HMUN

A Background Guide for the

Special Session on
Terrorism

Harvard Model United Nations

January 24 - January 27, 2019
 Table of Contents

Letter from the Under-Secretary--General..........................................................................................3

Letter from the Director.....................................................................................................................4
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................5
GA Plenary Theme.............................................................................................................................5
Crisis Elements ..................................................................................................................................6
Committee Structure..........................................................................................................................6
History of the Committee..................................................................................................................7
Statement of the Problem...................................................................................................................7
Topic Area ........................................................................................................................................8
Points of Contention........................................................................................................................31
Suggestions for Further Research......................................................................................................33
Closing Remarks..............................................................................................................................33
Endnotes..........................................................................................................................................35
 HMUN Harvard Model United Nations
A LETTER FROM THE UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the General Assembly of Harvard Model United Nations 2019! Thank you
for choosing to attend HMUN, and I cannot wait to hear you discuss and debate topics of
Neil D. Reilly international importance throughout the weekend in January.
Secretary-General
The General Assembly prides itself on most accurately simulating the actual United Nations,
in which all member states are represented and have equal power and voice in debating
Kayla R. Hollingsworth issues of global concern. You as delegates have such tremendous potential to spark change
Director-General and create impact, whether it be through learning about new issues, meeting fellow delegates
from around the world, or engaging with your committees to create feasible yet innovative
Adil Bhatia solutions. With over 2,000 of you across our 10 committees this year, I have no doubt that
Under-Secretary-General
Administration this potential for impact is greater than it has ever been before.

Lily Z. Piao The GA Plenary Theme this year is “The Responsibilities of Leadership.” To me, that means
Under-Secretary-General empowering each other to lead by example, and to tackle the problems facing our generation
Business with courage and assertion. Certainly, the topics that we will be discussing in this year’s
General Assembly will challenge you to confront these challenges head-on. I encourage you
Luis Patrick Cespedes to use your Directors, Moderators and Assistant Directors as support in your efforts to come
Comptroller
up with solutions to these issues. They care deeply about the topics you will be debating and
Nataliya Palinchak would love to engage with you as collaborators and partners.
Under-Secretary-General
Operations I would like to briefly mention a new tool introduced by the organ this year: the GA blog.
I hope you will all access it if you have not yet already. It is linked on the General Assembly
Angie J. Cui page on the HMUN website, and is meant to be used as a resource for you, as delegates, to
Under-Secretary-General
General Assembly
connect with your committee staff and with each other before conference even begins. Your
Directors will be updating it throughout the coming months, so please use it as a tool and
Esteban R. Flores feel free to provide me with your feedback.
Under-Secretary-General
Economic and Social My passion for the General Assembly came from attending HMUN when I was a delegate in
Council & Regional Bodies high school. I was just one individual in what felt, at the time, like an endless sea of delegates
in the Grand Ballroom of the Boston Sheraton. However, by the time conference ended, I
Pedro L. C. Farias
Under-Secretary-General had learned so much from my committee staff and the brilliant other students around me. I
Specialized Agencies truly believe that the environment of the GA is uniquely educational: take advantage of this
weekend to take risks, dive into debate, and develop meaningful relationships. I promise you
will not be disappointed.

Yours,

59 Shepard Street, Box 205

Cambridge, MA 02138
Voice: 617-398-0772 Angie J. Cui
Email: info@harvardmun.org
Under-Secretary-General for the General Assembly
www.harvardmun.org Harvard Model United Nations 2019
 HMUN Harvard Model United Nations
A LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR

Dear Delegates,

It is my honor to welcome you to Harvard Model United Nations 2019! My name

is Michael Shafer and I am excited to meet each and every one of you this coming
Neil D. Reilly January in Boston as your Director for the Special Session on Terrorism. My goal is
Secretary-General
to make sure you all have fun and learn lots at this year’s conference!

I grew up in rural Eastern Oregon and am currently a sophomore at Harvard. I

Kayla R. Hollingsworth study Government (perfect for a committee on terrorism) and focus particularly on
Director-General
international relations and Middle Eastern politics. Outside of HMUN, I am involved
Adil Bhatia with changing the way the United States holds elections through a group called Voters
Under-Secretary-General Choose, I work to affect policy change in Massachusetts through the Institute of
Administration
Politics, and I am involved with the radio station here on campus. Besides those cool
Lily Z. Piao sounding things I also watch far too much Netflix and annoy my roommates with
Under-Secretary-General bad jokes and terrible singing.
Business

Disrupting financial terrorist networks is a topic that I am extremely passionate about

Luis Patrick Cespedes
Comptroller and hope that you all will come to find it as interesting and important as I do. This
topic has many complexities that I hope to hear explored during debate in committee.
Nataliya Palinchak The financial networks of terror organizations should be at the forefront of discussion
Under-Secretary-General
Operations now that ISIS and other terror groups are being consistently beaten militarily and yet
are still able to have a global impact. I am excited to hear the ideas that are proposed
Angie J. Cui during committee to disrupt these financial networks and take away the influence of
Under-Secretary-General
General Assembly
terror organizations. Terrorism is a subject that I study extensively and cannot wait to
hear new ideas!
Esteban R. Flores
Under-Secretary-General I hope that this Special Session on Terrorism is a place where delegates can learn more
Economic and Social
Council & Regional Bodies about a different aspect of terrorism than is usually discussed on the international scene
and a place where delegates can learn how model UN functions and, by extension, the
Pedro L. C. Farias UN. I want delegates to push the boundaries and propose radical ideas that the world
Under-Secretary-General
Specialized Agencies
has not heard before. I am here as a resource to you while you prepare for committee,
debate, write working papers, and beyond. I am so excited to see you all at conference
and I want to encourage you to reach out to me with any questions or concerns you
might have or to just introduce yourself to me!

Yours,
Michael J. Shafer
59 Shepard Street, Box 205 Director, Special Session on Terrorism
Cambridge, MA 02138 sst@harvardmun.org
Voice: 617-398-0772

Email: info@harvardmun.org
 Harvard Model United Nations 2019 5

develop new and creative strategies to combat an

Introduction enemy that is continuously evolving. Above all,
delegates should take away from committee a
strong understanding of how leaders that tackle
As explained in United Nations Security Council
new issues must be constantly aware of the
(UNSC) Resolution 1566, the goal of terrorism
precedents that will be set by their actions.
is to enact political change through the use, or
threat, of violence. Within the past two decades,
the world has witnessed heinous acts of terrorism
that range from bombings to the hijacking of GA Plenary Theme
airplanes. These events have forced the global
community to come together to find new ways to This year, the General Assembly Plenary Theme is
defend and fight against organizations that often “The Responsibilities of Leadership”. In line with
operate on a global scale. The UN has served the organ of the United Nations we are seeking to
as the vehicle for this global collaboration, and simulate, which convenes under a plenary theme
numerous resolutions aimed at combating acts of each year, debate in each of the General Assembly
terror have originated from its discussion forums. committees will revolve around this larger
These resolutions address topics ranging from question of how and when international actors
definitions of terrorism to internationally binding should take on the challenges that they contribute
laws regarding the seizure of aircrafts. However, to, directly or indirectly. Whose responsibility is
these actions have not completely eradicated the it to prevent underdeveloped or underrepresented
influence or abilities of terrorist organizations. For nations from being exploited by other states or
example, the past decade saw the rise of the Islamic
institutions? To what extent are states responsible
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the declaration of
for the issues discussed in this committee, and
a Caliphate in the Middle East. While the Islamic
how should they be held accountable?
State rose to power in the Middle East, its ability
to launch terror attacks on an international scale
We encourage you to keep these questions in mind
became clear with the numerous attacks for which
the organization claimed ownership. Recently, when reading this guide and conducting your
ISIS has suffered substantial military defeats, butresearch. We hope that the plenary theme will
the financial self-sufficiency of the organization serve as a launching point for how to break down
allowed and continues to allow it to operate on a this topic and its many subtopics and case studies.
regional and international level. Your consideration of the theme should be present
in work you produce in committee, including
Terrorism has been evolving for centuries, but the speeches, working papers, and draft resolutions.
financial self-sufficiency of terror organizations Because all GA committees at HMUN 2019 are
allows them to exert a constant threat on a convening under the same Plenary Theme, also
significantly greater scale than ever before. take this opportunity to connect with your peers
Keeping in mind the precedence that will be set across different committees and see how the same
by the resolutions produced by this committee, starting point informs your conversations and
delegates should identify how the international debates when it comes to different topics.
community can disrupt, and thereby weaken,
terrorist financial networks. Delegates should
come away with a sense of why financial self- Crisis Elements
sufficiency is a dangerous evolution of terror
organizations and how international institutions
such as the UN can work to prevent and disrupt The events in this committee do not happen in a
such self-sufficiency. Delegates are expected to vacuum. The situations addressed and examined
6 Special Session on Terrorism
in the background guide continue to unfold in
the real world, and a central challenge of model
United Nations is to simulate international
institutes that must adopt with changing
landscapes of threat and tension. To this end,
this committee may introduce some minor
crises throughout the weekend to continually
challenge your understanding of and engagement
with the topic at hand and its various nuances.
When addressing these crises or updates, it is
important to remember the long-term strategy
you are hoping to pursue and balance that with
the immediate needs demanded by the situation
at hand.
Whether it’s a twitter feed of the latest breaking
news surrounding your topic, an expert witness
who comes to deliver new information to the
committee, or a brewing conflict somewhere in
the world, delegates will have to adapt the policies
they’re discussing to address whatever crisis
they might be faced with. Your working papers
should thoughtfully consider the best course of
action to resolve the crisis, your speeches should
be cognizant of its impact on the topic you’re
discussing, and a draft resolution should address
the underlying issues behind it. If and when a
crisis or update is introduced in your committee,
the dais will be sure to specify how we expect you This is a single-delegate committee. I understand
to engage with it and incorporate it into your that there will be some delegates much more
work.
Committee Structure
Disrupting terrorist financial networks is a
complicated issue that has the potential for a
multitude of creative solutions. Delegates should
be sure that their resolutions address both long-
term and short-term goals. Long-term goals
would be along the lines of enacting preventative
measures to proactively ensure that such financial
networks cannot form. Short-term goals will deal
more with the immediate problems facing the
international community in the form of terrorist
organizations that are currently utilizing financial
networks to extend their sphere of influence.
Short-term goals will focus on disrupting current
terrorist financial networks. I expect to see both
components addressed in resolutions prepared by
delegates since they are complimentary. When a
terrorist financial network is disrupted, measures
should immediately be put into place to ensure
that another one does not take its place. While
keeping an eye on past legislation passed by the
UN on this issue, delegates should look more
towards developing new strategies and frameworks
to counter this global problem.
There are four sub-issues addressed in depth in
this guide. While I do not expect delegates to
be completely knowledgeable about and ready
to address each of these, I do expect to see all
four at least given some thought in your written
resolutions, even if that writing accounts for a
small section of a resolution or working paper.
That being said, I fully expect financial and
military aid along with one or two other sub-
issues addressed at length in resolutions. Even if
issues are not explicitly addressed in resolutions,
delegates should be familiar at least with the
information covered in this background guide for
each sub-issue.
comfortable with speaking and some delegates
much more comfortable with working with
other delegates to develop solutions and write
draft resolutions. However, I do very much hope
to see all delegates engaged with both aspects of
committee. I encourage all delegates to get up
and voice their ideas and opinions in front of the
whole committee. I appreciate how difficult it can
be to speak up in front of others and sympathize
with delegates who struggle with this but will take
note of those delegates that neglect to address the
committee as a whole. I encourage healthy debate
that leads to new and greater solutions. I am not a
fan of talking to simply talk and will be aware of
delegates speaking with purpose, not just to gain
 Harvard Model United Nations 2019 7

attention. The goal of this committee is to pass To date, there have been 30 special sessions
a resolution that effectively deals with disrupting that have been convened beginning in 1947,
terrorist financial networks. To that end, I will the most recent of which was called in 2016.
greatly appreciate those delegates that work Special sessions hold the full power and function
with other delegates during committee sessions of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) as are
towards that goal. outlined in Chapter IV of the Charter of the
United Nations. These special sessions can make
As far as a rough schedule for committee goes: recommendations to member states, the Security
Thursday will primarily be spent formally Council, or both. As has been seen in previous
debating. After Thursday’s session, I will allow special sessions, the committee has the power to
writing to begin. It should be very clear that mandate the functions of standing committees
writing will explicitly not be allowed before this and erect new commissions or committees to
time. Delegates should be aware that there will further explore and report on prevalent issues. In
be a cap on the number of working papers that I preparing for committee, delegates should pay
will accept and that cap will be announced early particular attention to the three Special Sessions
on Friday. Working papers will be accepted until on Disarmament, and especially the first of these
either late first committee session or early second held in 1978. These cases will give a sense of the
committee session of Friday. This will be decided mandate of a special session and how they are
depending on the progress that delegates make. usually conducted.
Working papers will be introduced during the
second committee session on Friday with a Q&A Special sessions of the UNGA have discussion
by the signatories to follow. There will also be a cap
that is centered around the cause of the convening
on the number of draft resolutions that I will acceptof the special session. Thus, in the instance of this
and that cap will be announced early on Saturday. committee, discussion will center around how
Draft resolutions will be accepted either late first the UN can work to combat terrorist financial
session or early second session on Saturday with a networks. The goal of such sessions is to adopt
presentation and Q&A by the signatories to follow. resolutions and, if necessary, to adopt a program of
action to achieve the resolution(s) that arise out of
debate. At Harvard Model United Nations 2019,
the Special Session on Terrorism will function in
History of the Committee a manner and under a mandate that is outlined in
the Charter of the United Nations as previously
A special session on terrorism is not a regular mentioned. The resolution passed during the
committee of the United Nations, and a special Special Session will not be binding but will carry
session called specifically to address terrorism has the full weight of the opinion of the UNGA to
never before been convened. Special sessions have both the international community and the UN
repeatedly been called in the service of the UN - Security Council. The impact and precedence
previous special sessions have convened to discuss that will be set by the passed resolution will be
Palestinian sovereignty, the financial situation of tremendous and will shape future special sessions.
the UN, development and international economic
cooperation, the global drug problem, and other
pressing issues. The UN Charter allows for special Statement of the Problem
sessions to be convened when is required and
requested by either the Security Council or a
majority of the member states of the UN. Terrorism is not something new. However,
within the last two decades, there has been a large
8 Special Session on Terrorism

uptick in media coverage of global terrorism. a standing government so as to legitimize the

This is because nations around the world have power of the terror organization. If these sources
seen the devastating effects of acts of terror and of funding were to be cut-off, then the ability of
national governments have subsequently pledged these groups to carry out acts of terror, subject
to fight them. Nations have mobilized armies to populations to their rule, and recruit fighters
fight ISIS and developed new strategies of war would all be severely limited. This is why it is
to combat organizations that do not fight like imperative that the United Nations develops a
traditional armies. Terrorists take advantage of comprehensive set of strategies to combat and
their surroundings to build an organization that disrupt terrorist financial networks.
pursues political goals through violence and
threats and intimidation. Often, when there This guide will provide you with a history of the
is a power vacuum, they fill it and then use the problem and the action that has already been
threat of violence and economic desperation to taken internationally to combat terrorist financial
force others to carry out their violent actions. In networks. It will also give you a framework that
many areas where terrorist organizations flourish, will help you think about terrorist financial
there is a weak or nonexistent government and networks in terms of the strategies to disrupt
a faltering economic system that cannot support them. You will be provided with multiple case
the population. studies that will help you to view the issue from
a more global perspective, and will identify the
The international community can continue various problems that should be addressed in the
to pursue military actions to battle terrorist resolutions that you will propose.
organizations, but as long as these organizations
have financial systems in place to pay for weapons
and ammunition and can use those funds to coerce History of the Problem
people into becoming fighters, these organizations
will not be rendered inoperational. Terror groups
such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Hamas and Boko Haram
bring in millions of dollars a year through their As previously stated, terrorism is not a new
financial networks. In the case of Hezbollah, problem -- it can be traced back 2,000 years to
that annual income is over one billion dollars a the Zealots in Palestine. While terrorism has
year. With funding like this, these organizations gone through many changes since then, the late
are capable of recruiting fighters and carrying 20th century saw a return to religious terrorism
out heinous acts across the globe. They procure directed against the state as terror groups
these funds from kidnapping ransoms, selling attempted to legitimize themselves by proving
illicit narcotics, exploiting resources, smuggling that the government did not have a monopoly on
on black market, and soliciting individual the use of violence in society. The 21st century
contributions. Some organizations will pay the has proved to be not much different, as the world
families of those who became martyrs as a way to saw acts of religious terrorism such as 9/11 and
encourage martyrs to carry out their duty. the rise of violent religious organizations such as
the Islamic State. The most recent evolution that
Terror organizations rely on this funding in order terror organizations have undergone is financial
to stay operational -- to obtain weapons and self-sufficiency, which elevates their effectiveness
vehicles, to pay their fighters, to bribe government to unprecedented and terrifying levels. The rest
officials, etcetera. In the case of ISIS and Hamas, of this section will be dedicated to exploring the
funds are used to set up and maintain a proto- history of financial networks that have made
state that carries out some of the functions of terror organizations so much more deadly than
ever before.

The Zealots and the Assassins are the two earliest
examples of terrorist groups who non-state actors.
Acts of terror were carried out by true fanatics who
chose to and wanted to commit those acts. What
can be referred to as “modern terrorism” arose
after WWII, when groups realized that they could
use acts of terror to garner international attention.
With the rise of mass media, terror organizations
were able to gain the attention of the entire world
through their acts. Upon the beginning of the
Cold War, there was a renewal of state sponsored
terrorism that appeared in a form different then
previous iterations. The Soviet Union aggressively
sponsored terrorism during the 1960s and 1970s
in order to topple governments in unfriendly
regions. They provided funding, training, ideas,
and equipment for terror organizations across the
globe. During this time, many terror organizations
procured funding through governments such as
the Soviet Union as long as they could assure the
sponsoring government that the funding would
be used to target the sponsoring nation’s enemies.
The collapse of the Soviet Union did not bring
about a complete end to the renewed period of
state sponsored terrorism that can be seen today.
When such state sponsorships from both sides of
the Cold War began to fade, terror organizations
had to find new ways to sustain what they had
built with the funding and support of foreign
governments. During the 1980s and 1990s, terror
organizations branched out into other criminal
activities, including kidnapping, extortion, fraud,
resource exploitation, and drug trafficking. In
2002, donations from charities and individual
donors were the largest source of funding for Al-
Qaeda, showing that these entities play a large
role in funding terror organizations. Many terror
organizations now also employ front companies
that use legitimate businesses to launder and
raise money for these groups. The advent of the
internet has added new ways for terror groups to
raise and transfer their funds anonymously.
Harvard Model United Nations 2019 9
Relevant UN Action
The UN has passed many resolutions on
combating and defining terrorism. It wasn’t
until the 1996 when the financing of terror was
addressed by the UNGA Resolution 51/210. The
resolution mentions states taking appropriate
action to combat terrorism, which includes the
financing of terrorists and terrorist organizations.
In 1999, the UNGA adopted the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism. This Convention gave a definition
for what was to be considered the financing
of terrorism and called upon States to establish
local authorities that would monitor and punish
those who funded terrorism. By calling on states
to assist each other in criminal investigations, the
adoption of the Convention was a large step for
the UN in combating the financial networks of
terror organizations. However, it was not a perfect
resolution. While it calls on states to implement
authorities and strategies to combat financial
networks, it does not address how poor nations,
often times the breeding grounds of terrorist
activities, could afford to implement these
strategies.
In the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001
terror attacks in New York City, the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) came together
to pass two resolutions, 1368 (2001) and 1373
(2001). The two resolutions called on States to
prevent and suppress the funding of terror attacks
through a variety of actions that were outlined
in the resolutions. These guidelines were more
thorough then the 1999 Convention; however,
once again, these resolutions failed to address how
financial assistance could and should be made
available to impoverished nations to help them to
implement comprehensive financial regulations.
Resolution 1373 (2001) does mention the close
ties between terror financing and illicit drug trade
but offers no further insight into the issue other
10 Special Session on Terrorism
than the need to enhance coordination among in order to prevent the recruitment of desperate
nations. peoples in poor regions.
In October of 2001, the Financial Action Task
Force that was established in 1989 was expanded
so that their purview and recommendations
covered terrorist acts and terrorist organizations.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) drew up
a total of nine special recommendations that deal
specifically with how to combat the financing of
acts of terror and terrorist organizations. However,
because the recommendations of the FATF are non-
binding, countries are not required to implement
them. The FATF recommendations also do not
address how financial or military aid can be used to
help disrupt terrorist financial networks, although
they do suggest that countries review the legal
regulation of non-profit organizations’ activities
to prevent them from being taken advantage of
by terrorist organizations.
US fighter jets and gunships destroyed 283 Isis oil tankers
in Syria as part of efforts to cripple the terror group’s
income streams.
Source: The Independent
In 2014, the Security Council passed Resolution
2178, which echoed the calls contained in
Resolution 1373. This Resolution deals mainly
with how States need to act to prevent foreign
terrorist fighters from leaving their home nations
to join terrorist organizations abroad. There
is language in the Resolution that deals with
countering violent extremism in order to prevent
terrorism . This section does not, however, address
how financial desperation should be addressed
While the UN has begun its battle against terrorist
financial networks in the last two decades, its
work does not address several important areas in
disrupting terrorist financial networks. The UN
does not speak on how states can use financial aid
to to help each other and thus ensure a global force
against terrorist financial networks. Charitable
organizations and their contributions to terror
organizations, and the rise of technologies such as
blockchains that can be used to facilitate financial
transactions are areas that have been left largely
untouched by the UN. Previous UN legislation
passed does not offer suggestions or guidelines
for how military force can be used to disrupt
financial networks. Furthermore, the overall
language of some UNSC and UNGA resolutions
is vague and difficult to enforce. For example,
while the purchasing of oil from ISIS is explicitly
banned in UNSC Resolution 2253 (2015),
the purchasing of natural gas in not explicitly
banned. UN Resolutions designed to prevent
terrorist groups from gaining funds through the
selling of natural resources also only target ISIS
and Al-Qaeda, limiting their applicability. The
UN has also had problems with getting member
nations to implement the Security Council’s
recommendations. All of this shows that while
important work has been done, that work to truly
comprehensively tackle terrorist financing is far
from over.
Framework
Within draft resolutions, delegates should aim to
break down action that the UN could potentially
take into different categorizations. These could
include financial assistance, military action,
security recommendations, etc. Delegates may
find it easier to conceptualize different approaches
when broken down in this way. Delegates should
be aware that many of the topics discussed in
this guide and many of the topics that will be
 Harvard Model United Nations 2019 11

discussed in committee had specific definitions it was stated that terror organizations refrained
that should be used, unless a different definition from many activities such as kidnapping and the
should be offered and accepted during committee. selling of drugs so as to not soil their cause with
Many of these definitions will be explained in the association of such organized crime operations.
guide when they occur. For now, delegates should Again, it can be seen that the end of the Cold
remember that definitions are very important War kicked off a new wave of evolution for terror
when it comes to international law and action. organizations. As state-funding dried up as state-
Definitions for terms should be drawn from sponsored terrorism became more and more
available UN definitions unless explicitly stated frowned upon by the international community,
otherwise. However, some terms do not have terror organizations had to find ways to maintain
specific UN definitions and so those will be the level of funding that had allowed for them to
explicitly defined for use in committee in this have long reaching effects. One of the ways that
guide. proved effective at raising large quantities of funds
was being involved with illicit narcotics whether
it be growing them, creating them, transporting
Subtopic A: Narcoterrorism them, or selling them. So how has narcoterrorism
arisen and where can its effects clearly be seen?
Terrorism, while existing since the first century The first purported use of the term ‘narcoterrorism’
AD, has had to evolve with the times. Terrorist was in 1982 by the then President of Peru who
organizations, at least those that are extremely used it to describe attacks against the anti-
effective, are resourceful and flexible. To narcotics police force in the country. In 1985
understand what narcoterrorism is and why worldwide attention turned to the subject when
combatting it is so important when the end the infamous Medellin Cartel worked with the
goal is to disrupt terrorist financial networks, terrorist organization, M-19, to kill 11 Supreme
delegates must first understand, separately, the Court judges in Bogota, Colombia. In her 1990
history of the illicit narcotics trade and terrorism book, Narcoterrorism, Rachel Ehrenfield gave an
and how nations and international organizations official definition to the term stating that it is the
combatted each. The pages preceding this have “use of drug trafficking to advance the objectives of
given a review of the history of terrorism that certain governments and terrorist organizations”.
should serve sufficient; however, I would like to Since its inception the use of the term has become
remind delegates that to be fully prepared for increasingly popular and its definition increasingly
debate they should conduct their own research broad. For the purpose of this Special Session
and can start with sources that will be included on Terrorism, delegates will rely on Ehrenfield’s
later on in this background guide. With this definition with the supplementation that
understanding of terrorism, delegates need to narcoterrorism can be considered terrorism that
understand how the illicit drug trade became so is financed by involvement in illicit drug trade
heavily entangled with terrorism. as well as attempts by illicit drug traffickers to
coerce or intimidate governments to further their
Narcoterrorism arose in the 1980s in Latin own political agendas. Delegates should keep in
America. While there were certainly terror mind that the UN has no official definition for
organizations that dabbled in the narcotics trade, narcoterrorism.
it was not until this time that terror organizations
truly became involved with what today is called By the late 1990’s and early 2000’s the dangerous
narcoterrorism. Before this time the world had not nexus that existed between illicit drug operations
witnessed terror organizations that were heavily and terrorist operations and financing had
involved in the drug trade. Earlier in the guide
12 Special Session on Terrorism

become obvious. The United Nations Office on

off of the illegal operations. FARC at this time
Drugs and Crime estimates that drug trafficking
had moved beyond simply levying taxes on the
brings in more than $400 billion a year. With
producers of drugs and were involved in the early
this level of revenue, it is easy to see why, when
stages of production and transportation. It was
state funding began to become scarce in the
still the purview of more traditional organized
1980s, many terror groups turned to the drug
crime syndicates to handle the distribution and
trade in order to keep their revenue levels high. In
sale of the illicit narcotics. By tapping into the
the 1990’s it became obvious that drug trafficking
illicit narcotic trade, namely cocaine, FARC was
and terrorism had become heavily interrelated and
able to generate massive amounts of funds and
thus the strategies that had dealt with both drug
arms that fueled their terrorist activities.
trafficking and terrorism separately in the past
needed to be reviewed and used complimentary
in some cases such as with the FARC in Columbia
and the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the cases of
these two terror organizations new strategies
that dealt with drug trafficking and terrorism as
intertwined issues were necessary to combat a
new mutation of both that was stronger and more
well-funded than ever before. For the purposes
of better understanding how narcoterrorism has
evolved from 1980 to the present and the methods
used by both individual states and international
organizations to combat it this guide will discuss Cultivation of the coca plant in Colombia
two case studies, the FARC in Columbia and Al- Source: Al Jazeera
Qaeda in Afghanistan.
The merger of drug trafficking and FARC can
While the illicit trafficking of drugs brings in
almost be seen as inevitable. Terrorism has been
large amounts of money to fund terror and
shown to thrive in countries where there is a weak
insurgency organizations around the world it is
or failing central state. Add to this the fact that
perhaps in Columbia where the effect of these
drug trafficking is a transnational problem, much
funds can be most readily seen. One of the most
like terrorism, that destabilizes the governments
well-known terror organizations in the world that
of the countries that are heavily involved in the
has arguably taken the best strategic advantage of
trafficking, the perfect formula for a partnership
the multibillion-dollar industry that is illicit drug
amid chaos forms. The former Executive Director
trafficking is the Armed Revolutionary Forces
of the UN International Drug Control Program,
of Colombia (FARC). When the term narco-
Giorgio Giacomelli, showed the seriousness of
terrorism was first coined, terrorist organizations in
the drug problem when he said that “The drug
Colombia such as FARC were tapping into funds
phenomena is unique in the number of aspects
from the illicit drug trade by “taxing” those that
of people’s lives which it affects - the health of the
trafficked the product. The traffickers would pay
individual, political and economic development,
a fee to terror groups such as FARC to protect the
the safety of the streets and the stability of the
drugs all the way from the time they were grown
government”. Drug trafficking raises an enormous
until they were processed and sold. However,
amount of revenue and destabilizes governments
during the latter part of the 1990’s FARC began
while terrorism requires large amounts of funds
to transport its own illicit drugs, usually cocaine,
to be effective across a larger area and thrives in
so that they could turn an even greater profit
countries where governments lack stability so
 Harvard Model United Nations 2019 13

it would seem only logical that these two areas By tapping into the vast revenue created by drug
would at some point converge into what we now trafficking, the FARC were able to become one of
call narcoterrorism. the largest, most well-funded, and most effective
terrorist groups in the world. Today the FARC
The joining of terrorist forces with the trade of are a recognized political party in Colombia that
narcotics has major consequences. It strengthens runs members for congressional and even the
both terrorism and the drug trade without much presidential seat. However, the organization is
tradeoff for either. A look at FARC’s activities in still listed as a terrorist organization by the United
Colombia before and after they became heavily States of America. It can be argued that even
involved with drug trafficking easily proves this though the FARC says that is has traded in its
point. It is estimated that the FARC brought in weapons for words they succeeded in their goals
between $100 to $500 million from its involvement as a terrorist organization. The goal of terrorism
in drug trafficking. The effect of these funds is to affect political change through the acts or
helped the terror organization to dramatically threats of acts of violence, and the FARC did
increase their sphere of influence in Colombia exactly this. For over five decades they fought
as can be seen by comparing the FARC in 1986 the Colombian state and kidnapped, extorted
and in 1999. In 1986 the FARC had an estimated and killed to get their way. They took over whole
9,000 fighters who worked on 27 different fronts, swaths of the country and were able to launch
or semi-autonomous units in different localities, attacks into the areas that were most strongly held
and then in 1999 it had an estimated 15,000 by the Colombian government.
combatants on 60 fronts and was active in 40%
of Colombia’s municipalities. In the mid-1990’s After five decades of fighting, the Colombian
the cartel empires that had existed in the country, government accepted that they would never
the Medellin and Cali cartels, had fallen and left be able to defeat the terrorist organization and
behind smaller distribution networks that relied so gave them a seat at the table in exchange for
upon the protection and help from the FARC and an end to hostilities. While there have been
other organizations similar to FARC. setbacks and challenges to having that seat at the
table, FARC has nonetheless secured for their
Between the years of 1995 and 2000 Colombian organization a guaranteed political voice and
coca production more than doubled which made vote in the Colombian government. Without
Colombia the world’s foremost coca producer and the income from being involved with the illicit
gave even greater access to funds to the FARC. narcotics trade the FARC would not have been
By 1998 the Colombian government “estimated able to achieve the prominency and dangerous
that money from the drug trade was the single influence that they did. The combining of drug
greatest source of income for country’s terrorist trafficking and terrorism created a terrifyingly
groups… That year, they reportedly earned a total powerful and well-financed organization that
of US$551 million from drug links,” and this strong armed its way into the government over
money is what made it possible for the FARC to the loud objection of the citizens that suffered
almost double their number of fighters and more at the hands of these terrorists for over 50 years.
than double the control that they exercised over The FARC showed the world what could come if
the country. The Colombian government put out terrorism and drug trafficking joined forces, and
a report in 2005 that showed the FARC reaped other groups emulated their success. Perhaps the
US$617 million from the trafficking of cocaine. other terrorist organizations most well-known for
This amount made them the most well-funded its involvement in drug trafficking are Al-Qaeda
insurgency group in the world at the time. and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
14 Special Session on Terrorism
FARC-Colombia Peace Deal Finalized
Source: CNN
Much like Colombia, Afghanistan was and is a
very weak state. To understand how terrorism
and drug trafficking have worked together to
have a completely devastating effect upon the
nation of Afghanistan delegates should have a
basic understanding of the history of Afghanistan
since 1996 when the Taliban seized control of
the capital city. By 1998 the Taliban controlled
two-thirds of Afghanistan and were providing a
safe haven for Osama bin Laden and his terror
organization Al-Qaeda. After seizing control
of the government, the Taliban need a way to
fund their new government. During the 1980’s
the harvesting and selling of opium was used to
fund the Afghan war lord’s insurgency against the
Soviet Union. Once the Soviet Union had left
Afghanistan, the opium was still being harvested
and sold, but who needed the profits? Herein lay
part of the answer as to how the Taliban would
fund their illegitimate terrorist government in
Afghanistan. Taking a leaf out of the FARC’s
book the Taliban began to tax the production
of opium. During the 1990’s when the Taliban
began to tax opium, Afghanistan produced an
estimated 75% of the world’s supply of opium.
In 1999, the production of opium reached an all-
time high under the Taliban at a staggering 4,600
tons of opium produced in Afghanistan alone.
Just as could be seen in Colombia, the trafficking
of illicit narcotics in Afghanistan contributed
towards the weakening and eventual collapse of
legitimate government.
During the 1980’s and 1990’s Afghanistan was
locked into a deadly civil war after international
forces had pulled out of the country. The Afghan
government that had been set up was weak and
made weaker so by having to fight a civil war. It
was at this same time of chaos and violence in
Afghanistan that neighboring countries such as
Iraq, Pakistan, and other Central Asia countries
began to crack down on criminal enterprises.
These criminal individuals and enterprises were
then pushed into lawless Afghanistan where the
government was too busy trying to maintain some
semblance of control during the midst of a civil
war to deal with the inflow of criminal activity
from neighboring countries. The UN Office on
Drugs and Crime says in their 2003 report on
the opium problem in Afghanistan that “There
is anecdotal evidence of Taliban involvement in,
and encouragement of, the opium trade as a way
to expand their exchequer at a time when the
regime was hurting because of growing isolation
and funding difficulties”, and so the world is
given another example of a terrorist organization
reaching into the trafficking of illicit narcotics in
order to maintain and expand their funding levels.
The same report goes on to say that a weak central
government and a civil war created an atmosphere
of chaos that allowed for illicit drug production
to flourish. This opium production in turn
fueled the same civil war and further weakened
the government. The addition of terrorists, the
Taliban, only created for an even more vicious cycle
lawlessness, illicit activity, and violence. Having
established themselves as a quasi-government,
how much money was the Taliban bringing
in from the production of opium? It is verified
that during their regime, from 1996 to 2001 the
Taliban had imposed taxes upon the producers
and traffickers of illicit narcotics in Afghanistan
and it is suspected that the Taliban also had
a more direct involvement in the trafficking
and production of narcotics that brought in a
significantly higher amount of revenue. It is
 Harvard Model United Nations 2019 15

estimated that in 1999 the Taliban brought in at
$40 million in taxes from the production of opium.
The Taliban’s taxing of Afghan drug traffickers not
only provided revenue for the terrorist group but
also gave a sense of legitimacy to these traffickers
and kept the production and trafficking of opium
in a semi-legal state. The taxes collected by the
Taliban are used to purchase arms and finance the
terrorist training and support the operations of
other terrorist groups that operated in the region.
opium to help them fight against the legitimate
government of Afghanistan. The Taliban still use
the profits of opium production and trafficking
in the areas that they exert control over to
launch attacks against and sabotage the Afghan
government. Without the financial lifeline of the
production and trafficking of opium, the Taliban
would be much less effective and the government
of Afghanistan would have a chance at establishing
a stable and effective national government.

The Taliban have continued to exert a large amount

of control over Afghanistan, in large part because
of the funding they receive from the production
and trafficking of illicit narcotics. The FARC
forced their way into the Colombian government
by fighting a 52-year war that was funded by their
involvement in illicit narcotics. The FARC only
ceased their involvement with drug trafficking
after they secured for themselves a voice in the
government through this violence. The combined
efforts of allied nations that invaded Afghanistan
in 2001 could not eradicate the production of
opium or stamp out the Taliban who continue to
Taliban militant watches as farmers harvest opium in
Afghanistan’s Helmand Province
fight to this day, funded by drug trafficking. The
Source: NPR nexus of terrorism and drug trafficking has created
terrorist organizations that are more horrifyingly
The opium trade in Afghanistan helped the Taliban powerful and effective than ever before. With
to gain control of the country and keep control the examples of the FARC in Colombia and the
for five years, until the United States toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan serving to show just how
regime shortly after the attacks of September 11th, dangerous narcoterrorism is, what has the UN
2001. It is interesting to note that in July of 2000, done to combat this new evolution in terrorist
the Taliban declared a ban on the production, but strategies?
not trade, of opium declaring it to be un-Islamic.
However, the group was also promised help from The UN has taken action in the form of a variety
the UN with development if they banned the of resolutions aimed at combating narcoterrorism.
production of opium. This ban however, brought Before nacroterrorism arose in the 1980’s the
in an enormous amount of funding to the Taliban world, including the UN, was focused on fighting
who had amassed a stockpile of opium, and now terrorism and fighting drug trafficking and the
that there was a highly effective ban in place the growing drug epidemic. However, the focus was
value of that stockpile went through the roof as on combating each as a separate entity. With
the price of opium skyrocketed. The ban was the narcoterrorism evolution of the mid-1980’s
rescinded the next year, however, as the political the world, and the UN, had to reevaluate their
cost of enforcing the ban became too much for the methods and propose new solutions to a problem
Taliban to bear. After the Taliban were toppled, that allows terrorist organizations to bring in
they once again turned to the production of millions of dollars of funding every year. The
16 Special Session on Terrorism

following paragraph provides a brief summary of participated in drug trafficking and international
UN actions regarding narcoterrorism however, terrorism. Other than these resolutions there
it is strongly encouraged and recommended have been a few support and monitoring teams
that delegates look into these resolutions more that have also been established. There have also
thoroughly to better understand the existing been official addresses that point to the strong
paradigm and how it can be improved upon. linkage between international terrorism and drug
trafficking. Delegates can see that resolutions
Perhaps the largest step taken by the UN to aimed specifically at narcoterrorism are sparse and
combat narcoterrorism came in 1997 when the leave much room for improvement.
UN created the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.
As the prevalence of narcoterrorism began to rise, There are a variety of ways in which the struggle
so too did the amount of work the UNODC against narcoterrorism is being fought. There are
did on preventing acts of terror and combating also conflicting ideas over how it should be fought.
terrorist financial networks that relied heavily For example, when the United States invaded
on the production, taxation, and sale of illicit Afghanistan shortly after the events of September
narcotics. Each year the UNODC produces the 11th, 2001, often times a blind eye was turned
World Drug Report that explains the level of drug to those who produced illicit narcotics focusing
production and abuse in the world at that time on actual battles instead. However, once the
and also pinpoints the organizations that are the U.S. realized how much terrorist organizations in
most heavily involved with drug trafficking in the region were profiting off of that drug trade
specific areas. The report also outlines actions that took a much more hands-on approach to
that are currently being taken by both national the production of illicit narcotics by eradicating
and international organizations to combat, poppy fields and funding the growth of alternative
among other things, narcoterrorism and give crops. The British took a similar approach that
countries a guideline for how they might try was unfortunately crippled by lack of order on the
and tackle similar issues that they are facing. The ground in Afghanistan.
UNODC is an invaluable resource in the fight
on narcoterrorism, and I encourage all delegates When suggesting strategies to combat
to spend some time reading recent World Drug narcoterrorism, delegates should be aware of how
Reports and other information put out by the even the best of plans cannot be implemented
Office. accurately when there is no way to monitor the
real-time implementation and results of such a
In 2001, the Security Council passed Resolution plan in the areas it is used in. Delegates would be
1373 that expressed concern at the relationship wise to consider the impact of regional stability
between international terrorism and drug and security so as to ensure that the problems
trafficking. The resolution also encouraged nations of many different countries are not all pushed
to work together so as to be better prepared for onto a country that is already struggling as in
an international response to the issue. In 2014 the case of Colombia in the 1980’s. One of the
the Security Council passed resolution 2195 that most important considerations when drawing
urged further cooperation among member states up recommendations in resolutions is to ensure
to combat the linkage between international that the recommendations can be implemented
terrorism and drug trafficking. The resolution by all member states and, if this is not possible,
called upon specific regions to improve their that other member states are called upon to
regional communication and support and called assist those nations too weak or too poor in the
upon all member states to help the UN buildup implementation of said recommendations.
the capacity to respond to and prosecute those who
 Harvard Model United Nations 2019 17

Key Questions it is much easier and quieter to bribe an official

to look the other way. Thus, smuggling and
1. How can the UN direct its member states corruption often times are positively correlated.
to implement more comprehensive reforms In places where corruption is rampant, smuggling
aimed at countering narcoterrorism while is only made easier.
still respecting the sovereignty of the member
states? It only makes sense that terrorists would use
2. If countries and international organizations smuggling to their advantage. From smuggling
such as the UN work to bring down specific in weapons and supplies to smuggling people,
drug trafficking or terrorist organizations terrorists often times want and need to operate
involved in drug trafficking, how can the UN without alerting governing authorities as to
ensure that another group will not simply fill their actions. In order to remain effective, terror
the hole that is left; or that, as happened in organizations must work with those who can
Colombia, multiple smaller organizations will do things quietly. When executing a plan such
take on the same responsibilities and fill the organizations care little for secrecy because they
hole? want the world to know what happened, to know
that they were responsible, and to know why they
committed a terrorist attack. But in order for that
Subtopic B: Smuggling attack to happen successfully, the government
cannot know when or where the attack will happen
Smuggling has existed and flourished for centuries. or the capabilities of the attackers. So, terror
When governments began to raise funds by taxing organizations must utilize smuggling networks.
items brought into and taken out of their lands, However, terror organizations use for smuggling
there became a market for those who could get networks extends far beyond their usefulness in
items into and out of places without being subject planning and executing terror attacks.
to those taxes. When countries began to control
who could cross their borders there became a Terror organizations need smuggling networks for
market for those who could get individuals into their ability to transport items of value without
countries undetected. In every place, there are drawing attention. Smuggling networks are vital
wealthy individuals who want objects and/or as a financial source for effectively recruiting new
people brought in without attracting the attention members and committing grandiose acts of terror
of authorities or being subject to inspection and that require a large amount of financing. Large
taxation. By its very nature, smuggling is a highly acts of terror are costly to commit and continued
secretive act and enterprise whose statistical successful insurgencies cost money. In order to
history is almost completely unknown. Smugglers commit such acts these organizations need a large
do not want posterity to know how they operated, amount of funding and for many groups part
exactly what they were smuggling, and how much of that funding comes from the smuggling of
they made. The concrete statistical information contraband and people. Within the past few years
that is available comes from those smugglers who there has been largescale media attention devoted
have failed to fly under the radar and transport to smuggling and how it provides terrorists with
what they need to transport without catching the considerable financing as ISIS smuggles and sells
attention of government officials. Historically, artifacts that they come to have control over when
those that smuggle try to avoid violence as it is they were controlling large swaths of territory at
highly noticeable and governments, whose duty is the height of their military power in 2014. Much
to protect their citizens, often times do not turn like narcoterrorism, though, terror groups do
a blind eye to acts of violence. Rather than fight, not have to be directly involved with smuggling
18 Special Session on Terrorism
to turn a profit. There are indirect ways to be
involved with smuggling networks that still give
a financial benefit to terror organizations. A study
of terrorist groups in West and North Africa will
clearly show this. Terror organizations such as Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram
bring in large quantities of monies from both
direct and indirect involvement in smuggling
routes and networks.
Smuggling, as it will concern delegates during
this special session, should draw on definitions
set forth by the UN and legal definitions set
forth by sovereign nations. The UN definition
of smuggling is limited to defining what is
considered to be the smuggling of people which
is defined as “procurement, in order to obtain,
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material
benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a
State Party of which the person is not a national
or a permanent resident”. The UN does not
have a recognized definition for the smuggling
of goods. However, there are many definitions
of the smuggling of goods that are provided by
individual states. For example, the United States’
definition of smuggling essentially says that it is
the clandestine act or attempt to bring something
into the United States without it being properly
registered or inspected. Delegates should be aware
of the definitions of smuggling for the countries
that they represent and keep in mind that the UN
has no set definition of the smuggling of goods.
While the topic of smuggling can be quite broad,
for the purposes of this background guide it will
exclude drug smuggling. The smuggling of illicit
narcotics is often folded into the broad topic
of smuggling even though when discussing the
financing of terrorism, it should be included
under the umbrella of narcoterrorism. Terrorist
financing through the use of smuggling, in this
background guide and in this special session, will
include but not be limited solely to the smuggling
of persons, artifacts, contraband, and other items.
However, the direct smuggling of goods is only
one way in which terrorist organizations bring in
revenue from smuggling. Detzi and Winkleman
have identified four related methods for how terror
organizations obtain revenue, “Direct smuggling
and sale of illicit goods, taxation on trafficking
routes, protection services, and non-aggression
fees”, and so much like narcoterrorism there are
different ways, some direct and others non-direct,
that terrorist organizations can utilize smuggling
to finance their organizations and operations. It
is important that while preparing for committee,
debate, and while drafting resolutions delegates
keep in mind that the financing of terrorism must
be viewed through a global lens. While there are
certainly areas of the world where the problem is
more pressing, resolutions should aim to provide
global strategies. For this reason, the background
guide is purposely including case studies that deal
with multiple terror organizations in different
regions of the world. The next few pages will
be devoted to exploring how direct and indirect
involvement in smuggling helps to finance terror
groups in West Africa.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is a violent
extremist group that has existed since the 1990’s
in West Africa, although it has undergone several
name changes. Since the late 1990’s they have
operated a highly successful smuggling operation
that helped them to catch the attention of Al
Qaeda. After the events of September 11th,
2001, the entire world began a tremendous
crackdown on terrorist organizations and their
financing capabilities. The effects of this War on
Terrorism were felt by both Al Qaeda and the
Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat
(GSPC), or the group now known as Al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb. By 2006, the leader of the
GSPC began to open a line of communication
with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri,
two leaders of Al Qaeda. The GSPC was interested
in the name recognition of Al Qaeda that would
bring them recruits and the support of jihadists in
the region while Al Qaeda was interested in the
financial gain that could come from a partnership
with the GSPC and their lucrative involvement
in the highly successful smuggling operation

that they ran. In 2007 the GSPC became an Al
Qaeda affiliate group and changed their name
to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
This rebranding was more than just a change
in name, it came with a change in the goals of
the terror group as they had to align more with
Al Qaeda and began to focus more on Western
targets. United States General Carter Ham who
is the head of U.S. Africa Command has called
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb the best-funded
affiliate that Al Qaeda has.
While AQIM may not be a terror organization
that has the capabilities to launch attacks around
the globe, they have managed to survive in West
Africa for over 20 years. Even after a significant
campaign by the French government in 2013
that killed hundreds of extremist fighters and
severely limited the capabilities of several terror
organizations in the region, including AQIM,
the group still manages to pose a serious threat
to the governments and international missions in
the region. The organization still brings in enough
funding that if a local provides information
helpful in targeting the UN Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali convoys
they will be paid 750 dollars in country where
the minimum wage is 50 dollars. With funding
of this level, it is apparent why the group is still
able to hamper international efforts and work to
topple governments in the region even after 20
years of combatting the group.
AQIM has been able to expand the area that they
operate smuggling routes into include Libya,
Algeria, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Not only does
the terror organization get involved directly with
smuggling operations but it also gets funding from
taxing those that use their smuggling routes and
also are paid to leave some smuggling operations
alone. Not only do extremist groups such as AQIM
gain a financial revenue stream from the smuggling
operations that they are involved in, they also use
those smuggling operations to further the violent
acts committed by other extremist groups. Boko ISIS has become notorious for being the world’s
Haram is a terrorist organization that operates out wealthiest terror organization. As mentioned
Harvard Model United Nations 2019 19
of Nigeria and gained widespread media attention
when they kidnapped 276 Nigerian school girls
and still holds many captive four years later. The
organization has also caught the attention of
officials across the world for their ability to smuggle
heavy weapons into Nigeria. These weapons allow
the group to launch more audacious attacks that
further destabilize the government and result in
more casualties. A report by the news organization
Al Jazeera explains a few of the various ways that
such weapons are smuggled past Nigerian borders
and points to AQIM as a major supplier of and
transporter of these weapons to Nigerian borders.
The smuggling of arms is especially alarming as it
both supplies one terror organization with a profit
and another with the means to launch heinous
and devastating attacks. More than just giving
Boko Haram the ability to engage in more large-
scale missions, the use of such sophisticated and
heavy weaponry that the group has demonstrated
gives the terror organization a sense of legitimacy.
Such capabilities and the use of violence is
supposed to be monopolized by the government.
When a terror organization is able to wield these
capabilities, and commit acts of violence against
the government then such organization can gain
legitimacy in the eyes of the populace and in the
eyes of other terror organizations. This is a tactic
utilized by both Hamas and ISIS in tackling
governments and establishing their own rule of
law. With this type of legitimacy terror groups
can exert even more pressure on the populace to
join the organization or contribute financially
to the organization. Smuggling has given Boko
Haram access to heavy weaponry, courtesy of
AQIM, that is furthering their fight against the
Nigerian government. In West Africa, smuggling
has allowed terror organizations to garner
additional funds and pose and even greater threat
to governments. However, West Africa is not the
only place where smuggling is helping to finance
terrorism.
20 Special Session on Terrorism
previously in this background guide the group
reached the height of its power in 2014 and since
then has continued to suffer military defeats. At its
height, the group was able to control vast swaths
of land in Iraq and Syria and operated a proto-
state in the region as they collected taxes from
people living in areas under their control. Since
that time the terror organization has lost much of
the land that they once controlled and has also lost
an estimated 80% of their funding from a high of
$81 million a month in revenue in 2015 to an
estimated $16 million a month in 2017. Even
with that huge drop ISIS remains one of the best
funded terror organizations that the world has
ever seen. They are being beaten from a Caliphate
back into an insurgency terrorist group that is
incredibly well-funded for an insurgency that no
longer has to try and run a proto-state. Much of
the money that ISIS reaps and reaped that did not
come from taxation came from the sale of oil that
was produced from captured oil fields. To sell this
oil, much of it had to be smuggled out of ISIS-
controlled areas. While ISIS’ use of oil to fund
their terror activities will be talked about in much
more detail later in this background guide it is
important to note that much of this oil had to be
smuggled out of ISIS held territory. So while the
extraction of oil did make up one of the largest
components of funding for the terror group,
smuggling had to be utilized in order to deliver
that oil. The smuggling of resources such as oil
is not all that ISIS smuggled. The terror group
became adept at pillaging, selling, and smuggling
antiquities in order to fund their operations.
As was stated earlier in this section, the secretive
nature of smuggling makes it very difficult to put
exact figures on anything. Often times experts
can only say that a large part of an organization’s
funding comes from smuggling but cannot
provide any figures because the information just
is not accessible. They can extrapolate based
upon how much merchandise has been seized
or base their estimates upon reports from locals
but the estimates are truly a best guess. However,
in the case of ISIS we do have some concrete
numbers on the smuggling of antiquities. The
seizure of flash drives from a safe house just
days before terror groups seized the Iraqi city
of Mosul showed detailed financial information
about the group. These flash drives showed that
before the group took the city of Mosul and the
estimated $1.5 billion that was looted from the
city, the organization had cash assets of $875
million. These same flash drives also showed
that the organization had made $36 million just
from the sale of antiquities in just one region of
Syria. These millions were made by plundering
and smuggling these ancient artifacts. When ISIS
began to experience military victories and rapidly
swept through Iraq and Syria conquering land,
they seized the old smuggling routes and by late
2014 were making upwards of $1 million a day
from the war economy. The terrorist organization
was involved with trafficking antiquities, oil, and
gold and made money off of every sale. ISIS
made millions by operating and levying taxes on
smuggling routes.
A cuneiform tablet seized by the U.S. Government after it
was found to have been smuggled out of modern-day Iraq
Source: The Atlantic
Even today, when ISIS continues to lose territory
to the coalition of nations fighting it, they continue
to make money from smuggling. While the world
may have been able to defeat ISIS on the more
traditional battlefield, the organization is simply
returning to its roots as a deadly insurgency.

The money that the organization has stockpiled
from illicit activities such as smuggling is being
invested in Iraq to prepare for the new insurgency
that they will be able to launch with the massive
amounts of funding they are able to procure from
acts such as smuggling. The ability of ISIS to
raise such massive amounts of funds is incredibly
alarming and the use of smuggling must be dealt
with by the international community to combat
the financing of their terrorist financial network.
So how has the international community, and
specifically the UN, worked thus far to combat
this source of terrorist financing?
As mentioned earlier the UN definition of
smuggling deals only with the illicit trafficking of
people and does not mention the illicit trafficking
of goods. There are many UN resolutions and
documents that deal with the smuggling of
individuals and how it can be countered. On the
other hand, there are very few UN documents
that deal with smuggling of other natures. In
2017 the Security Council adopted resolution
2347 (2017) that condemned the destruction of
and illicit smuggling of antiquities in response
to such actions by ISIS. Delegates should pay
special attention to the remarks made by Vladimir
Voronkov, the Under-Secretary-General of the
UN Counter-Terrorism Office when he said
that there was a need for more “cross-border
cooperation and exchange of information, and
for including private and public-sector partners
to promote supply chain integrity and stop the
illicit sale of cultural property”. The UNODC
also does work that involves how to counter the
illicit trafficking of people that delegates would
benefit from looking at.
Resolutions drafted by delegates should explore
how smuggling routes can be identified and
shutdown. Delegates may also want to, if they
are so inclined, come up with a definition of
smuggling. This could be helpful in regions
where the rule of law is weak and it could be
difficult to identify what is smuggling as is often
the case in war-torn regions. It should also be
Harvard Model United Nations 2019 21
noted that much like narcoterrorism, smuggling
is something that transcends borders and affects
multiple countries in the regions where it is a
problem such as West Africa or the Middle East.
This means that any approach to counter this
funding source must utilize the cooperation of
all affected nations so as to ensure that there are
no weak links that allow smuggling networks to
survive. It could be helpful to have resolutions
that create new Offices or Committees that work
to ensure that specific regions have adequate
border security and information sharing networks
set up to help counter smuggling. These are just
a few of the ways that delegates resolutions could
work to counter smuggling.
Key Questions
1. What role does border security play in
preventing and stopping smuggling?
2. How can the UN address smuggling in war-
torn areas where it is difficult for legitimate
governments to even function?
3. Would imposing stricter punishments for
those who purchase smuggled antiquities help
to stop smuggling?
Subtopic C: Exploitation of Natural Resources
In the past two sections, this background
guide has explored two ways in which terror
organizations raise funds -- involvement in illicit
narcotics trade and utilizing smuggling networks.
This section will explore a third method of
raising funds, resource exploitation. Much like
narcoterrorism and smuggling, the exploitation
of resources offers several ways to obtain revenue
from directly mining or producing the resources
and then selling them, as in the case of ISIS, to
taxing the resources as in the case of the ELN and
FARC in Colombia. This subtopic on resource
exploitation will examine two terror groups that
have already been discussed, ISIS and FARC,
and also include insight in the ELN, a terror
organization that operated separately from FARC
22 Special Session on Terrorism
in Colombia during the same time frame as the
more well-known terror organization. This will
be the final subtopic that discusses ways in which
terror groups raise funds. The section that follows
will attempt to provide a framework for two
ways in which the UN might be able to disrupt
terror financial networks. This background guide
has highlighted only three ways in which terror
organizations raise funds. There are many more
than have been discussed. Before diving into
resource exploitation, I would like to remind
delegates that while I expect debate and resolutions
to center around the subtopics discussed in this
guide, I realize there are other means by which
terror organizations raise funds, such as charitable
and individual contributions and kidnapping for
ransom. So, I encourage delegates to use these
subtopics as a basis of debate that can expand
to include others as well. I ask that if a delegate,
after reading this guide, feels strongly about a
topic not touched on that they send me an email
explaining what they are considering discussing in
committee so that I can be aware and offer advice
on the pursuit of such topics. With that sidebar,
this guide will now turn to a discussion of natural
resource exploitation.
To understand how terrorist organizations have
taken advantage of resources delegates should have
an understanding of the history of the problem in
general. I encourage delegates to independently
delve into the history of resource exploitation
by both state and non-state actors in armed
conflicts and as a way to garner funds. Much
of the history of resource exploitation revolves
around the weaponization of such resources to
exacerbate armed conflicts. Historically water
has been targeted in armed conflicts to ensure
that enemy controlled lands do not have access
to clean drinking water in order to weaken armed
forces and the population in general. Examples
of the weaponization of water range from Julius
Caesar to present day ISIS combatants. Since
the industrial revolution and societies increasing
dependability on such energy resources as oil
those too have been used by military groups
ranging from World War II to the armed conflicts
in the Middle East against ISIS.
Much like the discussion on narcoterrorism, the
discussion on the nexus of terrorism and resource
exploitation will begin in Colombia. Just as the
FARC branched out into the illicit narcotic
trade in the 1980’s, they also turned towards
natural resource exploitation as a way to raise
funds. Between the years of 1984 and 1987 the
Colombian government and FARC operated
under a cease-fire agreement which FARC used
to expand their influence into resource rich areas
of the country. The FARC were not the only
militant group in the country that had this idea.
The ELN also became involved with resource
exploitation to raise funds. It makes sense that
such groups would turn to natural resources in a
country such as Colombia which is considered to
be one of the richest countries in the world when
it comes to natural resources . Colombia is the
world’s largest producer of emeralds, the largest
producer of gold in the region, and produces
“large quantities of other minerals, such as silver,
platinum, copper, nickel, natural gas, and coal”
all of which were heavily exploited by militant
terrorist organizations such as FARC and ELN.
The exploitation and extortion of natural resources
by terror groups in resource rich nations such
as Colombia can be a large source of funding.
The UN Development Program estimated that
extortion revenues accounted for over 30% of
Colombian guerilla groups. Colombia is a nation
that produces a large amount of oil as previously
mentioned. The ELN (National Liberation
Army) has a long history of attacking Colombian
oil production sites. The ELN are a terrorist
group that started in 1964 but by the end of that
dedicated had been almost completely eradicated
by the Colombian army. In the 1980’s the group
reemerged as a much more successful terrorist
organization due in large part of their ability to
finance operations and fighters through their
extortion of multinational oil companies that
operated in the northeastern region of Colombia.

The ELN is, or was until the Colombian
government made peace agreements, the main
rival to FARC in Colombia in vying for control
or at least influence over the country. U
ltimately the FARC were the more successful
group. Even though, the ELN were able to raise
large sums of funding and exert influence over
a relatively large area in the northeastern part
of the country. The ELN focused their strategy
predominantly on exerting control and influence
over the Colombian oil industry as it was a major
source of funding for the organization. While the
FARC have touched lightly upon the Colombian
oil industry the group that truly exploited it was
the ELN. The funds from exploiting oil and
oil companies that operated in areas that were
strongholds for the ELN helped the group more
than triple in size and reach a far greater sphere
of influence in the country. This funding that
has allowed for a greater number of fighters has
prevented the ELN from being stamped out by
the government, as they were at the end of the
1960’s, or the FARC who, after violently clashing
with the group on multiple occasions, formed an
uneasy partnership with the terror organization
when the Colombian government began to make
advances into FARC held areas.
The ELN’s exploitation of oil and the companies
who produce it in Colombia does more to fund
their terrorist insurgency. Companies have less
incentive to produce oil when there is a good
chance that their workers will be killed and their
machines destroyed in the process. If companies
do not have faith in the government to protect
them it allows terror organizations to take
advantage of such companies by demanding a cut
of their profits in exchange for them being left
alone. Terror organizations can make examples out
of companies and workers that do not pay their
tax or fine. These examples of violence against oil narcotics.
production companies and their oil production
sites does more than coerce other companies Colombia is rich in its natural resources, and its
into coughing up funds to avoid the same fate. militant groups quickly realized that there was
Such actions reduce the people’s, businesses’, a profit to be made by involving themselves in
Harvard Model United Nations 2019 23
and foreign nation’s trust in the Colombian
government as terror groups such as the ELN
and the FARC prove that the government cannot
provide protection to both native and foreign
companies producing oil and the workers that
they hire from local areas or bring from overseas.
Foreign nations, especially those that share a
border with a nation such as Colombia that
was unable to provide adequate protection for
such companies, lose trust as they feel the direct
consequences of a government not strong enough
to maintain order. As Lavaux shows, these attacks
can discredit the Colombian government in the
eyes of such countries as Venezuela as the attacks
“aim to show that the government cannot control
environmental damage to the hydrographic basins
shared with Venezuela, in particular the Catatumbo
River basin, from which the Venezuelan state of
Zulia obtains 60% of its drinkable water”. By
attacking and exploiting natural resources such
as oil, terror organizations simultaneously turn a
large profit and weaken the governments where
they are active which starts a vicious cycle of
empowering these terrorist organizations. This
phenomenon can be seen clearly in the history of
Colombia which suffered for over 50 years from
terror organizations that grew more powerful as
the government lost power until a deal had to
be reached between the two entities as discussed
earlier in this guide. While the ELN focused
much of their time and resources on exploiting
oil FARC turned towards the illicit narcotic trade
in Colombia. This was highly successful for the
organization as has been demonstrated. However,
they too exploited Colombia’s natural resources
and by the time the organization reached a peace
deal with the Colombian government the money
it was pulling in from the resource exploitation
was even greater than the amount of funding
they were receiving from their involvement in
24 Special Session on Terrorism
this industry. However, the lucrative amounts
of money being made from narcoterrorism were
far more appealing, that is until the international
community began a serious crackdown on the
trade of narcotics that made it increasingly
difficult for organizations such as the FARC
to continue in this trade without having to
face serious tradeoffs that came in the form of
international sanctions and military action against
the production and transportation of narcotics.
Because of these factors the FARC transitioned
towards the exploitation of natural resources
and, in particular, the exploitation of gold
production in Colombia which, as has already
been mentioned, is the region’s largest producer
of gold. When the nations of the world began
to focus their attention on the drug problem in
Colombia that had far-reaching international
affects the United States in particular contributed
billions of dollars to hamper the production of
cocaine. To a large extent the massive amount of
work that went into countering the production
of cocaine was successful as the number of illicit
narcotics coming out of the country continued
to drop. One of the main strategies used was
to fly planes that released an array of chemicals
designed to make it much more difficult to grow
and cultivate coca plants. These planes began to
fly routinely in the year 2000. The result of it
becoming more difficult to cultivate coca plants
and then transport the final product of cocaine,
many of the famers that were once paid to grow
coca plants for the FARC were now paid to mine
gold for the terrorist organization.
The amount of money that the FARC brings in
from mining and taxing the mining of gold rivals
the funds they brought in from their involvement
in illicit narcotics even at its most lucrative point
as the acting mayor of Mocoa in the Putumayo
province said in 2012 that the FARC “here make
about 800m pesos ($450,000) a week from
illegal gold mining” . The FARC transitioned
away from their involvement in illicit narcotics,
which both was being threatened by international
action and cast a negative light upon the terror
group that wants and needs to have the support
of the public if they hoped to truly overthrow
the Colombian government and establish their
own regime, and towards the much more safe
and lucrative involvement in the exploitation of
natural resources like gold. The production of and
transportation of gold is by no means illegal and
so the FARC had even managed to find a way to
almost legitimately raise funds.
Colombian rebels mining gold as it becomes more
apparent that the mining and taxing of gold is even more
lucrative than the drug trade.
Source: The Northern Miner
The way in which the FARC was raising funds
through the mining of gold was still illegal;
however, they were far less risky and did not
attract the same international attention and
action as international narcotic trafficking. The
exploitation of gold was also even more financially
beneficial than drug trafficking as is evidenced by
the fact that in just one of the 125 municipalities
in Antioquia, a gold-rich area of Colombia, the
FARC are believed to earn at least $240,000 a
month in 2012. This is the amount the terror
organization brought in from just one of the 125
municipalities in the gold-rich area. The FARC
had decades to perfect how they made money
from the illicit drug trade and they transferred
these same time-tested strategies over to how
they money off of exploiting gold. Much like
how they taxed those that grew and transported

narcotics, the FARC impose taxes on the mines
that produce gold in the areas that they control.
The organization also taxes the machinery that
produces the gold at an initial rate of up to $3,000
and another $2,000 per month for every piece of
heavy machinery.
The FARC can also take a percentage of the
total earnings of a mine in exchange for allowing
them to operate in peace. Many, if not most, of
Colombia’s goldmines were unlicensed during the
time the FARC was most aggressively involved
with the exploitation of the resource and so this
made them easy targets for the FARC. However,
even the legally operated mines were not safe from
the FARC who used them to launder their money
by having companies lie about the amount of
gold they were actually producing. The money
that the terrorist organization brought in from
exploiting gold made it easy for them to keep
police forces at bay and recruit local peoples to
help them. The exploitation of gold in Colombia
by terror groups such as the FARC show that such
organizations are highly adaptable, being able to
switch from narcotics trade to natural resource
exploitation in the blink of an eye. While the
FARC has since made a peace agreement with the
Colombian government, there are other terrorist
organizations that have taken to natural resource
exploitation to raise funds for their illicit activities.
Another terror organization that has taken to
exploiting natural resources to raise funds is
ISIS. They have gained international attention
for their success in exploiting oil from the lands
they have taken over in Iraq and Syria. While
ISIS exploitation of oil will be talked about in far
greater detail in the next section it is important
to note here that the exploitation and sale of oil
has played a large role in elevating ISIS to the
wealthiest terror organization that the world has
yet to see. The success of their oil industry sparked
international action against the industry that
came in the form of financial countermeasures
and sanctions and military action. The success
of the industry also encouraged the UN to pass
Harvard Model United Nations 2019 25
resolutions dealing specifically with ISIS and
their production of oil that would serve delegates
well to read. Delegates should also pay attention
to resolutions that encourage nations to submit
names to an international sanction list as a way
to limit some of the group’s funding. Delegates
could look at how the international community
has responded to and cut ISIS profits from the
sale of oil as a way to get ideas on what actions the
UN could take to prevent non-state actors from
taking advantage of natural resources. In drafting
resolutions dealing with resource exploitation
delegates should keep in mind UNGA Resolution
1803 (XVII) that affirms permanent sovereignty
of the state over its natural resources to ensure
that resolutions do not interfere with a state’s
sovereign right to its resources and also as a basis
to take action against non-state actors that violate
this sovereignty by exploiting the said resources.
While the amount of revenue ISIS brings in from oil has
fluctuated over the years their ability to refine crude oil
at such sites as this opened up a new world of funding
opportunities
Source: Getty Images
Oil is the not the only resource that ISIS has
exploited for financial gain. Water is another
source of funding for the terrorist group. One
of the strategies of ISIS was to cut off water to
cities so that those cities then had to buy water
from the only supplier in the area, ISIS. In some
villages ISIS was charging residents 7,000 dinar
26 Special Session on Terrorism
($6.25) per cubic foot of water. There are other
times when the terror organization completely
shuts off an entire area’s access to water and holds
it ransom. One village in Iraq was told that ISIS
would return access to the water supply if they
were paid a ransom of 4 million dinars or $3,500.
The ability of a terror organization like ISIS to
hold ransom water sources is a truly terrifying
prospect. Having power over water resources does
more than give a terror organization a financial
profit, it gives them a powerful weapon that can
be used to weaken governments and expand their
influence of control.
Pictured here is the Mosul Dam in Mosul, Iraq. For 10
days in 2014 ISIS forces held control of this dam which
is a terrifying prospect for the hundreds of thousands that
depend on the dam.
Source: CNN
Despite the recent attention that international
agencies such as the UN have shown towards ISIS
oil industries, the exploitation of natural resources
by terror organizations is an area that is largely
untouched by the UN. There are conventions and
resolutions regarding the weaponization of such
resources as water by state actors. However, the
exploitation of natural resources for a financial gain
by non-state actors such as terrorist organizations
is not an area to which the UN has dedicated much
time to discussing. Therefore, this special session
is unique and important in tackling this issue in-
depth. Delegates should be creative in coming up
with potential solutions to this issue. How could
the UN crackdown on non-state actors who are
illegally imposing taxes on legitimate businesses
through the use of force and intimidation? It may
be difficult for the UN to intervene in certain
situations without violating national sovereignty,
however when it is international companies being
extorted by non-state actors the UN may find a
way to intervene. In areas where the rule of law is
weak, such as the areas where ISIS operates most
effectively, and the government is unable to take
effective action, perhaps financial or military aid
could be given to help stop the illicit exploitation
of natural resources. In Colombia, the police
force was unable to approach the areas where the
FARC were operating their illicit mining activities
because of the superior military power held by the
FARC then the police force. Perhaps if aid could
have been lent to them the government could
have had more of an impact on the FARC’s illicit
activities. Resource exploitation can occur in
many forms from taxes to the operating of mines
and oil wells. The ability of terrorist organizations
to take advantage of natural resources gives them
a large financial benefit. The UN, as of yet, does
not have many resolutions or guidelines on
how to deal with non-state actors who exploit
natural resources and it is time for comprehensive
resolutions that address this issue.
Key Questions
1. How can the UN keep terrorist organizations
from taken advantage of and exploiting
natural resources for financial gain or direct
countries on strategies that they can adopt to
accomplish the same goal?
2. Keeping in mind the permanent sovereignty
of a state over its natural resources how can
international measures respect a state’s right
to use, develop, tax, and monitor their own
natural resources while still being able to
identify non-state actors that exploit the same
natural resources for a monetary gain?

Subtopic D: Financial and Military Aid
The past three sections have been spent discussing
some of the different factors that make up a
terrorist organization’s financial network. This
section will be devoted to showing how the use
of both financial and military aid can be utilized
to disrupt those financial networks. I will be
expecting to hear discussion on this topic and see
creative solutions that make use of financial and
military aid within your draft resolutions. The use
of both financial and military aid can be extremely
important and useful in combating the financial
resources of terror organizations. Financial aid
can be distributed to those countries that cannot
afford to enact comprehensive counter-terror
measures. As was mentioned in the section
discussing narcoterrorism, in the 1980’s and
1990’s many countries that bordered Colombia
began a serious crackdown on illicit narcotic
activity. Such a crackdown forced many criminal
enterprises to find shelter in Colombia, a nation
that was too embroiled in turmoil to be able to
devote the same amount of resources to cracking
down on illicit narcotic activity.
Perhaps if a greater amount of aid was given to
Colombia by an international organization such
as the UN or its member states, then the country
would have been able to keep such illicit activity
under control instead of engaging in a 50-year
long war. Military aid can be just as useful in
disrupting financial networks as it is in fighting
terrorists on the ground. Military aid can be
utilized to disrupt smuggling routes that bring in
millions of dollars for terrorist organizations such
as ISIS. In the past decade, it has become much
more difficult for terror groups to keep money
in traditional bank accounts and so cash can
be held in reserves. Targeted strikes can destroy
these reserves and make it more difficult for
terror groups to purchase supplies or pay fighters.
Financial and military aid could be utilized in
a variety of ways to disrupt terrorist financial
networks, as long as the UN can agree when and
where to use these tools.
Harvard Model United Nations 2019 27
With the rise of ISIS, a terror group like none ever
seen before, the importance of dismantling financial
networks has become even more important. Even
before ISIS established a Caliphate they were a
highly successful and financially independent
terror organization. Now that much of the former
Caliphate has been retaken by allied forces ISIS
no longer has access to the massive amounts
of money that were brought in from taxation.
However, it is important to remember that even
before the group was able to benefit from levying
taxes they were financially independent and
had a budget that registered in the hundreds of
millions of dollars. With this in mind it is clear
that new tactics need to be used in order to cut
off the financing of groups like ISIS and therefore
make them almost completely ineffective. By
aggressively making use of tools such as financial
and military to aid nations struggling to throw off
the heavy chains of terrorism, the world may well
be able to effectively combat extremist groups.
The testimony of Dr. Matthew Levitt, the director
of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence at The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, before the United States House
Financial Services Committee on the financing of
ISIS provides some insight onto this topic and it
is recommended that delegates read through the
full transcript of his testimony and not rely solely
on what will be highlighted under this section.
While the use of financial aid to countries directly
affected by terror groups such as Iraq, Mali, Syria,
and Nigeria may seem to be a reasonable and
even intuitive measure, the use of military aid to
disrupt financial networks may not seem as logical
of a move. However, as Dr. Levitt says groups like
ISIS obtain much of their financing from illicit
activities and “while military tools would under
other circumstances be the last thing one might
think of as a logical means of combating crime,
the fact is that airstrikes against ISIS have already
significantly undermined some of the group’s
criminal enterprises and further such strikes
should continue that trend”. Dr. Levitt goes on
to say that when the Iraqi government becomes
28 Special Session on Terrorism

more stable, they could begin the process of protecting the poppy fields they said no longer
prosecuting ISIS criminal enterprises within the existed. This program did not help to reduce
country. Military action can be taken against the growth of poppy fields and merely helped
a variety of illicit activities that are a source of warlords become wealthier. This shows that any
revenue for terrorists. financial aid program must be closely monitored
to ensure the proper results. The same goes for
Financial aid can be both a useful tool for financial aid that is given on a more macro-level.
helping those nations that financially unable
to implement counter terrorism measures and The Security Council has passed many resolutions
a powerful incentive for nations that have the encouraging nations to adopt certain counter
capacity to implement such measures but have terrorism financing measures and many of those
failed to do so thus far. More than being applied resolutions have already been mentioned in this
on a macro-level, financial aid can be put to use background guide. However, there has not been
on a more micro-level. Such aid can be used to an offer of any form of assistance to developing
incentivize farmers to grow crops that are not nations who are simultaneously the nations
used to produce illicit narcotics. Military aid and where the effects of terrorism are felt the greatest
action, while useful, can also have detrimental and the nation’s most likely to be unable to
unintentional consequences such as the loss of implement these recommendations due to a lack
civilian life or it use can make the general populace of funding, resources, experience, or many other
much less inclined to side with those nations that factors. Nations such as Colombia in the late
utilize it and generate a feeling of sympathy or 1980’s or the Afghanistan of today or Palestine
even support for the violent actors the military of Libya that are the breeding grounds for
aid is being targeted against. This is not to say terrorism most desperately need to successfully
that military aid should not be utilized. There is a enact such recommendations as laid out by the
time and place for such actions. Financial aid, on Security Council. However, it is often nations
the other hand, often comes without the threat of like these that have not adequately implemented
such negative consequences. Financial aid, when such measures for a variety of reasons that could
used and monitored correctly, can help to make include financial ones.
a populace more appreciative of the nation or
international body distributing that aid, especially Another reason that could prevent nations from
if it occurs on a micro-level and effects the day- being able to implement programs and security
to-day wellbeing of people. Delegate are strongly measures that are recommended by institutions
encouraged to creatively make use of financial aid such as the UN or entities that are a part of the UN
in their draft resolutions on disrupting terrorist such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime is a lack
financing networks. of knowledgeable experts. Financial aid to nations
such as this can come in more forms than simple
Delegates should be sure to study instances where monetary assistance. Such aid could come in the
financial aid was used towards disrupting terrorist form of experts who are lent to nations to help
financial networks to see for themselves what setup successful programs and security measures.
has worked and what has not. Take for instance For example, there was previously no international
the British attempt to eradicate poppy fields in agency or international coalition operating in
Afghanistan in the early 2000’s by offering farmers Africa to counter terrorism and disrupt terrorist
subsidies to grow crops other than poppies. Due financial networks. These types of interagency
to a lack of oversight on the ground the program organizations had proved successful in places such
only incentivized local warlords to lie to British as Europe and the Middle East. When there is an
officials and pocket their money while still international interagency organization operating
 Harvard Model United Nations 2019 29

to set up security measures and crackdown on earlier in this paper, has published nine
illicit activities such as smuggling and resource recommendations for countering money
extortion then the cost of and resources, both laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF is
human and otherwise, necessary to set up and composed of 37 nations and continually reexamines
maintain these programs is shared by a wide their recommendations on the countering of
berth of nations and the burden does not rest on terrorist financing. However, the FATF does
one country alone. The United States helped to more than issue these recommendations. One
set up AFRCOM, an international, interagency of the key objectives of the FATF is to identify
organization that has helped to crackdown those nations that fall short in complying with the
on terrorist activities in Africa. By having the recommendations that are put out. As of February,
inclusion of agencies that have a long history of of 2018 the FATF had reviewed the standards and
fighting terrorism areas benefit from the expertise programs of over 80 countries and had declared
gained from those decades of fighting terrorists 65 to pose a threat to the international system by
and disrupting their financial networks. not having adequate programs for anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorism financing in
It is often difficult to see the effects that counter- place. 55 of those 65 countries identified have
terror financing programs have. Many argue that since been taken off of that list after remedying
such methods simply are not effective. Michael those programs. This shows that the public
Levi discusses this issue in an article he published warning issued by the FATF has proved effective
and notes that it is hard to show what capabilities at getting countries to put in place adequate
terror organizations may have had before programs to prevent and disrupt the financing
traditional threat financing programs were used to of terrorism. There are countries still on that list.
disrupt terror financial networks. Such traditional Some countries, such as the Democratic People’s
programs focus on stopping terrorist access to and Republic of Korea, simply refuse to put such
the transfer of funds through traditional banking measures in place, and other countries, such as
systems and have grown in recent years to include Ethiopia, may simply lack the necessary resources
preventing terror organizations from accessing to enact the recommendations put forth by the
or raising funds over the internet. Levi argues FATF. Perhaps a deeper working relationship
that there should be a lower set of expectations between the FATF and the UN could help more
for how well such programs will work for cutting nations become compliant with both FATF and
off terror financing. He goes on to say that such UN recommendations.
methods allow for financial intelligence gathering
which helps governments to better realize where
If financial assistance were to be used more
funding is coming from and target individuals liberally by the UN to help countries enact
for sanctions and monitoring. While Levi brings
successful counter-terrorism financing measures,
up the important point of financial intelligence
then surely there would be much debate over who
gathering through such programs, expectations for
qualified for such funds, which countries would
the effects of such programs should not have to be
be awarded the funds, how the funds would be
lowered. These programs would be more effective
monitored, and what exactly the funding would
and show more results if all nations operated such
be used for. A deeper working relationship with
programs at the same degree of effectiveness. the FATF could help the UN to answer at least
Counter-terrorism financing programs are only as
some of these questions. The FATF would identify
strong and effective as the nation with the weakest
the nations that have not yet enacted satisfactory
of these programs. security measures. The FATF would also be
able to identify which nations failed to enact
The Financial Action Task Force, as mentioned such measures even after being publicly listed
30 Special Session on Terrorism
as endangering the international community by
not implementing such measures. From there
the UN could determine which nations needed
financial assistance and which nations needed to
face consequences in the form of sanctions for
endangering the international community. The
UN could help the FATF to review the standards
and programs for countries that have not yet been
examined. A closer relationship between the FATF
and UN would be of benefit to the international
community as a whole and help to get worldwide
counter-terrorism financing measures enacted
that would seriously cripple the ability of all terror
organizations to access and transfer funds.
Of course, there will still be much debate on how
exactly financial aid monies should be distributed.
When considering how the UN will use financial
aid in their resolutions delegates should read
Carol Graham’s article “Can Foreign Aid Help
Stop Terrorism?” and pay special attention to
the section that discusses the “do’s and don’ts” of
foreign aid. While much of the article focuses on
aid from the point of the United States the basic
principles and ideas that are contained within are
deserving of your attention and might help you to
draft resolutions that answer how and to who aid
should be given and provide a couple of warnings
for who to avoid giving aid to.
Military aid and military use in disrupting
terrorist financial networks is incredibly
important. However, while this method can be
effective at cutting of illicit sources of funding
for terrorist organizations, its use should be
weighed against potential negative fallout from
military involvement. No use of force comes
without risk. Some risks that delegates should
keep in mind when deciding whether or not to
include guidelines for military aid in their draft
resolutions include civilian casualties, the chance
that weapons could be turned against those
supplying them and their allies, and how the use
of force and its consequences will be perceived by
Smoke rises in the aftermath of coalition airstrikes on an
the general populace. These are only a few of the ISIS stronghold in Syria.
risks when it comes to using force and delegates Source: Newsweek
should be aware that there can oftentimes be
unintended consequences. These types of negative
unintended consequences can arise even in well-
planned, multinational coalition uses of force.
One of the most recent examples of the use
of military force to disrupt terrorist financial
networks was the coalition of nations that targeted
ISIS oil depots in air strikes. At the height of
their power and wealth the sale of oil constituted
one of the largest sources of revenue for the
terrorist organization bringing in an estimated
$3.2 million in revenue every day. The group
controlled approximately 350 oil wells in Iraq
and an estimated 60% of Syria’s oil fields which
allowed the group to sale an estimated 80,000
barrels of oil a day on the black-market by using
the smuggling routes they took over during their
conquest of the region. Several nations began
to target the oil refineries, production sites, and
smuggling routes in 2014 to disrupt the cash flow
ISIS received from selling the oil on the black-
market. This targeting of oil fields was extremely
effective at disrupting the ability of ISIS to
provide oil both to foreign buyers and internally
in the regions that they controlled which dealt a
blow to the revenue flow. By targeting oil fields
and even those individuals in charge of the large
oil operation the terror group was running their
available supply of oil has drastically fallen.
However, even with a campaign as successful on
paper as this, there are still negative consequences.

By destroying the supply of oil that ISIS had
access to the supply of oil available to civilians
that relied on that oil was also destroyed. Armed
groups in Syria noted that ISIS could use this as
propaganda to recruit more fighters by showing
that while they were trying to provide oil to these
citizens the nations of the world destroyed that
oil. However, instead of dialing down the level
of attacks the coalition of nations ramped up the
strikes and began to target more above ground
production sites and even the middlemen who
transported the oil, although they were given
warning of incoming attacks. An aggressive
campaign against ISIS oil was launched, and to
a large extent it worked. ISIS is still hanging on
to some of its oil but because of the aggressive
campaign against its production and distribution
estimates have placed the groups income from oil
in 2017 to $4 million a month, down 97% since
2014. The campaign against ISIS oil has been
highly successful and is a prime example of using
military aid and force to disrupt terrorist financial
networks.
While the UN has passed resolutions that relate
to countries receiving or being able to apply
for funding there are no resolutions that relate
directly to helping nations fund anti-terror
financing programs. Delegates should consider
looking into times when the UN has set up Trusts
that nations can apply for funding from. Several
of these have been set up and a similar process
could be followed for giving aid to countries to
implement security measures. Delegates could also
consider creating a new committee entirely, as is
well within the rights and powers conveyed upon
any general assembly including a Special Session,
to direct funding to specific countries. While
the UN has not specifically given out monies to
countries in order to disrupt terrorist financial
networks there are several ways that delegates
could propose such an idea. As for military aid
and force, those matters can be recommended by
the General Assembly to the Security Council for
review and their decision on whether or not the
use of force is justified. The General Assembly can
Harvard Model United Nations 2019 31
provide its opinion but the matter should still be
recommended to the Security Council for review.
The use of financial and military aid to disrupt
terrorist financial networks is an important aspect
of successfully stopping terrorism. Delegates
should be creative when it comes to these matters.
Terrorism is constantly evolving and so too
should the world’s answer to it. New ideas are
encouraged and creative ones are applauded. I
strongly urge delegates to think outside of what
has traditionally been done and use military and
especially financial aid in new and creative ways.
I look forward to the debate and draft resolutions
that arise out of the use of financial and military
aid to disrupt terrorist financial networks.
Key Questions
1. How can the UN creatively use financial
and military aid to disrupt terrorist financial
networks without allowing corruption or
misuse to waste the money and/or turn public
sentiment against the UN and many of its
member states?
2. By what standard will it be decided which
nations are allocated funds to implement
recommended security measures?
3. How will aid that is given be monitored and
who will oversee the use of funds?
Points of Contention
This section will outline three areas that I believe
will prove to be contentious in committee. In
preparation for committee and debate delegates
should become familiar with how their country
has approached countering and disrupting
terrorist financial networks in the past. Has
a country been highly successful or highly
unsuccessful at disrupting financial networks? Has
a country implemented all of the internationally
recommended security measures for countering
the financing of terrorism? Has a country received
32 Special Session on Terrorism
financial aid and if so has it been used adequately
as judged by the international community?
These are a few of the questions that delegates
should be able to answer about their nation. It
is difficult to set out pre-set blocs when national
attitudes and policies vary from one nation
to the next. Therefore, I have outlined three
potential categories nations may fall into where
contention may arise; nations in non-compliance
with international recommendations, nations in
compliance with international recommendations,
and nations traditionally hesitant about giving
out financial aid.
Nations in Non-Compliance with
International Recommendation
There are many nations that have yet to enact
security measures recommended by the General
Assembly, the Security Council, the FATF, and
other international entities as already mentioned
in this background guide. This bloc of nations will
likely have different opinions when it comes to
disrupting terrorist financial networks. Delegates
should make sure that they have a thorough
understanding of the measures to combat and
disrupt terrorist financial networks that their
countries have put into place. Those nations that
have not enacted any, or have enacted only a
few, security measures will likely be looking for
and supporting resolutions that offer a financial
incentive for nations to implement security
measures. This will be especially true of third-
world nations that may not have the financial
resources to implement and keep up such
programs. These nations may want to join forces
with other nations of similar status even if it
means compromising on some issues so that their
collective bargaining range is favorably increased.
These nations will also be looking to avoid any
resolutions that impose strict consequences or
punishments on nations who find themselves
in non-compliance with international security
recommendations.
Nations that find themselves in non-compliance
will want to remedy the fact in order to protect
themselves from being home to terrorist
organizations. However, their need to remedy will
be countered by the fact that any government is
slow to change and change costs money. These
nations will be looking for resolutions that offer
them the greatest benefit at the lowest cost.
Nations in Compliance with
International Recommendations
This bloc of nations is most concerned with
getting other nations in compliance with
international recommendations so that their
own security measures are not circumvented
by terrorist organizations taking advantage of
neighboring nations that do not have similar levels
of security measures enacted. These nations will
often be wealthier and less-affected by terrorism
than nations that are in non-compliance. This
bloc will likely favor punishing those nations
who are not yet in compliance with international
recommendations as a way to incentive those
nations to become compliant. This eliminates the
possibility of having to provide financial assistance
to such nations. These nations will be less likely to
support resolutions that give a financial incentive
to those nations that are in non-compliance.
Since these nations are often already less-affected
by terrorism and usually wealthier than those
nations in non-compliance, they have less to lose
if a resolution that strengthens global security
measures does not pass. They can use this to their
advantage to leverage a better deal for themselves
when it comes to providing financial or military
aid to countries that need stronger security
measures put in place. This bloc will seek to keep
their financial and military commitment to a
minimum with the possible exception of providing
assistance to countries that immediately border
them if there is a large enough threat emanating
from within that country’s borders.

Nations Traditionally Hesitant About
Engaging in Financial Aid
This bloc of nations will find themselves
concerned about the possibility of giving out
financial and military aid to nations they may
not support or believe will use the money in an
ineffective or improper way. Delegates should be
aware on their country’s stance on contributing
funds to multilateral aid as well as their country’s
position on the giving of bilateral aid. This bloc
may contain a conglomerate of nations from
different backgrounds and policy positions.
The main concern of these countries will be the
mismanagement of aid. Another concern could
be where the aid is directed, and at times, who it
is directed against. There are terror organizations
that are called terrorists in any nation, however,
there are many more where nations disagree on
the use of the term terrorist. These countries will
be gravely concerned about whether this aid will
be used to target militant groups that may not be
considered terrorists by some nations.
This bloc of nations should pool together their
influence to support a resolution that explicitly
lays out whether aid can be used to directly
target the financial revenue streams of terrorist
organizations and, if it can, which organizations
can be targeted. This bloc may find it in their best
interest to call for the creation of a committee
that determines on a case-by-case basis whether
aid can be used to directly target the ways in
which a terror organization raises funds. This
bloc could be made up of countries that are
both in compliance and not in compliance with
international recommendations.
Suggestions for Further Research
This background guide is not meant to be the
one and only place you go for information.
While there are many, many sources that I cite
throughout this guide, there are other places that
I looked to help me gather a strong foundation
of knowledge on terrorism. I would recommend
Harvard Model United Nations 2019 33
that you take the time to read through the
sources that I cite in their entirety and not just
the parts that I pulled from to develop this guide.
I would strongly recommend that delegates
do further research in order to be prepared for
committee. One place that I found helpful to
gather information was the FATF website and
the entirety of the recommendations that they
have published. Other places that I found useful
while writing were the websites of individual
nations that talk about what they have done to
disrupt terrorist financial networks. A great tool
that delegates have available to them is Google
Scholar. I started much of my research off by
simply typing keywords into Google Scholar such
as “terrorist financial networks”, “narcoterrorism”,
“terrorist counter financing strategies” and other
words or phrases that have to do with terrorist
financial networks. Another place delegates
could go to start their own research is the RAND
Corporation website. RAND has a large collection
of academic literature that deals specifically with
terrorist financial networks. Delegates should also
stay up-to-date on current events as these could
become highly relevant to our Special session. I
would recommend news sites such as Al Jazeera,
The New York Times, BBC, and CNN. If I find
any event or website to be of particular relevance
to our Special session I will be sure to include it
on the Blog and delegates should feel free to email
me with suggestions for sources of information
they feel should be shared with the committee as
a whole before the start of our Special session.
Closing Remarks
Let me thank all of you who have stuck with this
guide to the very end. I hope that it has given you
a basis for how to approach our Special Session
on Terrorism. Remember that this guide, while
full of case studies and important information,
should not serve as your only basis of research
for committee. I encourage you all to do your
own outside research. I hope that what you have
read so far has captured your attention and given
34 Special Session on Terrorism

you a new perspective on defeating terrorism.

Research your country and become familiar with
how they have approached this topic. I have
every confidence that come January you will all
be ready to present your own creative ideas on
how to disrupt terrorist financial networks. Do
not let yourself be intimidated by delegates who
may have more experience or seem to have more
knowledge than you do. Every voice is important
and every idea deserves to be heard and you are
all capable of rising to meet this global challenge
with new and realistic ideas.

I am so very excited to meet you all when you

show up for committee in January. This is a topic
that I am deeply passionate about and my hours
of research have only supported the fact that I
have so much more to learn about this issue and I
hope to learn from all of you. Please do reach out
and introduce yourself to me at sst@harvardmun.
org. Whether you simply want to say hi, have a
question or concern, want me to add something
to the blog, or have a good knock-knock joke to
share, I want to hear from you. Good luck with
your further research and I will see all of you in
January.

Best,
Michael J. Shafer
 Harvard Model United Nations 2019 35

Endnotes

1. “United Nations, Main Body, Main Organs, General Assembly.” United Nations, United
2. Nations.
3. Ibid.
4. “UN Charter - Chapter IV.” United Nations, United Nations.
5. “A/S-10/4 - E.” S/RES/1888(2009) - E, United Nations, 1978.
6. Zehorai, Itai. “The Richest Terror Organizations in the World.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 29 Jan.
2018.
7. Chaliand, Chaliand, Gérard, and Blin, Arnaud. The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to
8. ISIS. Updated ed. Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2016.
9. Juergensmeyer, Mark. “Terror Mandated by God.” Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 2
(1997): 16-23.
10. Chaliand, Chaliand, Gérard, and Blin, Arnaud. The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to
11. ISIS. Updated ed. Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2016.
12. “Terrorism.” Our World in Data.
13. Lockwood, Nick. “How the Soviet Union Transformed Terrorism.” The Atlantic, Atlantic
14. Media Company, 23 Dec. 2011.
15. Jenkins, Brain. “The New Age of Terrorism.” RAND, RAND Corporation, 2006.
16. Kaplan, Eben. “Tracking Down Terrorist Financing.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on
Foreign Relations, 2006.
17. Ibid.
18. “Terrorism.” Our World in Data.
19. Glaser, Daniel. “The Evolution of Terrorism Financing: Disrupting the Islamic State.” Chemical
Weapons in the Middle East - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016.
20. “A/RES/51/210. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.” United Nations, United
Nations, 1996.
21. “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.” United
22. Nations, United Nations, 1999.
23. “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001) - United Nations Security Council
Counter-Terrorism Committee.” United Nations, United Nations, 2001.
24. “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) - United Nations Security Council
25. Counter-Terrorism Committee.” United Nations, United Nations, 2001.
26. Ibid.
27. “Who We Are.” Money Laundering - Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
36 Special Session on Terrorism

28. “S/RES/2178 (2014) Security Council Subsidiary Organs.” United Nations, United Nations,
29. 2014.
30. Ibid.
31. “S/RES/2253 (2015) Security Council Subsidiary Organs.” United Nations, United Nations,
2015.
32. Safire, William. “On Language; Drug-War Lingo.” The New York Times, The New York
33. Times, 24 Sept. 1989.
34. “1985 Palace of Justice Siege.” Colombia News | Colombia Reports, 15 Apr. 2017.
35. Ehrenfeld, R. (1990). Narcoterrorism. New York: Basic Books. p. xiii
36. Ellyatt, Holly. “Global Drugs Trade ‘as Strong as Ever’ as Fight Fails.” CNBC, CNBC, 13 Aug.
2013.
37. Otis, John. “The FARC and Colombia’s Illegal Drug Trade.” The FARC and Colombia’s Illegal
Drug Trade, 2014, Policy File.
38. Ibid.
39. Talbot, Kristie. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey Ca. “The International Nexus Between
Drugs and Terror: Lessons in Conflict and Diplomacy.” 2010.
40. Piazza, James A. “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational
Terrorism?” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 3, 2008, pp. 469–488. JSTOR, JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/29734247.
41. “United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.” World Drug Report 1997, 1997.
42. Talbot, Kristie. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey Ca. “The International Nexus Between
Drugs and Terror: Lessons in Conflict and Diplomacy.” 2010.
43. Ibid.
44. U.S. Department of State Website, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2006: Chapter 2 –
WesternHemisphere Overview”
45. Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resource, Statement by Donnie R.
Marshall before the House on Government Reform, 1st Cong., 107th sess., 2001.
46. Talbot, Kristie. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey Ca. “The International Nexus Between
47. Drugs and Terror: Lessons in Conflict and Diplomacy.” 2010.
48. Jeremy McDermott, “Colombian Report shows FARC is Worlds Richest Insurgent Group,” Jane’s
Intelligence Review Online (September 1, 2005).
49. “Former Farc Rebels Take Seats in Colombia Congress.” BBC News, BBC, 21 July 2018.
50. “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State.
51. “Afghanistan Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 31 Jan. 2018.
52. Ibid.
53. “Narco-Terrorism in Afghanistan.” The Cornell Roosevelt Institute Policy Journal, 2012.
54. Ibid.
 Harvard Model United Nations 2019 37

55. “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem.” United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime, 2003.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. “The Taliban, Terrorism, and Drug Trade.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State.
2001.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem.” United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime, 2003.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Fantigrossi, Steven, “Afghan Narcoterrorism: The Problem, its Origins, and Why International
Law Enforcement Should Fight It” (2015). Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone Projects.
850.
65. Ibid.
66. “United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.” World Drug Report 2018, 2018.
67. Fantigrossi, Steven, “Afghan Narcoterrorism: The Problem, its Origins, and Why International
Law Enforcement Should Fight It” (2015). Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone Projects.
850.
68. Ibid.
69. Detzi, Daniel, and Steven Winkleman. “Hitting Them Where It Hurts: A Joint Interagency
Network to Disrupt Terrorist Financing in West Africa.” Studies in Conflict &Amp;
70. Terrorism, vol. 39, no. 3, 2015, p. 00.
71. Ibid.
72. “United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.” Migrant Smuggling, United Nations Office
onDrugs and Crime.
73. “18 U.S. Code § 545 - Smuggling Goods into the United States.” LII / Legal Information Institute.
74. Detzi, Daniel, and Steven Winkleman. “Hitting Them Where It Hurts: A Joint Interagency
Network to Disrupt Terrorist Financing in West Africa.” Studies in Conflict &Amp; Terrorism,
vol. 39, no. 3, 2015, p. 00.
75. Chattopadhyay, Sudakshina. “AQIM: A History.” Georgetown Security Studies Review, 18 Feb.
2016.
76. Detzi, Daniel, and Steven Winkleman. “Hitting Them Where It Hurts: A Joint Interagency
Network to Disrupt Terrorist Financing in West Africa.” Studies in Conflict &Amp; Terrorism,
vol. 39, no. 3, 2015, p. 00.
77. Ibid.
78. Chattopadhyay, Sudakshina. “AQIM: A History.” Georgetown Security Studies Review, 18 Feb.
2016.
38 Special Session on Terrorism

79. Ibid.
80. Masters, Jonathan, and Zachary Laub. “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.” Council on
81. Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 2015.
82. Boeke, Sergei. “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, Insurgency, or Organized Crime?”
Taylor & Francis, 2016.
83. Chattopadhyay, Sudakshina. “AQIM: A History.” Georgetown Security Studies Review, 18
84. Feb. 2016.
85. Le Sage, Andres. “The Evolving Threat of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.” Strategic Forum
86. National Defense University, 2011.
87. Abubakar, Ali Abare. “Three Years Later, Nearly 200 Nigerian Schoolgirls Still Missing.” USA
Today, Gannett Satellite Information Network, 13 Apr. 2017.
88. Onuoha, Freedom. “Porous Borders and Boko Haram’s Arms Smuggling Operations in
89. Nigeria.” Al Jazeera, 2013.
90. Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. 3rd
91. ed., University of California Press, 2003.
92. “Islamic State Territory Down 60 Percent and Revenue Down 80 Percent on Caliphate’s Third
93. Anniversary, IHS Markit Says.” IHS Markit, 2017.
94. Al-Khatteeb, Luay, and Eline Gordts. “How ISIS Uses Oil to Fund Terror.” Brookings,
95. Brookings, 28 July 2016.
96. Pringle, Heather. “ISIS Cashing in on Looted Antiquities to Fuel Iraq Insurgency.” Assyrian
97. International News Agency, 2014.
98. Chulov, Martin. “How an Arrest in Iraq Revealed Isis’s $2bn Jihadist Network.” The
99. Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 15 June 2014.
100. Ibid.
101. Mansour, Renad, and Hisham al-Hashimi. “ISIS Inc.” Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, 16 Jan.
102. 2018.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. “Security Council Hears Calls for ‘All of UN’ Approach to Stop Destruction, Smuggling of
106. Cultural Heritage | UN News.” United Nations, United Nations, 2017.
107. Ibid.
108. “Terrorism, Corruption and and the Criminal Exploitation of Natural Resources.” Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, Oct. 2017.
 Harvard Model United Nations 2019 39

109. Rickard, J. Siege of Uxellodunum, Spring-Summer 51 B.C. N.p., n.d. Web. McDermott,
Jeremy. “Gold Overtakes Drugs as Source of Colombia Rebel Funds.” BBC
110. News, BBC, 17 June 2012.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. “Gold and Guerillas.” The Economist (Online), 17 Aug. 2012, pp. The Economist (Online),Aug
17, 2012.
116. Ibid.
117. McDermott, Jeremy. “Gold Overtakes Drugs as Source of Colombia Rebel Funds.” BBC
News, BBC, 17 June 2012.
118. “ISIS Cuts Off Water, Electricity, Destroys Churches.” AINA News. Assyrian International
News Agency, 18 June 2014. Web.
119. Cunningham, Erin. “In Their Latest Outrage, Islamic State Fighters Are Using Water as
aWeapon in Iraq.” The Washington Post. WP Company, 07 Oct. 2014. Web.
120. “Islamic State: Up to $800m of Funds ‘Destroyed by Strikes’.” BBC News, BBC, 26 Apr.
2016.
121. “The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Fromer-Wexler Fellow and Director, the Stein
Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Dr. Matthew Levitt, Prepared Testimony Before
the House Financial Services Committee Hearing on Terrorist Financing and the Islamic State, as
Released by the Committee.” SEC Wire, 13 Nov. 2014, pp. SEC Wire, Nov 13, 2014.
122. Fantigrossi, Steven, “Afghan Narcoterrorism: The Problem, its Origins, and Why International
Law Enforcement Should Fight It” (2015). Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone Projects.
850.
123. Detzi, Daniel, and Steven Winkleman. “Hitting Them Where It Hurts: A Joint Interagency
Network to Disrupt Terrorist Financing in West Africa.” Studies in Conflict &Amp; Terrorism, vol.
39, no. 3, 2015.
124. Ibid.
125. Levi, Michael. “Combating the Financing of Terrorism.” The British Journal of Criminology,
vol. 50, no. 4, 2010, pp. 650–669.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid.
128. “Who We Are.” Money Laundering - Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
129. “Topic: High-Risk and Other Monitored Jurisdictions.” Money Laundering - Financial Action
Task Force (FATF).
130. Ibid.
131. Graham, Carol. “Can Foreign Aid Help Stop Terrorism? Not with Magic Bullets.” The
Brookings Review, vol. 20, no. 3, 2002, pp. 28–32.
40 Special Session on Terrorism

132. “The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Fromer-Wexler Fellow and Director, the Stein
Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Dr. Matthew Levitt, Prepared Testimony Before
the House Financial Services Committee Hearing on Terrorist Financing and the Islamic State, as
Released by the Committee.” SEC Wire, 13 Nov. 2014, pp. SEC Wire, Nov 13, 2014.
133. Ibid.
134. Reed, Matthew. “Blowing Up the Islamic State’s Oil Company.” Foreign Policy, Foreign
135. Policy, 26 Oct. 2016.
136. Lister, Charles. “Cutting off ISIS’ Cash Flow.” Brookings, Brookings, 29 July 2016.
137. Reed, Matthew. “Blowing Up the Islamic State’s Oil Company.” Foreign Policy, Foreign
Policy, 26 Oct. 2016.
138. Zehori, Itai. “Is ISIS Bankrupt?” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 12 Aug. 2017.