving scant consideration.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed
Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are
the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the
photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only
goes to show that no special means to be able to
view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to
by Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable to
assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality,
15
viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2)
by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook
posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone
on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’
children positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If such were the case, they cannot
invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy.
US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph
on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such imagery,
particularly under circumstances such as here, where
the Defendant did not employ protective measures or
devices that would have controlled access to the Web
page or the photograph itself.
United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method
of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably
expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the
chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance
of privacy.
The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held
that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to
“Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be
viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends
with the source of the content. The user’s own
Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or
her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook
friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is
shared or when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post
or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy
setting of which was set at “Friends.” Thus, it is
suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility
set at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more so
automatically, be said to be “very private,” contrary to
petitioners’ argument.
No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends
of minors
Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the
perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’
Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were
posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of
gathering the information as it was voluntarily given
to them by persons who had legitimate access to the
said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the
friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however,
neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who showed
the images to Escudero.
Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or
“Custom”
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures
posted were limited to the original uploader, through
the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s
contact list has been screened to limit access to a
select few, through the “Custom” setting, the result
may have been different, for in such instances, the
intention to limit access to the particular post, instead
of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the
user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and
palpable.
17. of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470
(2007)
posted in CONLAW2 cases
Facts
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong
Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by
virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of
Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong
Administrative Region filed a petition for the
extradition of the private respondent. In the same
case, a petition for bail was filed by the private
respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there
was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition
cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
and was granted by the respondent judge subject to
the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the
condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will
appear and answer the issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will
further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this
undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor
of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this
Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate
notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold
departure order before this Court even in extradition
proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government
prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to
the nearest office, at any time and day of the week;
and if they further desire, manifest before this Court
to require that all the assets of accused, real and
personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the
condition that if the accused flees from his
undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but
was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this
instant petition.
Issue
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
16
Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail;
that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory
law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to
bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained
that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that
extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of one’s liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in
Government of United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario
Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings, the same being available only
in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of
the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in
public international
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe
these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the
individual under our fundamental law, on one hand,
and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international
law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the
individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court
departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that
an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
18. Human Rights Law Case Digest:
Mejoff V. Director Of Prisons (1951)
G.R. No. L-4254 September 26, 1951
Lessons Applicable: characteristics of human rights,
constitutional guarantee that no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law,
Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights
FACTS:
Boris Mejoff, an alien of Russian descent who was
brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret
operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's
regime in these Islands. (The petitioner's entry into
the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by
the armed and belligerent forces of a de facto
government whose decrees were law furing the
occupation.)
He was arrested on March 18, 1948 as a Japanese
spy, by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. and
later there was an order for his release.
But on April 5, 1948, the Board of Commissioners of
Immigration declared that Mejoff had entered the
Philippines illegally in 1944 and ordered that he be
deported on the first available transportation to
Russia.
He was transferred to Cebu Provincial Jail and then
Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa on October, 1948.
He then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on
the basis that too long a detention may justify the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus - denied
Over two years having elapsed since the decision
aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has not
found way and means of removing the petitioner out
of the country, and none are in sight, although it
should be said in justice to the deportation
authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that no
ship or country would take the petitioner.
This is his 2nd petition for writ of habeas corpus
ISSUE: W/N the writ of habeas corpus should be
granted since he was detained longer than a
reasonable time
HELD: YES. writ will issue commanding the
respondents to release the petitioner from custody
upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed
under the surveillance of the immigration authorities
or their agents in such form and manner as may be
deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and
be available when the Government is ready to deport
him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the
question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this
Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for
decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond
for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000 with
sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the
Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact
by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right
of asylum therein even if they are "stateless," which
the petitioner claims to be.
The protection against deprivation of liberty without
due process of law and except for crimes committed
against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine
citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy
aliens, regardless of nationality.
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the
Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of Nation." And
in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights" and approved by the General
Assembly of the United Nations of which the
Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on
December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and
all other fundamental rights as applied to all human
beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that
17
"All human beings are born free and equal in degree
and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all
the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other
status" (Art. 2): that "Every one has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him
by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile" (Art. 9); etc.
petitioner's unduly prolonged detention would be
unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the only
purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger
that is by no means actual, present, or uncontrollable
Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but
unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this
country and so fraught with danger of excesses and
injustice that I am loath to resort it, even as a
discretionary judicial technique to supplement
conviction of such offenses as those of which
defendants stand convicted.
If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues
presented, its underlying principle is of universal
application.
As already noted, not only are there no charges
pending against the petitioner, but the prospects of
bringing any against him are slim and remote.