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 CO NT E NT S

I
Introduction
r9
1. ImPerial Pan-Islam
England's Brothers 47
2.
65
3. Islam Meets the Cold \Var
The \Var against Nasser and Mossadegh 94
4.
rzo
5. The King of All Islam
r47
6. The Sorcerer'sAPPrentice
r68
7. The Rise of Economic Islam
r90
8. lsrael's Islamists
Ll 4
9. Hell's AYatollah
L++
lO. Jihad I: The "Arc of Islam"
L70
Asia
I l. Jihad II: Into Central
12. Clash of Civilizations? 303

Notes
143
369
Acknowledgments
17r
Index

TJ
 INTRODUCTION

I'rrEnE ts AN unwrittenchapterin the historyof the cold'war and

llnited
the New World Order that followed. lt is the story 9f how the
States-sometlmesovertly' sometimescovertly-funded and encour-
agcd right-wing lslamistactivism.Deuil's Game attemptsto fill in that
vital missinglink.
Vital becausethis little-knownpolicy,conductedover six decades,
rs partly to blame for the emergence of lslamistterrorismas a world-
u.idephenomenon.Indeed,Americrt'swould-beenrpirein the Middle
F_ast,North Africa, and clentral and S0uth Asia was dcsigncdto rest
i1 part on the beilrockof politicalIslam.At leastthat is what its archi-
after
rccts hoped. But it proved to be a devil's gamc. c)nly too late,
Septemberrr, 2oor, did washington begin to discoverits strateglc
nriscalculation.
'Ihe United Statesspenrdecadescultivating lslamists,manipulating
Cold
and double-crossingthem, cynically using and misusingthem as
its
\\rar allies,Only to find that it spawneda force that turned against
sponsor,and with a vengeance.Like monstersimbued with artificial
life, radical imams, mullahs, and ayatollahs stalk the landscape,
of
rhunderingnot only againstthe united Statesbut againstfreedom

TE
 Dr v r l' s Gel.e

thought, against secular science,against nationalism and the left,

against women's rights. Some are terrorists, but far more are just
rnedieval-mindedreligious fanatics who want to turn the calendar
back to the seventhcentury.
'War,
During the Cold from 1945 to r99r, the enemy was not
merely the USSR.According to the Manichean rules of that era, the
United Statesdemonizedleaderswho did not wholeheartedlysign on
to the American agendaor who might challenge'Western and in par-
ticular U.S. hegemony.ldeas and ideologiesthat could inspire such
leaderswere suspect:nationalism,humanism,secularism,socialism.
But subversiveideassuch as thesewere also the ones most feared by
the nascentforcesof Muslim fundamentalism.Throughout the region
the Islamic right fought pitched battles against the bearersof these
notions, not only in the realm of intellectual life but in the streets.
During the decades-longstruggle against Arab nationalism-along
with Persian, Turkish, and Indian nationalism-the United States
found it politic to make common causewith the lslamic right.
More broadly, the United Statesspent many years trying to con-
struct a barrier againstthe SovietUnion along its southernflank. The
fact that all of the nations between Greeceand China were Muslim
gave rise to the notion that lslam itself might reinforcethat Maginot
Line-style strategy.Gradually the idea of a green belt along the "arc
of Islam" took form. The idea was not just defensive.Adventurous
policy makersimaginedthat restiveMuslims insidethe SovietUnion's
own Central Asian republicsmight be the undoing of the USSRitself,
and they took stepsto encouragethem.
The United Statesplayed not with Islam-that is, the religion, the
traditional, organizedsystemof belief of hundreds of millions-but
with Islamism. Unlike the faith, with fourteen centuriesof history
behind it, Islamismis of more recentvintage.It is a political creedwith
its origins in the late nineteenthcentury,a militant, all-encompassing
philosophy whose tenets would appear foreign or hereticalto most
Muslims of earlier ages and that still appear so to many educated
Muslims today. \Thether it is called pan-Islam,or Islamic fundamen-
talism, or political Islam, it is an altogetherdifferent creaturefrom the
spiritual interpretationof Muslim life as contained in the Five Pillars

the left,
rrre 3 re JUSt
:re calendar
- - : : :l ;:ll\' \l'as not
- :lat
-^-- era,
^ -^ *L
tne
- : .:.,-:i-dlvsign on
: , it:rl and in par-
- - .- : :nspiresuch
r- :.:.::1 . S O CialiS m .
: -: - :--lrl f f ealed by
:-rri rS of t hes e
-: - .-r ::r th e s t r eet s .
- - : . t,,.,i S m - alO ng
. 'i'rrted States
, ' . * '.--::q h t .
:,1. ll\ '1l1 8 t O C O n -
-.:-.::nflank. The
- :,: ivere \{uslim
: -- r-. :hat \faginot
.- --:-t-rrnqthe"arc
- . '".. -\dventurous
: : -: irtviet Union's
: : ::. ussRitself,
'--:-- : nrllions-but
-:- -: - i,rif S of history
' . I .:::;a1creedwith
: - :. .:-..-.ncompasslng
; : :-::iilcal to most
: : :-ianv educated
". - .,..::-lrcfundamen-
l:-:- -.-::3ture frOmthe
i -:i r. :i-reFive Pillars
E
Introduction
of Islam. It is, in fact,a perversionof that religious faith. That is the
mutant ideology that the United Statesencouraged,supported) orga-
nized, or funded. It is the same one variously representedby the Mus-
lim Brotherhood, by Ayatollah Khomeini's lran, by Saudi Arabia's
ultra-orthodox'$Tahhabism, by Hamas and Hezbollah, by the Afghan
fihadis,and by Osama bin Laden.
II
The United Statesfound political Islam to be a convenient parrner
during each stageof America'sempire-buildingproject in the Middle
East, from its early entry into the region to its gradual military
encroachment,to its expansioninto an on-the-groundmilitary pres-
ence,and finally to the emergenceof the United Statesas an army of
occupationin Iraq and Afghanistan.
In the r9jos, the enemy was not only Moscow but the Third
'World's
emerging nationalists, from Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt to
Mohammed Mossadeghin Iran. The united Statesand Britain used
the Muslim Brotherhood, a terrorist movement and the grandfather
organization of the Islamic right, against Nasser,the up-and-coming
leader of the Arab nationalists.In the clA-sponsored coup d'6tat in
Iran in 1953, the United Statessecredyfunded an ayatollah who had
founded the Devoteesof Islam, a ianatical Iranian ally of the Muslim
Brotherhood.Later in the samedecade,the united statesbeganro toy
with the notion of an Islamic bloc led by Saudi Arabia as a counter-
point to the nationalistleft.
In the 196os,despiteU.S. efforts ro contain it, left-wing national-
ism and Arab socialismspread from Egypt to Algeria to Syria, Iraq,
and Palestine.To counter this seemingthreat, the United Statesforged
a working alliance with Saudi Arabia, intenr on using its foreign-
policy arm,'wahhabi fundamentalism.The united statesioined with
King Saud and Prince Faisal (later, King Faisal) in pursuir of an
Islamic bloc from North Africa to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Saudi
Arabia founded institutions to mobilize the \Tahhabi religious right
and the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi-backedactivists founded the
Islamic Center of Geneva(r96t), the Muslim \forld League(1962),
 ,.:-+l*i*r

4 . DEvrr's Gelrr

the organizarion of the Islamic conference (tg6g), and other organi-

and confused.D::: - -
zations that formed the core of an international Islamist movemenr.
criseswith polrr:, . -
In the r97os, with the death of Nasser and the retreat of Arab
with the risinc i ---.
nationalism,the Islamistsbecamean important prop beneathmany of
army'scrackJ,,"' '
the regimes tied to the united srares.The united Statesfound itself
dialogueuith :-, - -
allied with the Islamic right in Egypt, where Anwar sadat used that
rorism . In Elr::.--
country's Islamiststo build an anti-Nasseristpolitical base;in paki- i no r rrinl c rrr r' - --- '
stan, where General zia ul-Haqseized power by force and established
Mubar ek'. i;- '
an Islamist state; and in sudan, where the Muslim Brotherhood,s
Brothers..\:.:
leader,Hassan Turabi, marched toward power. At the same time. the jihad, the T":....:"
united Statesbeganto seeIslamic fundamentalism as a tool to be used
Laden's-\l Q...:, -
offensively against the Soviet union, above all in Afghanisran and
u ith the I.,.i:. - -
central Asia, where the united states used it as sword aimed at the
And thcr -., r : -
Soviet Union's underbelly. And as Iran's revolution unfolded, latent \i r r r '- -
sympathy for Islamism-combined with widespread U.s. ignorance
Il C Os ttIl :s f \ . : -: . - --.
about Iran's Islamisrcurrenrs-led many u.s. officialsto seeAyatollah
.:: -
crvrlrz.rrtotrs.
Khomeini as a benign figure, admiring his credentials as an anti-
Qaeda-tn;::-- .:
communist. As a resulr, the United Statescatastrophically underesti-
\rd helr.;,:-..:,
mated his movement'spotential in Iran. \
l :.t;--.t !..:. --.
Even after the Iranian revolution of r979,the united Statesand its -. : :J: : n : .: : : . : .- .: .' . - -
alliesfailed to learn the lessonthat Islamismwas a dangerous,uncon-
trollable force. The united Statesspent billions of dollars to supporr
an Islamistjihad in Afghanistan,whose mujahideenwere led by Mus-
Iim Brotherhood-allied groups. The united States also looked on
uncritically as Israel and Jordan covertly aided terrorists from the
Muslim Brotherhood in a civil war in syria, and as Israel encouraged
the spreadof Islamismamong palestiniansin the occupiedterritories,
helping to found Hamas. And neoconservatives joined the cIAs Bill
casey in the r98os in secrerdealswith Iran's Ayaroilah Khomeini.
By the r99os) the cold 'war was over. The poritical utility of the
Islamic right now seemedquestionable.some strategistsargued that
political Islam was a new threat, the new "ism" replacingcommunism
as America's global opponent. That, however, wildly exaggeratedthe
po\ver of a movement that was restricted to poor, undevelopedstates.
still, from Morocco to Indonesia,political Islam was a force that the
United Stateshad to deal with. s7ashington'sresponsewas muddled

:-.:,-: . lndotherorgani-
:*- ,' - -. ,..amiStmovement.
!. :' :- : ::. retreatOf Arab
: " .', :: ,l beneathmany of
i, - : -: :.:..,,,rrSadatusedthat
i- :.-- : -:rcalbase;in Paki-
:, - : :.e and established
: - : - --: ihe sametime, the
!- : - -- i:-. -rsa tool to be used
:- : i .:-\fghanistanand
- ..: S..\'ord aimed at the
-.-:-
-. -, -.::,,nunfolded,latent
-. .:-..tJ U.S. ignorance
' :--..:.ilsto seeAyatollah
-: - -:-rnfials as an anti-
-: - r.::,rphicallyunderesti-
- - - - :-. 'JnitedStatesand its
.. : , J r n ocrn r
: - . 'l dollars to support
-
.. :..n n'ereled by Mus-
- - r:- >::res also looked on
. :=i. rerrorists from the
' - ::J :s ]sraelencouraged
:-- - ::.; oCCupied territories,
":- .r :. iotnedthe CIA's Bill
. - - :-.,:nllah Khomeini.
.- l-. ii.litical utility of the
' -': :lr.lteglstsarguedthat
:;plaeing communism
' : :,. '.i':idlvexaggeratedthe
.: - : :. undevelopedstates.
-r : ,:-r1\\'f,Sa force that the
TN
Introduction . s
and confused.During the r99os, the United Statesfaced a seriesof
criseswith political Islam: In Algeria, the United Statessympathized
with the rising forces of political Islam, only to support the Algerian
army's crackdown against them-and then \Tashington kept open a
dialogue with the Algerian Islamists,who increasinglyturned to ter-
rorism. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, includ-
ing a violent undergroundmovement,poseda dire threat to President
Mubarak's regime; yet the United Statestoyed with supporting the
Brothers. And in Afghanistan, shatteredafter the decade-longU.S.
jihad, the Taliban won early American support. Even as Osama bin
Laden'sAl Qaeda took shape,the United Statesfound itself in league
with the Islamic right in Pakistan,SaudiArabia, and the Arab Gulf.
And then came 9lrt.
After zoor, the Bush administration appeared to sign on to the
neoconservativedeclaration that the world was defined by a "clash of
civilizations," and launched its global war on terrorism, targeting Al
Qaeda-the most virulent strain of the very virus that the United States
had helped create. Still, before, during, and after the invasion of
Iraq-a socialist, secular country that had long opposed Islamic
fundamentalism-the United States actively supported Iraq's Islamic
JS, Un CO n- right, overtly backing Iraqi ShiiteIslamists,from Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani
to radical Islamist parties such as the SupremeCouncil for Islamic Rev-
olution in Iraq and the Islamic Call (Al-Dawa), both of which are also
supported by Teheran'smullahs.
III
The vaunted clash of civilizations,that tectonic collision betweenthe
'West
and the Islamic world, if that's what it was, began inauspi-
'War
ciously. Amid the wreckage of \forld II, America stumbled willy-
nilly into the Middle East, into a world it knew little about. If the
United Statesmade mistakesin dealing with Islam in the secondhalf
of the twentieth century, it was in part becauseAmericans were so
profoundly ignorant about it.
Until r94r the Middle East, for young America, was a fearsome
and wonderful place,a fantasylandof sheikhsand harems,of turbaned
 .,,,,H'tsF.

.-...1*.' F€#*5#lllHffi.*

D s v rr' s Gaun

sultans,of obscenebath housesand seraglios,of desertoases,pyramids,

and the Holy Land. In early literature-novels, poems, travelogues-it
was a place of mystery and intrigue, inhabited by the unsavory and the
irreligious.Its peoplewere often portrayed as scimitar-waving',Mussul-
men" and "Mohammedans," uncivilized and uncouth. It was the land
of pirates and "Turks," a term that retains its pejorative connotation
today.
Sinceits appearancein r 869, Mark Twain's The rnnocentsAbroad
has come to symbolizea peculiarlyAmerican sort of naive blundering
overseas.Yet few realize that Twain, perhaps America's most acute
satiristand observer,usedthe book to describea months-longsojourn
in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It was hugely influential
among nineteenth-centuryu.s. readers.But Twain unfortunatelycon-
tributed to, and took advantageof, built-in prejudice against things
Islamic. Meandering through TurkeyoSyria, Lebanon, and palestine,
Twain seemsto be fairly holding his nose,marveling at the barbarism
he is surveying.Dwellings are "tastefully frescoedaloft and alow with
disks of camel dung placedthere to dry." Damascus("How they hate
a christian in Damascus!")is the "most fanaticalMohammedan pur-
gatory out of Arabia." He added: "The Damascenesare the ugliest,
wickedestlooking villains we have seen." comparing the Holy Land
to a classicalengravingof Nazareth,Twain wrote:

But in the engravingtherewas no desolation;no dirt; no rags;no

fleas;no ugly features;no soreeyes;no feastingflies;no besotted
ignorancein the countenances; no raw placeson the donkey's
backs;no disagreeable jabberingin unknown rongues;no stench
of camels;no suggestion that a coupleof tons of powder placed
underthe party and touchedoff would heightenthe effectand grve
to the scenea genuineinterestand charm which it would always
be pleasantto recall.

By the early twentieth century-with the advent of 'world 'war I,

the forced disintegration of the ortoman Empire, and the start of the
British-sponsored"Arab Awakening," led by the likes of winston
churchill, T. E. Lawrence("of Arabia"), and GertrudeBell-the mod-

- :.:l i ,r3 S f S , py r am ids ,
- "'.. :i. 1\elogues - it
. -: --r S . r v of yand t he
- ." -1 \ rllE
-: -,:.: 1\ 'Connot
e at ion
- the standard-issueAmerican idea of the Arab, along with its accom-
,. ..:':,tcents
Abroad
-. ' l :il..l'S mOSt acute
, ':' :-.::s-long
sojourn
:i :lgel)' rnfluential
-- . . , - -. (' r t L i l l . 1 [ e r y
-.,,,-^.-1,,
-: .*.-; eqainstthings
. -:r :r. and Palestine,
: r i .,.!rhe barbarism
: - . :: and alow with
. - .-: " Horv they hate
1.1'rammedanpur-
.,:r-:i .lre the ugliest,
- ,,: :,i rhe Holy Land
: ::: no r ags ;no
: - ..,n o bes ot t ed
. : :he donkey's
-:--;S: nO S t enCh
: ,s'der placed
- - : ::iect and give
- .:'.r.ouldalway s
* ::-t of World Var I,
-:. ..rJ the start of the
'Winston
,.:- likes of
:-::-.le Bell-the mod-
il
Introduction
ern Middle East had begunto intrude on the Americanconsciousness.
Still, it was filtered through a layer of romanticism and ignorance.
Lawrence'ssexuallycharged,desert-romanticaccounts,including his
r ' " ^^' r l- 'Wisdom,becameU.S. bestsellers,
as did oasis-
lvlulr)L famous SeuenPillars of
to-oasistraveloguesby various adventurers.For most Americans,the
Middle East was most memorably encapsulatedin film and song.
Rudolf Valentino's The Sheik (t9zr) embodiedwhat would become
panying rgzr song, "The Sheik of Araby," whose lyrics included the
vaguelythreatening:"At night, when you're asleep/ Into your tent I'll
creep." Its influence lasted decades.Benny Goodman recorded the
song in r.937,as did the Beatlesin t96z and Leon Redbonein t977'
L
^ ^U,n - Little if any professionalAmericanMiddle Eastexpertiseexistedin
'World
the years leading up to \Var II. From the nineteenth century
until well into the twentieth, pretty much the only Americanswho ven-
tured into the region were membersof a band of Protestantmissionar-
ies, educators,and doctors who took it upon themselvesto bring the
gospelsto the heathenmassesand to preach among the Christiansof
the Ottoman Empire,in Syriaand Lebanonespecially. Pioneerssuchas
Daniel Bliss,his son Howard Bliss,and the Dodge brothers(Reverend
David StuartDodge and \Tilliam Early Dodge),who built and ran Syr-
ian ProtestantCollege-renamed the AmericanUniversityof Beirut in
the rgzos-and Mary Eddy, a missionary'sdaughterwho founded a
clinic in Lebanon, alighted on the shores of the Ottoman Empire's
Arab provinces.The Blisses,Dodges, and Eddys would becomethe
parents, grandparents,and great-grandparentsof America's priest-
hood of "Arabists" who emergedafter'World'WarII.
IV
In :-945Franklin Delano Rooseveltwent east in searchof oil-and
found Islam. He conducted a fateful shipboard encounter with the
king of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud, and for the United States,it marked
the real staft of its political and military engagementwith the region.
Flushedwith victorv. the United Statesfound itself in the role of a
 ',,1i#{iil

,:ls#|i

.-_.*r;!fi=i :*i4ri:#lA&FF

D p v rr' s Geun

worldwide superpower.Its activism then was naive in the extreme-

endearinglyso for its partisans,and frighteningly so for others. The
post-\forld'v7ar II generationof U.S. leadersbelievedwholeheartedly
that the American spirit would conquer all, figurativelyspeaking-ot
if necessarSon the ground in real life. This was. after all. Henrv
Luce's"American Century."
The Middle East was then emergingas the most strategicallyvital
'west
area outside the industrial and Japan. Though it lacked exper-
tise,languageskills,and cultural familiarity with the region'scomplex
civilization,the united Stateswas calledto its imperial mission by the
very logic of its immensepower. In Norman Mailer's The Naked and
the Dead, General cummings presciently describedthe inexorable
growth of American power that would be unleashedby \7orld'v7ar II:

I like to call it a processof historicalenergy[saysCummings].

Therearecountriesrharhavelarentpowers,latentresources, they
are full of potential energy,so ro speak.. . . As kinetic energya
country is organization,coordinatedeffort. . . . Historically, the
purposeof this rvaris to translateAmerica'spotentialenergyinto
kinetic energy.. . . \(hen you've createdpower,materials,armies,
they don't wither of their own accord.our vacuumas a nation is
filledwith released power,and I can tell you that we're out of the
backwatersof historv now.

But as America's energy flowed into the Islamic world, the united
states began its long-running engagementwith little or no compre-
hensionof the forcesir was dealingwith.
Until after the second world \Var, Middle East studies in the
united states were virtually nonexistenror relegatedto a subsetof
theology. Partly sponsored by the government, centers for Middle
Eastern affairs began springing up after 1947, when princeton uni-
versity createdthe first Near East cenrer in the united States.But it
would be many yearsbefore the United Stateswould have a cadre of
academicexperts who had a grasp of Islamic politics, currure, and
religion.
From FDR on, leading u.S. politicians were prisoners of mis-
guided srereotypes.They seemed entranced bv the almost other-

:- :ite extreme-
:': others.The
- ,.:,rleheartedly
, :re .rking-or,
.-i:r itll, Henry
" .,:.,-:e
gicallyvital
.. : :cked exper-
r -::lilll S COmPIex
- . ::rrssion
by the
,'.' \ , t k ed and
:-. l l i t nex or abie
- -', \\'or ld W ar I I :
. . ,l nr r r ings l.
: ) .l raeSt.hey
':: i eller $f a
': :L cellr ' ,t he
r. iller g Y lnto
: i ,1i S. illtTl1€S,
-. i , 1 n a t i o n is
: : : ' ()L i t O f t h e
, :1.1.the United
- - r)f nO Compre-
,.: studiesin the
.:,1 to a subsetof
for Middle
:r-.tc'rS
'::-. PrincetonUni-
" :..J Srates.But it
- : ir.rvea cadre of
::-s. culture, and
:oners of mis-
elmost other-
t
Introduction
worldly appearanceof their Arab interlocutors.FDR, after meeting
Ibn Saud,returned to'Washingtonand "could not shakethe image of
the hawk-like Saudi monarch, ensconcedin a gold chair and sur-
rounded by six slaves."Harry Truman, two years later, describeda
leadingSaudiofficial as a "real old biblical Arab with chin whiskers'a
white gown, gold braid, and everything." And Eisenhowerdismissed
,,a very uncerrain quanrity, explosiveand full of preju-
the Arabs as
dices.,,The official record is full of such uninformed stereotypingof
Arabs and Muslims by u.S. officials. For the next sixty years, the
handful of American Arabists who actually knew something about
the Middle East would try to combat those stereotypes.But they
would fail.
V
The American attachment to a romantici zed fantasyof Arab life and a
racist-fed, religious disdain for the Arabs' supposed heathenism
proved a deadly combination when the time came for America to
engageitself politically and militarily in the Middle East. Perhaps
thosestereotypesled American policy makersto seeMuslims as fierce
warriors. Perhapsthey believedthat the fanaticism of their religious
renetswould lead them ro resistatheisticcommunism.Perhapsit was
the notion that in southwestAsia the traditional religious establish-
menr was a bulwark of the status quo. But it never dawned on u.s.
officials that Islamist organizationssuch as the Muslim Brotherhood
wefe a qualitatively different phenomenonfrom the comprador cleri-
'Vfar
cal establishment.Certainly, as the Cold progressed,the big
enemy, the uSSR, and its alleged accomplice, Arab nationalism,
seemedto have a common enemy:Islam.
In someways, the cold war itself beganin the Middle East.Presi-
dent Harry Truman proclaimed u.S. responsibility for Greece and
Turkey, replacingGreat Britain in that role, in 1947, and confronted
the soviet Union in northern Iran's Azerbaijan. England's imperial
presencewas shrinking: London abandonedGreeceand Turkey, then
India and Palestine,and the retreat was on-with only the United
 .,.:-+.:r*ii"

ro . Drvrr's GauE

States to fill the vacuum, an allegedly tempting target for Soviet

expansion. (Later scholarship would show that neither Stalin nor
Khrushchevhad either the intention or the caoabilitv to seizecontrol
of the PersianGulf and the Middle East.)
The strategicimportance of the Middle East was obvious to all: it
was (and is) the indispensablesourceof energyfor America'salliesin
Europe and Japan. At the time, the United Statesdid not depend on
the Persian Gulf for oil, relying instead on Venezuelaand Texas,
Louisiana,and Oklahoma. But Europe and Japan desperatelyneeded
the Gulf for day-to-daysurvival.It is no exaggerationto say that U.S.
'Western
strategistsrcahzedthat the defenseof Europe was inconceiv-
able without a parallel plan to control the Gulf. Despite important
internal tensionsamong the'Westernpowers, they forged a seriesof
alliances in the region: NATO, the abortive Middle East Defense
Organization, the Baghdad Pact, CENTO-all directed against the i \l.'

USSR.More quietly \Tashingtbn and London supported the Islamic

right against the left in country after country and encouragedthe
emergenceof an "Islamic bloc."
For those who knew little about the religion and culture of the
Middle East-presidents, secretariesof state, CIA directors-the
Islamic right seemedlike a sensiblehorse to ride. They could identify
with people inspired by deep religious belief, even if the religion was
an alien one. In their searchfor tactical allies,Islam seemedlike a bet-
ter bet than secularism,sincethe left-wing secularistswere viewed as
cats'-paws for Moscow, and the centrist ones were dangerously
opposedto the region'smonarchiesand traditional elites.In the after-
'World'War
math of II, the list of nations ruled by kings included not
only SaudiArabia and Jordan, but Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and Libya.
By the r95os, the military-intellectualcomplex of Middle East
studies was up and running in many U.S. universities,producing
Arabists and Orientalists who were called on by policy makers for
advice in grappling with the region'scomplexities.The CIA and the
StateDepartment gobbled up Ivy Leaguegraduateswho spoke Ara-
bic, Turkish, Farsi, Urdu, and other Middle East languages,and a
core of U.S. government Arabists emergedwith at least a working
understanding of the region. Yet, by their own testimony, few of them
 Introduction II

' : So vi et learnedmuch about Islam or Islamism,concentratinginsteadon the

. - ': ,,.,tn n o r nuts-and-boltseconomicand political questions.Most of the Arabists
-: : were secularists,and did not have much sympathy for fundamentalist
-t lllt f O l
Islam. Many, in fact, insteadsympathizedbroadly with Arab nation-
- :'. .rll:it alism. Many of them saw Islam as the bygonesymbol of a past era.
"-,.,..Lresin As the Cold'War unfolded, however,State Department and CIA
- -: :-l l d O n officerswho sided with Arab nationalism were increasinglyignored.
I : . - : Ta \a s , Their views were attackedby Cold'Warriors,and by the supportersof
' - : te e d e d Israel, who were determined to undermine anyone who considered
::'.-..i
u.s. himself or herself "pro-Arab." By the r97os, the very term Arabist
- - - ' ncel\'- had become indelibly tainted. Sincethen, pro-Zionist activistshave
- l- l,rftlllt piled on, waging an ideologicalblitzkrieg againstthose Arabists who
:-, -: l leS O f remained in government or academia.Robert D. Kaplan's tenden-
- : -. l-fense tious 1993 book, The Arabists: Romance of an American Elite,
. . : , : : : lS t marked the high point of this effort. Ever sinceits publication, attack-
i th e

-
' : I > lamic rng Arabists has becomea cottageindustry.Virtually all of them were
-::.d the ercluded from prewar planning on Iraq. To a man, most Arabists
\\.erestrongly opposed to the preemptive war. But by excluding them,
,,.:- r)f rhe the Bush administration guaranteedthat planning for the war would
-:-:'rs-the be carried out by know-nothings.
: . l o . r i f-'

- - :t(l n w as
VI
:- i e a b e t-
: -: :-ff'ed aS Somemay argue that the United Statescreatedneither Islam nor its
"
: ,:-:'iL-fOUSIy fundamentalistvariant, and that is true. But here we need to consider
. '. :re a fte r - an extendedanalogywith America'sChristian right.
-- .rd ed n o t Conservative and evangelisticChristians have been present in
Largenumbersin America sincethe colonial era. But in another sense'
'. 1. :d l e Eas t rhe emergenceof the Christian right in the United Statescan be dated
-. : ro d u ci n g ro the late r97os, with the formation of the Rev. Timothy LaHaye's
:r,r kers for California allianceof churches,the creation of the Moral Majority by
- \ a n d the LaHave and Jerry Falwell, and the role of those two men and others
. : rrke Ara- :n rhe rise of the Council on National Policy,the Christian Coalition,
. . : - : a s. a n d a -lnd organizations like Pat Robertson's broadcast empire and Dr.
.: ..i ri'orking T-rmes Dobson'sFocus on the Family. Until then, conservativeChris-
::'"\' of them ::-rns\\'erea politically inchoateforce. Relentlesslyorganizedover the

t
 ,..''.ij!;.anB

tz . Dn v t r 's Gel.e

past three decades,they have become a self-conscious.politicallv

powerful movement.
The same is true for the Islamic right. The reactionary tendency
within Islam goesback thirteen centuries.From Islam,searliesryears,
obscurantists,anti-rationalists,and Koran literalists competed with
more enlightened,progressive,and moderate tendencies.In more
recent times, Muslim reactionarieshave been a drag on moderniza-
tion, opposing progressiveeducation,liberalization, and human rights.
But it wasn't until the creation of the pan-Islamicmovemenrof
Jamal
Eddine al-Afghani in the late r8oos, the founding of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt by Hassan al-Bannain .9zg,and the crearion
of Abul-Ala Mawdudi's Islamic Group in pakistan in r94o that the
Islamic right had its LaHayes,its Falwells,and its Robertsons.Those
early Islamistssharpenedthe culture wars in the Middle East just as
their christian right counterpartsdid in the United States,and for the
samereasons.
Just as the christian right found support from wealthy right-wing
donors, especiallyoil men from Texas and the Midwest, the Islamic
right won financial supporr from wealthy oil men, too-namely, the
royal families atop Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. And just as the chris-
tian right formed a politically convenient alriance with right-wing
Republicans,rhe Islamic right establisheda similar understanding
with America's right-wing foreign policy strategists.In facr, supporr
for the christian right and the Islamic right converged neatly during
the Reaganadministration,which eagerlysought allianceswith both. so
blinded were someAmericans by the cold \far that militant christian-
right activistsand fervent zionistpartisans of Israercheerily supported
Islamistfanaticsin Afghanistan.
The analogy betweenchristian and Islamic fundamentalistsholds
in other areas, too. Both exhibit an absorute certainty about their
beliefsand they tolerate no dissent,condemning aposrares,unbelievers,
and freethinkers to perdition. Both berievein a unity of religion and
politics, the former insisting that America is a "christian nation,', the
latter that Muslims need to be ruled either by an all-powerful, religio-
political caliphate or by a system of "Isramic republics" under an
ultra-orthodox version of Islamic law (sharia).And both encourasea

'.,-,,.rs. politically
-:,-.. ,rlJfv tendenc y
- - :r- ) aarliestyears,
- -:' ::-.aies. In more
--,: rn moderniza-
- -.::-:humanrights.
. nt of Jamal
'- -:lerhe Muslim
- threat to the safetyand securityof Americansposedby Al
- -'. .,:rJrhe creation
. -- " :r r9+o that rhe
- -- . r;rrsons.Those
'' , '.1 ::le East
iust as
-r - -t.:-tr:.and fOr the
- :.:hr right-wing
- ' -.r. rhe Islamic
.--. : )-namely, the
' -- ...r .l( rhe Chris-
' '- ','.rrh right-wing
- many as 5'ooo operativesin America. None of the many hundredsof
,r: Lrnderstanding
_- . Ir fact, support
- : ::i neatlyduring
- , -.:J-s \\-ithboth. So
' - . : ::::.tr.rntchristian-
-.,r
-: :.rilv supported
-..: :.rlentalists holds
- . -: , rr\ rbout their
,: .:-r:es.unbelievers,
. ..--:', of religionand
-: >:L.tn nationr" the
- , -:,ru'erful, religio-
- :::,-i.ltcs" under an
-' * :rrth encouragea
rn
Introductictn r3
blind fanaticism among their followers. It's no accidenrthat among
followers of both christian and Islamic fundamentalism,the world
indeedappearsto be engagedin a clashof civilizations.
VII
A war on terrorism is preciselythe wrong way to deal with the chal-
lengeposed by political Islam.
That challenge comes in two forms. First, there is the specific
eaerta; and
second,there is a far broader political problem createdby the growth
of the Islamic right in the Middle East and South Asia.
In regard to Al Qaeda,the Bush administrationhas wilrfully exag-
gerated the size of the threat it represents.It is not an all-powerful
organization.It cannot destroy or conquer America, and it does not
pose an existentialthreat to the United states.It can kill Americans,
but it has never had accessto weapons of mass destruction, and it
almost certainly neverwill. It doesnot possesslarge numbers of cells,
assets,or agentsinsidethe united States,although after
9lr r the u.s.
attorney general made the unfounded charge that Al
eaeda had as
Muslims arrestedor detained after glrr were found to have terrorist
connections.In three and a half yearsafter 9lt.., not a singleviolent
act by Al Qaeda-or any other Islamic terrorisr group-occurred in
the united States:no hijackings,no bombings, not even a shot fired.
No ties were ever proved linking Al eaeda to Iraq-or ro any orher
state in the Muslim world: not to Syria, not to saudi Arabia, nor ro
Iran. In shorr, the threat from Al Qaeda is a manageableone.
using the u.s. military in conventionalwar mode is not the way ro
attack Al Qaeda, which is primarily a problem for intelligenceand
law enforcemenr.The war in Afghanisranwas wrongheaded:It failed
to destroy Al Qaeda's leadership,it failed ro destroy the Taliban,
n'hich scattered,and it failed to stabilizethat war-torn nation more
than temporarilS creatinga weak central governmentat the mercy of
n'arlords and former Taliban gangs.\7orse, the war in Iraq was not
onlv misguidedand unnecessary, but it was aimed at a narion that had
 --+-*rb

r1 D rvrr' s Gel .r

absolutelyno links to bin Laden'sgang-as if, said an observer,FDR

had attacked Mexico in responseto pearl Harbor. The ham-handed
use of the armed forcesagainsta nonstateactor like Al
eaeda is use-
lessand self-defeating.Like some grotesqueancient legend,for every
head lopped off by laser-guidedmissiles,Marine-ledraids into Islamist
redoubts,Israeli gunship attacks on Hamas and Hezbollah enclaves,
and cruise missile aftacks on remote strongholds,three new heads
grow in its place. Bur becausethe Afghan and Iraq wars fit nicely with
the Bush administration'sbroader policy of empire building and pre-
emptive war, and becausethey allowed the United states to consrrucr
a vast political-military enterprisestretching from East Africa deep
into central Asia, those two wars went forward. A problem that
could have been dealt with surgically-using commandosand special
Forces,aided by tough-mindeddiplomacy indictmentsand legal action,
concertedinternational..efforts, and judicious self-defense
measures-
was vastly inflated by the Bush adminisrration.
Still, Al Qaeda can be defeated.
'fhe larger problem, that
of the growing strengthof Islamic funda-
mentalismin the Middle East and Asia, is far more complicated.
NaturallS the first problem is related to the second.unless the
Islamic right is stopped,it is possiblethat Al
eaeda could resuscirare
itself. or, as in Iraq after the u.S. invasion,new Al
eaeda-style orga-
nizations might emerge by drawing on anti-American anger and
resentment.or, one of the other Islamic-rightterrorist groups,such as
Hamas or Hezbollah, might metastasizefrom a group with a mostly
local focus to one with larger,international ambitions. The violence-
prone and terrorism-inclinedgroups in the Middle East draw finan-
cial support, theological justification, and legions of recruits from
among the more establishedIslamic fundamentalistinstitutions thar
have sprung up in the past three decadesin virtually every Muslim
country. Like a kettle of water boiling on a stove,out of which only a
small volume of steamsteadilyescapesinto the air, in the Middle East
the forces associatedwith political Islam are kept simmering. out of
it' a steadystream of radicals is constantly emitted-extremists who
are immediately absorbed by one of the already existing rerrorist
groups.
 Introduction . ri

- . :. * .:: ,rbserver,FDR So what can the United Statesdo ro turn down the heat?To lower
the political temperatureunderneaththe Islamistmovement?
- " : {- Qaedais use- First, the United Statesmust do what it can ro remove the griev-
- : -' :ie rtd, for every ancesthat causeangry Muslims to seek solacein organizationslike
- :, ;. into Islamist the Muslim Brotherhood. Not all of thesegrievances,of course, are
causedby the United States,and not all of them can be sofrenedor
ameliorated by U.S. acions. At the very least, however, the United
- " - ,.---:sfit nicely with Statescan take important steps that can weaken the ability of the
:- '. ::riding and pre- Islamic right to harvesrrecruirs. By joining with the UN, the Euro-
. - -: - ' :-:.:aS tO COn StfUCt peans,and Russia,the United states can help settle the Palestinian-
': '- " i,:st Africa deep Israeliconflict in a manner that guaranteesjusticefor the palestinians:
--- \ problem that an independentstate that is geographicallyand economicallyviable,
_ _. ____ : .-r crecial
I s(,) dr t u J[ tied to the withdrawal of illegal Israeli serlemenrs,an Israeli return
- .' " -- i:J legalaction, roughly to its t967 borders, and a stable and equitable division of
- *: l:1S e me asUfes- Jerusalem.That, more than any other action, would remove a global
casusbelli for the Islamic right.
Second,the United Statesmust abandon its imperial pretensionsin
- : lslamicfunda- the Middle East.That will require the withdrawal of u.s. forcesfrom
-: Afghanistan and Iraq, the dismantling of U.S. military basesin the
- :rplicated.
: ,rd. Unlessthe PersianGulf and facilities in Saudi Arabia, and a sharp reduction in
..uld resuscitate the visibility of the U.S. Navy, military training missions,and arms
l---eda-styleorga- sales.Many U.S. diplomats who lave worked in the region know that
::-'.ln anger and the provocative U.S. presencein the Middle East fuels anger and
): groups,suchas resentment.The united Stateshas no claim to either the persian Gulf
,-: n'ith a mostly or the Middle East,whose future economicties and political relation-
:... The violence- shipscan and must be determinedsolely by the leadersof the region's
Elst draw finan- states,evenif it redoundsto the detriment of U.S. inrer:ests.
.i recruits from Third, the United Statesmust refrain from seekingto impose its
: -nsritutionsthat preferenceson the region. Since zoor, the United Stateshas done
...r' er-eryMuslim incalculabledamage by demanding that the "grearer Middle East"
r: of rvhich only a conform to American visions of democracy.To be sure, for the more
.: rhe Middle East radical idealistsin the Bush administration,Bush'scall for democracy
::rmering.Out of in the Arab world and Iran is seenprimarily as a prerext for more
-ertremists who intrusive u.S. involvement in the region. Even taken at face value,

- xrsting terrorist however,the initiative ignoresthe fact that the nations of the Middle
Eastmust find democracyat their own paceand in their own time. An

rn
 I6 D n v r r 's GettE

obsessivedrive for democratic reform in the region is self-defeating

and insulting to the statesand peoplesof the Middle East. Some of
those statesmay be ready for reform, and some may not. Democratic
changesthat end up empoweringthe Islamic right and catapultingthe
Muslim Brotherhood to power in Cairo, Damascus, Riyadh, or
Algiers will not servetheir intended purpose. They will only deliver
additional statesinto the hands of the Islamists.The United States
should adopt a hands-offpolicy in connectionwith democracyin the
Islamic world.
And fourth, the United States must abandon its propensity to
make bellicosethreats directedat nations in the Middle East, includ-
ing those-such as Iran and Sudan-that are still under Islamist rule.
The wave of Islamism may not yet have crested.Other nations may
succumbto its tide before it recedes,sinceit is a force that has gath-
ered momentum for decades.But the United Statesmust get used to
the fact that threatsof force and imperial-soundingdiktats strengthen
Islamism.They do not diminish it.
The true emancipationof the Middle East will require action by
the secularforces in the region to uplift, educate'and modernizethe
outlook of peoplewho have beencaptured by Islamism.It is an effort
that will take decades,but it must begin now. There is nothing about
Islam that requires it to remain mired in the seventh-centurybelief
that the Koran must govern the world of politics, education,science,
and culture. It means changing a culture that allows millions of
deluded Muslims to think that back-to-basicsfundamentalismis some-
how an appropriateanswerto twenty-first-centuryproblemsand con-
cerns. Fundamentalism,whether it takes the form of Islamism, or
whether it appearsin the form of America'sChristian right or Israel's
ultra-Orthodox settler movement, is always a reactionary force. In
the Muslim world, a rational division of the secularand the divine is
far from unheard of. Tensof millions of Muslims are able to separate
their religious beliefs,held privatelS from their politics, just as mil-
lions of Muslims, Christians,and Jews do in the United States.It is
they-the true silent majority-who must seize the initiative from
the fundamentalists.They may ask for, and should receive'support
 Introduction r7

- : iI l' at ln $ from civil society in the West: from NGOs and universities,from
.: \ i t llle of researchcentersand think tanks, and more.
: :l-;tiC f t1tlC The peoplesof the Middle East must engagenot only in nation
: ,: :L n gt he building but in "religion building." As the hothousetemperaturesin
:.:'. or Middle East political discourseare lowered, Muslim religious schol-
--..1h.
Jeliver ars, philosophers,and social scientistscan come together in a great
::: States debate to hammer out a twenty-first-century vision of a tolerant,
--.,-'. in the modern Islam, to createa new culture no longer held hostageby self-
dealing mullahs and ayatollahs.A consensuscan emergeorganically
in the Muslim world that reinterpretsancienttexts and traditions in a
manner appropriate to an enlightenedworld outlook, and then that
consensusmust find its way into everynook and cranny,beginningin
the major cities-Istanbul, Cairo, Baghdad, Karachi, Jakarta-and
spreadingto every village and mosque. It will mean reforming the
educationalcurriculum in the Muslim world, deemphasizingreligious
universitiesand so-calledmadrassasin favor of modern education.It
will require new mass-mediaoutlets in placeswhere they can flourish,
-: '.Jl l on by and the use of radio, satellite television, and the Internet to reach
-' :.:n i ze t he placeswhere they cannot. All this will take many years. It cannot
. :n e f f or t occur unlessthe armed conflicts that roil the region are ended, and
- ::-..a gabout unlesseconomicconditions move steadilyupward. Religion building,
- : :-: ,trl belief like nation building, can take a long, long time.
. :,. sci enc e,
- : :::i l i o n s of
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 IM PERIAL PAN- ISLAM

IN r 8 8 5, EXACTLv one hundred years before officials of the

Reagan administration made a secret initiative toward Ayatollah
Khomeini's rran, a century before the united Statesspent billions of
dollars in support of an anti-sovietjihad in Afghanistanled by Islamic
fundamentalistmujahideen,a peripateticPersian-Afghanactivist met
in London with British intelligence and foreign policy officials to put
forward a controversialidea. would Britain, he wondered,be inter-
estedin organizinga pan-Islamicallianceamong Egypt, Turkey, per-
sia, and AfghanistanagainstczarisrRussia?1
It was the era of the Great Game, the long-running imperial struggle
between Russia and England for conrrol of central Asia. The British,
owners of India, had seizedconrrol of Egypt in r88r. Turkey,sOtto-
man Empire-which included, among other lands, what is now Iraq,
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states-was
wobbly, too, and important piecesof it were up for grabs, although the
final dismantling of Turkey's holdings would await \World'War I. The
biggest imperial land rush in history was under way in Africa and
southwestAsia. And the British, mastersof manipulating tribal, ethnic,
and religiousaffiliarions,experrat settingminoritiesar one anorher's

*
 2"o . D E v r r 's GeuE

throats for the greater good of Her Majesty's realm, were intrigued
with the idea of fostering a spirit of Islamic revivalism-if it could serve
their purposes.Both Russiaand Francehad the sameidea, but it was
the British, with their tens of millions of Muslim subjectsin rhe greater
Middle Eastand SouthAsia, who had the advanrage.
The man who, in 1885, proposedthe idea of a British-ledpan-
Islamic alliancewas Jamal Eddine al-Afghani. From the rgTos to the
r89os, Afghani was supported by the United Kingdom, and at least
once, the record shows-in r882, in India, according to a secretfile
of the Indian government's intelligence service-Afghani officially
offered to go ro Egypt as an agentof British intelligence.2
Afghani, the founder of pan-Islam, is the great-great-grandfatherof
osama bin Laden-not biologically,but in ideologicalterms.'werewe
to constructa biblical genealogyof right-wing Islamism,it would read
like this: Afghani G838;t897) begat Mohammed Abduh
GB+S-
r905)' an Egyptian pan-Islamicactivist who was Afghani's chief dis-
ciple and who helped spread Afghani's message.Abduh begat
Mohammed Rashid Rida (r865-r935), a Syrian discipleof Abduh's,
who moved to Egypt and founded a magazine,The Lighthouse, to
advocateAbduh's ideas in support of a systemof Islamic republics.
Rashid Rida begat Hassan al-Banna (19o6-1949), who learned
Islamism from Rashid Rida's The Lighthouse, and who founded the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in .'928. Banna begat many offspring.
Among them were his son-in-law,said Ramadan,the Muslim Brother-
hood's international organizer,whose headquarterswere in switzer-
land, and Abul-Ala Mawdudi, the founder of the Islamic Group in
Pakistan,the first Islamistpolitical party, who was inspiredby Banna's
work. Banna'sother heirs set up branchesof the Brotherhoodin every
Muslim state,in Europe,and in the united states.Another of Banna's
offspring, a Saudi who took part in America's Afghan jihad, was Al
Qaeda'sOsama bin Laden, the family's blackestsheep.
In the half century betweenr875 and t9z5,the building blocks of
the Islamic right were cementedin place by the British empire. Afghani
createdthe intellectual foundation for a pan-Islamic movement-with
British paffonage and the support of England'sleading orientalist,
E. G. Browne. Abduh, Afghani'schief disciple,founded.with the help
 Imperial Pan-Islam zt

, ::.- inrrigued
- : ,iruld serve
-.-,.. il,rt lt was
. : :hc greater
:-:.r-ledpan-
-:.i-istothe
*'. ..-:rJ.rt least
- . ,--s.cret file
.-,:: officially
- Brotherhood,which dominatedthe Islamicright throughout the rwen-
-t
of London's Egyptian proconsul, Evelyn Baring Lord Cromer, the
Salafiyyamovemenr,the radical-right, back-to-basicsfundamentalist
current that still exists today. To understand the proper role of
Afghani and Abduh, ir is imporranrro seerhem as experimenrsin a
century-long British effort to organizea pro-British pan-Islamic move-
ment. Afghani, a quixotic and slippery ally, shopped his servicesto
other imperial powers, and ultimately his mysrical, semi-modernist
version of fundamentalistIslam failed ro rise to rhe level of a mass
movement.Abduh, his chief disciple,attachedhimself more firmly to
the British rulers of Egypt and createdthe cornerstoneof the Muslim

--- .,:Jf.rtherof tieth century. The British backed Abduh even as they launchedtwo
.:rrl'.:.\\'erewe other pre-'world war I schemesto mobilize Islamic fervor. In the
- . : .,'.rruldread Arabian Peninsula, the British helped a desert band of ultra-
j --,.t1 tg49_ fundamentalistArabs, led by the family of Ibn Saud,createthe world's
-,: '.;hief dis- first Islamic fundamentaliststate in Saudi Arabia. At the same time,
-.-:.rh begat they encouragedthe Hashemites of Mecca, a second Arabian family
. : : \L'rduh's, with a spurious claim to be descendedfrom the original prophet of
Islam,whose sonsLondon installedas kings of Iraq and Jordan.
-,':i:,tttse,to
':' :epublics. originally, the Hashemires,as guardiansof the Arabian holy cities
-
, : , learned of Mecca and Medina, were supposedto have assumedthe leadership
' :nded the of the entire Muslim world, with the idea of establishinga pro-British
- '.' .. \,ffspring. caliphateto replacethe faltering one in Turkey.That plan never quire
, .- .::i Brother- came together,but a parallel one did. From the rgzos on, the new
'$Tahhabi
: '- r:1Switzer- Saudi state merged its orthodoxy with the Salafiyya,now
::'- Gr oup in organizedinto the Muslim Brotherhood-and the resurgenceof Islam
-:: lr Banna's was under way.
: -t ,,rdin every It was Afghani, however,who startedit all. Like many of his prog-
" :r of Banna's eny, Afghani made common causewith the imperial powers as they
' .::d. rvasAl competed for influence over the vast swath of territory between east
Africa and china. Years after his death, many-but not all-of his
:.:g blocksof biographersand chroniclers have painted him as a believer,consis-
:rre. Afghani tently advocatinga renaissanceof Islam; as an anti-imperialist,thun-
.:-:nent-with dering againstthe great powers; and as a liberal reformer,seekingto
. Orientalist, blend medievalIslam with the scientificrationalism of the Enlighten-
r rrh rhe help ment. while elemenrsof all this are presentin Afghani'scareer,he was

m
 z2 D E vrr' s Geur

aboveall a political magicianwho invoked religion

for temporal ends, In facr.
and who was ar onceally, errand boy, and tool of
the imperiarpowers. Afghanr
Although Afghani rarely missedan opportunity to
offer his services,in religion.
serial fashion, to the British, to the French,and
to the Russians,and
servedas an agent for all rhree, his followers-Abduh
especially- R.l -
becameincreasinglyAnglophilic.
.111t l
Born in r838, apparently in persia,
Jamal Eddine adopted the [..i.'. ,
name "al-Afghani" in order to createthe impression illta
that he was born
in Afghanistan' By claiming Afghan origins, Afghani \\ l:
could disguise
his identity as both a persian and a Shiite, the
minority branch of
Islam, thus giving him a broader appeal in the Hi i \ \ r" , r l
mostly Sunni Muslim
.,. i .-
world. Lying about his place of birth was just Afghani's .111!1 --. :
first dissimu-
lation' According to Elie Kedourie, a leading t , -, >
British orientarist,
Afghani's followers (including Abduh and Rashid L:: ,.-.
Rida) ,,practiced
economy of trurh'"3 Throughout his life, Afghani -:.,t : . r:
dissembled.
Although he is rightly credired with having developed :.. -'--,
the theoretical -
basis for a pan-Islamicpolitical and social movement
spanning the
entire Muslim world, he was a heterodox thinker
who was a F-ree_
mason, a mystic, a political operative,and, above
all, someonewho
believed,as Kedouriewrote, in the "sociarutility
of rerigion.,,aAfghani
treated religion as a tool. He was outwardly pious,
constructing a
detailedschemefor a politics governed by the pared-down,
seventh-
century version of the simple Muslim societyof
Mecca during the era
of the Prophet' But in his more esorericwriring,
Afghani was explicit
about his beliefs:

'we
do not cur the headof religionexceptwith the sword
of reri-
gion.Therefore,if you wereto seeus no% you
would seeascerlcs
and worshippers,kneeling and genufiectrng,never
disobeying
God'scommandsand doingall that they areordered
to do..,

Noted Kedourie: "This letter makes absolutery

clear that one of
Afghani's aims-of which his discipreAbduh
knew and approved-
was the subversion of the Islamic religion,
and that the method
adopted to this end was the practiceof a false
but showy devorion.,,6
 Imperial Pan-Isldm )1

: :::uloral ends, In fact, although he preached Islamic orthodoxy ro rhe masses,

- t::r.rl powers. Afghani was a closetatheistwho railed againstnot only Islam, but all
- I : r:rr S erViCe S,in
religions,to more esotericgroups of listeners:
' - . i.
-r:sians,and
- - rspecially- Religions[wroteAfghani],whateverthey arecalled,resembleone
another.No understandingand no reconciliationis possible
- - ": :dopted the betweenthesereligionsand philosophy.Religionirnposes its faith
- : -.,: 1a u'asborn and its creedon man, while philosophyliberateshim from them
whollyor in part.
, .ild disguise
:'. L.ranchof
Howeveq Afghani concluded:"[But] reasondoes not pleasethe mass
.- .-::.rrliMuslim
and its teachingsare understood only by a few choice spirits."TThe
. :,:sr dissimu-
elitism of this passageis an essentialpart of Afghani's mysrique.
.-:.1 f)rientalist,
Throughout his life, Afghani had one messagefor the "mass" and
- :,t " practiced
another for the "choice spirits": for the masses,pan-lslam; for the
-:- rr:theoretical elite, an eclecticbrand of philosophy.And while he posed as an anti-
imperialistwhen it suitedhis purposes,Afghani and thosein his inner
t n n i no th c
circle engagedin conspiratorial alliancewith those very imperialists.
',i'as a Free-
Many historians, however, take the Afghani story at face value:
: : ,:lleone WhO
that as an Islamic activist,he helpedto createa movementthat would
-
- :r."r Afghani
restoreIslam to its former glory, to recapturethe pristine,golden days
. - . t r r.r. c*-t .i no
'.'t'* e
of the Prophet'srule in Mecca and Medina. Much conventionalwis-
- : - '-, i vl l . S ev ent h-
dom portrays Afghani as a crusader.. against imperialism, and as a
-- . : .:i l n g t he er a
reformer who soughtto bring enlightenmentand rationalismto a fog-
- - ' . : :-:ri '.rsex plic it
bound Islamic intellectual tradition controlled by a stodgy clergy.
Sadly,that is the view propounded by some of the leading Anglo-
American Orientalists.H. A. R. Gibb, aurhor of the classicModern
:; oi reli-
Trends in Islam (tg+Z), wrote that Afghani believedin a state gov-
_ ::; .1 \LCL tL 5

-
erned by "sound Koranic orthodoxy"8 mixed with a modernisticout-
l )lt ne\ ' l n g
: i, ).
look, while Wilfred Cantwell Smith called Afghani "the complete
Muslim of his time." In his landmark work, Islam in Modern History,
Smith wrote breathlesslyabout Afghani's allegedanti-imperialism:
-,: :h:rt one of
.-J approved-
He [Afghani] saw the Westas somethingprimarilv to be resisted,
-'.: rhe method
because it threatenedIslamand the community.. . .He was vigor-
',.'. devotion."6
ousin incitinghis Muslim hearersto developreasonand rechnology

F
 2-4 [)r vrr,' s Geur-

asthe \X/estwas doing,in order to be strong.. . . Indeed,this urging

to action, from a non-responsiblequietude to a self-directing
determinatioll,was carriedfurther into an almostirrepressible or
effervescentdynamism.e
,{fo h r n i 'r ^:'
knou,n .rL.'. .
Smith wrote admiringly of Afghani that
\ foh.
.^^tf,.*',I t. t. -

geographically, his career encompassed Iran, India, the Arab did so r i l- .

world, and Turkey.as well as the EuropeanWest.He was both onlviur r '.
Sufi and Sunni.He preacheda reconciliationwith the Shiah.He oclvsser .
united with traditional Islamic scholarshipa familiarit_vwith Evcn : : . - -
Europe and an acquaintancewith its modern thought.. . . He
Br it ish- 1c. . ,
inspiredpoliticalrevolutionariesand venerable scholars.He advo- , )r( Cl_ l
catedboth local nationalisms and pan-Islam.A very greatdealof
, 1li- c'rp:- : - . : : - - -
subsequent Islamicdevelopment is adumbratecl in his personality
r,. -l -
and career.In fact, thereis very little in trventieth-centuryIslam ILLINC\. .'.

not foreshador'vedin Afghani.r0

Correctly,Smith added that Afghani was "the first Muslim revivalist

to use the concepts'Islam' and 'the \7est' as connoting antagonistic
historicalphenomena."lrThat makesAfghani the true originator of
the concept of a clash of civilizations,as popularized a century later
by Bernard Lewis and SamuelHuntington.
\WhetherAfghani was) as Smith maintains, irrepressiblydynamic
or merely opportunistic, there is no question about his role as god-
father to the Muslim Brotherhood and similar groups on the Islamic
right. The devout and militant Brothers of today would no doubt be
shockedto learn that their inspirational forerunnerJamal Eddine al-
Afghani was an atheist and a Freemason.Nonetheless,Richard P.
Mitchell, whose book The Societyof the Muslim Brothers is the defin-
itive work on the organization,observedthat the pedigreefor the mil-
itant, terrorist organization that rose to prominence in Egypt after
\World\Var II goesdirectly back to Afghani. "The Brotherssaw them-
selvesclearly in the line of the modern reform movement identified
rvith the namesof Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Mohammed Abduh, and
Rashid Rida," he wrote. "Towards Afghani the Brothersfelt a special
kinship. Many felt him to be the 'spiritual father' of the moverrrent
and to him Banna was most often compared."12
 l n r p t 'r r a l P d r t - l s l a m ' zi

, : : 11SUrg l n g
j-.lirecting
. ATcHANI AND HIS FoLLowERs
: -:.si b l e or
Afghani'spublic life beganin r869, when he left Afghanistan.Little is
known about his life beforethat. He claimed to have beeninvolved in
Afghan politics in the r86os, and according to a leading scholar he
.::rc A r ir b did so while actingas a Russianagent.r3But his lastingimpact began
-: . '.'.rs b ot h only in 1869, when he undertook a rernarkable,quarter-century-long
, t:'.r.rh .He odyssey.
' ,.-.r\ ivith Even in brief outline, it is dizzying. He r'ventfirst to India, whose
-::,...H e British-ledcolonial authoritieswelcomedthe Islamicscholarwith hon-
-, He a dv o-
ors, graciouslyescortinghim aboard a government-ownedvesselon an
- -. -'-:.ler-rlclf all-expenses-paid voyage to Suez.After visiting Cairo, he traveledto
' :':-:rl n lllit y
'.:-.-r Islam Turkey, where his unorthodox religious views causeda furor among
the religiousestablishment,leading the Turkish governmentto expel
him unceremoniously.Back in Cairo, Afghani was adopted by the
. ::I rer.ivalist Egyptian prime ministeq Riad Pasha, a notorious reactionary and
- .:.ntagonistic enemyof the nascentnationalistmovementin Egypt. Riad Pashaper-
: :.rg i nat or of suadedAfghani to stay in L,gypt,and allowed him to take up residence
- -:rl tu r y lat er at Cairo's 9oo-year-oldAl Azhar mosque, consideredthe center of
Islamic learningworldwide, where he receivedlodging and a monthly
.. :.'r clvnamic governmentstipend.It was Afghani's first official post as an lslanric
. -Lrleas god- scholar,and the first (but not last) time he would be on the payroll of
:'.ihe Islamic one of the imperialpowers or their stand-ins.Afghani spenteight years
,. :rr)doubt be in the midst of Egypt'stumultuous politics, up to the eve of England's
:r-:.F,ddineal- shellingof Alexandria and the British occupationof Egvpt.
... Richard P. Fetedby the British in India, transportedby l,ondon to Egypt, and
, -r:sthe defin- sponsoredby England'sagentsin Cairo, Afghani patientlylaid the cor-
-:: :or the mil- nerstoneof pan-Islam.But the vicissitudes of Egyptiancolonial politics
: F-gvptafter wcre not always kind to him: as nationalismin Egypt gainedstrength
-: l- : ilw th em- (until crushedby the British),Afghani'sinfluencedeclined.In r879,he
- ::r identified u'as expelledfrom Egypt, beginninga sojourn that took him to India,
.: \bduh, and London, Paris(wherehe stayedthreeyears),Russia(wherehe spentfour
:. :clt a special lears), Munich, and Iran. In Iran, the shahmade him war ministerand
.:'- l-novement then prime minister,but Afghani and the shah soon parted ways, and
-\fghani beganagitatingagainstthe Persianmonarch. Foreshadowing

E
 D p v t r 's GalrE

Ayatollah Khomeini's r97os revolurion, Afghani took refuge

in a
mosqueand organizedthe clergyto support him, until he was
arrested
and deportedto Turkey. In r896, his followers would assassinate
rhe
shah,endingthat king's fifty-yearreign.Afghani died in tgctz.
Always it was Afghani'ssecreractivitiesthat set him apart.
In the r87os, in Egypt-while outwardly professingto be a pious
Muslim-Afghani frequented the lodges of the Anglo-Egyptian
and
Franco-EgyptianFreemasonsocieties.He delvedinto mysticism,
includ-
ing sufism. on his expulsion from Egypt, the British consur-general,
in
an intelligencereport, said that Afghani "was recentlyexpelledfrom
the
Freemasons'Lodge at cairo, of which he was a member,on account
of
his open disbeliefin a supremeBeing." According to Kedourie, Afghani
was a member of the General Scotch Lodge,la which was organized
around the allegedmysreriesof the Egyptian pyramids and the so-called
Grand Architect, the Fr.eemasons' concept of a god. Many British and
Frenchofficials in the nineteenthcentury were caught up in an
obsessive
fascinationwith the "orient," the pyramids, Masonic lore,
and assorted
cults of secretbrotherhoods, and used thesefraternities as channels
of
imperial powe! ofren competitively.
It was in the late r87os that Afghani met the man who would
become his chief disciple, Mohammed Abduh. As a fixture
at Ar
Azhar, cairo's historic mosque, Afghani gathered around himself
a
burgeoninggroup of acolytes,none more attachedto him personally
than Abduh. Born in Egypt in tg4g,Abduh was raised by a family
of
devout Islamic scholars,and by the age of ten he had memorized
the
Koran and was able to reciteit in the precise,singsongfashion
vener-
ated by the elders.Like Afghani, Abduh was also drawn to the
mysrr-
cal Sufi brotherhoods,with their rranscendenrview of spiritual
life.
sufism, an ancient current within Islam, challengedmany
orthodox
Muslim beliefs in favor of a meditative, introspectiveapproach
to
"oneness"with God, and the movement gave
rise to many tartqa, or
brotherhoods, some organized as tightly bound secrer societies
and
others as hierarchicalmass movementsspread over vast geographic
areas.
Abduh was raken with Afghani almost instantry,and they developed
a bond. According to Kedourie,the biographerof Afghani and Abduh,
 Imperial Pan-lslant 27

. :-lLl g e i n a When Abduh met Afghanihe was sometwenty-twoyearsold, an

.I .,,-ts :lrrested ardentyoung man going through a crucialphasein his spiritual
:: .-t )sina te th e life, and this no doubt made him impressionable; but Afghani
must havehad a powerfulmagneticpersonalityto haveerercised
over Abduh then and for many yearsafterwardso strangeand
:: .::t.
tenaciousan influence. The link betrveenthemis verymuchthat of
: :c il prous
the master and in
disciple some secret.
esoteric
cult.l5
', : t i a n a n d
.:rr. includ-
- . ine ra i , i n For eight years,between r87r and 1879, the two men worked
:: from the closely together.They organizednot only in Egypt, but throughout
,.aaountof the region, and built a diverse collection of followers, some of
\tghani whom-including a group of mystical Christians from Syria who
-.
,rganized were attracted to Afghani's offbeat message-founded the Young
: >o-called Egypt secretsociety.Gradually,Afghani and Abduh amasseda coterie
-':rtishand of devotedfollowers around Al Azhar.In r 878, Riad Pasha,the prime
: - , r f 5 g tti U " minister and Afghani's protector, went out of his way to appoint
J .lssorted Abduh to a prominent post as a history teacher at Dar al-Ulum, a
: : . rn n e l so f newly launchedIslamic school,and as professorof languageand liter-
ature at another institution. Eventually,when Riad Pasha'spower
- ' 'l') l vOu l d ebbed, Afghani and Abduh left Egypt. In Cairo, nationalistsin the
- , : , i: e a t Al army were gaining momentum, led by the famous Egyptian hero,
- : Ahmad Arabi, a colonel and war minister,who led an uprising against
- -- r mse l f a
- ': ; r SOn a l l y the British role in Egypt. Arabi's movement *as crushed,the British
- . : . rmi l v o f completedtheir occupationof Egypt, and Arabi was exiled to Ceylon.
- :'- - : ize d th e Abduh opposedthe military's resistanceto the British, advocating a
:: '- . r n Ve n e f- middle ground, decrying violence, and trying to arrange a compro-
-: : 1- mYsti - mise between the army's fierce nationalism and London's imperial
- : : . : L r.rll i fe . designs.Abduh's chief acolyteand biographer,Rashid Rida, summed
.^ , rtl -ro d o x it up: "He was the opponent of the military revolution eventhough he
' -:: : r l. lC h t O was a directingspirit to the intellectualmovement.He hated the revo-
:- . : . i rtqd, or lution and was opposedto its leaders."16
- - t -t t es and There was a pattern herethat would endearright-wing Islamiststo
.- ' - , , or".hi. Westernimperial strategistsfor generationsto come. The opposirion
of Afghani and Abduh to Egyptian nationalism,and their support for
-: . :r'r'elOped vaguenotions of an Islamic state,foreshadowedthe Muslim Brother-
,:.:.\bduh, hood'soppositionto PresidentGamal AbdelNasserin the r95os, the
 D r v r r . 's Gavp

resistanceof the Musiim Brotherhood-led Hamas in Palestineto the

nationalismof the PalestineLiberation organization, and countless
other instancesin which Islamistsopposednationalism and left-wing
movementsduring the Cold tX/ar.
Afghani and Abduh did not confine themselvesmerely to intellec-
tual theorizing and Islamic scholarship.When Afghani was finally
expelled from Egypt, he and Abduh were accusedof organizing "a
secretsocietycomposedof 'young thugs,"' apparently a referenceto
unruly membersof the Masonic lodge that Afghani led,r7foreshad-
owing the paramilitary organization establishedby the Muslim
Brotherhoodin the r93os. LeavingEgypt, Afghani endorsedAbduh
as his fit slrccessor:
"I leaveyou Shaikh Mohammed Abduh, and he is
sufficientfor Egypt as a scholar."l8Abduh was remporarily eriled to
his village in Egypt, though he woulcl later join Afghani in Paris and
then return to Egypt in triumph, with the full support of the represen-
tativesof Her Majesty'simperial officers.
Upon leaving Egypt in rtl79, Afghani wenr to Arabia, rhen to
India. Soon afterward Afghani, later joined by Abduh, migrated to
Paris,where the two men begantheir most productivecollaboration.
It was in Paris,in the mid-r88os, that Afghani and Abduh built the
network that would continueafter their deaths.In r88a. the two men
began pubfishinga weekly newspapercalled The IndissolubleBond.
Though it lasted only eighteenissues,the paper had great influence.
Exactly how it was financedis unclear,though Kedourie suggeststhat
it was supportedsecretlvby thc Frenchgovernment,to which Afghani
turned after his formal offer in India to becomea British agenr was
rejected.re
C. C. Adams,who in r933 wrore the most completebiog-
raphy of Abduh, notes rhat The IndissolubleBond was "rhe organ of
a secretorganizationbearingrhc samename, founded by [Afghani],
composed of Muslims of India, Egypt, North Africa and Syria, the
purpose of which was to 'unite Muslims and arouse them from the
sleepand acquaint them rvith the dangersthreateningthem and guide
them to the way of meetingthesedangers."'20Afghani also organized
a pan-Islamicsocietyin Mecca that had as its goal the creation of a
singlecaliphateto lead the entire Mr-rslimworld.
Whether Afghani and Abduh were acting on their own initiatrveat
 Imperial Pan-Islam L9

:.:rne to the this time, or-more likely-in cooperation with London or Paris, is
" .t cOuntless unclear. Immediately afterward, however, the French government
:',r leir-wing halted publication r>fThe IndissolubleBond, and Afghani and Abduh
traveled to London, ostensibly to discussthe crisis in the Sudan,
:, , rntellec- where they proposedthe notion of a pan-Islamicalliancewith Great
.'..i' hnally Britain. The proposal was advancedin the midst of a tribal-religious
_-,.:rizrng"a rebellion against the British in the Sudan, led by the charismatic
' : li'f Cl' lC e tO Mohammed Ahmad, a Sudanesesheikh who proclaimed himself the
-
:oreshad- Mahdi, or savior,and led a puritanicalIslamic revolt. Two versionsof
'' . \ luslim Islarnism carne into conflict: the Mahdi's, a feral, angry revolt in
..J Abduh which nationalist sentimentswere in part disglrisedby religious lan-
r. rnd he is guage,and Afghani's,an Anglophilic version of Islamismthat viewed
: '. rriled to the Mahdi as primitive and uncouth. In r 8 8 5, the forcesof the Mahdi,
:r I'rris and the Helpers of the Prophet,defeatedand killed the
calling thernselves
-:
. 1'upre Sen- celebratedBritish general,Charles Gordon, and captured Khartoum.
Afghani sought to maintain his pan-Islamic credentialsby paying
:-t-1.then to lip service to the Mahdi, but-continuing to cultivate his British
::tl g ri lt ed t o patrons-he opposedthe Sudaneserebel behind the scenes."I fear,as
..rl .o ri r t ion. all wise men fear, that the disseminationof this doctrine [mahdism]
-. :r l .u i lt t he and the increaseof its votarieswill harm England and anyonehaving
il-r't\\'O IT ICII rights in Egypt," wrote Afghani. In a separatepiece,entitled "England
.:t)rl r' B ond. on the Shoresof the Red Sea," Afghani argued that the Mahdi was
, , : tn tl lr enc e. attracting the support of the "simpleiminded." He suggestedin
-,:-{.sts t hat another articlethat the Mahdi's revolt could be met only by an oppos-
-i r.\fg l- r ani
ing challengethat usedIslam as its organizingprinciple. "The strength
. - -l q e nt was of an Islamic preaching," he wrote) "cannot be met except by an
::.':1 ct ebiog- Islamic resolution,and none but Muslim men can strugglewith this
::'.i ()r gan of pretenderand reducehim to his proper stature."21
' \ t gh a n il, Afghani, in other words, proposed fighting fire with fire-Islam
:-.1\r'ria, the with Islam. The British, apparently,did not take him up on this pro-
' :::t from t he posal,a rejectionthat angeredAfghani, though Abduh remainedfaith-
:::r rr-rdguide ful to I-ondon. In going their separateways, Afghani went to Russia
'.,,
rtrganiZ ed while Abduh journeyedto Tunis, in North Africa. From there, Abduh
-:.cJti on of a
"then traveledincognito in a number of other countries,strengthening
the organizationof the societythey had founded."22Their message,to
:- i n i ti at iv e at the massesat least,was one of pan-Islamin its purestform:

I
 3o D E v r r - 's GanaE

The religionof Islamis the one bond which unitesMuslimsof all

countriesand obliteratesall tracesof raceor narionalit,y. . . . The
Muslim peopleswereonceunitedunderonegloriousempire,and
their achievements in learningand philosophyand all the sciences
are still the boastof all \.{uslims.It is a duty incumbentupon all
Muslimsto aid in maintainingthe authorityof Islam and Islamrc
rule over all landsthat haveoncebeenMuslim. . . . The only cure
for thesenationsis to return to the rulesof their religionand the
practiceof its requirements accordingto what it was in the begin-
ning, in the daysof the earlv Caliphs.. . . The supremeauthority
or,erall shouldbe the Koran.2'l

Today it seemsstandard Islamist boilerplate,and could be taken

from the pagesof a Muslim Brotherhood tract or an Al Qaeda com-
muniqu6. But in the r 8 8os, it was a new concept,and a revolutionary
one. Not in centurieshad Muslims heard a challengeto renew their
societiesaccordingto the methods of the early caliphs.And the mes-
sagein this call to arms, published in The IndissolubleBond, about
restoring Islamic rule "over all lands that have once been Muslim,"
read like a jihad-style summons to recaprureparts of Spain, central
Europe,and lands where provinceshad fallen to Christianity or other
religions. It was a challenge whose promise would seize T. E.
Lawrence and his British intelligencecohorrs at the Arab Bureau rn
Cairo during World \Var I, when London posthumously took up
Afghani and Abduh's proposal to mobilize Muslims for a new caliph-
ate, one that could at once underminethe crumbling Turkish empire
and threatenRussia.
Abduh, who had returned to Egypt on occasionin disguiseduring
his travelsin the r8Sos,watched as Egypt'snationalistswere scattered
by the British. By the late r88os Abduh openly cast his lot with Lord
Cromer and the British administration in Egypt. In 1888, with
Cromer's heip, Abduh returned openly to Egypt and took the first of
severalofficial positionsin Cairo. Like Afghani, Abduh spoke quietly
about the " social utility of religion."2aKedourie, analyzinghis collected
lecturesfrom Beirut,publishedas Risala,concludes:"It is clearthat . . .
the erstwhile mystic, outwardly a divine, was secretlya free thinker, like
 )mperial Pan-Islam 3r

i ::t]s of a ll his master." On returning to Cairo, Abduh forged a partnershipwith

:'.,. . . The Lord Cromer, who was the symbol of British imperialism in Egypt.
.-:'rtre.and Born EvelynBaring,he was a scionof the enormouslypowerful Baring
::1 : sci e nc es banking clan of the City of London, and he had servedin the r87os as
-: -rn o n all
the first British commissioner of the Egyptian public debt office and
r": Isl am ic
then controller general. After London crushed Arabi's revolt, Baring
returnedto Egypt in r883 as British agentand consul general'and he
,in.l the
: ^ .' l re gin- served as the virtual ruler of the country until r9o7. Abduh and
: .--,:lilority Cromer becamefriends and confidants,the militant Islamist and the
aristocratic British empire builder who became his patron. With
Cromer'sbacking,Abduh was namedto lead a committeeto reorganize
Al Azhar, became the editor of Egypt's Official .lournal, and was
- ,:.J be taken
-. Q:eda com- appointedto Egypt'sLegislativeCouncil, where he became"its leading
--',rrlutionary memberwhose opinion on everyquestionwas heard with respect.He
:r'new their was chairmanof its most important committees."li
' r:rJ the mes- FinallS in 1899, two years after Afghani's death, Abduh was
. 3 ,tttl,about named mufti of Egypt. As mufti, he "was the supremeinterpreterof
'.::l \Iuslimr" the canon law of Islam (the sharia)for the whole country' and his fat-
- \:,11n.central was, or legal opinions, touching any matters that rvere referred to
him, were authoritative and final."26 it also gave him significant
-: -..:tLf\.Or Othef
. i ..'ize T. E. patronage power, since he helped overseethe rich religious endow-
:.:.-.i.Bureau in ments, or waqfs.
.' ...1\'took up As Abduh's influence in Egypt grew, Afghani spent a few years in
: ,i ne\t'caliph- Russia,where he had gone to sulk after London rejectedhis offer to
i:rrkish emPire help build a pan-Islamicalliance.According to Kedourie,Afghani, for
a time at least,was "a client and subsequently an agentof Russia."r-

: ;isguiseduring He reportedly tried to sell Moscow on the idea that he could help
spark a revolt in India, the very heart of the British Empire. According
--i \\'crescattered
-- -.: ior r.vithLord to a British intelligencereport from r888, Afghani "had impressed
^ lr r 888, with upon someRussianofficialsthe prospectof a generaluprising in India
' - :, )ok the first of rvheneverthe Russianschose to give the signal."28It seemsthat the
- -:,.:rspoke quietlY Russiansdidn't buy what Afghani was selling,and soon afterward he
, ' - rrq l-riscollected back in London.
i'u'as
Afghani's London contacts r,l'erediverse.He plunged into a world
-: :s clearthat . ' .
: :reethinker,like rhat includeda swirling mix of freethinkers,Masons,Gnostics'mystics,

t
 D r:vrr' s Gevn

sufis and other experimenrersin religion and the divine,

blendedwith
writers' travelers,and orientalists fascinatedwith the so-called
Near
East.It was a heady time. London in the lare ninereenth
cenrury was
Iike a gigantic rneltingpot of religiousacrivism.Many British
intellec-
tuals, and not a few irnperialists,were seizedwith a desire
to find a
sort of holy grail, a unified field theory of religious belief.
Rerigi.us
svncretismwon followers amo'rg the elites,along with
the idea that
perhapssomenew cult, somenew systemof belief,would
emerge,one
that could unite the empire'smany cultures. Experimental
religions,
some of whose roots went back into the earry nineteenth
cenrury,
began to flourish-and Afghani, whose view of Isram
was tempered
bv a deeper commirment ro mysticism, the Sufi
brorherhoocls.
Freemasonrgand philosophicalskepticism,was open
to it all.
one of Afghani's most important contacts in London
was the
renowned British orientalist Edward Granville Browne.
Br,wne, a
cambridge university professor,is perhapsthe godfather
of twentieth-
century orientalism, especiallyin the area of persian
and religi.us
studies,and he exerted enormous influencenot only over
academics
but policy makers as well, until his death in 1926. As
we shail see,
E' G' Browne was a teacherand friend to the powerful,
incrudingtwo
leading British intelligenceoperarives,Harry st.
Joh' Bridger philby
and r. E. Lawrence,during Britain'sintenseengagement
in rhe Middre
Eastin world war I' In the rggos and rB9os,Browne
traveledwidely
in the Arab world, Turkey, and persia, and he speciarized
in cultlike
movements,Sufism,and the alternativemysteryreligions
springingup
in the Middle East.
Browne's Persianteacherwas Mirza Mohamrned Baqir. ,.Having
wandered through half the world,', wrote Browne, ,.learned
(and
learned well) half a dozenlanguages,and been successively
a shiite
Muhammadan, a dervish, a Christian, an arheisr,a
Jew, [Baqirl had
finishedby elaboratinga religioussysremof his own,
which he called
'Islamo-christianity.'"2eThe two men became close,
and Browne,
inspired by the works of an eccentric specialistir
the religions of
central Asia, Joseph de Gobineau, delved inro movements
like the
Baha'is,developinga lifelong fascinationwith that
odd relieiouscurt.
 ImperiLtlPan-lslam J1

- .tt'cl rvith Like Mirza Baqir'sIslamo-Christianity',the Baha'ispromoted an odd'

- . c.l Near syncretisticfaith based in Persia, with outposts in Haifa and else-
-: l -iLll' \ ' W 2 S where. For years, the Baha'is were viewed with suspicionin the
' . '' intellec- Middle East, with many conspiracv-mindedpolitical and religious
'- :'r hnd a leadersaccusingthem of Masonic connectionsand ties to British
' iicligious intelligence.But the Baha'iswere openly Anglophiles,and after $7orld
: :.1c'lrthat \Var I, one of the Baha'is'founders,Abdul Baha,was knightedby the
- " ' : . 1 9e . OI1e governmentof Great Britain. Browne becameperhapsthe chief publi-
:.rlt qtons, cist in the West for the Baha'is, and he apparently believedthat the
. ' . .alttur v, Baha'i movementwas destinedto play a shapingrole in the future of
t. :-nrpered religion in the N{idcileL,ast.
-Jliloods, Both Afghani and Abduh had multiple contacts with Browne,
.,. Mirza Baqir, and the Baha'is.According to Kedourie, Abduh and
'- \\'.1Sthe Baqir debatedtheology and the Koran in Paris during the time when
-,;,ru'ne,a Afghani and Abduh were publishing The Indissoluble Bond, and
- :..\r'r.]tieth- Afghani sent the newspaperto the Baha'i movement'sleadersin their
" -. :-clrgious Middle L,astheadquarters.Another person who played an important
'r..r!lemics role in furthering Afghani's increasinginvolvement in Persia-where
- .h.rli see, he would eventually become prime minister-was Malkam Khan'
- ,..1ingtwo Malkam Khan was the Persian ambassadorto London for many
, :r'r Philby years, the son of the founder of the PersianSociety of Freemasons.
: rc \liddle Like Afghani, the Baha'is,and Baqir, Khan believedthat a reformed,
. ..1 n'idely universalist"religion of humanity" was the prerequisitefor political
- :r cultlike action in the Middle East, especiallyin Persia.Even though Afghani
'r:inglng up never abandonedhis rhetorical support for a fundamentalistversion
of Islam, under Khan's influenceAfghani formed the "Arab Masonic
- :'. "Having society."30The chameleon-like Afghani seemedto believein combin-
:...-rcd (and ing a simplisticversion of Islam for the "simple-minded,"or the
. r a Shiite masses,with a top-down, syncretisticone-world religion above it.
'With
ir.iqirl had Br:t Afghani's careerended, paftially at least,in failr-rre. the
,rr he called supportof Malkam Khan, he spentmost of his final yearsin Persia,as
:-J Browne, war minister and prime minister,but his ideasdidn't succeedin win-
.iigions of ning over either the shah or the Iranian elite. Tired of Afghani's
.:-:: like the appealsto Iran's mullahs, the shah acted. "The Shah finally violated
:..:ior-rs
cult. the sanctuaryof the mosque and had Jamal arrested,although on a

D
 )+ D r , v r r 's Gal,.r.

sick bed at the time, and conveyedto the Turkish border."31He would
bounce back and forth betweenTurkey, Afghanistan,and Persiadur-
ing the r89os, "attractingr"Kedouriesays,"the affention... of secu-
rity and intelligencedepartments."32 At the very end of his life, the
British bailed him out once more. "In r895 Afghani, then at Istanbul,
some two years before his death finding himself in Sultan Abdul
Hamid's bad books,and threatenedwith extraditionto Persiawhere he
was wanted for subversion,appliedro the British Ambassadorfor pro-
tection as an Afghan subject."-r3
The British consulategave Afghani a
pass,allowing him to leavethe sultan'sterritory.He eventuallyreturned
to Turkev,where the itinerantpan-Islamistdied of cancerin r 897. E. G.
Browne ensuredthat Afghani'sfame would last long beyond his death
by lionizinghim in his rgro classicTbe PersianReuolution.
But Lord Cromer, ever the practical imperialist,wrote perhapsthe I'

ultimate epitaph for Afghani, Abduh, and the firsr generation of

Islamic revivalists."They were much too tainted with heterodoxy to
carry far along with the conservativeMoslems. Nor were they suffi,
ciently Europeanizedto win the mimics of Europeanways. They were
neither good enough Moslems, nor good enough Europeans."Like a
scientistclosingthe books on an experimenrthat failed, Lord Cromer
concludedthat the pan-Islam of Afghani and Abduh neededa major
revision.Its Masonic-tinged,universalistmodernismdidn't blend well
with a call to return to seventh-centuryIslamic purism, and so it had
failed to win the allegianceof either the clergy or the modernrzers.
Eventually,Afghani's ideas,preservedby the journalist Rashid Rida,
who founded The Ligbthowse,the publicarion rhar brought Afghani
and Abduh's ideas to the Egyptian Salafiyya and the Mus-
lim Brotherhood, would find more fertile soil. In the meantime, the
British would turn to a much lessambiguousversionof Islamistradi-
calism in the next phase of their colonial policy in the Middle East:
SaudiArabian'$Tahhabism.
 ImpeidlPan-lslam i5

.-.. ,.r'ould
: : -.:.t dur- AeouLLAH PHITBY's BRoTHERHooD
: secu-
. t:. the From 1899 through the aftermath of \7orld'V7ar I, Great Britain
,:.:.tnbul, embarkedon one of the most remarkableimperial gambits ever con-
-..." \bdul ceived.The Ottoman Empire, the nineteenthcentury's "sick man of
. ' :]rrehe Europe," was finally in its deaththroes.The rise of the imperialnavies,
: : ': pro- railroads, and finally the development of the internal combustion
-.-.rrni a engine and the automobile created an insatiable demand for oil.
: . :l . 1 f ne d Despitethe growth of Texas,Romania, and Baku as centersof oil pro-
. -. F "G
. . duction, it had also begunto dawn on imperial strategiststhat Persia,
: . .lerrth Iraq, and Arabia had untold petroleum wealth. Hard-headedimpe-
rialists saw southwestAsia as a gigantic chessboard, and they were
' :: -,l f i t he playing for keeps.London'sgambit was to make a play for the loyalty
:: . 1:,1 Il Of of the world's Muslims, not by appealing to the Islamic world's
:l * r\\'t O enlightened,modernizingMuslim elite but to its traditionalist-minded
' ':' sllffi- massesand autocrats.
l-:'' \\'ere While fending off the French in the Middle East, the British had
- . Lrke a simultaneouslyto deal with three other powers. The Russians,seem-
--, ing to pressinexorably down from the north, were one concern.The
-: ()l T ler
: - . l l l Jior Germans,whose global power was expandingunder the Kaiser,were
^ .:'.,1u'ell fast building ties to Turkey while making plans to constructa rail Iine
: - rrhad from Berlin to Baghdad.And the Turks, whose'empire'slife force was
- : : : l iz e rS. ebbing, still had an ace in the hole, namely, the existence of a
.-- J Ri d a , caliphate in Istanbul that, nominally at least, could claim the alle-
:: \ t gha n i gianceof orthodox Sunni Muslims everywhere.
:- : -\l u s- London was firmly in control of India (including,of course,what
.l : : l l ! ' . the is now Muslim Pakistan),and thanks to Lord Cromer the British had
:::': >t rildi- locked up Egypt and the SuezCanal as their lifelineto India. They had
.:: , c F-ast: significant,even dominant influencein Afghanistan and Persia.And
they had important surrounding real estate' from Cyprus to East
Africa to Aden that could be used to bring power to bear in the Per-
sian Gulf. For their gambit to seizecontrol of Iraq and Arabia, they
neededa force to challengeTurkey's control of that vast expanseof
sand-coveredterritorl'.
The first step in accomplishingthat feat was the forging of an
 D l l 'It-'s Gel tP
J6

SaudiArabia-
alliancefor the Englishthrone wrth the future king of
\wahhabi Islamic movement.To under-
and with the long-established
must first take a
stand how the British-Saudialliance developed'we
betweenthe
stcp heck into the cighreenthcenttlrv'when rhe entente
Wahhabi fam-
Al Saud,the future royalfamily, and the Al Shaikh,the
ily of the Islamists,was first cemented'
Muslim
In the middle of the eighteenth century' an itinerant
the
preacher,sort of an Arabian Elmer Gantry, began crisscrossing
from
northern reachesof the peninsula and the Fertile Crescent'
Baghdad'
Mecca and Medina to the al-HasaOasisin the eastto Basra'
in r7o3) was
and Damascus.Mohammad ibn Abdul \(ahhab, born
learning that
not a city dweller,and he didn't bother with the kind of
Spreading the
occurred in the Arab world's intellectual centers'
\wahhab thunderedthat
Islamic version of fire and brimstone,Abdul
that had been
the Nluslims nee.dedto purge themselvesof everything
It was a
learnedsincethe days of the Propheta thousandyearsbefore'
packing
revivalistmovementin the classicsense'with eagerfollowers
tents thrown up by Abdul'Wahhab'sorganizers'
Abdulwahhab,smostlmportantconvertwasthefounderoftheAl
saw himself
Sauddynastv,Mohammed ibn Saud'Ibn Saudapparently
Mohammed' con-
as an eighteenth-centuryversion of the Prophet
To
quering lands for Islam and imposing his faith on the conquered'
their followers
reinforcetheir message,Abdul'Wahhab,Ibn Saud' and
disagreedwith
had the unfortunate habit of slaughteringanyonewho
their shrines'
them and demolishingtheir cities,their mosques,and
in Arabic,
Abdul wahhab was called "the Teacher,"or al-sbaikh
clan were
and from then on the descendantsof the Abdul wahhab
and the AI
called the Al shaikh.3aThe alliance betweenthe Al saud
rgzos.It wasn't
Shaikh families evolved into the saudi state in the
through the
without its ups.and downs, however; from the rToos
in turn' be
r9zos, the Al Saudrepeatedlyfounded statesthat would'
Ottomans
swept awav either by the more worldly, and lessfanatical'
and their alliesin Egypt, or by rival Arabian tribes'
'srahhabis,it is usually said,
In standardaccounrsof the rise of the
and moderniz-
often with respect,that the \Tahhabiswere reformers
the idea of
ers. or that they united the Arabian Peninsulaaround
 Imperial Pan-Islant J7

rXlahhabismis consideredsome-
_
I . ' 1, 1-
tauhid, or monotheism. (The term
,: : t d er- what insulting by its adherents,who prefer the term IJnitarians,from
"unity of God.")35And Wahhab is often describedas a thinker, whose
, '::: l l he philosophical work and interpretation of the Koran were ground-
lwahhabism:A critical
' ,- fln1- breaking. Not so. Hamid Algar, aurhor of
Essay,notes that the Arabian desert and Abdul Wahhab's so-called
\ ' i , l s Lm theology had something in common. "lts topographical barrenness
.. : - : t h e seemsalways to have been reflectedin its intellectual history," he
: '-l. f f OIT l wrires.36In discussing"what might charitably be called the scholarly
output of Muhammad b. Abd al-Sfahhab,"Algar saysthat his works
-'.:ir.lad,
-::. \\'as are simplistic and superficial,comprised mostly of reprinted collec-
"- :r j tllat tions of the Prophet'ssayingsand containing little or no "elucidation
'Wahhabism,notes Algar
:.-:'. j the or commentary." Even the custodians of
wryly, are "embarrassedby the slightnessof [his] opus."t- A great
- : :': . 1 t hlt
- . ,J b e en thinker he was not.
= . : $ -l 1Sa But Abdul \Tahhab was a master at hurling polemicai thunder-
- : , i c k i ng
bolts at moderate Muslims, accusingthem of abandoning Islam, of
the
apostasy,of heresies,and worse. Joining forceswith the Al Sar-rd,
: :rheAl \Tahhabisassembleda mighty army of followers,who spentcenturies
, :llrself wreaking havoc acrossArab territory. They were, in the words of a
:- :: . CO n- nineteenth-centuryEnglishwriter, notorious for "preferring slaughter
to booty" in their conquests.38 The slaughter never ended. In the
- - - :: e[ 1.TO
L( )w e rs alliance began a "campaign of killing and
r7oos, the Saud-\il7ahhabi
: -. ...1lvith plunder all across Arabia," first in central Arabia, then in Asir in
. -.:-:lles. southern Arabia and parts of Yemen, and finally in Riyadh and the
'- .\rrrbic, Hrjaz.3eIn r8oz they raided the Shiite holy citl' of Karbala in what is
a. ,lll \vere now Iraq, killing most of the city's popr-rlation,destroyingthe dome
. : t heAl over the grave of a founder of Shiism, and looting "property,
,: $':1Sn't weapons,clothing, carpets,gold, silver, [and] precious copies of the
"signa-
: - ,rsh the Quran."40In fact, Wahhabismwould be weirdly marked by a
ture activity of dome demolition."4l Domes in Mecca, too, would be
: - :Llrn , b e
' :: om a n s destroyedin the early part of the nineteenthcentury. (It is a practice
that continuesroday. In the former Yugoslavia,Saudi Arabia would
., - . . ii' sa i d , demand radical changesin Islamic sites."Saudi aid agencies,"wrote
: r - )dern i z- John Esposito, "have been responsiblefor the destruction or recon-
:: . : Lc i e ao f struction of many historic mosques, libraries, Quran schools, and
 j8 . Dtvrr,s Ger.rt

cemeteriesin Bosniaand Kosovo becausetheir ottoman

architecture,
decorations,frescoes,and tombstonesdid not conform
to wahhabi \\.
iconoclasticaesthetics.',
)a2
As the dome-destroyers expandedtheir power in Arabia, they ulti-
mately came inro conract with Great Britain. England's
ties t. the Al
Saud began in the mid-nineteenth century, when
a British colonel
made conractwith rhe House of saud in Riyadh, the
sleepydesertcity
that would eventuallybe the capital of Arabia. "The
first conracrwas
made in r865, and British subsidiesstartedto flow into
the coffersof
the saudi familS in ever growing quantity as $zorld
war one srew
closer,"reports Algar.a3
In r899, Lord Curzon, then viceroy of India, carved
out the pro_
tectorateof Kuwait, and London's ties to the Al
Saud and the rfah_
habis beganin earnesr.The Ar Saud,srrugglingto impose
rheir wilr in
Arabia, were invited to estabrisha base in Kuwait,
a tiny emirare
south of Basib that was increasinglyan ourposr
of British imperiar
power and conrrol.aa rhree years later, the Al Saud would begin
Just
the final effort ro securecontrol over rhe whore of the
Arabian penin-
sula. "The Amir of Kuwait," according to an account, .,dispatched
Ibn Saud' then just twenry yearsold, ro rry ro rerake
Riyadh from the
[pro-ottoman] Rashids."a-5 Riyadh felr to Ibn Saud in r9oz, and it
was during this period that Ibn saud establishedthe
fearsomeBroth_
erhood, known by their Arabic name, the lkhwan.a6
He collected
fighters from Bedouin tribes, fired them up with
fanatical rerigious
zeal,and threw them into battle. By t9 r z,the Brotherhood
numbered
rr'ooo, and Ibn saud had borh cenrralArabia's
Neid and al-Hasain
the eastunder his control.
Between fi99 and the outbreak of world lVar I,
rumors of oil in
the Middle East becamereality. The first oil "concessions,,-really
one-sided,imperialist deals imposed by oil men
backed by grear-
power gunboats on weak vassal statesancl captive
tribal leaders_
were signed' suddenly the persian Gulf emergedas
a straregrcsire.
Arabia and the Gulf had beenviewed by Great Britain
as one rink in a
chain that ran from Suez to India, the two anchors
of the empire.
slowlS the reverseseemedtruer: suez and India would,
increasingly,
be seenas basesfrom which the British would be able protect
to their
 Imperial Pan-lsldm 39

-,' : i c lure, burgeoning oil interests in southern Persia, Iraq, and the Gulf.
: ,t rhhabi William Shakespear,the felicitously named British officer who was
appointed political agent in Kuwait, becamethe first of severalleg-
,,.::r:r'ulti- to the Al Saud, and he forged the first formal
endary British liaisor-rs
:-:,fheAI treaty betweenEnglandand SaudiArabia,which was signedin r9r5.
: .:: iolonel Punctuatinghis accomplishment,Shakespeardied in battle alongside
. - - :.fft Clt I the Al Saud in a desertconfrontation wrth the rival Al Rashid tribe.
: :-: , t a twa s But the treaty he designedbound London and Arabia, years before
: - , rile rs o f Saudi Arabia was a country. "It formally recognizedIbn Saud as the
: , ): r e g re w independentruler of the Neydand its Dependenciesunder British pro-
tection. In return, Ibn Saudundertook to follow British advice."47
- . . : nc p ro - With the outbreak of war tn r9r4, Great Britain saw a golden
: :::ewah- opportunity to oust Turkey from Arabia. As the Ottoman Empire
: ,r r u ' i l l i n wobbled, two British teams backed two drstinct-and opposing-
-.'. ir.Illrate Arab playersin the barren, desertstretchesof the Arabian peninsula.
. - ''rn c r i r l
-] ] t ' . | - ' The first team was led by Harry St. John Bridger Philbg a British
. J iregin operative well schooled in the political utility of religious belief by
- .:. Pe1lin- none other than E. G. Browne. Scion of a modestly distinguished
-- .'rrtched British family with ties to Ceylon and India, Philby was a product of
: - ::()m the England'smost prestigiousschools,including \Testminster,where he
--:. and it was a Queen's Scholar,and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he
:r.: Broth- At the dawn of the twentiethcen-
becamea discipleof E. G. Browne's.aE
: -' - , ,1lected tury, Cambridge was a training ground for empire builders, and he
. -r[gious rubbed elbows there with England's(and the world's) best and bright-
, '. -.:nhered est. Grounded in the ties betweenchurch and state in England, and
. -Hirsain with an intimate familiarity with the Anglican establishment,Philby,
though an atheist,exhibrteda strongappreciationof religion'sinfluence
. ,f orl in on politics,and he describedreligiousbelief as "of all conventionsthe
- . '-really greatest,...so strong in its resistance to all opposition."4e
At Cam-
-: '.. qreat- bridge he studiedphilosophy,oriental languages,and Indian law, and
. --rders- then joined the Indian Civil Service.Philby-who would later undergo
' ,: - l: il C S lt e. a sham conversionto Islam, adopting the name "Abdullah"-would
:. t nk i n a carry Browne's lessonswith him to India, where he servedas a minor
i- -: . functionary,and then to Arabia, where he succeededShakespearas
-l l -l p lf e
- - - r<i nolrr GreatBritain'sliaisonto Ibn Saud.
: : : c t th e i r While Philby's team, Britain's India Office, backed the Al Saud,
 4o D p v I l 's Ger,tr

their friendly rivals were basedin Cairo at the Arab Bureau' a branch
of British intelligence,which sponsoredthe famous T. E. Lawrence
("of Arabia"). The Arab Bureaubackedthe Sharifof Mecca,Hussein,
head of the Hashemite dynasty,and his sons, Abdullah and Faisal.
They were the rulers of the Hijaz,the province in westernArabia that
included Mecca and Medina. The Al Saud, meanwhile, controlled
most of central Arabia's Neid from Riyadh, which is now the Saudi
capital. In the end, of course,the Al Saudwould conquer Arabia and
name the counrry after their family. The Hashemiresons, Abdullah
and Faisal,having lost to the Saudis,would be installedlike replace-
ment parts as kings of two other nations whose borders were drawn
up by Winston Churchill: Abdullah as king of Transjordan,and Faisal
as king of lraq.
In both cases-the Al Saud and the Hashemites-the British
sought to mobilize {slam. The Hashemitesboastedthat their family
was directly descendedfrom that of the Prophet Mohammed, a claim
made by any number of scurrilouswould-be rulers in the past century.
The British, naturally, saw the Hashemitesas potential claimantsto a
new, and pro-British, caliphate based in Mecca. The Al Saud, pro-
pelled by the warriors of \Tahhabism, were a formidable Islamic
strike force that, the British believed,would help London gain control
of the westernshoresof the PersianGulf.
Initially, around t9t6,it seemedthat the Hashemiteshad the upper
hand. Becauseof their position atop Mecca and Medina, the British
believedthat Hussein and his sons could rally Muslims from North
Africa to India to the British cause.At the time, the tottering Ottomans
controlled a decrepitcaliphate,which nominally exercisedsway over
religiousMuslims worldwide. But the Ottomans were besiegedon all
sides,and the British took the lead trying to use Islamic loyaltiesas a
force againstthe Turks. It was a policy cooked up by London'sMiddle
East team: Lord Curzon, the ultraimperialist foreign secretaryand
former governorof India; the aristocraticRobert Cecil,and his cousin,
Arthur Lord Balfour,who with RothschildbackingpromisedPalestine
to the Jews;Mark Sykes,the duplicitous chief of the Foreign Office's
Middle East section;and David George("D.G.")Hogarth, the head
 lnryeridl Pan-lslam - 4l

::rnch of the Arab Bureau, the author of The Penetration of Arabia, and an
i .,,rence archaeologist, Orientalist, and keeper of the Ashmolean Museum at
i -:'sein, Oxford. Churchill, Arnold Toynbee, and other leading lights of
:F.risal. B ri ti s h i mp e ri a l i s m j o i n e d i n. Outl i ni ng the pol i cy, Law rence sai d:
::.r rhat
:.::,llled If the Sultan of Turkev were to disappear,then the Caliphate by
r-:rudi common consent of lslam ',vould fall to the family of the prophet,
:: . 1 . l n d the presentrepresenrariveof which is Hussein,the Sharif of Mecca.
Hussein'sactivities seem beneficialto us, becauseit marcheswith
:::rllah
our immediate aims, the breakup of the Islamic bloc and the dis-
: : : ' , JCe -
ruption of the Ottoman Empire, and becausethe stateshe would
:
-: . 1\\rn set up would be as harmlessto ourselvesas Turkey rvas.If properly
* I'.risal handled the Arab States r,vould remain in a state of political
mosaic, a tisslleof jealous principalitiesincapableof cohesion,and
r: rilsh yet always ready to combine againstan outside force.
- .,.nilv
.,-,.rim The idea seemedsimpleenough.The Hashemiteswould sragean anri-
'-. Ottoman revolt, complete with swashbuckling,romantic images of
- : I Llt\'.
-.. to a Arabs led by Lawrence charging across the sand to liberate them-
selvesfrom Turkish rule. Behind the scenes,Britain would try to forge
- : -lnliC an alliance between the Hashemitesand the Zionists, with the goal
-:', t r o l of installing a pro-British Jewish state in Palestine,and with the
Hashemitesruling present-daySyria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and the
Hijaz along Arabia's west coast. Uniting it all would be a Mecca-
::trish based,and British-controlled,Arab caliphate.Egypt and Sudan,of
- \orth course,would remain in the British camp, too.
l-1lt ) Philbn meanwhile,was working the easrernflank. Sir Percy Cox,
'. the political representative
of the India Office in the PersianGulf, was
-: r )\'e f
: 'r rtll the man in chargeof England'seffort to securethe preciousoil rerrito-
l.:. .l S 2 ries, whose potential was just beginningro emerge.PhilbX then a jun-
).i. Jdle ior officer, worked with Cox and with the legendaryexplorer and
i :', .tnd super spy, Gertrude Bell, whose intimate knowledgeof Arabian tribal
- '. i s i n , lore and the genealogiesof its families,along with her experrlinguistic
-,-r itine abilities,made her an essentialmember of the team. Cox dispatched
, ,:ice's Philby to meet Ibn Saud in r9t6. While London was mobilizing the
-.. :lead Meccansagainstthe Turks in westernArabia, Philby was assignedto
 4z D E vrr-' s Genp

marshalthe Al Saudagainstanotherwarlord clan, the Al Rashid,who

had the misfortuneto ally itself with the Turks in easternArabia.
Beginning in January r9r7, Ibn Saud was put on a f5,ooo
monthly retainer,and Philby was the bagman.50Off and on after that,
Philby would serve as Ibn Saud'sBritish handler, and met him on
dozensof occasions.In 1919, he escortedIbn Saud'sfourteen-year-
old son, the future King Faisalof Saudi Arabia, on a tour of London
that included visits to Philby's old Pied Piper,E. G. Browne, and to
\Tilfred ScawenBlunt, perhaps England's leading advocate of pro- t-r-.

British pan-Islam.
Britain'simperial exercisein redrawing the map of the Middle East
and building a new caliphate foundered, however. Great Britain, of -\
course, remained the dominant player in the region by virtue of its
sheer imperial power. But the Arab-Zronist deal didn't quite work,
and lraq proved troublesome,and deadly,for British troops. Further- 1: J.

more, the French insisted on booting the British out of Syria and ..' ::
Lebanon, and the Bolshevikstook over Russia and revealeddetails
about secretAnglo-French understandingsthat proved exceedingly
embarrassingto London. And, though London placed most of its
chips on Hussein'sHashemites,IbnSaud'slegionsswept through Ara-
bia, conquering all before them-including Hussein'smini-realm in
the Hijaz. Gertrude Bell, speakingof Iraq but in a manner that could
have referred to Britain's entire Middle East policy, said, "'We have
made an immensefailure here."-51
Philbv, still in British service,maintained his connectionto the Al
Saud.Indeed,he seemedalmost to worship the uncouth Ibn Saudand
his Bedouinthugs, the Ikhwan:

The Arab is a democratLwrotePhilby],and the greatestand most

powerfulArab ruler of the presentday is proof of it. Ibn Saudis
no more than primus inter pares;his strengthlies in the fact that
he hasfor twenty yearsaccuratelyinterpretedthe aspirationsand
will of his people.52

Though Philby often posturedas an advocateof democracyand Arab

republicanism,he never wavered from supporting the brutal Al Saud
 lmperial Pan-Islam +)

-,,t.hid,who dynasty.'t3
Even some of Britain's most hard-coreimperialists,includ-
-.: -rl-,ra. ing D. G. Hogarth, saw the Al Saud,and in particular their'vfahhabi
l- ^^^u
- 1 l ) r uu warriors, the Ikhwan, as rather unsavory. "To men [like Hogarth]
.i.-.
'- ,1t t L^+
L\ r trt at , with experienceof Islam in India, Egypt, Syria, Turkey and the
:'-t him on Htjaz, the proselytizing of Ibn Saud's lkhwan was a menace, and
_.::-en-year- \x/ahhabisma fanatical creed unsuitedto
most of the Islamic world."
: rf London wrote Philby'sbiographer.ta
', :'e. and to In the rgzos conquest of Arabia, philby's ,,democrats," the Al
,..:a of pro- Saud,left 4oo,ooo dead and wounded, carried out 4o,ooo public exe-
cutions, and ordered, under its strict interpretation of Islamic law,
'--.\ir.ldleEast
35o'ooo amputations.ti The scorched-earthbattles by which the
'- .: llritain, of Ikhwan conqueredArabia for the Al saud gave Britain an unbroken
- :rue of its chain of vassalstatesand coloniesfrom the Mediterraneanto India.
-. : -,rite \vork, Yet even as the Saudi statewas being established,the bloody Ikhwan
:.. Further- were seenby somein London, and by someArabs, as a double-edged
- : ivritr and sword. A Lebanesefriend of Ibn saud's describedthe Ikhwan thus:
- - :....'d details "Today a sword in the hand of the prince, a daggerin his back tomor-
: - : rccedingly row."-56Hussein, the British-backedSharif of Mecca, pleaded with
:- . - ttL)S t of its London to force Ibn Saudto dismantlethe Ikhwan. In a missiveto the
- - -' ' rrr(Ih
"t-'_^_*
Arr- British Agent in Jeddah in r9r8, Husseinwrore: "whar concernsme
-. :-.:-realm in above everythingelse. . . is that H.M.G. should compel [Ibn Saud]to
.' .-:- :ir.rtcould abolishand dispersewhat he calls the lkhwan-the political societyin
- -.. "\\e have the cloak of religion." The British coolly refused.5T
Ibn Saud tried to maintain that the Ikhwan were an independent
:r ro the Al force, but the British knew otherwise,of course."He doesnot want it
^:r S.rudand to be known that he himself is at the bottom of the whole thing, and is
fostering and guiding the movement for his own ends," cabled a
British official in t9zo. Yet, other, far lesswell informed Br:itishoffi-
: " J rltost
' i l L rd i s cials warned, rather stupidly it would now seem. that the Ikhwan
-...rrthat were Bolshevik-inspired !58
,:l s:rn d Theoretically,at least,Ibn saud still had the option of creating a
secularstate, one in which fundamentalistIslam would not have an
official part. But he was propelled by the momenrum of his alliance
- '.' e n d Arab with the \Tahhabisand with the Ikhwan, as rhe shrewd British politi-
::.rlAl Saud cal officer Percy Cox realized:

r
 11 D r v r l 's Ger,tr

In late r9r5 or earlyt9r6 Ibn Saudfound that Ikhwanismwas

definitelygainingcontrolof affairsin Najd. He sawthat he had to
makeone of two decisions: eitherto be a temporalruler and crush
Ikhwanism,or to becomethe spiritual head of this new 'Wah-
habism.. . . In the end he was compelledto acceptits doctnnes
and becomeits leader,lesthe shouldgo underhimself.5e

The Islamic fundamentalistmovement that Ibn Saud rode to power

was essentialto the origin of SaudiArabia. He utilized Islam to break
down tribal loyaltiesand replacethoseloyaltieswith adherenceto the
cult. "In a desert,tribal society,where the family was an individual's
security,identity, and legitimacy,the renunciation of all this was no
light matter," wrote John S. Habib. "It underscoredthe degree to
which Ibn Saudwas able to substitutethe brotherhood of Islam domi-
ciled in the hiira60for the protection,security,and identity which they
surrenderedwhen they left the tribe."61
When the dust had clearedafter'World'WarI, and after the varrous
imperial conferencesthat establishedthe boundaries of the Middle
East's states, the Ottoman Empire had been dismantled, Britain
reigned supremein the region, and Ibn Saud controlled the bulk of
Arabia. According to Philby,Ibn Saud'sIkhwan numberedmore than
5o,ooo by the r9zos.6zTo the west, in the Hijaz, the Hashemitesstill
ruled, but their time was running out. In 1924, the new Turkish gov-
ernment under the modernizing Mustafa Kemal Ataturk disdained -u::l'

the backwardnessof official Islam and shockedconservativeMuslims

worldwide by peremptorily abolishing the caliphate. Hussein, the
Anglophile Sharif of Mecca, tried to capitalize on Ataturk's acrion.
PerhapsrememberingT. E. Lawrence'sgrand design, Hussein pro-
claimed himself caliph, but unfortunately for him, no one was listen-
ing. The British had essentiallyabandonedHussein by then, having
chosen to ride with Ibn Saud and another up-and-coming Muslim
fanatic, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem. "Philby,"
wrote Monroe, "returning from Syria in this moment of Muslim
uncertainty,enteredin his diary that Hussein'spower in Arabia was
confined to the Hijaz coast, and that his gestureabout the caliphate
was meaninglesswhen set against the bright light of Ibn Saud'sstar
 I ntpariaI I'arr-l slant ,+.t

rising over the Arabian desert."6-iSoo' afterwarcl

Ibn saud,shordes
swept into the Hiiaz, ousting the I{ashemites,slaughrering
hundreds
of men, women, and chirdren,and unifying Arabia
und., ih" conrror
of Riyadh. so beganrhe rnodern s,ucli state.And
rrhirby.,stiu closeto
Ibn Saud,was there at the creation.
Ibn Saudserout immediatelyto establishhimself
as the uncrowned
king of Islam, but it was a processthat developed
slowly. .,A formal
: : r\\-er treaty between Ibn saud and Great Britain, recognizing
-- -- . . t .
the full inde-
t !1N
pendenceof the kingdom, was signed on
May zo, t927,,, \^/rote
, t he
-i : BernardLewis. "Muslim recogrition was slower
and more reluctant.',
I iJ t l ' s He added:
. '. : . I IO

: : -- : l IO
A Muslim missi'n from India visited
-- )ilti -
Jeddahand demandecr that
-t the king handovercontrolof the hor1,pracesto a commirree of reo-
, : l t eV resentarivesto he appointedby all Muslim counrries.Ibn saud did
not respondto this demandand sentthe missionback
to India bv
: : -: : ()Ll S sea.In .funeof rhe silmeyearhe conveneda. all_Islami.
Congr.r,
l.i.l.lle in Mecca,i'viting the sovereignsand presidentsof the independent
Muslim statesand representatives from Muslim organizationsin
- -:irin
countriesunder non-Muslimrule. Sirty_ninepeople
-..of attendedthe
congressfrom arl over the Isramicworrd. Addressing
- : l: 1 . 1 I l them, Ibn
Saudmadeit clearthar he was now the ruler of the
iiyaz. . . . At
::.;fill the time he evokeda mixed responsefrom his.guerts.
Som. dis_
' : j o\'- sentedand departed;others acceptedand reccignrzed
the new
. . *- : ti -]e d order.6a
'.1,..1ims
': :.. tlle Ibn saud also finally had to confronr the Ikhwan.
By the rate
' r
- :l O n. rgzos' their lob done, the Ikhwan were resrless,
and increasingly
_ .- rtl-rt_
resenredIbn saud's monarchy. They clashed,and
by ryz9Ibn Saud
.. \tf ll- had dismantledthe Ikhwan and transformedremnants
of the Bedouin
. r---.\
ing force into the Saudi armed forces. Still, rravi'g
crushed the rkhwan,
1,.l.;lim Ibn saud did not abandon wahhabisrn.Indeed,
to consoridatehis
power in the more worldly, and lessrerigious,
Hijaz, rhe king created
-'.1-r.lim the religi.us police to enforce five-times-a-rlayprayer,
dress codes,
: _-:. \\'ilS and other srricruresof orthodox wahhabism.In
the early r93os Ibn
... :i1at e saud also crearedthe society for the propagation
of Virtue and the
- * : Sta f Suppressionof Evil, who were composed of "iiliterate.
fanatical
 D E v t t - 's Getrao

Bedouin who were only too eagerto enforcethe literal prescriptions

of prayer,and the closing of shopsduring prayer time, in addition to
the prohibition of smoking and other 'immoral' habits."55It still
CXIStS,

For the British, the emergenceof the state of Saudi Arabia gave
London a foothold at the very heart of Islam, in Mecca and Medina.
For the more pfagmatic among Britain'simperial strategists,it seemed
that Ibn Saud'sarmed forcesproved themselvesto be of greaterworth
than the mystic-theologicalcurrentsadvancedby Afghani and Abduh
and their secret societies.And clearlS London's experiment with
Afghani and Abduh was not completelysuccessful. Afghani, in partic-
ular, proved to be an elusiveimperial asset,and while his vision of a
pan-Islamic alliance might have appeared attractive to the British
elite,it failed to capturethe imagination of the massesand it met with
determinedopposition from rulers in Turkey and Persia.
The creation of the Saudi stateby the British gaveIslamisma base
out of which it would operatefor decadesto come' For England,and
then for the United States,SaudiArabia would serveas an anchor for
imperial ambitionsthroughout the twentieth century.Yet'Wahhabism,
for all its power, was still primarily a religious, not political, force. It
could win the devout allegianceof Saudis,and it could be proselytized
to Sunnisfar and wide. But in the modern sense,true politicalIslam had
not yet emerged.Missing was a mass-basedIslamist political force
that could hold its own againstthe new century's most attractive anti-
imperialist ideologies,communism and nationalism. Yet the seeds
r'X/ateredand
planted by Afghani and Abduh were about to sprout.
carefully tended by Saudi Arabia's \Tahhabis and the British intelli-
genceservice)a new Islamist force was about to arise on soil sown by
Abduh. For the first time, a true grassrootsIslamic fundamentalist
party would begin in a city on the SuezCanal, not far from Saudi Ara-
bia: Ismailia,Egypt.
 ::.scnptlons
:r rddition to
- :s."^i It still 2
-. -\rabia gave
, :rd ,\Iedina.
:..:.. it seemed
: ::.ller worth ENGLAND' S BROTHERS
... :nd Abduh
: ::: ne nt With
-.-r in ne r t i c -

- : ',tsion of a
: the British
, - : rr met with

rrsm a base
,:::land,and IN rrs posr-Wonro \Var I struggleto maintain its empire,Great
: .rnchorfor Britain made deals with many devils. From the late rgzos until the
\ ahhabism, failed invasion of Suezin 1956, those pacts included support for rwo
-,ri. force.It fledgling Islamist movements in Egypt and Palestine.In Egypt, in
:roselytized t928, a young Islamic scholarnamed Hassanal-Bannafounded the
: r, Islamhad Muslim Brotherhood,the organizationthat would changethe course
- -- : -ltrcalforce Middle East.And his palestinian
of history in the rwentieth-cenrury
- .. .::::.l.tiveanti- confrdre was Haj Amin al-Husseini, the demagogicmufti of Jeru-
-:.: the seeds salem.Both Banna and Haj Amin would play imporrant roles in the
: t\':rered and growth of Islamism in the decadesafter Vorld \WarI-and, like the
: --: !::rish i ntelli- Saudiroyal family both owed rheir start to British support.
"--r : .,.i1sown by Banna'sMuslim Brotherhood was establishedwith a grant from
- - -.:iamentalist England's Suez Canal Compan5 and over the next quarter cenrury
-:- -- ::r SaudiAra- British diplomats, the intelligenceserviceMI6, and Cairo's Anglophilic
King Farouq would use the Muslim Brotherhood as a cudgel againsr
Egypt's communists and nationalists-and later against president
Gamal Abdel Nasser.Meanwhile, in Palestine,Haj Amin, the Nazi-
leaning,viciously anti-Semiticfirebrand, climbed to power beginning in
the rgzos with overt backing from the British overseersof the Palestine
Mandate. Together,Banna and Haj Amin would be responsiblefor the

t
 IR D t - t 'r r 's Cer,tr

worldwide spreadof political Islam. The two men tied Wahhabi-style

ultra-orthodoxy to the pan-Islamicidealsof Jamal Eddine al-Afghani
and-with Saudi funding-created the global enterprisethat spawned
Islam'sradicalright, includingits terroristwirrg.
London's relationshipwith the Muslim Brotherhooclwas complex.
Although the British supported the organization at its founding,
and although the org:rnizationmay have receivedsupport from Brit-
ish intelligencein tire subsequentyears,the Brotherhood-and politi-
cal Islam-was only one force in an ever-shiftingpolitical universein
Egypt and the broader Middle East. The British and the king used
Banna'sgroup-especially its underground,paramilitary arm and its
assassins-whenit suited them, but kept a wary eye on the organiza-
tion, which sometimesturned againstthem. As the Muslim Brother-
hood gained strength,eventuallvclaiming severalhundred thousand
membersin Egypt alone, with branchesin Jerusalem,Damascus,and
Amman, it becamean important player in Egyptianpolitics.As such' it
drew attention from a number of foreign intelligenceservicesover the
years,from the Nazis and the KGB to the U.S. Office of StrategicSer-
vicesand the CIA.
The Muslim Brotherhood explodedonto the sceneat a time when
British power in the Near East, though nearly universal, was also
unsettled.
As the smoke clearedafter World \Var I, England reignedsupreme
in the region,but uneasilyso. The flag of the British empirewas every-
where from the Mediterranean to India. A new generationof kings
and potentates ruled a string of British-dominated colonies, man-
dates, vassal states,and semi-independentfiefdoms in Egypt, Iraq,
Transjordan, Arabia, and Persia.To varying degrees,those monar-
chieswere beholdento London, but not without occasional,tentative
attempts to claim some author:ity for themselves.The kings were
trapped between two conflicting forces: on the one hand, in each of
those states,an anti-monarchicalnationalistmovement beganto take
shape; on the other hand, the British Foreign Office and London's
colonial officials were breathing down their necks.Juggling factions
like ballsin the air.the Britishspentthe yearsbetweenr9r8 and r945
 England's Brotbers 10

,ri. j-stvle trying to balance the king, the tribal leaders,the emerging middle
- \'_
fo-''"-
h rn-'i classes,the armg and the clergyin eachof thesestates,alwayswith an
.:'.1\\'ned eye toward preservingBritish power. sometimesthe king would get
too srrong,and form an alliancewith the army; in that casethe British
- - ,nrpler. would try to break the allianceof king and generalsby favoring tribal
-- - ,.incline, chieftainsinstead. somerimes,if the tribes or ethnic groups gor roo
- -- .:r Brit- uppitS the British would deputizethe army to crush them.
- ' i politi- The Islamic right emer:ged
amid this shifting balance.It provided a
: . 'l '.'c-fSe ln vital counterweight to England'schief nemeses:the nationalistsand
- : ' , . : l tlS ed the secularleft.
S
'-':- ,rnd its
:- - - {Jn l za -
.' - 'ljrot he r- Is lel,.'s ANTI-NATtoNALrsrs
': - ..l rl t lS X t ld

.-' =. -us . a n d The Muslim Brotherhood,founded in .'gzg by Hassanal-Banna,was

: - -. . . lrC h ,i t the direct outgrowth of the pan-Islamic movemenr of Afghani and
, . - , r'e r th e Abduh. The transmissionbelt for that influencewas Rashid Rida, a
'- -
: -gic Se r- Syrian who had arrived in Egypt in fi97. Rashid Rida, who had
receiveda religious education in Tripoli, in what is now Lebanon's
. : ::l: rr-hen Sunni stronghold, had been an avid follower of The Indissoluble
: ', .rs alscr Bond, Afghani and Abduh's weekly,and when he arrived in cairo he
sought out Abduh, rhe soon-to-be mufti of Egypt, and becamehis
- : , . .'e lP f e I Tle chief acolyte. In 1898, Rashid Rida founded the publication Tbe
- - '. .:.severy- Lighthouse,l a weekly eight-page newspaper that was explicitly
. ,- ,,1 kings aimed at carrying on the tradition of the pan-Islamic Bond. Unlike
'-
: :. lTlllIl- Afghani and Abduh, who operated through secretsocieries,under-
l -.:t. Iraq, ground groups, and the Masonic movemenr,Rashid Rida advocated
-
-: lllO i l i l f - the establishmentof an aboveground"Islamic Society,"with its head-
- , . :i'ntiltive quartersat Mecca and with branchesin everyMuslim country.2
.:ris \vere Though Rashid Rida never managed to found the society he
:. :: r'llCh tlf r.vanted-that would awair Hassan al-Banna-he createdthe Societyof
. - ,': t o ta ke Propagandaand Guidanceas an early forerunnerof the Muslim Broth-
-: , - , rn cl o n 's crhood.At the time, Abduh enjoyedthe patronageof Lord cromer, the
- absoluteruler of Egypt at the rurn of the century,and the work of
- :.rctions
. r: r. l r Rashid Rida could not have occurred without British acquiescence.
94 5
 50 . D s v r r - 's Gaur.

According to C. C. Adams, The Ligbthouseconsisrenrlyattackedthe

nascentnationalist movement in Egypt, which was secularin nature,
and the nationalists hit back at Rashid Rjda. The Lishthouse also
welcomedthe growth of Saudipower:

A new star of hope has appearedwith the rise of the 'Wahhabi

dynastyof Ibn Saudin Arabia.The Governmentof Ibn Saudis the
greatestMuslim power in the world today,sincethe fall of the
Ottoman dynastyand the transformationof the Governmentof
the Turks into a governmentwithout religion,and it is the only
governmentthat will give aid to the Sunnahand repudiateharm-
ful innovationsand anti-relieionism.3

Nationalists, in both Egypt and Turkey, were deemed "atheists and

infidels" by Rashid Rida.a
The Societyof Propagandaand Guidance,and its relatedInstitute
of Propaganda and Guidance,were establishedin Cairo with financ-
ing from wealthy Arabs from India. Irs enrolleesincluded studenrs
from as far away as Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Central Asia, and
EastAfrica. They formed a secondwave of the internationalcadrefor
an Islamist movement,after the secretsocietiestied to The Indissolu-
ble Bond. Prominent Egyptian sheikhs and orher religious leaders
formed what came to be known as the "Lighthouse Party," made up
of followers of Abduh and Rashid Rida collected around Al Azhar
and including various leadersof the mysrical Sufi brotherhoods.In
opposition to the new Narionalist PartS they helped establisna sec-
ond Egyptian political formation called the Peoples Party, which
included followers of Abduh and Rashid Rida. The PeoplesParty,
reputedly createdwith British supporr, openly supported the British
occupation of Egypt, and it won plaudits from Lord Cromer, who
describedits membersas a "small but increasingnumber of Egyptians
of whom comparativelylittle is heard." In his 19o6 Annual Report,
Lord Cromer wrote: "The main hope of EgyptianNationalism, in the
only true and practicablesenseof the word, lies, in my opinion, with
thosewho belongto this party."5
Rashid Rida's chief acolytewas Hassanal-Banna.
It is impossibleto overestimarethe importance and legacyof Hassan

: : . . . .ke d th e
: : : l na tu re ,
.'- , ll-.e a l so
' .'.
, . : iirl b i
. . , . i\ rh e
-, , f th e
:''- - ' : : l t Of
- -: r t rllv
: -::l, lrlT l -
',:::;ists and
:::.r Institute
., .:h hnanc-
---:: \tlldents
:: . \rirr, and
--,. ;lclre for
' 1l
, , i Llt ssolu-
- ..: leirders
-..'irrldeup
, -r \l Azhar
: - : : : lr l Od S. In
.: r . '. 15 ha se c -
. r: : r. rvh i ch
: . : rcs Pa rty ,
:: * : he Bri ti sh
: ,nter, who
- l--s v n t i e n q
.-:-,r,rlReport,
'.., rsm.in the
:::rion. with
:.:.-'.()tHassan
England'sBrotbers . 5r
al-Banna. The twenty-first-century War on Terrorism is a war against
the offspring of Banna and his Brothers.They show up everywhere-in
the attorney general'soffice in Sudan, on Afghanistan'sbattlefields,in
Hama in Syria,atop SaudiArabia'suniversities,in bomb-makingfacto-
riesin Gaza,as ministersin the governmentof Jordan,in posh banking
centersin the Gulf sheikhdoms,and in the post-SaddamHusseinsov-
ernment of Iraq.
To get the Muslim Brotherhood off the ground, the Suez Canal
Company helpedBanna build the mosquein Ismailiathat would serve
as its headquartersand base of operations, according to Richard
Mitchell's The Societyof tbe Muslim Brothers.6The fact that Banna
createdthe organizationin Ismailia is itself significant.Ismailia,today
a city of zoo,ooo at the northern end of the canal, was founded in
r863 by Ferdinand de Lesseps,the canal's builder. For England, the
SuezCanal was the indispensableroute to its prize possession,India,
and in t9z8 the sleepybackwater town happenedto house not only
the company's offices but a major British military base built during
World'War I. It was also, in the r9zos, a center of pro-British senti,
ment in Egypt.
Mitchell reports that Banna was closely associatedwith Rashid
Rida.7Banna'sfarher,an influentialscholar,was a studentof Abduh's,
and Banna himself avidly readThe Lighthouse as a young man, larer
calling Rashid Rida one of the "greatestinfluencesin the serviceof
Islam in Egypt."8 The relationship between Afghani, Abduh, and
Rashid Rida was seenby Banna as a kind of BlessedTrinit,v.Accord-
ing to Mitchell: "Afghani was seen [by Banna] as the 'caller' or
'announcer'and Rida as the 'archivist' or'historian.' . . . Afghani sees
the problems and warns, Abduh teachesand thinks ('a well-meaning
shaykh who inspired reforms in the Azhar'), and Rida wrires and
records."eThe Lightbouse halted publication soon after the death of
Rashid Rida in 1935, but in 1939 Banna revived it in tribute to his
mentor.lo
The political program of the early Muslim Brotherhoodwas hardly
complex.Bannainsistedthat Muslims should rerurn ro the simpledays
that prevailed during the era of the Prophet Muhammad and his
immediate successors, rejecting modern scholarly interpretationsof
 5z D F . r , r r . 's Cievr.

Islamic law and what he saw as the \Testernizedimpurity of thought

that had startedto beguileMuslims, especiallyyouth. For Banna, the
Koran was enough. "Confronted bv the Egyptian nationalistsof the
Ir9zos]-who demandedindependence, the departureof the British,
and a democraticconstitution-the Brothersrespondedwith a slogan
that is still current in the Islamistmovement:'The Koran is our constl-
tution."'1r Indeed,the Koran and the Sunna (the tradition associated
with the prophet's way of life) were enough to guide society,and
Islamic law (sharia)could replaceman-made,secularjurisprudence.
Yet Banna had a very weakly developedconcept of an Islamic state,
whose elaboration would await his heirs: Sayyid Qutb, Pakistan's
Abul-Ala Mawdudi, Khomeini, et al. Accordingto Mitchell, for Banna:

The political structureof the lslamic statewas to be bound by

threeprinciples: (r) theQuranis thefundamental (z)
constitution;
governmentoperateson the conceptof consultation(shurdl;3)
the executiveruler is bound by the teachingsof Islamand the will
of thepeople.r2

Islam, for Banna, was an all-encompassing, cultlike systemof belief.

purists,and the Sufis,
Referringto the Salafiyya,the back-to-the-basics
the mystical,Freemason-like movementwithin lslirm, Bannadescribed
his movementthus: "a Salafiyvamessage,a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a
political organization,an athleticgroup, a culturai-educationalunion,
an economiccompany,and a socialidea."ll
In 1932,Bannamovedto Cairo and established the Muslim Broth-
erhood in the Egyptian capital. For the next twenty years, until the
revolutionof 1952,the Brotherhoodwould serveas an anchor of the
Egyptianright, allied to the palace,to the right wing of the nationalist
\fafd Party, and to conservativeofficers in the Egyptian army. In
1933, Banna convened the organization'sfirst national conference,
which took place in Cairo. Soon afterward, youth clubs and athletic
associationstied to the Muslim Brotherhood beganto form paramili-
tary units, first called the Rovers in ry36. Erplicitly organizedalong
the lines of European fascistmovements,the Rovers (later called the
Battalions),14
were a unique presencein Egypt: disciplined,menaclng,
 England'sBrothers 5l

- irt and utterly devoted to Banna. In r937, at the coronation of King

,: . : it e Farouq, the Brotherhood'sthugs were enlistedto provide "order and
security" for the king's ceremony.l'5
- -. l. The Muslim Brotherhood'schief rival between the wars was rhe
' i.] ll nationalist Delegation(\7afd) Party.Assembledfrom the ranks of the
. :l : t i - pre-'STorldWar I anti-Britishpolitical movement,the'Wafd Party was
---l
"- -r , named for the "delegation" led by Saad Zaghlul, who attended the
-Ll
- ..,1 postwar conferencesat which the victorious imperialistsdecidedthe
future of the region,creatingentirestatesand assigningthem ro vari-
ous Europeancapitals.The'Wafd, as a coalition, had left-, center,and
.- -1rl ) right-wing components,and it variously aligned itself for or against
I r-':1.1: the monarchy and other Egyptian political forces over rhe years.The
Wafd left would eventuallytoy with an alliancewith Egypt'scommu-
nists,while the smallerright wing of the \7afd often maintainedsecret
relationswith the Brotherhood.
For the next decade, Banna played a complex game of three-
dimensionalchessin Egyptian poiitics. He enjoyedintimate relations
with the royal entouragearound King Farouq, getting financial sup-
: al. port and political assistanceand providing the king with intelligence
. f< and shock troops againstthe left. "Certainly by the 194osthe Ikhwan
- . .-,1 has an on-and-off close relationship with the palace, and a lot of
.. : : -.. 11 money was changing hands, and the British would be involved in
that," says .|oel Gordon, a Muslim Brotherhood expert. "Anything
the palacedoesis linked to the British."16Banna also developedclose
ties to two key Egyptian officials,Prime Minister Ali Mahir, an ardenr
advocate of pan-Islamism, and General Aztz Ali Misri, the com-
mander in chief of the Egyptian armed forces.Through various chan-
nels, mostly secret,Banna was connectedto the palace, sometimes
through the king's personalphysician,or through various government
officials or the army. He was consulted by the king on the appoint-
ment of Egyptian prime ministers,and at least once receivedan offi-
cial invitation to a royal banquet.
"The Societyof the Brothers,"wrote Mitchell, "was obviouslycon-
ceivedof as an instrument againstthe Wafd and the communists."lT
Right-wing \Tafdists,primarily big landownersand capitalists,viewed
 j4 'D p . v r r '. (irrrr

the Muslim Brotherhood as an ally, while the mainstream wafdists

consideredthe Brotherhood a reactionarvforce.ts

THs BRoTHER HooD's SscnET AppARATUS

During world \il/ar II, the Muslim Brotherhood first establishedits

intelligence service and a secret, terrorist-inclined unit called the
SecretApparatus. "The intelligenceservicegathered information at
military installations,foreign embassies,government offices,ancl so
on," a r95os analystwrote.leThis clandestineunit is what gavethe
Brotherhood its well-deservedrepuration for violence. created in
1942, over the next twelveyears(until it was smashedby Nasser),it
would assassinatejudges, police officers, and government officials,
burn and ransack Egyptian Jewish businesses, and engagein goon-
squad attacks on labor unions and communists. Throughout this
period, the Brotherhood operated mostly in alliance with the Egyp-
tian king, using its paramilitary force on his behalf and against his
political enemies.As the king began ro lose his grip, the Muslim
Brotherhooddistanceditself from Farouq while maintaining shadowy
ties to the army and to foreign intelligenceagencies-and always
opposed to the left. According to Mitchell, the Apparatus operared
preciselythe way an Egyptian intelligenceunit would: ,,ln t94q the
secretapparatus also began to infiltrate the communist movemenr,
which during the war had taken on new life and which the Muslim
Brothersconsideredto be one of their principal enemies."20
without doubt, rhe vast majority of the membershipof the Mus-
lim Brotherhood was zealouslydedicatedto the creation of a right-
wing Islamic governmenr, and they were militantly opposed to
imperialism.Yet the leadershipof the Brotherhood played politics at
the highest level, collaborating with the palace,rhe secularpolitical
parties, the army, and the imperial powers. rfhether the Muslim
Brotherhood's leaders were indeed true believers who decided to
make their own temporary deals with the world's Great satans, or
whether they were cynical politicians and evenoutright agentsof for-
eign powers, is not known for certain. But there seemslittle doubt
 England's Brctthers j 5

\\ rrfdists that while some leadersof the organizationwere sincere,otherswere

double-dealersand agents.
The Brotherhood existed in a kind of political netherworld. Its
overt branch, and its political stars-above all, Banna himself-
hobnobbed with kings and generals,while its covert branch engaged
As long as the Brotherhood'svio-
in espionageand assassinations.
- : : . t \ h e d i ts lencewas aimed at the enemiesof the king and the British, it managed
' - rlle d th e to operatewith impunity.'$fhen it crossedthe line, as it did from time
: -: rr. rti o n a t to time, the governmentwould crack down on it or ban it temporar-
:- ,: . . a l n d SO ily. At other times, when it was either useful to the palace or to the
- , : l. rYe th e army, or when it was simply too powerful, it was tolerated and even
: . : ete d i n supportedhy the regime.Throughout its entire cxistence.roo, the
- \ , r rse r), i t Muslim Brotherhood had an ace-in-the-hole,namely, the political
' : 'r , ffi ci a l s, support and money it receivedfrom the Saudi royal family and the
:-: l i l gO O n- Wahhabi establishment.
, - ')Lrtthis The Muslim Brotherhood was organizedinto cells,or "families,"
-' ri l-gyp- groups of five to seven members who "underwent indoctrination
, . _.,.
ilrst his and systematic,sometimesextendedmilitary training in the various
- '. \luslim branchesof guerrilla warfare to qualify as 'activebrothers.'When the
- - .lrrlowy training was completed,they were instructedto pretendthat thev had
-r.,. rln'ays given up their membershipin the Brotherhood and to join someother
: . ,nerated organizationactivein religiousaffairs or sports."2l
" The British, with two centuriesof deep ini.olvementin religious
- .r-14the
- -- -i c[tCt-]tr and tribal politics,were well aware of the power of Islamism.A British
:- - \lLrslim intelligenceofficer tied to the king recognizedthe power of the Islamic
'Vfar
revivalat the end of World II. MI6's David "Archie" Boylewas liai-
- : rc \'lus- son to Farouq'schef de cabinetHasseneinPasha,a British intelligence
- .r right- asset.Boyle "sensedthe 'murmuring resurgenceof Moslem renais-
.-: ,sed tO sance,which as in 1919 was again in t946 commencingto affect the
: * : 'litics at -\'tiddleEasterncountriesas a whole. This time it was to be coupled
- ," :oiitical u.ith the race for oil.'"22 The British embassy,and later the U.S.
:-. \Iusiirn imbassyin Cairo, had regularcontactwith Banna'sBrotherhood.
- : ;:tl ed tO After World rWarII, the faltering Farouq regime lashedout against
: . \ .::.1 nS, O f rhe left, in an intensecampaign of repressionaimed at the commu-
::: :. of for- :rists.The Cold'War was beginning.Prime Minister Ismail Sidqi of
, .' doubt Eg)pt, who was installedas head of the governmentwith the support
 5 6 . D rvrr' s Gaur

of Banna, openly funded the Muslim Brotherhood, and provided deliveryimpr..,

training camps for its shock troops. Its sweepinganti-left campaign be a religioLr.. -
was enthusiasticallybacked by the Brothers: decent,and:, .,
Muslim Brot:,.
In this campaignthe Muslim Brotherhood,bitterly antagonisticto which the 5,::
the communists,could join wholeheartedly.Their pressreported
arrangeX ll-::l
the courseof the governmentalcampaignin a daily columnenritled,
Rashad,il . :
'The Fight Against Communism.'The 'intelligence'of the Society
passedon information useful to the governmenrin its continual meetingdrc:::
nrund-upsof real and suspected communists, especiallyin labour Banna, thg', ..
and universitycircles.2s BannaStrlrtr- :
$u1 11-.1r: ..:
In addition, the Brothers organizedright-wing trade unions, under- trating iti I: .:
mined strike actions, and bitterly opposed the Wafd nationalists I t was 2 CLl, t . l
(often secretly in conjunction with the 'Wafd's right). Concludes lt was a p- l- . - .
Mitchell: "For the momgnt, the palace,the conservativeheadsof gov- t hat was r , '. : :
ernment,and the Muslim Brotherhood sharedcommon foes:commu- What is clc, , :
nism and the \fafd."2a Soviet s h: - : -
Anrvar Sadat,the future Egyptian president,was a key member of m anY r lgn: - '.
the Muslim Brotherhood in the r94os. During World'War II he was including : . . i
associatedwith a loosely organizedmovement of junior officersthat, m an Nilzt ::
in t949, rvas formally estabiishedby Nasser as the Egyptian Free Cent r ir l I r : : . :
Officers in the wake of the Palestinewar and who seizedpower from ing Worl.l \''.':
the king in 1952. The Free Officersincluded men from a wide variety I nt eliigen; . - .
of ideologies,from communistsand left-wing nationaliststo lTafdists per hir ps \ 'I . . : *
and members of the Muslim Brotherhood, all united in their belief t he r 9: c: . : ^. *
that Farouq was hopelesslycorrupt and servile.England'simperious I sl. r m ist s: : . . - : -
treatment of Farouq during the war by British ambassadorMiles c ] es. sttt.t.i.: ::-.
Lampson-who reportedly2scalled the young Farouq "boy" to his n hen \ i. . . - ,
face-had enragedthem, and they maintainedcontact with one another . eaUf lt r . : : . -
in the postwar years. " Soun. l : ': . , :
Sadat, a right-wing member of Nasser'sFree Officers movement, , r r r est cJ : : : .
was the liaison between the dissidentmilitary officers and Banna, and : r r t ed. . r t r :
during the war Sadat conducted regular rere-e-rCtes with the Brother- i C 11C C
i r-i ' . -:' .
hood founder. In his autobiography, In Searchof ldentity, Sadat pro- rlou n --:.
vided a detailedaccountof his relationshipro Banna.26Sadatwarmly \ .- --
1\ i- a-..

praisesBanna:"His understandingof religion [was] profound, and his . r ) uld : r : - - . -

 England's Brotbers - j7

, : . , ind p ro vi ded deliveryimpressive.He was indeedqualified,from all points of view, to

: '. : f t ca mp aign be a religiousleader.Besides,he was a true Egyptian:good-humored,
decent,and tolerant. . . . I was struck by the perfect organization of the
Muslim Brotherhood, and by the respect,evenextraordinar,vrevercncc,
: - : .1ir)O
. l St l C tO
which the Supreme Guide commanded."27ln 1945 Sadat tried to
- - : : : f e p o fte d arrange a meeting between Banna and King Farouq, through Yusuf
-t::::rentitled,
- ::le Society
Rashad,a contact of Sadat'sand the king's personalphysician.That
- : - a(rn ti n u a l meeting didn't happen, but in a frank discussionbetweenSadat and
. . : ir l a b o u r Banna, they agreed to cooperatein building the Free Officers, and
Banna started recruiting military officersfor the group.28
But was Banna recruiting membersfor the Free Officers-or infil-
.:rions,under- trating it? It isn't clear.The Brotherhood was more than a movement.
: nirtionalists It was a cult, it was a revivalistparty, it was an intelligenceoperation,
- . . Concludes it was a paramilitary unit, and it was an international organization
, :eadsof gov- that was rapidly building branchesin many Middle East countries.
' i , eS :C O m mU- 'What
is clear is that during the r94os, the British, the Nazis, and the
Soviets had thoroughly penetratedthe Brotherhood. In the 191'os,
, r :'. ntembefof many right-wing Arab nationalists and many on the Islamic right,
" - .',,'-rr
II he was including the Brotherhood, found succor and support in ties to Ger-
id
,ilIl(-t5- ^ - ^ -LLll<^-
11, man Nazi intelligence.According to Miles Copeland, a legendary
- E .r ll- -
-
- -. ^ . ; . -
- i\ l'Lla rl
r Central IntelligenceAgency operativewho spent yearsin Egypt, dur-
: :*:Owerfrom ing'World'Vfar II Banna'sorganization "had beenvirtually a German
^ r ,,,.'ide
variety Intelligenceunit."2e In saying so, Copeland no doubt exaggerates,
.:) io V/afdists perhaps willfully, though countlessIslamistshad Nazi affiliations in
: - :- iheir belief the r93os and r94os. After \7orld'War II, many of the Nazi-linked
: .* : imperious Islamistsmigrated back to British, and then into Anglo-Americancir-
-- ,-:.ttior Miles cles, sometimeswith generousfinancial inducements.In the r9 jos,
, '-1t\'" to his when Nasser arrestedthe leadershipof the Muslim Brotherhood, his
:r. , )neilnother security servicesfound out how tangled were the organization'sties.
"Sound beatingsof Muslim Brotherhood organizerswho had been
--,i : lllO Y em e nt, arrested revealedthat the organization had been thoroughly pene-
'
,: - : BJnna, and trated, at the top, by British, American, French, and Soviet intelli-
:- :he Brother- genceservices,any one of which could either make active use of it or
: r ,".. S.rdirtpro- blow it up, whichever best suitedits purpose," wrote Copeland.30
, '-rJ.tt warmly As it becameevermore clear to London and Washingtonthat Farouq
:' .rnd.and his could not survive, the searchfor an alternativeregime developed.The

G
 D rvrr' s Gel rr,

main options were first, the combination of the Wafd and rhe commu- -\lLrslinrF:
nists; and second,the secretivealliancebetweenthe Muslim Brother- ,: rhc r: :
hood and the military officers.Neither the British nor the Americans :: i:i. :::. - ,
wanted the'sfafd-communisroption; the British seemedinsisrenton
propping up the monarchy, while the Americans opted for supporting
Nasser'sFreeOfficers.The Brotherhood,with ties to both the monar-
chy and the Free Officers,played a double game.
The \Vafd Party itself was divided into competing factions and
plaguedby corruption. Yer an importanr sectionof the'Wafdsoughtan
alliancewith the left and the communists,which worried the palace,the
British-and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brothers worked hard to
destroy any possibility of a \Wafd-communisraxis, and the \Vafd struck
back at the Brotherhood,portraying Banna'sthugs as beingin the pay of
the British and the pro-British prime minisrer,Ismail sidqi. The commu-
nists and the'wafd accused.theMuslim Brotherhood of being "rools of
the imperialists." The \Vafd charged that "phalanxes of the Muslim
Brothers" were carrying out "acts of fascistterror." It called for disso-
lution of the Brotherhood's (government-funded)paramilitary unirs,
and it documentednume.rousinsrancesof strike-breakingby Muslim
Brotherhood goons.31But the Brotherhood would gain strength from
an unexpecteddirection in r948: the war in Palestine.

BaUNA A ND THe Mur,rr

The Arab-Jewishwar strengthenedthe Muslim Brotherhood immensely.

It was a chaotic moment in the Middle East, as a new Jewish narion
establisheditself on part of the territory of British-occupiedpalestine.
The war, the defeatof Arab armies by paramilitary Jewish units, and
the creation of Israel forever changedthe dynamic of politics in the
Middle East, and it spurred political Islam in severalways. First, the
Brotherhood created paramilitary units during the war itself, forces
that won official backing from Arab srares-and, like the Afghan jihad
of the r98os, created legions of battle-hardenedIslamist veterans.
Second,the Arab defeat discreditedthe Arab regimes,including the
monarchies. It created space for new political forces such as the
 England's Brothers 59

- * :he commu- Muslim Brotherhood, and the fledglingIslamiststook full advantage

'...im Brother- of the propaganda value that attachedto the loss of Palestine.And
:.r: -\mericans third, the Islamists generatedpolitical capital by raising the alarm
:: rnsistenton over the Jewish threat to Jerusalemand its Islamic holy places and
: supporting usedthat threat as a rallying cry.
::. rhe monar- The war also bolstered ties between the Brotherhood and another
key British-sponsored Muslim operative, the conspiratorial, Nazi-
: :-rctionsand leaning mufti of Jerusalem,Haj Amin al-Husseini.Their connection
,'.,::dsoughtan went back more than a decade. Haj Amin had his first recorded
:.-.-palace,the encounterwith the Muslim Brotherhood as far back as r935, when
:-ed hard to he met Banna's brother, Abdel-Rahman al-Banna, who'd helped
.. \\'afd struck Banna found the group and who headed its SecretApparatus.32Like
- : :r the payof Banna,Haj Amin played an immenselyimportant role in founding the
: Tne commu- twentieth-centuryIslamic fundamentalistpolitical movement.
-:::lg "tools of The creation of Israelspurredmore than Islamism,of course,pro-
: :re Muslim viding fodder for Arab nationalists,suchas Nasser,who wanted to rid
. .i for disso- the Arab world of its fraternity of dissolutekings. For nationalists,
:-..-:tarr-
units, Israelwas a symbol of Arab weaknessand semi-colonialsubjugation,
- : rr -\{uslim overseenby proxy kings in Egypt,Jordan, Iraq, and SaudiArabia. But
::::ngth from Banna and the Brothers argued that the Arab nationalists were
wrong, that no solution could be found in secular nationalism and
nation building, and certainly not in Westernization.The only way to
restorethe former glory of the Islamic world was to return to funda-
mentalistIslam, they proclaimed.
A multidimensionalstrugglewas developingthat would decidethe
future of the Middle East.The Islamistswere just one of many forces
competing against one another: There were the nationalists,the left
including the growing Arab communist parties),the secularintellec-
: -: . Jn i ts, and ruals,and the urban working class;there were the wealthy merchants
-rnd businessmenengagedin internationaltrade and commerce;there
ri'ere traditional elites, tribal leaders,and aristocratic landowners;
,rnd last, there were the monarchiesand their armies.The burgeoning
- \ishan jihad Islamistswere a kind of wild card: Bitterly opposedto the nationalists
--.->:\'eterans. -rndthe left, they maintainedties to the traditional elitesand had the
:-.;iLrdrng
the .upport of many merchants,and they also had covert allianceswith
.rrmr-officersand royals. For the British, and the Johnny-come-lately

I
 6o . D p - v r r . 's G.q.r.rn

Americans,it was hard to know where to place one'sbets.The pales-

tine war had vastlycomplicatedthe Anglo-Americancalculations,since
both the left-nationalistforces and the Islamistsblamed "the \(/esr"
for the Israelidebacle.
The Brotherhood grew by leaps and bounds in the lare r94os.
Banna'sson-in-law,Said Ramadan,helpedorganizechaptersin Pales-
tine and Transjordan.Under cover of arming themselvesfor war with
the Zionists, the Brotherscollectedand stored stockpilesof weap'ns,
often supplied by membersof the SecrerApparatus who had ries to
the Egyptian army. And the Banna-Haj Amin alliance,forged in rhe
crucible of the Palesrinewar, helpedthe Brotherse-xrendtheir reach into
Syria,Jordan,Lebanon,and Palestine.
To say Haj Amin al-Husseinihad a checkeredcareeris an under-
statement.His paranoid worldview, centeredon fiercehatred of Jews,
and his open support for Hitler make him an object of scorn by histo-
rians. But from the beginning Haj Amin was a British creation. He
exerciseda spell over generationsof British spooks, including Freya
Stark, a legendaryBritish intelligenceoperative who describedHaj
Amin in almost reverentialterms: "The Mufti sat there all in white,
spotlessand voluminous, a man in his early forties, wearing his tur-
ban like a halo. His eyeswere light blue and shining, with a sorr of
radiance,as of a just fallenLucifer."3.l
Hal Amin's careerbeganmodestl,v,ro say the least. A scion of an
important Arab Palesrinianfamily, he studied at Egypt's Al Azhar
Islamic university,br-rtdidn't do well and failed to finish. After \7orld
\Var I, he took a job with the Reutersnews agencyin Jerusalem,as a
translator-Gradually,he immersedhimself in Palestinianpolitics, bur
he showed a flair both for violenceand for fanatical,anti-Jewishcon-
spiracytheories,among them the Prorocolsof the Eldersof Zion. He
was arrestedfor his role in anti-Jewishriots, but in t9zo, Sir Herbert
Samuel,the British High Commissionerfor Palestine(and a Jew),
singledhim out for a dramatic specialpardon, and then "engineered
his spectacularrise to power."3aThough Haj Amin's credentialsas an
Islamic scholarwere nil, Sir Ronald Srorrs,the governor of Jerusalem,
rigged an election on his behalf and then appointed Haj Amin as
 England's Brothers ot

: . Th e Pa l es - Jerusalem'smufti. According to the Political Dictionary of the Middle

: . it()n s,sl n c e East in the zoth CenturY,a mufti is a
. 'rhe N(/est"
Muslim religiousofficial who issuesrulings (fatwa), in general
.1tr- r g4os. in responseto questions.In most Islamiccountriesthe mufti is
government-appointed. A mufti has a highly respected statusand
t:r-: ir-tPales-
greatspiritualand socialinfluence,but playsno executiveor polit-
: ,r n-irr with
Hai Amin
ical role.An exceptionto this wasthe mufti of Jerusalem,
'r \\'e a p ons , al-Husseini (appointed r9zr, dismissed r937), who exploitedhis
:rlcl ties to positionto consolidate his politicalleadership.ss
- : . ge di n the
: :. t'cachinto A year later, Herbert Samuelestablishedthe SupremeMuslim Coun-
cil, which assumedcontrol of Palestine'srich religious endowments,
- : .1ll under-
and named Haj Amin president.The two posts gave the erratic Mus-
: -r.1o1-Jews, lim demagogueenormouspolitical power.35
- :.::I.r'histo- Parallel with the establishmentof the Muslim Brotherhood, in
- -:.rtion.He t93:. Haj Amin convenedan Islamic Congressin Jerusalemand trav-
- . :irre Freya eled to India, Iran, Afghanistan)and other Muslim countries' raising
- -.-:-ri.edHaj funds and building support. He enioyeda modicum of British support
, , in u,hite, and protection even as he veered into a political alliance with Ger-
":'g his tur- many; when sixty Arab militants were arrestedin Palestinein 1936
: r ,t srtrt of clur:ingan anti-British rebellion, Hai Amin-who'd taken part in the
revolt-went free.37Eventually,his Nazi sympathiesforcedhim to flee,
- '-l()n Ot an lirst to l-ebanon,then to Iraq, then to lran,"andfinally-after pledging
. \1 .\zhar .\dolf Hitler his "loyal collaboration in all sphere5"38-to Berlin. In
--::rr Vorld Germany,Haj Amin oversaw Axis propaganda broadcastsinto the
- -.,icnr,as a \Iiddle East, directed a network of espionageagents,and organized
: .rrics,but .rll-Muslimunits of the Nazi SS,madeup mainly of Bosnians.
- -',','rsh
con- With the collapseof the Third Reich, however,the mufti quietly
- : Zion. He iclt Germany via Switzerland, settling in France' where the Allies
.. i - Herbert lcfused to zlrrestor detain him. The British, in particular,declinedto
.r a Jew), .crk his extradition, and Great Britain's undersecretatyfot foreign
'r:rqineered ,'.tt.rirsmade a point of saying:"The mufti is not a war criminal."seIn
, -'.:i.rlsas an r u46. Haj Amin al-Husseiniarrived in triumph in Egypt, where he
- J:ruSalem, ',i'ls u,elcornedas a guest of the king. "The new shrine of political
-:: -\rlin as I'ierrr is the mufti's house,Villa Aida, near Roushdy PashaStation of
 *tlil

6z I ) r . v i r 's Gar.rs

the street car line that runs out from Alexandria to the suburb of
Ramleh," a lrlew York Tintes report in August 1946 proclaimed.
"There is an Egyptian soldier about every eight or ten yards around
the garden, and the mufti has private bodyguardsinside."a0Another
report said that the mufti's political work was "lavishly financed" by
SaudiArabia's King Abdel Aziz and Egypt'sKing Farouq.ar
Apparentl5 the British didn't hold a grudge against the mufti,
becausethey soon hired him as a propagandist.In Cairo, British intelli-
gencehad establishedthe Arab News Agencyand the Near EastBroad-
castingStation (NEABS),whose "first director was Squadron-Leader
Alfred Marsack, a devout Muslim who had servedin the Middle East
beforethe war and who had devotedthe best part of his life to Arab
affairs,and had evenconvertedto Islam."42Perhapsimpressedby his
experienceas a Nazi broadcaster,the MI6 outlet hired Haj Amin. The
man who oversawNEABS, through MI6's Near EastAssociation,was
Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, an aristocraticBritish banker who'd headed
the Arab Bureau,the Cairo headquartersof British intelligenceduring
World'Vfar I and T. E. Lawrence'sbaseof operations.a3
ln t946, the mufti and the Muslim Brotherhood jointly organized
a paramilitary force in Palestinecalled the Rescuers,with up to
ro,ooo men under arms.a4The Rescuerswere either tolerated or
ignored by the British authorities.In Egypt, meanwhile, Banna and
the mufti establisheda working relationship. One of the Muslim
Brotherhood's military units, stationed in Gaza, was put under the
command of a Sudaneseaide to the mufti.ai And in Cairo, Hassanal-
Banna backed Haj Amin as rhe head of a new Palestinegovernment.
Perhapsthe high point of the mufti's careercamewith his triumphant
return to Gaza in September1947, where he proclaimed the state of
Palestineand himself as "Presidentof the Republic."a6With the Arab
defeat by Jewish forces, however,Haj Amin's fledgling state was no
more. But Haj Amin would survive, prosper,and return to battle in
the r95os.
Banna, meanwhile, was nearing the end of his fiery lifetime. The
regime of King Farouq was on its last legs,and the political vultures
were circling. The r948 Palestir-re
crisis fatally undermined Farouq's
regime, making it difficult for any of Egypt's political forces to ally
 England'sBrothers 6j

: : :ttburb of with the king. An economiccrisis,too, engulfedthe country, accom-

. - ::trclaimed. panied by riots, demonstrations,strikes, and growing violence.The
' accord betweenthe Muslim Brotherhood and the palacebroke down,
-.:Jsilround
.-
-: Another and both nationalists and Islamists sought political advantage by
' -:--lnced"by blaming the corrupt and fecklessregimeof King Farouq for the Pales-
tine defeat.Finally,in Decemberr948, the Egyptian governmentout-
-.: :he mufti, lawed the Musiim Brotherhood, and weeks later, a Brotherhood
. , :::rshintelli- murderedPrimeMinister Mahmud Fahmi Nuqrashi.
assassin
:.- t'lst Broad- Two months later, in January 1949, Banna'scareercame to a sud-
, , i:, )n-Leader den end. Hassan al-Bannawas assassinated, shot to death on the
-. \ir.lc-lleEast streetsoutside the Young Men's Muslim Associationheadquartersin
- :.e to Arab Cairo, apparentlyby Egyptian securityofficers.aT
: I -::ricl by his Banna's death provided an exclamation point for the end of the
:--, -\min. The first era of the Muslim Brotherhood,and the beginningof another.In
.. it-.ltion,was the wake of Banna'sdeath, various factions of the Muslim Brother-
, : ,'d headed hood competedfor control, and the party itself drifted in and out of
.::t.e during legality,first bannedand then tolerated.The new supremeguide, suc-
ceeding Banna, was Hassan Ismail al-Hudaybi, an Egyptian judge
': '. rrrganized whose brother was chief of Farouq's royal household, and whose
'. .,.rthup to appointmentwas engineeredby a wealthy landorvnerin Upper Egypt.
- : ,icratedor (Fifty years later, Hudaybi's son would also serve as the Muslim
,. Bannaand Brotherhood's supreme guide.) The Brotherhood's factions would
,:'.e\'Iuslim eachmaintain ties to parts of the Egyptian bbdy politic, keepinglines
: ,.: under the open to the palace,infiltrating the army and the police, and establish-
: . Hassanal- ing covert contacts with the burgeoning movement of Free Officers
: .,r!e f f llTlef lt . who, in r952, would seizecontrol of Egypt.
- . :rir-rmphant Despitethe factional divisions,however,it was clear that the Mus-
:,, :he stateof lim Brotherhood would outlast Banna.Thanks to Said Ramadan,the
'.,. Brotherswere extendingtheir range and influenceworldwide, and in
.:h the Arab
_ .:-lfe was no Egypt they remained a potent force with hundreds of thousandsof
-:' :..,baftle in adherents.Money from Saudi Arabia helped sustain the movement
when other Arab governments,especiallyEgypt's,moved against
..:.time.The them. And thanks to the Cold'Vfar, the Muslim Brotherhood would
: -rl vultures draw energyfrom the global crusadeagainstcommunism.Its combina-
:r:d Farouq's tion of elite insiderpolitics and undergroundviolent militancy marked
' ,i.es to ally the true start of what we now call "political Islam." The Islamist
 6t, . D r v r l 's Galrn

regimesin Pakistan,Afghanistan,Iran, and Sudanthat camero power

beginningin the late were the direct result of the groundbreak-
ing work done by Banna, -'97os
Ramadan,and their allies.
Amid the wreckage of \World 'War iI, the United Srateswould make
its first, tentative stepsinto the Middle East. The vasr areir stretching
from Greece and Turkey through pakistan and India was fated to
become a major battleground during the cold
'il/ar. whar ser rhe
Middle East apart from other arenasfor the East-rwestsrrugglewas
its proximity to the ussR and the fact that two-thirds of the world's
oil was concentratedin a tiny area surrounding the persian Gulf.
The strategistswho built the NATO, Baghdad pact, ancl CENTO
alliances,the Rapid Deploymenr Force, and the U.s. central com-
mand attachedextraordinaryimportanceto securingthe Gulf. Unfor-
tunately, those same strategistsconfusedthe allegedthreat from the
soviet union with the homegrown forcesof Arab and persiannarion-
alism, who saw the region'soil as part of their natio'al patrimony. To
defeatthe nationalists,and to build a tier of narionsalignedin opposi-
tion to the soviet union, the United Stateswould reach our to the
Islamic right.
The Muslim Brotherhood was waiting.
: - :: : li tO POW er
-: -: , , L l l l d b re ak -
3
:: - . ' , ' u l d ma k e
: ''-:-', stfetching
- . .'..ls firted to
":' 'h h .tt se t the
,:. . . r | L r g g lwa
e s IS LA M ME E T S T HE CO L D WA R
--- - rhelvorld's. 1f
-: r ' : r rt ; . t n Uu
--.
lI.

-:. .,.ni CENTO

- . :ntral Com-
: : .' (iulf. Unfor-
: .^.:'i.ltfrom the
': ^' r i -sllln nat lon -
:.. :ttrimonY. To
,. *rriclinopposi- I rrnsr MEI Hassanal-Bannain Saudi Arabia," recallsHermann
-:..;6 our to the Eilts, then a young American diplomat in Jeddah,who saysthat he
knew Banna reasonablywell. "He used to come to Saudi Arabia for
mone,v,actuaily," he says. "l ntet him at the home of the then-Saudi
deputy minister of finance, who was a man who was himself very
pious and who handled Banna. His name was Shaikh Mohammed
Sorour [Sabhan],who was a slavewho had'beenmanumitted,and it
was Sorour who handled most of the major financialmatterswith the
Muslim Brotherhood.He was a black.and he was from Sudan."r
It was :'948, just a few months beforeBannawas assassinated in
Cairo. Eilts would often seeBanna in Sorour'shome. "He rvas a fre-
quent visitor, becauseSaudiArabia was his principal sourceof financ-
ing," Eilts remembers.Since its founding twenty years earlier, the
Brotherhoodhad becomea powerful, evenfrightenir-rg force in Egypt,
with a secretparamilitary arm that sponsoredterrorism, infiltrated
the Egyptian army and intelligenceservices,and intimidated its politi-
cal opponents."l found him to be verS very friendly," saysthe former
U.S. diplomat, who would becomeone of America'sleadingArabists
and ambassador to Egypt and SaudiArabia. "There was no hesitation
rn meetingVesterners."

iii,l
ijlttrn
 66 D nvrr' s Gavr

Eilts didn't discussBanna'smovemenr

with him, but U.S. political
officers in cairo in the r94os
did so on a routine basis. ,,I know rhat
some of my colleaguesat the
American embassyin cairo had regular
meetingswith Hassan al-Banna
at the dme, and found him perfectly
empathetic,"he says."we kept
in touch with them especia'yfor report-
ing purposes,becauseat that
time the Muslim Brotherhood was one
ele_
ment that was viewed as potenrially
politically important, so you kept
conta* with them. I don't think
we were ararmedby them, though there
was concernwhen the Brotherhood's
secretApparatus assassinated the
prime minisrer fof Egypt]. we
were concernedabout stability,primarily
and our judgmentwas that these
assass worryingbutthat
theydid.rorJor.."r,serious
political,"rlX',,t#,Iere
It's not surprisingthat u.S. diplomats
in Egypt and saudi Arabia in
the r94os would maintain ,"g.rr",
conract with the Muslim Brother-
hood' despite its violence-prone
nature and fascist orientation. The
regime of Egypt'sKing Farouq
was on its last legs,and it wasn,t clear
what might replace it. According
to Said Aburish: ,,The growrng
Muslim Brotherhood,which by
then had r.5 million members,repre_
sentedthe only potential challenge
to the ruling establishment.,,2 yer
many early u.s. representatives
in the region were attractedby rts mil_
rtant anti-communistoutlook.
The Brotherhood,the broader
community of the Islamic right, and
the underlying institutions of
traditionar Islam in the region srood
the center of a swirling debate rx/ashington:\was ar
in Islam a bulwark
against godlesscommunism?
or was organizedIsram a backward-
looking, ultra-conservativeforce
whose inherent anti-western outrook
made it recepriveto_the class-warfare
poritics of the reft? could the
United Stateshelp shapeIslamic
institutions that could be the back-
bone of a new civil societyin
the Middre East, or did America,sinrer-
est lie in allying itself with the
region,ssecularmodernizers?
The united srateswas just
beginning to feer its way around
Middle East' Few American officials the
had any experiencein the region,
u's' universirieswere abysma'y
weak on Middre East studies,and
despiteits leadingrole in winning rfforld
\far II the U.S. military had
virtually no significanr presence
in either North Africa or the persian
Gulf' The fledgling centrar Intelrigence
Agency, which was gobbling
 Islam Meets the Cold \Yar . 6t

r .: L'.5.political up Ivy Leaguegraduatesand virtually anyone who could speakAra-

' . "l know that bic, was inexperiencedat best.From its founding in t947 until at least
: : hrrd regular the r95os, the CIA took a backseatto British intelligence.
-: 1:m perfectly "Our attitude," according to Miles Copeland, a CIA officer who
=",..- r' for report- servedin the region in those years, "was one of let's-wait-until-we-
: : \\'asone ele- know-what-we're-doing. "l
:j :. \(l f'OU kept The Middle East was British turf, and the British were exceedingly
.-: . :houghthere turf conscious.Egypt, Iraq, and Iran, though nominally independent,
, -r.trsinated
- the were under de facto British suzerainty.Palestineand Transjordan
-.
-,
-). ^-; -^
I'l
-; 1. ,
rllrdrrl)r't were officially British mandates.The statesthat make up Kuwait and
;. ::..rrrgbut that the other Gulf sheikhdomswere British colonies,as were India and
Pakistan.Yet the British hold on the region, and on its oil, was erod-
- ' . -:Ji Arabia in ing, and America'spost-World War II engagementin the Middle East
\,'-,...rmBrother- was growing fast. It beganwith SaudiArabia, the country that would
:.'::ratiOn.The be the entry point and anchor for the American presencein the region.
.: : ri'asn'tclear But that country's policy of supporting and financing the Muslim
'Tne growing Brotherhood would forever entangle the United Stateswith funda-
- :::bers, repre- mentalistIslam. The U.S. connectionwith SaudiArabia and the Mid-
: :. : l : l l ent . " 2 Yet dle East was spurred by the desirefor oil and the logic of Cold NTar
:.-r:J bv its mil- containment. Yet U.S. inexperiencein the region, and its near-total
lack of understandingof the region'sculture, including Islam, bedev-
:..:rr:Cright, and iled American policy from the start.
: i : llrl l 'l StOOd at According to standard histories, the official U.S. entry into the
-- .::',a bulwark region is said to have begunin t945, on a yacht anchoredin the Great
.-- ...hackward- Bitter Lake astridethe SuezCanal. There, in February,on his journey
-,:, : ' : l i f I l
O UtlOOk back to \Washingtonfrom Yalta, Franklin Delano Rooseveltmet King
,::i Could the Abdel Aziz lbn Saud, the first meeting between an American president
- : :'c the back- and a Saudi monarch, settingthe stagefor a half century of relations
.:-::-.:rica's
inter- betweenthe two countries.
- - -:: S i But two other crucial eventsprecededthe FDR-Ibn Saudencounter.
'.,..-'.rround the First came the signing,in t933, of the U.S. oil concessionin Saudi
--: :r the region, Arabia that would grow into that global petroleum superpower,the
: . .: .rudies,and Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco). And the man who bro-
. :lilitary had kered that all-important deal was the British spook, Harry St. John
:,: : rhe Persian Bridger ("Abdullah") Philby, the operativewho had helpedIbn Saud
: - '.,.f,s gobbling and his \Tahhabi Brotherhood take power during and after World

Jg"
-
 68 D n v r L 's GatrE

\Var I. In the late r9zos, philbn trading on his saudi

connections,left
official government employ and went into business
for himself.
Increasinglytied to the Al Saud, philby distanced
himserf-at reast
publicly-from British policy. To the bemusement
of his friends and
the consternationof his wife and family, he converted
to Islam, taking
the name "Abdullah." His conversion, however,
was a lark_or a
subterfuge.In his diarg he wrote jocularly "how nice
it would be for
me when I becamea Muslim and could have four
wives."4 Having
been an atheist since cambridge, it was clear that
Abdullah philby
"neededIslam not as a faith but as a convenience,,,
and he tord friends
exactly that. t Yet he plunged into Islam, visiting Mecca,
taking multiple
wives, and marrying a slavegirr who was a gift from
Ibn saud. His real
interest, howeveq was making money, and in
Jeddah it was said that
Philby "should be callednot Abdullah, sraveof God,
but Abd al-eirsh,
slave of halfpence."6.. The born-again wheeler-dealerran businesses,
becoming Ford Motor's official represenrarivein Saudi
Arabia (though
he said: "I hate the sight and sound of motor
cars,,).7Eventuallyhe
becamean agenrfor standard oil of california (socar)
and, using his
friendship with the king, philby sealedthe deal
for socal,s enrry rnto
what would becomeits ultimate El Dorado, achieved
at a bargain price:
{5o,ooo ($z5o,ooo)down and annual rent of just f5,ooo
in gold. The
concessionwas to last sixty yearsand cover
36o,ooo squaremiles,half
again as large as all of Texas.8For a pi*ance, the king
had signedaway
his country's richest treasure. And the United
States,representedby
Standard oil of california-eventualry joined by
Texaco, then Exxon
and Mobil, the four Aramco partners_was in.e
FDR's proclamation, in r9
43,that SaudiArabia would henceforth
fall under:the U's. defenseumbrella was the second
crucial develop-
ment. "I hereby find that the defenseof saudi Arabia
is vital to the
defenseof the United States,"luthe presidentannounced.
Roosevelr'sembraceof SaudiArabia had multiple
aims. There was
the obvi.us one,namely,that its oil was a precious
resource.Therewas
a strategic one, in which the threat (remote though
it was) of soviet
encirclementof the PersianGulf was a concern.And
therewas a rac'-
cal one, aimed ar America's allies,especiailythe British.
Although Lon-
 lslam Meets the Cold War ' 6s

a: : rn s ! lef t don was dominant in the region, including southern Persia and Iraq,
: rirnself. there was a sometimesbitter rivalry betweenthe United Statesand the
:-:t least British-and to a lesserextent, France and Italy, too-over oil in the
:.::ldSand Middle East.All jealouslyguardedtheir companies'advantages.
=::r.t;rking Four yearsbeforehis shipboardencounterwith the king, FDR had
- : : { -O f a seemedwilling to let Saudi Arabia be handled by Great Britain, since
-: ; be for London was virtually all-powerful in the region, and the United States
'- had little experiencethere. "Will you tell the British I hope they can
Having
:r Philby take careof the king of SaudiArabia?" FDR askedan aide. "This is a
; friends little far afield for us."11But StandardOil of California and the Texas
- - -r . ', lt i^ l o Oil Company, partners in what would soon be renamed Aramco,
.:. His real would have none of it. They convinced Interior SecretaryHarold
. ..trr'1
that Ickes,FDR's right-hand man, and then FDR himself, that the United
: r.-Qirsh, Statesmust stand up to the British, who, they said, were "trying to
-:..^-_^^
_. \ ll lf ) 5c5, edgetheir way into" SaudiArabia.12In the midst of \forld'Vfar II, the
'.---rhough two allies eventually struck a deal, carving up the region's oil.
::.:.l.1lh'he Roosevelttold Lord Halifax, the British ambassador,"Persianoil . . '
'We
.. ,.singhis is yours. sharethe oil of Kuwait and Iraq. As for Saudi Arabian
oll. rt s ours. ' '
rrll
::lirv into
---.,. ^.;^^.
_.: 11 yrr!1, To rX/instonChurchill, FDR cabled: "Pleasedo accept my assur-
: ,1.1.
The ancesthat we are not making sheep'seyesat your oil fieldsin Iraq and
:t:.es.half lran." Replied Churchill, who'd almost single-handedlybuilt Lon-
- ,- __ 1 rrlv
r.!u
.. ,,,^.,
a/ don's overseasoil empire, "Let me reciprocate by giving you the
- , 'r rpd hrr fullest assurancethat we have no thought of trying to horn in on your
-::-. E\xon interestsor property in Saudi Arabia."la (Both men, of course,were
lying. The British had long coveted Saudi oil, and the United States
-::-.ceforth would soon elbow its way forcefully into the oil concessionsin Iran
:. -::i'elop- and Iraq.)
:.,..to the FDR's meeting with Ibn Saud did mark a consummation of the
U.S.-Saudipartnership.To transport the king, who'd never been out-
' -: f e \ v 2S side of Arabia before, the United Statesbundled him onto the U.S.S.
- : .'fe WaS Mwrphy, complete with familS retainers, servants' and sheep for
: Soviet slaughter,and the desertpotentateset up a tent on deck for sleeping.
', .:. I tactl- Elliott Roosevelt,the president'sson, describedFDR's encounterwith
,.:h Lon- Ibn Saud,as the king was known, aboard the Quincy:

ffiww-
 7o D E v l r 's Ga,l,rr

Discreetly' my sister Anna

had taken her leave of Father
for a trip to cairo, out that day
of a.r.r.n.. for the Moslern with rr::
secluding,h. custom of
yo,-.1 of the family. . . . Father ended up by prom_ posed ,,
ising Ibn Saud that he
would ,an.tron no American Uniteo i.
tile to the Arab people. move hos_
. . . And Ibn Saud, looking h o -o r. --
Father's wheelchair, was enviously ar
surprised when Father promptly king. p:.
him a presentof it.1i made
ish sta:.
treatic. "
Actually' it was a spare lation : -,
wheelchair, and it was roo smalr
for the bulky
monarch' But it was enough o\\'11L:.
for the saudi king ro decrare
FDR's "rwin," and it symbolized himserf Briti:r:
the formar beginning of the
Saudi alliance' c' L. Sulzbergeq u.S.- and .r::,r
writing in the rJew york.rimes,
excited at the prospe* of was eign R: ,
the United Sratesgetring irs hands
oil: "The immenseo, deposits on saudi pilct -
in SaudiArabia alone make
try more important to thar coun_ inf lr L. : - - .
American diplomacy than armost
smaller nation"'he wrote.15 any other ieil p r : .
Roosevelt,too, it is crear,cared
abour oil, and not much a lot Thc f , : :
about Islam.
FDR's r943 procramarion r llL: r . :
thar America wourd iiefend Saucri
bia would be reaffirmed Ara_ B-r.::.., -
by A..rican president,mosr promi_
nently in the rg57 Eisenhower "u.ry - -.
Or-,-,,-
Doctrine and the rggo carter
Doctrine' rn t944, the
united states sent its first miritary .. '-
i:'...:-.
saudi Arabia, and in t945 mission ro '.'-,.-.-
the United statesand saudi Arabia
a military cooperarion agreemenr signed
thar establisheda major u.S.
Force baseat Dhahran in Air
the persianGulf, a facility rhat
as an American baseuntil would serve
the rg60s. That agreemenrwas
lowed by a t949 accord, quickly fol-
which provided for a u.S. survey
cover the entire Arabian peninsura, ream to
with recommendationsfor creat_
ing a U.S.-equipped,
43,ooo-man army and air force, and
accord setting up a permanenr a r95r
U.s. Military Training Mission
country.t 7 in the
From the beginning,America's
relationshipwith SaudiArabia
a no-nonsenseone' involving was
a rapidryexpandingoir output,
defensearrangements,and bilaterar
a vast influx of Texans,okrahomans,
Louisianans inro the kingdom. and
The United States,joined by
Britain as a rival and junior Great
partner, u"g"r, to surround
saudi Arabia
 lslam Meets the Cold tfi/ar 7r

with military alliances.In r95r, the United Statesand Britain pro-

posed a "Middle East Command," linking the United States,the
United Kingdom, and France with Turkey, Israel, and Jordan. They
began by approaching Egypt, but abandonedthe idea when Egypr's
king, pressedby nationalistsand deeplvunhappy about the new Jew,
ish state,politely declined.Next, the British took the lead in signing
treatieswith Turkey,Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan,calling the new constel-
lation the "Baghdad Pact." The United States,which was building its
own tiesto thosestatesand rvassimultaneouslyintent on elbowing the
British out of the oil-rich PersianGulf, didn't join the BaghdadPact,
and an astuteU.S.observerof the time, writing for the Council on For-
eign Relations,rather snidelynoted that the British had assembledthe
pact "in order to save its position in Iraq and to bolster a flagging
influencethr:oughoutthe Middle East."18The BaghdadPac, too, soon
fell part when Baghdad,its center,underwent a rer.olution in r958.
The British-installedking of Iraq was toppled and execuredby an
.illianceof army nationalistsand the lraqi Communist Party,and the
Baghdad Pact was no more. It was replaced by the Central Treaty
C)rganization,linking the United States,the United Kingdom, Turkey,
Iran, and Pakistan.Pakistanwas also linked to the \fest by its mem-
bershipin the SoutheastAsia Treaty Organization.
The Anglo-Americanalliancesin the Middle Eastrestedon the rra-
ditional leversof externalinfluence-military power.economicmuscle,
and diplomacy. More quietly, though, as the Cold \ff/ar evolved, an
edditional factor emergedto bolster the U.S. and U.K. presence,
n,rmely,the religiousand cultural power of political Islam. Especially
important in that regard was Saudi Arabia's would-be role as Islam's
Vatican. As Saudi Arabia emerged as America's counterweight to
Eg)-pt,Nasser,and nationalism, a number of Muslirn Brotherhood
organizers emerged as emissariesfor the Islamic right across the
rr-gion-none, perhaps)more importanr than Said Ramadan.
Ramadan, a key Brotherhood ideologue,servedas Saudi Arabia's
.rnofficial ambassador of Islamism. As the Muslim Brotherhood
.rruggledto maintain its presencein Egypt, where it was increasingly
.'.rodc'lswith the new regime under Nasser,Saudi Arabia not only

i$fiffil
i#-xr
 72 . D r , v r r 's Gavs

bankrolled the Brothers but offered its territory as a safe haven. A

seriesof saudi kings were preoccupiedwith the threat of communism,
and they saw the Muslim Brotherhoodand otherson the Islamic right
as the leading edgeof the anti-communisrmovement.Equally impor-
tant, perhaps,Saudi Arabia saw Egypt'sNasseras a dire threat, since
Nasser-ruling impoverishedEgypt-coveted saudi Arabia's oil. So
for reasons of both anti-communism and anti-Arab nationalism,
saudi Arabia encouragedthe growth of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt and throughout the Middle East.

RamADAN AT THe $7trrre HousE

In the late summer of t953, the oval office at the white House
served..asthe stage for a little-noticed encounter between president
Dwight D. Eisenhowerand a young Middle Easrernfirebrand. In the
muted black-and-whitephotographlerecording the event,the grand-
fatherly, balding Ike, then sixty-three, stands gray suited, erect, his
elbows bent and his fistsclenchedas if to add musclero someforceful
point. To his left is a young, olive-skinnedEgyptian in a dark suit,
with a neatly trimmed, full beard and closelycroppedhair, clutching a
sheafof papersbehind his back. staring intently at the president,he is
just twenty-sevenyears old, but already has more than a decadeof
experienceat the very heart of the Islamic world's violent and pas-
sionate politics. Alongside him, some dressedin 'western attire and
otherswearing robes,shawls,and Muslim headgear,are membersof a
delegation of scholars, mullahs, and activists from India. syria.
Yemen, and North Africa.
The president'svisitor that Septemberday was Said Ramadan, a
militant official and ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood. The
young man even had a claim to semi-royaltyin Brotherhood circles,
since he had married wafa al-Banna, Hassan al-Banna'sdaughter,
making him the son-in-law of the organization'sfounder.As he stood
at the president'sside, Ramadan appearedrespectableand harmless.
Yet the Brotherhoodwas known throughout the Middle East,sincear
leastthe late r94os, as an organization of fanatics and terrorists.Its
 Islam Meets the Cold \Yar . -72

:1 . A acolyteshad murdered severalEgyptian officials, including a prime

t : !m, minister, and just five years before Ramadan met Ike, the Muslim
: :ght Brotherhood was declared illegal by the faltering regime of King
Farouq of Egypt. But it didn't disappear.Over the nexr fifty years,the
:: n c e Muslim Brotherhood would stagerepeatedcomebacks,slowly build-
.So ing its power and influence,spreadingits ideology and building chap-
. . inl , ters in Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, and beyond. And until his death, in
iin Switzerland,in t99 5, Said Ramadan would be its chief international
organizer.
Despite the fact that Ramadan was angr).,violence prone, and
openly intent on remaking the Middle East accordingto Islamic fun-
damentalist specifications,he wasn't regarded as a threat. In fact,
based on a secret evaluation by the U.S. ambassadorin Cairo,
Ramadan was viewed as a potential ally. It was the very height of
McCarthyism and the Cold \Var, and the Muslim Brotherhood was
bitterly anti-communist.Not only that, but Ramadan'sallies in the
Muslim Brotherhood,Pakistan'sIslamic Group,20and similar organi-
zations acrossthe region were vigorously opposedto Marxists, left-
wing activistson campuses,trade union organizers,Arab nationalists,
"Arab socialists,"the Baath Party, and secularistsof all kinds. In the
latter category were pesky upstarts like Egypt's president Gamal
Abdel Nasser,whose loyalty to the American side in the Cold \Var
was in doubt evenin 1953, just a year after his Free Officersmove-
- .1t- ment had oustedthe corrupt and despisedmonarchy.
' .'.,] Said Ramadan was born in 1c126at Shibin el Kom, a village about
seventymiles north of Cairo in the Egyptian Nile Delta.21As a young
''-.-
". - l (lr teenager,he encounteredHassan al-Banna and he joined the move-
ment immediately.After graduating from Cairo University,tn :-946
Ramadan becameBanna'spersonalsecretaryand right-hand man. A
The vear later, Ramadan was named editor of Al Shihab, the Muslim
-_:_.-.
- -,c)r Brotherhoodweekly.
Besideshelpingthe Brotherhood'sleader:with organizarionaltasks,
: l,-rd the founder'sson-in-lawbecamea roving ambassadorfor the Muslim
- Brotherhood,amassinga vast network of internationalcontactsthat
-\5.
the more parochial, and Egypt-based,Banna didn't have. In 1945,
.. I t s Ramadan traveled to Jerusalem,which was rhen a British-controlled
 74 . Dnvtr's Geue

city under the PalestineMandate, where the storm croudsof the war
between the Arabs and Jews were beginning to gather. Over the
comrng years' Ramadan would spend a great deal of time traveling
between Jerusalem,Amman, Damascus, and Beirut, building the
Brotherhood'schapters.On October 26, 1945,Ramadan openedthe
Muslim Brotherhood's first office in
Jerusalem,22founding the orga-
nization that, by the r98os, would become known as the Isramic
ResistanceMovemenr (Hamas).By ,947, twenty-fivebranchesof the
Muslim Brotherhood existed in palestine,with between rz,ooo and
2o'ooo members.23 rn t948, Ramadanhelpedto organizetheMuslim
Brotherhood'ssymbolically significantIslamic force that battled the
Jewishforcesthat establishedIsraelthat year.
Ramadan also made the first of many visits to pakistan in the late
194os' taking part in the first meetingsof the 'world Muslim congress
in Karachi in ry 49 and.r 9 5 r, where he flirted with becomingsecretary-
generalof the organization.24lThe congressitself was denouncedby
the Pakistan left as having been organ izedby "Anglo-American impe-
rialism.";2'rPakistanhad achievedindependencefrom Great Britain a
year earlier, and as the first Islamic state it became a magnet for
Islamistideologues,organizers,and scholars.A young Islamistnamed
Abul-Ala Mawdudi-who'd founded a Muslim Brotherhood-style
movement in Pakistan called the Islamic Group-was transforming
his movement into a political party. For the next decade,pakistan
would become a kind of second home for Ramadan. The fledgling
Islamic stategave Ramadan a broadcastslot on Radio pakistan, and
he enjoyed good relations with the \Testern-leaninggovernment of
Pakistan,including with Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, who wrore
the prefaceto one of Ramadan,sbooks.26
Ramadan'ssray in Pakistanwasn't entirely voruntary.The Broth-
erhood had beenbannedin Egypt, and Hassanal-Bannaassassinated.
Ramadan returned to Egypt in r95o, when the Brotherhood made
one of its many comebacks,but he would periodically spend long
periods of time in Pakistan,where he worked croselywith Mawdudi
and his Islamic Group. Ramadanalso worked with pakistan,sMuslim
League,and with official Pakistani supporr he traveled and lectured
 Islam Meets tbe Cold'War .
75

: rhe war throughout the Arab world. At the time, politics in Pakistanwas split
Ci'er the among radical Islamists,moderateIslamists,secularnationalists,and
.: :raveling the left. Meanwhile, the country was being drawn into pro-Western
' - l i no t hc military alliances.During severalyears in Karachi, Ramadan helped
:ined th e Mawdudi organizea muscular phalanx of fanatical Islamic students
: :ne o rg a - that battled Pakistan'sleft, especiallyon university campuses.The
:-. : I s lami c so-called Islamic Student Society, known by its Urdu initials as
:: : . e s of th e the IJl27 modeled on Mussolini's fascistsquadristi,was a Ramadan
:: . t 30 and project. "Although organized under the supervisionof the [lslamic
::.: -\luslim Groupl, IJT was greatly influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood of
d the
:,,.:tle Egypt. Between t95z and 1955, Ramadan helpedIJT leadersformal-
ize an administrative structure and devise an organizational srraregy.
' .:- rhe late The most visible marks of the brotherhood's influence are IJT's 'study
:. Longress circle' and all-night study sessions,both of which were means of
::a -a f e taf y- indoctrinating new members and fostering organizational bonds,"
- . . -o . l h.t according to one expert, Vali Reza Nasr. The often-armed IJT thugs
:,-:n impe- clashed repeatedlywith left-wing students on campus. "Egg ross-
:: Brrtaina ing gradually gave way to more seriousclashes,especiallyin Karachi
:.-...net for and Multan," wrote Nasr. "Antileftist student activism had become
::-:.:named the IJT's calling and increasinglydetermined its course of action. [The
:: ,rd-style IJT becamel a soldiers brigade which would fight for Islam against
::..i O f mlng its enemies-secularists and leftists-within. the government and
-. Pakistan without."28
jcri olino
- - In betweenhis trips to Pakistan,Ramadan also apparentlyworked
r . l.l 1 1. z f ld with Arab fundamentalists,especiallyamong Palestiniansand Jorda-
a :: - -rent o f nianswho founded the so-calledIslamic Liberation Party.2e(Later,the
-.',lo \\rrote Liberation Party metastasized,relocating its headquartersto Ger-
many and then spreading through Muslim Central Asia. It was
l^: B ro th - increasinglysupportedby Saudi Arabia. By the r99os, it had become
i: - :).Slna te d . an important violence-proneforce allied to the Islamic Movement of
.- 'd rnade Uzbekistanand to Al Qaeda.)While in Jordan in the r95os, Ramadan
!:: : 'id l o n g also helped found the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.
- \l. r rvd u d i The leader of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood was Abu Qurah, a
,:, . -\Iuslim r.vealthyJordanianmerchantwith closeriesro King Abdullah and the
:.: iectured British-backedHashemite monarchy. According to Marion Boulby,
 ',,ji:ii

D t v r r 's (l .lvr
76

Banna sentRamadanto Amman for the expresspurposeof gettingthe

Muslim Brotherhoodof Jordan off the ground, and the king "granted
to
the Brotherhood legal status as a welfare organization' hoping
the left'
securelts support againstthe secularopposition," i'e', against
As in Pakistan,the Brotherhood becamea tool for suppressingthe left
and Arab nationalists.Ramadanand Qurah "argued that in the twen-
tieth century Egypt and the rest of the Islamic world wefe threatened
by the onslaughtof communistand nationalistideologieswhich denied
the supremacyof sharia in society."30
Ramadan'spresencein the Oval Office that day in 1953 was no
accident.Officially, Ramadan was in the United Statesto attend the
colloquium on Islamic culture at Princeton University, with a side
put-
trip to \ffashington.The Library of congressjoined Princetonrn
of
ting together the nine-day program. It was an august event' full
pomp and circumstance'held under the leafy greeneryshading Prince-
ton's Nassau Hall, in the high-ceilingedFacultv Room' Among the
speakersand attendeeswere some of the leading orientalists of the
era, men like Philip K. Hitti, T. Cuyler Young, and Bayly \X/inderof
princeton, wilfre<l cantwell Smith of McGill university, Richard
Nelson Frye of Harvard Universit-v,Carleton Coon of the University
of Pennsylvania,and Kenneth Cragg, editor of the journal The Mus-
'world, from the Hartford Seminary Foundation. Directing the
lim
of
conferencewas Dr. Bayard Dodge, the venerableformer president
the American University in Beirut.
According ro the official recorcl,the conferencefortuitously took
advantageof the fact that a number of celebratedpersonagesfrom the
Middle Easr were visiting. But the participants didn't iust "happen"
to have crossedthe Atlantic. The colloquium was organized by the
U.S. government'which funded it, tapped participants it considered
useful or promising, and bundled them off to New Jersey'Hitti' per-
haps the dean of the orientalists,visited cairo, Bahrain, Baghdad,
Beirut, New Delhi, and other citiestcl scout participants'and supple-
mentary funding for the colloquium was sought from U'S' airlines'
including Pan Am and T\7A, and from Aramco, the u.S. oil consor-
tium in Saudi Arabia. Like many of the participants, Ratnadan, a
hard-edgedideologueand no scholar,was visitingthe confercnceas
 Islam Meets tbe Cold Wttr . 77

an all-expenses-paidguest.And the U.S. governmenrwas not exactly

in the dark about who he was.
Payingfor the ssnfslsncs-including rhe expensesfbr transportrng
rlttendeesfr:ornthe Middle East-r.r,asthe International I'formarr.n
Administration, a branch of the State Department, with roots i,
the
LI.s. intelligencecommunity. The IiA had a brief exisrence,oflicially
scrr.rptn tg5z and then incorporated,in rg5i, into the clA-con'ected
u.S. Infbrmarion Agency.Among its responsibilities,the IIA oversaw
official U.S. "culture exchangeprogranrs,"suchas the princetoncolkr-
c1r-riurl.
It's also clear rhat a primary purpose of the colloquiunr r,r,as
politica[.A declassified IIA documentlabeled"conficlential-Secur:ity
Information," says: "on the surface,the co'flrence l.oks iike
an
r'\ercisein pure learning.This in effectis the impressionclesirecl."
The
conference,it goeson, was designedt. "bring togetherpersonsexert-
rng great influencein formularing Muslim opinion in fields such
as
education,science,law and philosophy ancl inevitably,therefore,
on
politics."Its gral was sweeping."Among the va.riousresuitsex;rected
from the colloquiumare the impetusand directir'that may be give.
ro the Renaissance movementu,ithin Islam itself.',il
America'sambassadorin cairo at the time was the veterancliplo-
Jeffersoncaffery, a Louisiana lawyer then nearing the end of a
'rat
.tellar foreign servicecareerthat spannedfour decades.He'd.
beenin
L airo sincet949, ultinately servingsix yearsin the languid capital on
:he Nile. In July ry53 caffery penned a classifiedcabre suggesring
:hat Ramadan be invited to the princeronconclave.caffery's dispatch
:ro'ides a revealing glimpse into how much u.s. intelligencehad
:iready gathered on the Muslim Brotherhood and its leadership,
ir.1ch,and activities.caffery's dispatch providesa capsulebiography
'r Ramadanand a thumbnail sketchof the Muslim Brotherhood.But,
::-rd in full, it is eerily sanitized,making no mention of the Brother-
',,od's involvement in terrorism and violence,
and nowhere does
-:ffery cite their commirmenr to an Islamic state under the Koran.
rffe'v', a highly experienceddiplomat, is not naive, and it is clear
:',p ]1it accounrthat he (and perhapsthe cIA) were willing to over-
''rk arrr violencetied to the Brothers and were targeting
Ramadan
- :' recruitmentas either ally or agent:
 76 D r v r r 's Ga.lap

Saeed Ramadhan is considered to be among the most learned

scholars of Islamic culture in the Ikhwan el Muslimin (Moslem
Brotherhood). A graduate of the Faculty of Law from Fouad
University in Cairo in r945, he takes but few casesand devotes
rnost of his tirne to the study of Islam. Born in 1925, he is young
in years but old in erperience.
At present he is engagedas editor in chief of El Musliman, a
monthly magazine now in its second year, which publishes arti-
cles on Islamic law and culture by scholars through the Muslim
w'orld. Its circulation is about ro,ooo and subscribersreach from
Tunisia to lndonesia. As General Secretaryof the World Islamic
Conference, he travels extensively throughout the Islamic States
and has recently returned from conferencesin Pakistan.'When in
Egypt he gives weekiy radio broadcasts in Islamic culture and
interpretation of the Koran.
In r 94o Ramadhan beganhis studiesof Islam under Hassan al
Banna, former Supi'eme Guide of the lkhwan el Muslimin, and
became editor of El Shihab, a magazine introduced by the latter in
v147.It was a monthly magazine for articles on Islamic law and
culture but ceasedpublication after five issuesunder pressurefrom
er-King Farouk's government. Shortly thereafter the Brotherhood
was outlawed and upwards of zrooo of its members arrested.
Saeed Ramadhan left for Pakistan in time to prevent possible
detention. He lived there about a year during which time he had
fivo radio broadcasts weekly which were beamed to the Arab
States,including Egypt. Late in r949 the Muslim League of Pak-
istan requestedRamadhan to give a seriesof lectures on Islamtc
Culture in many parts of the Middle East. Starting in Sudan, he
gave talks rnainly in universities through Egypt and ending in
Turke-v.12

Caffery had been contacted by an unnamed American agent, on

behalf of Mohammed el Bakay of Al Azhar, the centuries-old Islamic
center of learning in Cairo. Bakay, who also traveled to Princeton,
described Ramadan as "a distinguished member of the Muslim Broth-
erhood" and suggestedthat he be invited to attend the Princeton gath-
ering, adding that the Society of Muslim Brothers was willing to help
pay his erpenses.s3Concluded Caffery:
 lslam Meets the Cold \Xlar 7c)

The Embassybelievesthat Ramadhan'sscholarrvattainmentsare

sufficientto makehim eligibleto atte'd the colloquium on Islamic
culture. His positionwith the Muslim Brotherhoodmakesit impor-
tant that his desirefor an invitationbe considered
carefullyin light
of the possibleeffectsof offendingthis important bodv.ra

For the next four decades,Ramadanwould turn up, Zelig-like,as a

key operativein virtually everymanifestationof radical,political Islam,
from the Muslim Brotherhood-ledterrorism in Egypt in the r95os and
t96os to the riseof AyatollahKhomeini in Iran in the r97os to the civil
war in Algeria in the r99os. There'sno concreteevidenceto prove that
Ramadanwas recruitedas a cIA agentin the r95os, but it's clearthat
his invitation to the Princetoncolloquium marked hirn as a potential
target for recruitment,and he would later become a crucial ally of
Saudi Arabia's royal family in assemblingan Islamic bloc of narions
and movementsopposedto the spreadof communism and to Soviet
expansion along its southern frontier. According to declassifieddocu-
ments in the Swiss archives,reported by Sylvain Bessontn Le Temps
of Geneva,in the 196osthe swiss authorities-then hosting Ramadan
at his Islamic cenrer in Geneva-looked upon Ramadan favorablg
thanks to his anti-communistviews. And they added: ,,SaidRamadan
is, among other things, an intelligence agent of the English
.and the
Americans. \fhat's more, I believethat he has rendered services-
according to an intelligenceplan-to the fSwiss federal police].',
Ramadan's dossier, reported Le Temps, includes several documenrs
indicating his connectionsto "certain western secretservices."3-i

Isr-Rnr: BurweRK AGArNsr CoMMUNrsnr ?

'were
Ramadan,the Muslim Brotherhood,and the Islamicright useful
alliesin the cold war struggleagainstcommunism?was lslam itself a
bulwark againsta foreign, atheisticideology?In one sense,rhe answer
was no. Both communism and nationalism could and did easily
attract adherentsamong the massesof Muslims. In Iraq, for insrance,

ffi
 8o D E v r r . 's CiauP.

the Iraqi Communist Party, the Arab rvorld's largest,won the alle-
lWorld \Var
gianceof millions of Iraqi Shiitesduring the period after
Il, and by the late rgios the party was strong enoughto organizca
demonstration in Baghdad that attracted more than one million
Iraqis. And Egypt's Nasser,whose Cairo-basedVoice of the Arabs
radio broadcastscarried his nationalist messageinto Syria, Jordan'
Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, gathered an enormous following
and for much of the r95os and r96os was by far the most popular
Arab political leader.Just as christians in Europe joined the commu-
nist parties en masse,in the Islamic world Muslims unhappy with
their statusor their quality of life, or who were opposedto Western
imperialism and Anglo-Americaninfluencein the Middle East, opted
for cclmmunismor, more often, for Arab nationalism'
Yer even if Muslims were attracted to left-wing ideologies,some
Orientalistsand U.S. policy makers felt that there was still reasonto
believethat political Islarn might yet be mobilized in forms that were
explicitly anti-commulist. In the Micldle East, organizedIslam took
ntany frtrtns, of course. First and frtremost was the traditionalist,
clergy'-based religion, organized around mosques' religious founda-
tions or endowments,Islamic courts, a1d other institutions.many of
which had a powerfLrlsocial imp:rct but were not explicitl,vpolitical'
Next, therewas "state Islan," such as existedin SaudiArabia since
its foundingin the rgzos or in Pakistansinceindependence (and cspe-
cially sincethe r97os), in which entire nations werc organiz.edaccorcl-
ing to religigus identity and islamic law, and it was sonletimes
difficult to see the dividing line betr,veenIslam and the state. And
finallv, there rvas the emerging "Ne1a,Itight" in the Muslinr r,r'orld,
includingthe Muslim Brotheriroodand other erplicitll'poiiticalorga-
nizations or parties committed to the establishmentof an Islamic
republic. To those in the West looking for ideological forces in the
Midclle East that could provide an intellectualcounterweight to the
radical appeal of communism, all three of theseforms seemedattrac-
tive at one time or anotheq and indeed there was overlap among
them.
ln the United States,there was :rlarm over the fact that the Arab
,.sll1s,'-6hrt is, opinion leaders,intellectuais,politicians,journalists,
 Islant Meets the Cold War . 8r

and the like-were increasinglydrawn to left-wing movemenrsand

parties.Among the masses,there was more reluctanceto abandon the
Koran for Das Kapital, especially among ill-educated peasants,
Bedouin tribesmen,and pro-capitalistmerchantsand bazaar leaders,
making them harder to mobilize ctn behalf of Marxism and Arab
'What
socialism.So the question was: sort of ideologicalframework
might be able to attract both the Arab and Muslim masseson one
hand and to capturesomeimportant segmentof the Arab eliteon the
other? For some analysts,the "new lslam," led by intellectualsand
politicaloperativessuch as Banna,Ramadan,and Mawdudi, seemed
made to order.The X,luslimBrotherhoodwas having somesuccesson
r-rniversity
campuses,attracting students-especiallyengineers,scien-
tists, physicians,and managementand businessstudents.Could such
a movement,especiallywith the support of the Saudi Arabian royal
family, counteractthe Marxist-nationalist bloc? And could U.S. pro-
p:l€ianda,stressingAmerica's own religious values in contrast to the
atheistic Soviet Union, draw the Muslim massesinto the American
camp-or at leastaway from Moscow? It seemedworth a try.
One who seemedto think it might be worthwhile was Bernard
Ler,vis,the inventor of the phrase "clash of civilizations." For five
tlecades,Lewis, who is currently an emeritusprofessorat Princeton,
hirs been arguably the single most influential theorist in the field of
Islamicscholarship.Yet, for all that time, Lewis has beenintense)ycon-
troversial,largelybecausehe hastaken a highly partisan,c6nss1y21iys-
lrrcl later,"neoconserv"ri,r."-point of vieq and becauseof his strong
.rffinityfor israel.A ty j3 essayby ProfessorLewis, "Communism and
Isi;rm," is an important example of the then-currentthinking on the
-rcrt haftleof ideologies.
Lewis made it clear that the people of the Muslim world seemed
intent on creating a string of authoritarian governmentsand that, if
:ire 'West'sobjective was to oppose the spread of communism, that
'.rouldn't be so bad. "If the peoplesof Islam are forced ro make a
.frright choice, to abandon their own traditions in favour of either
\ ()mrnunismor parliamentarianism,then we are at a great disadvan-
.-rge."he wrote. "It is fortunate, both for Islam and for the \il/estern
'...,rr1d,
that the choiceis not restrictedto thesetwo simplealternatives,
 8z' D s v t t - 's Genr

peoplesof restoring' .r{

for the possibility still remains for the Muslim
a form of
p.rh"p, in a modified form' their own tradition; of evolving "fd
even auto- q
gou.rn-.nt which, though authoritarian' and perhaps
cynical tyranny of .{
cratic, is neverthelessfar removed from the
European-style dictatorship. " t6 {
..fortunate,'likelihood of authoritarian Mus- .
After endorsingthe
Islam would ulti- {
lim regimes,Lewis went on to suggestthat, indeed'
mately prove infertile ground for Marxist ideas: '!
il
l
Islam,for the
communismis not and cannotbe a religion,while
greatmassof believers, still is; and that is the core of the Islamrc
be
resistance to Communistideas'Though their beliefin liberty
yet be strong
too weak to sustainthem, their beliefin God may
profoundly religious in the
enough.The Islamicpeoplesare still
a religion is no
d..p.rt and simplestmeaningof the word' Islamas
as I have sug-
more anti-Gommunistthan christianity; in fact,
a torce altectlngtne
gested,ratherlessso. But it is more potentas
most
iiu., u,-tdthoughtsof its adherents'Pious Muslims-and
creed'nor
Muslims are pious-will not long toleratean atheist
principles'
one that violatestheir traditionalreligiousmoral '''
Muslims against the immorality and
The presentrevolt of the
lWesternleadersmay tem-
opportu.tir- of their own and of some
of selfless
porurlly favor the Communists,with their appearance
when
devotionto an ideal, but will work againstCommunism
Let us
Muslimscometo seethe realitiesbehindthe propaganda'
hopethat theywill not taketoo longoverit'

Lewis'sessaywas
At the Princetoncolloquium, heid the sameyear
scholar'Mazheruddin
written, a marker was laid down by a Pakistani
Siddiqi,afellowatthelnstituteoflslamicCultureinLahore'Afor- Ttffi
at the university
mer government otficial and prolific writer, educated uil
Islam and Communism'
of Madras in India, Siddiqi was the author of rfr
Marxismandlsla.m,^ndHi"o'icalMaterialismandlslam'Inhis f,n
it clear that commu-
addressto the Princetongathering,Siddiqi made (t/f
faith-basedand built
nism could be resistedonly if its opposition was lfim
onlslamicfundamentals.SiddiqiattackedMuslim..authoritarian- oil1
Islamic world's sec-
ism," but also unleasheda bitter salvo againstthe 'r01
intellectuals who
ularists, "the pseudo-scientistsand half-baked
 Islam Meets the Cold War . 8t

-a -
-
rrlIlg
.,.'5r surreptitiously or openly advocate the gradual annihilation of reli-
:- :mof gion," and who argue that religion is "a mass of superstitions, dog-
: a .1tl IO - mas, and supernatural doctrines which tend to belittle the power of
: : :- . :l V of reason." Secularists, not communists, are the greatest danger to the
stability of Pakistan and, by implication, the broader Middle East:
., .-.-\1us-
,. : Lrlti- Communist atheism [Siddiqi said] has a power of inspiratron
which pure rationalism does not have. It is a faith as well as a sci-
ence,a social gospelas well as a metaphysicalsystem.It is the only
real substitute for religious faith which the champions of science
and technology are seekingto undermine in Pakistan.
It is the socio-economicsignificanceof Islam that makes it a
standing barrier against Communism. The Muslim masses are
attached to the Islamic idea, just becauseit offers them the prom-
ise of social and economic equality and freedom of expression.
If any attempt is made to deny the socio-economiccontent of
Islamic teachings, Communism is sure to rush into the vacuum
that would be created. For, as I have pointed out, Communism
offers both the emotional satisfaction of religious faith and the
promise of social and economic security.. . . In the Islamic world,
the choice is not between Communism and seculardemocracy,but
between Communism and liberal Islam. . . . The greatest danger
to the stability of Pakistan comes neither from reactionary theolo-
gians nor from the Communists who can offer nothing better to a
Muslim, but from those who without any knowledge of the deeper
aspectsof Islam . . . are trying to create a spiritual vacuum in our
life that would safely let in Communism.3T

: . a ,:.\ \\'aS
.World
-::uddin Kenneth Cragg, The Muslim editor, had a similar message.
::. -\ for- Cragg's paper, "The Intellectual Impact of Communism upon Contem-

- :.:-.'arsltv porary Islam," originally delivered at rhe colloquium, was published a

,-.,. . r t t i S t n, few months later in the Middle East Journal.3s In it, he presented a
",:. In his sophisticated argument for an Islamic revival. "'we in religious resis-
: - 'mmu- tance to Communism," wrote Cragg, "understand that the Muslim
:-i built world must develop an intellectual response to the challenge of com-
:: : . 1 rl an- munism) on a level that is spiritual, metaphysical, and moral, in order
:.i's sec- to combat the Marxist 'eschatology' that 'looks forward to a Commu-
* _'-. tVhO nist Heaven on earth.' " Cragg offered an antidote to this seductive
 D E v t r - 's GenE
^/

Marxism: "With Islam, as countlessmodern writers have explained,

[the perfect societyl is the true Islamic society-some would say the
true Islamic State." And he concludeswith a hopeful vision: "May it :
not be that by virtue of this common needto give a worthy answerto
Communism the two faiths, Islam and Christianity,have the opportu-
nity of a fruitful relationshipwith eachother?" Cragg citesa comment
from the Princetongathering,in which the occasionof Turkish troops tl:

fighting in the Korean \Var was evoked, to conclude: "Now at last

after r,3oo yearsof largely fruitlesscontroversy.men of the rwo great
monotheisticreligionsare strugglingshoulderto shoulderagainstgod-
lessmaterialism."
Yet, in the r95os, the idea that Islam would join the "Christian"
\Westin a jihad-crusadeagainst"godlessmaterialism" was decidedlya
minority point of view. On one hand, many hard-headedstrategists-
who might be called "realists" today-felt that Islamism was too
weak or uncertaina force to be relied upon. A secondpole of opposi-
tion came from some of those who believedthat Islam could never
servethe anti-communist cause becauseit was ir-rherentlytoo anti-
Western.
Hermann Eilts recallsthe idea that Islam was an ally in the struggle " irli

againstMoscow as an "overstatement."
"There was a view that lslam and communism were simply anti- i'il

thetical," saysEilts, who beganhis servicein Iran and SaudiArabia in

the r94os. "Very few people in governmenteven thought very much
" :ll
about Islam. . . . There were those who said, 'It's helpful to keep the
communistsout.' But no one really took it very seriously.The general
view in the U.S. government and in the academic world was that
Islam was becoming a shrinking political factor, and sharia law,
'TT
Islamic law, was being relegatedto personalstatus.And I remember
so well American economicspecialistscoming out to the countriesin -{l

which I servedand making the point that the quicker you get rid of "t'I

Islam, the more quickly you are going to develop,becauseIslam was ,':"
11
seenby them as a barrier to economicdevelopment."
John C. Campbell, for decadesthe Council on Foreign Relations'
iiiitl

chief Middle East strategist,led a CFR task force, launchedin 1954, ]L

 Islam Meets tbe Cold \X/ar 85

. -. 1. i-^ , 1 comprised of many of the heavyweights of the U.S. foreign policy

\ . 'I.tl tlL u t

: slr- the establishment. For Campbell, Islam may or may not have been a bar-
",\lay it rier to economic growth, but it didn'r appear to be a barrier against
i :l \ \ \ -ef t O rh e U S SR :
,pportu-

-, )ntment Certainly Islam cannot be counted on to serve as such a barrier.

. r rroops The theory that communism and Soviet influence could never
'.,, ;rt last make inroads in the N{oslem world becausethey are materialistic
and atheistichas not been borne out. Religion does have a signifi-
:"\ O great
cant place in Middle Eastern society.It colors both popular and
.::tstgod-
official attitudes.But it does not establishan absolute immuniry ro
a political virus such as fascism or communism. Communist the-
:rr istian" ory does have certain superficialparallelswith Islamic dogma, and
-.:. rtledly a the promise of a better material life is nor inconsisrentwith it.
--'--.,.'rSfS- Above all, the impact of rhe modern world on Islam has produced
, "- \\ . 1S t O O two major trends which rend to open rhe door toward communist
influence: first, the inability of traditional doctrines and institu-
, : opposi-
tions to hold the loyalty of the intellectualleadersand new genera-
_ , r rd llevef
tions bent on finding a way out of material backwardness;and
l r ro i] [ t i-
second, the revulsion against the West, which, while often rein-
forcing the senseof dedication to Islam, has often created also a
irrLlggle senseof identification with whatever theories and political forces
r,verehostile to the \West.. . . In the Arab lands and lran, the anri-
'Westernnationalist movement has had
- - :-.:lV anti- a srrong admixture of reli-
gious feeiing,even fanaticism.
- \rebia in

{cep the The inherently anti-Western bias of political Islam, thought Campbell,
. '.r qeneral ought to preclude any idea of its usefulness in U.S. strategy.3e
- ,. ',r'asthat Despite such warnings, the United States experimented, often
j j , . . ; '.i .7l a w' clumsilS with Islamism in the years berween r945 and 1957.
,- . -. lre mb e r Even as early as r945, when British and American planners began
: , . .tl rri e Si n rhinking about how to build alliances and a sysrem of defense against
, : . f ri d of rhe USSR across its vast southern border, Islam was factored in. The
. .. I . L l tn r'va s British-inspired League of Arab States, for instance, was considered
n-eak because it didn't include Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. So, ir was
:'- R.clations' proposed at one point to convert the Arab League into a League of
-.J rn 1954, Islamic States,to include at least some of the Northern Tier countries.a0

*'*r*41
 86 [)nvrr.' s Ger,rr

That idea fizzled,and subsequentporicies

focusedlesson Islam and
mo'e on direct Anglo-American power.
Stilr, during the Truman and
Eisenhoweryears' the united states
carried out a seriesof efforts to
mobilize political Islam in the cold war,
and ro useIslam as a weapon
against Soviet influence.Some of them
were serirus,minded.others
were clums.y,evenhilariously misguided.
Consider the ,,Red pig,' program. part
of the American approach
toward political Islam in the r95os
was ro rry ro win propaganda
points by emphasizingthat the United
States*as a piuu, narion arnd
that the SovietUnion persecured religion.In r95r, the U.S.Informa_
tion Servicein Baghdad proudly announced
the lar-rnchof a pr:opa_
ganda campaign designed to win
the hearts and minds of Iraqi
Muslirns by a "comparison of the srate
of religion in the United Srates
and in 'a communist state."' A posrer
was created ',which showed
the communisr state as a big bully
martreatinga man labeled ,Reli-
gion."' A secondposter

tells the story of the GreedyRed pig ancl

how he cameto a bad
end. The fact that the pig is wearinga
Red Staron his arnrband
and has at his rear insteadof the normall,v
piggy curl a hammer_
and-sicklerail hasnot escaped the observers.
. . . Othersrernarked
on the suitabilityof making the Communist
villain a pig because
of the resistance appealit hasfor Moslems.ril/efeelthar a
whole
seriesof cartoon-posrers can be developed,usingthe Red prg as
the centralfigure.al

Edward S' crocker, the foreign service

official who helpeddesignthe
campaign, helpfully included thirty-two
illustrations of the Red pig
campaignwith his dispatch.
The fledgling centrar IntelligenceAgency
also erperimented with
creative,if half-cocked,ways of conne-ing
with the Islamistmovemenr.
Some of rhem are told in the raucously
funny book The Game of
Nations by Miles Copeland,the CIA
operationsofficer who, during the
r95os, served as a liaison to Nasser
and who spent many years
embroiled in Arab politicar skullduggerl,.
coperand retired earry from
the cIA but maintained crose.onn*io,r,
to dozensof its current and
former operatives,especiallyto Kermit
and Archie Roosevelt,grandsons
 Islam Meets the Cold V/ar 8z

:-. : r Isl a m and of Teddy Roosevelt.A back-slappingsoutherner,Copeland used his

: - : T r u mi rn and good-ol'-boy charm to mask a sophisticatedunderstandingof the
: :- r ri e ffo rts t o Arab world. He reported that around the sametime as the "Red Pig"
. .. '-'. ] i a we a pon campaign,the CIA came up with the "Moslem Billy Graham" proj-
- ' tled. Others ect. In r95r, Secretaryof State Dean Acheson "borrowed Kermit
Rooseveltfrom the newly formed Central IntelligenceAgencyto head
:-. - . 111ap p ro ac h a highly secretcommitteeof specialists-somefrom the StateDepart-
, :- i.ropa€ianda ment, some from the Department of Defense,and some brought in as
- :) n.l ti o n a n d consultantsfrom businessconcernsand universities(and none from
, - . : . In fo rma - the CIA except Roosevelthimself)-to study the Arab world," said
-- , 'f a p ro p a -
Copeland.At the gathering,an operation designedto mobilize Islamic
-' : .ti of |:aqi religious sentimentswas launched. "Someone advancedthe idea of
i :: irc.dStates promoting a 'Moslem Billy Graham' to mobilize religiousfervor in a
' , -: ; i.r sh o w ed
great move againstCommunism and actually got as far as selectinga
- : re l e d 'Re l i- wild-eyed Iraqi holy man to send on a tour of Arab countries." The
identity of the Iraqi wasn't revealed.But Copeland consideredthe
entire effort to be a learning experience."The project did no harm,
-, :.rbad
and the managing of it taught the committee much about what was
- - -::ti.:rnd
wrong with their basic planning assumptions-lessonsthat were put
: ::l i l I er_
- . - :::.tfk ed
to good use later when [Saudi Arabia's] King Feisal'sadvisersput
, _ .'rai tuS e
Feisalup to much the samekind of project, with Feisalhimself as the
- - , ', r h o l e holy man."42
: Another, lessambitious CIA project involved some sardonic pro-
- -- P i q a s
pagandaaimed at the USSR'sinfluencein Egypt. The CIA unearthed
some pre-'WorldVar I anti-Islamictracts with titles llke Mohammed
- . -- .1c.signthe Neuer Existed, The Harmful Consequences of Fasting during
- : r Re d Pi g Ramadan, and Against tbe Veil, and reissuedthem, this time attribut-
ing them to the Sovietembassyin Cairo.a3
: t wi th The CIA also experimentedwith using Egypt as a centerfor reach-
-it fe d
.: : : Ove me n t . ing out to Islamic activistsin the Middle East and Africa. The vehicle
. . Gtme of ior the effort was none other than Anwar Sadat.SinceWorld lWar II,
- . Juri n g th e Sadathad been closeto the Muslim Brotherhood, servingas the liai-
: ::t-tlt\- years son betweenthe organizationand Nasser'sFreeC)fficersmovementin
:- - r rrl r. fro m tl-rer94os and early r95os. SadatapproachedNasserwith the idea of
:- , . ir re n t a n d .reating an Islamic Congressand, when Nasser agreed, Sadat was
: : . {r itn d SOn s .rppointed to lead it. According to Miles Copeland, "Religious

i:
 U8 . Dr,vrr-'s Gaur,

attach6swere sent to various Egyptian missionsabroad and assigned

the task of watching for opportunitiesto usecommon religiousinter-
eststo achieveat leasttactical 'union.' . . . The American Governmenr
at first gave limited encouragementto the program."4aLater, when
relations betweenthe United Statesand Nasserreachedthe breakine
point, the CIAs support for the venturewas withdrawn.
More seriouslSthe United Statesbeganto explore with SaudiAra-
bia the possibility of creating an Islamic bloc, whose porential was
noted by someU.S. officialsand diplomats beginningin the r94os. It
was still too early for the U.S.-SaudiIslamic allianceto take concrere
form as it later would. However, the questionof whether Islam could
serve as a barrier against communism, Marxist ideas, and radical
Arab nationalism occupied the thoughts of many academics,policy
makers,and foreign serviceofficers.
..In r95r, rWilliamA. Eddn the U.S. consul generalin Dhahran,
Saudi Arabia, wrote a detailed account of discussionshe'd had with
various Muslim leaders,including the king of SaudiArabia, the mufti
of Jerusalem,an Islamic leaderin Egypt, and an Arab Leagueofficial
suggestinga strategyfor the "Christian, democratic'Westjoining with
the Muslim world in a common moral front against Communism."
According to EddS the mufti, Haj Amin al-Husseini, the British-
linked Palestinianwho'd been a supporter of Nazism during the
L93osand r94os, "spoke of Russiaand Communism with the deepest
hate, insistedthat we were on the wrong side in the last war [World
\WarII] and should have beenallied with Germany againstRussia.. . .
He spoke cordially of the cooperation which would be offered by
Muslims to promote a joint propagandawith Christiansro make this
danger clear." Regarding Saudi Arabia, Eddy explicitly noted the
power of the fundamentalistWahhabi movement:

While in an audiencewith the King of SaudiArabia,Abdul Aziz al

Saud,this week,the King addressed himselfstronglyro the same
point. He affirmedthat both Christranityand Islamarethrearened
by Communism,their common enemy.. . . Muslims in the East,
and Christiansin the \fest, should be allies in this trouble to
defendtheir historicfaith. . . . As headof the puritanical'Wahhabi
movementto restorethe pure faith and Dracticesof Islam. the
 lslamMeetstheColdV/ar . 8.r

King is without any doubt the most representative

and influential
\{uslim in the world today.as

Eddy sentcopiesof the letter to three officialsof Aramco, the consor-

rium made up of Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, and Chevron, and to
BrigadierGeneralRobert A. McClure, director of psychologicalwar-
fare, Department of Defense.
Eddy was more than a low-level consular official. During World
War II, Eddy had been an intelligenceoperative for the Office of
StrategicServices(OSS),where he'd gotten experienceusing political
Islam on America's behalf. "Born in Syria of missionaryparents, he
spoke fluent Arabic and was a distinguishedscholar and war hero
rvho had lost a leg in the First'World 'War." With great derring-do,
Eddy conducted operationsin parts of German-occupiedNorth Africa.
''Eddy formed chainsof informants to gather intelligence,spreadsub-
versivepropaganda,and organizea resistancemovement." That resis-
-.::i tance, however, would include a Muslim secret societS led by
: . .1 collaboratorsknown only by the nicknames"Strings" and "Tassels."
, . - 1.
."--ii
Stringswas the "leader of a powerful Muslim brotherhood in north-
:1 . ern Morocco."a6
_ :. A year later,an unsigned r9 5z diplomatic report entitled "Conver-
--\:t-

: le sation with PrinceSaud," labeled"Secret:SecurityInformation," said

that Aramco was paying for a print shop and a broadcastingstatron
-, I in Riyadh for the propagation of religious tracts. Prince Saud, who
rvould soon become king, declaredthat Saudi Arabia was "a leader
: i.) among the Arab statesbecauseof . . . the presenceof the Holy Cities
: ir ts rvithin the Kingdom." And Saud had another point to make, the U.S.
diplomat added:

Someday,he said,he wasgoingto givetangibleform to thisleader-

ship.He saidthat he had planswhich he did not wish to discussin
detailnow to sparkplug a pan-Islamic movement.He saidit could
do a greatdealof goodin the Muslim countriesby causingthemto
work togetherasa unit but againhe repeated that he wasnot ready
to discussthe plan in detail.. . . I told him that his information
aboutIslamicunity wasveryinteresting and we would be veryglad
it
to know moreabout when his plans rvereclearlyformulated.. . .
 9o D nvtr' s Gaur.

I told him that we would welcome such a movement under his

leadership becausewe were sure that it would be friendly.aT

\fhile some foreign policy functionaries had their doubts, efforts

to encourageFaisalin this direction were undertakententativelyany-
way, without a real grasp of either the politics or the culture of the
Muslim world.
David Long, a retired foreign serviceofficer and specialiston Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf, says that in the period after'World'War II the
United Stateswas operating blind. "'We didn't know anything," he
'War
says. "When we get up to the period after'World II, yes, there
were times when Islam was usedas a rallying cry for the political issue
of the day." But, says Long, U.S. policy lacked an understandingof
historical precedent."\7e were trying a replay of what they'd tried a
thousand years.ago," he says, referring to the caliphates of old.
'Well,
"Their ideology is ancient. we never heard of any of this when
we jumped into this r)3oo-year-oldsaga,simply becausewe were the
biggestplayer in the game." SomeAmericans,said Long, had a rudi-
mentary familiarity with the Middle East and Islamic culture. "It was
usually said that the oil company kids and the missionarykids knew a
little. But I've talked to them, many of them, over the years. They
lived in their own little world, and what they knew was in fact very,
very limited.'We wanted oil, and we wanted to fight communism, but
we weren't really all that interestedin all that crap about Islam. We
were neophytes-way, way behind the curve of what the British and
Frenchpicked up after all the time they'd spentthere'" Asked whether
the United Statesactively supported political Islam as an alternative
to communism in those days, Long says,"'We encouragedit' But we
didn't createit."
Adds Long:

The dealwas,the Saudiswerevulnerable. We would providesecu-

rity for them, and they would provide oil for us.
\When it came to Nasser,Faisal reviewed the bidding and
opposedpan-Arabism.He decidedthat they were socialistsand
that they were against Islam. So, while we and the Israelis
 Islam Meets the Cold V/ar . 9r

*: 1lt ) were demonizingNasser,herewas Faisalopposinghim. He was

worried that Muslim youth would turn to socialismand abandon
Islam.We didn't understandthar-we didn't understandFaisal's
'::. efforts motivations.We tried to setup an alliancebetweenSaudiArabia
and Tunisia,forgettingthat Bourguibawas a secularist. 'We
- '1 . - r. . r - said,
'Hey, you're all moderates.'But to Faisal,Bourguibawas an
..:: of the
apostate.
So we weregoingin the samedirection,but we didn't under-
: ,:rSaudi
standit. 'Wetried to giveit a differentslant,that of powerpolitics.
;i:: II the To the Saudis,however,it was basedon the ideathat they are the
" ho
- ---
--
-- : . defenders of the faith, of the Muslim holy places.But we saw it in
'.,:. rhere a powerpoliticsframework.a8
.: . -, rii s s u e
''-_r- . irn o
-' -_D
nf
-_
As Long suggests,the American "neophytes" stumbled into an
'.'J tried a allianceof sorts with Islamic fundamentalismalmost without realiz-
;: of old. ing what was happening.Very few American diplomats and scholars
::.:swhen had studied the relationship between Islam and politics, and rhose
: '.\'ere the who did were often muddled. In 195r, the Middle East Insriturecon-
:: 3 rudi- vened a two-day conferenceon "Islam in the Modern \World," at
'\X/.
:- . "lt was which Philip Ireland, a senior State Departmenr official who'd
:: knew a servedas U.S. charg6 d'affaires in Baghdad,deliveredan addresson
:,:i. They the relationship of Islam, democracy,and communism, wondering
:laf very, "whether presenttrends will carry Islam into the camp of Commu-
i:.tsn1.but nism or into that of Democracy."After noting that "Commsnism"-
IWe actuallS he was referring to nationalism-was making gains in Syria,
"..:m.
::::rshand Iraq, and Jordan, Ireland noted:

- ii'hether
In SaudiArabia, the Yemen,and the Hadramaut,the primitive
: . rnati ve
and austerecharacterof Islam has indeedproven,practicallyas
: . B ut we
well astheoretically.
a barrierto Communism.ae

Ireland did not put much stock in the theocratic version of Islam,
expressingthe hope that somehow Muslims would be able to blend
Islam with modern political theories.LeadingU.S. strategistsworried
a nd that as Islam modernized,Muslims would abandon their faith for sec-
i :! e n d ularism, and that such a trend would open the doors to the spreadof
,. :-relis Marxist ideasin the Middle East.BayardDodge, the highly influential
 L)2 . D l vrt.'s Gal l n

ex-presidentof the American U'iversity in Beirut Ggz3 to r

94g), told
the sameMiddle East Instituregroup:

Tcrdaynationalismof a materialistic type is bec<tming a srrongele-

ment in Islamicthought and society.And that, of course,works
directly againstthe old idea pan-lslamor the caliphate, .f
'f
Islamasa greatorganizedbrotherhood.To a largeextent,natio.-
alism has takenthe place the religi.ussideof the pan-Isranr
movement.Needless 'f
to sa)',it is the youngMuslim, uninterestecl in
Isla'r as a great svsrem,who is particularl,vlikely to becomea
Communist.. . . The reactionof the Muslimsof the risinggenera-
tion is an exceedinglyunfortunateone, as so manv of them are
casti'g asidetheir religio', their moraliry,or their loyalty to the
cult. They live licentiouslives,drinking,. . . gambling,. . . amus-
ing themselves in cabaretsand housesof prostirution.
If Islamis undermined, if materialisrn and radicalisnr comein,
with eommunistthoughtperhapsperrneating it, rhe ourcomewill
certainlybe a rnajortragedyfor the rvorld.50

Loyalty t. "the cult"? Living "licentiousiives... in housesof prosti-

tution"? Dodge, the scior-r
of Protestantmissionarieswith roots in the
Middle East of the ninereenrhcenrury, s.unds more like a Bible-
thumping revivalistthan a foreign policy analyst.Ancl, in fact, in his
address, Dodge praised the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey,s anti_
Ataturk religi.us revival, and Persiansunder Reza shah whr are
"finding that they musr go back and have more religion if they are to
combat communism."'i1 Dodge here expressedalmost exactry the
sought-afterchristian-Muslim alliancethat so many u.s. policy makers
dreamedof, regardlessof how impracticalit seemed.\forse, though, it
was preciselywhat the Middle East didn't need, as it struggleilnith
modernity,and as secularleaderseverywherein the region(exceptSaudi
Arabia) sought ro reduce or elirninatethe role of Islam, the clergy,the
rilTahhabis,and the Muslim Brotherhood. 'S7hatDodge, and many
others, feared is that communism, and not western-stylecapitalism,
would win the hearrsand minds of Arabs, Turks, persians.ancl Indi-
ans freed of the shacklesof religiousbelief.
Many American diplomats,of course,equally concernedabout
promoting U.S. interestsoverseasand combatingcommunism,took
 [slam Meets the Cold Wdr qz

:()l d the sensibleview that the United Statesought to concentrateon eco-

nomic development in the Middle East, and that facilitating the
region'stransition away from backward religiousfundamentalismto
modern, and Western,ideasclf organizingsocietymight not necessar-
ily benefitthe SovietUnion. Many, too, believedthat Islam should not
be anything more than a systemof personal belief, not a political or
socialsystem.
But as the r95os wore on, their voiceswere lessand lessinfluen-
tial. Nasser'snonalignment,or "positive neutralism," beganto look
more and more like a communist Trojan Horse to the Dulles brothers
'Iil7ar
and their Cold co-thinkers.So. too. did the nationalismof Prime
Minister Mossadeghin Iran. In both cases,as the Eisenhoweradmin-
istration moved to confront theseregimes,it reachedfor one of the
most dangerousimplementsin its tool box: Islamrcfundamentalism.

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: t. l . -

: l i rs
-i. . -.1L l -

-tre
ri : [O

.i r il S

.:'.. ir
.' rrh
) t: 1di
'.. il.re

:- ,t lt \'

. > lll,

li
"-

li llll

- . 1-

fltt" --+
 4

THE W AR AGATNST NASSER AND MOSSAD EGH

lN ruE EARLy r95os, two nationalistleadersemergedin two of the

most powerful counrriesof the Middle East,Egypt and Iran. In Egypt,
Gamai Abdel Nasser'sFree officers ousted that counrry,s dissolute
king and threatenedto spark revolution in saudi Arabia, the heart of
the world's energy supply. In Iran, a freely elected democrat and
socialist-inclinedleader named Mohammed Mossadeghsuccessfulh.
challengedthe ruling shah of Iran, forced him to flee, and asserred
his country's right to take over the oil industry from Britain's Anglo-
PersianOil Company.
In both casesGreat Britain, the united states,and their intelligence
agencieswent into action, overthrowing Mossadeghand trying but
failing to do the samero Nasser,and in both cases,MI6 and the cIA
usedthe Islamic right as a car's-paw.In Egypt, they used the Muslim
Brotherhood, and in Iran they mobilized a group of ayatollahsthat
includedthe ideologicalgodfatherof Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomerni.
Perhapsthe greatesttwin tragedies,or lost opportunities,for the
united Staresin the Middle Eastin rhe past half century are the Amer-
ican failures to embrace Gamal Abdel Nasser and Mohammed
Mossadegh when they emerged,in the r95os, as leaders of their
people'saspirations.That error createda residueof resentment,bir-
 Tbe War against Nasserand Mossadegh 95

rerness,and anger in the Middle East, feeding widespread,lingering

.rnti-Americanismto this day and even providing fuel for Al Qaeda's
recruiters.Yet it was a folly compounded by yet another massive
error: the U.S. decisionto support SaudiArabia as the counter pole to
-\rab and Persiannationalism, and to tie itself to a worldwide net-
u'ork of Islamistssponsoredby the Saudis.It was a decisionwhose
consequencesled, indirectly, to the rise of A,vatollah Khomeini's
rheocracy,the destructionof Afghanistan,and Osama bin Laden'ster-
rorist international.

THE , BRO THERHO O D AG A I N S T NASSER

From 1954, when Nasserconsolidatedpower over his rivals, until

r97o, when he died, Nasser garnered unparalleled,even legendary,
support in Egypt, and throughout the Arab world. Andr6 Malraur,
:he Frenchwriter, said, of Nasser:"He will enter history as represen-
:ative of Egypt, the sameas Napoleon of France."r \William R. Polk,
an official at the National SecurityCouncil in the r96os, said: "He
n-as the John Kennedy of the Arab world."2 Five million people
:urned out for his funeral, and that doesn'tcount the tens of millions
,rf Arabs who mourned privately, "the ones who wept in coffee-
i-rouses,at home, alone, in groups, silently,loudly, through prayei, in
;.rrs in faraway California, or who sufferedthe pain of his death in
:rozen numbness."3Yet over and over, in the 195os and again in the
r96os, the United Statesstiff-armed Nasser,and worse. Behind the
).enes,the CIA schemedto topple him.
"'We were trying to overthrow Nasseq" saysEd Kane, a CIA opera-
:ions officer who was stationed in Cairo in the late r95os and early
.r()os. "The Agencywas involvedin a covertoperation-a very inept
rr-re,I might add-relying on membersof the ancien r6gime, who had
'rl.solutelyno power.'We were attempting to find elementswho could
, )\-erthrow him, mostly figures tied to the old regime-landowners,
:ndustrialists,and other old enemiesof Nasser's.It was a futile project."a
Half a century ago, Nasser symbolized Arab revoiution, self-
letermination, and independence.The seizure of power by the Free
 96 . DE,vrr's Gaun

officers in Egypt came during an erawhen the entire Arab world, from
Morocco to Iraq, was locked in the grip of a political ice age.Morocco,
Algeria, and Tunisia were French colonies;Kuwait,
eatar, Bahrain, the
United Arab Emirares,oman, and yemen were British colonies. Iraq,
Jordan, and saudi Arabia were kingdoms ruled by monarchiesinstalled
by London. And Egypt, under the wobbly King Farouq, was the politi-
cal and economic cenrerof the Arab world. By taking power in Egypt,
Nasserelectrifiedthe political classin the Arab world, inspiring a host of
would-be imitators, liberation-mindedpolitical parties, and army revo-
lutionists.From 1954 onward, through agenrs,political supporr, and
the powerful Voice of the Arabs radio in cairo, and by virrue of his
charismaticappeal,Nasserled the independencemovement in the Arab
Middle East. From '956 to 1958, Lebanon,
Jordan, and Iraq were
rocked by rebellions, Iraq's king fell, and Syria united with Egypt in
Nasser'sunited Arab Republic, a short-lived but exciting experimentin
unifying the Arab world. The Algerian'evolurion drew moral and mate-
rial support from cairo, beforewinning independence in tc)6z,thesame
year that Yemen underwent a Nasser-inspiredrevolt, triggering a proxy
war pitting Saudi Arabia against Egypt. Even as lare as 1969, a year
before Nasser'sdeath, Libya's king was overthrown and Sudan,sright-
wing regimeeliminatedby military leadersloyal to Nasser.
In the Manichea', with-us-or-against-usworld of the cold rwar,
Nasserwas loathed and demonizedby London, \Tashington,and Tel
Aviv. Around the world, from Guatemala to the congo to Indonesia-
and in Iran-the cIA was busy getting rid of leadersnot becausethey
were communists, but becausetheir independentstreak made them
untrustworthy interlocutors in the war between the superpowers.
Nasserwas no exception.
unlike other leadersin Latin America or Africa, however, Nasseq
with his revolutionaryoutlook, threatenedthe very heart of America's
post-\7orld \Var II srrategy: rhe vast oil fields of saudi Arabra. Not
only was Egypt a potential military rival to SaudiArabia, not only did
cairo clash with Riyadh in a shooting war in yemen, not only did
Nasserinspire Arabs in saudi Arabia with republicanideals,but the
Egyptian leader even won over some of saudi Arabia's royal family.
 The War against Nas-<erand Mossadegh

...iro. led by PrinceTalal, formed the so-called"Free Princes,"defected

: , F,gvpt,and demandedthe establishmentof a republic in Arabia.
-\s rhe United Statesbuilt its network of alliancesin the Middle
i-...r. relying more and more on non-Arab states,including TurkeS
i-:n. irnd Israel,there developedan "Arab cold war," with Egypt at
,rreend and SaudiArabiaat the other.Superficially, it seemedas if the
.:rLrgglewithin the Arab world pitted Soviet-leaning Arab countries
.,.srinstAmerican-alliedones,but in fact the SovietUnion had no true
r rresand few friendsin the region.T'hereal dynamicthat plavedout
:-enveenr954 and r97o occurredbetweencompetingvisionsof the
-.irLrreof the Middle E,ast.On one hand, there was Nasser'ssecular,
::r,rdernizing,industrial Arab world of independentbut cooperative
rr.rb republics.On the other was SaudiArabia's semi-feudalarray of
put at the West'sdisposal,in
with their natural resources
::r,,narchies,
was the Muslim Brotherhood
.rhich the royal families'ace-in-the-hole
the Islamic right.
,,.n.1
A contingent of America'sArabists rejectedthe strategyof isolat-
.:rqNilsser,and someevensaw him as the Arab world's savior."ln the
:.eqinningNasserhad somestrong support from the Agency and from
::rcembassy,"saysKane,referringto the period from r95z to r954.\
\ccording to one widely cited account, by Miles Copeland in The
(,ttrte of I'Jations,the CIA even encouragedthe Free Officers in their
-* oilrtion, after first trying to get King Farouq to modeihize Egypt.
Thc legendaryKermit ("Kim") Roosevelt,the man who would coor-
linate the r953 CIA coup that restoredthe shahof Iran to his throne,
.;-rctlv visitedFgypr in r95z:

His mission,specifically,lvasfirst to attemptto organizea "peace-

fLrl revolution" in Egvpt wherein King Farouq himself would
supervise the liquidationof the old and its replacementby the new,
thereby defusing the revolutionary forces which CIA agentshad
astnuchastwo vearsearlier.t'
rclentified

But. accordingto Copeland,Farouq was too "bird-brained"Tand

!orrLlpt to respond, preferring to engagein or:giesand troll Cairo's

{iG!58
 98 D rvrr' s Gaur

Red Light district in sunglasses

than to take responsibilityfor Egypt.
Kim Rooseveltthus

. . . agreedto meetthe officerswhom the CIA had spottedas likely

leadersof the secretmilitary societyknown to be plotting a coup.
This he did in March r952, four monthsbeforeNasser's coup.. . .
There were three such meetings,the third attended by one of
Nasser's most trustedlieutenants.8

Rooseveltreturned to \Tashington to convince the U.S. government

that it must acceptthe removal of Farouq.
There is no way to corroborate Copeland'saccount. Declassified
archivesdon't provide any help, and no one elsehas steppedforward
to endorse Copeland'sspecificasserrions.Yet the United Statesini-
tially enjoyedgenerallygood relationswith rhe new Egyptian govern-
ment. In his excellentbook, Nasser'sBlessedMouement,Joel Gordon
reports that declassified"records do substantiatecharges of close
links betweenthe U.S. embassyin Cairo and the new regime." The
British, on the other hand, though resignedto following the U.S. lead,
seethedwith anger at'Washington,fearing that Nasser'srise to power
threatenedthe SuezCanal, its bases,and its path to India.e
But more was at stake than the remnants of the British Empire. The
emergenceof Nasser was an existential threat to the oil kingdoms-to
Saudi Arabia, to Iraq, and to the British-ownedsheikhsin the Gulf.
The British, and then the Anglo-Americans, opposed Nasser not
becausehe was a communist,or becausehe was susceptibleto commu-
nist influence; in fact, Nasser suppressedthe Egyptian left and the
various communist partiesvigorously.In addition, the Egyptian com-
munists were poorly organized and divided, with support primarily
among the intelligentsia,and had no chanceof taking power exceptas
a minority stakeholder in a \fafd-led nationalist government. 'What
was intolerable to London and'VTashington(and to Paris, too, until
1956) was that Nasserrefusedto be controlled,was adept at playing
the superpowers off against each other, and inspired loyalty among
Arabs outsideof Egypt, including thosesitting on rop of the oii.
\X/hat especially worried London and 'Washington was the idea
 The War aRainst Nasserand Mossadegh ' 99

that Nasser might succeedin unifying Egypt and Saudi Arabia, thus
creatinga major Arab power. One of the ironies of the Arab world is
that Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine,which have historically
been the centersof Arab learning and political movements'have no
oil. On the other hand, except for Iraq and non-Arab lran, the oil
states-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain,
Qatar-have tiny populations and no intellectual tradition (except
ultra-orthodox Islamic theology),and are ruled by royal kleptocracies
whose legitimacyis nil and whose existencedependson outside mili-
rary protection. Most Arabs are aware that both the monarchies
themselves,and the artificial bordersthat demarcatetheir states'were
designedby imperialistsseekingto build fencesaround oil wells in the
.J r9zos. From a strategicstandpoint, the Arabs would gain much by
marrying the sophisticationand manpower of the urban Arab coun-
tries (including Iraq) with the oil wealth of the desertkingdoms. At
the center of that idea lies Egypt, with its tens of millions of people,
and SaudiArabia, with zoo billion barrelsof oil. Underlying the rhet-
oric of secular pan-Arabism is the reality that uniting Cairo and
Riyadh would create a vastly important new Arab center of gravity
r.vithworldwide infl uence.
So, after its initial flirtation with Nasser,the United States-led by
Secretaryof StateJohn Foster Dulles and his brother, CIA director
-{llen Dulles-lined up with London againstArab nationalism' British
prime minister Anthony Eden,who had beenviolently anti-Nasserall
along, considereda British-sponsoredcoup d'6tat in Cairo as early as
r953. The only political force in Egypt that could mount a challenge
to Nasser-except for the army-was the Muslim Brotherhood,
u'hich had hundredsof thousandsof followers. The Brotherhood also
had the sympathyof someEgyptian officers,including BrigadierGen-
eral Mohammed Naguib, a longtime Muslim Brotherhood fellow
rraveler who was a conservativemember of Nasser'sFree Officers
movement.In t952, after the officers'coup toppled the king, Naguib
u'as named president and prime minister of Egypt' with Nasser as
deputy prime minister.Behind the scenes,Nasserwas the real power.
"William Lakeland, the [U.S.] embassy'spolitical officer, realized
almost immediately that Naguib was only Nasser'sfront man," wrote

:jnF+
 roo . D r , v I t . 's Gamn

Miles Copeland. "'While the Egyptian public and the outside world
were cheeringNaguib, the embassy,through Lakeland, had begun to
deal with Nasser as the one who really made the decisions."l0But
Naguib, though lesspowerful than Nasser,had close ties to Hassan
Ismail al-Hudaybi, the man who had succeededHassan al-Banna as
the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. Ultimately, a power struggle
between Nasser and Naguib would develop, and Naguib-with
British support-would reachout to the Brotherhood as his chief ally.
Nasser'sown early relationshrpwith the Muslim Brotherhoodwas
tricky and nuanced.rl On taking power in t952, the Free Officers
were very careful not to alienatethe Muslim Brothers.Severalmem-
bers of the officers' movement were members, and most of them,
including Nasser,had extensivecontacts with the organizatron going
back to the r94os. At the start the military junta faceda diversecoali-
'Wafd
tion of opponents,including the and the left, the monarchists,
the fascistYoung Egypt party, and the Muslim Brotherhood.Nasser,
who personally oversaw the military's delicaterelationshipwith the
Brotherhood, decided at first to co-opt and neutralize the group
rather than confront it. When the new Egyptian regimebannedpoliti-
cal partiesin t953, it exemptedthe Brotherhood.
There was, however, little chance that Nasser and the Muslim
Brotherhood would ever seeeye to eye. The Brotherhood wanted an
Islamic societS Nasser a secularone. Perhapseven more important,
Nasser wanted reforms, including land reform and educational
changes,that the Muslim Brotherhood bitterly opposed.In conversa-
tions with U.S. ambassadorJeffersonCaffery-the sameCaffery who
recommendedthat the Brothers' Said Ramadan visit Princeton and
'White
the House in r953-Hudaybi, the Brotherhood's chieftain,
said that he "would be glad to seeseveralof the [FreeOfficers] 'elimi-
nated."'12At around the sametime, a senior British diplomat, Trefor
Evans,the "oriental counselor" at the British embassyin Cairo, held
at least one meeting with Hassan Ismail al-Hudaybi, the supreme
guide of the Muslim Brotherhood-a meetinglater cited as treasonby
Nasser when he cracked down on the organization. Both British and
American officials maintained an ongoing relationship with the
group.

- .:-.1the outsideworld
--- - .<-ierrd.had begunto
-' - -: ::te clecisions."lo
But
\:' - ,: ;iose ties to Hassan
- - . , -:: Hassanal-Bannaas
- - -- .::"r. a power struggle
.: :. end Naguib-with
: - -. :r(rodas his chiefallY.
. I ..:.:trrBrotherhoodwas
, i:. the Free Officers
- :,.thers.Severalmem-
: -'-:r:. -rnd most of them,
- ' : --' drganizationgoing
-- - .:.:.lceda diversecoali-
,- - . the monarchists,
-fr.
.' ::' B:orherhood.Nasser,
- ,:. :-letionshiPwith the
'. - :rr'Lltr2lizethe group
,:-.:eqimebannedPoliti-
.r.serand the Muslim
: ,tl-rerhoodwanted an
:\.eI1lrlofe important,
. ,:m and educational
,,pposed.In conversa-
l.resameCaffery who
:.:n visit Princetonand
:,.therhood'schieftain,
- FreeOfficersl'elimi-
- - i:rrish diplomat,Trefor
- - - - .:ttbilssYin Cairo, held
. . -Htrdavbi,the supreme
: - - - .-.-ter cited as treasonbY
-- ' ,::ion.Both British and
- Brotherhood activity, noting "rumors of clashesbetween Brothers
: - :el.rtionshiP with the
liwffi
'War ror
The asainst Nasser and Mossadesh '
Nasser's long-postponed showdown with the Muslim Brother-
hood occurred in ry54. It coincided with rising British frustration
with the Egyptian leader during U.K.-Egypt negotiations over the
transfer of the SuezCanal and its basesto Egypt. While left-wing and
Labour politicians in England seemedwilling to make a deal with
Nasser,the British right-led by unreconstructedimperialistssuch as
\Tinston Churchill-was nearly apoplectic about the Egyptian
upstart.From r954 on, Anthony Eden,the British prime minister,was
demandingNasser'shead.'Weare indebtedto StephenDorril for the
*MI6
story of Eden'sjihad againstNasser,which culminatedin t956.
PresidentNasser,"accord-
had beenconsideringa plan to assassinate
ing to Dorril, who adds that in Cutting the Lion's Tail, Nasser's
adviserMohammed Heikal publisheda copy of a telegramfrorn CIA's
JamesEichelbergerin London to CIA director Allen Dulles,citing dis-
cussionswith MI6's GeorgeYoung. "He talked openly of assassinat-
ing Nasser,insteadof using a polite euphemismlike 'liquidating.' He
said his people had been in contact with suitable elementsin Egypt
and in the rest of the Arab world." Eichelberger-like Copeland,part
of the CIA's shrinking pro-Nasserfaction-leaked what Young said to
Nasser!13 A month later,Eden ranted: "'What'sall this nonsenseabout
isolating Nasser or 'neutralising' him, as you call it? I want him
destroyed,can't you understand?I want him murdered.. . . And i
don't give a damn if there'sanbrchyand chaosin Egypt."1a
In the first months of r954, the chaosnearly began,as the Muslim
Brotherhood and Nasser went to war. It started in January, when
Muslim Brotherhood thugs attacked pro-Nassernationalist students
at Cairo University. Anwar Sadat, the former Muslirn Brotherhood
memberwho had casthis lot with Nasseragainsthis former organiza-
tion, pennedan article attackinggroups that "traffic in religion." Two
dayslater Nasserissueda decreeoutlawing the terrorist group' and he
blastedthe Brotherhood as a pawn of the British. The decreebanning
the organization said: "The revolution will never allow reactionary
corruption to recur in the name of religion."l-t Declassifiedrecords
show that British intelligencewas carefully reporting on Muslim
.rnd the police in the Delta and covert meetingsheld in Ismailia'"16
ffi
D rv rl ' s Gens Tra \\,;' .:-

According to Robert Baer,a former cIA covert operationsspecial- Fidail'an-i Isldrrt-

ist, the cIA also endorsedthe idea of using the Muslim Brotherhood rows a term usecl:-
against Nasser.rn Sleepingwith the Deuir, Baer describesthe rough Mountain' Tho'"'
outlinesof a top secretU.S. effort: sim ilar t o t hose
cont act s.O n \ l '- '
Persian Prir-rrel' -
At the bottom of it all was this dirty little secretin rwashingron:
Fldal leader. \
The \x/hiteHouselookedon the Brothersas a sirentaily,a secret -
touched off rl-''
weapon against (what else?)communism.This covert action
hood and [ \ - : " '-
startedin the 195oswith the Dulles brothers-Allen at the cIA
and John Fosterat the StateDepartment-when they approved -
SaudiArabia'sfundingof Egypt'sBrothersagainstNasser.As far The r 95, 1,Br t ': . ''
as Washingtonwas concerned,Nasserwas a communist.He'd evenint he I I r i- '
. -
nationalizedEgypt'sbig-business industries,including the Suez re ached acl't , : '
-' ''
canal. The logicof the cold war led ro a clearconclusion:If Allah fanatics rvirl-r:
agreedto fight on our side,fine.If Allah decidedpoliticalassassr- i te ones in I r - - - : -
natlonwaspermissible, that wasfine,too, aslong asno onetalked ' n vhet her t het ^-
abourit in polirecompany.
forces thc-r "' . : '
Like any other truly effectivecovert acrion, this one was
r ight in f . g' 1. .
strictlyoff the books.Therewasno cIA finding,no mem.randum
notificationto congress.Not a pennycameout of the Treasuryto shaclou'r'. .'.' '
fund it. In otherwords,no record.All the white Househad t'do pick ar-r.1;''-
was give a wink and a nod to counrriesharboringthe Muslim a lse- l. r '- c- lt : : '"'
Brothers,like SaudiArabiaand Tordan.17 :tc -tl It1.J ' l ' -' ' l

t - l\ f ir r - l; ''. '': '

while both Britain and the United srateswere praying with fire,
mobilizing assassinsfrom the Muslim Brotherhood against Nasser,
there is also evidencethat the Brotherhood was cooperatingwith a
violent, assassination-proneIslamist group from Iran, the so,called
Devoteesof Islam, one of whose founders was an Iranian ayatollah
who worked with the cIA in toppling Mossadegh.Bernard Lewis, a
former British intelligenceofficer and a leadingorientalist, nored that
the Brothers' decisionto engagein outright opposition to Nasserwas
tied, in part, to its connectionsto the Devotees.It was, reportedLewis,
a visit to cairo in t9 14 by the leaderof the Devoteesof Islam that rris-
geredthe Muslim Brotherhood'sr954 uprisingagainstNasser:

The same combination of idealism and violence, of piety and

terror, can be seen in the Persian organization known as the
 .Vldr
The against Nasser ttnd Mossadegh rol

-- )pcrttionsspecial- Fidaiyan-iIslam-the devorees of Islam,which, significantly,

bor-
'.l,:.1imBrotherhood rows a rermusedby the medievalemissaries of the old Man of the
:cscribesthe rough Mountain. Though Shiites,they h.ld pan-Islamicopinionsrarher
similar ro rhoseof the Egyptianbrorhers,with whom they have
contacts.On \,,larch7, LL)
5r, oneof their membersshotand killed
-:: :n \\rashington:
PersianPrirneMinister GeneralRazmara.It was a visit of the
Fidai leader,Nawab Safavi,to Egypt in Januarn 19_54,that
- ::rf .tllr',a secret
' . covert action touchedoff the firsr serioLrs
and openclashbetweenthe Brother-
hood and INasser's] militaryregime.18
- -. ien :rt the CIA
rhev approved
The r954 Brotherhood-Devoteeslink reveals rhe exrenr to which,
.: \a sse r . A s f ar
':l rru n i s t . He' d evenin the r95os, Islamicfundamentalismwas truly international.It
, .i .1 i n gt he S uez reachedacrossnational bordersin the Arab world, it connectedArab
'.-i u si o n :I f A llah fanaticswith thosein Pakistan,and it linked sunni militants with Shi-
:i rl 1 1 1 an1
as s as s i- ite ones in Iran and elsewhere.Even half a century later, it isn't clear
ii no one ta lke d whether the cIA understoodthe internationalscopeand power of the
forces they were dealing with. Did they understandthat the Islamic
. th i s one was
right in Egypt, in Saudi Arabia, in Iran and elsewhereoperated a
: ,n re n o r andum
: :te Treasur\''to
shadowy,worldwide fraternity-or did they believethar they could
ii rru se h ad t o do pick and choosewhen and where ro support the Islamic right, on a
: ::tq fh e M us lim case-by-case
basis?The fact is that by the r95os the Islamistshad cre-
ated a transnationalorganism,whose existenceappearedto eludethe
cIA for decades.Instead,American diplomats and cIA officials pre-
r plil\'ing with fire, ferred to seeIslamic acrivistsonly'in relation to the country in which
,,,.1irgainstNasser, they were stationed.
.riops.t, t* with a During r954, relations between Nasser and the Brothers grew
Ir.rn, the so-called more tense. Though now officially outlawed, the Brotherhood still
:: Irirnianayatollah maintaineda powerful presencethroughout the country.Nassermoved
r. Ilernard Lewis, a first against Naguib. In a prolonged struggle during February and
r:nta1ist,noted that March, Nasser marginalizedNaguib, shunting him aside and deftly
t:ton to Nasserwas neutralizingthe Muslim Brother:hoodin the process.In April, Nasser
-rs.reportedLewis, brought to trial the first of severalleadingBrother:hoodofficials,and a
,: of Islamthat trig- finalconfrontation with the organizationseemedinevitable.The Egyp-
n \t Na s s er : tian police beganwatching the organization'sactions,even raiding its
mosquesand imposingcontrols on sermonsby radical imams. In Sep-
-; . o f p i e t y and tember,the Egyptian goverrment stripped five Muslim Brotherhood
-. kriorvn as the officials of their citizenshipwhile they were on a mission to syria.

m -d
 ,,ii=ri*,&i*ffiryre

r o4 D svrr' s Gaur

Among them was Said Ramadan, rhe Brotherhood'schief ideologue.

The five men were attending a conferencein Damascusat which they
organized Muslim Brotherhood members from Iraq,
Jordan, and
sudan to denounceNasser.leLeading members of the Brotherhood.
including Hudaybi, wenr inro hiding.
Finally, on October 26, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood
fired eight shots at Nasser.The facts surrounding the assassination
attempt are somewhat murky, but in most accounts the shots at
Nasser were fired at point-blank range by a Brotherhood member
who was immediately arrested.ril/asthere a larger conspiracy?\were
the British putting the Brothers up ro killing Nasser?certainly, the
record shows,the idea wasn't beyond Eden.
During the mid-r95os, in acrionsthat foreshadowedthe arrempts
to kill Fidel castro by John F. Kennedy's cIA, the British hatched
innumerable schemes1o murder the Egyptian leader,some of them
harebrained.They funneledmoney into Egypt to bribe Nasser'sdoc-
tor to poison him, concocteda plot to "inject lethal poison into some
popular Egyptian Kropje chocolates" destined for him, creared a
James Bond-like "modified cigarettepacket which fired a poisoned
dart"' and tried to "slip a poisoned pill into Nasser's coffee."
(copeland' who learned about the latter scheme,says that he joked
with Nasserabout it. "Turn your head, Gamal, and let me seeif I can
put this poison in your coffee."l2oyet all of this British skullduggery
was not funny, and it givescredenceto the norion that the British may
have tried to usethe Muslim Brotherhood'sveteranassassins, too.
Reprisalsagainstthe Muslim Brotherhood were swift and deadly.
More than a thousand Brothers were arrested;many were sentenced
to long prison terms, and six were hanged.Assetsof the organization
were seized,and its officesand welfare centerstaken over by govern-
ment agencies.Naguib, with his credibility among the army fading
and his Brotherhoodalliesscattered,was oustedfrom the government
entirely in November, leading c. L. sulzberger ro describehim as
"Kerensky with a fez" inthe New york Times.2l
To help round up the Muslim Brotherhood'sleadinglights, Nasser
played a secretcard, using a jujitsu-like maneuveragainsta clique of
former Nazis who had taken roosr in Egypt after \forld'war II. During
 The tYar against Nasser and Mossadegh r o5

- :: rdeologue. the war, many right-wing Islamists and Brotherhood activists-

r: ri'hichthey including Haj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Ierusalem, who had
r , l. J.
u4r
- t, ^^ A
4llu settledin Cairo-had intimate ties to the Nazis and to German intelli-
: :,rtherhood, gence.After the war, many former Nazis who escapedthe Nuremberg
trials and other dragnetsfled to safe havens around the world, and
::urherhood Egypt in the r94os was particularly welcoming.By then, the CIA and
'Vfar
.,) !.lssination MI6 were fast recruiting former Nazis to the Cold struggle
, ::e shots at againstthe SovietUnion. \Torking with Reinhard Gehlen,the former
- ,d member Nazi intelligencechief, the CIA and the U.S. army helpedto set up the
-:::-rcr'?\fere famous Gehlen Organization, the associationof ex-Nazi spies that
'West
.:tainly, the was used by JamesCritchfield of the CIA as the core of the Ger-
man intelligencesystem.Someof them, no doubt, infiltrated Egypt on
: .:ri attempts behalf of either U.S. or British intelligence;otherswere simply migrat-
: ::.h hatched ing to what they hoped was a hospitableenvironment.
- ::re of them One of the ex-Naziswho endedup in Egypt was Franz Buensch,a
\.:sser'sdoc- German whose claim to fame was the publication of an anti-Semitic
- :r into some tract calledSexualHabits of the Jews, and it was Buenschthat Nasser
': . createda manipulatedin order to ferret out Brotherhoodplotters.According to
.,. ,r poisoned Miles Copeland,Buenschproposed an outlandish schemeto use for-
- - '::'s coffee." mer Nazis to organizean international Islamic underground in con-
. r,rf he joked junction with the Muslim Brotherhood.Nasserfeignedinterestin the
'r-: See if I can gambit, then, saysCopeland,had his securitychief use it to round up
, .iullduggery Muslim Brotherhood members:
'. Bntishmay
,:. : n S . t O O .
Buensch. . . did developone projectthat quicklygainedEgvptian
,, : -rnd deadly. interest:a plan to collectNazi diehardsfrom their varioushiding
placesall over the world (Argentina,Brazll,Ireland,Spain,etc.)
and give them Islamicnames,joir-rthem to "undergroundassets"
: p\' govern- developedby Egyptduringthe SecondWorld War,build a subver-
siveintelligence org combiningthe bestin Germanand Eg1'ptian
ralenr,and "put it at the disposal"of GamalAbdeiNasserfor his
international war egainstcommunism and imperialism.
The plan was presentedto SaadAfraq, the GeneralIntelli-
genceAgencvofficerthen responsible for administrationand sur-
:hts, Nasser veillanceof the Germans.Saad,whosegenialmannercoveredone
: .r clique of of the shrewdestbrains in Egypt, affectedgreat interestin the
:r-ll. During plan, but insistedthat he must hear much more about these
 ro6 D rvrr-' s Geur:

"undergroundassets."Buensch,who until then had beensulking

at Egyptianindifference to his pet subject,beganto feelthat at last
he was beingappreciatedand that perhapshe was on to some-
thing big. With SaadAfraq'sencouragement, he producedall the
ir.rformationon the subjecthe couldremember, thenpumpedother
membersof the Germancolony for what they remembered. The
resultwasenoughevidence to hanghalf the MoslemBrotherhood,
plus enoughleadsto keepEgyptiansecurityofficersbusyfor the
next two yearsestablishing the extentof influenceof the organiza-
tion not only in F,gyptbut throughoutthe Arab world.22

In r954, Egypt and the United Kingdom had signedan agreement

over the SuezCanal and British military basing rights. It was short-
lived. In r956, Clreat Britain, France, and Israel concocted a plot
against Egypt aimed at toppling Nasser and seizing control of the
SuezCanal-a conspiracyin which they enlistedthe Muslim IJrother-
hood. When the gathering British-H,gyprianshowdown erupted in
r956, the organizationhad beenlargelydismantledand its members
jailed, driven into exile, or forced underground in Egypt. But that
didn't stop London from reaching our ro its old allies. The srory of
Suezhas beentold countlesstimes:how NassersoughtU.S.financial
help to build the Aswan Dam and was rebuffed insultingly; how the
United Statesrefused to sell arms to Egypt; how the Soviet Union
stepped in to supply aid and sell Czech arms to Nasser; how the
British stonewallednegotiationsabout handing over rhe canal; and
how London and Parisplotted with Israelto go to war. Eden'shatred
for Nasserhad reachedfever pitch. Lesswell known, however,is the
fact that as the plot unfolded, the British held secretpowwows wirh
the Muslim Brotherhood in Geneva.According to Dorril, two British
spooks, Col. Neil Mclean and Julian Amery, helped MI6 organizea
clandestineanti-Nasser opposition in the south of France and in
Switzerland."They also went so far as to make contact in Geneva,
where the MI6 head of station was Norman Darbyshire,with mem-
bers of the Muslim Brotherhood, informing only MI6 of this
demarche which they kept secrerfrom the rest of the Suez Group
[which was planning the military operation]. Amery forwarded vari-
ous names to [Selwyn] Lloyd," the British foreign secretary.23The
 'War
The against Nasserand Mossadegh . ro7

i - . i rng exactnatureof MI6's contactswith the Muslim Brotherhoodin Europe

. :- 1. 1)L
during this period is not known, but it may have rangedfrom organiz-
i , I T le-
ing a secretassassinationeffort to assemblinga secretgovernment-in-
.r . rhe
erile to replaceNasserafter the Suezwar.
: : her
The Anglo-French plot that unfolded in 1956 reads like a
:: T he
, - ^ r, rd , nineteenth-centuryimperialist scheme.London and Paris arranged
:: rhe for Israel to launch an unprovoked war against Egypt. According to
: ,- r:: lZ e l- the conspiracy,the British and French would wair a decent inrerval,
perhapssomedays, and then intervenemilitarily to imposea truce on
Egypt and Israel, meanwhile seizing the Suez Canal in the process.
-:::L-L'ment \lasser, they hoped, would fall-perhaps be overthrown. And the
'.,, short-
-1i ,\{uslimBrotherhood,though weakened,was waiting in the wings.In
-- - r nlnt
the end, PresidentEisenhower-fearingthat the SovietUnion would
:: , ()f the reap untold rewards by capitalizing on the Anglo-French-lsraeli
::: Ilrorher- rrggression-joinedwith other nationsto foil the plot. For a rime, it
::,:pted in scemedas if the United Stateshad an opportunityonceagainto build
. :rcmbers rr positiverelationshipwith Nasser.Almost immediately,however,the
. But that opportunitywas lost, and the Dulles brotherswent back to the usual
l: ri OfV Of pirtternof confrontingboth Nasserand Arab nationalism.
: : n. r n ci a l There were those Statc Department and CIA officials who wcre
'. : :rorv the clismayedby the administration'sreflexivelyanti-Nasserposition.
' .. r -: U ni o n
One of those was Copeland, who was an unabashedadrnirer of
:.: r or v th e \asser. Wrote Copeland,mixing praisewith tongue-in-check scold-
-,. r. rl; a n d ing, "He is one of the most courageous,most incorruptible,most
.: : . 'i hatre d and in his way, most humanitariannational leadersI
Lrnprincipled,
: '. rr . is th e hirvccver met."24Yet as the r95os worc on, Copclandbecamemorc
-"'.
'\\'S With .rnd morc a minority voice, as \il/ashingtonCold \Tarriors turned
:.', , r British )iasserinto the devil incarnate.The StateDepartment'sArabistswere
:qilnl ze a "soft on Nasser,"Copelandsays,but "this tendencywas more than
:--, - r nd i n offset by the opposition of the commercialcommunity," espccially
.:. Cieneva, the big U.S. oil companiesand banks. As the tide turned against
'.,. : : hme m- (.opeland'sview of Nasser,he was pulled asicleby a joking CIA col-
I- of th i s leaguevisitingCairo. "I think we've finally €aotyou Nasserloverson
. ^ :z Gro u p rhe run," he said.ln t954, Copelandnotesruefully,the CIA chief in
::J ed va ri - C.irirocabled \Tashingtonthat it should persuadeIsrael to emphasize
:'-: , . 11 Th e "the Brotherhood'scommendablecapability to overthrow Nasser."2'5
 r ot 3 . I ) r - v r r . 's Ci aur..

John Voll, a noted specialiston Islam, says matter-of-facdythirt As in tgr p:.

CIA support for thc Muslirr Brorhcrhoodduring the Cold \7ar was Nasser,Irarr'. :
the right thing to do. "lt was a slnart intelligencevehicle,"saysVrll. against.Nlos..t.
"[t was thc only alternativcto Nasscr.The C_]orrmunist Partyin Egypt topplcd thc .r:.,-
was a nonstartcr.In tcrrns of intclligenccarndpolicy planning we Mossadr':::
would havc beenstupiclnot to havehad I rel:rtionshipwith rhcm."l(' was a cot llll- J\ . :
In retrospect,however,it is hard to think clf irnythingrnorestupicl. hef or e r 9i: . - . 1
The United Statesdidn't need an altcrnative1tl \xsssr--it or-rghtt<r Q ajar clrnr . : .
havc embracedhim, ancl hel;rcclhim undernrinerlrc Islamic right. t ion wit ir t l: : -
Insteacl,U.S. policy hirrdcrredagirinstNrrsscr,jrincd thc Saucliroyals Pahlavi r 1r t . . '
and their Islamicfundamentalistallies,irnd launcheda decadcs-long elected t( ) :'.:.:
cffort to uscpolitical Islam as A conrerstoncof Arncricaninflucnccrn lr ir u's oil lr - . .,1. ':
thc Middlc East. leum . \ 1, , . . . '. - .
Morcover, the icleological
rigiclityof Amcricirnforcignpolicy elites l l l l s s tol l ..i :1,. -

wasn'tconfineclto F.gypt.While the U.S.soughtto r-rndermine

Nasscr, \rrtion.rl l: ':
it took ou trnothcrregionalnationalisf,Primc Ministcr Moharrrmed 1..,1;I,thr' -,-l

Mossirdeghof Iran. That effort would culrninarein Anrcrica'sr.nosf :1":

J :1' r1-1111.'

famousCIA covert operation,the r9,5j cor-rpcl'6tatin lran-and, as , , i t hc. \ : r - ,

in lJgypt,right-wingIslan-rists
woLrldplay a prominenrrolc. 'i. ] r r u t , , F: '- . "

Br it r : h i'. :
'
llfr tll! ! ll:
t r\ ' : t t : l i , r-.
TsE CIA eND KrroMElNt's GoDFAIHL.u r "' --

' . , , ()l : ! l \ \ l , -: I - l

It is one of the ironiesin regardto both NasseranclMossrrdegh that , , '''.1, ,". .:' --
- :

both rncnhad a modicurnof Americansupportcluringtheir initial risc

to power,until the erigenciesof the Cold War rurnedU.S.policy deci-
sivelyagainstthem. At first, the United Statesrcnrativclysupported
the Iraniar-r
nationalistsled by Mossadegh,parrly our of Washington's
early belief that liberal Third World narionalistsmight be able to
modernizetheir nationswhile, at the samctime, keepirrgthem in the
'Western
orbit. But the Eisenhoweradminisrrarionwasn't buying it. Its
view was: You are either with us-that is, Third World leadershad tcr
allow military bases,join alliances,and make economicconcessions
while implementingfree-marketpolicies-or you were agarnstus. In
a lesspolarizedworld Mossadegh,like Nassel might have beenable
to reach a long-term accommodationwith \il/ashington.
 -fhe \Yar agdinst Ncsser and MossaCegh . r 09

i-: r t ha t As in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhoodwas mobilizedagainst

-.t.
- ll ' tt as Nasser,Iran's forces of radical political Islam were cynically used
. , .. \'oll. againstMossaclegh. T'hevery samecleric-led,right-wing Islamiststhat
' Fgvpt toppledthe shahin r979 were paid b1.the CIIAin r953 to supporthim.
- _- ' l rr \\/r1 Mossadegh,an Iranian lawyer educatedin Prrrisirnd Switzerlirnd,
rt )^
- - : l1 l. -' was a complexfigurewho was a fixturein lranian politicsfor decades
::.:Lrpicl. before r9-53,havingscrvedin Iran'spiulirrmentunder the pre-Pahlavi
-.:hr tcr Qalar dynastyin r9r.5 and as foreign rninistertn tL)zl.IJis associa-
:, l 'l g ht . tion with the earlicr line of Iranian kings set hirn at ocldswith Reza
. - - r-()\'i llS Pahlavi anc'lhis son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. In r 944, he was
, . -- : .-1<l t t g elected to parliament egain, as e stronfl advocate of nationalizing
' . , ' :l .C i t -t
-. Irirn'soil industrSthen under the grip of what is today British Petro-
leum. Mossadeghbecamechairman of the parlianrent'soil com-
- . .'lites rlission, and he createda coalition political movcment,called the
. \.rsser, NariorralFront. After the assassination of Gcneral Ali Raznrarain
'-.r:Intcd r 9.5r, the shah felt compelledto nrlmr:Mossadeghto succeedRazmara
- . :.
. l l l () S t as prime ministcr.But Mossadeghpushedthrough the nationalization
-.:.:rrl.rrs of the Anglo-Persiern Oil Oornpany(APOC). It was a catastrophic
APOC, later Anglo-IranianOil Company ar-rdthen
blow to F.rrgland;
BritishPctroleurn,was the pridc ancljoy of Britain'simperial assets,
having gotten its start during World War I as the specialprojcct of
$Tinstorr(lhurchill. who saw Persianoil as a sourccof fuel for the
uorldwidc Britrshrravy.Moss,rdcg,h insrrntly hccamee hatcd men in
:: - ; l t h lrt l-ondon,and he clashedbittcrly with the shilh,whoseown nationalist
- :r . rl r i sc irnpulscswere subordinatcto his clesireto maintain his throne and
ro havc gooclrelationswitlr London ilnd Washington.At first, many
- ' ,. lcci -
--:'lr t rteCl of lran's most politicalayatollahsparticipirtedin the National Frcnt,
-:t gr on's but they left it and joirred thc CtA-sponsoredcampaign against
: .,l.. le t<l \lossadegh,wlrich rcsultedin a rnilitarycolrp d'ct:rtin August r953.
: l: l l l t h e The shah, who had fled the country, was restored to the Peacock
t:-.j l r . lts Throne-and the nationalizationof Iran'soil inclustrywrrsannulled.
:. l rrc l to Irr the process,the Unitcd Statesmuscledin on Iranian oil: 4o percent
-, :s\ lOllS of rhe sharein the new consortiumwas givento five big Americanoil
-.: Lr s.In companies,and BP'ssharewas reduced.
-:: l l t rb l e Thc story of the coup, rlrn jointly by the CIA and MI6, has been
told many times.Almost neverreported,however,is the fact that the
 I ) u v r l 'r (laur

tw, intelligenceagenciesworked closelywith Iran's clergy,the ulema,

to wcaken and ultimatelyto overthrow Mossadegh.A critical role was
plavcd by streu mobs, bought and paid for by the CIA and mobil-
ized by rabble rousersticd to thc ulema, who demandedthe ousrer
of the prrime and thc rerurn of the shah. Ayatollah Seyyed
'rir.risrcr
Ab,lclassemKashirni,the chief representative of the Muslim Brother-
ho.cl in lrnr'ranclAyirtollahRuhollah Khomeini'smentor and predeces-
sor as lr:rn'slcadingIslrrnristcleric,was a centralfigurern the campaign.
Acc.rdi.g tr f.rrrcr lrrrrrian g()vernmentofficials, Khomeini
hir-tsclf,ther r. nr.re thau rrnrbscure,middle-agedmullah and a fol-
l.wcr'f Kashani's,took part in the ClA-organized,pro-shahdemon-
stratior-lsagrrinst Mossaclcgh.2T It is a supreme irony. Twenty-five
ycirrslater,irr r 97[],that sarle Khorneiniwould onceagainleada reli-
gioltsurob,this tirneto Lurse:rt
thc shahand createthe IslamicRepub-
lic of Imn.
AyatollahAbolqasseml(asl-r:rrri (ft82-t962) was Khomeini'sgod-
father.He was clui'rtcsscnrially p.litical, having startedhis political
crrrecrirr tlrc r9'os by servingin thc lranian parliament.In Iran, the
clergy had a repr,rtati<-rn
for stopping at nothing to protect their status.
In the r92os,that nrciu-rt that tl-reestablrshment ulemawould vocifer-
ously veto thc creationof an Iraniirnrepublic.Rezapahlavi,the mili- I

tary stro'gnrar who took control of lrirn in the early r9zos, admired
I(crnill Ataturk, rhe scculirrTurkish rcpublican leader,and wanted to
declarelrar ir repr-rblic j|,
rn rhe Turkish model.But the mullahs,includ-
itg Kirshirni,fearedthat a secularrepublicwould fatally undermine
their p'wer, irrd sr they clemandeda m.narchy. princess Ashraf i$
Pahlavi,the shah'stwir sisteqwrote in her memoirsabout the clergy's 1l
reslstlu'lccto republicanism:"My father favoreda republic like that of
Turkey,trnd hc pr.posed this idea to the leadingshiite mullahs. Bur ar
a meetirl; in the holy city of Qom, the clergy-staunch supportersof
the feudal system,the monarchy, and all tradition representingthe
statusquo-told my father they would opposeany plan for a repub-
lic."28 Not ready to challengethe powerful religious establishment,
Reza abandrned rhe idea of a repr-rblicand proclaimed himself king.
The young l(ilshani was one of the kingmakers.
over the next twenty years,Kashani would have two enemies:the
 The tilar against Nasser and Mossddegh

. .. i m a , communistsand the shah.Like Islamistseverywhere,the ulema feared

.: \\-2S and hated the communistsand their Tudeh Party,and used their reli-
: .obil- gious muscle against the left. But for the mullahs, rhe real threar rcr
,Llster their power in Iran came from the shah, who disdaineclthe clergy as
) : i ved medieval-mindedrelicsopposedto his efforts to modernizethe coun-
: r r h er - try. Beginningin the r93os, following the Ataturk model, the shah
: i c ces- acted forcefully against the clergy. He brought the backward sharia
:. t . 1lgn . courts under statecontrol and nationalizedsome of thc clergv'sreli-
: r e ini gious endowments,reducingthe clergy'sfinancialpowcr anclrcnrov-
: : iol- ing an importantsourceof their incomc.He instituteda Westcrnfornr
: . f lO n- of dress,banningIslamicgarb, took control of marri:rgcancldivorce
.:',-hve proceedings,and battled the Islarnistsover the cmrrncip:rtitx of
: ,: reli- \\'omen.The shah orderedthat public plirccsbc opcn to wol.nenancl
R:Pub- outlawed the veil and the oppressivcchaclor.In r919, the shrlh
banned the horrific practiceof self-flagellation,
11rxutilirtingriturrl
'. god- practicedby some fundamentalistShiites.re The nrcasurcswcrc wcl-
, . r r ic al comed by lran's modernists,Lrutthc clergy fLrnred.Often or-rtflankecl
: :. . t he [-,vthe shah,Kashaniquietly built up politicalpower.
\ . 1 LU ). Just as the Muslim Brotherhoodin F.gyptin thc latc r 94os c:rrriccl
,alter- out acts of terrorism,in Iran, Kashar-ri
anclhis ilk fomer-rtecl
tcrrorist
-. r.nili- violenceagainstthe shah.In r94-;, Kashanihelpcdfouncltl-rcunoffi-
: ::ri red cial Iranian branch of the Muslim Brotherhoocl,the l)cvoreesof
::rd to I'lrm, led by a rrdical rnul llh rtrtncclNrtv:tbSrrfevi.'Ast,rir.s
oi tcrror-
:::clud- rst attacks by Kashani'smovernentincludcd .-t tL)41)irssassinntion
a :n I n e .rttemptagainstthe shah, carried out by a mcmber of thc Islrnrist
.\ . h r af ,,rndergroundaffiliated to a publication calleclThc I'lag rf lslam. ln
:, ; r gv'S Abdul HusseinHa jir.
r 9 _io,one of the Devoteesof Islam assassinatecl
:: ar of rhe shah'sministerof court, and in r95r illrotherI)cvotcernurdcrccl
. B Lrtat rhe prime minister,GeneralAli Razrnara,just rrsIran wils relrce()tirlt-
::ar5 ()f rngthe rightsto its oil resources
with [,onclon.I{itzntarir.siriclthe shah
:: g t he :n his memoirs,"had the agreementwith thc Anglo-lraniirnOil (irrn-
--. " h-
- 'f "t ,
:env in his pocketwhen he died.' r0Most eclucatcd Iralriirns,fr<;mthc
::l1 e n t , .hah on down, suspected the Britishof havingtiesto lran'sclergyand
' -1 , ; -^
._ Nlrr5. :o rhe Islamistmovement,if not to the actualactsof tcrrorism.
"The British wanted to keepup their empire,and the bestw'ayro cio
:- i: t he :irar was to divide and rule," saysF'ereydounHoveyclir,who serveclirs
 [)rvrr.' s (i evr

Iran'sambassadorto the United Nations until the r979 revohtion, and

whose brother, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Iran's prime minister in the
rL)7os,was executedby the Khorneini regime."The British were play-
ing all sides.They were dealingwith the Muslim Brotherhoodin lrgypt
and the mullahsin lran, but at the sametirr-re
tl-reywcre dealingwith the
army and the royal familics."He saysthat the Britishsaw thc Islamists
as just anothertool thror-rghwhich their power coulclbe extcnded:

They had financi:rldealswith the rnullahs.They would finclthc

mostimp()rtantonesand theyw<lrldhelprhern.Anclthe mullalrs
were sm.lrt:they kncw tlrat the Britishwcrc thc most irnportant
power in the world. It w:rsalso about ln()ney.The Britishwoulcl
bringsuitcasesfull of cashandgiveit to thcscpeoplc.For exanrple,
peoplein the bazaar,the wealthymcrchants,would eaclrhave
theirown ayatollahthat theywor:[dfinirnce. Arrclthat'swlratthe
Britishweredoing.rr

Ashraf,in her Inenroirs,wrote about Britain'sunholy tiesto the clergy

in lran:

Many influential clergymen formedallianccs with representativcs

of fclreignpowers,most often thc British,and therewas in fact a
standingjoke in Persi:rthat said if you pickedup a clergyman's
beard,you w<luldseethe w<lrds"Made in England"stam;red on
the otherside.TheseShiitcrnullahsexercised ,r powcrfulinfluence
overthe mindsof the mrrsses. At timesthe vcliceof God seernedtcr
bc speakingwith a Britishor Russianaccent.It was difficultfor
thepeasant to decipher
wherereligionleftoff andpoliticsbcg:rn.r2

Ashraf addedthat aftcr Worlcl'WarII, London bolsteredthe Islamic

right as part of its Coid Wirr stratcgyfor the region. "'With the encour-
agementof the British, who saw the rnLrllahsas an eff'ectivecounter-
force to the Communists,the elcrnentsof the extreme religious right
were startingto surfaceagain,irfter yearsof beingsuppressed."ls
The shah hirnself,in merut-rirswritrelr yustbeforehis death in exile,
notesthat the man who killed his ministerof court in r95o, Fakhr Arai,
had ties both to the l)evoteesof Islam and to the llritish. "Arai was
 The'V/ar dgdittst Nassar and Mossadegh

involvedwith an ultraconservative religiousgroup that was comprised

:.. . l n d
: . rhe of the most backward religious fanatics," he wrote, adding that he
: :1.1v- may also have had indirect ties to the British embassyin Teheran.
l -rnf
in strangepies. The British had ties to
"The British had their fir-rgers
:::'.tl-le the most reactionaryclergyin the country.'']a
By the early rg5os, Britain'sstake in Iran was threatened.Since
-:::rists
:: World \WarI, the Britishhad enjoyedcxclusiverightsto Iran'soil' So
it wasn't surprisingwhen the United Stiltesat first viewedMossadegh
favorably.Mossadeghwas seekingto renegotiatethe lran-L].K.oil
agreementon rermsmorc favorableto Teheran,and the Britishwere
rattling swgrds arrd making threats.wirslringt<ln, at odds with l,on-
don gvcr Middle East()il,providcdaid irnd sold arrnstg Mossadegh's
laovernment and, in r g 5 r, Moss:ldcghvisitcdwirshirlgton."President
thc llritish llot to invadclran," wrote a
Truntanselt it note irrrplot'ing
plan
lcaclirrghisrorian.r5But when Mossadeghreicctedan At.nericarr
to allgw U.S. oil contpaniesinto Iran, the United states switchcd
coursc,and turncd rrgainsrMossaclegh. the flcdglingclA
Sr,rddcnly,
. rgy
ar-rdllritain'sMI6 joinedrogethcrin a plot to topple Mossadegh.
lrnterKlshani.
l]ntil r 9 5z, Kashaniposedasan ally of Mossaclegh's irrthc Nationi.rl
BLrt
-: . r Frgnt.thc natignalistcgalitiorrthat governcdlrirn Llllderthe shah'
Kashani
I - ..
as tlre [JniteclStrrtcsarrdthc Britishnloved againstMossadcgh,
rtbrtlcftrncd Iirn and lovccl int<l<lpposition.Kashanirnaintainedcovcrt
: ,. but in public he adr<liflydis-
utrdcrgrtluncl,
tics t9 the Islamist-terrorist
j
(llA was
tanceclhimselffrorn the Devoteesof Islamand thcir ilk. The
: :,

: ,!-
"Prospects
a. - well awareof Kashani'spowcr.In rr rcport in october l9-tz,
for SurvivalOf M0ssrldeqRegitnein Iran," thc CIA notccl:
^. , r n l i C
rcturncdto p()werin Julv r9,52tl'rerclravebeen
SirrccMossrtclecl
::' .a o U f -
c ()l ttl l l u ()g src p ()rtso f ;rl ots t< l tl verthrrl w hi rl l . K l rshl rnitrnd artny
-1n ter- < l ffi c e rsrrc fre c l u e n tl vmenti oneclrrs l crl ders.... A c< l rl testi rl the
-:: right strccts bctwcen the forces sr-rpportingMossadecl rrnd K:rshani
r' '
rv o ttl .ll ' .rch i ttc ' r'rttttltl t ' strttcti vc'
. - , ...;l -

Ar-t.rongthc forces that could be rnobilized by Kashani,

the CIIA
:. : . \ r ai,
i n c l u c l e c l"thc Bazaarmobs and the bandsorganizcdby his son"
and
rl,1. l W ilS
 D r v t r - 's Geul,

"the Fedayanterrorist organization of Moslem extremists." Even as

that report was being wrimen by the CIAs analysrs,rhe CIA's covert-
operationsunit was already working with Kashani to mobilize his
forcesand to provoke exactly that "contest in the streets."Ina rL)Sz
StatcDepartmentmemo, one of Kashani'salliesis quoted predicting
violence,sayingthat it "might be necessary
. . . to punishthe commu-
nists physically." 'rz
In r95z-53, the CIA and MI6 approachedKashani and half a
dozen othcr key lranian religious leaders,offering money and other
inducementsto break with Mossadeghand supporr the shah. "Reli-
gious leaderswere encouragedwith funding to adopt a ntore funda-
rnentalistline and break with Mossadeq,"accordingto Dorril.38The
Britishtook the lead,usingits vast intelligenccnetwork in lran, includ-
ing the resourcesof the Angkr-IranianOil Company,which maintaincd
its own, private secrctservice,the Central Informati<lnBureau. The
British, of course,wcrc activein covert operationsagainstMossadegh
krng beforethe United Statescameon board, but the Americansreport-
edly had the chief pipeline to Kashani.Ann Lambton, a professorar
Oxford's Schoolof Oriental and African Studicsand a former British
intelligenceofficer, played a behind-the-scenes
role in the action rcr
undermine Mossadcgh and, in a report at the time, she noted that
"Kashani has receivedlarge sums of money from somewhere" and
noted that it may have beencoming from the CIA.3e
brom t946 to r953, the man who ran U.S. covert operationsin
Iran was John 'Waller,a veteran of the American clandestineservlce
who joined the Office of StrategicServices(OSS)during World'Vfar II
and then served with the CIA until the r97os. He spent much of
World War lI in Cairo and Teheran and as a very young man was
given a leading responsibility."Here I was," 'Wallerrecalls,"head of
counterespionage for the Middle East at age nineteen." In 1946,
barely into his twenties,he openedthe first American intelligencesta-
tion in postwar Iran, recruiting former German spies to assist the
United Statesin the Cold \Var and working with Iran's tribal chief-
tains, including the Qashqai,the Bakhtiari, and the Kurds.
".We,in the field, liked Mossadegh,"says'Sfaller,now in his eight- l*:

ies. "In fact, his niece married a [CIA] case officer." But soon the
 The War against Nasserand Mossadesh rr5

'.
Er.enas Americansbeganro side with the British, who despisedMossadegh.
.-:.-:.0\'e ft- "We had an obligation to our old ally, the British, and oil was an
::. rze his issue." According to'Waller, one of the main props holding up
.: .t r95z Mossadegh were the mullahs and the bazaar. ,,The bazaar and the
--., ]',- t ino mullahs were very, very close. And the mullahs had control of the
-.:
- i)l l -]Inu-
people,especiallythe lower classes,"he says.a0
of all of the religious leaders,the most important was Kashani,
,-.r half a sayss7aller,who as the cIA srarionchief, developeda warm relation-
.,: J other ship with the fiery ayatollah during the sevenyears that he was sta-
.,.::."Reli- tioned in Iran. "I did a porrrair of Mullah Kashani,in pastels,"waller
:: funda- recalls,with a smile. "or, I should sar Ayatollah Kashani.He sat for
:: .." The me for a bit, and I finished it from photographs." waller insiststhat
,:r. lnclud- Kashani never becamea full-fledgedclA "agent"-*you don't make
:..rt.tined an ayatollah your agent," he says-but adds that the United states
-: :.lLr.The and the Br:itishhad severalimportant agentsin the anti-Mossadegh
\i.raclegh coalition, "some of whom were extremelyadroit at handling both the
:-. rcPort- bazaarand the mullahs." And 'Wallersavs:
: : ii\So f at

::: British It was obviousthat the clergywereimportant.. . . Kashanitold me

:. , - i i()n tO why he was droppingout of the Mossadegh coalition.Becausethe
: : rt l th a t TudehPartywasbeingtoleratedby Mossadegh. Theyweresynony_
' mouswith the Russians, and religiousmen don,tlike communism.
:. : : : i ilild
Kashaniwirsrhe headman of his god, which gavehim politi_
cal power.It's like the Christianright here.He was rhe ayatollah,
: l.r ilO llS ltl
the Khomeiniof the day.He had power over rhe church.He had
\ Cf Vl C C
:: ' . : power over the poor people,which was most of the peoplein the
: .: \\rirr II s<tuthernpart of the city.And, from time immemorial,the mullahs
: :: t L l c h of werecloseto the bazaaris.
: :: l . l n was
.. "nr';rdof Did the CIA fund Kashanidirectly?"Yes," accordingto'Waller. .,It
i'.', t 946, \\'asmoney both to Kashani and to his choseninstruments,money to
. - : l -l c e S t a- finance his communication channels,pamphleteering,and so on to
,,-..istthe rhe peoplein south Teheran." waller adds, with a wry grin, that even
'.:.ii chief- r'atollahs are, well, corruptible. choosing his words carefully, he
..1'S,"l think he was truly religious,but forgive me for being a cynic.
. .r\ eight- Berngreligiousdoesn'tdistract you from political or commercialreal-
i :rit l rl t he It\'.Or from Sex."
 [ ) r v r r - 's Ci ,rvl

\fith Kashanion board, the CIA and MI6 for-rndit easierto stage
streetriots ancl dernonstrari()ns
egainstMossadeghand againstthe
communists.Kashani'spower among the massesof Teheran'sslums
and in the nosclucswas ccx'rsidcrable
. The military collp that oustcd
Mossadcghwas coupled with clemonstrations financedby the CIA,
usingthe crowds loyal to Kashaniand organizedby the clergyar-rdhy
gangsof thugs ir-rthe pay of nrobstcrs.Waller rcturned to \iTashingtor-r
and in thc field the lcg-
to overscethc cor-rpd'€'tatfrorr-rhcaclclLlarters,
ertdaryKcrrnit Roosevcltr:rn the opcrationon the grouncl.Two lrirn-
ian brothers, the "Boscocs," under (llA control, and thrcc otl'rer
Iraniirn brotlrers,the Rashiclians,under MI6 corrtrol, joined with
Shaaban.faafari,l farnous lranirrn athlete ancl pcrfornrer,to work
with Kashaniin assemblingthc rnobs."Orre of our irlielltswrrsa man
called'the BrainlcssOnc,"'recirlls \flaller."Hc was a sportshcro, it
juggler-getting hirn to work with us wrrslike gettingBabelLuth.He
could gct a r-nobtogethcrfast.We paid for those."
"Through the Rashidians,"wrr)te[)orril, thc C]lAand M16 "cstab-
lishedcontirctwith conservrrtivc
clcricssuch as AyirtollahsB<lrujerdi
and Behbchani,who feirrcd that Mossaclccl's'leftist aclvanccswere
endangeringnationill sccurity;' rrrrd dissidcnt rnr.rllahsfrom the
National Front, Kashaniand Makki, who clrinrcd that the ministrics
were full of 'Kremlin-controlledirthcists."'alRecallsWaller,"At thc
time Islar"nhildn't raiscdits hcrrdin an orgl.rrrized
way. BLltcornmunisnr
and lslam havenevcrbeencornpatible."al
An important part of thc ClAs worl< in lrilr.rin the early r95os
involved efforts to rnobilizeIraniirn rcligiorrssentinlentagainstthe
USSR.It cameduring a time when thc United Stirteswas experlment-
ing with Islarnistanti-communistfervor in Egypt,Pakistan,and else-
where. In lran, much of the (lIAs focus was directed against the
communist Tudeh Party, although the Tudeh was never really a serr-
ous threat.Mossadeghwas no communist,having come to power rn
part with U.S.support.But once he was placedon Washington'sene-
mies list, the CIA went all-out to discredithim by portrayinghim as
communist-controlled,especiallyin propagandaaimed at the mul-
lahs. The propaganda effort was coordinated by two CIA officers
whom we shall meet later.Donald Wilber and Richard Cottam.

' i : i o s t a€le
.'-:-..iltst the
: l: . \ S lums
:-.r: ()usted
' :ire CIIA,
: -- rrrd by
,:,.t.itirrgton
:. .: tlie leg-
'-,.r'o
Irern-
-
: r.iu other
'rrcl with
: -. lr I WOfk
' .' . .1\ i 't nlan
-: - hcro , a
' . i{Lrrh .H e
f. 1. . "c sta b -
- . it , , ruj e rd i
: - 't . is w e re
. - :'( )l l l t hC
' : :: rl t i st ries
, -. " . \ t the
_ 'r] l I u l' [ srT l
: ,: \ I 9-tOS
.. -j. i l n st thc
: r. :'L'ri lncn t-
.". .rnclclse-
,:j -ri l t st t he
-. ...ir rr seri-
: ir()werin
' - *iL )l l 'S e l'. | e-
i. :: rq hi m a s
, , . : f he mu l -
,. l \ officers
:: . 1 lll .
The -V/aragainst Nasser and Mossadegh . r r7
At times, the propaganda was heavy-handed:
The next move was to bring out the psychologicalwarfare assets.
"In a lurid effort to totally discreditthe left," Ayatollah Behbehani,
who receivedmoney from the Americans, sent out letters bearing
the insignia of the Tudeh Party, and containing "grisly threats"
w ri tte n i n re d i n k " to hang al l the mul l ahs from the l amppostsof
v rrri o u sIra n i a n c i ti e s." al
.\c c o rd i n g to D o rri l , the C IA used j ournal i sts K enneth Love of the
)'lew York Times and l)on Schwind of the Associated Press as agents
to c i rc u l a te th e i r p ro p aganda.aaN ot onl y di d the C IA use ayatol l ahs
such as Behbehani to spread falsified thrcats fnxn the TLrdeh about
h a n g i n g mu l l a h s , b u t i t pai d vi ol ent agcnts provocateurs to ri l e up
Ira n ' s re l i g i o u s c o mmuni ty. The (l l A and M16 pai d thugs and rabbl e-
ro u s e rs to p o s e a s T u deh fol l ow ers i n vi ol ent strcet demonstrati ons
a tta c k i n g Ira n ' s Sh i i te establ i shment:
The rnobs calre ()ur onto the strccts.. . . A key aspectof the plot
was t() p()rtray thc rnobs as supportersof the Tudeh Party in order
t<l proviclc a suit:rblepretext for the coup and the rcsumption of
p o w e r b y th e s h a h . l M16 rrgentslhi rcd:r fake Tudch crow d, com-
prising an unusual mixturc of pan-lrarriansand Tudeh mernbcrs,
paid for with fifty thousand clollarsgivcn to them by a CllA officer.
Richarcl (lottaur observed that agcnts working on behalf of the
B ri ti s h " s a w th c o p portuni ty and sentthe pcopl ew e haclunder our
control into thc strcctst() rrct21s if they werc Tr-rdeh.
Thcy were more
than jr-rstpr()vocatcurs,they were shock tr(x)ps,who acteclas if thcy
w e re T u c l e h p e o p l e throw i ng rocl < sat mosques ancl Imul l ahsl ."
"The pLrrpose"Ianother writer saidl, "w:rs to frighten a majority of
Ir:rniansinto believingthat a vicfory for Moss:rdcc1would be a vic-
tory for the Tr"rdeh,
the SovietUnion, and irreligi<ln."a5
After thc restoration of the shah, efforts were madc to put the
Is l a mi s t g e n i e b a c k i n the bottl e. B ut the force of pol i ti cal Isl am,
re p re s s e di n Ira n s i n c e the r92os, had now revi ved, thanks i n part to
th e a s s i s ta n c eo f th e C IA and MI6. It w oul d not be so easy to qui et i t
down again, and in a very literal sensethc forces that toppled the shah
 l )pvrr-'s (i A Ml r

in t97c)were cxactlythoseunleashedto return him to power in r 95 1.

In the r 9 5os, the shahand his SAVAKsecrctscrvicestr'ovcmightilyto
keepthe Islamistsin checkanclto buy off, corrupt, or otherwtscllcu-
tralizethe mcdievalmullahs,includingl(honrcini."l)uring the shah's
reign,thc governrncntpaid the clergy,too," s:tysFereydor.rn
Hovcycla.
the fornrer Iranian UN ambassador,whose brother scrvcd as the
shah'sprintenrinisterfor n-ranyyears."Sonreof the moncy carncfronr
rny brother,irnclsorneof it camefrorn SAVAK," he says."And SAVAK
had its own peoplein thc clcrgy."a6Yct thc shah preferrecl
to clismiss
Islam rrsa relic of the past. And so when the movernerrtagainstthe
shah beganin earnestin the micl-r97os,r'rcithcrthc shah nor rnost()l
his syco;rhanticaideswoulclrccognizcit for what it was.
After r95 j, Kaslranigraduallv faclcclfror.nview. tlut his ircolytc
would introduceit vinrlent new stritilrof politrcalIslam.He wrrsjLrsr
beginninghis riseto powcr.
The r94os irnd r95os were still firrnrativeyearsfor Khorreini.His
politicalviewswerc in flux, althor-rgh
Khonreini'swritingsduringlTrrrlcl
War II reflectedclistrstcfor thc "dark dictatorship"of RczaShah,whosc
reigncndedwhen he was clcposecl in r94t.ot By instinct,Khomeiniwrr.
pronc to denounccthc compliant,Shiitcclcricalestablishment in lran.
He gravitatecltoward Kashani, Navrrb Srrfavi,ancl thc l)cvotccs of
Islam, and beganto refinehis radic:rlviews. "Khomcini's owu politicrrl
position during this period was somewl"rereberweenrhar of thc clcric.rl
establishnrentand the Feddiltdrz,"wrote l(homeini'sbiographcr,Baqcr
Moin. He supportcdthe fairly conservative
AyatollahBorujerdi,br-rt

he wasradicallyopposecl to secularisr.r.r,
believecl in the
adirrnantly
ruleof tlteshdrid,irnclhadactivisttenclencies.
He hadabsorbed, in
other wclrds,someof the ideasof the Fediriyan perhapsin the
courseof conversations with NavvabSafaviwl.ro,accordingto the
latter'swidow, wasa frequentvisitorto Khomeini'shclme.as

Kashanibeganto act as Khomeini'smentor at this point.

An o th e r i n d i cati on of the K homei ni ' s pol i ti cal i deas at the ti me

w a s h i s a d mi rati on for A yatol l ah A bol qassem K ashani (r882-
1 9 6 z ), w h o from r94j w as cl osel y l i nked ro the Fedai yar-r-e
 Tbe rXlaragainst Nasserand Mossadegh . r)9

- rL)5 3 . Islam. . . . Khomeini was a frequent visitor to Kashani's

home and
.: :iily to admired his courage and stamina. He shared his
views on many
i .:i De U- rs s u e ss u c h a s a n ti -c o l o n i al i sm, Isl ami c uni versal i sm,
pol i ti cal
-.. a c ti v i s m ,a n d p o p u l i s m.a e
'ltilh's
i '.r'r'dar,
:.1s rhe i)Lrringthe r953 coup, Khomeini was involved
with the rerro'st-
:r: fr()m i'clined Devorees.f Islanr,even after Kashani
decidedro keep his
. \\AK .iistance.Yet Khomeini and Kasha'i remainedcrose,
and Khrmeini
-l \ l -l -l i S S i.ll.wed Kershani's advicetr break with Mossadeghand supporr
the
l: :l\f the rerurn of the shah. Still, Khomeini maintaincd
ties r' rhe r)evorees,
:: { ) s t of rncl he intcrvenedin ir vain effrrt to preventthe execution
,f Navab
:.rfavi in the micl-r9jos. Br-rrrhe carcr-rrating
ayat.lrah rcarneda grear
.-.;,rlyte fr.nr his expcricnccin r953. Kash.ni :rncrthc l)ev.tees,
'lcrrl he fert,
,',.i. iu st \\'cre too p'litical, and l.st the all-important con'cctio'r
with the
csrablishurenr ulem:.rin the h<llvcity.f eorn. Borujerdi,.n the
othcr
::l i . H i S h.rnd'th.ugh adrnircclby Kh.meini for his rerigioLrs
sch.rarship,was
: \\irrld r.. clistantfr'm politics.Repairingro Kh'mcini
eom, spcnfthe next
. .i hose rer ycars sceki.g to unite the p.litical and the religioLrs
elcr'ents.f
: '.:ll \ VllS Irer's Shiite nrovenrent.Hc would next cxploclc
onto the sccnern
:r Iran. rty61-64.mountinga front:rlchallengeto thc shah.
:: i s Of The Unitedstilres,rncanwhile,w.uld torgetall ah.ut
Islamin lran.
: l i t rca l Thc shah was reinstalled, and secure.\rvashingt'nhad w'n a healthv
, .. 'ric a l chunl<.f the lranianoilindustryfor U.s..irc,nrprrrics,
enclrhe unitei
'. I-!.rc1er statcswas busilyhelpingthe shahbuircrhis army,his policc
force,and
: .1r his nruch-feared intelligenceservicc,the sAvAK. Despitcthe help of
s.nrc rf the r'ullahs in topplingMossadcgh,the irnperial
shahwas rn
nr'od t. sharepowcr with anyrne-liberals,businessmen,
'. or clergy.
.jt
s'the Islamistsseethed and simmeredbeneathhim, unnoticed.
::] C
The st.ry of political Islam irnd its burge'ning alliance
with thc
U.itecl Statesnow shiftedt, the Ara[r w,rlc1.Nasser,
vict.rious after
the SuezWar of r9;6 ancl unbowed, was prcsentlng
an ever more
seri'us challenger' the cold \far ideologuesof-
thc Eisenhower
rrclministrati.n. Egypt'sMuslim Brotherhoodwas crushedand forced
int<lexile.To stop Nasser,and fo support a'ti-c.mnrunisr
anclanti-
nirtionalistf,rccs acrossthe entire Arab world,
the United States
trrrncdro SrrudiArahir.
 5

THE KING OF ALL ISLAM

"Tl-regenius of you Arlericans is tl-ratyou never makc clear cut

stupid rrroves,only complicatcd stuylid moves which make us
wonder at thc possibility that fhcre may be sonrcthingwe arc
n r i s s i n g ".
- G a m a l A b d e l N r r s s c r r9
, 57

Dwrcsr Dnvro ErsEnHo'ffER was a good general,a modesr

prcsiclcnt,irncla poor studentof lslam.
In thc imrnediateaftermathof Suezin rL)56,after lke had intcr-
vened to force Israel out of the Sinai and ro undo the Anglo-French
conspiracyagainst Gamal Abdel Nasser'sllgypt, rhe United Srate,
had a chanccto improverelationswith Nasscrand Arab nationalisnr.
Instead,h,isenhoweropted for an alliancewith SaudiArabia, makins
the reactionary bastion of Islamic fundamentalism into Americ:r',
chief ally in the Arab world. Until Nasser'sunrimely death in -r9zc.
SaudiArabia would serveas the bulwark of Americaninfluencein th.
region. Like Franklin Roosevelt before him, who had announce.i
America'sclaim to a strategicstakein Saudi oil, Eisenhowerpremisc.i
friendiy relationswith Saudi Arabia on rhe importance of that coun-
try's petroleumwealth. But he expandedthat relationshipto include .r
utilitarian alliancewith SaudiArabia's benightedversionof Islam. H.
set a coursethat continued under the Kennedy,Johnson, and Nixon
administrations.
 The King of All lslam . Lzr

The cornerstoneof the administration'sMiddle East policy was

the Eisenhower Doctrine. Echoing FDR, Ike proclaimed America's
imperial goal of incorporating the Middle East into its permanent
sphereof influence."The existingvacuum in the Middle East must be
filled by the United Statesbefore it is filled by Russia," proclaimed
Ike.l In a messageto Congressin January r957, the presidentprom-
isedthat the United Stateswould provide military and financialaid to
any Middle East countries "requestingsuch aid againstovert a€igres-
sion from any nation controlledby internationalCommunism."l To
supportthe doctrine,Eisenhowerinvited King Saudto make an offi-
, - . Llt 'Washington,
cial state visit to emphasizingthe importance of Saudi
": ! 1\
Arabia by personallygoing out to the airport to meet thc rrriving
- -t rf
monarch.Ever grateful,thc king endorsedthe lrisenhowcrDocrrirre.
It made senseto Eiscnhowerto vicw SaudiAr:abiairsthe ultimatc
prize, sinceone-fourthof the world's oil lay beneathits sands.Br-rt
L,isenhower saw SaudiArabia as rtore than a treasureto bc protccted.
Its role as the worldwide centerof lslam suggestedto Washingtonthat
Islam-and Islamism-could be wieldcdas :r sword againstthe Soviet
Union and againstleft-leaningnationalistslike Nasser.
J r.nodest llisenhower,CIA Director Allen l)ulles, and Sccrctaryof State
.|ohn FosterDulles irlso sought to build an alliancewith SaucliAra-
.:' hrrd inter- bia'sWahhabipan-Islermicmovement,and Allen Dulles'sCllA secretly
-.::glo-French encouragedSaudrArahia to rchuilclthe Muslim l3rothcrhoodagrrinst
:rrrcdStates Nasser.The presidcntfearedthat the SovietUnion wils trying to use
: :r.rtionalism. EgyptianpresidcntNasseras thc "head of an enormousMoslcm con-
,: ia. rn a ki n g federation."Flisenhower
recalled:
:: , .\rnerica's
:: , r :ll ln | 9 7 o , Tir checkany m()vementin thisdirectionwe wantedto explorethe
:: -rcn cei n th e of building up King Saud irs i'r counterweight
possibilities to
:: . t nntl u n ced Nasser.The king was a logicalchoicein this regard;he at least
professecl
21nti-Communism, and heenjoyed,on religious
grounds,
. ' .rr prcmi se d
amongirll Arab nations.l
a highstandir-rg
r : t ha t co u n -
: : o in cl u d e a It was a flawed idca.
: , t I s l a m. H e First, E,isenhower'sfear that the Soviet Union was on the vergeof
:. : nd Ni xo n making major gainsin the Middle Eastwas greatlyexaggerated, and
the notion the USSR might try to embraceIslam was wildly off the
 tzz . D r v r r 's Gaut

mark' True' Moscow was trylng to leapfrog

the anti-communlst
Northern Tier sraresof Turkey, Iran, and pakistan.
It did so by seek-
ing influence in the Arab world, especialry
by cultivating ties to
Nasserand, after r95g, hoping that the revolutionary
governmentof
Iraq would form a pan-Arab alliance with
Egypt. But neither the
lrgyptian nor the Iraqi g.vernment was pro-communist,
and an
E'gypt-Iraqalliance never emerged.aIn addition,
although the Soviet
Union may have looked with favor on pan-Arabism,
with its empha-
sts on nationalism, Mosc'w feared the rise
of Islam within its own
bordersin central Asia and had no intention
of fosteringpan-rslamin
the Middle H,ast.yet none of this deterredlke
from prrrJ'g a fateful
alliancewith Riyadh.
Moreover, the notion of a U.S.-saudi alliance
built on Isram
ignored the fact thar King saud did not
exactly enjoy much presrrge
among.Muslims.',Saudwas weak, stupid,
and corrupt, and he was
surroundedby Levantinecourtiers,"says
JamesAkins, a veteranU.S.
diplomat who servedas ambassadorto saudi
Arabia in the r97os..
Ilesidesthe fact that he was hopelesslyignorant,
with only the foggiest
understandingof the modern world, Saud
was also widely seenas dis-
solute,a sex addict, a drunk, and an all-around
seekerof pleasure,
servedby pimps and procurersof alcohol in
ren lavish palaces.with
more than a hundred children5from an endless
seriesof wives and
concubines,he was also, quite literally, the
father of his country. All
in all, saud was a less-than-sorid foundarionupon which to build a
Middle East empire, and especiallynot if
one to appealto the
conservativesin the Muslim world. -ished
Yet as king of Saudi Arabia, whose territory
included Mecca and
Medina, the holiest citiesin Islam, Saud did
embody worldwide pres-
tige as custodian of Islam's two shrines.
As the cold war matured,
SaudiArabia's role as the centerof worldwide
Isram would loom ever
larger in U.S. straregicthinking. Saud-cynicallS
some might say_
sought to porrray himself as King of All Islam,
and that ,ra, ..ro,,gh
for Eisenhower."Arabia," wrote Eisenhower,
"is a country that con-
tains the holy placesof the Moslem world,,,
and he reasonedthat ,,the
King could be built up as a spiritual lead,er."7
According to Nathan
citino, the effort to build up King saud as the
leaderof Islam was Darr
 TheKingof All Islam . rzz

.--_. rLl) t
ot a ,ornt strategy with Great Britain
called "omega.,, Eisenhower
, : Cr N
- t -,
insistedrhat "our efforts should be toward
separati; the saudi Ara_
bians from the Egyptians."sThe president
and the Dulres brothers
:- ' -t a t t of
were even more encouragedwhen King
Saud requestedan Islamic
: :: . : : t he Iegal ruling from the wahhabi clergy
. -. i forbidding Musrims from
_ i u Jll
acceptingaid from the Sovietbloc.
-- - \r r| lp f
An effort to cobble togetheran ,,lslam
-. - -' n h r - strategy,,emergedearly in
1'257."Following the saud-Eisenhower
- . : : OWn
summit, the administration
continuedto cultivate Islam as a bulwark
- -.. . : n l
againstcommunism,and as
in part of this policy it sought opportunities
ro overcomethe social frag_
: , :,treful mentation that afflicted the Middle Easr,"
wrote citino, who con_
ducted a study of u.s.-saudi rerarionsduring
the Eisenh.weryears.
- i:lam "In Iare January,the Nati.nal Security
- - _l'rf
cor-rncirstaff estabrished a
tOc
working crmmittee on Isramicorganizations
that compireda list .f
: . : - W aS
Middle Easrernand North African s.cial,
curtural, and religi.us
;:-lr U.S. groups' such as sufi brotherh.ods, which
the United states lnforma_
: - e -o s,5
tron Agencycould target with propagancla.,,e
' - ' q g l e st
The cIAs chiefspeciarist on Isramat the time was none .ther
.: , i s d is- than
l)onald Wilbea the operativewho had hetped
organizethe r953 coup
l -:JSU re, d'etat in Iran. "xTilber knew a lot about
Islam," saysJohn $'ailer, a
:, >. W i t h retired cIA official who oversaw the coup
from crA headquarrcrs.r0
:'' l : 2 nd But in his memoirs, Aduentures in the
Midcile tasl, Wilber rafher
,::r\. All modestlydescribeshis work on lslam at
the time:
:urld a
-:..ro the one subject'n which I was c.ntinualry
actlvewas Isramand the
Muslimsof the MiddreEast.F.r lackof anyone
betterquarified, I
:Ja J a nd becamethe Agency'sspecialist on Islam.In the spring'of t957|
.e !
l, r LJ-
was the CIA memberof an inter_agency working group on lslanr,
:.-ttured, and thenthe co-authorof thegroup study.
rn the fielcrilnd at heacl-
quarrersI reviewedfilesand alsoc.llected
' ,:.Ilever publication, inf,rr_
mationon trips,and I authoredseveralstudies:..lslam ",.,d
i: s ay - in Iran,,,
"Islamin pakistan,"..Islamin Afghanistan,,,
:n t )U gh lerc.l.More exhaus_
tive than any publishedmaterial,thesewere
r3r c on-
to serveasguiderines
for workingwith Muslimgroups.ll
f'r,tt"the
\.rthan Wilber also included in his surveysresearch
into the extent to which
r'ls part the Central Asian Muslim population inside
the Soviet Union could
 t2-a. . D tvtr-'s (i ,tl ,ttt

be rrobilized against the USSR, and he coordinirtcd propaganda

efforts in the late r9-5os"exposing the Soviet Clonrmunistirttitudc
toward Islam."ll
Eisenhoweralso soughtinpr:t frorn non-CllAspecialistson Islam,
inclr-rcling LeadrngOrientalists,sol.ne
thoscwithin acrldemia. of whonr
haclhighlightcdthc Princetoncolloqr-riunr
iu which the Muslim Broth-
erhoocl'sSaid ltarnadantook pitrt, werc tappeclfor their cxpcrrisc.
Wrote Clitino:

Thc Eiscnhorvcr spor.rsorcd

aclrninistrati()n a corrferencc in Wrsl'r-
instolrof lcaclinghistoriirnsof the MiclcllcL,irst,including,rlnrolrs
tn rtn v o th e rs,the pronri ncnt Oftonrrrnhi st< l ri ani l ncl l rl ter U rti ver-
s i ty < l f C h i crrgopr< l fessorIl al i l Inal ci k. N i rti onal S ccLrri tv(l l rrnci l
staff-ersroutirrelv attenclcclrrcaclernicconfcrcr.rccsancl collectecl
scholarly prrperson the c()lrtcnrporilrl MiciclleF-ast.lrr onc r.tot,rbl.:
with (blcl War rrrnrificrr-
cxanrplc of Midcllc F.rrstcrnscl.rolarsl'rip
tions, filcclrtway in the NS(. staff prrpersat the F.iscnl'rower' [-ibrrrry,
Il c rn rrrc[.c l w i s cxpl rri nshol v N acl shbandiS ufi sl rvi rrgi rr the (]rucrr-
s u s rc g i o n rri ght bc usecl ,rs a fi i th col unrn i nsi cl c the S ovi er
e rn p i rc .ll

T w o c l o s e acl vi sersof K i ns S i rud-Y usuf Y assi n ancl Mohrt.tttnccl

So ro u r S:l b h a n -concl uctcd the negoti ati ons w i th S ecretrrryof S tatc
.fc l h n F o s tc r D u l l cs.l a Y assi n, a S yri i rn frorn l -i rtarki i l ,on thc col st of
th e M e d i tc rra n ei l n, w as rl sl y, w el l -connectecl rnember of thc ki ng' s
c n to u ra g e w h o hacl fi rst come to S aucl i A rabi a on thc rccommencl a-
ti o n o f ri g h t-w ing S yri an pol i ti ci i rns. I-Ic rcprcsentecll bn S rr.rd' sfi nan-
c i a l i n te re s ts i n l )amascus. Maki ng use of S audi money and hi s S yri an
c o n n e c ti o n s , Y assi r.rpl otted to subvert or destabi l i zc that country.
B e g i n n i n g i n r 956-57, the (i l A , too, l aunchcd a covert operatl on
a i me d a t to p p l i ng the S yri an government. l 5 In r95l l , Y assi r.rw rrs
i mp l i c a te d i n a S audi conspi racy to assassi nate E gypt' s P resi dcnt
N a s s e r,w h o w a s fl yi ng i nto D amascus. The exi stence of the pl ot w rl s
a n n o u n c e c l b y the S yri an army' s chi ef of i ntel l i gence, w ho reveal ecl
th a t S a u d i Arabi a had offered hi rn a bri be of fr.9 rni l Lon to hei p
c a rry i t o u t. It w oul d not be the l ast U .S .-S audi conspi racy agai nrt
A ra b n a ti o n a l i st l eaoers.
 TheKingof All Islam . rz\

More interesring,for our story, is the role of Mohammed

Sorour
sabhan. sorour was rhe freed slavewho, while serving
..!1C
as saudi Ara-
bia'sdeputy financeminister in the late r94os, was
rhe saudr paymas-
rer for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In the r95os,
sorour had
'. r n t becrme minister of financeand one of King Saud,s
closestadvisers.In
. . -1. the r96os, he would assumea powerful position
. it-
overseeingsaudi
Arabia's worldwide effort to promore the Muslim Brotherhood
a.cr
other radical Muslim fundamentalistgroups, fr.m
Africa to Indone-
sia. It isn't known if at ail, or to what extent,sorour
and Duiles dis-
cussedthe Brotherhood.But in supporting an alriance
with saudi
Arabia' then the Brrtherhood's chief financiar supporter,
the Unitecl
Stateswas in fact enlistingthe Brothersin the Cold
War.
Askedabout America'sdecisionto supporrSaudiArabia,s
Islamic
bl'c against Nasser,a former senior crA officiarrwh'
scrved in thc
Middtc East summarizeclthe ciold \war:rationare:.,what
other porc
was there?King Hussei'?" he asks."The.ptic was
the cold war The
(l.ld war was rhc defining crarity
of the time. we saw Nasser as
socialist,anti-western,anti-Baghd:rdpact, and we
II
were rooking for
sorle sorr ,f c.unterf il. Saucliefforts to Islamicize
the region were
scen as powerful and cffectiveand likely ro l-resuccessful.
we lovcd
-| | l|ec l that. We had an ally againstcornmunisrn."r(,
: \ttrtc ore crrsequence.f Eisenhower's effortsin the r9sos to build up
, '. r st ()f snrrtirA'hir rrsn bulwark agrinstc.nrmrrnism*ai
th. riseof the bin
: - : i. . t tl g 's Laden farnily. seekingr, enhanceSirr-rdi prestigeas custodiansof thc
-- :: t cnc l i r- Muslim hrly placesin Mecca and Medina, Ike aurhrrized
half a mil-
,. . d.nan- li.n clollilrsfor SirudiArabia t' str-rdythe c.nstruction.f a railroadt'
' . \\'n l l n carry pilgrirns to Mecca, part of an cffort to refurbish
Mecca as thc
:, )unrry. ccnrcr .f Islarnicculrure. l(ing saud hirecl Sheikh
Moharnmed hin
Laden to undertake thc reconst.rction of the
:r' l' ilt lOn Great Mosque rn
. . -lll Wl l S Mccca.It wirs through this prum contr.ct that the
bin Ladensbega,,,
i:- . ':iclen t to accumulatetheir vast wealth.
: l( ) t \V llS

: i' r 'C al c d

:o help
'. .lgainst
 D r . v r t , 's Ciavr

THs BROTF{IiRFrooD's Snuor R11FUcE

Initially Sirr"rdi
Arabia suppliedthc Muslim Brotherhoodwith money
only.Aftcr r 9.y4,howevcr,the c()Llntryitselfbecamea chief baseof its
oprerations.When Nassercrackeddown on the Muslim Brothcrhood
in Flgypt,Sar-rdi
Arabia provided :rn important refuge for the organtza-
tion, and mirny of its mernbersflockcclto the dcsertkingdom. This
rnigrationoccurrcdjust as the Unitcd Starcswes giving up on Nasser
anclturning to Saudi Arabia. The Brotherssettledin Jeddah,wherc
tl-reywent into business,and in Riyaclh,Mecczr,and Medina, where
they rirdicalizcdthc Wahhabi movcnlcnt.For thc next half century,
SaLrdiArabia would be thc llrothers'ultimirteredoubt,providingsuc-
cor and support,along with virtually nnlirliteclfinar-rcing.
"Onc of the slupiclcstthings l-'aisirlevcr did was to invite the
Ikhwrrr-ris
into SaLrdiArabia," saysDavid [-or-rg, who'd servedin the
Statel)cpirrtrnent'sIlurear.r "But it seemed
of Intelligenceand ll.esearch.
innocuousat the tin-rc.At the timc, cverybodywas fightir-rgCommu-
nism,and so wcrc we. And so wrrsF:risal."l7Faisal,the crown princc,
woulc'ln'tbecomcking of SaudiArabia until the r 96os,when he ousted
Sirudin a palacecoup, but hc was widely seenas morc sophisticated,
rnoreenlightened,
ilnclfar shrewderthan the dissoluteSaud.
The Muslim Brotherhood,a highly political organizationdedi-
cateclto creatinga worldwide caliphate-basecl
Islan-ricstate,was both
an ally and a threat to Saudi Arabia. "The SaLrdisweren't terribh
hrppy with the Muslim lJrothcrhooc'I, but if you-and the Saudis
were-scared to death of Nasser,the Mr-rslimBrotherhood was still
the only game in t{)wn," says Jol-rnVoll, a Georgetown Universin
professor.rsIn its foreign policy, Saudi Arabia r-rtilizedthe Brother-
hood againstL,gypt,Syria, and Iraq, built its power in Sudan,encour-
agcd it in Afghanistanand Pakistan-where it allied with Abul-Ala
Mawdudi's lslamic Group-and even toyed with supporting it in
SovietCentral Asia. But internally,the royal family did not tolerate
Muslim Brotherhood action. "The Saudiswere very tolerant of the
Muslim Brotherhood, and they encouragedit in Egypt, Sudan, and
elsewhere,but they were adamantly opposedto fBrotherhood] actir'-
 TheKing of All Islam Lz7

irv inside Saudi Arabia," says Ray close, who served as the clA's
chiefof stationin SaudiAr:abiafrom r 97o to 1977.le
"The Saudis,as you know, oppose all political parties," says
' .j
Hermann Eilts, one of America's most experiencedArabists, who
servedas ambassadorto saudi Arabia. "And the Saudiregimehad the
-l
erperiencein the late rgzos with the Ikhwan, not exactlythe Muslirn
r: -- -1- Brotherhoodbut the tribesmenwho wcre becomrngrather fanatical.
Now what Hassanal-Bannaand thc Muslim Brotherhoodwerc doing
, - t- . . : f
in Egypt,and in Syria,was somerhingthat was generallyin line with
Saudithinking on the irnportanceof Islam, as opposedto national-
., : lU
ism, as a uniting factor. Nevertheless,thcy were not eagcrto have thc
-. :,::\'. Muslim Brotherhood,or any other political force, organizethem-
selvesin saudi Arabia.Thcy were unwillingto allow any politicalpar-
ties, including Muslim political parrics."2l)In facr, in r946, whe'
::h C Hassan al-Banna tried to opcr 11Muslim Br.therh'.d branch in
- :ne l

Mecca,the Saudiauthoriricsbluntly refusecl.zr

::l 1t ' d Though the saudis t.'k str.ng meesuresro preve't the Muslinr
:'.:]l u- Brotherhoodfrom beconringa forceinsidcSaudiArabia. the Brothers
operatedthere in a scnri-underground fashion.Many of thern went
--.tc'd into business,
establishirrg
Islan-ric
banks and corporationsthat made
....,,]
them wealthy.c)rhcrsbecameinflLrcntialin rhc-rnassmeclia.clbse, the
(llA stationchicf,recallsthat RichardMitchcll,thc auth.r of the
defin-
itive book, The societyof the Muslim Bruthers,intr.duce-clhinr to one
key personality."lt was rhr,ugh Dick Mitchell that I rnct the rnly
memberof the Ikhwarnthat I everknew,MohammcdSirlahr-rddin," sa1,s
close. "He was the cdit.r of Al Medhrl newspaper.He wrrs b.rn in
Suclan,and spent some rinre i' L,gypt,k'ew all the lkhwanis. His
presencewirs tolerateclas long as he wrotc things againstcommu-
r-risn-r."
And still othersweltt inro acadcmia,infiltratingSaLrcli
Arabia's
nctwork of lslamicuniversitics.Yet thcy opcratedas a sccretsociety,
kept their membershiphidclcn,irnd maintaineda clandestinenresence
in many Saudiinstiturions.
It was in thc univcrsity system that the Mrslim Brothcrh.od
wor-rldfind its mosr secureperch.SaucliArerbiahad neverhad much of
a systemof higher education,ar-rdwhirt it did have was overwhclm-
ingly dedicatedto rraining clericsand inculcarinswahhabi values

:frIEb*+-rc
 r28 . D r v r l 's (lavr,

among the country'syouth. In the r96os, SaudiArabia createda pair

of institutions,the Islamic Universityof Medina (rc.6t) and King
Abdel Aziz llniversity ( r,)67), which becameintellectualcenrersfor
the Islamicright. 'rhe IslamicU'iversity of Mcdina beganwith Paki-
stan's Mawcludi, ar militant Islamist, ils one of its trustees,who
wanted to make it into the fundamentalistalternativeto ciairo's AI
Azhar, the thousarnd-year-oldrepositoryof thc mainstrea'uIslamic
traditior-r.2.
The Muslim Brotherhood and its wahhabi allies con-
vincedthe royal family that Al Azhar was too closeto Nasser,so they
lavishly funded the Isla'-ricuniversity .f Medina. l).zcns of Egyptia'
lslamic scholarsaffiliatedwith or sympathcticro the Muslinr lJrother-
hood took up postsat the university.
The vicepresidcntof thc universitywalsa man wh. would figurci'
hard-right lslamic politics i' saudi Arabia frr the scveral
'cxr
decades:sheikh Abdel Azizbin Baz. I]lind sinccyouth, bin Baz was il
fanaticalwahhabi who woulcl resisrmodernizari.n in saudi Arabia
and flirt with violenceand terrorism.111v966. bin Baz insistcdthat
the copernicanvicw of the universewas heresy,that the sun revolvecl
around the earth, and rhat the earth itsclf was flat. Anyone who clis-
agreed,said bin Ilaz, was guilty of "falsehood toward Cod, the
Koran, and the Prophet."2rHis views angeredKing Faisirl,but irr
r97 4 bin Baz would be appointedpresidentof the official Direcrorarc
of ReligiousResearch,Islamic Legal Rulings,Islamic prrpagarior,
and Guidance.2a
The Islamic Universityof Medina was conrrolledby Saudi Ara-
bia'sGrand Mufti Mohammed ibn Ibrahim Al shaikh, a chief of the
rvahhabi Al Shaikh clan. Fully fl5 percentof its srudenrswere
no.-
Saudi, coming from virrually every Islamic country in the world.
Through this institution and its sisteruniversiriesin Saudi Arabia, the
Muslim Brotherhoodwas able to spreadits ideologyeverywhere.2t hr
addition, tens of thousands of young Saudis were indoctrinated
through the saudi sysremof higher education.The Saudi universin
systemexpandedexponentially,from 3,625 studentsin r965 to more
than rr3,ooo studentsby t986. Half of its six universitieswere reli-
gious in nature and, according to one study, nearly one-third of ali
 The King of All lslam . t z.)

'-,-..lisf,dentsmajoredin Islamicstudies;for the other

7o percenr,a
: r.:.rloi their coursework was religiousin nature.26
lr'es Aki's, who servedas U.s. ambassadorto SaudiArabia in
.:: ferl\- r97os,
was troubleclby the emphasison religion, but the
- '','.rlfarrily t.ld hirn to keep out of it. "They told me, ,rt,s
nor yo,r
:'.rriness,"'s:lysAkins. "Thcre wasn't much we could clo about it."
\^irs. alrng with more prolrressive Saudis,was upsct that the Saudi
-r;rr'crsitysystemwasl-r't trainingadministrators,rrranagers, scicntists.
-,;r.1cngineers."I talked to them about trzrir-ring rnorc doctors,
-.crnists, engincers, and fewer mullahs," rccallsAkins. .,But
I was let
: ' kr<)$rthat I was bey.nclrry colrpetence,and that I was meclclling
',',herc I wrrsn'rwanted. I th.Lrght
it wns rark str-rpidity.
lr was an
ri.soli,rtecirtirstrophe,training all thosc rrrullahs.A lrurnlrcrof thc
:'ri.ces urgeclmc to talk t'the p.wer strllctlrre."Tir avail. The
:.rLrciinrinistryof cducarionwrs conrrollcdby the Al Shaikh, ''
and its
:roiclovcr that part of govcrnrrcntwils urrshakable.
l-hc rclari.nshiplrctwcenthe Al Sirr-rcl,the Al Shaikh,and the Mus-
.rrr Br'ther-swirs a c'mplex onc. S.mc rncrrbersof the r.yal far-nily
*erc 1-rious irncl orthoclor, irncl sirw wahhalrisn as the righteous
i.l.rr.ic path. others, .f c.urse-Kirrg S:rLrcl
irrd I(ing F'ahd.and hun-
.i rccls.f pleirs'rc-seekins lcsscrprirccs-we re liberti.es, wh.sc rcl:r-
:rrnshi p to wirhhabi iclcologvwils fenuousat bcst. The Al shaikh,
Lrsurrlly
ir clistinctbloodline,also begrrnrnarryingthe Al Saucf, crcating
t.rnrilvbonclsthet pulled parts of both clans in two clirections,the
roral rrnclfhc rclisious.(King Faisal'srnother,for instirncc,
was fronrthe
\l shaikhfrrrnily, givirg Frrisalrrna.rir pict,vthrt .rhcr s.ns .f Abdel
'f
.\ziz coulclr'tas errsilyclainr.)Accorclingto F)ilts,fhcrewas rr ..consranr
ttig rf war" bctwce' rhe r.yal fa.rily :rnclthe rcligi.usfanrily:

()ver ri'rc,'.e rrls. i<lu'd that:l"ong thc Al Sharkh,

rn.re arrcl
nr()rcwerc lcrrving, rrrd rvererot g<lingint. thc rcligi<lLrsleaclcr-
ship,b't i.r. thc aruryirrclthings.f rhar.rlture.S, the sacral
niltrrrcoithc Al Shrril<hfantilycantet() bc clilrrtccl,
so nruchs<lthrtt
trrrisal,
in tL)7r, when tlrc GrandMufti drecl,eli'ni'arcdthc n<lsr
f'r a preri'ciarrclesrablisheda nrinistrv.i jusrice,which*,,r r..,,
rrsa werrkening of thisl<lng-standing,two-century-old relationship
 t30 D rvrl ' s Gavn

betweenthe Saudisand the religiousleadership. The ministry of

lusticeremained,but the king laterreestablished
the muftiate,and
nameda memberof the AI Shaikhfamilyto it.
The ulema [clergy]were powerful,and the Al Shaikhfamily
couldcontrolthe ulema.But as theAl Shaikhfamilyweakened in
its influence,with only somemembersgoing into the clergy,and
youngerpeoplecoming up and many of them becomingulerna,
the rel.tionshipbetweenthe Saudifamily and the Al shaikh fam-
ily crackedsomewhat.Soy.u getto the currentsituation,wherea
large numbcr of younger peopleobject to their elders,to the
ulema,and to the Saudir.yal family and are seekingto g. their
()wnway,ar.rdrathermilitantly.2T

As strainsberweenthe Al Saudand Al Shaikhbeganto show,the Al

shaikh beganto exhibit the effectsof prolongedexposurer. rhe Mus-
lim Brotherhood.whereas the Al shaikh were establishment-orienred,
morc religious than political, and above all committed to stabilin.
(especiallyf.r thc Saudrthrone), the Muslim Brotherhood'smembers
were often brash, highly political, and as often as not, revolutio'-
mincled.After r954, as more and more Brotherssettledin saudi Ara-
bia, the Al Shaikh becomemore militant. If the Al Shaikh
'aturally
had intereststhat diverged from thrse .f the Al saud. the Muslim
Brotherhooddid so evenmore strongly.
According to Martha Kessler,a former cIA Middle East analyst
who has studiedthe Muslim Brotherhood,the loyalty of the vahhabi
establishmentin Saudi Arabia ro the royal family wenr only so far.
and that was even truer for the Brotherhood members in the king-
d.m. "The Egyptian Brothers in Saudi Arabia were even further
removed [than the Al shaikh] from any senseof loyalty ro rhe House
of Saud"' she says."It's not clear that they wanted to overthrow the
regime, but inside the Brotherhood, there was always a debate
betweenthose who wanted to overthrow what they saw as the cor-
rupt regimesand those who wanred to spend their time organizing.
developinga basein the community."28
The delicaterelationship among the Saudi royal family, its vah-
habi establishment,the Muslim Brotherhood,and the evenmore rad-
ical Islamic terrorisr groups would continue to evolve. The balancr
 TheKingof All Islam . r 3r

:-j shift, depending on their relative strengths,power struggles

-.n the royal family, and regional politics. This balancewas made
:r irof€ complex, thanks to the role of Islamic charities,often con-
-:-::d to one or more Saudi princes,that wittingly or unwittingly
-i:J.rS conduits for money to terrorist groups.The situation was
, .;erbated by the fact that individual princes often acted indepen-
-:'r v of the king, the government,and other membersof the family.
. :.. Sirudiroyal family is not a monolith by any means," saysRay
.:. "There is alwayssomebodyready to give money to someone.
- - -e
. is a lot of free enterprisegoing on in royal family politics."
-,. the Muslim Brotherhood gained influence in Saudi Arabia,
' . Saud and then King Faisal skillfully incorporated thc organiza-
. -- rnto the kingdom's official foreign policy. In the r96os, two land-
'..i eventsmarked that grand design:the creation of the Muslirn
, :..1Leaguein t96z and the establishment of the Organizationof
'-, Irlamic Conferencein r969. Under Faisal,Saudi Arabia vigor-
..... n'clrkedto set up an "Islamic bloc," completewith Amencan
::ort. which ultimately succeededin eclipsingEgypt'sNasser.

Klr.rc Falsnr's IsLAMrc Br-oc

, ':.rrEisenhowerhad helpedset in motion in thc r95os continucd

.-: rn the decadethat followed.
i'.usal,king from t964 to r97 S, wasa more modernmonarchthan
' -- Saudft957-t961, and had a clearvision of SaudiArabia'sfor-
: policy."Faisal," saysC)harles
Freeman,a veteranU.S. foreign ser-
-: Lrfficerwho servedas U.S. ambassadorto Saudi Arabia. "made a
-: rcrdte decisionthat Islam was the antidote to Nasser."2eIt was a
-: . :lopmentthat'Washington Although some
viewedenthusiastically.
.,--.rr-minded U.S. diplomats and intelligence officers registered
- :.tions from time to time, the U.S.-Saudialliancewas set in stone,
" -- so Saudi Arabia's Islam-basedforeign policy worried few. Even

-, '.ates of the U.S.-Israelialliance,who gained momentum in the

- -:s. were far more worried about Nasserthan about SaudiArabia.
'World
The foundation of the Muslim Leaguein 196z marks the
 rl z l )rvtl 's ('avl

formal beginning of the resurgence of radical-right political Islam.

F < ru n d e di n Mecca i n t962, the Musl i m W orl d League w as a \Who's
Who of the lslarnic right. For the first time the movemenr had a
central nervous system more organized than the clandestine Muslim
Br.th e rh ood. The vi rtual l y unl i mi ted abi l i ty of S audi A rabi a to f und
th e o rg a ni zati on gave i t enormous ckrut. A mong the foundi ng m em -
bers and officers of thc League3, were virtually all of the lcader:sof the
Is l a m i c rcsurgence,i ncl udi ng:

Sa rdRarnadan,the son-i n-l awof H assanal -B anna,the fcl underof

th e Musl i rr B rorherhood. and thc B nrtherhood' s chi ef i nrcr -
rta ti < l rralorgani zer,w ho' d spent years i n S yri a, .fordan, paki st an
and elsewhere beforc oper.ringthe Islamic Center of Cler-reva
in
r 9 6 r, w i th S aLrdisupport.

" A bul -A l a Maw dudi , the founder of P aki stan' sradi cal -ri ght
Islanric Socicty (.lamaat-eIslami), who is the single most impor-
ta n t rtrchi rcct of the noti on of an Isl arni c R epuhl i c, and w ho
p l a y e d a cruci al rol e i n batteri ngP aki stan' sl eft-secul aropposi ti on
l n o v e ntent and i n pushi ng P aki stan i r-rtothe hard-ri ght Isl anr ic
c :rn rpunder Zi a ul -FIaq,the di ctator w ho sei zedpow er i n t977 .

Haj l A mi n al -H ussei ni , the pro-N azi nrufti of .ferusal er n,

w h o ' d been an agenr of B ri ti sh i ntel l i gencesi nce the rgzos an d
w h o , after W orl cl W ar l l , becamea S audi -fundedanti -N asserpro-
p a g a ndi st.

Muhamrnad Saciiq al-Mujaddidi of Afghanistan, who marn-

tained CIA c<>r.rt:rcts
in that unfclrtunatecountry in the r 96os and
rvhosedirect heirs would form rhe core of the r979-8c; anti-Sovier
Afghan jihad backedby rhe CIA, SaudiArabia, Egypt, and pakistan.

Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Shaikh,the government-appointed

Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia and the titular head of the Wahhabi
movement, who had enormous clout within the Saudi royal family.

Abdel Rahman al-Iryani, the militant Muslim fundamentalist

who would take power in Yemen in 1967 and lead that formerly
pro-Nasserrepublic into the Saudi camp after a long civil war.
 TbeKingof All Islam ' r3i

In all, a coupleof dozenof the world's leadingIslamistscametogether

rn the League.3l
"The rWahhabivision went international in the r96os in response
ro the threat posed by Arab nationalism and socialism," wrote
CieorgetownUniversity's John Esposito. "Saudi Arabia and other
monarchieswere threatenedin particular by Nasserismand in general
bv radicalArab socialistgovernments.. . . The Saudischampioneda
prrn-Islamicpolicy againstNasser's'secular,socialist'pan-Arabism
u'ith its tiesto 'atheisticcommunism.'. . . The Saudigovernmentalso
.icvelopedclose ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-e
Islami.Despitesignilicantdifferences, they shared[anl antipathyto
enemies-Nasserism,
a()rllrnon secularism,communism."12
printed propa-
The Muslim \forld l,eaguesent out missionaries,
qrrnda,and doled out funds for the building of Wahhabi-orientecl
and lslamicassociations:
ln()s(lues

The lcagueidentifieclworthy bcr-reficiaries, invitedthcm to Saudi

Arahia,and gavethernthe recommendati<>n (tazkiya)that would
latcr providethem with largesse frorn a gener()us privatcdonor,a
rnernber of tlreroyirlfamily,a prince, or an ordinary businessnran.
The leagucwaslnanaged by n'rembers of thc Saudircligiousestrrb-
lishment,working with other Arabswho eitherbclongedto thc
Muslim Brothcrsor werecloseto them,alongwith ulenrrls.frorrt
thc Indiansubc<lntinent c<lnnected to the l)eobandSch<lols or ttr
the p:rrtyfounded by Mawdudi.rr

The CIA was only vaguelyaware of the Mr.rslimWorld League's

rnrportance,and official Washington-committed to winning the
(.olclWar regardless of how unsavoryits allies-didn't ask the CIA to
it. "\7e saw it all in a short-termperspective,"saysa CIA
ini'estigate
officerwho servedin SaudiArabia. "'Weweren'tlooking at long-tern-t
Jonscquences." Accordingto this officer,in thc early r97os thc CIA
rriedto placean agentinsidcthe Muslim World l.etrgue."l ran a pen-
r'trationof Rabitat," he says,usingthe Arabic name for the organiza-
in Washington,as one of the leastimportant
"It was considered,
rior"r.
rhings I'd done." Headquarterswas interestedin wars, coups, and
qunrunningin the PersianGulf, not in the activitiesof the Lcague."I
 r 11 [ ) l v r r . 's (iaur-

found it fascinating,and important,"'he says."I didn't seeRabitat as

an effort to expilnd SaudiArabia'sown influenceinternationally,but
as a way to expandIslam'sinfluencein the Arab world irnd bcyond.[t
wasn'[SaudiArabia sctmuch as,well, kind of a 'Varican'-typcorganism.
It's almost as if it were an operation being run in spite of the Saudis."
Yet, he says,it certainlywasn't seenas a threat,or somcthingof geopo-
litical conccrn,and washington wasn't interested."The sound of snor-
ing," he says,"was deafening."The covertoperatiorrwas drclppcd.sa
Charles\Waternran, a CIA Arabist who spent many ycars in the
Middle East and Lrltimatelybccarnethe agency'schief of st:rrioni'
SaudiArabia, saysthat to the CIA the Muslirl World Lcaguclooked
innocent cnough in tlre r96os and r97os. "lt lookcd like anothcr
Muslim organizationworth rnonitoring,but not somcthingt() worry
about," saysWaterr,an."[f they c-ndedup supp'rtirg lslarnicstudcnt
nloverncntssomewhere,and they got involved in somc conflict with
lcft-wing studcnts,ollr reaction was, 'Okay, 6nc, anothcr benign
action intendcdto control thc left."' was thc (lIA wror.lsat thc tir-nc
ftr not focusingon thesegroupsand thcsecharacters? "'rhey secrrecl
like they wcrc just Islamiccharitableorganizations, and so wlrat?"l5
Ray Close,the former CIA chief, agrees.Asked whether thc CIA
haclany worrics abouf ties betwccnMuslinr lJrotherhoodand wah-
habi clcrgS he silys:"We didn'r folkrw it. lf a'yone is at fault, rr was
me. $7ejust didn't seethem as a threat.Thcy wercn't a targetof ours.
I'd get tarflet lists-but no one in washington wils irsking nre to look
at them. . . .It didn't entcr into our corrsciousness."
Ninety-ninc percenrof the fur-rdingfor the Muslin-rVorld Lcague
camefrom thc governmentof saudi Arabia.Its tiesto rhe saucliestab-
lishment were manifold. One of the League's secretary-generals,
Muhammad Ali al-Harkan, was a leading Wahhabi and ex-Saudi
minister of justice,who would later serveas de facto grand mufti of
Saudi Arabia. Besidesthe ministry of justice,the \fahhabis and the
Leagueinterlockedwith the Saudiministry of educationand the pow-
erful ministry of pilgrimage and religious endowments,which con-
trolled the enormous annual Muslim pilgrimagesro Mecca and the
vast funds availablefor charitiesand proselytizing.All that, in rurn,
 The King of All lslam . rI j

meshedwith the universitysysrem,especiallythe Islamic universities.

The League worked cl'sely with the militant 'world Assembly of
\Ir-rslim Youth (\7AMY), establishedtn tL)72,which wourd later be
rrccusedof sustainingterrclristactivitiesoverseas.36
During rhe r96os,the strugglebetweenEgypt and saudi Arabia-
in effect, a proxy fight in which the United Statestook the saudi
side-unfolded in two directions:first, in yet anotherflare-upof the
\'luslim Brotherhrodin Egypt;and second,in a shooringwar that pit-
ted Nasseragainstl"aisalin Yemen,a tiny nation at the southwesrern
corner of the Arahian Peninsula.Irr both cases)the ties linking the
Muslim llrotherho.d, the Muslim W'rld l.eague,and the Arab
rvorld'sconservativcnronarchiesprovidcd Riyadh with a pclwcrful
rcgionalapparatusto wield againstNirsscr.

Ramaddn and thc Return of thc Brctthers

A centralorgarrizcrof the SaudiIslanricbkrc was the rnan whom lke

had erc.unte'redin thc oval office in r9,y3:SaidRarradan.Acc.rcling
to ir Swissrcport, dLrringthis period Ramaclanwas believedto l-rave
lrcenar Amcrican agcnt.Hc also g.t help fro' \westciermarry,wirs
backcclfinarcially by SaudiArabia ard earar, anclscrveclas
J.rdan's
represcntativeto the UnitcclNafions in (lcneva. At the same.tin-lc,
Ramadan served as thc intcrnational mastcrnrindof the Muslirn
IJrotherho.cl,and i' r965 he was allegecllyinv.lvcd in a seconcl
assassinatir)n
i:rttcmptagainst Nirsser.Tl-re action against Nasscr
occurrcd in the niclst of yct rrnotherrevolt by the Brothcrhclodin
Irgypf, d-ristirrc aicledby Rarnadan'swell-organizecl apparatus.f
exiles.Part of his rnachinerwas basedin SaucliArirbia, ancl Dirrt in
(ieneva,whcre Ranradanhad scttled.
compirrcd t. its pre- r 9.t4 strelr{rth,the .rganizi,rtirr in h,gyptwirs
a shacl.w.f its former self.It had bcenf'rcccl to operateclcepunder-
ground sincethc | 95os. It trieclto establishfront organizationsand
political salonsto nraint:rinits organizationalpresence,but Nasser's
securityserviceswerc effectiveiu repressingit. By the rnid-r96os.
however,many of the p.litical pris.nerswho had lreenarrcstcdin the
 | 36 D E v r r . 's (i ,qr,tr_

post-r9i4 crackdown on the movement had been released.

once
again they tried to organizeagainstNasser.
From Geneva'Ramadanwas pulling many of the organizatirn's
strings.In 1954,Nasserhad strippedhim of his Egyprian
citizenship,
and he went into exile. with help fr.nr the west Gernrangovernmenr,
which was angry at Egypt for having recognizeclEast Ge'nan5
ancr
travelingon a rwestGerman diplornatic passport,he went
to Munich,
west ciermany,beforeg.ing to swirzcrrand.There, bankrolred
by the
king of saudi Arabia, Ramadan establishedthe Islamic
crenterof
Genevain r96r, which would serveas a headquartcrs f.r the Muslim
Brotherhood.Ramadan would livc therc for thc next
thirtv-four
years,until his deathin r 995.
The center bccame au ,rganizarionarnerve ccntcr, publishing
h.use, and meeringplacc f'r the Islamic right and
Muslinr Brrthcr-
hood .activistsfrom acrossthe Muslim w.rld. Accordi.g
t. I{ichard
Labeviere,a journalist who l-raswritten irbout the
Muslirn Br.ther-
ho'd's ties to terr.rism, Ramada' n.t .nly rnanaged
the organrza-
tion's funds but, alo.g with yrussef Nada, a Brotherho'd
financier-
helpedto establishrhe group'sbank, Al Taqwa.iT
1v11c162,Ramadan helped SaucliArabia establish
the Muslim
world League."My fatherwasn'rjusr one of the leaders
.f the founcr-
inggroup of the lea13ue," saysHani Ramadan,said'ss.n and the cur-
rent director rf the Islamic center in Geneva...He
had the original
idea for the creation of an Islamic league,which
eventuallybecamea
parallelchannelthough which he could communicate
his thoughts.,,
According to Hani Ramada., the Islamic center was
well receivedin
Switzerland when it was firsr established."There
was nothing like
today's lslamophobia," he says. "The first reactions
to my father,s
activity and to the presenceof an Islamic center i'
Genevawere posi-
tive, both within Switzerlandand more generally
with the E,uropean
public'" But Hani Ramadan admirs that the
whole purpose of the
venture was to promote the Muslim Brotherhood. .,The
creation of
the Islamic center was supposedto realizemy father's
desireof creat-
ing a center from which he could spreadthe teachings
of Hassan ar-
Banna, a place where studentscoming from various
Arab countries
could meet and be trained in the messageof Islam.',rs
 TheKingof All lslam ' r 17

r.,)rce Scatteredin exile, and undergroundin Egypt, the Muslim Brother-

hood grew ever more radical in the early r 96os.In Cairo, the Brother-
: : ) I -I S hood was gathering strength for another showdown with Nasser.
t : ', f p. Elsewhere,political Islam was growing. Saudi Arabia was increas-
ingly making an aggressivebid to act as leaderof the Arab and Islamic
,t lt cl blocs;AyatollahKhomeini was beginningto stir in lran; Iraqi funda-
Jh, mentalist Shiites had created a conspiratorialpolitical party, the
:he Call;3eand Mawdudi's movementin Pakistanwas gaining momen-
of tun-r.When the r965 crisisover the Brotherhoodexplodedin Egypt,
ln t I{amadanand thc Brotherhood'schief idcologue,the militant leader
SayyidQutb, both of whom werc nrllegedly behinclan attemptto kill
' llr
Nasser,were at the cerrterof the crisis.This tinre, Nasscrwas better
:t g prcpared,and he callcd on frienclsancl supportcrswithin Egypt's
If- clergyto back him, while paintingR:rmadanand the Muslim
Mr.rslirn
rLl Brotherhoodas U.S. agents."Otr jo August llgyptianpublic opinion
lcarncd, through ir spcechNasser clclivercclfrorl M<tscow,that the
Socicty of Muslirn l]rcthren was the forcc behind a gigantic plot
saidthe presi-
Thcir irccomplices,
erproscdby the intclligenccserviccs.
Mustapha Amitt, a leadinglibcral iournalistarrested
clent,incluclecl
. : :.ll on z Septernber on chargesof 'spyingfor the UrtitedStates.'After the
-l raids, the regime'srcligious functionaries,spokcsmen,ancl writcrs
were mobilizeclto clenounccseditior"rs elcments,. . . condemnitrgthe
-.1 Muslim Brcthrenas 'ureclieval terrorists,'" writes (iillcs Kepel, one
:-l the world's foremost analystsof political Islarn. "The ncwspapers
exposcdthe forcignlinks of thc 'religittusfanatics':SaidRamadan,al-
:l Banna'sson-in-law,was said to bc pr'rllingthc stringsfrom Amman,
\i- .fordirn,on orclersfrom CIINTO."a0 Ratladilrrrnay or may not have
beena U.S. agcnt, br.rtthcre is tro doubt thirt hc had alignedhimself
closelywith thc axis of nations-inclLrcling Prrkistan,
a CIENTOmem-
ber,Jordan,irnd SaucliArabia-that the United Stateswnrssupporting
againstNasser.
According to Le Temps, Itgypt witst-t'tthc only governmenf that
considcredSaid Ramadanto bc an Americana!!cl-lt. Thc government
of Switzerland,too, believedthat l{amadan was working for the
United States.1n 1c266, at the height of crisis in h,gypt,a high-level
n-rcetingof Swiss officials, including diplomats, the Swiss federal
 rj8 . Drvrr's Gaur

police, and the securityservices,met to discussRamadan'scase.Doc-

uments now in the swiss archivesreveal that the Swiss authorities
concludedthat Ramadan representeda "conservativetendency,pro-
western and not hostile" to the interestsof switzerland. The Swiss
archivesalso reveal that the swiss, at least, believedthat Ramadan
was an agent of the CIA and MI6. "He was more than a simple pro-
pagandist appreciated for his anti-communism,,' according to Le
Temps. A Swiss government analyst concluded: ..Said Ramadan is,
among other things, an inrelligenceagent of the English and the
Americans."Le Tempsnoted that Ramadan'sties "to certain rwestern
secretservicesare suggestedin severaldocumentsin his dossier."4l
Nasser'st965-66 crackdown on the Brotherhood decimatedthe
organization once again. Many of its underground leaders were
arrestedand others fled. Nasser ordered the execution by hanging
of the organization'schief ideologue and theoretician,sayyid
eutb,
who had earlier been granred exile in saudi Arabia.a2According to
Hermann Eilts, King Faisal vigorously inrervenedwith Nasser o'
Qutb's behalf,ro no avail.a3

Kennedy, Nasser,and yemen

The struggle between Nasser and Faisal erupted into open warfare
from t96z to r97o, when Egypt and SaudiArabia fought a bitter and
bloody proxy war in Yemen.The two protagonistswere at the height
of their powers in the r96os. Nasserwas an Arab icon with followers
in every Arab country, and Faisal-who edgedour King Saud in the
early r96os-was using Saudi money,the Muslim \X/orldLeague,and
the \Tahhabi movement to bolster the conservativecoalition. The
Egyptian leader,wielding his typically colorful rheroric, blasted the
desertkingdom for acting on behalf of U.s. imperialism,while Faisal
equatedNasser'sArab socialismwith "atheisticcommunism.,,
Although the war was by and large invisibleto the American pub-
lic, it had a very significantimpact on u.S. policy in the Middle East,
strengtheningAmerican ties to the conservativeArab statesand above
all to SaudiArabia and its Islamic bloc. The story of rhe yemen war's
 The King of All Islam t39

Doc- impact on U.S. Middle East policy is told in some detail in \Tarren
-...^^
-_-l f J Bass'sSwpport Any Friend, an account of the Kennedy administra-
'Vfith
i ro- tion's flirtation with Nasser. the departure of Eisenhowerand
: '. , , ' LSS his uncompromising attitude toward nonalignment, rhe Kennedy
-1 J.t 1. l- t administration offered an olive branch to Egypt. Under Kennedy',
lro- someU.S.officialsacceptedthat Nasserwas independent,not a Soviet
- 1. pawn, and that lfashington would have to reach an accommodation
i: rs, with him. Optimists believedthat Nasser,who was no communist-in
fact, he ruthlessly locked up members of the Egyptian Communist
>,(i ll Party and other leftists-might be convinced to abandon his ties to
the USSR. More realistic analystsfelt that Nasser could at least be
: lhe persuadedto reach a modus vivendi with the United States.And, of
.,r,-C
fe course,still others,especiallypartisansof Israel,saw Nassermuch as
SaudiArabia did, as the devil incarnate.
l rln
"Our relations with Nasserwere difficult," recallsTalcott Seelye,
1i t o who headedthe StateDepartment'sArabian Peninsuladeskduring the
: ( )I l Kennedyyears." We saw that his movementconstituteda threat to the
Saudi regime,and there was a reactionin Saudi Arabia, too. Prince
Talal Ione of the so-calledSaudi 'Free Princes']defected[to Irgyptl,
and two Saudipilots did, too. So we were very worricd about the sur-
vival of the Saudiregime."aaThe CIA prepareda National Intelligence
::. 1r e Estimate(NIE) called"Nasserand the Futureof Arab Nationalism,"
' .l nd which told the White House:"Militant nationalismwillcontinueto bc
.: gh t the most dynamic force in Arab political affairs, and Nasser is very
'.i,crs likely to remain its foremost leader and symbol for thc foreseeable
l ihe futurc." It went on to warn the young presidentthat "the long-term
, :nd outlook for the conservativeand Western-alignedregimesis bleak,"
The and that the Saudiregimewas likely to be swept away.45
I rhe Kennedy thought it worthwhile to explore an opening to Nasser,
: l: . ll to the chagrin of both Israel and Saudi Arabia, and he begana series
of exchangeswith the Egyptian leader,through diplomatic contacts,
:ub- letters,and personalmeetings.To Kennedy,Nasserwrote: "Why does
E.tsr, the United States,a country establishedon foundations of freedom
and by meansof a revolution, opposethe call of freedom and revolu-
1 -tr's tionary movements,and line up with reactionaryforces and enemies
 r4o . Dlvrr.'s (,aul

of progress?"'16By reactionarvforces,of course,Nassermeanfabovc

all Sar-rdi
Arabia, and his questionwas a g.od rne. Unlikc Ike, who
reflerivelysaw indepenclent-mindcdThirclWorld counrricsirscommu-
nist stooges,
JFK was willing to cxplorerhe possibilitythat suchmovc-
mentswere not neccssarily incompatiblewith U.S.intcrests.In flrct,as
a senatorin the r 9.5os,Kennedy"blastedthe F.isenhower aclministra-
tion's'head-in-tl-re-sand'
attitudetoward Arab nationrtIism."4-
But the Kenncdy-Nasser duet faltered,and .lrimatcly failcd. r'
septemberr 962, pr.-Nasser f.rces ovcrthrew the grvern-
''cdievaI
mcnt of Ycrnen,which occr-rpied a crucialpicceof rcaI estatcstrirrcgi-
cally positionedon rhe sourhernflank of saucli Arabi:r astriclcrhe
Red Seaand the Indian Ocean.Ar thc rirlc, I(cnnedysaid, ..1don't
cven know where it is."a8The leaclerof Yemcn in t962 was Imrrrr.r
Ahr-nad,a decrepit,joo-polrnclautocratwith a reputationfrlr brutal-
ity. Hc.thoughtof hi'self as the "protect.r of (l.d's religior-r,"
arcl he
den'unced Nasser'sec()nomlcprollram as "u.-lslar.ric."4eWhen he
died, rcbelsbackedby Nasseroverthrewhis ecluallyreaction,ryson,
Mohammeclal-Iladr.According t. Seelyc,Nilsscr "was behinclthe
overthrow of the regime,ilnd Saudi Arabia wrrs very,vcry Llpsct."t0
The rcvolutionin Yemcn,soon backedby the arrival of thousandsof
F.gyptiantroops,posec'la threatto the very cxistenccof saudi Arabia.
Robert Konrer,the whitc Hrusc aide f'r Middlc Flastpolicy,war'red
Kennedy,"Thc H.use'f Sar.rd well knows it c.uld be.exf.,"l Sirucli
Arabia, alarmecl,lent arms a.cl m.rey t' the ycme'i mclnarchists.
The suhsequentwar left zoo,ooo deaclin ncarly a clecacle
of 1igl-rting.
Kennedyhad already been warned, by the CllA and othcrs, rhar
SaudiArabia'sregimcn-rightnor lasrlor-rg,
and rhar Nasserwas likcly
the Arab world's furure.Initially,hc tried ro be evcn-handed,
recogniz-
ing the new governmentof Yemenand sendingEllsworth Bunker fo
mediatea settlementbetweenEgypt and saLrdiArabia. But pressure
mounted on Kennedy from all directions.The British, still clinging to
their precariousper:chir the Arab Gulf anclAden, were again (asdur-
ing the Suezcrisis) apoplecticabout Nasser.Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan, who'd beenin the British governmentduring Suez,wanted
to "tear Nasser'sscalp off with his fingernails."52They immediately
 Tbe King ctf All Islant

1: ' ( )\'e deviseda schemewith Israel'ssecretservice,the Mossad. to aid the

. '.\ho i.rnti-Nasserforcesin Yemen by supplying them with arms and finan-
' : t ll tt-
cial help. "MI6's fornrer vice-chief,George Young, who was now a
i l . , r\'e- lrankerwith Kleinwort Benson,wils approachedby Mossadto finclan
: -: . i 1S F-nglishman accepttrbleto tlre Siruclisto rull a guerrilla war against
\ 1 1. 1-
the fYemeni]republicansand their Egyptianbackers,"wrote l)orril.
"'l can {ind you a Scotsrnan,'replied Young. He tl-renintroc'lucecl
\lcl-ean to Brigadier [)an Hiranr, the Isracli clefenscattache, whcr
promisedto supply weapons,fLrnds,anclinstrurctors who cotrld pass
rhemselves tltaf thc Sauclis
off as Arabs,a sfrrtteg), eagerlygraspecl."53
Israeldrew on its popul:rtiouof Yct-ncni.fews,rvho had irnrnigrateclto
Israeland who could prassthernse lvesotl-as YerncrriArilbs, and dis-
them to tl'rewar zonc wlrcrc thcv scrvecias rnilitary instruc-
tr'ratchecl
tors. Accordingto Dorril: "Thc (llA helpeclthc Israelisinfiltrrrtcbtrck
rnto Yemensomc of these.fewsto trililt the gucrrillrrsin the usc of
r.nodernweapons.The trainers,naturally,tool<carc to clisguise their
frlre nationality."Both Iran'sSAVAI(sccretscrviceand SaudiArabian
intelligcnccwere witting nrembersof the anti-Nasserfront in Yemcn.
Isrircl also contributed iln.ns to the rebels,including Soviet-madc
. l: fl t it haclscizedir-rconflictswith the Arab states."'fhe CIA and
\\reelpous
..:.t l'rt tt.
MI6 relieclon . . . 'practical-mindcdr-nembers of the Saudiroyal farn-
,, ,.:-tle cl
rly'to dcvclop a covert alliancebetr,veen
Israel,Saudi Arilbia, lran,
.. rLrc l i
rrucl.fordan."5aAccording to Howard Teichcr,a tr',r<',-lsr,rcli
tl.S. offi-
-, :risrs. cial, thc Israeliair force also intervenedon behalf of SaucliArabia
_ rt t l(r
I
- ' "ts' rrgairrstEgypt, dr-rringthe war in Yemen."lsraeli warplanes,"wrote
-. thr.tt Teicher,"flew south over tlre Red Scato signalunamlrignor-rslyto the
, rkcl,v Egyptiansto keepthcir distar-rce from SaudiAratria."5t
'Washington,
. "- t l tz- Irr the British urged Kennedyto takc a stand against
. . i. l - to Nirsser.l"urtherpresslrreon Kennedycame)of course,from lsrael.Dur-
l : . st i fC ing the war in Yemen,thc Israelistried to reinforcethosein Washington
: : t q to rvho saw Nasseras a tool irr a Soviet schemeto control the Persian
- .. t l ttr- (iulf, and lsrael cast itself as Americir'srnost rcliable anti-communlst
:i .ir olcl ally in the region.
, , . t nt ed
Yet more pressurecamefrom the big U.S.oil companies,who were
: : . r tely ,rlarmedover the threat that Nasser posed to their cash cow, Saudi
 | 4z D E vrr-' s Geur,

Arabia. Aides to Kennedy were swamped with lobbying from the

Aramco partnersand Gulf Oil. The latter companywas represented
by Kerrlit Roosevelt,who told the White House that U.S. interests
and Nasser''s"arc simply incompatible."jFK sent a former Aramco
executive,Terry Ducc, to meet with King Faisalon his behalf.56And
Kcnnedy began to rLnr opereti()nsagainst Egypt in and around
Ycrncn."Kennedy,"saysformer ambassadorCharlesFreeman,"was
screwing irround with all sorts of covert operations and the Green
Bcretsin Arabia."57
Kenncdy'sovertllreto Nirsserwas over.More important, the United
Statcshad sclr-rarcly
set itselfagainsta centralgoal of Arab nationalists:
to unite lrgypt ancl othcr oil-poor Arab nations with Saudi Arabia's
vast wealth. "The Saudikingdom has alwaysbeenwary of any Arab
unificirtior-rschenre."wrotc Shirccn Hunter. "The Aratr nationalists
believecl, for rxanrple,that the oil of SaudiArabia and other oil-rich
Arab statesbclongeclto the Arab nation anclnot only to the oil produc-
ers and should bc usedfor Arab economicdevelopmcntand be at the
serviccof :rchievirrg its other goals.. . . Thus the Arab radicalsposed
irn existentialthrcirtto SaudiArabia."58In retrospect,it is possibleto
ask: What nrighthavehappenedif the United Stateshad supportedor
folcrateclNasscr,anclhad irllowedSaudiArabia to fall to Nasser?In
the r 96os,in the rniclstof the Cold War,it was an r:nthinkableoption.
The -fohnson adnrinistrrtionvigorouslyreinforcedthe U.S.-Saudi
alliance.King Faisalwas lionizedby LBJ, who offeredmilitary assis-
tance and technicalhelp to the Saudi ruler,who'd replacedthe dis-
crcdited King Sar-rdat the start of the Yemen war. A $4oo million
Anglo-Amcricanair defenseprogram was launchedin SaudiArabia,
along with a massivcschemeto build military basesand other infra-
structurcand a $roo million U.S. program to supply Saudi Arabia
with trucks and n-rilitarytransportvehicles.5e
The U.S. support for Saudi Arabia tacitly backed a vast inter-
national effort by King Faisal to rally Muslim support in the Cold
\il/ar.In r 6 Faisalbegana frenetictour of Muslim countriesto find
9 5,
allies,describingMarxism as "a subversivecreedoriginated by a vile
Jew."ooHe was ever more determinedto stamp it out. He joined the
shah in calling for a grand Islamic alliance,and visitedJordan, Sudan,
 TbeKingof All Islam ' r t3

'r1 the Pakistan,Turkey, Morocco, Guinea, and Mali in ry66 to drum up

:::nted support.
.:t r5L5
In Jordan, he wailed that "the powers of evil have planned to fight
.: . t m co Islam and Muslims wherever they are" and are "trying to kill every
'- sign of Islamic influence."61 In Sudan, he proclaimed:"As for the
- \ nd
i: , r U nd communists, they are attacking us becausethe Islamic movementis
. " \\'AS
going to destroyall that communism standsfor, ir-rparticular,disbelief
i ' reen in the Almighty God." Noting that the USSRcontainedMuslirn terri-
tories,he added:"The Communistsfear thc expansionof our movc-
ment becauseit will reachthe Islamicterritoriesthat havcfallenunder
their oppressivedomination."62In Pakistan,he issuecla clirrion call
for an Islamicbloc despitethe fact that Islirrn"is facingmany uncler-
currentsthat are pulling Moslemslcft and right."r'rPakistan,a right-
wing Islamic state that was part of two formal irlliirnceswith thc
'West,
sent troops to stabilize Saudi Arabia fronr both intcrnal ar-rd
externalthreats.Beginningin the eirrly r 96os,Pakistaniarrrryofficcrs
had taken up posts in Saudi Arabia'sarued forces,irs traincrs ancl
commanders.One of them was CleneralZia ul-Hac1,who in r977
would mount an Islamistcoup d'6tat againstZulhqar Ali Bhutto.6a
Though Faisal'scampaign for lslirrnic solidrrritydrcw slrpport
among right-wing Islamic states-cven thc shah, no frrn of Islamic
fundamentalism, favoredit-it was seenby Egypt, Syria,anclIraclas
threatening.But Faisal'slslamic bloc was viewcd fdvorably by Lon-
don and Washington. In r 966, tt political officer in the British
crnbassyin Saudi Arabia explicitly cndorscclFaisal'scfforts, aclcling
that the United Stateswas in accord.too:

I take the relaxedview of F:risal's activities....J'hc Anrericrrrr

embassyhere,with whonrwe havediscussed the srrbjectirt severi.rl
levels,sharethis view.That is to saythat the c()nccprof Islarl as
an aggressive force has completely clisappcarecl cxcept rlm()n!l
: rnter-
someolderSaudis.65
. C-old
:,find
', : r'ile After all, he wrote approvingly,the Saudi enrnity was directed only
:- J the againstcommunism,Zionism,and a handfulof Christianmissionaries.
i r,l: n As Faisal'sstar rose)Nasser'sfell. The crushingend to Nasser's
 r44 I)rvrl ' s Gnur-

appeaf came in t967, when, in six devastatingdays of war, Israel .1lt!1...:

defeatedlrgypt, Syria,Jordan, and their allies,occupying.ferusalem 1 1. l I ! . : ' r

and parts of all threecountries,includingthe Sinaipeninsula.Nasser .\r.rl'.

would live for another three years,but the r967 war sappedArab I ir..:..
nationalism'svitality."Nasserwas ableto retool anti-colonialism
and T:r..
excite pecrple,but the t967 war blcw that myth totally, becirusehe
krst,and not only lost, but lost miscrably,"saysDavid l.ong. "I was in
Jeddah,and my boss,the political counselor,said to me: 'That's thc
end of Nasser."'6('
Faisal,now with clearAmericanbackir-rg, recloubleclhis effortsto
org:rnizea bloc of Islamic statcs,touring as far afield as Indonesia,
Algeriir,Afghanistan,and Malaysia. "Faisal," wrote the authors of
'fhe House of Saud,"had bccorncrrore dementcdthan ever irbout the
'Zionist-Bolshcvist'conspirircy."67 His efforts canlerto fruition in
rc16c1,
in pilrt thanks to thc actionsof a mentirllyunlralancedAus-
tralian who attempteclto set fire to .ferusalenr'sAl Aqsa mosque.
Whcther this was a convcnienrpr()v()cation or deliberatclystzrged
as
an excuseto rnobilizcIslamicrnilitancy,King Faisaleagerlyscizedon
it, suntmoningleadcrsof the Islamic world to Rabirt, Morocco, for
what woulcl bc thc worlcl'sfirst Islamic summit conference.Becausc
thc inr:rgcryof Al Aclsa was so strong, even Egypt fclt compelled
to rrttendFaisrl'striumphirnt grrthering.6sAlthough Syria and Iraq
boycotted the rneetirrg,twcnty-fivc natior.rsattended.The sumnrit
resolvedto crcatc thc Organizationof the Islanric(lonference,an
ever-expancling rnini-LInitcclNations for the lslamic world, which
rapidly movcclIslirrlisrrrto thc centerof the rrgencla
in country after
ir.rTLrrkeSand amongtlreArabs.
countr)':in Pakistan,in Afghanistrlr.r,
Norninallf irrti-lsrael, Faisal'sreal goal was to forge a broad
Islirn'ric
front againstthe SovietUnion. "lly thc latc r96os wc're still
fightingcornrnnnisrn, so we reinforccdFaisal'ssllppolt fclr the Mus-
lim llrothcrlroodanclpirn-Islarm,"
saysDavid l-ong."'Weneededthem
againstar-ryirlliesthat Moscow coulcl conjure Lrp.If Saudi Arabia
coulc'lhelp createan institutior-ralized
Islan-ricconsensus,so nruch the
better."
l,ong, a perceptiveanalyst with a strong senseof irony, saysthat
despitethe fact that it was glaringly obvious,most U.S. policy makers
 The King of All Islam r' +5

i :, 1 eI and analystshad little or no appreciationof the potentially explosive

'We
l illl
nature of the Islamic resurgence."We didn't seeIslam. saw Saudi
.\ \f l
Arabia," he says."Pan-Islamwas not, to us, seenas a strategicthreat.
\:.rb There were bad guys doing bad things to peopleon rhe left, to Nasser.
-'.nd They were fighting the pinkos. So we didn't see pan-Islam as a
. llC
threat."
:! lll
ln r97o, working as an analystat the StateDepartment'sBureau
of Intelligenceand Research,Long had an inkling that the cnergyof
pan-Islarnmight bc channclcdinto anti-Arnericanismonc day, but no
one was listenine:
: itt

. -t
\ ()l
I w rrsrrtIN R i n 1 9 7 o ,rtn c lI tri ed to r,vri tcabout Isl am.B ut therew as
no lnarket for it. I felt that there was still a boclv of clisenchirnted,
. in p c o p l ew h o w c rc sti l l focusedon anti -c< l l oni al i sm,
c l i s a ffc c tc d even
-L .i \- tlr<rrrghthe t.)67 rvar had shattered the myrl.r of Nasser.I silw
i n c rc a s i n gc l i s i l l trs i < l n rn cwnti tl ' r A rab nati orral i snr,
but rn()stpeop[e
.: JS
clicin'tseeit. Sooner()r lrlter,I felt that thcsc gr-rvs woulcl latcl.ron t<l
s o l re th i n g ,a rrc th l a t th a t s o r retl .ri ne rni ght be Isl arr,si ncethey w cre
: , )lt
s trl l c l i s a ffe c te dIj. u s t fe l t that Isl arrrw or-rl dbe the new paradrgrn,
: i)f
b u r d re h i g h c r-u p sw c rrcs ti l l fol l ol vi ng the ol cl scri pt. I w as scl rsi rrg
: , l ic
th a t c l i s i l l u s i o n n rc nltv i th Arab rrati onal i snrand N asseri srr w as
'.1
s e tti n gi n . I b e c rrrn e
p r< l fo u ncl l vsuspi ci ousthat fhere w or-rl cl
not bc
T-.
r,, rLl a f<lllorv-<lrr to Nasser,t() crerltethe transnational nr<lvementthat
' .:: l i t w o u l d a p p c a l to th e n ra l c orrtents.I cl i cl n' t sce anyri rrecol l nnl l
. .1ll along, except Islar.r'r.t"'
^. . l-

r:: c r T h c Ara b c i e fc i rt i n th e r9 67 w ar encouraged i rn Isl i tmi c resur-

gen c e . T h e A ra b s ' c ru s h i n g l oss rai scd cri ti cal questi ons about the
..1
'.1t1 f ut u re o f th e A ra b w o rl d . l t p rovoked i nchoate anger among thc pop-
-;ll
\ ,lil
uli rti o n o f th e c o L l n tri e s i n v o l vecl , and i t l cd to enornl ous turmoi l i rr
A r a b p ro l i ti c s .On th c o n c h a n cl , betw een t967 ;tncl r 9Zo, severalA rab
1 i,-Ill r eg i m e s fe l l to l e ft-l e a n i n g n a ti onal i sts. H afcz A ssacltook over S yri a,
-l :'t lt M u a m m :l r Qa d d a l i o u s tc c l L i bya' s ki ng, Jaafar N r,rmci ri sei zedpow er
:ire in S r.rc l i rnth, e Ara b B i r:rthSo c i i rl i stP arty rose to pow er i n Iraq, and the
P a l e s ti n i a n s c a n re c l o s e to to ppl i ng Jorcl an' s K i ng H ussei n i n the
: : l, lt upri s i n g c u l m i n a ti n g i n B l a c k S epteml ' rerr 97o. S ome of these l eaders
\."15 c it c d N a s s e r a s a h e ro a n d ro l c model .
 r46 D rvrl ' s Gevr

But another ideologywas seekingto replaceNasser-stylenational-

ism: Islamism.
The seeminginability of the Arabs to competewith Israel and the
Ioss of more Arab territory (the Sinai peninsula, Gaza, the Golan
Heights, and the'West Bank) were stinging blows. Nasser'senemies,
irrcludingthe Muslim Brotherhood,usedthem againsthim, charging
that Nasserismand Arab socialismhad failed.They beganpreaching
about a return to Islam as the solution to the Arab wor:ld'sills. It was
a timelessmessage,deliveredin the pasr by .famal L,ddineal-Afghani
and Hassanal-Banna.But in the wake of the 1967 debacle,it res-
onatedwith millionsof angry Arabs.
WatchingIraq, Libya, and Sudanfall to rebels,both SaudiArabia
and the United Stateswere desperateto contain the spiraling changes
in the Arab world, not leasr to deflect the growing strengrh of the
Palestinian movernent and the PalestineLiberation c)rganization.
SaudiArabia bet on conservative Islam as the antidoteto Nasserisrn-
and the United Stateswenr along. lr
Three yearslater, in the midst of the Black Septembercivil war in
J'rdnrn,Nasserdied. He was replacedby Anwar sadat. Sadat'seleven-
yearcareeras presidentof Egypt was, from the standpointof Washing-
ton and Riyadh, a real blessing.The wily ex-Muslim Brotherhood
member and longtime Nasser aide struck up an allia'ce with saudi
Arabia, suppressedEgypt'sleft, brought the Muslim Brotherhoodtri-
umphantly back to Cairo, and finally realignedEgypt with the United
Statesand Israel.Sadatwould changerhe courseof history.And for all
that, he would die at the handsof Islamistassassins.
 -.1
l. 1 l-

: :he 6
r , ;ln

'-' t l 0

^rrto

T H E S OR C ERER' S APPRENTICE
:..tni
:c 5 -

:he
'r )ll.

i : t11.

lN rsr. r97 os, guided by Kamal Adham, SaudiArabia'schief of

:: lll intelligence,Anwar Sadat brought the Muslim Brotherhood back to
: " ln - Egypt. The United States,accustomedto working with Saudi Arabia,
...,- \vas untroubled by the rise of Islamism in Egypt. In fact, Washington
^.)()d was so eagerto work with Anwar Sadat to bring Egypt over to the
'.rucii U.S.side in the Cold \Var that policy makers,diplomats,and intelli-
-
i
--l
il l- genceofficersviewed Sadat'srestorationof the lslamic right benignly
::rcd or tacitly encouragedit.
: tll But Sadat had opened a Pandora'sbox. Once freed, the Brother-
hood knew no bounds. Back in their ancestralhome, the Brothers
rvorked feverishly to spread their influence worldwide. The conse-
quenceswere profound, and deadly-not leastfor the Egyptian presi-
dent himself.
C-loncurrentwith the growth of the lslamic right in Egypt, Sadat
helped engineer a dramatic expansion of America's power in the
^\'liddleEast.Under Nasser,Egypt was a nation at odds with the United
States. Twenty thousand Soviet troops, technicians,and advisers
L.rackedEgypt's armed forces; a war of attrition was under way along
the Egypt-Israelborder; and Egypt and the United Stateslacked even
normal diplomatic ties. But Sadat establisheda covert relationship
 r4t3 . I ) l v r r . 's (i.rr,r,rr-

with Adham, the clA, and Henry Kissinger, the U.S.narirnal securiry
adviser.ln tc)7r, within a year rf assumingcontrol, Sadat.ustedthe
Egyptianleft fr.m the grvernrnent,:rnd in r97z he stunnedMoscrw
by expellingthe Sovietforces.Afrer the r973 RarnadanWar-waged
in conccrt with Saudi Ar:rbia a'd ar.und Islamicthcmes
'rsanized
rather than Arirb nationalism-ligypt and thc Unitcd Sraresreesrab-
lishedties.In r 977, Sadatflew tr Jerusalern, splittingthe Arab w.rld
and opening with lsracl that lcd to the camp David
'eg'tiatio'rs
Egypt-Israelagreenrenr. By r 9flo, Ilgypt was Anrerica'sleaclingAral-r
ally, engagedin supportrngthc U.S.iihacli' Afghanisrarirnd provid-
ing a basefor U.S.influcncein thc oil-rich l)crsianclulf. l-or cven thc
most cynical U.S. N,licldlcL,astspccialisrs,tl-rcchirngcin l]gypt, frorn
foe to ally.wes drzzyirrg.
At thc beginning,few expectcdverv r"nuchfrom Sirdat.For thirty
years'he haclopcrirteclin Nasser'sshadow.He'cl becn a memberof
the Muslim lJrothcrhoodancl playcd thc role of intermccliaryin the
intrigue between thc pi:rlircc,the l]rothcrhoocl,ancl thc Free officers
movenent.After Nasscr'scor-rp, Sirdrrtservedas the Egyptianleader's
liaison t' the llrotherh.'d, then functi.ncd as L,gypt'sunofficial
ambassadorto Islirrnists
worldwide.Br-rtto L,gyptians
trndro U.S.offi-
cials, sadat ncver scemeclt. bc r'.re than a scc,nd b;lnana.After
Nasser'sde:rth,in October r 97o, Sadatwas widely sce' as a placc-
holder who would be ,usted afrer a hchinc'l-thc-scencs struggle for
power in cairo. "ln the UnitcciStates,cxpect:rtionsof Sirdatwere
zip," saysDavid [..ng, a f.rmer U.S.f,reign service'fficcr...He was
the bumblingvice president."l
In his autobiography,In Searchof ldentity, Sadatwrore that when
American envoy Elliott Richardson returned home t' rx/ashington
after visiting cairo to offer condrlenccs rn Nasser'sdeath, he pre-
dicted that sadat "wouldn't survivein power for mrre than four or
six weeks."zInsideEgypt,Sadatfacedformidableopponents,includ-
ing Nasser-stylenationalists,who were deeply suspiciousof Sadat,
and communist-leaning or pro-Sovietofficials.sadat himselfhad no
real political baseor constiruenc.v.
Yet not only did Sadatsurvive,he
succeeded in engineeringa completeabout-facein Egypt'sforeign and
domestic policies. Where Nasser had forged ties to Syria, Iraq, and
 Tbe Sorcerer'sApprentice . r49

Algeria, Sadatembracedthe conservativemonarchiesof SaudiArabia

-;c u rity 'Where
and the Gulf. Nasserrelied on the SovietUnion for arms and
-..:cdthe
)' 1rrscow maintaineda nonalignedposture internationally,Sadatbroke Egypt's
'-n rrged ties to the USSRand enrolled Egypt in America'sCold War bloc. And
where Nasser promoted Egypt as a Third World leader along with
-,hernes
::l i St i 1 b -
Yugoslavia, India, and African and Latin American nations, Sadat
implementedan Egypt-centered, go-it-aloneforeign policy.
--,I \\'Ofld
-: l).rvid Sadatconsolidatedhis shaky rule by unleashingthe power of the
: : .\rirb Islamic right as a hammer againstthe left, with the generousfinancial

: :'rovid- of SaudiArabia. Though Nasserhad suppressed

irssistance the Mus-
' :" crl the lim Brotherhood and fought to reduce the power of right-wing
,::. irom Islamism in F,gypt,Sadat welcon-redthe cxiled Muslim Brotherhood
back to Egypt, reinvigoratedthe organization,and built its institu-
I - t hirty tional presencewithin the universities,
professionalassociations,
and
',:: irer of the media.BeforeSadat,the lslamistswere for the mosr part fringe-
,- . : n t h c
dwelling,marginalizedradicals;after Sadat,the Muslim Brotherhood
ilnd its cvcn more radicalyouth wing were part of mainstreampoliti-
: r ) iliecrS
- . . r t lc r's cirl discoursein Egypt.
Peoplcwho traveledevencasuallyto Egypt during the r97os were
-. - r f ic i i rl
-
. . . offi -
struck by this thoror-rghtransformation. [n the schools,in thc streets,
-. r . \ f te r in the mosqucs,in thc press,therewcre manifestations of the growrng
. . , i. llr ce - presenceof Islamic fundtrmentalism.Michael l)unn, editor of the
Middlc East .lournal, says that he could not help but be amazed by
..* - lc to r
*. : : \ \ 'Cf C
the shift during the mid-r97os. "In F)gyptthings changeddramati-
il c n'rts
cally," he says."Peoplewcre wearingbeardseverywhcre.There werc
thingscalleclMuslim Brotherhoodmagazinesor newspapers. People
. : : n hcn
were wearing white djelldbas.The mosqueswere overflowing, with
peoplespillingout into the streets."rStudentsflockedto join Islamist
: . :l: ll g tO n
groups, and thousandsof new mosqucswcre constructed.Muslim
. : : i prc-
a - )uro r
Brotherhood-linkedbanksand businesses sprouted,and phalanxesof
Islamistthugsemergedto intimidatepoliticalopponents.
-. n ulr.tcl -
But for Sadat.it wrrsa fatal erntrrace.
: : . t c lat,
Initially,the Islamicright servedas Sadat'sallies.Ciradually,how-
: : rrcl n o
:: . : r 'c, h e
ever,more and more of them turned againsthim, especiallyafter the
: -: : jll
accord. In Egypt, Sadat underestimatedthe depth
H,gyptian-Israeli
l -lnd
and virulenceof the growing Islamistopposition,especially
among its
.: .: q. lrn d
 r\o . L ) n v r r - 's (i a,vr,

terrorist factions. In the United Srares,the Statel)epartment and the

CIA failed to pay sufficientatrentionro rhe clangerfrom the Islamic
right in Egypt, relying insteadon assurancesfrom thc Egyptiansrhar
it was under control. By the tirnc Sadat w:rs assassin:rtecl in r9[i r
by membersof a militant Muslinr Brotherhoocloffshoot, a violelrr
Islamistundergroundwas fkrurishing.C)thcrEgyptianofficialswcre
assassinatecl,
touristsmassacrccl,
Clhristiarrs
attacked,and sccularEgyp-
tian intellectuals
rnurdcredor silencecl.
Once again,I-gyptwor,rldbe the Muslim Brorherhood'schief brrsc
of opcraticlns.

S,qonr [JNcAGr,]s rrrE Bno'r'HERS

No onc was lrlorecloselyconnccfedto Anwar Saclat's rcconstructlon

of Egyptianpoliticsthan KanralAclham,thc chiefof Saudiintelligcnce
.
Adham, sccrctlyworking thc back chirnnclsto l-lerrryKissinger,U.S.
sccretaryof stirteanclnatir-rnalsecurityaclviser,was busily settir-rg
thc
sttrgefor Amcrica'sCold War empire in the Micldle lrirst.
Even beforc Nasser'sdeath, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, ancl other
wealthyCltrlfstateshad steppcdin after lrgypt'sdefeirtin t967, ctfler
ing promisesof financial aicl to the battcred counrry tS i1 wily of
strengtheningpolitical ties. Saudi Arabia cluierlybeganto back thr
Ilrotherhooc'lin F.gypt.Thc Muslim Brotherhood hlamed Nasser'.
allegedlack of piety and suppression of Islirmfor the reverses
sufferc.l
in thc war, and they beganagitatingilgainstNasscr."The Saudicirrr-
paign made itself felt at a time of studentunrestin Cairo in the sum-
mer of t96c1,"wrote ReinhardSchulze."For the first tinc in yeilrs.
oppositionistsopenlyappearedas'Muslirn Brothcrs'and demanded.r
more definitefight againstleft-wingand communistactivities."a
After Nasser died, Faisal mainrained a lingering suspicion oi
Sadat, but Adham worked hard to convincethe king, ever on thc
lookout for Zionist-Bolshevikconspiracies,that Sadat was nor
anotherNasser.Adham had closetiesto both Faisaland Sadat.As th.
brother of Faisal'swife Iffat, the spy chief led a group of senior advis-
ers who argued that Sadat'smembershipin the Muslim Brotherhoo.l
 The .\r'rcerer'sApltrent ice r5r

t: . t nd rh e indicated,at the very least,a "right-wing temperament." t At the same

-.: I slami c time, the wily Adham had businesstiesto Sadat,recognizingthat the
: : - :. nSt h a t L,gyptianpresidenthad a taste for the finer things in life and letting
: :r rgllt Sadatknow that SaudiArabia could provide them. In the r96os, the
.: ,,iolent chiefhad formed a seriesof profitablejoint business
Saudiintelligence
- . 1. \ We fe vcntureswith Anwar Sadat'swife, Jihan, giving rhe new Egyptian
- . r :'F - e yp - lc:rdcra personalstakcin bettertiesbetweerrCairo and Riyadh.6King
FaisaldesignatedAdham as his go-between,and lessthirn a monrh
I brtse after Nasserdied, Faisalsent Adham to Clairo.Apparently,Adham
arrived not only with promiscsof Saudi aid, but also with a secrct
American assurancethat Washingtonwould help F.gyptget irs land
back from Israel,if Sadatwould only break with Moscow anclorder
the withdrawal of the Sovietforcesfrorr-rF.gypt.7
By early r 97 r, Adharn hacl becomea ubiquitousprescncein thc
-. .l: -L lCt lOl - l
Egyptiancapitrrl.Moharr-rmed Flcikal, the pro-N:rsserjournalistand
:r .lqCn Ce . <>fAl Abram, who was appointednrinisterof information in
eclit<rr
-
-L,r'.LI.S. rc;7o but resigneclfrr,ru govc'nrmcl'ltin tL)74over differenceswith
- - - rr
' , r, r . '.r h n
, 5. Sirdirt,obscrvccl,"This was not somcthingto reassurethe Russians."s
Not only was Adham itctingas rln intcrmediaryfor Faisal,but he was
: . 1 ()t h e r also secretlyworkins as a concluitfor corrnrLllticfttions
bctweenSadat
- - . of f er- irrrd Kissingcr.e[n his mcmoirs, Kissingerclcscrilrcs
the conncction,
-'r \\ a \, ()f noting that thc Saudirole allowcd Sadatand Nixon to stay in touch
:. 1. k rh c while "bypassingboth foreign nrinistrics.'r0Ar rhe rir-ne,the Llnitccl
\ .rsser's Statcshad uo embassyin Cairo; Irgy;rt,likc most Arab courrtrics,hacl
. . -rfierecl diplornaticrelationswith tlre UniteclStatcsafter the rc167war.
lrr<rken
!.tttt- SaudiArabia had not. So in effect,SaudiArabiir was the broker for
I i: ' : t llf l - relationsin the crrly t97os.
U.S.-Egyptian
: ' \ 'f a rs, In May r97r, Sadattook the first stepin consolidatingpower and
:--'. : lr leda purging the governmcntof its Nasserists.Claiming to have evidence
of a plot to assassinate
him by Nasser-eraoflicials,whom Sadatcalled
Lt()n of "Soviet agcnts," Sadat struck. Joined by Ashraf Marwaln, a wily
:: , r t l th e Egyptian bureaucrat who was a closc friend of Adharn's, Sadat
'. '. . 1\ I'lO t
of the National Assembly,the war minister,the
arrestedthc spezrker
-::..\s the information minister,the rninisterof presidentialaffairs,membcrsof
: rclvis- the ClentralCornmittee,and other senior officials, whose "inane
:: -.fr h O O d socialistslogans"were "at variancc... with our religior-rs
faith."ll
 r52 . f)l ,vtl 's Gavn

Revolution." A year later, coordinating

Sadat called it "the Secor-rd
with Adharn, Sadatordered the expulsion of Sovietforces.
"Kamal Adham persuadedSadat to kick the Russiansout of
I-gypt," says the CIA's Raymond Close, who worked closely with
Adham.r2Sadat,of course,was alre:rdypredisposedto do so. But
Adham offeredcashanclIslamistbacking.
On Sadat'sinvitation,arrdwith Kamal Adham'sand King Faisal's
support, kcy membcrsof the cxiled MLrslimBrotherhoodleadership
bcgan returning to Egypt. ln addition, after r97t Saclatfreed large
numbers of Brothcrhoocl;rrisoncrs.Many of thern were angry illrcl
evenmore committedto violenceand secrefiveunclergr<tund organiz-
ing, and irnrnediatelyclisappeared to build their rnovetncnt.C)thers,
particulirrlythosc of the oldcr llerleration,sought to estrrblishthem-
sclvcsas ovcrt alliesof the new L,gyptianpresicient. Otnar Tclmrssatli,
frced in r 97 r , was a lawyer irnd future editor ctfTbe Call, the Muslim
Brotherhood'sjournal, who would eventuallybecomcthe orgatttza-
tion's suprcrneguide. Upon his release,hc went dircctly to Sirdat's
presidentialpalaceto inscribehis thanks, aloug with those of other
members of the Muslim Brotherhood,in the public registry.ri

Th c I slanri c ( )rtrrtmuni I1'

Throughout thc decade,thc Muslim Brotherhoodmetastasized and

divided into variousfactionsand competingcurrents.On thc surface
at least,the old guard irppearcdto put a premium on modcntion.
Many of the older Muslim Brothcrhoodofficialswho'cl fled to Saudi
Arabia returnedto Egypt as prosperousand well-connected business-
men. In contrast, fiery younger members, especiallythose <tn cant-
puses,spun off mini-Muslim Brotherhoodclubs and organizatlons.
Thesegroups,with the full supportof Sadatand the Egyptiansecurity
and intelligence services,proliferated rapidly. Soon they became
known as the Islamic Community.14BecauseSadat did not formally
legalizethe Muslim Brotherhood organization,the movement spread
willy-nilly, with no central leadership.
For the Egyptian leader,supporting the growth of these proto-
Islamic Community groups on campuseswas merely one more way of
 TheSorcerer'sApprentice . r5l

' i . : 1.1 Il n g
using Islam to consolidatehis power. "To escapeliving in Nasser's
shadow, Sadat shifted gears and made strong appeals to Islam,"
i.)ut of accordingto John Esposito.He added:
. '. rvith
.,,. But Sadatassumed the title of rheBeliever-President,
an allusionto the
Islamiccaliph'stitled Commanderof the Faithful.He beganand
endedhis speeches with versesfrom the Quran.TV broadcasts fre-
: Feisal's
l, . r'rh i n
quently featuredhim in a mosque,cameraszeroing in on his
'
prominentprayermark, a calluscausedby touchingthe forehead
:;i lrrrge
to the groundin prayer.l5
i:\' and
"
:qt nlz - Islamic Community studentgangsreceivedbehind-the-scerles sup-
\ ) t hers, port from sadat'ssecretpolice. "After December 1972 the fortunesof
.. r thc m- the Islamist studentstook a turn for the better," wrote Kepel. ..They
'. '.:
- 1 \ \.tlt l,
finally found the key to success:discreet,tactical collaboration with
\ l L r slim the regime to break the left's domination of the campuses.,'16 Like
: j. l l r i zll- Islamistgroups everywhere,they usedheavy-handedtactics,violence.
>.rclat's trnd intimidation againsttheir opponents,and they often had signifi-
: other cant financial backing from Saudi Arabia and from right-wing Egyp-
tian businessmen."The'jama'at islamiyya [Islamic Communityl were
Islamist student associationsthat becamethe dominant f,rce on
Egyptian university campuses during Sadat's presidency," wrote
Kepel."They constitutedthe Islamistmovement'sonly genuinemass
-..i'tl rrncl organizaticrns."
Soon chantsof "Democracy!" clashcdwjth "Allahu
-. urfacc Akbar!" in student demonstrations.A few years later, the Islamic
l:-l- . l t l O i l . community groups had virtually seizedcontrol of universiriesi'
: , 5 lt ud i Egypt and forced the left-wing groups into hiding.l7
t -. . ilt es s- One of Sadat'saides played a critical role in gerting the lslamic
:l ci l nl- Community up and running. Mohammed Uthman Ismail, a former
: ;a. t t l ()n s . lawyer,had in r97r worked closelywith the Egyptianpresidentas he
.- - ! ...
u l rty+. ,
-l
outmaneuveredand then locked up his opponentson the left. Ismail is
f icl't ITle "consideredto have acted as the godfather of the jama'at islamryyd,
: )rntally in Cairo from late r97r and throughout Middle Egypt beginning in
.: rpread r973."t8 ln t973,Ismail was appointedgovernor of Asyut, long a
stronghold of the Islamists,from which post he continued ro ur€ie
p roto- the lslamic Community groups to "fight against the communists.,'
u 'av o f Reminiscentof the early days of the Muslim Brotherhood, when the
 154 D rvrl ' s Gaue

muscular Rovers and the terrorist SecretApparatus grew out of ath-

letic camps for boys and young men, the r97os-eraIslamic Commu-
nity organizedgovernment-sponsored summer camps. The first one
was held at Cairo Universityin r973, where Sadatsent a high govern-
ment officialto signalthe regime'ssupport. The campswere held with
increasing frequency over the next several years. In 1974 Sadat
reorganizedthe rules governingthe Egyptian StudentUnion, to allow
the Islamic Community to take over thar important institution. One
governmentdccreedeclaredthat henceforththe chief purpose of the
Student Union would be "to deepenreligious values among the stu-
dents." The takeover of the StudentUnion would be only the first of
many: professionalassociationsof doctors, lawyers, engineers,and
other guilds would soon fall, too, and, of course,the redoubt of Al
Azhar would be captured by the right once again, ending the role it
had been dgveloping as a more balanced, and non-fundamentalist,
Islamic center. In t971, the Muslim 'World League, that powerful
instrument of Saudi lslamization efforts, concluded a pact with Al
Azhar, pulling that venerableinstitution into the orbit of the Wah-
habis.reThat same year,Sadat also createdthe post of deputy prime
minister for religious affairs and establisheda SupremeCommittee
for Introducing LegislationAccording to the Sharia. Islamistsintro-
duced bills in the National Assembly to prohibit alcohol, to use
sharia-basedpunishments,and for mandatory teachingof religion in
schools.20
An astuteobserverof that period, Abdel Moneim Said,director of
Egypt'sAI Ahram Center for Political and StrategicStudies,saysthat
the influenceof SaudiArabia in Egypt during the early r97os was per-
vasive.Many Egyptianswent to work in Saudi Arabia, and returned
having imbibed conservative,'WahhabitheologS he says.Saudi Ara-
bia also lavishly funded Egyptian institutions, desperatefor funding.
"It moved Al Azhar to the right, and to publish extremelyconserva-
tive views. Many Saudi Arabian NGOs donated money to Egyptian
mosques,and that was also moving them to the right," says Said.
"And many Egyptian journalists were on the Saudi payroll, secretly,
of course."
According to Said,the Saudiinfluencealso had an effecton Egyptian
 TheSorcerer'sApprentice . rs5

1aw. "Egyptian judicial thinking changed-from the rgzos ro rhe

r96os it was so moderate,enlightened,"he says."But by the r97os,
thosewho'd been to the Gulf started coming back and brought with
them a narrow-minded interpretation of the law. Egyptian percep-
tions of SaudiArabia were changing,too. SaudiArabia always feared
rhe impact of Egypt on Saudi Arabia, but now ir was working in
reverse.Habits began to change,ways of thinking about life, about
separationof malesand females,"he says.21

The Ramadan War

In October r973, Anwar Sadatlauncheda surpriseattack, coordi-

nated with Syria, on Israeli-occupiedEgyptian and Syrian territory. It
turned out to be an abjectmilitary failure,but a resoundingpolitical
success.And, becauseit was laden with Muslim themesand begun
during Ramadan, the holiest month in the Islamic calendar,the war
ratchetedup the level of Islamist fervor in Egypt.
After some initial battlefield victories, during which Egyptian
troops crossedthe SuezCanal and advancedagainst Israeli forccs in
the Sinai peninsula,Egypt sufferedmassivereverseswhen Israel's
Ariel Sharon struck back. The lsraelissurroundedand cut off an
J5C entireEgyptianarmy on the westernsideof the canal,prccipitatinga
,:1 I I'I
U.S.-USSR confrontation,a worldwide nuclearalerr,and a crisisthat
was perhaps the closestthe world came to Armageddon during the
CloldWar-
But for Sadatthc war had important consequences.
First, it led t<r
an engagementwith the United Statesto arrange the ceasc-fireand
then the disengagementagreements, which cemented the U.S.-
Egyptian allianceof the t97os. Second,it confirmed the ties berwecn
Egypt and SaudiArabia, which led to the Arab oil embargoc>fr977-
74. With its newfound, Croesus-likeriches from the OPEC price
increasesof those years,Saudi Arabia suddenlyfound itself with vir-
tually unlimited resourcesto advancethe cause of Xfahhabi funda-
mentalism.And third, the r973 Arab-Israeliwar burnishedSadat's
Islamic credentialsand bolsteredthe ability of the believer-president
to cloak himselfin the garb of a Muslim holy man fighting a holy war.
 rs(\ . D t v t t 'r (in.ur

" \trl -' .

In many ways, the t973 war marks the rebirth of the Islamistmove-
ment. Egypt referredto the October war as the "War of Ramadan," I l l l l i ( )::
I
the Muslim holy month. Its troops were indoctrinatedfor thc battle \\,l\ l.

rl ' .
with lslamic pcp talks about liberatingthe Al Aqsa Mosque in .feru- .:.

salem. "\rVhen F,gyptiantroops crossedthe canal," says Hcrmann

F.ilts,the U.S.ambassador,"they were shouting'Allahu Akbar."')) I
the rc)73 war was designedto ervcngethe t967
Syrnb<rlically,
defeert. markedthe failurc of
That war, impliedSadat'spropagandists,
Nasserismand Arab socialisrrr. had long decriedthe r.)67
Thc iman-rs
defcatas one brought on by Nasser'slack of piety and his clispirr:rgc-
ment of lslam. In contrirst,and to raily the support of the Islarnic
right, Sadatportrayedthe mythicaltriumph of the t973 war as ir sign
of Islam's power. Dcspitc thc f:rct that thc Ran'radanWar hacl not
dcfcatecllsrael,and clespite
the fact that Egyptnearlysuffercdthc c:rt-
astrophicloss qf an entire army, the ligyptian crossingof thc Sucz
Canal was touted as a lanclmarkevent.l)esperatefor a victory,con-
scrvativeMuslirns worlclwide compared thc Ramadan \7ar to the
great military victoriesof lslarn'sflrst centuries,whcn Muslirn rule
wirs cxtendedto ClentralAsia anclSpainanclits irrmieshammeredat
the gatcs of F-ranceand Austria. It's safe to siry that Sadat clicln't
expcctto conquerIsrael,or evcnto liberatcthe Sinai.Saclat's war was
plannedas a "limited" war, with strictlypoliticalnrotivations.To this
day,it's unknown whctheror not someU.S.officialsdeliberatclypkrt-
tcd with Sirdat,or at leirsttoleratcdhis saber-rattling,in order to com-
plctethe Cold War rcorientationof Egypt-at IsraeI's expense.\X/hatis
certain,however,is that the CIA was fully awareclf Sadat'swar plans,
and so was KamalAdharn,the Saudiintelligence
chief.Indeed,months
beforethe war was launched,Adham and the Saudiintelligenceservice
outlined for the CIA the plan for the Ramadan \War,
including Saudi
Arabia's decisionto usethe so-calledoil weapon, and the CIA station
in SaudiArabia dutifully reportedall this to Washington.2:l
Martha Kessler,one of the CIlt's most perceptiveanalystsof politi-
cal Islam,saysthat the war marked a turning point. "The r973 Arab-
Israeli war was fought under the banner of Islam, and that period
marks the seriousdisillusionmentin the Arab world with European
ideas, including communism, Baathism, and Nasserism," she says.

. r ::t rst lTlove-
- J i, a1. , l^ -
. \ - l lI l.lUA llt
- - rhe battle
.-- r; in Ieru-
... Hermann
' r r')l
' : .'. he
:: . f lil u rc o f
: .. : t he r 9 6 7
- . .lr sp i rra g c-
: : rc Isl i l mi c
, ,., r : . r s a si g n
" .'.
: : ' hl tcl n o t
' -: - : ! l th c crl t-
. : t hc Su cz
. c olt -
-I()fv r
-'i\.rr to the
\1 rslinr rulc
-,.:-'rnrcrecl
at
-.-,.1.rtclicln't
- - : : \ \\' llf W aS
:: : r\ . T<l th i s
:: : '. rt e l vp l o t-
-.lcr to colT)-
' : :r .c . Wh a t i s
:: . \ \ ilf p l a n s,
.: : r ' . i. l-tt<l n ths
. -: ll cC S erViCe
, .:JrngSaudi
: t I.\ station
' .:. ol politi-
: r 9-.1Arab-
- -1 .
't
: r r L. rl ro p e a n
:-. " s h c sa ys.
'fhe Sorcerer'sApprentice . r 57
"None of theseideas were very inspired in the first place, and more
" important, weren't working. So the idea to base that war on Islam
\\:ASvery intentional:units were renamed,call signalschanged,and so
on, all to reflectIslamic themes.I mark the rise of political Islam, at
Ieastf<rrthis cycle,with the wal"24
But the return of political Islam to Egypt proved double-edged.
r9 6 7 LJnderneaththe piety, conservativedress, and sharia-stylejuridical
unbeknownsteither to Sadator to the CIA, dangerousnew
rr.rlings,
forceswere gatheringmomentum.
Thc Qutb Factor
Toward the end of the rc)7os,and especiallyafter Sardat rnadehis trip
to .ferusalemancl began talking to lsrael, the Islarlic right became
incrcasinglyradicalizcdand many of them movedinto outright oppo-
sitionto Sadirt-or plotteclsecretly.
Vhile backingthe Islamistsmight
havcsccmedlikc a cleverideato Sadatat thc time, it was too cleverby
hrrlf. Evcn as thc rnilitantsof H,gypt'sIslamic C)ommurritybattered
\rrclat'spolitrcalrivalson thc left, they fell increasingly
underthe spell
of raclical,irrdependent new inramswho preachednot only art anti-
corrrnunistmcssrlge) rn onc.
but an anti-Weste
The first inkling that sonrethingmight bc wrong came as early as
r974, whcn a gan!lof lslarnists,mostly lrgyptiansbut leclby a Pales-
rinian, sparkcdir bloody uprisingat thc military'sTechr-rical
College,
itn cventthat was supposedto have led to the assassination
of Sadat.
\lany werc killccl,and more arrcstecl, irnd Sadatofficiallyblamedthe
revolt on l.ibya. Its leader,Salih SirriyA,was from a small town near
Haifa, Isracl,which was the birthplaccof the founder of the Islamic
I-ibcrationParty,a far-rightgroup dcdicatedto restoringthe lslamic
and which had closetiesto Said Itamaclananclthe Muslim
crrliphrrte,
Brotherhood.Sirriyawas, most likely,an adherentof the Liberation
Accorclingto GillesKepcl,
I'rrrty.25
'l'\. ^ r i', 'rl,u
,1 Si rri y a l i v e d i n J o rdan unti l T9Zo. H e then spenta yei rri n l raq, br" rt
linally had to flee Baghdad, where he was sentencedin :rbsentiain
r 97 z f ctrnrembershil-r in the party. He then moved to Cairo. \Vhen
 r5ll . Drvrr.'s (l,l,r,rr-.

he arrivedin CairoSirrryabeganfrequenting the Muslim Brerhren,

especiallySupremeGuide Hudaybiand Zaynabal-Ghazali, the
rl()vement's He
ltassirnaria. won her confidence and had regular
discussionswith hcr.2.'

Accorclingto Said,when lrgyptianinvestigators examinedthe events

at thc college,they found disturbingsignsof profound, underlying
slriftsarnong the cadets."\7hen they did a revicw," he says, ..rhcy
for-rndthingshad becnchangingar rhc Technicillc'llegc: rnuchmore
praying,separirtionof groups,signsof extremism."BLltso intent was
Sadat .n r'obilizirg Islamic fcrvor that .cirher L,gypt'srntelligence
scrviccnor the olA pickcd r-rpon the rrcnd.lT"Thc lcaderof thc Mus-
Iim Brotherhoodat thc time w:ls 2rmiln namcd Telmassani, who had
becn in jail, wh'm Sadathad frccd, and frecd on rhe undersr:rncling
thilt thcy wo"uld-well, let me Llsethe ternt 'behave,"' si.lysllilts. ,.And
thcy did. occasio.ally thcre w'r-rldbe an articlein one of the Muslim
IlrotherhoodpLrblications thar would criticizcthe government,irnd ir
woulclbe closecifor a month, and Sadatfelt that the questionof con-
trcllling the reemergence
of the Muslim Brotherhoodorganization
was no grcat problcrn."28
But while the.fficial Muslim Brorherhoocl
rcmainedostensibly
doc-
ile, the undergr'ur.rdir.d stude.t-basedIsla''ricc,mmunity groupsand
offshootswcre preparir-rg for war. C)verthe next ycars,thesemilitants
woulcl patientlybuild thcir forcesin lrgypt, occasionallyengagingin
spectacularviolenceor assassinations. "Many Islamistsbcganto live
alone, to go out to the desert,to build thcir movemcnt," saysSaid.
"Iigyptian intelligence misseclit."le In rrl77,lslamictcrroristsassassi-
nated the L,gyptianminister of religious endowmcnts, and began tcr
face repressionand arrest, yet they continued to proliferate. When
SadatstunnedEgypt by goingro Jerusalemin t977 ro seeka dealwith
Menachem Begin, the lsraeli prirne minisrer, Irgypt's lslamists-
including the Brothers and the Islamic Community gangs-would
move toward evenmore militant oppositron.
Many of Egypt's Islamic radicals were followers of Sayyid eutb,
who was hanged by Nasserin t966. During the r96os, eutb had
deveioped a radical theory that compared Muslims who did not
 The Sorcerer'sApltrentice . r59

I --.1..o.
follow the ultra-orthodox views he espousedto the barbariannomads
,-. 1 , l . t h e
of Arabia who existedin a state of "ignorance" before the arrival of
i: r' g u l a r
the prophet. Qutb and his followers used this theory as a justifica-
tion for assassinationof Arab leaderswho were lessthan devout.
Aithough Qutb's theorieswere confusedand inconsistent,some\West-
;: :ire events hailedhim as a thoughtfulcritic of secularismin the
ern C)rientalists
.. .:nderlying Middle East.It was Qutb, and his book, Signposts,that inspiredthe
: .,tvs, "they most radical(and the most violent)EgyptianIslamists,mosrlyoutside
: ':uch more the purview of both Egyptianintelligenceand the CIA.
. ] l t t e nt was
Accordingto F.ilts,Sadatfailed to seeany dangerin encouraging
,:rtclligence radical-rightIslamicgroups,but someothersin his imrnediatecircle
' : the Mus-
did, includinghis wifc,.fihan. "Sadat,who haclbeen,aftcr all, ir Mus-
:: :. ri'ho had lim Brother earlier,tclok the view that the growirrginflucnceof Islam
:i rstanding and thc Muslim Brotherhood,cspeciallyin thc universities,wASno
. i-.rlts.
"And
more than young people erprcssingtheir views," says F-ilts.BLrthe
: ::-,r-\{uslim adds:"I rcmcmbcrmany people,includinghis wifc, sirying,'Ytruhave
. : l- L'l l [t ilnd it
to watch thesepeople,'and sayingthat they are clangcrolls,and hc
. : t , )n o f co n -
would just wave his hanc'land say,'Oh, they arc just young pcoplc.'
: : . 1lt iz a ti o n He simply did r-rotbclievethat their intcrestin religionand the Mus-
lim Brotherhoodrepresentecl a threat,and l-rccould not hc persuaded
' : :: r . ibl y d o c- by someof his rlinisfersthat they werc."r0
-. :r()Llp sa n d
So, too, few U.S. diplomatsor CllA officerstruly understoodthc
:> r nrili ta n ts ..1epth
of thc Mrrslim Brotherh,,otl'spcnctrilti()n.,f l-gyptiensocietyirr
: : rq. lg i n g i n the late r97os, nor dicl thcy grasp the fuz'zyrelationshipanrongthc
:: j .lI l to l i ve officialMuslim Brotherhood,thc lslamicOomrnunity,:rnclthe undcr-
. .. r vs Sa i d .
ground groups and followersof Qutb. Irilts,along with Li.S.intelli-
:: . t \ ils sttssi - gence officers in Egypt, observedthe Islamicizationof Egypt, hut
: .1 bcgan to found it hard to read. After all, Sadat wirs enc()ur.rging
it, irnclthc
:.rre.When Egyptian leaderseemedto bclicvethat it was both useful and Lrlti-
. - r t iea l wi th matelyharmless."There was an awarencssthat somc elenrents of thc
l .lr t mi sts- religiousmovementwcre troublesome,"says tilts. "l took the r.iew
:: -WOU l d that it was somethingthat had to be watchcd carefully." But Flilts
believedthat the Egyptiang()venrrcnt cor"rldcontrol thc phenorne-
,:' r id Qutb, non, and that the more establishcd,
conservative
leadersof the N'Ius-
. Qutb had lim Brotherhood,such as Telmassani,were avcrscto violent tilctlcs
: ) did not and militant actions."Telmassanidenouncedlthe radicalsl,but did
 r6o D rvrr-' s Gar,ru

he mean it?" asks Eilts, rhetorically.The ambassadorbelievedthat

there was an overlap betweenthe Muslin-rBrotherhoodleadership
and the militants, but he could.'t be sure. "lt was hard to tell," he
says."So one had to rely to someextenton the ;udgmc't of the presi-
dent,and the ministcrs."3 |
The clA hardly faredbetter.A seniorcIA officialwho spcnrrnany
years in the Middle East, including severalyears i' cair. in the
rg7os, saysthat someof Egypt'sown intelligencepeoplewarned him
not to underestimatcthe clangerfrom the Islamists."l had a good
friend, a senior l]gyptian intelligenceofficer,who once told rlc: 'yor-r
peoplehaveg.t to understandthe power of the mosque.\wc irreg,i'g
to losecontrol, and peoplewill believe<lnlyin the mrsclr-rc."'12
Kathy
christis.n, wh. j'ined the cIA i, r97 r and he,ded thc crAs E.eypt
deskfr<rm1977to rc)77,s'<lys that the p.tential dangerof lslzr.ris' in
Bgypt cl-rringth'se years wasn't s'mething tl-ratthe agcncy worricd
about. "I'd heardirboutthc Muslim Rrrxhcrhoocl. of course.but fhcre
was very littlc emphasison Islarn," she says. "It was very casy ro
ignoreIslarnat the timc."rl There is no questionthat r.rnrajor reirsoll
why the Islarnicright in Egyptwas ignoreclis becauseAnrericanintcl-
ligenceancipolicy officialshad for decadesseenfir rr view lsla'risnr as
an anti-S<tviet
force.
Irilts saysthat during his tenurc as a'rbassador,fr'm t974-'wr-ten
Flgyptand the united Statesrcestablished cliplomaticries-untir ,,)79,
it was difficult for thc embassyand the clrA to meet with or'rherwise
contactthc Islamists,especially thoscwho were now startingto adclpt
explicitly anti-governmentpositions."The
llovernmenttook a dim
view of open contacts between the United Statcs and opposition
forces,on the grounds that it would encouragcthe opposition forces
to believethat they were supported by the United Srares,"saysEilts.
"So one had to handle these things very carefully, meeting these
people at receptionsgiven by others." During Kissinger'sshuttle
diplomacy in the wake of the t973 Arab-Israeli\Var, Eilts says,the
U'ited Statespromised Sadat that the crA would not act clandes-
tinely against Egypt. "So rhar limited the intelligencerhat we could
get," he adds. "You can talk about covert contacts
fwith Islamistsl,
but it's a little hard to get them arranged."34

::lreved that
* leadership
: :o tell," he
: ,i the presi-
\ n L - l lt many
..rrro in the
,,.rrned him
'r.r.i a good
.i n'tc:'You
'.'.
r .rrcgoing
,. "r1 Kathy
. I.\'s Egypt
- I.ienrismin
: . r n,Orricd
'.- . I'ut therc
, r '\' CllS y t O
' - . i,( rl ' l-c 1' ls on
: : ieru t i n tel -
j. ilnr i srn a s
- - --1-when
- . . nt t l | 9 7 g ,
: ot hcrwi se
' : :r q t o a cl o p t
:: 'okadi rn
: ,1. '1'r<tsi tion
. . : Lon fo rce s
.. ' .. t vs l ti l ts.
r': r ' t ing th e se
:: r r 's s h u ttl e
., . : . s lt V S,th e
. .. -r clrrn d e s-
'..:.:\\'c cOuld
:: ls l: r mi stsl ,
The Sorcerer'sApprentice . t 6r
Besides,the CIA wasn't exactly well equipped to go hobnobbing
with bearded,radical Egyptian imams and violence-orientedIslamic
Community activists.Reflectinga problem that has plaguedthe CIA
for decades,the agency lacked the requisiteskills: few non-Western
caseofficers,few fluent Arabic speakers,few peoplewith credentials
in Islamic history and culture. One CIA officer who served in the
Middle East,and who did not want his name used,tellsan illustrative
story of one doomed effort to grapplewith Islamism."I remember
sceingthis litde office, run by this red-headedofficer, who told me
that his office was in chargeof 'penetratingfundamentalistIslam,"'
he says,laughing."And I rememberthinking, Don't givc me a red-
headedIrishrnanto go out and 'penctrate'Islam. It rcqr-rires
argreat
dealof pl;rnnirrg
and and
strategy understanding.
I don't think thereis
:r tougher intelligenceproblem to deaI with, unlessyou're a Muslim
and you can go to the nosqlle and talk to thesepeopleirnd get your
handsaround the problem.And we didn't do it."rt
For the lslarnicright, the ]97os was a decadeof transition.Thc
sort of Islanricfundamentalismthat the Unitccl Statcshad known
sincethe end of World \flar II still cxisted-and still existstoday.But
:rlongsidcit, a new ancl rnore virulent strlin was tarkirrgshape.In
Egypt, it took the form of the lslamic (lommunitv's raclicals,wh<r
later formcd the corc of fslamic.fihacl,led by Ayman al-Zawahiri,Al
Qacda'snumbcr two leader.In Iran, it wrrs rc1'rresenterlhy the ultra-
who formeclthc radicalwing of Aya-
militant Shiitefr-rndamentalists
tollah Khomeini'smovement.And in SaudiArabiir,the austeredesert
home of thc Wahhabi,it gaveriscto C)samabin l-adenand his follow-
ers, who considcredeven Saudi Arabia's orthodor clergy false and
impiousMuslin-rprctcnders.
The Statc Departmcnt and thc CIA failed to pick Lrpon the trirn-
substantiationof the Islamic right in the r97os. Instead,they sirw
what they wantedto sec:a politicalIslamthat was conservativc,anti-
communist,and contentto busy itself with the finer points of sharia
as interpretedby its beardedscholars.A handful of Americanspecial-
ists on Islam and the Middle East arguedthat the Islamic right was
not only anti-communist but anti-democratic, anti-\il/estern,and
prone to violence,but in the late r97os that was a minority vrew.
 t6z D E vrr' s Geue

Even after the stunning eventsof the next severalyears-the revolu- led:.,
tion in lran, the seizureof the Grand Mosque in Mecca,sadat'sassas- E^, ^-
sination, Hezbollah'struck bomb in Lebanon that killed zar U.s.
Marines-the Islamic right was still viewed as an ally. above all
dur_ fr e c - :
ing the Afghan 1ihad. , - .- - 1T
t\11,.

Part of rhe reasonwhy Islamismcontinued to have appearin the qLtl ,\

West was the rise of Islamiceconomicsin the 1c17os. Many of the verv
same militants whose acolytesengagedin terrorism also wore surts. I f !:- .

built busi'esscs,f.unded banks, and appearedt' all the world to bc BL: . . :

nothing more tha' prosperous,if pious,citizens.yet the businesses
and
banksgeneratedborh profits and exrremistf<rllowersof thc prophet. , : u. -
-

::-. : ::
The Brotherhood's Bank

Besidespolitics, econrmics played a critical role in rhe spread ,f

Islarnismin Egypt in the r97os.When Sadatcameto power in r97o.
fhe clam'rous vestedinterestsof the pre-Nasserancien r6gime-the
very sameforcesthat the clIA had tried and failed to mobiljzeagainsr
Nasscrin the late r95os-saw an opportunityto restoretheir wealth
and political connecti.ns.Many of rhem, especiallythe semi-feuclal
land.wning families,whose power had been reducedbut not elimi-
nated, rnaintaincd close ties to the Islamic right. Indeed, acrossthc
Middle Easr, from Pakistan and lran to Turkey and Egypt, the big
landowning families and the bazaar,the wealthy merchanr families.
had intimate ties to Islamists.In many cases,they were family tics: a _:
wealthy [andowner,r'tr bazaari, might have a brother or cousin who
was an imam, mullah, or ayatollah.And they worked hand in hand.
The Brotherho.d becamebig supportersof Sadat,splan to expand
free enterprisein Egypt, and they enthusiasticallyjoined in support of
sadat's new economic policy of openness, or infitah. From the out-
side, the inlitah was driven by the austeriry-mindeddemandsof the
International Monetary Fund. During the r96os and r97os, the IIVIF
forced brutalchangesin many Third world economies,as a conditio'
for receivinginternational loans. Theseso-calledconditionalitiesIed
to severeeconomic pain in country after countrp as subsidieswere
eliminated, jobs lost, and industries privatized. often, IMF policies
 The Sorcerer'sA'Drentice ' r63

led regimesinto confrontations with the left and with labor unlons.
Egypt was no exception.The IMF's strict demandsfor austerity and
cutbackswere the direct result of vigorous U.S. efforts to encourage
free-enterpriseeconomicsin the Third'STorld and to combat social-
ism. In Egypt, right-wing Islamistsand conservativebusinessowners
quickly found common cause.
The Call, the magazineof the newly liberatedMuslim Brotherhood,
receivedsubstantialfinancial support from wealthy Egyptian rightists.
Businessescapitalizingon Sadat'sinfitah policy provided the bulk of the
magazine'sadvertising."Out of the total of nearly 180 pagesof color
advertisingin al-Datua lThe Calll, 49 were bought by real-estatepro-
moters and entrepreneurs,5z by chemicaland plasticscompanies,zo by
automobileimporters,rz by'Islamic' banksand investmentcompanies'
and 45 by food companies,"accordingto GillesKepel.Forty percentof
the magazine'sads came from iust three companiescontrolled by Mus-
lim Brotherhoodmemberswho'd madefortunesin SaudiArabia'rn
lnterviewed in an Egyptian weekly, the Muslim Brotherhood'sTel-
massaniwas forced to admit that "most of the commanding leversof
the policy of economicopening(infitah)are now in the handsof former
Muslim Brethrenwho were in exile and havenow returnedto Egypt."17
ln t974, the Muslim Brotherhoodformally issueda declaration
commanding its membersto support Sadat'spro-lMF infitah- Suchan
action was true to form for political Islam. Throughout their history,
Islamistshave always been militantly pro-capitalist,opposing class-
struggle politics on principle. Rarely did they rally support for the
poor, the disenfranchised,or the downtrodden. In Egypt, espccially,
the Islamistsdid not make common causewith aggrievedworkers or
farmerswho failed to benefitfrom Sadat'seconomicpoliciesor whose
livelihoods were thrown into turmoil by the infitah; instead, they
engagedin strikebreaking,enthusiasticallyopposingtrade unions and
intellectualsallied to the left.
The rise of so-calledIslamic banks was central to the Islamization
of Egypt's economy. Organized on the questionableprinciple that
ordinary commercial banks do not operateaccordingto Islamic law,
especiallybecausethat law supposedlydoes not allow interest to be
charged on loans, Islamic banks often disparagedtheir non-Islamic
 t: 64 D e v t t - 's Galrn

comperitorsfor being irreligious,and even,most offensively,for being

.,Jewish.,'They used an insidious tactic to market their servtces.
warning that usersof conventional banks were anti-Islam and were
thus "destinedto go directly to hell."-18
The developmentof an "lslamic economy" in Egypt further encour-
agcd the spreadof political Islam. Members of the Muslim Brother-
hood drew on the financial and businessresourcesof its wealthr
'wealthr
supporrersro srrengrhenits social and political organizing.
membersof the Islamic right and Muslim Brotherhood operarivestrr
financial institutions directed funds to mosques, small businesscs.
friendly media outlets, and other venturesthat bolsteredthe commu-
niry. Bccauserhe Brorhcrhoodoperarcsas a clandesrincfraternitr.
some of this could be done secretly,with a wink and a nod' E'gypt's
Islamicright still drew on Saudisupport,but it was becomingfinan-
cially independent.Says a leading Egyptian analyst, "They created
many businesses and banks, and they had solidarity with each other.
A Muslim Brotherhood member is happy to give half his income tcr
the Muslim Brotherhood."3e
The creatignof the FaisalIslamic Bank of Egypt (FIBE)in t976
reenergizedthe Muslim Brotherhood in that country, in tandem with
Sadat'sefforts to mobilize the Islamic right. The bank was the corner-
stone of an empire of Islamic banks run by Prince Mohammed al-
Faisalof Saudi Arabia, a son of King Faisal,and it played a decisiye
role in the Islamizationof Egypt and the region'
By all accounts' Prince Mohammad was not a member of the
Brorherhood,in keepingwith the policy of the Saudi royal family to
use the organizationas an arm of its foreign policS but to avoid get-
ting too close ro it. The prince tended to rely more on establishment
figures,including Egypt'sgrand mufti, to gain legitimacyfor the bank'
And he won sadar'ssupporr for a speciallaw to charter the FIBE.a
Among the founders of FIBE were former Egyptian prime minister
Abdel Aziz Hriazi. who would move on to become a leader of the
Islamic economicmovement,and uthman Ahmed Uthman, an ultra-
wealthy industrialist known as "the Egyptian Rockefeller" who
played a key part in bankrolling the Muslim Brotherhood's resur-
gence in the rg7os.a1 Influential Muslim Brotherhood members.
 The Sor c er er ' sApPr enti c e ' r65

includingYusuf al-Qaradawi,Abdel-Latif al-Sharif,and YoussefNada

all joined FIBE's early board of directors.a2Each one of these men
rr,ould play a critical role in the growth of Islamismnot only in Egypt
but throughout the region. And each one, in later years,would hover
on the fringes of the most extreme wlng of the Islamist movement.
The most notoriousof FIBE'sfottnderswas the blind Islamicscholar
,rnd rabble-rouserC)marAbdul Rahrnan.Abdul Rahman w:rs "spiri-
tr-raladviscr" to Islamic Jihad, the fundamentalistgrollp whose mt:m-
bers would murder Sadat. Later, Abdul Rahman wotrld help thc
C.IA recruit martyrdom-seekingholy warriors for the anti-Soviet
Afghanistaniihad. He would then imrnigrateto the United States,
rvhcrehe would bc arrestedand convictcclfor his role in the r993
bomLringof New York's World Trade Ccnter.
The FaisalIslamicBank was givcn unprecedented stetcilssistirncc
it guaranteedthat thc
The spcciallaw that iruthorizec'l
rrt its four-rdirrg.
bank could not be nationalized,that it would not be subiectto stan-
clarclstatc banking regulations,that it would bc excmpt frorn tlany
Thc official who
tilxes,and that it could operatc in total secrecy.4l
presentcdthe law to the Egyptianparliamentwas not the econorrlics
endtlwments'"fhe passilgcof thc
nrinisterbut the ministerof religi<ttts
lrrw siriledthough parliarnenthecausceven left-wing dcputieswerc
airaiclto appearto be "votirtg againstAllah."aa
Al-Sharif,who woulclbe lailedby Egypt irrthe r 99os,wlts a ntltori-
ous wheeler-cle aler who traded on his connectionsto rnilitant
From his position at FIBI'I,he becamcinvolvedwitlr the fast-
Islan-rists.
rrnd-loose IslamicMoney ManagemctrtCompanics,which cmcrgcclin
the r9[3osils go-go, frcc-markct investment firms, offcring rates of
return to investorsthat werc significantlyhigherthan thosepr<lfferecl
by trtrditionalbanks.An IMMC typicallyofferedx 2-t perccntrcturn,
cloublethe usualratc at a bank. Orle of thc lirst, and nlost importirnt,
the Al-sharif (iroup, which "had tiesto the Muslim Brothers."a5
r,virs
The IMMCs wcre highly political,and covertlyintervencdto support
Muslirn Brotherhood-linkedcandidatesin Egypt's parliamentary
electi<rns,especiallyin t.)87. The high-flyingIMMC systemshattered
in the late r 9 8os,threateningthe very foundationof the Islamicbank-
ing network, and Faisal'sFIBE in particular."It was rumored that
 166 . D r : v r i . 's Cler,rr-

Pri'ce Mohammed al-Faisalloadedplaneswith billio's ,f U.s.

d.i
lars,with ordersthat they bc sentdirectlyfrom clair' arirp'rt to Faisirl
Bank bra'ches in .rder t. meet the withdrawal demandsof dcp'si-
tors," wrote soliman.a6ln r.)r)1,saleh Kanrel Al-Baraka bouehr
the Al-SharifGroup for g r 7o rrillion. 'f
Yusuf al-Qaradawi,the Egyptian Muslim Ilrotherhrod acivist i.
Qatar,was anorhcrFIBI,fou.der. earadawi is widcly krrw' i' the Aral.
world for his militant, tablc-thurnpingspcc-chcs,which circularcon cr.ls-
settes.He is ir vocrrlsupporterof suicidelrombersagainstIsraelancl,afte
r
thc LJ.s.invasionof Iraq,hc issueclproclanrationsto justifythe nrurcler.f
U.S. civiliilns there. But Qaradawi tones down his cxtrcmist rhetorre
whc'r talking to \westernaudicnces.In zoo4 hc was invited to attcncl
a
B.rkings lnstitufirn-'rganizedirrternation:rlforurn.' Islam.
Perha;lsthc m.rsr irrp'rtant ,f the l.lBE Mrslinr Br'thcrhr..l
f'unders is YoussefNada. Nada, .f the ,rigirar, prc-Nasser.
'ne
mernbersof the Br.therhood,was inrplicatcdin a r
95,1assassinati.n
attempt againsrthe lrgyptian lcadeqand likc SaiclRarnadan.Naclr
cscapedEgypt,flccingt' clerr,ary arcl ther t'Italy. Ar'ng witl-r
Muslim Brrtherh.'cl vuerans, Nada hclped fou'd the lla'k'thcr- Al
T:rqw:r ("l'car'f ciod"), with cc'ters in the Bahamas,rtaly,
antl
switzerla'd. Al Taclwa is secn as the Muslim Br.thcrh.'d's scnri-
offici.l bank. Abclelkadershoheib,a' Egyptia' journalistwho spenr
ycars following Nada, observcs,"lnitially, A.T. Ilank was c.ncei'etl
as ir centrelecononricinstrumentof the Muslim Ilrothcrhood,in p;rr-
ticular its interrational branch." Thc internati.nal bra'ch was l'rq
associatedwith Said Ramaclan,who is the sorr-in-lawof Hass:rnrrl-
Banna, f'under of the MLrslrmBrotherhood ir Ge'eva. and
wh.
f.unded the Islamic cenrer in (ieneva,switzcrla.d. Al Taqwa
u,a,
"directed by YoussefNada," said Shoheib.lTA c.nfidential
list .t
Bank Al Taqwa'sfoundersincluded leadersof the Muslim Brrrher-
hood in Syriaand Tunisia,alongwith yusuf al-earadawi,who Ser\re
ti
as "presidentof A.T.'s office of religiousaffairs."asMany of thosc
connectedto the FIBE-Taqwacircleswould later rurn up in the in'.es-
tigation of Al Qaedaand its allies.In zoor, Nada was designated
br
the U.S.Department of the Treasuryas a terrorist financier.ae
FIBE's connecion to radical Islamistswasn'r the only thing rh.rr
 The Sorcerer'sApprentice . r 67

helpedbring it down in the r 98os.The bank alsoenjoyedan inrimate

rclationshipwith the infamous Bank of Credit and CommerceInter-
n:rtional(BCCI).otherwiseknown as the "Bank of Crooks and Crim-
inals International."BCCI, owned by Pakistaniancl Gulf invesrors,
rr.rsnororiouslyinvolvedirr helpingro finarrcctcrrorism,g,urrrunning.
.irug trafficking, and unadulteratedlinancial chicaneryuntil its spec-
trrcularcollapsein r988. The CIIA was a frequent BCCI customer,
tusingthc bank to deposit U.S. and Saudi funds to finance the
.\tghanistanwar-funcls that suppliedertremistIslarnicmilitantstied
to the rnujahideenthcrc. BClClI,
though not ofliciallyan Islamicbank,
nrrrdecrtensiveuse of Islamichank creclentials, language,and sym-
\When
lrolism. it crashed,invcstigators
found tlrat ll(l(ll had $589 mil-
lion in "unrecordeddcposits,"of which $245 nrillion "belongcd t<r
rhc Faisallslan-ric
Bank of }rgypt."t"
After Sadat'sassrlssinetior.r,
nrany of thc raclicalswho'c'l been
plrrccdin senior positions at FIBE were ousted, including Nadir,
(]araclawi,ancl Al-Sharif. Irgypt'sStatc Sccurity Office spccifically
.rskedPrincc Moharnrred thrrt tlrcy bc removecl.slYet thc clamage
ri'rtscione.PrinceMohar-nmcd'sbank had helpedinstitutionalizethc
Islrrnricrcvival in F.gy1rt,
which fostcrcda violcnt unclergrouncl
of ter-
rorists.l)uring the rgllos r.rnclr99os, this network would resistall
tiforts by thc govcnrmentof Husni Mr-rbar:rk to clismantlcit.
Saclat'sdeath was thc cncl of thc roacl for the believer-presrdent.
P,utby thcrr,Iran wrrsnnclerthe sway of I(homeini'sversior-r
of Islarn,
rhe U.S.-backc lihad
d in Afghanistirnwas in fLrllswing,and Islarnism
hirclbecorncthe c'lefininuideokrgy of activists frorn North Africa to
tleep in Soviet ClentralAsia. This cxfraordinary seriesof devclop-
lrcnfs were uradepossiblcin part by Saclat'sand America'sfevoritc
.rlly, Saudi Arabia. Now awash in tcns of billions of pctrodollars,
thrrnksto thc Ic)7osoil-pricc incrcirscs
irnposedby thc Organizarion
of Petroleun-r
F.xportingOountries,the Saudisusedcold, hard cashto
l''uilda pro-Americanempire of Islamic bilnks and financialinsriru-
tions in Lgypt, Sudan,Kuwait, Turkey, Pakistan,irnd elsewhcrc.It
nirs the marriagebctwcen the Muslinr lJrotherhood'sideologyand
the powcr of Islan-ricbanking that finally catapulteclright-wing
Islamismto worlclwideDower.
 7

THE RISE OF ECONOMIC ISLAM

IN rttE r97 os, politicalIslam was bolsteredlry the explosionof rr

parallel force: economic Islam. Part of thc virst wealth pourirrg into
the Arab oil-exportingcountrics found its way into a network ol
banks and investmentcornpaniescontrolled by the lslarnic right ancl
the Muslim Brctherhood. In country after country, these Islamic
banks did much more than serve as money-changers. Somctimes
openly, sometimes secr:edy,they supported sympathetic politicians
and army officersand funded activistsand political parties,Islamist-
run mediacompanies,and businesses controlledby the Brotherhood.
From r 974 onward, the Islarnic banking systcm servcdas thc finan-
cial backbonefor the Islamic right.
And throughout it all, the Islamic banking system-which went
from zero to global powerhouse in the two decadesafter 1974-
depended heavily on the advice and technological assistancert
receivedfrom a host of American and European institutions. includ-
ing such major banks as Citibank.
To \Testern bank executives,International Monetary Fund offi-
cials,and free-marketideologues,the Islamic banks seemedideal. Thc
Islamic right had long made clear that it preferredcapitalismto athe-
istic communism. None of the important Islamist movements,fronr
 The Riseo{ Economic Islam ' L69

the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to Pakistan'sIslamic Group to the

Shiite fundamentalistsin Iraq, preachedsocial and economic justice.
Instead,they opposedstateownership,land reform, and socialwelfare
programs.
Like the Muslim Brotherhood itself, Islamic banking was born in
Egypt, financed by Saudi Arabia, and then spread to the far corners
of the Muslim world. At first it seemedinnocuous, a free-market-
oriented systemof financial power that professedfealty to the Koran
but deliveredcold, hard cashto its many supporters;soon enough,the
Islamistpoliticaldimensionof lslamic bankingmade itselffelt. Even-
rually,the Islamic banking movementbecamea vehiclenot only for
cxporting political Islam, but for sponsoring violence. Often the
Islamic banks had direct or tacit support from \iTesternbanks and
governments.
At the beginning,the growth of economiclslam seemedto fit per-
fectly with \Tashington'sClold War design for thc Middle East. It
cmergedas a marriagebetweenmilitant economictheoreticians of the
Islarnicright in the Arab world and the technologyand know-how of
leading$Testernbanks,financial institutions,and universities.
se-veral
It beganslowly in the r95os, as Muslim Brotherhoodeconomistsand
rrvo leading Iraqi clergymcn developedthc early prototypes for an
Islamiceconomy.[t gatheredmomentumin the r96os, when a Mus-
financierfoundedthe first lslamicbank. And it took
lrrn Brother:hood
Kuwaiti, and Ar:ab
off in thc rL)7os,with the full support of Sar.rdi,
(iulf potentates,especiallyafter oil pricesquadrupledin r977-74.
PrinceMohammed irl-Faisal,the brother of the Saudiforeign minister,
finally brought it all togetherJcreatingthe first multibillion-dollar net-
rvork of Islamic banks and building a reputationas Islam's"prince of
tithes." Throughout these years, the Islamic banking netwttrk was
organized,staffed,and often controlled by wealthy Muslim Brother-
hood activists,who usedthe banksto financeright-wing politicaltrans-
formationsin lrgypt, Sudan,Kuwait, Pakistan,Turkey,and.fordan.
Economiclslam operatedon two levelsin the r97os. First, Saudi
.\rabia itself,wielding huge dollar surpluses,dangledtheserichesin
front of poverty-strickenMuslim nations such as Egypt, TurkeS Pak-
istan, and Afghanistan, offering aid in exchangefor a pronounced
 r7o . D r , v t r - 's Genap,

political shift to the right. Second,a tightly disciplined network of

Islamic banks set up shop in Cairo, Karachi, Khartoum, and Istanbul.
where they not only becameimportant financial players but quietly'
funded the growth of the Islamic right.
In Egypt, Islamic bankers joined Sadat to support that country's
transition from Arab socialismto Sadat'sinfitah (economicopening)
to restore free-marketpolicies, and in the processthey helped build
the political momentum of the Islamicright. ln Kuwait, the royal fam-
ily invited Muslim Brotherhood-linked bankers to fund a political
forcc against nationalistsand Palestiniansin that tiny oil emiratc. In
Sudan,Jordan, and Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood and right-wing
politicians built financial empireson the foundation of lslamic banks
and used their wealth and connectionsto advancethe causeof the
Islamic right. Often, as in Egypt, they identified their economicpoli-
cieswith economicreforms demandedby the InternationalMonetarv
Fr-rndand by inviting in multinational corporations and foreign
lenders.
Thanks to economicIslam, there was now a direct line from ultra-
wealthy Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Qatari sheikhs,princes,and emirs to
Muslim Brotherhoodbusinessmen and bankersto street-levelthugs of
the lslamic right-all of it fueled by petrodollars.It was a force that
transformedthe Middle East.

Isr-eltrc BeNKS AND THn'Wn,sr

Big banks, oil companies,and U.S. government institutions eagerly

encouragedthe Islamic bankers in the r97os.The ry73 OPEC price
increasesmade the Gulf important not just becauseof its oil wells, but
for its financial clout as well. Vast quantities of U.S. military goods
poured into Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other Gulf countries. Egypt
joined traditional U.S. allies such as Israel and Turkey as outposts of
'Western
influence. And the United Statesand Great Britain began
constructingand expanding air and naval basesand bolsteringfleets
in the Indian Ocean, the Horn of Africa, southern Arabia, and the
easternMediterranean.
 The Riseof Economic Islam ' r7 L

Islamic clerics and medieval-mindedMuslim Brotherhood scrib-

blers didn't get the Islamic banking movementoff the ground on their
own. \Testernbankers,salivating at the prospectof tapping into the
vast stores of petrodollars that were accumulating after OPEC's
r973-74 price increases,did more than play along. The big banks
rvere already major players with Saudi and Arab Gulf conventional
bankers,so when the Islamic banking movement emergedit seemed
too good an opportunity to miss.Major \Westernbanks and financial
pitched in to provide expertise,training, and the latest
ir-rstitutions
banking technologyto facilitatethe explosionof Islamic-rightbank-
ing power.Reassuredby C)rientalistsand academicswho assertedthat
Islam'scommitmentto capitalismwent back to M<thammed,the big
moneyccnterbanksplungedin.
Major participantsincludedCitibank;the Hong Kong and Shang-
hai Banking Corporation; Bankers Trust; ClhaseManhattan; thc
Milton Fricdman;the Interna-
disciplcsof the Univcrsityof CJhicago's
tional Monetary Fund; Price Waterhouse;U.S., British, and Swiss
technicians;the major oil companies;Harvard Univcrsity;and the
Universityof SouthernCalifornia;among others.Creatinga banking
svstcmthat didn't chargeinterest,and yet still could function both
legallyand cfficientlyin the world of global finance,was no mean
trick. It is beyond thc scopeof this book to discussthc theory of
lslrrmic finance, ancl thc mechrrtismsthat rtllowctl nott-intcrcst
"lenclers"to recouptheir "loans" and still make a profit. Sufficeit to
saythat a complcx and multilayeredtheory of cxactlyhow to clojust
that developedin the r97os.l More important, for our story,is how
thesebanks propelledthe growth of political Islam, with the con-
niv:rnceof Westernhankers.
Ibrahim Warde, one of the keencstobserversof the world of
lslamicfinanceconcludes:

The international barrkirlgsystemwas . . . instrumental in thc very

c rc a ti o n o f Is l a m i c b a n k s . The fl edgl i ng Isl ami c banks, l acki ng
experience and resources,had little choice buf to rely on the
e x p e rti s eo f th e i r i n te rn a ti o nalcounterparts.A nd as Isl arl i c banks
gained experience, the world of finance was undergoing major
 t72' Dtrvrr-'s (lnr,rl

transformaticlns.
so ratherthan beingphasedout, the cooperatioll
with \x/esternbanks-in the form of joint vL'nrurcs,
rlrurigement
agreements' tech'icalcooperation and cclrresp<lndenrbar-rkrrrg-
was steppedup, leadingt. increased converllence ancl f'si''
between cclnventionaland Islamicfinance."2

Sorneof the groundbreakingw'rk on the deveroprrenr .f a the.ry

of Islamicbanking,includingh.w to organizea m.dern bank using
non-intercst-bearing
securities,was being drne in pakistan,in l,.r-
d'n, and, in the r 96os,at the Universityof (ihicag., by the ec.nrmisr
Lloyd Metzler.IBy the L97os,when petrr-rslamtr.k they wcre
ready. 'ff,
"citibank, BankersTrust, chase Manhattan, all the Amerrcan
banks at the time werc doing a l't work for the Saucris,
s. when
'f
this Islamicbankingphen.menonstarted,it wirs secnASi'r opporrll-
nity t. d'busincss," sayswardc. "G.ldman sachswas activei'crc-
ating certaintypesof commodity-based productsf'r Islamiclrarks."a
Between r975 and zooo, U.s. institutionssuch as Fannie Mac ancl
FreddieMac did pilot projcctsfor Islarnicmorrgagcs,the U.S.Fecrcral
Reservestartcdlslamic banki'g programs,the wrrrld Bar-rk's Inrerra-
tional Finance (iorpor:rti.n got i.rvolved, and evc' Big oil uscd
Islamic financial instrumentsfor project fir-rancing..,The large wcst-
ern multinationals. . . opencdIslarnicwindows f'r rcceivingdcposits
He'ry. ..TheFrench,
frorn their wealthyGulf clients,"wrote cjlerrrent
led by BanqueNationalede paris. . . j.ined rhe Americanand
Britishpresences, 'rany
headedby citibank and KleinworrhBens.n."t
In fact' Islamic banks set up hcadquartersin L,uropearrd othcr
worldwide money centers.lslamic banki'g "operatesmore out of
London, Genevaor the Bahamasthan it doesout of
-|cddah,Karachi
or cairo," accordingto warde. It hewed closelyto an alliancewith
neoliberaleconomists."ldeologically,both liberalismand economrc
Islam were driven by their common oppositio' to socialismand eco-
nomic dirigisme."6
Islamic finance repeatedly relied on right-wing economists and
Islamist politicians who advocatedthe privatizing, free-markerviews
of the chicago school. "Even Islamic Republics have on occasion
 Tbe Riseof Lconomic Islam . r 71

: : , r. f lo l t openly embracedneo-liberalism,"wrote \X/arde."In Sudan,between

* : t.ll cll t
r99z and the end of 1993, Economics Minister Abdul Rahim
.,,-
Hamdi-a disciple of Milton Friedman and incidentally a former
--l\lOll

Islamic banker in London-did not hesitateto implement the harsh-

est free-market remedies dictated by the International Monetary
Fund. He said he was committed to transforming the heretoforesta-
- -. : .l theory tist economy'accordingto free-marketrules,becausethis is how an
- - ' . 1nk L l si n g
lslamic economy should function."'7 Similarly',the radic:rlAlgerian
.. . , : . in L o n - Islamist moverrrent,which would force that nirtiou it'rtoa ;lrotracted
-: : . on Omi st civil war in the r 99os, openly backccltl-reIntcrnirtionalMonetrlry
-- . . lc V w cre
Fund's harsh prescriptionfor Algeria. "When foundeclin r9[J9,"
wrote Clement l-{cnry,an astute observerof lslamic finance,"the
- , .\rrcricitn clu Salut(FIS)aclvocrrtecl
AlgeriarrFront Islrrrniclue nrarkct refolnrs in
.*.. \() \,Vhen its party prograrr-inclucling :rligningthc clinar lAlgcria'scurrcrrcyl
' ,: , )pportu- irt inferniltion:rlmrrkct r:rtesrrsthe IMF was insistingat fhe 1i111c-
, - : '\ C lll Cf e- irtg."\
lrrd lslrtrnic['tanl<
- - ,l rJItK s . rrl

- Clitibankwrrsa pionccr."(litibank bcc,rtrctlre flrst Vestcrn bank

- \ l.rc and It would continuet() pay
t() set Llpau Islrrnricwitrdow," saysWarclc.'r
,'-.:. Fccleral dividends.ShaukLrtAziz, who scrvcclon tlrc boarclof clirectursol (liti
,: -, . Ilrtcrna- lslilmic IJirnkanclthc (litibank-conttectccl
SaucliArnericarrllrtnk. artcl
: * ()rl usccl who spentthirty vcarsas an Islarnicbattkcr,sct up Clitibank'sIslamic
'- .i:qc \7est-
barrkingprollranrin lJahrain.toAz,iz. risefo bcconrc
w<lrrlrlerverttr-rally
, : tlcposits of financerrnclcc<lnotricrrffrrirsi,i Pekiste'rrntl, irr zoo4,
r-ninister
'...:.'frcnch,
Aziz would he nrrrncciPakistan'sprinre ministcr by l)resiclent
Pervcz
. : ', r-icilIt ilncl Mr"rsharraf.
.r i
: -'-,Jll.
What excited'Westcrnfree-trtirrkctgllruls\vils tl'renotion thrrt b1,its
: i .i r1 ( i ot hcr Islanrwas a capitalistrcligion.Mohanrmed,thc Prophet,was a
r.rature
:' ,t-t Ot-tt 0f traclerwho believedin iree markcts,low
capitalisttrnclprofit-seeking
:.,:r. Karachi taxes,privateenterprise,:rndthe absenceof regulatiol'ts,
and his carly
,: .tnccwith Islan-ric
regimein Mecca obeyed rules that woulcl make a neo-liberal
-,l r!ol l O t I iC economistsmile-or irt leastthat is the portrait paintcd by Islamic
- : : r . rn cle co - fundamentalistsand by free-marketideologuesfrotn the West. It was
a portrait that not only justifiedWesternsupport for thc cconomic
: t rsts a n d projectsof the [slarnicright but providedyet anothermeansto attack
r : ie t vi e w s Arab socialism,state-runeuterprises, and dirigismeas "anti-Islamic."
: - . ()CC ilSiO n Though the idea of drawing upon seventh-century
religioustracts and
 t74 D r : v r t . 's G,q.l,.r

fourteenth-century Islamic economic theories to build a modern eco-

'Western
nomic system might seem laughable, bankers and secular-
m i n d e d Mi d d le Ii ast pol i ti ci ans coul dn' t resi st the l ure of the money
flauntec'lby Muslim Brotherhood financiers.
T h e Is l a m i c Free Market Insti tute, a conservati ve foundati on i n
Vi rg i n i a , i s s ued a papcr cal l ed " l sl am and the Free Market," w hi ch
captures the outlgok perfectly. Citing scores of Koranic verses, IFMI
p ro c l a i m e d th at bei ng a truc Musl i m means opposi ng soci al i sm ,
re s i s ti n g ta x e s, respecti ng pri vate property ri ghts, and obeyi ng the
u n i rl te ra b l e l a w of suppl y and detnand:

^fl.rc(]r-rr'arrexplicitlv recluiresa free market of open trade basedon

c<lnsetrsual,voluntary trattsacti<tns. . . . Ir-rdeed,Islam commands
its followers to go ()ut irrt<lthe markct and eartl their livelihood and
profit,.to support their families and enioy prospenty.. . .
lslam specificallvproviclcsfor private property rights. In con-
lsl:tm enshrir.resprivate property in a sacred
trast to s<tcirrlisrn,
T rr-rs t.Is l a nr rccogni zesc()ntract ri ghts as w el l and the Qur' an
c o tl n trrttds fol l < l w crs to ful fi l l thei r contractual promi ses.
M u h a m tn ird' stcachi ngsal so provi declth:l t pri cesshoul d be deter-
n ' ti n c db y suppl y and cl el nandi n the open marketpl aceand not set
a rb i tra ri l y bv i nterveni ng offi ci al s. Thi s refl ected the l ong-
c s t:rb l i s h ednrerchantbackground of hi s tri be, as w el l as hi s ow n
merchanrtradins .rctivities.. . . lrr his rule of the city of al-Madinah,
M u h rrm m erdexpl rci tl y chtl se not to i mpose any taxes on trade,
nrirking thc city an effectivefrec-tradez.one.. . .
lsl:rrn's thor<lughly free-rnarket ecclnomic policies produced
an cnormolts ccorromic boom it't the lands it governed, as has
always been true evervwhere such policies have been tried. As a
result, while Europe remairredmired in the anti-market feudalism
of the Dark Ages, the Islamic World would become the dominant
t
economic power or.rearth for almost 5oo years.l

The idea that the Koran somehow provides guidance that might be
used to outlaw socialism and to insist upon unfettered private enter-
prise is unfounded, since its strictures are far from explicit and cer-
tainly cannot be applied to modern economic systems. Yet that didn't
 The Rise of Economic lslam ' r 75

: llern eco- stop conservativeWesterneconomistsfrom sayingit did, and it didn't

i:i secular- stop Muslim clergy,including well-known Iraqi and Iranian ayatol-
: ::a money lahs, from issuing legal rulings (or fatwas) to codify such narrow-
minded interpretation.
Graham Fuller,a former CIA officer who headedthe Middle East
-:.i.ltion in
.::. " rvhich deskat the CIA National IntelligenceCouncil in the early r9Sos,later
--:>es.IFMI argued that America's interestsare not incompatible with the rise of
: .,rcialism, fundamentalist Islam.In the mid-r98os,as a CIA official,he authored
^-,'irrc the estimate(NIE) that proposedthat
a controversialnationalintelligence
the United Statesseekcloserrelationswith Iran'sayatollah-ledregime
in order to preventSovietgains,e pJperthet contrihtrte.lro the initra-
: .: . : alo n tive by the Reaganadministration'sOliver North and William Casey
:-.:::'tnds that becameknown as "lran-contra." Fulleq now a prolific author,
r iand has also written extensivelythat the econttmicvision of the lslamic
right is friendly to free-marketadvocates."There is," he wrt)te, "n{)
. : - c<tt t - mainstreamIslamist organization. . . with radical s<lcialvicws."l2
- : - .tc re d Continued Fuller:
' ] . r r'a n
: : : lr se s. itr thc
Islamdoesnot favor,in principlc,heavystetcitltcr','t'rlrion
l: ieter- marketplaceor in the ccononticpr<lfile<tfsttcietv....Strangely,
: :: )t set rernaincluiteambivalentabotrtor evclthostileto s<tcial
Islamists
' rrllo re v o l u ti c l n .l J
'' "r -

1 .. ()\ \ 'l l Islamists strongly opp()se Marxist illtcrpreteti(lt'tsof soci-

i - :- :rnah , e ty .l ' l...l s l a m i s ts are :l mbi val ent ol t the rttl e of the strrtci n rhc
. .: : lde, economy-a disparity between tlreory ancl practicc. . . . (llassical
l s l a mi c th e o ry e nvi sages the rol e of the sti rteas l i rni tedto faci l i tat-
' : .iLr ce d i n g th e w e l l -b e i ngof markets i rnd merchal ttsri l thcr thrrttcotrtr< l l -
.. r . ha s l i n g th e m . l s l a m i stshave al w ays pow erful l y obi cctcd to soci al i snr
=:. .\s a a n d c o mmu n i s m. . . . Isl am has never hi rd probl ems w i th thc i cl ea
=-. . : - rlism th a t w e a l th i s u n evenl ydi stri butecl .r5
:11 nant
Is l a mi c b a n k i n g grew astronomi cal l y. A ccordi ng to thc C i eneral
C o u n c i l o f Is l a m i c B anks and F' i nanci al Insti tuti ons, by zoo4 thert:

.: night be w e re mo re th a n z 7 o Isl ami c banks w i th assetsof $z6o bi l l i on and

::'.-1teenter- d e p o s i ts o f $ z o o b i ll i on.r6 C hi ef credi t bel ongs to an Iraqi cl ergyman,

.:: end cer- an Egyptian banker, a Saudi prince, and a cluster of Kuwaiti royals.

: ::rlr didn't Their stories follow.

 'tJ6 D l v r l 's Gaus

TrIp Avaro LLAH AND TF{E PRINCE

The man who laid thc cornerstonefor "economicIslam" was an lraqi

Shiite clergymannamed Mohammed Bakr al-Saclr,the patriarch of
the Sadr:family ancla closerelativeof lraqi rebel cleric Muqtada al-
Sadr, whose Mahdi Arn-ry cmerged as a powerful force in Iraq in
Loo1.AyirtollahSadr'sideasprovidedthe theoreticaljustificationfor
an lslirrtrist
econonricpolicy.
In r96o, Saclrwrote ()ur F.cortctry, which becalncthe Holy Bible
oi lslrrrr-ric ecotrotnictheorics. His Nctnusurious
iunclanrentirlisnr's
IJanksin lslun (ryl j) r,vasone of tlrc first tonrescxplicatingthe basis
Prothr,vorkswould bc rrnrongthe foundingdoc-
of Islarnicbanl<irtg.r;
urrelrts for ir;rro-cupitalist, rrnci trilitatrtll'anti-socialist,lslamist
lt is not surprisittgthat MuhirrnntadIlakr al-Sirdr
politicrrlecor.ron-ly.
irlsohclprccl
founclan unclergrouncl, tcrroristlslamistparty,thc Islarnic
(iall (Al Dawa) i n the r9.tos.The (lall was est:rblishcd as an anti-
c<lmnrrrnist force in llaghclacl, conserviltivcIraclistttdents
<lrgrrnizing
agirinstMarxists on crrmplls;later,it reportccllyreccivecl covcrt sup-
port from lran's SAVAK secrctserviccin orclcrto underminethc lJaath
Pirrty in Irirq, carryins ()ut ;.lssilssinrti()rrs
rrttdbomltingsfor decades
againstIraclileaclers.
Saclr'str)irrtncrin crcating thc Clell wrrs Ayatollah Muhsin rl-
Hakirn, founclerof another lorrg-lasting political
lraclifr-rnclatncntirlist
dynasfy,whose sciorrswoulcl also take prlrt in thc U.S.-installed
rep4irne
in zoo3 through thc Suprrcrne (louncil for the IslamicRevolu-
tion in Iracl(SOll{l).SaclrirnclHrrkim lvcrethe co-organizersof right-
wing politic:rlIslirnrin lraclin thc late r95os.What propelledthem to
orgiu.rizctheir movementwirs the growth of left-wing activism in Iraq
and the strengthof the Iraqi CommunistParty.The communistsand
the left were strongestamong the disenfranchisedShiitesof Iraq, espe-
cially in the sprawling,Shiite-dominated slumsof Baghdad.Accord-
ing to a former CIA official, "Membership in the leftist organizations
during the period was so strong that one author on the period
describesthe Communist Party in Iraq as the only political party that
the Shi'a."18What frightenedSadr and Hakim was that
represented
 The Riseof F,conomic lslam

hundreds of young Shiites,especiallyon universiry campuses,were

abandoning their allegianceto Islam and joining the socialists,rhe
communists,the Baath, or the pro-Nasser forces. Led by Ayatollah
..:riraqi Hakim's son, Mahdi al-Hakim, the Call "was organizedalong strict
:. -.:ehof party lines.. . . The party functioned in secrecy,with small cells,
-. r. .tt-
. .1
.-:u.t anonymity,and a strict hierarchy."le
,:.rq i n Many of Iraq's leadingclericshad long-established ties ro British
.: ,n for inteiligence.F'or more than a century,I-ondon had maintainedties to
the Shiiteclergy of Iraq and Iran, especiallythose basedin the holy
. Ilible crty of Najaf,Iraq. From r85z ur-rtiltheearly r9jos, through a clever
r i ltr lO llS linirncialmechanismcallec'lthe Oudh Bequesr,imperialEnglandand
:.: i.asis its intelligenceservicekept hundredsof Iraqr Shiiteclergy in Najaf
:
-
tlrtc- and Karbalaon thc Britishparyroll.z0
After the overthrowof England's
i. . rnr ist Iracliking in r 9 5[], many of thoseayatollahsbeganorganizinga!]arnsr
, -\ adr thc Iraqi left and the Iraqi Communist Party,and it was during this
. .. . t rnic periodthat the Islanric(lall was foundcd,with directtics to thc Mus-
:'t .iltti- lirn llrotherhood in Egypt (dcspitethe fact that the Brothers were
.: ...l r'lltS Sunnianclthe lraqis were Shiites).t'In 1c16o a joint Sunni-shiitedec-
:-i .LtP- larirtion representinllsomethingcalled thc Islamic Party issued a
: il.t.rth strong rlttitck<ln the Irircligovernmentand its communist allics,irn
:-J . I d c s attack that was cndorseclby Ayatollirh Hakim. Cioncluc'led Yirzhak
Nirkash,the author of Thc Shi'isof lrdq, "Hakim nor only supported
-..:t l rl - the memorandlrm,bLrthimselfissr-red a fatwa attackingconrmunlsm
:.i t i c l rl by namc and asscrtingthat it was incompirtiblcwith lslam."22
:.:rllcci Thc rrnti-communistorganizingand cconomic thcorizing of the
R.:rolu- two Iraqi Shiite ayatollahsinspiredan iconoclasricyoung Saudi to
: :'rqht- builclthe first Islamic banking emprire:PrinceMohammed al-Faisal,
::. . . i I t o son of the late King Faisaland brother of PrinceSaudal-Faisal,rhe
.:-.Irrtcl Sirr-rcli
foreignministcr.PrinccMohammed,thc "prince of tithes" and
..: . . f r l d founder of thc Faisal (iroup, thc worldwide network of Islamic
-. i \p e - banks, along with Saleh Kamel, the brother-in-lawof then-Saudi
\-;, l r c i - ClrownPrinccFahdand a billionaircwho createdthe Al Barakabank-
l.r i i o n s ing empire,pioneeredthe rapid expansionof economicIslam.
:.riod PrinceMohammed,SalehKamel,and their alliesnot only launched
::'' rhat the Islamic banking movement,but changedthe face of the Middle
.:. that East.Not all Islamicbankerswere political,and evenfewergravitated
 r7a D E . v t l 's (leun

hard to
roward the violent lslamic-rightfringe, but in practiceit was
tell thcnraparr.Somelslamicbankingcircleswere run by non-activist '
pious Muslims who simply spiedan opportunity to make somemoney'
tc)
Many more were activists,who saw lslamic banking as a means
their
advance thc cause of militant, political Islam, and who used
either
banks ro supporr the Brotherhoodand its allies.And still others
founded Islamic banks, or utilized existing ()nes,as inn<lcent-looking
fronts for terrorism, arlns trade, and other skullduggery'Unfortu-
was
natelyfor the CIA, and for Citibank, knowing which was which
by
all but impossible-and often, all three worked togethercheek
jowl: the pious,the political,and the perpetrators'
M:rny of the leadinglslamistactivistsof the last four decadeswere
involved with Islamic banking both in theory and practicc' often
underthe wing of PrinceMOhamn]edal-Faisal.Many wereconnected
was
to the Brotherhood.Sayyid Qutb, the extremist from Egypt who
hangcdis 1c166,wroteSocialJusticein Islam, purporting to be a blue-
print for how fundamentalistMuslims ought to look at ecclnomicthe-
ory. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian scholar of lslamic law' who
his reli-
sertledin the vahhabi Gulf sheikhdom()f Qatar, parlayed
gious credentialsintO seatson the board of severalIslamic banks.
Mohammed al-Ghazali,anorherIrgyptianMuslim Brotherhoodleader
who found a haven in the Gulf, wrote tracts on Islamic econtlmics,
including Islam and EconctmicQuesti<tns'
In Egypt, the man who got it all startedwas Ahmed al-Naiiar'a
Mit
German-trainedEgyptian banker who, in t963, created the
the
Ghamr Bank, describedas "the first Islamic bank in tlgypt and
world."23 Mit Ghamr was begun with German banking assistance
the
and, through Najiar's family, with the support of forces within
public
Egyptian intelligenceservice'It was done covertly' Neither the
an
nor the Egyptian governmentwere told that it was intendedto be
lslamic bank.2aAt the time, in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was
Nasser'snemesis,and Najjar took stepsto distancehimself, at least
publicly, from the violent underground movement' But Najiar was
certainlyconnected.The foreword to a book that he wrote describing
his experienceas the pioneerof Islamic banking was written by Jamal
al-Banna,the brother of Hassanal-Banna,the Muslim Brotherhood's
 The Riseof Economic Islam . r7q

founder. "The main distinction between Dr. Najjar and fotherl econo-
mists. . . is that he doesnot considerlslamiceconomicsas a scienceor
a study,but as a causefor awakeningthe Muslims, and a method for
their renaissance.Therefore, he considers'Islamic banks' only as a
basefor his mission."25Najjar himselfwrote that the reasonhe started
the first Islamic bank was to "savethe Islamicidentity which was start-
ing to fade away in our society. . . in preparation to shift to Marx-
ism." He bitterly attacked Nasser and bemoaned the fact that
Egyptianswere "ashamedof Islam and proud of socialismor national-
ism." Yet in public, saysNajjar, "I could not declaremy true goals."26
The Muslim Brotherhood was deeply involved in Najjar's work,
l: . \ \ 'ef e and many of its membersinvestedin his early ventures.2T
By t967,it
a . , )f re n was clear that the Muslim Brotherhoodhad essentially
taken over Mit
:. :-.;atcd Ghamr, and the bank was closed. Egypt's experiment with Islamic
: ) \\'as banking in the t96os was "liquidated," says Monzer Kahf, when
: -. i.lr.te- "Islamic revivalistsand former Muslim Brotherhood members infil-
:-: J t he - trated Iit] as clients,depositors,and probably employees."28
At its
' . i. . \\'ho peak,Mit Ghamr had nine branchesand z5o,ooo depositors.Najjar,
::. reli- in his memoirs, blamesNasserfor the undoing of his bank. Unde-
:.1nks. terred, he went to Sudan, where he was welcomed by the Muslim
:. :.tcler Brotherhood there. "The Society [of the Muslim Brothersl in the
:. nrics, Sudan was a harmoniousIslamic and democraticcivilian one," he
wrote, specificallyciting as his interlocutor therc'HassanTurabi, thc
i,,-trq a leaderof the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan,who would riseto power
:.^.: \ lit in the late r97os.zeWhen the Sudanesegovernmentwas overthrown
by Jaafar Numeiri, who pledgedloyalty to Nasser,Najjar fled.
"r.J the
: . . i. 1Il C e Naijar traveled to Germany,Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emi-
: : - : lt the rates, and Malaysia, spreading the gospel of Islamic banking. He
: :ublic would turn up over the next three decadesvirtually everywherean
: i.c itn Islamic bank openedits doors. "He was a promoter of the idea of
.i rvas Islamicbanking to anyonewho would listento him," saysAbdelkader
,,.: ieilst Thomas, the founder of the American Journal of Islamic binance,
'Vfhen
- ,: r \ \ 'as who worked with Citibank on Islamic finance in Bahrain. the
.;: r [. ing Saudi-backedOrganization of the Islamic Conference created the
' '. i .t rnal IslamicDevelopmentBank (IDB) in Jeddahin r97 5, Najjar was there.
:: : - ()od's The IDB was the granddaddyof Islamic banks, generouslysupported
 r80 . D e v t l 's GauE

leir dr ; - -
by Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, and the UAh,. lt was quickly fol- -r,,,.i _
.
lowed by the Dubai lslamic Bank (r975), the Kuwait FinanceHouse
I Llt N,

l
Bank
Ggzz), the Islamic Bank of Sudan (tgzz), the Jordan Islamic
l
for Financeand Investment(rg78), and the Bahrain Islamic Bank
\L| '. -

1.,-.-
(tst8).
l\r.:
Najjar recruitedhis most important acolyteswhen he convinced -:
I ----
PrinceMohammedal-Faisaland SalehKamel to get into Islamicbank-
1\ t . l r
-

ing. "lt was the sameguy," saysThomas. "lt was his mectingsthey
attendedin the I qzos.Their ideasare similarbecausethe samepcrson
..:
inspired them. They started trt the sametime, and many of the same
peopleworked with them."l0Accordingto Naiiar,he first encountered
Prince Mohamrned at a meeting9f the Islamic Devclopment Bank in
the early 1c17os.1l
Mohammed al-Faisal'slslamic banking ernpire started with the
creari<rnof the FaisalIslamicBank of F)gypt(I-IBL,)in t,)76.Of all the
Islamic banks, FIBE was the most formal and carefullystructured,
establishinga sharia board made up of carrefullyscreenedFlgyptian
clergy.PrinceMohar-r-rmed als11founded thc lnternational Associetion
crf Islamic Banks, creared the Handboctk of Islamic Banking, and set
up the global network called the "Faisal Group." That group
included all or part of the Jordan lslamic Bank, the FaisalIslamic
Bank of Sudan ftgz8),and F-aisalFinance Housein Turkey (r985)' In
rg8r, ar an Islamicsummir meetingin Taif, in SaudiArabia, Prince
Mohammed put togerherrhe House of IslamicF'unds(in Arabic, Dar
al-Maal al-Islami,or DMI), a huge holding company that servedas
rhe nervecenterof his empire.DMI, basedin the Bahamasand with
in ten
its operationscenterin Geneva,at one point had subsidiaries
countries, including Bahrain, Pakistan, Turkey, Denmark, Luxem-
bourg, Guinea,Senegal,and Niger.sz
SalehKamel, meanwhile,was settingup his own empire,the Al-
BarakaGroup. Kamel, a Saudibillignairerelatedto the royal family
.,sponsorsan annual seminar at which scoresof eco-
by marriage,
nomists and bankers meet with sharia scholars."33At Al Azhar, the
thousand-year-oldCairo centerof Islamic learning,he establishedthe
Saleh Kamel center for Islamic Economic studies. The managing
director of Al-Baraka Invesrmentand Developmentcompany was a
 Islam . r 8r
TheRiseof Economic

leading Muslim Brotherhood member,3aand its branchesin Sudan,

Turkey,and elsewhereworked closelywith the Brotherhood.
Throughout the r97os and r 98os, both DMI and Al-Baraka found
strong alliesin London, New York, Hong Kong, Switzerland,and off,
shore money centersin such placesas the Bahamasand the Cayman
Islands.Ibrahim Kamel, DMI's vice chairman and CEO, told an
'West
Islamic banking conferencein Baden-Baden, Germany,that the
very existenceof DMI's Geneva operations center could not have
occurred but for the assistanceDMI receivedfrom Price Waterhouse:
"The people who explained IIslamic bankingl to rhe SwissBanking
Commissionare Price Waterhouse,who have been auditing us for
ovcr threeyears."Literallydozensof conferences
took placein West-
ern moneycenterson Islarnicbanking,and prestigiousacademicinsti-
tutions got into the act. h,ventually,even Harvard University would
yoin in, with its Harvard IslamicFinanceInformation Program,sup-
ported financiallyby WesternanclIslamic banking circles.
Islamicbanking provideda mechanismto bring togetherwealthy
conservatives,
Islamistactivists,and right-wing Islamiclaw scholars
in an environmentthat empoweredall three. Islamic banking pro-
vidcd the enginethirt made Islamic revivalismgo. During the Cold
\War,no thought was given to the notion that Islamicbanking might
havea cleleterious
impact on Micldle Eastsocicties,and that it might
boomerangagainstthe West. Timur Quran, the Turki$h author of
lslam and Mammon, points out now that lslamic econornics"has
prornotedthe spreadof anti-rr-rodern
:rnd in somerespectsdeliberately
anti-Western
currentsof thought all acrossthe Islamicworld."r5
The most vivicl description of how Islarnic banking fostered the
expansionof politicalIslarn:rppearsin the writing of Monzer Kahf, a
radicalIslamistfrom Syria.Kahf, who receiveda Ph.D. in economics
from the Ur-riversity
of Utah, gradr-rated
from the Universityof Damas-
cus and studied Islarnicjurisprudence(fiqh). From r975 ro r98r,
Kahf ran the financial:rffairsof the IslamicSocietyof North America,
a militant Muslim fundamentalistorganizationbasedin Indianawith
:.e closeties to the Muslim Brotherhood.After a stint as a banker in New
iJ
'f
York, Kahf went to work for the Islamic Researchand Training Insti-
,1 tute of the lsl:rmicDevelopmentBank (IDB) in Jeddah,from r985 to
 lrl|?'

,lim

l ) r . r 'r r . 's (lAMr:

r999. Sincethen, Kahf has beena consultantand lectureron lslamic

financein California,and has wrimenwiclelyon thc subject.
ln a paper presentedto the zooz Harvard Forum cln Islamic
Financcand Banking,Kahf describes
how the big Islan-ric
Lranksforged
a political-ccor.romic
alliancewith thc Muslirn clergy,tlrc ulcnra.

The formalsystenraticcontirctbcnvecnbankersanc'lshariirsch<ll-
arsc:urc'duringthe alurosrc()ncLlrrcnt
preparrltionfor the esta[r
lishmetrt
of lslarnicbanksin Egyptrrnd.jorclan
in fhc scconclhalf
< l fth e l 9 7 o s .
\Wh e n th e new speci es()f i nterneti onrrlIsl al ni c Investrncut
F u n d s e m c reecl ,though ntrtnagccll ty W estern bankers, br< l kcrs,
a n d h o u s c so f fi nance,they hacl to sct sl rari rrschol arson b< l arcl ,
t()o , i n o rd e r t< l g:ri n l cccptancc:rncil egi ti rnr.rcy.
Thc mr.urvsernr-
l l a rs , me e ri n e s,confercnces,ancl svrtrp< tsitlarat ensucclsi nce the
rn i c l -r9 7 o si n the four c()rnersof thc w orl cl have furthcr enharrcecl
th i s rte w i l l i a nce betw eenIsl anri cbarrkers rrndshrrri aschol arsancl
clcveIopcd nru tu:rII y rerv,rlcli n g rvork i n g rclationsl.ri ps.
F ro rn th e poi nt of vi eu,of the ul erna,rhi s ncw rrl l i ancebri ngs
th e rn b a l c kt() thc frtrefront < l f the pol i ti cal sccneat i r ti me w hcn
th e y n c c d e dthi s boost vcry rnuch.... Thi s al l i i rnccrrl sogi ves the
ulenra a new source <lf inc<lnreancl a r.vinclt)wro r'rnew lifestyle
th a t i n c l u c l c srri r tri rvel , s()meti mcsi l r pri vrrtr j crs, rtrryi ng i n fi vc-
s t:rr h o te l s , b e i r.rgunder the focus of rncdi a attenti on, provi cl i ng
th e i r o p i n i o n s to peopl e of hi gh soci al ancl ccorrorni crank, w h< l
c o tre ru n rri ng for l i steni rrg,bei ng cor.nrni ssi onecl to uncl ertrrke
p a i d -fo r fi q h r escarch.... They i n f:rct bccrrmecel ebri ti esi n thei r
re s p e c ti v cc < t nntri es,
and evenoutsi cl ethei r borders.
T h e a l l i a rrcecrcates rrn atnrosphercof fresh pol i ti cal rap-
p rr> c h e n re nbty the Isl ami c nrovemenrand thc governmentsi n thc
M u s l i m, :rn c lespeci al l ythe A rab, countri es..j .'

By ra p p ro c h e me nt, K ahf me:l ns the Isl arni zati on of soci al and pol i ti -
c a l s o c i e ty i n th e Isl ami c w orl d. K ahf adds that the shari a schol ars
who were picked for thc advisory boards irnd other posts were carc-
fu l l y s e l e c te d . T hose w ho w ere too radi cal , and w ho w oul dn' t be
'Western
accepted by moderate government officials and bankers,
were avoided; at the same time, the "government-cheering ulema"
 The Riseof Economic Islam . r 83

The processcreatedan entire new classof

were similarly excluded.3T
wealthy,right-wing Islamists,with accessto money and media.

Tne DESERTTzA'troN oF KuwArr

The exper:ience of Kuwait provides a classiccasein point of how the

Islamic banks changedthe Middle East.
There is a distinctive pattern to the political evolution of Islamic
banking.One or more lslamic banks establisha beachheadin a par-
ticular capital. The bank servesas an economic headquartersfclr
Muslim Brotherhoodbusinessmen and other lslamist activists.The
bank builds a baseof devout followers,while establishinglucrativc
allianceswith politicians,both religiousand secular.Islamistorgani-
zations then draw strength from the bank's economic power, and
Islamistinstitutions-including mosques,charities,and businesscs-
prosperas a result.And a new classof wealthy Islamistsemergesto
hclp financethe Muslinr Brotherhoodand Islarnistpoliticalfronts.
Unlike SaudiArabia, which is stronglyinfluencedby the Wahhabi
sect,the tiny, wealthy statelctof Kuwait is traditionallymore liberal
and freewheeling.But in the r 97os, the I(uwaiti royal family, the
Islamicright, and Islamic banking groups joined hands to do battle
with a risingnationillistmovement.As a result,the PersiariGulf emi-
rAte was fundamentallytransformed.The centerpieceof the effort
was an lslirmicbank calledthe Kr-rwaitFinanceHouse.
Kuwait was ncver especiallya haven for the devout. The Wahhabi
militancy that seizedArabia for the Saudisand had influencein Qatar
,rnclpirrtsof the United Arab F.miratesneverfound a foothold there.Its
playboy-dominatcdroyal family; maintained in power by force of
tlritish arms,seemedmostly contentwith its lot. Yet it was a shaky,arti-
flcial nation, carvedout of Iraq's southernprovincesand the Ottoman
F.rnpire,createdstrictly as a British outpost in the (lulf that doubledas
an oil field for British Petroleumand Gulf Oil. A seriesof Iraqi govern-
rnentslaid claim to it, and its fragile existencewas preservedagainst
Iraqi irredentismat leasttwice, by British forcesin r96r-when it first
 r rJ4 D r r v t t - 's (iaur:

achievedindependence-andby an American-ledcoalition in t99r.

Irvenafter r96 r, Kuwait was dependenton British civil servants,army
officers,and Anglo-Americanoil experts,and the arrangementwas sat-
isfyingto both sides:the Anglo-Americanswould haveexclusiveaccess
to Kuwait's oil, and its royal family would gratefullyaccepttheir pro-
tection and a healtl-rycut of the proceeds.Still, it was a largelysecular
society,and in the Clulf,Kuwait was known for its relativelyliberal tra-
clition, with an on-again, off-again parliamcnt, a rnostly free mcdia,
the tiny population
and a modcstlyflourishingpoliticaldebate. Bccause
of Kuwirit prcferred not to work if they didn't have to, Kuwait
imported hundredsof thous:rndsof workers from the Arab world and
Asia,especially And that w:rsthc rub.
Palestinians.
"Kuwait was a listcningpost fclr Arab nationalism," s:rysTalcott
Seclyc,who was a U.S.foreignserviceofficerin Kuwait in the late r 95os.
"Nassc.rism,sccular Nasserism,w:rs the predominant pcllitical fclrcc
thcn,and it ovcrshaclowed
Islam."The revolutionin Iraq in r95ll,led lry
contmunistsand nationalists,found widespreaclsympathy in Kuwait,
evenamong a minority in thc royal family, the Al Sabah."I remembcr
sitting with ShcikhJabr al-Sahah,who is now the ruler," recallsSeelye.
"l mcntionedthe king of lrac1,he went like this"-drawing his finger
rrcross indic:rte,'He hasto go.'" Seelyesaysthat cventhen,a
1[16215-c'11;
had gatheredin Kuwait. "lt was very much a secular
lot of Palestinians
society,"he says."But the Britishwere in control."J8
Dr-rringthe r 96os, Kuwait's lfovernment,though it wouldn't be
mistlkcn for e Creck eity-stltc.wrs am()ngthc leasteuthoriterianilt
the Middle East.Palestinians,who made up a great part of Kuwait's
working and professionalclasses,along with students,were an
important force. The Islamists,representedby the Muslin-rBrother-
hood, had only marginalimpact then. "I usedto attendthe National
Assembly in those days," says a former CIA official who served in
Kuwait, "and I was always amusedby listeningto the conservative
Islamists,who were always criticizing the Sabahs."Yet they were not
a significantfactor, nor were they organized."There was always the
Muslim Brotherhood, coming out of Egypt," says the CIA veteran.
"But I never thought that the Islamic sidewas significant."3e
 The Riseof Economic Islam r85

:. r 99r. Many of the most progressivePalestiniansin Kuwait had emerged

:r..l f m y from the ranks of the Arab Nationalist Movement, founded in the
,1 -1\ )dt- r94os by GeorgeHabash, who would later createthe Popular Front
: - lCCe S S for the Liberation of Palestine(PFLP).The ANM, which was liberal
.: : : pro - and secular,receivedsome backing from Nasser and from the Arab
> - a ula r Baath SocialistParty,and it built a significantfollowing among Pales-
e : .11t r a - tinians in Beirut, Amman, and Kuwait. "ln r968, when the PFLP was
:tcclia, formed, they were all ANM," says another CIA official, who often
l -: : .l l l Otl dealt with Palestinianleaders."l talked to a lot of the ANM people
l.rir'ait back then."40The ANM was only one expressionof Arab national-
:Jand ism and pan-Arabism,which beganto gain adherentsin Kuwait dur-
ing the r95os and r96os, first among erpatriate Arabs working in
T.rlcott Kuwait, then spreading to privileged Kuwaiti nationals, and even
: l 9ios . gaining support among some membersof the oligarchic Kuwaiti rul-
;.. f()rce ing family. By the mid-r97os, the strengthof Arab nationalistsin
.. .'dby Kuwait alarmed the dominant branch of the Al Sabahclan, and likc
r., i w l r i t , Sadatin Egypt, they reachedout to the Islamists.
:-.r ill be r For the story of how an Islamic bank helpedchangeKuwait, we
i :f e l v e . are indebtedto Kristin Smith, author of a brilliant and instructivec.lse
. irrger study of how right-wing Islamist money and a threatenecloligarchy
. : -al lt a joined forces.al"The Kuwaiti government,alarmed over the volatile
.: . L l[ ar mix of the opposition's rhetoric and the large Palestinianexprrtriate
communityworking in Kuwait, dissolvedthe parliamentIin rr176lf<>r
the first time sinceliberation and begancastingabout for new alliesto
counter the Arab nationalists,"wrote Smith. "It found them in the
Islamic forces."42
In reachingout to the Islamists,the Kuwaitis had Jordan in mind,
where the Muslim Brotherhoodhad helpedKing Husseincrusha Pales-
tinian insurgency.That small state, whose monarch was descended
from the Hashemitedynasty installedin Amman by T. E. Lawrence,
Churchill, and the British Arab Bureau, hosted a huge population of
Palestinianrefugees.After yearsof tension,a civil war eruptedthere in
r97o.ln a massacreremembered as "Black September," King Hussein
mobilizedJordan'sBedouinmilitary to defeatthe Palestinianuprising.
The Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan, which had long supported the
 IIJ(i D u v r l 's Gnl.t-:

the
Jordanian monarchy, threw its weight into the battle against
PalestineLiberation Organization in support of the king' So, the
Kuwaiti rulers must have reasoned,the Islamic right might also pro-
vide important leverageagainstthe Arab and Palestiniannationalists
in thc Clulfsheikhdom.
At the time virtually no Kuwaiti women wore veils.In mosques,
mostly the elderly prayed.In Kuwaiti universities,men end women
attendedclassestogether.Most Kuwaitis believedthat religion was
important in private life and in cultural activities,but not in politics.
I'oliticalIslam in Kuwait had only a tenuousfoothold, althoughthe
small Muslim Brothcrhood was efficientlyorganizedthrough the
SocialReform Society,which had beenformcd in t96z'
But beginningin the mid-r 97os,the Al Sabahand Islamistsjoined
hancls.As the politicalpressurcmountedfrom nationalists,Pl,C)sup-
portcrs, and restiveKuwaitis excludedfrom power by the royal fam-
ily, thc Al Sabahclampeddown, eliminatingthe noisylegislature. The
clissolution of the parliamentby the ruler was applaudedby the Mus-
lim Brotherhoodand the SocialReform Society,whosechairmanwas
br<tughtinto the governmcntas minister 9f religiousendowments.
That ministcr,in turn, encouragedand helpedcreatean intercst-frec
bankinginstitution,the Kuwait FinanceHouse (KFH) in t977' Based
on discreditedtheoriesthat the Kgran prohibits intereston loans' a
thesisthat modern Islamic scholarsridicule, Islamistsin Kuwait-
backcclby thc Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt-had beenlobbying for
the establishmentof such a bank since the early tg7os. Almost
clvernight,KFH grew into Kuwait's second largest bank, under the
patronageof the Al Sabah.

KFH was established with a 49 percentgovernmentsharein the

capital,and it has enjoyedperksnot affordedother banks'most
significantlyfreeclomfrorn central Bank regulationand protected
monopolystatusasKuwait'sonly Islamicbank' . . ' KFH is a con-
crereexpressron of the de facto allianceberweenthe ruling familv
and the Islamic movement.. ' . Islamicfinancein Kuwait, then,
embodiesthe growingIslamizationof publiclife in Kuwait under
the benigngazeofthe Kuwaiti government.4r
 The Rise of Econctmic lslam ' r87

::i the KFH had another effect,too. It bypassedKuwait's merchant elite, the
> ,. the private traders who resentedthe Al Sabah'sdominance of the mini-
i , pfO- nation. Many in the merchant classhad gravitated toward the Arab
:r lists nationalistsin opposition to the Al Sabah.But they were barred from
involvementin KFH; instead,the Kuwaiti governmentmobilized the
! q Lles, desert-based Bedouinsagainst the merchants.The tribal Bedouins
',,.()nlen were the force that King Husseinusedagainstthe Pl,O, and they pro-
:1 \\IAS vided the core of the most rcactionaryforcesin SaudiArabia.
I irnc s. A leadingKuwaiti professor,ShafeeqN. Ghabra,calledthe rising
: : h t he influenceof the Bedouinin Kuwait "desertization":
-:r rhe
The n-rarriage between Bedouinconservative valuesand thc
Islamicl movementmilturecl....Tlrc lnaioritvof thc relatively
deprivcdBedouintribes havcmovedfronrthesidclincs to thc forc-
front in dem:rndingsocietalrecognitiot.t
and equalitl,,the basisfor
whichis foundin Islarn.Several populist[slirmists
infltrcntial have
riscnfrom their ranks.... This pr()cessof "desertization," as the
BahrainithinkerMuharnmadAnsarilabclsit, is amot.tg thc most
destructivcprocesscs in the Middle East.It undermines nrodern
societyby bringing into urbansocietyfhe ultraconservativc valucs
of the dcsertarrclnrixingthenrwith Islalnicpopulisrn.aa

The Al Sabah werc prepared to risk evcrything to cncollragc

Islamismagainstthe left. It workccl. Whert thc Al Sabahclecidedit
', :: lq f or was szlfeto restoreparliament,lslamistsquickly took advantagc,win-
.\ r m os t ning two seatsin r98r and steadilygainingafter thirt.'Wrotc(ih:lbra,
:i fr t he "In the elections lof r9t3rl, the secular p:rn-Ararbistforccs wcrc
dcfcatedby the Islamists,who bccamethe only organizedpolitical
None of this, of coltrse,was the result of
group in Parliirment."'+'i
: : : lc
some native, legitimatelslamist upsurgc; rathcr, it was thc dircct
taken by the Kuwaiti rulcrs,and it was
resultof a consciousclccisior-r
'- -l all
-

,ll-
backed by the Kr-rwaitFinanceHouse.
-
--.1.. \
The deeppocketsof KFH bankrolledthe growth of the Islamistsin
- -l

Kuwait from 1977 forward. It was widely reported in Kuwait that

*91 KFH "repays Islamist politicians in kind, putting its considerable
resourcesbehind their election campaigns." KFH, Kristin Smith
 i,lr
,,.ir.
' ' i. ' .

,.i,r

rU8 'l ) l . v t t . 's Cnvl

wrote, used"money,real estate,jobs... to influenceelections."a6Its

real estatewas reportedly usedfor ralliesand and
demonstrations, its
huge workforce enlistedin lslamist campaigns.KFH also becamc
home to more than a hundreclIslamic charities, usually tied ttr
Islamist€lroups.Someof the KFH-basedmoney was divcrtedto sup-
port radical Islamist groups in Egypt, Afghanistan,and Algcria.
Islamistcashfrom KFH alsodirectlysupportcdKuwaiti charitiesand
social groups run by Islamists,and at leastone <lf the KFH-linked
charitieswas reportedlytied to Al Qaeda.aTInsidc the bank, KFH
of the sexes,erndoutsidcit created"Islami-
inrposedstrict segregation
cally run" buildings,shoppingmalls, and sch<tols <trganizcd acctlrcl-
principlcs.Its tentacleswereeverywhcre:
ing to ultraconservative

KFH hasbeencspecially interestedirl educatiorr, field

sportsoring
trips'toKFH, scholarships stlldentsto studyIslarnric
enctlr.rraging
econclmics,Islar-nic
competitions (Koranicmemorization irnclthe
like),and the establishmcnt of privatclslilrlricschools....KFH
rnagazinc,
reachesout to societyat largethrough its nlclntl-rly A/
Nr . , or , wh i c h h a s a c i r c u l a t i o n o f o v e r t o , o o o . 4 E

The presenceof the KFH, which bccame a $ r billion institution,

accelcratedthe spreadof right-wing Islamismin prcviouslysecular
Kuwait. The teachcrs'associationand the ministry of educationwere
taken over by Islamists,and curriculawere changedto reflectthe new
religiosity.The rninistryof informationalsofell under the influenceof
Islamists,and televisionbroadcastsbecamemore conservativeand
sublectto censorship.Books, too, were censored,while pamphlets
preachers
and audiotapesreflectinglslamistviewsand revivalist-style
flooded the country.ae
The desertization of Kuwait is just one exampleof how the mon-
eyed power of the new Islamic right extendedthe movement'sinflu-
ence.But what appearedbusinesslikeon the surface-to the CIA and
even to many rulers in the Middle East-had a dark side, in the sur-
reptitious growth of an Islamist underground whose wrath was
directednot solely againstthe left and the nationalistsbut againstthe
United States,the West, and its Arab and Middle Easternallies.The
 The Rise of Ecorutmic Islam ' r 89

Its institutions of economic Islam-banks, finance houses,and charities

: ] tS establishedby the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies in the Gulf-
:-1 l C quietly helped to spawn this new generationof Islamists,including
:rO the forerunnersof Al Qaeda.
i t n-
' _f
Yet the United States,SaudiArabia, and Pakistancontinuedblithely
: : l J. to make use of the Islamic right in their foreign policy calculations,
,.-rd and other countriesjoined in. In the late r97os, as the United States
- .,1
\rLl laid the groundwork for the jihad againstthe USSRin Afghanistan,
'tr IJ
two key U.S. allies,Israeland Jordan,launcheda mini-jihad of their
. - -. i
1 ,lt - own, mobilizingthe Islamicright againstSyriaand the Palestinel.ib-
:J- erationOrganization.

, ,: 1.

-., 1 r

, ,) l

.:::.l

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:.l r-
-. - l

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 T.
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8

ISRAEL' S ISLAM ISTS

Amr,ntcR's posrrroN tN the Micldle East never seemedtnore

securethan during the lerte r97os. Only a handful of so-called
rejectioniststates-lraq, Syria, t.ibya, ar-rdthe PalestineLibcration
Organiz-ation-51e1;61 outside America's nascent empire. And the
United Stateswas on the offensive.Along with its allies, including
Washingtonsoughttcr
and the Gulf n-ronarchies,
Israel,Egypt,.Jor:dan,
weakenand isolatethe rernainingreiectionists,minimizingtheir role
in the regionand evenseekingregimechanges,usinga combinationof
threats,persuasion,and bribes.Two mernbersof the anti-U.S.bloc'
Syria and the PLO, found thernselvesfacing simultaneouscivil wars
against forces led by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic right.
ln turn, the Muslim Brotherhoodwas supp<trtedby two U.S. allies,
Israel and Jordan. And the United Statestacitly backedits alliesin
promoting Islamist unrest against Damascusand the PLO's Yasser
Arafat.
The Israeli-Jordanianeffort in support of the Muslim Brotherhood
took off in the late t97os, and it continued well into the r98os. Dur-
ing that time, the Islamic right would begin to exhibit the radical and
anti-American characteristicsthat would later mark its Osama bin
 Israel's Islamists

Laden-linked terrorist phase. A hostile Islamist takeover in Iran' a

maior Islamist revolt in Saudi Arabia, and the murder of Sadat by
Muslim Brotherhood-linked terrorists all erupted in ry79-8r' But
before, during, and after theseevents,Amman and Jerusalemwould
continue their recklesspolicy in support of Brotherhood-alliedgroups
in Syria and Palestine.Although there is no evidencethat the United
Stateswas directly involved in the Israeli-Jordanianefforts, according
to U.S. officialswho servedin the Middle East during this period, the
CIA reported on thesedevelopmentsand U.S. officialswere aware of
what Israeland.fordan were doing. At no time did the United States
dissuadethem.
It might seemsurprisingthat a Jewish state and a secularArab
monarchywould join forceswith Islamic fundamentalism.But both
in Amman and in Jerusalem,thc Muslim Brotherhoodwas seen,cyni-
cally, as a weapon against Syria and the PI-O. ln Syria, thc Brod-rers
carriedout systematicattacks,terrorism,and uprisingsin a civil war
:-.,)rc that left thousandsdead. And beginningin r967 through the late
r98os, Israel helpedthe Muslim Brotherhooclestablishitself in the
-t I
1 ICLI

:::()ll Ahmed Yassin,the leaderof the Broth-

occupiedterritories.It assisted
::h c erhood, in creatingHarnas,hetting that its Islamistcharacterwor-rld
- J: I l g weakenthe PI-O. It did, though it backfiredin a way that the Israeli
.:. : to supportersof Hamas didn't count on, evolvinginto a terroristgroup
':,le that in the r 99oscarriedgut suicidcbombingsthat killed hundrcds9f
: ()f IsraeliJews.TogethcqIsraeI and .fordanunleasheda monster'
l. t )g.

," .1i \

'_iit
Isnnn L's TRAINE o Zr,l't'
I i(

. 111 "lsrael startedHamas," saysChilrlesFreeman,the veteranU.S.diplo-

a: Cf mat and former U.S.ambassadorto SaudiAr:abia."lt was a projectof
which had a feeling
aplencyl,
Shin Bet lthe Israelidomesticintelligence
'od that they could useit to hem in the PLC)."r
[)ur- In Arabic, Hamas-an acronym for the lslamic Resistance
i nd in 1987,
Mt;vement-means "z.eal."Though it was formally established
fl n the foundersof Hamas were all membersof the Muslim Brotherhrlod,
 t9z D E vrr-' s C eur.

especiallyin the Gaza Strip.In the wake of the t967 war, and Israel's
occupation <tf Gaza and the West Bank, the Islamistsflourishedwith
support from both lsrael and Jordan. Officially, the Brotherhood in
the occupied territories fell under the supervision of the Muslim
Brotherhoodof Jordan, and Hamas was a wholly owned subsidiary
of the organization.
The roots of Hamas go back to the r9jos. Beginning with the
activities of the pro-Nazi (and pro-British) mufti of Jerusalem,Haj
Amin al-Husscini,Palestinianactivismhas all along had a minoriry
Islamist component. The mr"rftimet Hassan al-Banna'scmissaricsir-r
r935. A forerunner of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine,the
Makarem Societyof Jerusalem,was set up in r943.2 Many Palestin-
ian nationalistswho wcluld [Jo on to become leadersof the sccular,
non-lslamist movenlent for a Palestinianstate were attracted to the
Brotherhoodar the time, as branchesbeganto proliferatein Amman,
in the Syrian citics of Alcppo, Hama, and l)arnascus,ancl in Gaza,
Jerusalem,Ramallah, Haifa, and elsewhcrc.Thc Muslim Brothcr-
hood'sfirst officein Jerusalemwas openedin r 94 5 by SaidRamadan,
and by 1947 therewere twcnty-fiveMuslim Brotherhood branchesin
Palestinewith as many as 25,ooo mcmbcrs.sIn Octobcr r946, and
againin L947,theMuslim Br:otherhoodheld a regionalconventionin
Haifa, with delegatesfrom l-ebar-ron
and Transjordan,calling for the
"spreadof Muslirn BrotherhoodchaptersthroughoutPalestine."a
In the early days,the movementwas bifurcated.In Gaza,the Mus-
lim lJrotherhoodwas affiliated with the organization'sheadquarters
branch in Cairo. On the \fest Bank, the area of Palestinethat came
under .fordanian administration after 1948, the Brotherhood was
attachedto the Jordanian branch. In r95o, the West Bank ancl.for-
danian branchesof the Muslim Brotherhood united to form the Mus-
lim Brotherhood of Jordan. It was a docile, conservativegroup that
developed increasinglyclose ties to the monarchy, and which was
scorned by nationalists.sThe Hashemites,in turn, encouragedthe
activities of the Brotherhood, seeingit as a force to counterbalance
communist, leftist, and, later, Nasseristand Baathistsentiments.The
founder and organizationalleader of the Brotherhood in Jordan was
Abu Qurah. a wealthy merchanrwith no interesrin upsetringany
 Israel'sIslamists ' r c)3

: I >r:rel's apple carts. Qurah had close ties to Syrian businessmenin Amman
::J wi th and to Banna and Ramadan in Egypt. King Abdullah "granted the
:- ,Lrdin Brotherhood legal status as a welfare organization,hoping to secure
I. Iuslim its support against the secular opposition."6 The king regarded the
- :. idiary Brotherswith somesuspicion,but he hoped that by coopting them he
could enhancehis legitimacy as an Islamic leader.His father, T. E.
",..:n the l.awrence'sSharif Hussein of Mecca, maintained a well-publicized
.:::1.Haj but spurious claim to be a direct descer-rdantof the Prophet
.-':rority Mohammed, and althoughthe aura was dimming, Abdullah and his
: .r .il CS l l l grandson,the future King Hussein,would do what they could to keep
:t : - .. . t he it alive.
: - . . . csf
in - The Brotherhood,like the Islamicright everywhere,was strongly
- : , Lt lll r, anti-communist,arguing"that in the twentiethcenturyEgypt and the
: :,) the restof the Islamicworld were threatenedby the onslaughtof comntu-
l. : nrrt n , nist and nationirlist ideologieswhich dcnied the supremacy of
ll ( r; 1 Zi l , shdria."7The Muslim Brotherhoodwas a loyal force in support of
: : 'rher- King Husscin,and bitterly opposcclto pan-Arabism.Its socialbarse in
:--tt .t rl il ll
, .fordirnwas rooted in the wealthy,East Bank landowning familicsivhtr
:,:rcs in saw socialisrnand land reform as existentialthreats.When Jordan's
' -: '. Jl l c i left-leaningprime ministerSuleimanill-Nabulsi,who was influcnccd
: : :. r )l l l ll by Nasscr,challcngedthc monarchyin a showdownin r.)\7 that can-te
::'rthe closeto topplingit, thc Brotherhoodsidedwith the king and savedhis
.:. throne."Frorn this point t)n," wrt)teBoulby,"thire existedan unn'rit-
-: \ il. I 5 _ ten understarndingof coeristcrtcebetweenKing Husseinand the Broth-
r[crs
: --.:. crhood."8Yusafal-Azm,a lcaderof the Brothersin.fordan, said:"Wc
- : - : . .l l l l e agreedwith thc king bccauscNasscr was irrational in his irttacks
. : $'as againsthim, lancllto protectourselves,becauscif Nasser'sfollowers
::-,: Jor- had risen to power in .fordan,thc Muslim Brotherhoodwould have
.-.: \ l t t s - been liquic'lated,as thcy werc in llgypt."'r The Brotherhood'ssupport
-.:' f ltirt for the king came at a critical moment. Nasscr and his allieswere
. - :t \\:i]s ascenclanf,the king of Iraq (a fellow Hashemitc)was overthrown,and
::J the U.S. policy had shifteddecisivclyagainstF.gypt.In r95tl, U.S.troops
':,:lrnce wcre sentto l.ebanonand the Britisharmy to .fordanand Kuwait, t<r
:.:.. The halt the nationalistupsurge,and the Brotherhoodioined in. While
:.::r \\'as communist, Baathist, and Nasseristparties were suppressedby the
.:': .rny king, the Muslim Brotherhoodwas encouragedto run candidatesin
 r94 D r - : v l r - 's Gnl,rn

elections for .fordan's sham parliament, winning seats in Hebron,

Nablus, and other West Bank cities.The Jordanianarmy also provided
military training to Brotherhoodparamilitary forces.10
In Gaza, later a stronghold of Hamas, the Muslim Brothcrhood
took root among Palestinianstudents coming from Cairo and
Kuwait. The Brothers createdthe Lcague of PalcstinianStudents,
many of whose leaderswould latcr abandonthe Islamistsand form
the corc of the Pl,O, including YasserArafat, Salah Khalaf, and thc
Hassanbrothers.l I In Gaza,then under Egyptianadministration,the
Brotherhoodfouncl itself feelingthe heat when PresidentNasserof
Ilgypt crushedthc organizationin Cairo. ln .July r957, Khalil al-
\flazir, il future PLC)leader,wrote a paper proposing that "the Pales-
tinian Brothcrhood establisha specialorganizationalongsidetheir
own which hasno visibleIslarniccoloratiorror agenclabut which has
thc sta.tedgoal of liberatingPalestine."From this momcnt on, the
Ptrlcstinianlnoverrentwas clividcd.On one sidewerethe nationalists.
thosc who ilgrced with Waziq who wcnt on to forrr-rthe Palestine
Nationirl LiberationMovement,or Fatah,in r958-59. On the othcr
siclcwcre the Islamists,those who prcfcrredto rernainkryal to the
Muslim Brotherlrood,who did not join Fatahand, irr 1960,cxplicitlr
o1-rpclsed ll
the ncw organizirticln.
Fatah-which began guerrilla artacks against Israel in r965-
wor-rldembody Palestiniannationalism and ally irself, somcfimes
uncomfortably,with Nasser'svision of Arab nationalism.The Broth-
erhood,on the other hand, remaincdin the camp of the Arab conser-
vatives,allied to the Jorclaniankir-rg,and supportedby SaudiArabia.
Kuwait, and the soon-ro-be-independent
Gulf sheikhdoms.The
Brotherhood'smembershipamong Palestinians,
which had reached
many thousandsin the r94os, declinedsharply as Arab nationalism
becamethe rallying cry in the Middle East. Pro-Nasserparries, the
Baath, communisrs,and Farah all gained. The Muslim Brotherhood
had a membershipof lessthan a thousand on rhe West Bank, and a
thousandin Gaza,before the rr)67 war with Israel.In the West Bank.
the Brotherhood was tolerated by the Jordanian authorities,while in
Gaza it was repressedby Nasser'sEgypt.
It is during this period that Ahmed Yassinfirst emergedas the fun-
 Isrdel's Islamists rc)5

damentalist firebrand who would win Israeli backing in the r97os

and r98os and who would found Hamas in r987.r3In r965, Yassin
was arrestedby Egyptian intelligencein one of Nasser'scrackdowns.
'West
Alter ry67, with Israel in control of the Bank and Gaza, things
changed.Yassinwas freed. According to Shaul Mishal and Avraham
Sela,Israeli scholarswho wrote The PalestinianHamas:

Israelwas more permissiveregardingsocialand cultural Islamrc

activity,irnd the very fact that the'WestBank and the GazaStrip
were under one government enabled a renewed encounter
betweenIslamicactivistsof both regi<tns. This in turn pavedthe
way for the development of joint organizationalendeavors. . . . ln
the late r 96os,a joint organizaticlnof Islamicirctivityfor the Gaza
Stripand the WestBank-the UniteclPalestini:rn IMuslim]Broth-
erhood Organization-wasfounded.. . . The I97os witnessed
growing links betweenthe Muslim Brotherhoodin the Israeli-
occupiedtcrritoriesand Israel'sArab citizens. Thus le:rcling Mus-
lim Brotherhood figures from the West llank and Ciaza, like
Sheikh Yassin,visited Israeli Muslinr cornnlunitiesfrom rhc
(lalileeto theNegevto preachand lcadFrid:ryprayers.ra

Soon Israelwould beginto seeYassin,and the Muslim llrotherhood,

as valuablealliesagainstthe PLO. ln iL)67the Muslirn Brotherhg6cl
beganto createits infrastructure,undcr the tolcrant eyi of the now
all-powerful Israeli authorities.Charity organizationsproliferated.
The religiousendowments(waqfs) grew richer,controlling I o percent
of all the real estatein Gaza,hundredsof busincsses,and thousands
of acresof agriculturalland. And, like Egypt,Sudan,and other coun-
werc beingIslamized.From r967 t<t
the Palestinians
tries after 1c167,
1987thenumbersof mosquesin Gazagrew from 2oo to 6oo, and on
rhe WestBank,from 4oo to z5o.l'
ln r 97o, the PLO was expelledfrom jordan after beingdefeatedin
the civil war that eruptedin September.The Muslim Brotherhoodin
Jordan supportedthe king and his Bedouin army againstthe PLO,
and Israel helpedKing Hussein,threateningaction if the Syrian army
moved to help the PLO. That sameyear,Ahmed Yassin,leaderof the
Muslim Brotherhoodin Gaza,askedthe Israelimilitary administratign
 196 . D r v r l 's GauE

for permissionto establishan organization.His appealwas rejected,

but three years larer,under the watchful eye of the shin Bet, yassin
founded the Islamic center, an Islamistgroup rhat was only thinly dis-
guised as a religious institution. Yassin began to establisheffective
control over hundreds of mosques.Many of these mosques,along
with charitiesand schools,servedas recruiring vehiclesand political
organizingcentersfor Islamists.rn r976, Yassin'sIslamic center spun
off the Islamic Association, a membership group with branches
throughout the Gaza Strip, and the movemenrgrew.
Israel'sformal support for the Islamistsoccurred after r977,when
MenachemBegin'sHerur Party and the Likud bloc stunnedthe Israeli
Labor Party in national elections.rn r978, Begin'snew government
formally licensedAhmed Yassin'sIslamic Association.It was part of a
full-court pressagainstthe PLo. civil war was raging in Lebanon,
where lsraeli-backedMaronite christian militias were battling the
Palestirrians.
In the west Bank and Gaza,Begintried to underminethe
PLo's prwerful influencein two waysr by fosteringthe Islamistmove-
ment, and by the crearion of so-calledvillage Leagues,local councils
run by anti-PLO Palestinianswho were carefully vemedby the Israeli
military authorities. Yassin and the Brotherhood won significant
influenceovcr the Village l.eagues.up ro zoo membersof the Leagues
were given paramilitary training by Israel, and Shin Bet recruited
many paid informers through the nerwork.r6The leaguesrhemselves,
run by quislings,were desrinedto fail, scornedand ridiculed by pales-
tinians in the occupied rerrirories.But the Brotherhood would con-
tinue to gain, at the expenseof both Fatah and the more left-wing
Palestiniangroups, such as the Popular Fronr for the Liberation of
Palestine.
David shipler, a former reporter for the New york Times, cites the
Israeli military governor of Gaza as boasting that Israel expressly
financedthe Islamistsagainstthe pLO:

Politically speaking,Islamic fundamenralistswere sometimes

regardedas usefulto Israel,becausethey had conflictswith the sec-
ular supportersof the PLO. Violence betweenthe two groups
eruptedoccasionally on'WestBank universitycampuses, and the
 I srael'sIslamists r c)7

Israeli military governor of the Gaza Strip, BrigadierGeneral

\ " i ' s in
yitzhak Segev, oncetold me how he had financedthe Islamicmove-
.', dis- ment as a counterweightto the PLO and the Communists'"The
IsraeliGovernmentgaveme a budgetand the rnilitarygovernment
:-. tive
givest<t the mosques,"he said.In 1980, when fundantentalist
:iong
protestorssetfireto the officeof the Red CrescentSocietyin Gaza,
:,.:trcal headedby Dr. Haider Abdel-Shafi,a Communistand PLO sup-
:: p L l n porrer,theIsraeliarmy did nothing,intervening only whenthe mol'r
i :c h e s marchedto hishomeandseemed to threatenhim pcrsonally'I'

Israelwas not the only suppctrterof Yassinand the Muslim Brother-

Arabia,t(x)' wantedto undermirrethe
hood. Religiouselenrentsin Sar-rcli
secularPl.C),ar-rdwealthy SaudibusinessleaclcrshelpedfinanceYassin,
althgughhis ability to operatein Gazaclepended on the goodwill of the
"ties with the Muslim Brothcrhogdin Jgrdan
Isrzreliauthorities.Yassil't's
were instrutnentalin enablingthem to forgc closerelationswith Islamic
in Saudi Arabia, which in the 1c17os
institr-rrit;ns and rgtios providcd
Still,the gtlvernmentof
gcnerollsfinancialaid to Islamicassociations."ls
SaucliArabiir remainedsuspici<lus of Yassin,and cventuallyit would
seekro halt evenprivateSaudiaid to the Yassin-ledmovcment.Perhaps
to cgrry favor with conservative Saudi Islamists and Wahhabi-
influencedmenrbcrsof tlre royal farnily,the Brgthcrhgodattackedthe
outlook. The Brothcrhooclsaic'lthat thc I']I-O
PLO for its irreligior,rs
.,dgesnot serveGocl," and Yassilrdeclarcd:"Thc' pt.() is secularist.It

cannot be acceptedas a rcprcsentativeutrlessit becomesIslanlic."l'r

At the time, ir scemedunlikely that thc Muslim Brothcrhood
would gain much of a footholclirmongPalestinians.Firstof all, manv
r; l Palestrnianswere Christian,anclwould haveno truck with an organi-
zation pledgeclto creatc an Islamic state. Palestinianswerc alstr
.
- a\ -L^
LlIc among the Arab world's nrost modern, educated,ancl Westernized
' :e: Sl V populations,and as a diasporathey were well trirveledand well con-
nectedthrgughout the Arab world, the UniteclStates,and llurope, not
ro mentionthe USSR.Above all, they were nationalists.On the other
hand, the very nature of the PalestinianIslamistswas to oppose
nationalism,and to opposethe creationof a stateof Palestine,instead
focusingon the necessityof first IslamizingPalestineand the Arab
world. But among Palestiniansthe appealof Islamismgrew as Israel's
 r9[l D p v r r - 's Galtl

relentlessrepressionof the PLO causedpeople in the West Bank and

Gazato l ook for alternatives.
U.S. diplomats and CIA officialswere aware that Israelwas foster-
ing lslamism in the occupied territories. "\(/e saw Israel cultivate
Islam as a counterweightto Palestiniannationalism," says Martha
Kessler,a senior analyst for the CIA who early on was alert to thc
importanceof the Islamistmovementand the threat it could posc to
U.S. interestsin the region.20But neither the CIA nor the State
Department tried to stop it. Throughout the foreign serviceand the
national securitybureaucracyin Washington,there was division as to
of PalestinianIslamism.Somesaw it as benignor use-
the significance
ful, some as possiblyharmful, and sttmesimply believedit wouldn't
catchon, that Islamismwouldn't attracta following among Palcstini-
irns.SaysKesslcr:

RadicalIslamand extremismdidn'tconteinto playils muchwith

the Palestiniansas elsewhere,at leastcarly<ln.Many arnongthe
Palestiniandiasporilwere cducated,soplristicated, and sccular.
TheirrnovetowardIslamicradicalism didrr'ttakcplaceuntil later.
The Israelisencouragedit quite a bit. Although they weren't
for it completely,they dicln'tcrack clownorl it. They
resporrsible
allowedthem to flourish.Wherethey could fiddlearound with
eventsto elevateIslamiststo the detrir-nentof Fatah,they wtluld'
They'dtreatreligiousfigureswith deference.2l

"I thought they were playing with fire," saysDavid Long' a formcr
Middle L,astexpert at the State Department'sBureau of h-rtelligence
and Research."I didn't realizethey'd end up creatinga monster.But I
don't think you ought to messaround with potentialfanatics."zz
Meanwhile, in Syria,lsrael and Jordan were doing just that.

TencE T: D A MA S C U S

In the r97os,Israel and Jordan were technically at war with each

other,but they had a complex and cooperativerelationshipbehind the
 ls r a e l 's l s l a m i s t s ' r9c)

::-.fi and scenes.King Hussein was on the CIA payroll, and Israel'sand Jor-
dan's intelligenceserviceshad a relationshipthat, while it couldn't be
characterizedas warm, was at leastprofessionallycorrect. "There is a
long tradition of complex covert relations between the Hashemites
and the Zionists, over many years," according to Philip Wilcox' an
Israeland Jordan also had a
experiencedU.S. foreign serviceofficer.Z3
common enemy:Syria.
The Syrianruler,Hafez Assad,was vulnerableon Islamicgrounds.
He was. of course.a secularleaderand a Baathist.But Assadwas also
a memberof a religiousminority in Syria,the Alawites,a quasi-Shiite
secf that was viewed with disdain by the ultra-orthodox Muslim
Brotherhoodand which was considcredun-lslamicby \Tahhabicler-
ics. Perhapsmore than in other Arab countries,thc Mr-rslimBrother-
with kaleidoscopically
hood irr Syriawas highly factionalized, shifting
power centers both in Syrian Sunni strongholdssuch as Alcppo,
. :ir Hclrns,and Hama ilnd among Muslinr Brotherhoodleadersin exile in
:;] L
Ciernrany,Switzerland,and London.
.t l'.
Muslim Brotherhoodwas also an early offshoot of
The Syriar-r
l: i.
Hassan al-Bantra'smovement in Egypt. Thc Br:otherhoodin Syria
J:- . I
. :,\ drew its membersfronr thc ranksof Syrianstudentsreturningfrom Al
. :n Azhar in Clairc in thc nrid-t93os,and it formcd hranchcsin Syria's
nrajor cities under the namc Shabab Muhammed (Young Men of
Mr-rhammed). Alcppo, in northern Syria,scrved,ls thc he,ldcluarters
Brotherhoodbeginr-ring
of the Muslir-r-r in r9j5.r4 [n r944, its head-
: )rnle r qlrartersmovedto Damasclts,and it was led by MustafaSibai,a grad-
. r{ence uate of Al Azhar and fricnd of Hassanal-Banna.In the r9-tos' as
:, B LrtI Nasser cracked down on the movement' a significantnumber of
IJrotherhoodnremberstook refuge in Syria. Ilut rrs Syria moved intcl
the nationalistcamp, first joining Nasseras part of the United Arirb
Republicand thcn underthe Baathin the r96os,the Muslim Brother-
h<rodfound Syrialesshospitable . ln t964, the Brothersleclanti-Baath
"Islam or Baath." ln t967, during and
riots in Syria,under the slogar-r
after Syria'sdefeatin the war with Isr:rel,the Brotherhood'smost mil-
: : r'eCh itant faction declareda iihad againstthe Syrian government.Their
:..:r,-ithe animosityonly intensifiedafter r973, when Assadproclaimeda new
 L o o 'D r , v l t - 's Gaur

secularconstitution for Syria that describedthe country as a "demo- rtt-

cratic, popular, socialiststate." Violent Islamist demonstrationsfol-

lowed.25 irr:
In the mid-r97os, as Lebanon'sagonizingcivil war began,draw- t:, '

ing in Israel and Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood launchedan all-out Il-. -

assaultagainstthe governmentof Syria.

Beginningin t976, the Muslim Brctherhoodin Syria carried out
bomb attacks,and other violent actionsin numerous
assassinations,
cities,including Damascus.Next door, in Lcbanon, Syriawas engaged
in a proxy war with Israelin the midst of l-ebanon'scivil war, and the
Brothers proved to be a formidable anti-Assad force. Accusing the
Syrian regime of being run by "false Muslims," the Brotherhood
declaredjihad, its campaign led by Aclnan Saad al-Din, a former
member of the l.gyptian Muslirr-rBrotherhood. Thc Clombat Van-
guard of .Fighters,an undergroundparamilitary arm, assassinatcd
Baath officials and prominent Alawites, security agents,and inform-
ers, along with Sovictmilitary advisersin Syria.Graduallythe crisis
escalatedinto violent demonstrationsand strikes,and then to major
terrorist attacks. In June r97L), a gang of Brotherhood tcrrorists
attacked a Syrian rnilitary school in Alcppo, killing eighty-three
cadetsby locking them into a building and attacking it with auto-
matic weaponsand firebornbs.The following year,the Muslim Broth-
Assad,and the governmentretaliated
erhood attemptedto assassinate
in an unrestrainedcounterattack.In October r98o, the so-called
IslarnicFront of Syriawas established,
uniting the IslamicLiberation
Party, both factions of the Muslim Brotherhood, and other funda-
mentalistgroups. Fighting intensifiedin r98r, and in November a
massivecar bomb in Damascuskilled two hundred people.26
To carry out such sophisticatedoperationsagainsta stateknown for
its security apparatus,the Muslim Brotherhcloddependedon support
from both Jordan and Israel. The two nations did not try very hard to
keep their support secret,establishingtraining camps for Muslim Broth-
erhood fightersin Lebanon and in northern Jordan, near the Syrian bor-
der. Israel funneled support for the Muslim Brotherhood through
Lebanon,part of which went to the FreeLebanon Forces,a private army
of mostly Christian, but partly Shiite, militiamen in southern Lebanon
 Israel's Islamists ' 2o r

::-lo- run by a charismatic rebel military officer, Major Saad Haddad. In

-.1
,()t- 1978, in the midst of the Lebanesecivil war, Israelsent 2o'ooo troops
into I-ebanon,and in withdrawing, left paff of Lebanon under the con-
ffol of Major Haddad's FLR which remained allied with Israel until the
- (rLtt mid-r9Sos. In a seriesof communiqu6sin the early r98os, Haddad
boastedof training the Muslim Brotherhood.For example:
,)ut
:. ) L] S Yester:day the Free Lebanon commander,Ma1. Sa'd Haddad'
: led openedthe seventhtraining camp for the Muslim Brotherhood
i :h e somewherein Freel.ebanon.About 200 persons,most of them
Syrians and includingsomeLebanese, areattending thiscourse.In
a speech, Maj. Haddadurgedthe traineesto train ot't
commandrr
,,l d
operationsso that theyand their colleagues liberateSyriafrom the
':rcr
factional Alawi regime. . . . The Major said: "The trainingyou
will receive, whichis of highstandards and includes theart of sur-
.- . I
:-a L l
prisingthe enemn is not availableanywhereelsein the regionor
lt- evt'nitt the wholeworld."l-
:: >15

i (,1
Haddad providedthe
Actually,the trainingthat the Israeli-backcd
_ -\t)
Brotherhood was avirilablein at least two other placesat that exact
:.:ac moment: northern .fordan, and the Maronite Christian enclavein
- :()- a fascist-likemilitia run by the pro-
Lebanon,where the Phalangists,
- -. ll-t .
Nazi Gemayelclan and supportedby Israel,ran Brotherhoodcamps
I
: -fLl
..'.,] for war in Syria.
The campsin Jordanopcratednlorc or lessopcnly.In r 98 r, Syria's
ll, r ll
foreign minister denounccdKing Husscin: "The king's policy has
: J..t- driven him to transform Jordan into a base for the gang of murder
:- .t
and crime,the Muslim Brotherhood'in order to exert pressureon and
confuseSyria."28 Two weekslater,Assaddclivcreda lengthyspeechin
:()f
which he bitterly criticized.|ordanfor supportingthe Muslim Broth-
I ' rt erhood insurrectionin Svria:
iro
--L
.11-
Problemscreafedby the Muslim Brotherhoodlhave begunlto
. If _
emergeincreasingly in Syria.Of course,the Muslim Brotherhood
historicallink in thechainof reactionary-imperialist
is an essential
: : tV relationsin the region.. . . It was naturalfor theJordanianregime
:. , rn and the Muslim Brothersto exchangesupport'. . . It was natural
 Loz . Dgvtt-'s Gaur:

for the Muslim Brotherhoodgang to implementthe ordersand

for that gang to find all the necessary
arms,training,and finan-
cial facilitiesin the Jordanianarena.. . . We arrestedcrirninals
belongingto the Muslim Brotherhoodgang in Syria and at the
.fordanian-Syrian borderwho told us they had beenin Jordan,
lwhere they receivedlsumsof money,weapons,and forgediden-
tity cards.2e

And a month later, Abdullah Omar, a leading Baath Party official in

Syria,said that Syriahad evidencethat the Muslim Brotherhoodwas
backedbyJordanand by the "Phalangistgangsin Lebanon,supported
by Isr:reland U.S.imperialism.'r0After the explosionin l)amascr-rs
in
rgtlr that killed hundrcds,Syriaaccusedthe Muslim Brotherhoodof
actingas "agentsof Israel."sl
All of Assad'sand Omar'schargeswere true.
The scalcof the attacksin Syriawas harelyrcportedin the United
"C)ver thc past five
Statcs.A rare cxception appearedin I,Jewstuceft.
yearsthe Brotherhoodhasassassinated hundrcdsof Alawite members
of Assad'sruling Baath Party,along with their relativcs,Assad'sper-
and a nurrrberof Sovietadvisers,"l,lewsweekreportcd.
sonal dcrct<rr,
"Assad has irccusedJordan of providing shelterand training for Syr-
ian Brothcrs."ll But for thc most part, the Brotherhoodterror cam-
paign in Syriawas invisibleto Americans.Not so to U.S.intelligcnce,
however."We knew about the Muslim Brotherhoodthere,a lot more
than what was in the papers,"saysDavid Long. "I was the division
chief for Near Eastat INR lthe Bureauof lntelligenceand Researchl.
'We
looked benignly upon it. We knew it was risky, but life is risky."3l
I'or Assad,the Muslim Brotherboodpresentedan existentialthreat.
Martha Kessler,the former CIA analyst,saysthat Israeland Jordan

. . . were playing with fire, and I don't think they realizedhow

dangerous it would become.But for Assadit wascritical.He spent
nearlyfive yearstrying to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood,to
accommodate them or co-optthem.In the end,he'd virtuallylost
control of the northernthird of the country.He was going down
at the time.He was reallvin trouble."3a
 lsrael's Islamists ' 201

U.S. diplomats were aware of Jordanian support' at least' for the

Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, but claimed that the United Stateshad
a hands-offpolicy. Talcott Seelye,the U.S. ambassadorto Syria at the
time. says:

I was ambassador to Syriafrom 1978to 1981,and that'swhen I

becameaware of an undergroundlrlovementin Syria, because
therewas a carnpaignof bombingand assassitlatiolls of Baathist
;.. r 1i n of6cials.By 1979 we sensed the Islamicmovement in Syria.In
: \\'tls 1980,while I was out of the country'someonegot into Assad's
:, r ted officeand threw a bomb, and killed one tlf Assad'sbodyguards
" !- . \ it l br.rtmisscdhim.Thc Soviets,who had a lot of peoplethere,would
.1 of ridcarounclin hcavilvpr()tecred
vehicles.

Seelycsaysthat Assadsummonedhim to cornplainabout the Muslim

-': :Lr ed Brotherhoodviolence.
. : live
:: i .c rs King Husseinhad propitiatedthc fMuslim Brotherhoodl, which
'':L'l'- hadestablishcd carnpsin northJordan. I wentto see Assad, and he
States
told me: "l know the I-Jnitcd "l'cllikc
is behindthis." lsaicl,
::cci.
to secthe evidence.I can tell you Ioo percentthat wc are not."
: \).r- \Whether King Husseinwasactivelyinvolvcd,I don't know.
- .1tt t -

But Scelye adds:"I don't think it bothercdus too mdch theltthey werc
--l( )f C
r'
', \LOn
ceusingproblclnsfor Assa.l."
Actually, King Hussein was involved. Four years later, Jordan
-,: ; l rl .
. .. I I adrnrttedits role in support of the Muslirrr [Jrotherhtlodand apolo-
gizcdto Syria."lt turns out that somewho did havea connectionwith
: .:c. 1 t .
:
the bloody eventsin Syria were presentin our quArters"'wrote the
-,1

king, in a letter tO Assad.36In what was called an "extraordinary

admissign,"Husseinsaid that his country had permittedthe Brgther-
hood to wagewar on Syriafrom the kingdom but, in seekinga recon-
ciliation with Assad,he now believedthat the Muslim Brotherhood
..outlawscommitting crimes and sowing seedsof dissension
were
among people."King Hussein'sprime ministervisitedl)amascus,and
the king declaredthat he wanted to warn "againstthe evil designsof
 zo4 . D r . : v r r . 's (lavr,

this rotten group."37A few days later,hundredsof anti-SyrianMus-

lim Brotherhoodmemberswere roundedup in Jordan.rs
Robert Baeq a CIA operationsofficer who worked in the Middle
East and India, has written about his encounterswith thc Muslim
Brotherhood,criticizingthe agencyfor its willingnessto play along
with the Brothers. "Syria," wrore Baer, in Sleepingwitb the Deuil,
"seemedto be the real problem." That counrry was critical to the
prospectsof Middle East peace and, officially, $Tashingtonwantecl
Assadgone. "But," wrote Baer,"if he wcrc replacedby thc Brothers,
you could count on things gettinga lot worse." Baer askedhis boss,
Tom Twetten,about the Muslim Brotherhood:

He shrugged. "The Jordanians givc thcrnnr()ncyand rcfugc,but

only becausethey hate the Syrians-nrvcnemy'scncrly is rrrv
friendsortof deal.""What do the.fordarrians sayabourthern?"I
asked."We'don'tpresstheJordaniirns for clctails.
And thcv d<lrr'r
volunteeranythir-rg.
The Muslim Brotherhoodisn't a targetf()r
us." 'WhatTwettenwastellingrnewasthat he had no instructions
to spyon the MuslimBrotherhood. . . . Sincethe Muslim lJrother-
hood wasn'ta target,lthe CIA inl Amman wasn'tsr-rpposed to
wastemoneyon them.te

Did the United Statessupporr the Muslim Bnrtherhood directly?

Accordingto Baer,the answeris highly classified."Peoplesiridthere
were code-wordfileson this," he says,meaningthat only thosewhcr
were directlyinvolvedcould accessthoseultra-secret
reports."l don't
know. It was supportedby SaudiArabia, which was supportedby us.
'What
happened was, you simply went to governments and said:
Here'ssomemoney-do your dirty work. Or, we'd give ther-nsupplies
and equipment."
According to Baeq the Muslim Brotherhood wasn't gerring slrp-
port only from Haddad, the Israeli-backedmilitiaman in southcrn
Lebanon. "It wasn't just Major Haddad, it was the LebaneseFront,"
he says, meaning the right-wing LebaneseChristian bloc that had
closeties to Israel. "The LebaneseFront was protecting the Brother-
hood in Beirut, in Christian East Beirut." Baersaysrhar the CIA failed
to take the organization seriouslyas a potential threat. "\7e missed
 Israel's Islamists 205

\ I Lrs- the Muslim Brotherhood. It was seen as 'tlteir' problem," he says.

"Our approachto the Middle L,astwas definedb1,the Cold \X/ar,and
Il.ile if these guys were going after Assad, well, so what? \7e certainly
-..irt.n didn't confront King Husseinon this."a0Nor did we confront or chal-
- , . , il-18 lengethe Israelis.

rhc.
,::l t r'cl HnvA ANo H,A.NaRs
::irs,
-L )SS, In different ways, lsraeli and Jordarriansupport for the Muslirn
Brotherhoodcameto a headin the r98os.
In Syria,the final showdown betweenAssad'sgovernmentand the
Brotherhoodtook placcin Hanra,a Syriancity of zoo,ooowhich had
always beena strongholdof Sunni fundamentalism.It began,recalls
former U.S. ambassadorSeelye,with a rumor. "The eventsin Hama
started with a false rcport that Assad had been overthrown," Seelye
says.Excitedby the news,the Muslillt Brothcrhoodwent on a murder
sprec in the citp slaughterir-rghundreds of soldiers ar-rdSyrian offi-
cials."The Islamistskilled all of the Baathistofficialsin the city," says
Seelye.alFor Assad,it was an intolerableprtlvocation.He assernbled
his arn-ryspeciirlforces, uncler the command of his brother, Rifaat
t-
Assad,a notoriously heavy-handeclenforcer.Thousandsttf troctps-
: : '. r re rz,ooo, accordingto Amnesty Internatitlnal,with rhe lJrotherhood
'.'.irrr claimingthere were upwardsof 5o,ooo42-enteredHlttrl, ruthlcssly
, ,n'f supprcssingthc insurrcctionand leavingnrany dead. Again, figures
-
' '. us . vary. An early report in Time said that I,ooo were killed. Most
. .r trl: observerscstirnatedthat 5,ooo pcople died. lsraeli sources,and the
] : ]I CS Muslim Brotherhood,both chargedthat the deathtoll passedzo,ooo.
Over tirnc, the legendof Hama grew.It was usedby Syria'scriticsttr
\ " ltt -
r' portray Assadas a ruthless,Stalin-likekiller, a depictionthat Assad
::: c r t t did little to discouragebecauseit intimidatedMuslim Brotherhood
:tf . ' troublemakers. ReportedTime,wceksafter the crisis,"There were no
: reci signslastweek that the trouble in Hama was spreadingclsewherc."ar
"That," says Seelye,"was the encl of the Islarnicntovr:mentin
:..:lccl Syria."aa
: .. C d But in Israel'soccupiedterritories,the Brotherhoodwas still gaining
 206'l )E vl t.'s Gaup.

momenturn.In the early rgtlos Israelsupportedthe Islamistson sev-

eral fronts. It was, of course,supportingthe Gaza and \WestBank
Islamiststhat, ir-rr987, would found Hamas. It was, with Jordan,
backingthe Muslim IJrotherhoodwar againstSyria.In Afghanistan,
Israclcluietlysupportedthe jihad againstthe USSR,backingthe Mus-
lim Brothcrhood-linkedfundamentarlists who led the mujahideen.
And Israelbackcd lran, thc rrrilitantheart of the Islamistmovement,
during its long war with Iraq.
Not cveryoncin Israelwas happy with the policy of collaborating
with Islanists. From all accounts,it was prirnarily lsrael'sfar right-
Begin, Prinre Ministcr Yitzhak Shamir, and DefenseMinister Ariel
Sharon-who pr,rrsucdthis policy most aggrcssively. The Labor Party
in Isrireltendcdto secthe PLO as a viable partner for negotiationson a
final scttlerncnt.[Jutthe Israeliright opposeda settlementon principle
rrndwantcd to hold on to the occupied\WestBank,citing biblicalrea-
sonsfor wanting control ovcr .fucleaand Samaria,the ancientnames
for thi.rtdisputeclreal csfate.
"The fact is thilt Israel'spolicy was a mistakein the long run," says
Patrick [.ang, thc forrner Middle F.astdircctor for the DefenseIntelli-
ger-rceAgency.[.ang s:rysthat the not everyonein the Mossad, Israel's
intelligencescrvice,agreedthrrt supportingAhmed Yassin'sMuslim
Brothcrhoodwas a good idea. Especiallythose in the Mossad who
were most knowlcdgeableabout Arab and Islamic culture were
opposed."Thc Arilbistsin Israelisecurityservicesdidn't like it. But
the lsraelileaders{iguredthey would kill off the PLO terrorists,and
then they coulc'lclcalwith Hamas. They misunderstoodthe phenome-
non. The Israelis,most of them, were secularists,too, and they
thought thesereligious terronsts were a flash in the pan. They were
trying to defeatArab nationalismusingMuslim zealots."45
Victor Ostrovsky,a former Mossad officer who left the agencyand
becamea strong critic, is the author of two books on the Israelisecret
service.a6According to Ostrovsky, "right-wing elementsin the Mos-
sad" feared that the popularity of L,gypt'spresident Anwar Sadat
might force Israelto give up territoriesthat it wanted to hold on to, so
they backedfundamentalistEgyptian groups "under falseflags," that
is, by disguisingthe fact that the aid was coming from Israel.aTAnd
 Israel's Islamists ' zo7

:::>fs on sev- Ostrovsky leveledchargesthat the Israeli right deliberatelyfostered

: \\'est Bank Islamic fundamentalismamong Palestinians.
'.'.::h
Jordan,
Supportingthe radical elementsof Muslim fundamentalismsat
--.:lhanistan,
well with Mossad'sgeneralplan for the region.An Arab world
.:.: rhe Mus-
run by fundamenralists wttuldnot he I pert) t() erlvncg()tiilti()rr\
:r uj.rhideen. Israelagainas the onlv democratic,
with the West, thus leaving
,: :toYement,
rationalcountryin the region.And if the Mossadcould arrange
for Hamas. . . to take over the Pirlestinian
streetsfrom the PLO.
- i: borating thenthe picturewould be cotnplete.aE
'.
- -.
- . lr- rr
-:^l iLi l.r -

1.:-rster Ariel During most of thc r98os, the Muslim Brothcrhooclin (laza :rncl
, .,-l-'orParty the'West Bank did not support resistance to thc Israclioccuprltion.
'::-.itions on a Most of its energywent into fighting the Pl-O, especi:rllyits morc lefr-
n principle wing factions,on universitycampllses.Yassin'sfclllowersusedcluLrs,
. rr[''licalrea- chains,and even guns in violent clasheswith pro-P[.O Palestinian
---:int names nationalists.The IslamicUniversityin Ciirzawas the siteof nunrerous
battles,with PLO supportersseckingto secularizethe universityancl
--: t -L l n r" says the Muslim Brotherhood trying to prcserveits [slirrnistcharacter.In
::rse Intelli- one clash akrne, on .fune 4, rc)83,Iltore than 2oo studentswere
..-rd.Israel's injured. Similar confrontationsoccurred at Birzcit Univcrsity and
;.:.'. \{uslim Najah Universityin the West Bank.a"Fatah,the nrain componentof
i1 ,rsirdwho the PLO, tried to co-optthe Muslim Brotherhoocl,
seekingto arrangea
. -.:rlre were workablecompromise.The Muslirn Brothcrhoocl, howcvcqdcnrandcd
: .:Lc i t. But nothing lessthan the completeIslamizationof the P[,O, includingthc
:: r rists,and eliminationof the P[-C)'sleft wing. "The Muslirn Brothcrhoodlcaclcr-
r'-'rhenome- ship urged Fatah to purge its ranks of Marxist elements,to be alvitre
. :nd they and to cooperatccloselywith the Islemic
of the futility of secularism,
- The,vwere Efroups."'50
In r983, there occurreda curious and still unexplirinedinciclent
r :*enCyand which has led some of Ahmed Yassit't's critics to sllspectthat he hacl
i.:.rr-lisecret secretties to the Shin Bet. Itarly in the year, Yassinwris arrestcd by
::. rhe Mos- Israeliauthoritiesafter he "ordercd mcmbersof lthe IslamicCenterl
.:-riar Sadat to secretly gather firearms, which werc then clistribr-rtecl
arlons
.i on tor so selectedoperatives."5lSomeof the weaponswere stored in Yassin's
,:.,tqs,"that own house,and he was jailed. At the time, Palcstinianresistance
to
r:,lel.a7And lsrael was far more subdued than during the two ttprisings,or
 2oB . D svtt-'s GA N IE

intifadas, of later years, when armed Palestinianfighters were com- data t, :

mon. In 1983,however,a collection of deadly weaponry would have us. .]t ::
beenseenas a very seriousoffense.Although Yassinwas sentencedto the r:;-:
thirteen yearsin prison, he was releasedafter only a yeaL Compound- Estittt-
ing PLO suspicions,Yassin claimed that the weapons were being the lr::
F. --
gatherednot to attack Israeli forces but to combat other Palestinian
factions.
In t986-87, Yassin founded Hamas. Even then, as the intifada
beganto develop,there were reports that Israel was backing Hamas.
"There were persistent rumors that the Israeli secret service gave
covert support to Hamas, becausethey were seen as a rival to the
PLO," saysPhilip Wilcox, a former U.S. ambassadorand counterter-
rorism expert, who headed the U.S. consulate in Jerusalemat the
time. "I have never seenan intelligencedocument to that effect,but I
'Wilcox
wouldn't be surprisedif it were true." saysthat U.S. officials
in Jerusalemdealt "regularly and intensively" with Hamas in the late
r98os, calling it a "complex organizationwith different strains... '
There is a more moderateelement,which we've alwaysthought might
be amenableto negotiations,and then there are the fanatics and the
militants."52
Although Hamas won support from Kuwait and from some
wealthy Saudis, the Saudi government was suspiciousof Hamas.
"Saudi Arabia didn't want money going to an Israeli front organiza-
tion," saysCharlesFreeman,who was U.S. ambassadorto SaudiAra-
bia. "So they pulled in Prince Salman,the governor of Riyadh' and
made him the head of a committeeto stop the collection of money in
the mosques that might go to Hamas." Eventually, however, as
Hamas seemed to grow more independent of Israel, and as the
intifada gathered momentum, the committee stopped functioning
and Saudi Arabia began to look the other way. "Probably there are
membersof the Saudi royal family who give money to Hamas," says
Freeman.53
Not everyonein the U.S. governmentwas h"ppy about the emer-
gence of Hamas, particularly the Arabists and the more anti-Israel
centersof power in the Pentagon.The DefenseIntelligenceAgency,
alarmed at the strength of the PalestinianIslamists,began collecting
 Israel's Islamists . Lo9

" - i: : : \\ ' ef e CO I f I - data for an analysisof the phenomenonin the mid- to late r 98os. "For
.-:'. \\'ould have us, at the beginning,the PalestinianIslamicmovementwas way below
,t.,,-)Sentenced tO the radar," saysLang. "\7e tried to write an NIE [National Intelligence
:,,: Compound- Estimatelat the end of the r98os, sincenothing had beenwritten. But
' :. \\'ere being the friendsof Israelin the Reaganadministrationstoppedus."'54
: ::: Palestinian Even after the Palestinian uprising began in t987, the PLO
accusedHamas and Ahmed Yassinof acting "with the direct support
. .,> rhe intifada of reactionaryArab regimes. . . in collusion with the Israeli occupa-
:.,--.rng Hamas. tion." YasserArafat, the chairman of the PLO and presidentof the
: -: :r'rvice gave PalestinianAuthority, told an Italian newspaper:"Hamas is a crea-
.. .,.nval to the ture of Israel,which, at the time of Prime Minister Shamir,gavethem
.,-:.
- aounterter- money and more than 7oo institutions,among them schools,universi-
::-.illem at the Arafat told the paper that former Israeli prime
ties, and mosques."s-t
-- .-
.,
pfiant
!rrr!Lt
h"t
uqr
T
r minister Yitzhak Rabin admitted Israeli support for Hamas to him, in
.: L-.S.officials the presenceof Egyptian presidentHusni Mubarak. Arafat said that
:,-.:-..rsin the late Rabin describedit as a "fatal error."
r: ::-f Strains.... The establishmentof Hamas roughly coincided with the starr of
. . - ^,,rroht m ioh t the first intifada (ry82-gl). It was the first major, coordinatedPales-
:.:,:-.,riics
and the tinian uprising in the occupiedterritories,and virtually all Palestinian
factions supported it, including Hamas and the PLO. The uprising,
:-,* lrom some which included both violent and nonviolent tactics, had several
,.: of Hamas. important effects.It once again brought the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict
:: )i.]torganiza- to world attention,and it propelledmoderateIsraelis,suchas Yitzhak
: :,r SaudiAra- Rabin, Shimon Peres,and Ehud Barak, toward negotiationswith the
: Rrvadh,and PLO. The inauguration of the peace talks in Oslo, Norwag which
:r :-.()f money in beganthe so-calledOslo process,raisedthe first realistichope for an
'.. horvever,as Israeli-PLOsettlementsincets 62.
,:...tnd as the Hamas, which had previously used violence only against other
::: lunctioning Palestiniangroups, took up arms against Israel during the intifada,
^,.-rlvthere are leading to an Israeli crackdown. Many Hamas leaderswere arrested,
: H.rmasr"says including Yassin, in t989. Despite the support of Hamas for the
intifada, however,the PLO and Hamas were engagedin a constant
,:-: ,ut the emer- tug-of-war. \Thenever the PLO and the Israeli Labor Party moved
* :L' anti-Israel toward an accord, Hamas would unleasha violent wave of attacksto
...:-nce Agency, disrupt the talks. "Undermining the peace processhas always been
: ::.1n collecting the real target of Hamas and has played into the political ambitions of
 2ro D rvrr' s Gaur

Likud," wrote one analyst. "Every time Israeli and Palestiniannego-

tiators appearedready to take a major step toward achievingpeace,
an act of Hamas terrorism has scuttledthe peaceprocessand pushed
the two sidesapart."s6
Hamas soughtto gain advantageover the PLO by promoting itself
as the most militant force. ReportsRay Hanania:

The more the Labor-Arafatpeaceprocessadvanced,the more

Hamasturnedto violence.When . . . PLO officialsdenounced the
murder of touristsin Egypt in Februaryr99o, Hamascountered
by sendingvehicleswith loudspeakers throughthe streetsof major
Palestinian cities,praisingthe attacksand denouncingthe PLO for
its criticism.'57

BesidesHamas, which joined other Islamist organizationssuch as

PalestinianIslamicJihad and Hezbollah (Party of God) in adopting a
rejectioniststance,the Israeli right, led by Benjamin Netanyahu and
Ariel Sharon of the Likud, were fundamentally opposedto the kinds
of concessionsRabin, Peres,and Barak were willing to offer. From
r993 onward, Likud and Hamas would reinforceeachother'sopposi-
tion to peacetalks, often taking advantageof high-profile provoca-
tions from one side or the other.
Initially, Hamas found itself outflankedby Oslo. "During the years
of the Oslo peaceprocess(from Septemberr993 to Septemberzooo)
the political and military sectorsof the Islamic movement in which
Hamas predominatedwere substantivelyweakened by a number of
factors."-58
The Israeli Labor government and the PLO combined to
undermineHamas. In addition to arrestsand executionsof leadersof
Hamas, secular Palestinianswere mobilized to support the peace
talks. Popular opposition to rerrorism was widespread.But the Israeli
right, including its terrorist far right, would fatally undermine Oslo.
In February r994, an Israeli terrorist named Baruch Goldstein, a
member of the extremist Kach movement, entered a mosque in
Hebron, in the West Bank, and murdered dozens of unarmed wor-
shipers.The massacreinvigoratedHamas, which portrayedthe attack
as an assaulton Islam requiring an armed jihad in response.A wave
of suicide bombings followed. Then, in November r995, another
 l s r a e l 's l s l a m i s t s ' zrr

,::r nego- Israeli Likud-inspired terrorist murdered Prime Minister Rabin. The
-.. peace, death of Rabin left a vacuum in Israelipolitics,and the continuing sui-
- :ushed cide attacks by Hamas panicked the Israeli electorate,leading to the
electionof Netanyahu'sLikud in ry96. The tough-talkingNetanyahu
:::q itself launched an unsparingcampaign of repressionaimed at all Palestin-
ian groups, and in 1997 he ordered a botched attempt to kill a top
Hamas official in Jordan. But Yassinproved to be a survivor. In the
il- . , rf e
aftermath of that debacle,Israel and Jordan reachedan accord that
.: -: : h g
freed SheikhAhmed Yassinfrom prison, where he'd languishedsince
. l: : C d
*-. 0r his r989 arrest.SuddenlyYassinwas back in action in Gaza,thunder-
-1
ing againstOslo and building opposition to the PLO.
- ' :tlr
The pattern repeateditself in zooo. Netanyahu fell in t999, and
was replacedby Barak, who reengagedthe PLO in negotiationsand,
:. .uch as with PresidentClinton's help, camecloseto reachinga comprehensive
: , : ilng a deal. Once again, however,the Israeli right provoked the Islamists.In
." -,.lu and September2ooo, Sharon made a heavy-handed,provocative visit to
: - - kind s an Islamic holy site, the Haram al-Sharif/TempleMount, an action
:: . : . F rOm calculatedto provoke the Muslim Brotherhood fundamentalists,and
.' . ,ppo si - it did. The result was the second intifada (zooo-zoo4). Suicide
I t r')\'O C?- attacks in Israel murdered scoresof Jews, and stampededsecurity-
minded Israeli voters into Sharon'scamp. Sharon was overwhelm-
: ::'.evears ingly elected prime ministeq dooming any chance of a PlO-israel
_-
- . ann\
deal. Longtime observersof Israeli politics werb stunned that Israel
: s'hich would be led by a man who conductedterrorist attacksagainstPales-
: -.::rl.,erof tiniansin the 195os,as headof the infamousUnit ror, and who bore
: ::ned to responsibilityfor the massacreof hundreds of Palestinianrefugeesin
.:-:Jersof the Sabra and Shatila camps near Beirut by Israel'sPhalangistallies,
:: . . . p e i l ce during the r98z Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Called "the Bulldozer,"
::: I s r a e l i General Sharon launched an all-out effort to destroy both the PLO
:.: Oslo. and the PalestinianAuthority. Arafat was caught betweenHamas and
,: .lein, a Sharon:the Islamistswould carry out an atrocity, and Sharon would
'. :qtle in hold Arafat responsible,retaliatingagainstthe PLO.
:'.:J wor- Both Sharonand the Bush administrationrefusedto talk to Arafat,
:: :. lt t aCk marginalizingthe PLO leaderand creatingfurther room for Hamas to
:. -\ rvave grow. The result was predictable.Polls show that in t996, only r5
.: not he r percentof Palestiniansbackedthe Islamists;by zooo, it was still only
 zrz . Drvrr's Gerar

r7 percent. By zoor, however, 27 percentof Palestinianssupported

Hamas, and by zooz, aBirzeit University poll revealedthat 42 percenr
of Palestinianssupported the Hamas idea of an Islamic state. This
was, Roy says,"totally unprecedented."5e
At times it seemedas if Sharonwas intent on demolishingany pos-
sibility of a PLO-Hamas agreement,even though the Israeli govern-
ment ostensiblywas demandingthat the PLO end Hamas'scampaign
of suicideattacks.In zoor, when the PLO secureda Hamas pledgeto
halt its terrorist attacks, Sharon ordered the assassinationof a top
Hamas official. "\Thoever gave the green light to this act of liquida-
tion knew full well that he was thereby shatteringin one blow the
gentlemen'sagreementbetween Hamas and the PalestinianAuthor-
ity," wrote AIex Fishman in the Israeli newspaperYediot Achronot.
Again, in zooz, only ninety minutes before Hamas's Yassin was to
announcea.cease-fire,
Israel bombed a Hamas headquartersin Gaza,
killing seventeenpeople, including eleven children. lil/rote Roy:
"Some analysts maintain that while Hamas leaders are being tar-
geted,Israeliis simultaneouslypursuing its old strategyof promoting
Hamas over the secularnationalist factions as a way of ensuringthe
ultimate demise of the [PalestinianAuthority], and as an effort to
extinguishPalestiniannationalism once and for all."60
Yassin,and severalother top Hamas officials,were assassinated
by
the Israeli military and secretservicesin zoo4. Yet Hamas continues
to grow. In zoo4, Sharon announcedplans to withdraw unilaterally
from the Gaza Strip. After years of violencethere, Hamas is report-
edly the most powerful presenceon the ground, and if Israel does
withdraw, Hamas will make a play to emerge as the leading force in
Gaza,especiallyin the vacuum left by the death of YasserArafat.
The story of Hamas-from an Israeli experimentalpet project to
the PLO's chief nemesisto the main sourceof anti-Israeliviolencein
'West
Gaza and the Bank-ran the gamut of Islamist political expan-
sion from the r96os to the r99os and beyond. From an Israeli stand-
point, the growth and transformation of Hamas over thesedecades
was an earthquake, and it signaledto many in Israel that political
Islam was not a force to be trifled with. But the radicalization of the
PalestinianIslamist movementwas really not an earthquakeso much
 lsrael's Islamists zr3

: I lr)rte d as an aftershock.The original earthquakewas the one that shook Iran

in t979, toppling the shah and leading to the establishmentof the
r: , . T h i s Islamic Republic of Iran. That eventtransformedIslamismfrom being
a non-stateactor to the governmentof one of the region'smost pow-
erful states,and it excitedthe Islamic right throughout the region.
For the United States,perhaps,the forces of Islamism being used
against Syria and the PLO were small potatoes. But Iran, one of
America's twin pillars of the PersianGulf, was at the heart of U.S.
interestsin the region. For the first time, after the Shiiterevolution in
Iran, the United Stateswas moved to take a seriouslook at whether
the Islamic right was a double-edgedsword that could pose a serious
threat to the West.

- , - - ,-l h. t

: .: lnue s
r- -.r ll. t

:aport-
r=. does
: ,:aein
:: : .
 \
i. -.
lL -:.

9 fiL--

rn-

T( \:
s:-1

HELL' S AYATOLLAH

NsvER DrD A REVoLUTToN catch the United Statesmore by

surprise than did the one rhar swamped Iran in ry78-79. For a
moment) it seemedas if the entire U.S. position in the Middle East
might crumble, that SaudiArabia and the Gulf would fall to a revolu-
tion like that in Iran, that no Arab monarchy-from Jordan to
N[s1ecg6-was safe.Panicky U.S. officials ordered the CIA to deter-
mine if lran's Islamic revolution might spread,and the U.S. govern-
ment hired a steadysrreamof expertson Islam to provide insightsand
predictions.National securityexpertsworried that the line of defense
along the SovietUnion's sourhernflank had been breachedand that
the USSRwould take advantageof the collapseof Iran to swoop inro
the region and supplant the United Stares.
For the first time, political Islam moved to cenrer srage,and the
consequences would be profound. In Iran, in Afghanistan, in Paki-
stan, in widening, concentriccircles,the Islamic right was no longer a
marginal force but the driving energy behind a porenrially region-
wide transformarion.For analystsof the big picture, it was no longer
unthinkable to envisage a string of Islamist regimes from North
Africa through Egypt and Sudanto Syria,Iraq, and SaudiArabia and
into Pakistanand Afghanistan.
 Hell'sAl,atollah . zr5

Yet when the dust cleared,the American positiclnheld. Iran-or so

it appeared lost to American influence, but the rest of the
empire seemedsecure.With the exception of marginal Sudan,where
the Islamic right seizedpower in the 198os,the Iranian virus seemed
to have beencontained.So for many policy makers,spooks,and spe-
cialistsin the Middle East,it was back to businessas usual.Tne revo-
lution in lran was dismissedas a specialcase,and while Iran itself was
regardedas a regionalthreat, the United Statesdid not beginto regard
the Islamic right as a significant foe. The United Statesmaintained
closeties-including covert ones,through intelligenceliaisons-with
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan,the two bastionsof Sunni Islamic funda-
mentalism. The Islamist insurrections against Syria and the PLO
crestedin the r9Sos,and neitherone causedany alarm in U.S.policy
circles.And in the r9Sos the United Statesspentmore than $3 billion
supporting the Afghan mujahideen,whose political objectiveswere
difficult to distinguishfrom those of Iran's ayatollahs.The American
::cby alliancewith the Islamic right rolled on.
.Fora In various ways, too, the United Statestried to connect with the
: - East Islamic Republic of Iran. The Carter administration'sliberalstried to
::', OIU- befriend the seeminglymoderate,American- and European-educated
:*-:n to Islamistsaround Khomeini, who wore suits instead of clerical garb,
.rcter- while many U.S. neoconservatives,including officials in President
I . tt lt-
Reagan'sadministration,reachedout insteadto the'hard-coreclergy
.. ^ - :And
: and the Qom-basedayatollahswho were the real power in Teheran.
c lt s c
-; . Neither of theseinitiatives bore fruit, however,and Iran for the next
:.i rhat quarter-centurywould bedevilU.S.policy.
: into The revolution in lran stunnedand confoundedthe United States.
A confused,bumbling, and often contradictory policy toward Iran's
,: .i rhe revolutionariesmarked U.S. policy from r977, when the first stirring
- P:ki-
of the revolt occurred,through the uprising, the fall of the shah, the
near-civilwar that gripped Iran until 198r, and the consolidationof
:-:i O n - the clericalregimein the r98os.
-'i l q e r First, Washington exhibited an inertial reliance on its nearly
\orth unlimited confidencein the shah.Throughout the r97os, U.S. intelli-
'.-:.lnd gencereports repeatedlyconcludedthat the shah'sregimewas secure,
and theseoptimistic assessments
continued up to the very eve of the
 zr6 D rvtr' s Geur

revolution, leading many U.S. policy makers to believe that the abandoninE
shah was not seriously threatened.In these reports, Iran's Islamic donaries. .:
movement was usually ignored or relegatedto a footnote. The CIlt's successor:
aid to Iran's Islamistsin r95J was ancienthistorg and in the decades who had .::
that followed the shah marginalizedthe ayatollahs,exiling some- sandsof i-.
including Khomeini-and buying off others. The State Department Khomeir-r.:
and the CIA complacentlyignoredIslam in Iran, which suitedthe shah though .r:'
iust fine: the shah vigorouslyopposedU.S. contactswith lran's clergy, How ccl'.l-
evenwith the more docile,pro-regimeayatollahson the shah'spayroll. pled if ir '.''=
But after the Carter administration got its national securityteam Amer:.:
in place in 1977, the United States began pressing the Iranian United >:':
monarch for reforms and establisheda pattern of intensive,sub rosa The U.:. ::
consultationswith lranian opposition groups, including key religious not Ire: :
leaders.This had the effectof weakeningthe shah'sresolve,confusing Khome::-,-
his regime, and bugying the religious right. The U.S. goal in making offici,ri :
t1
thesecontactswas not revolution, but what many hoped would be a repunL:
'.
more stable,pro-U.S.constitutionalmonarchy.Part of what was driv- $-as tn-. -'-*
ing this effort were persistentrumors-apparently backed by solid suit-u.',:':
U.S. intelligencereports-that the shah had cancer.(He did, and he Ghot'n:.'-
died in exile in r98o.) Those who pursued this policy apparently \clL'--- -

beiieved that the shah was strong enough to weather a transition Qo tt-t-: -:..
\ ( --,.
peacefully,and that it would result in more power for Iran's intellec- -\ l a -: -'

tual elite,the aging heirs of Mohammed Mossadegh'sNational Front, Sonl. '-'-'''

the technocrats,and a smattering of moderate Shiite religious ele- I IIC\
-

ments. \fhat they didn't realizewas that the anti-shah movement , rI l l l -: -:

would be driven increasinglyby the religious right, above all by the -i! ! \ -
*
_

steely,l.enin-like figure of Ayatollah Khomeini. I.:.'- - l ::

Then, however, during the revolution itself-especially from

November ry78 to the capture of Teheranby Khomeini in February ::-.::. .:

ry79-the Carter administrationfell into bitter internalwarfare, with

some arguing that the United Statesought to abandon the shah and :-: . -a

others urging that the United Statessupport a bloody military putsch ,-:: :-
againstthe revolution. During those crucial four months the United
Stateshad no policy at all, and in any caseit was too late to change
the course of events.The shah fled, his government collapsed,and
the Islamic Republic of Iran was born. Those who had argued for
 Hell's Ayatollah zr7

abandoningthe shah had clearly underestimatedthe Islamist revolu-

,.,rrniC tionaries, and now they counted on the emergenceof a democratic
: \ l1 1 s successorregimewith a slight Islamisttinge, not a dicratorship.Those
:-:'ades who had argued for a coup, which would have led to tens of thou-
. nl e - sandsof deaths,had also underestimatedthe depth and power of the
: : :: l l e n t Khomeini movement.Their view was often colored by the insistenr,
:: shah though absurd, belief that the USSR was behind the trouble in Iran.
_. ! r
b/! How could so powerful an American ally as the shah of Iran be top-
: -:.,roll. pled if it weren't Moscow's doing?
. :ian-l American policy wasn't any clearer after the revolution. The
^ -. . nian United Stateshad preciousfew experts on Iran's Islamist movement.
-: r os a The U.S. diplomats who went to Iran after the revolution were mostly
: . . I iO US not Iran specialists,and they knew little about Islam or about
:: , ising Khomeini and his ilk. Many of them worked hard to implement the
--.. - .'. . ,*b'ing
official policy of trying to work out a modus vivendi with the Islamic
:bea republic, but that policy came crashingdown when the U.S. embassy
:- u11t- was invaded by a mob in November ry79. The'Western-educated,
" .olid suit-wearing aides to Khomeini-men like Ibrahim Yazdi, Sadegh
,:t.i he Ghotbzadeh, and Abolhassan Bani-Sadr-were swept away in the
r -' r.r l-,
"second revolution" that followed the embassy takeover, and the
: - ): i l O n
Qom-basedclergy and Khomeini assertednear-dictatorialcontrol.
:::liec- Meanwhile, U.S. hard-liners were not ready to give up on lran.
F:o nt, Somesaw Iran's Islamicorientationas a threat ro rhe SovietUnion.
,.r ele- They counted on Iran's fear of its Russianneighbor to the north and
', :-llle l1t
on the Islamists' hostility to communism to move Iran back into
:', the accord with the United States.Supportersof Israel-and, of course)
Israel itself-saw even the militant mullahs as potential allies. Even
:T0ITI during the U.S. embassy crisis, Reagan and the neoconservatives
: : '! t i l ry made overturesto the mullahs. By the mid-r98os, the neoconserva-
: . \\ 'it h tives,Israeliintelligence,and Col. Oliver North of the National Secu-
:t a t nd rity Council joined Bill Caseyof the CIA in a secretinitiative reaching
:, l r sch out to the strongmanof Iran, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.
L r r t ed The religiousrevolution in Iran did more than kick the props out
. 1.rrlge from underneathAmerica's most important outpost in the region. It
J . a nd crystallized a fundamental change in the character of the Islamic
:; ; f O f right, one that had been taking shape since the rise of the Muslim
 2r 8 D n v t l 's Gaun

Brotherhood decadesearlier.As it gained strength in the r97os) the

Islamic right grew more assertive,and parts of it were radicalized.
Violence-proneoffshoots,typified by the emergenceof an Islamistter-
rorist underground in Egypt, emergedto challenge'STestern-oriented L)i-.

regimes, and the terrorist Hezbollah movement gained force in lr'

Lebanon.Even the more mainstreamIslamistgroups were inspiredby o::-

the example of Iran, and many Muslim Brotherhood-linked otganiza- :-_'.'
tions took on a more pronouncedpolitical character. -1--!

The errors that the United Statescommitted during and after the ,:.:
revolution in Iran were almost Shakespeareanin their tragic scope.An
enormouspart of the blame falls on the U.S. intelligencesystem.The
fall of the shah was the most significantfailure of U.S. intelligence
betweenPearl Harbor and the attacksof Septemberrr' zoor. As the
United Stateseagerlylent support to the Afghan jihadists and reached
out to supposedlymoderatemullahs in Teheran,almost no one in the
intelligencecommuniry was looking ar the big picture. To the Ameri-
can public, the dark-eyed, scowling visage of Ayatollah Khomeini
symbolized the emergenceof a threatening new force on the world
scene. But for U.S. diplomats and intelligenceofficers, right-wing
political Islam continued to be profoundly misunderstood.Even as
Islamism's power made itself felt-in the violence in Mecca, civil war
in Syria, Sadat'sassassination-the United Statesfailed to grasp its
implications.Even after Iran, Islamism was not seenas a worldwide
movement linked by fraternal bonds and secretsocieties,but as a frag-
mented, country-by-country ideological movement. The narve argued
that Iran was a unique case,a conservativedictatorshipthat had fallen
to a peculiar form of Shiite militancy that would have no resonance
among the Sunni Muslim majority. Others, naive in a different and
more dangerous way, were seizedwith the notion that Iranian-style
Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood could be mobilized in
Afghanistan and Central Asia as a tool for dismantling the Soviet
Union. Despite the pronounced anti-American feeling at the heart of
Islamism, key officials-from Jimmy Carter's national security adviser,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, to Ronald Reagan'sCIA director, Bill Casey-
would aggressivelypursue the idea that political Islam was just
another Dawn on whatBrzezinski called "the Grand Chessboard."
 Hell's Ayatollah zr9

: !. r he
: i r zed. Tgp RETURN OF THE AYAToLLAH
: it ter-
-:; n t ed On February 2, 1979, just a day after Ayatollah Khomeini made his
: :e in triumphant return to lran, George Lambrakis, a senior U.S. embassy
::d by officer in Teheran, dispatched a long missive to \Tashington. In it, he
mused about the implications of the takeover of Iran by Khomeini
"i nrza-
and his ilk. And he wasn't too worried. His assessmentis worth quot-
ing at length, because it shows how profoundly the United States
underestimated the Khomeini movement only days before the ayatol-
lah took control of Iran:

Our best assessment to date is that the Shia Islamic movement is far
better organized, enlightened, and able to resist communism than
its detractors would lead us to believe. It is rooted in the Iranian
people more than any 'Western ideology, including communrsm.
However, its governing procedures are not clear, and probably
have not totally been worked out. It is possiblethat the processof
governing might produce accommodations with anti-clerical, intel-
lectual strains which exist in the opposition to produce something
more closely approaching'Westernizeddemocratic processesthan
might at first be apparent. . . .
The Islamic establishmentis neither as weak nor as ignorant
as the shah'sgovernment and some 'Westernobservers.wouldpor-
tray it. It has a far better grip on the emotions of the people and on
the money of the bazaar than any other group. In many ways it
supports a reformist/traditionalist view of Iran which is far more
attractive to most Iranians at this time than the models of commu-
nism representedby the SovietUnion or mainland China.
On the other hand, it is not guaranteedto operate in a parlia-
mentary democratic fashion as we understand it in the lVest. . . . A
good deal of authority is likely to be exercisedby an Islamic Coun-
cil. Though the make-up of such a council is still not clear, under
the movement's program, political leaders rather than mullahs
would appear destined to play the preponderant role in making
'We
and executing government policy. . . . suspectthat the Moslem
establishmentwould probably not be able to avoid making some
tust accommodations with Westernized ideas of government held bv
ma n y i n th e o p p o s i ti o n movement.I
 z2-o . D r , v r r 's Geltp

Khomeini had returned to Iran, from Paris, on February r, just a

day before Lambrakis'smemo was written. Nine days later, the interim
governmentof Iran collapsedand the mullahs createdthe dictatorship
that has lasted more than a quarter of a century. PresidentCarter wel-
comed the new Iranian governmentand optimisticallyreachedout to
its leaders,but ominouslS on February r4, a Khomeini-inspiredmob
seizedcontrol of the U.S.embassyin Iran, only to withdraw after tense
negotiations. Nine months later, a similar mob invaded the embassy
and held scores of American personnel hostage for more than a
year,precipitating one of the greatestdiplomatic crisesin American his-
tory. By the end of it, Khomeini reigned unchallengedas Iran's dictator.
How could Lambrakis have beenso wrong? \fhy did a seniorU.S.
government official-and he was not alone-believe that Khomeini
and his clerical mafia would cede power to "political leadersrather
than mullahs"? \fhy would he describethe Khomeini movement as
"enlightened"? \7hy would he expect that something "closely
approachingWesternizeddemocraticprocesses"would emerge?
There is plenty of blame to go around. Neither the StateDepart-
ment, nor the CIA, nor the vauntedcommunity of foreign policy think
tanks, nor academiagot lran right. Most of the blame must go to the
U.S.government,for mixing blind ignoranceof Iran with sheerincom-
petence.But the blindnessextendedto many leading U.S. academic
specialistson Iran. Several-the University of Texas'sJamesBill, the
Universityof Texas'sMarvin Zonis, and the Universityof Pittsburgh's
Richard Cottam, the former CIA officer-acted as semi-official con-
sultants to the \fhite House and the State Department in r978-7r1.
Bill, whose book, Tbe Eagleand the Lion, is often cited as a definitive
work on U.S.-Iranrelations,authoreda major piecein loreign Affairs,
the journal of the Council on ForeignRelations,in late r978 that, like
Lambrakis's missive, also completely missed the mark. Even as
Khomeini thunderedagainstthe shahfrom Iraq and then from France,
and mobs carried photos of the ayatollah down the streetsof every
major Iranian city, in "Iran and the Crisisof t978" Bill concludedthat

. . . the most probablealternativeif the Pahlavidynastyshouldbe

destroyedby force and violenceis that a ieft-wing, progresslve
 Hell'sAyatollah ' zzr

group of middle-ranking army officers would take charge. . . .

Other future possibilitiesinclude a right-wing military junta, a lib-
eral democratic system based on Western models, and a commu-
nist government.2

Nowhcre in the piece does Bill even mention the possibilityof an

Islamic republic,even though by then Ayatollah Khomeini was the
clearlyacknowledgedleaderof the revolution.Bill, one of the United
States'few experfs on lran, was not the clnly one to misread Iran's
f-uture.As the wave of lran's revolution crestedin Novemltsv 1c;78,a
high-levelrneetingat the StateDepartlrent was calledto irnalyzethe
unfolding crisis. I-Ienry Precht, the departrncnt'sIran desk officeq
rccallshow-despite all thc intelligenccavailableto him-he got his
an:rlysisfrom a handful of lr:rniansfudentshc nretthe night before:

Latc in Novemberr978,we callec'l irr all the expertson Iran,offi-

cerswho'd scrvedthere,others,and we hadthisbig confabto clis-
cusswhat to cloaboutIran and what was goingto happenthere.
Well, the night beforeI'd gr:est-lectured at a classat American
Universitpand it turneclout therewerea lot <lflr:rnianstudcnts
there.And whcrrI asl<ed what they thoughtwirsgoingto happcn
in lran, they all saicl:lslarnicgovernnrent. T'hcnext clay,at our
confcrcnce, we went aroundthe r<lontall sayirrg what we thought
rvouldl.rrrppen, peoplewcresayingthingslike,"Thepewill bc
:rr.rd
a Iibcralg()vernrncnt,with thc NationrrlFrout,and Kh<lmcini will
go to Qonr." \7henlny trlnrcatne] said,"lslarnicgovernment." I
wastheonly one.'

J'he fact thc U.S.governmentgot lran so wrong cannot be seenas

anythingbut a massiveintelligencefailure. But thc failurewas not due
to a lack of information, for thc revolution was unfolding in the
streets. and Khomeini was not an invisible actor. Yet the United
Statcs,which initiallyhad supremeconfidencein the shahof lran, was
convinceclthat Iran was stableand not susceptible
to rcvolution.Even
as the revolutiongaineclmomentum,and it sectnedincreasingly clear
that the shah could not survive, the United Statesrefusedto believe
that Khonrcinianclthe clergywould seizepower for themselves, pre-
ferringto believethat somesort of religious-secular
hybrid democracy
 [)l vl t-'s Ga,vtl '

would emergein the chaosthat followedthe fall of the shah.Thomas r 93O S.t ( ) : :

Ahern, the CllA stationchief in lran in r979, arrivedmonths after the mit, thc -

revolutionand was taken hostagcby the Khomeini-directed mob that vet er an \ \ :

thc embassyon November4, spcnding 444 daysas a captive.

seizecl hattatr ll-,:
| . ()l l| .r---
----
Accordingto Ahcrn, the revolutionshouldhavebeenplain to sce,for nl g

anyonewho cared to look out the winclow in tc)78.He recallsthat Am er t c. r :

when hc rcturneclto CllA headquarters in r98r, irfterbeingfreed,the grun.rt-rlc"

irgencywas bentoaningits failureto anticipatethe revolution."Aftcr I lr an gr . ''''

got back,thcrc was a seniorpcrsonirr thc Near ItastDivisionlamcnt- and sc. : : ' .

irbout thc fall of the shah," recallsAhern.

ing tlre intelligcncefailr-rrc m ake i''- .

"Ancl I lookedat him anclaskcclhirn if he hadn't beenlooking at what m or c ii: '- :

going on in the strccts!"Thc C.lA,Ahcrn said,trcatedthe prob-

rnu,as sand: '':
eX P el .l :l :
lcrn of pre-revolutionaryIran in traditional spy-versus-spy fashion,
trying to cliscoversccrctsabout the Khomeini mrlvernentand the sta- Clolcl\\ .:
bility of the slrirh..But,hc says,the CIA failcd to draw obviousinier- ncss.l:-.-
cncesfrom what was going on in day-to-clayilff:rirs,and so it str-rck Dltrrrl:::
se ctl i - :: -
with its sceminglysafepredictiotrthat the shah was gtlit'tgto survive.
"We joincd the rest of the govcrnrncntapparatlrsin tellingthe White of lr.r:-
\c . l
House what it watrtedto heaq which is that this was just a nuisance
supportfronl \\'.1\ :-. :
and that the shahwas iust fine,anclthat with ur-rlimitcd
thc United Statcshe would wertl.rerthc storm. There was a failureat incl.
the working levelto speaktruth to power."+ IiL.c:.'--.
'Irl'.:.'. .
In the r 97os,that powcr restedwith drrecfactionsin U'S. policy cir- '
) rr-" '_
cles,cach of which approachedlran in differcntways, and-each in its
ti\ _'- \
own way-didn't scc Khomeini'svictory cttnting.For each,Ayatollah
Khorneiniwas like a Rorschachtcst, i1dark figure in whom specialists :1'.1I -
--
--
, r:'-
on lran and seniorpolicy makerscoulclseewhat they wanted to see.All
:- .-

\_J:-
mademistakes,and in doing so helpedKhomeini succeed.
Firstwerethe Kissinger-led realists,who guidedU.S.policy toward
Irarr in thc first half of the decade.For them, Khomeini was nearly
invisible.They'd spentthe r97os building Iran into a regionalpower,
the policemanof the Gulf, and America'sbulwark againstthe USSR
and Arab nationalism. Their allies included the CIA, from Richard
Helms, the CIA director appointedas ambassadorto han in r973
rvho as a boy had gone to school with the shah in Switzerlandin the

:...:. Thomas
::') .lfterthe
::: nrobthat
i: .l cilptive.
:. :o 5gg, f61
: ::;alls that
- i
- i'--,
rrLLu,
'l tL rtL
h-
: :: . "A fte r I
. :.]lrtment-
,-. :. lr Ah e rn .
.: ::{ .rt whilt
-* :he p ro b -
. : '. lrt sh i o n ,
, ,: r . l f he sta -
-.. , ) Llsi n fe r-
:. , r tS t U Ck
: :, ) \ urvi vc.
* : r c'Wh i te
: _1It Llts 2lnc e
i:: .( )rt fro m
. . : :r ilu rc a t
> : . ,rlicy ci r-
-,' . rch i n i ts
-. . \ r 'ato l l a h
-- . : r. ci i rl i sts
:-: , I S e e .Al l
.\ t owa rd
, '.. l\ llea rl y
:',tl plowcr,
,: :hc U SSR
:: I{ichar:d
, t n rL )7 3
: . , : c l in th e
Hell's Ayatollah ' Lz3
r93os, to the veteransof t953, includingthe Rooseveltbrothers:Ker-
mit, the covert operator extraordinaire, and Archie, another CIA
veteranwho was a senior official at David Rockefeller'sChaseMan-
hattan Bank. Kissinger,Helms, the Roosevelts,Rockefeller,and the
big oil and defensefirms had spent years turning Iran into a virtual
American colony, especiallyunder PresidentRichard Nixon. They
grumbled at the shah's occasionalefforts to assertindependenceas
Iran grew stronger,and they were annoyedat the shah'sextravagance
and seemingmegakrmania.They bristled at the shah'sreadinessto
make businessdeals with thc Sovict Union from timc to time. Ilut
more important was the bottom line: Iran was hostingtens of thou-
sandsof U.S. military advisers.[t was the numbcr-oncmarket for
expensiveweaponssystents,and could be counted as :rn ally in thc
Cold War everywhere.And it was a very profitableplaceto do busi-
ness.Iran was an Americanoutpostat the heartof thc world's oil supply.
Zbigniew Brzezittski,
During the Clarteraclministration, the national
most
securityadviser, closclyapprorimated thc Nixon-Kissingervicw
of Iran.
Secondwerc the Clarteradministrationliberals.For them,Khon'reirti
was not invisible,but hc was a vagueforce in thc background,seem-
ingly less important than ir diversecollectionof intellectuals,lcft-
liberals, reformcrs, and former National Front activists.Thc Clarter
liberalsin Wershington wcre wary of the shah anc]conccrncdabor.rtthe
armsbuildupin lran. Not as hawkishas Brzezinski, they weretroublccl
by the Nixon-Kissingcrwillinlaness to allow the shaha blank chcckin
building up his military.They wcre also r"rnhappy
with thc shah'srecord
on human rights ancl with the authoritarian nature of the regime.In
keeping with C:rrter's oft-spoken desire to promote hurnan rigl-rts
abroad,they prcssedthc shahto liberalizcthc rcgimc.Someclearlyfelt
that wholesalercform, and even the end of the shah'srcgimc, wits rut
important goal of U.S. foreignpolicy.[n that conncction,Khomeini's
forceswere seennot as a threat,l'rutas a suitablyanti-communistjunittr
partner in a broad Iranian national reform moventent. l)uring the
administration,the liberalswerc representedby the StateDepartment,
particularlythe Iran deskand the human rightsteam.
 zL4 . D t v l r - 's Gnur

Third were the hard-right advocates.f cold war supremacyand didn't st:.
Americanmight. Toda6 they would be calredthe "neoconservatives." of{icial ri :
During the carter adrninistrirtion,the right was mostly in
and it graduallyc'alescedaround candidateRonald Reagan 'pp.sition,
in the Thc:.
late r97os. cl.sely alliedwith Israel-which, i'rurn, was joineclwith ettl t'-'-'
Iran in an axis againstthe Arabs-the ne,c.r.rservatives tt'tttl :i
wcre''t fazcd
N .t:: :
by Khomeini. Though they supportedthe shah,they didn't hcsitateto
t( ) '- - l
developcl'se, though covcrt, connecti'ns with thc I(h'rnei'i rcginrc
r r l '' ':
after r 1179.ln r98o, Rcagan'steam engagedin sccrettalks on irrms
and hostages with Teheran'sayatollahsin a calculatecleff,rt to urder- l
LIL!'

mine carter, in what hasc'me t. be known as the "oct.lrer Surprise" l-f -:-
-:

scandal.Besidcsarms, Israel als' pr.vided ira' with intclligence .-\::'"

throughoutits war with Iraq. And, together,Isr:rcland the r-
vatives,along with Bill casey, iriruguratedthe Iran-c.ntra'eoconse
scandal, Irrhi. :-
involvingyct additlonalarms salesto Khomci'i's regime,fro'r both str()llr:-
Israeland the United States. reg,fll. -
ce r l l .:.:-
r 9 6 :.. .:
Carter dnd the Shah
clcrc :
The inaug'rari.rr of Jim'iy carter as presidenralarmeclthe shaha'd suPi. ::
encouragedthe Iranian opposition, from the intellectr-rals irr thc ttl r.l
-'

National Fror.rtto rhe ayatollahsof the Islamicright. clarter'sr'augu- I' :. -t

ration in r977, for many Iranians,triggeredrnemoriesof an earlier t'cfr ,: ::-..
period in U.S.-Iranrelations-nrt the cllA's r95l coup d'6rar,which clcr *'
rest.red the shah to power, but the early r96os, when the Kcnncdy rr::-.:-- "
administratio.royed with the idea unsearingthe shah and rcplac-
'f
ing hirn with a less aurhoritarian regime. t.l ,
The carrer white F{ouse f " '.=

placed great ernphasison human rights, ancl many admi'ristration l l ' . : --' . '

of6cialsobjectedto the old policy of building up thc shah'spower. :(,..' -

Both the monarchy and the mulrahs remernberedthe Kennedy
administration, and they saw it as a prececlent.I)uri'g the Kennedy i l -: -

years' John Bowling, the Iran specialist at the State Deparrmenr,

wrote a paper analyzi'g lran's opposition forces and "discussingthe .....
advantagesof a sTesternpolicy shift of supporr for a narionalist,more
popularly based,Mosaddiqistcoup.".tBut the doubtsabout the shah

-: ::l l .l C Y 3nd
" . : : . \ .1 ti ve s. "
'- r losi ti o n ,
l.: .',- . 1I1i n th e
- 1. 'ln e d wi th
' ' : : cll't fa ze d
_ " . t i\ lta te to
:- - :l l .)l f C$lI T le
ll l' t)ll ?I I T I S
: :: to Llnc ler-
^. : \ urp ri se "
:- : rt r'l l i g e n c e
:- - : t c ()co n ser -
- - :: . 1sci l n d a l ,
-- ,. jr o n r b o th
: r.. .hrth and
,:...r1\ in thc
j- : : . : - \ inilLrgu-
-. llt e i l rl i e r
- " - i. . lt, wh i ch
:c Ke n n cd y
r . r n.1re p l a c -
' . '.
: rit e Ho u se
--:: l lr i strll ti()r1
r^ \ f owe r.
: : -. . 'Kcn n e d y
:rc Kcn n e d y
i)cpr trtn tcn t ,
i:. . Lls si n g th c
: : rJlist, rro re
: ) ur t h e sh a h
Hell's Ayatollah ' zz5
didn't start with Kennedy, according to a former high-ranking CIA
official who was involved in the discussions:
There rvas a big debate,in the U.S. governmentand in the
embassy:Shouldwe support the shah,or a nationalistgovern-
ment? This had been going on sinceabout r95ti, when the
itself.The questionwas:Do we want
NatiorralFront reconstituted
shahor support Thcrewas talk
the nationalists?
to supplant the
about somethinglike a British-stylemonarchv, with real power
restingin an electedgovernment. In the end,Kennedymadethe
decisionto supportthe shah,but on conditionthat therewouldbe
real reforms,and that the shahwould acceptIthe reformistlAli
Arniniasprimeminister.'-
llill noted:"Kennccly'sdoubtsabout the shahwere so
In his l'rook,.)amcs
strongthat he evcl.tconsidercdforcing his abdicationin f:rvorof rule by
rcgencyuntil his youngson cameof age."7In principle,Kennedy's con-
cern about the shah wasn't misplaced,but the problcrn in the early
cxistedoutsidc9f the
I 96os,irsin thc late r 97os,was that no nrlternative
clcrgyto rcplacethc shah.Thc National Front had lost nearly:rll of its
slrpportin the ycarssinceMossadegh,and increasinglyit was cgnfined
t9 salonsin Tehcran,with alliesamong intellectualsin WcsternF-uropc.
lrressedby the Ur-ritedStates,the shah made halfheartcclefforts at
refgrm. in what he calleclthe Whitc Revolution.Scnsing$196d,the
clergy had bcgun ro srir, and in the outlying districtsthe rcligious
right-which had closctics to the wealthy landedfamilies-beganto
mobilizc thc population againstland rcform. Violent inciclentstook
place in many provincesand the prin-rernovcrswerc the mullahs,
lcd by RuhollahKhorneini.Not yet an ayatollah,hc came
irrcrcasingly
t<rpr<rminence after making a demagogicspeechin t963 denouncing
thc shah.T9 creatc his political organization,Khomeini establishecl
the Coalition of IslamicSocieties,led by twenty-onewealthy hazaari
rnerchantsfrom three maior Teheranmosques.Many of the partici-
pants in Khomeini'scoalition would later becomethe leadersof the
regimein t97.1and serveas top officials9f the lslamic Republican
Party,includingMohan-rmed HosseiniBeheshti.s
 226 . D s v r l 's Geur,

The shah had nothing but disdain for the clergy.In a January 1963
speech,he sputteredwith rage at the Khomeini-led mullahs:

They were alwaysa stupid and reactionarybunch whosebrarns

have not moved [for] a thousandyears.'Who is opposing[the
White Revolutionl? Black reaction, stupid men who don't
understandit and are ill intentioned.. . . It was rheywho formed
a small and ludicrous gathering from a handful of bearded,
stupid bazaaristo make noises.They don't want this country to
develop.e

Suchtalk didn't endearthe shahro the clergy.In r963, Khomeini was

arrcsted by SAVAK. Rumors circulated that he was to be tried and
executed.But it was unprecedentedto imposethe death penalty on an
ayatollah.ln r964, Khomeini was expelledfrom Iran, first to Turkey
and then to lraq, settling in the holy city of Najaf, where he would
rcmain until r978.
ln t977, recallingthe Kennedyyears,the shah and thc clergy both
anticipatedthat the new U.S. r:egimemight begin to put pressureon
the monarchy,creatingroom for the clergyto organize.Indeed,it did.
According to the Iranian ambassadorin London, the shah feared
"that.|immy Carter might have 'Kennedy-typepretensions.''10 The
shah had crackeddown on his clericaloppositiononce again in the
early t.17os,arrestingmany of Khomeini's allies,including Ali Akbar
Hashemi-Rafsanjani,the future strongman of rhe Khomeini regime.
But the election of Carter, whose commitment to human rights res-
onated in Iran, stirred the clergy once again. In May 1977, Cyrus
Vance, the U.S. secretaryof state, visited Teheran to see the shah.
"After Vance'svisit, the word spread quickly through the extensive
Iranian grapevinethat the shah had just been given his orders from
\Tashington: liberalize or be removed," wrote Bill. "It soon became
acceptedfact in Teheran.. . . The opposition . . . concludedthat they
could now operate under an American protective umbrella that had
beenraisedby CyrusVance."11
According to Charles Cogan, a former CIA official who headed
the agency'sNear East Division, Vanceforesaw a peacefulrevolution
in Iran leadingto a regimethat might eveninclude Khomeini:
 Hell'sAyatollah ' zz7

: T:nuaryr963 Vanceand, shall we say'the StateDepartmentin generallooked

. . -, ihs: forward towardsthe possibilityof a smoothtransitionwhereby
the monarchywould cedesomepower to the dissidents who were
,,-. ,se brains considered to be not iust Khomeini but around
moderates htm'
:: , r rn g [th e transitionto
and therewere some,and this could be a successful
.',:ro don't the parliamentaryconstitutionalmonarchy.l2
.,'.::,r fOrmed
: l.earded,
r tO Slowly at first, and then acceleratingas the rebellion against the
-o LtI] t f V
shah gathered momentum, U.S. embassyofficers,visiting American
\il/ashingtonbegan
officials, the CIA, and semi-officialenvoys from
:. Khomeiniwas making contactswith the opposition. "The shahwas very angry in the
. : l.c tried and late rc)7osover the fact that opposition figuresand membersof the
i:-. :en:rltyon an clergy were going in and out of the U.S' embassy,"saysJuan Cole, a
:,. :r-.t ro Turkey University of Michigan professorand expert on Islam.13That view is
'.,,:,-rL-he would confirmed by Charles Naas, a senior political officer at the U.S.
embassyin Teheran, who worked under Ambassador Bill Sullivan.
: ::. clergyboth Sullivan, a tclugh-talkinglrishman who served in some rough-and-
:,.: Pressure on tumble posts, including l,aos during the cIA's covert war in that
. : i:rdeed,it did. country, arrived in Iran in r 977, replacingHelms. According to Naas,
:::. :hah feared Sullivan aggressivelysought contacts with the anti-shah opposition:
:-\ '( )llS."'1 0 T he "'When Bill Sullivan went out, I told him that I'd never worked on a
:-- r. lg: l i n i n t he country where I knew less about the politics there," says Naas.
-.:rrs Ali Akbar "When he got there, he startedencouragingthe political sectionto go
:. :rcini regime. out and meet more people,and they talked to young technocratsand
..r:.rrrrights res- National Front people, including a few people who had a good fecl
.- ,. r 9-7, Cyrus "ra
for the religiousleaders.
I .cc' the shah. The shah,saysNaas, "was aware that we had changedour m.o.

--
:hr' L-xtensive and had started encouragingthe opp6sition." In his memoirs, the
..:. ,rrdersfrom shah put it this way: "The Americanswanted me out. . . . I was never
--: \()on beCame told about the split in the Carter administration [norl about the hopes
- ,.i.'d that they some u.s. officialsput in the viability of an 'Islamic Republic'as a
It
: r:clla that had hulwark againstcommunism."
The key player in bridging the divide betweenthe secularNational
,.:. u'ho headed Front and the clergywas Mehdi Bazargan,the founder of the Liberation
i:::ul revolution Movement, a religious,pro-clerical party.Destinedto becomethe first
'.::rcini: prime minister of Iran after the revolution, Bazargan had a long
 2.28 . D E v r r . 's GenrE

history of working with the mullahs, but he also maintained a long- mark. A \:-
running dialogue with U.S. State Department and CIA officers. In even thcr, :
_ . . . . i l . _ \. -.
c 1rt
fact, Bazarganhimself was a quasi-mullah. "Bazargan," says an ex- UeSr

CIA operationsofficer who servedin Iran, "was basicallyan ayatol-

lah, or what they called an 'ayatollah without a turban.'"r6 Thc ::'
oll! -:
Inevitably,the U.S. effort to reach out to the opposition not only dis-
a tl r :' - :
rnayed the shah but emboldenedthe opposition, especiallyits reli-
n.1\ i
gious conponent. "These signals were mistaken by Bazargan and
dcc '-'-'
othersr" says Naas. "After the revolution, Bazargantold me, 'You rrlg : -
have no idea how encouragedwe were by PresidentCarter.' This is
one of thosesignalsthat goeswrong." .l l. -

From his post at thc United Nations, FereydounHoveyda, Iran's ( ::

"
ambassador,watched as thc Carter administration undermined the
fc'"--'
shah. A coalition was emerging between the opposition liberals, ;-. --
Bazargan'sreligigus movement, and the Khomeini-led clergy. "The
.\mericartswerc in eonstantcontact with the liberalsin Iran after
r977." he says."They told theseliberals,especiallyBazarganand the Chl: . '. ' -
:1tf ' l l :-' .
Natiorral Front. that the time had come to come out with dissentand . T. --
111 lf.:-
protest.That I know for sure. Some of them told me at the time: the
lllg,.,
Americansare telling us, 'It's time to protest.' . . . I told [Americansl
;
\\'l'.. :
that it was like playing with fire. You are bringing in the worst possi-
ble enemy of the West." A top official in the StateDepartment recalls f't ' --
rl . ' . - ' --
a meetingrn 1977 during which he usedthe very samewords. "Jessica
t]..- :-'
Tuchman and some of the other people on the National Security
(J'-.:-:
Council staff were arguing against supporting the shah, arguing
against supplying him with tear gas to use against the demonstra-
tc)rs," he says."And I told them: 'You don't know what you are talk-
ing about. You have no idea of the political dynamicsof Iran, because
nobody does.You're playing with fire."'17

U.S. Intelligence and Iran

Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution unfolded in slow motion' over sev-

eral years.Only the most obtusecould be surprisedat its outcome.
A string of U.S. intelligencereports on Iran were wildly off the

: ::llned a long-
, \ officers. In
i :. . S a Y San eX-
,.:,:.1)'anayatol-
: . r - l l lrban. " ' 16
: : nor only dis-
::::.rJllv its reli-
'" Brzargan and
:. : rld me, 'You
: . .irrer.'This is
! ,i cvda, lran's
-::;crmined the
, : iron liberals,
.: ;lergv. "The
,.. :n ]ran after
:-.i : g . l n and t he
,," : : t ! i i sS C nt and
,: : h e time: th e
:'.\rnericansl
::,. \\'orstpossi-
: - 1 : : n l e nt reC allS
',,. ,rds. ".fcssica
i: . r . t l Se cu r it y
. : , r h. a rg u i n g
:: : ! le n tOn str a-
:: ( ) Lta re ta l k -
"
: I: . rn. b e ca u s e
:. r n . O V ef S e V-
:> ( )l l t come.
',,.ildlv off the
Hell's Ayatollah ' zz9
mark. A State Department analysis written in May t-972 suggeststhat
even then some diplomats saw Khomeini as embodying "liberal val-
u e s ," a l b e i t w i th di mi ni shi ng appeal :
T h e Sh a h o f Ir an mai ntai ns:r posture of publ i c pi ety and champi -
o n s Is l a mi c c al l ses even though l rani ans . . . are not greatl y
a ttra c te db y p a n-l sl ami csenti ments.The Irani an cl ergy no l cl nger
have major political influence.. . . They have been, for the past
decade,fighting a rear-guard and losing action against the grow-
i n g ti d e o f :r s ecul arstafe.... A yatol l ah K hornei ni , arrestedand
exiled to lracl in tL)6qirs a result of his anti-g()vernmentactivities,
i rs p i re sto l e a d Irani i rn Musl i ms, br-rthi s cl osecoopcrati onw i th the
Go v e rn m e n t of Ir:rc1i n anti -S hah propaganda and :rcti vi tv harve
ru l e d o u t a n y chance< l f rec< l nci l i ati onw i th rhe prescntshah and
re d u c e dh i s a ppealto many Iri l ni att Mtrsl i rnsw ho mi ght otherw l sc
s h i rres o m e o f hi s basi cal l yl i beral val ues.rs
Charles Naas, who served irs the State l)epartment's dircctgr of Irar-t
a ffa i rs fro m r L )74to r97tl , and thcn servcclersdeputy chi ef tl f n' ri ssi orl
i r-rT e h e ra n d u ri n g the rev< tl uti on,says that throughout the peri ocl l ead-
i n g L rpt< ' tt9 7 c ;, L I.S . governmcnt anal ysi s of l ran w as poor, espcci al l y
w h e n i t c a me to s o-cal l eclN ati onal l ntcl l i gerrceE sti mates (N l F.s), pre-
p a rc d b y th c C l l As N ati onal Intel l i gence C ounci l . " In cl oi t-tgN IF.s at
the tin"re,tl-regcr-reralview was that thc rcligious right clidn't represent a
th re a t to th e re g i me," N aas strys." Therc w as practi cal l y no reporti ng
o n th c Is l a mi c g ro ups i n the country, so w e w ere caught rel ati vcl y fl at-
fo o te d ." In th e August r977 N ati onal Intel l i gence l l sti mate on Iran,
" l ra n i n rh e r9 8 os," thc C l l A concl uded that " thc shah w i l l be an
e l c ri v ep a rti c i p i rnt i n Iri l ni an l i fe w el l i nto thc r98os" and that " therc
w i l l b e n o ra d i cal change i n Irani an pol i ti cal behavror i n the nci l r
fu tu re ." A y e a r l ater, i n A ugust 1c178,a second (i IA report concl r" rded
th a t l ra n s e e m c dto be headed for a smooth transi ti on of pow er i f and
when the shah left the sccne.The CIA went on to say: "lran is not in rr
re v o l l rti o n a ry o r even a ' pre-revol uti onary' si tuati on." t' ) B y t....78,
President Carter, who rvas watching lran disintegrate on televisiorr,
cornplained in writing to the national security bureaucracy, saying that
 z3o'D E vtI-'s C l ,qN aE

he was "dissatisfiedwith the quality of political intelligencc"he was focusecil:

getting on lran.20Yet the CIA, lacking lran spccialists,Farsi spcakers, bloc pcr'' :
and expertson Islamism,could not do bctter. ait-neclllt ::
Adnriral StansfieldTurner was Cartcr's CIA dircctor. "ln t977. Aser l
lslarnas a political force was not on our radar scope,"hc says."The W aS i tl l i "'

communitywas not adequatelypreparedto understandit.

intelligence religiou.
Khomcini'spotcntialby a largc margin."ll But it
Wc undcrcstinrated tacts\\ i:;-
was worsethar-r virtually
of Iran specialists,
that. Outsideof a hirr-rdful scrvicc. .
no onc in thc Clarteradrninistrationhad any idea of who Khorneini go trrlk :
was until it was too lirtc.Henry Precht,who servedas the lran desk fr o ttt ti l . :

officer rn tr)78, recallsgettinga clispatchfrom Teheranat the height a p p t) ttt:.:- .

f) ,..-

of the revolutionaryfervor. "The dcpartmentrcceiveda cablc fronr

-
DL'-

the embassyin Teheran,nrentionirrgKhomeiniand idcntifyirrghim as fC l l l ()tu.

'an Iranian religiousleader."' says Precht. "To have iclcntifiedhinr sevcr '1. -
like that to yoLrrrc4ders back in Wasl-rington
told rnethat thcrc wastt't wel'c . l: - :
a greatawareness of who he was." 1l1gl. : ' . ,:
.
Although thousandsof Amcricans, including hundrcclsof U.S. itirzrrl:.
in lran, few if any of
officialsand a major CllA station were Lrirsed i i - ._
11:91-1,

l :' : :
them hacl any farniliarity with Iran's subcultures,religious under- l l rg.

ground, and oppositionforces.Virtually all U.S. oflicialswho have sh. t h. '

Ir,
: -
written memoirsabout the Iranian revolution recallthat thc United sll\'\ I

Statesrelieclon the shah and his inner circlc for infortnationabout t hcr . ': :
'Washington
lran's intcrnal politics.Partly that was because trustcd sell.li'::

: --
the shah implicitly and believedthat his intelligence
and securitysys- lll.ll',

tern were infallible, and partly it was becausethe shah strongly \\'i]\:.1'-

objectedto any efforts by the United Statesto contact the clergy and t hc r : . ':
-f\t',
thc opposition.Walter Cutler, a veteranU.S. diplomat who servedin ' .-
Tabriz, Iran's secondlargestcitS in the r96os, saysthat even then it l l l ()l -. ' :

was difficult to establishcontactwith the clergy."ln Tabriz,when I was .rt rl' . -

there,I was instructedto talk to the mullahs,"he recalls."But it was Hc: -
clear with the shah: Don't messaround the religiouselements.There g(),, i -:' l
\: ,--
:'
was a healthy presenceby SAVAK."ZZBy the t 97os)when Niron and
t\
Kissingerestablishedthe U.S. partnershipwith the shah,U.S. officials
were discouragedby \Tashington,too, to stay away from the opposi- !.1-a ---:

tion and the religious elements.The huge CIA station in Iran was tltr '-"
 Hell's Ayatctllah ' zJ 1

:--c h e wa s focused primarily on Cold War objectives,keeping track of Soviet

: . i sp e a ke rs, bloc personnelin Iran and overseeing the U.S. surveillanceapparatus
aimedat the USSRin northernlran.
: "I n t9 7 7 , A senior CIA official who servedin Iran said that becausethe shah
: : >lVS. "Th e was an ally who didn't want U.S.spiesmeddlingwith the clergSthe
. .: rlc rsta n d i t. religiousoppositionwas off-limits.2lPrechtindicatesthat U.S. con-
_: r . - ' lJut lf tacts with the clergywere beingcarefullytr:ackedby Iran's intelligence
.:s. r'irtually service."At one point, the embassypolitical officerhad arrangedto
- Khomeini go talk to a mullah," says Precht."And the ambassadorgot a call
. ::. I ran desk frurmthe mil-risterof the coLlrt, saying, 'Your political officer has an
-
- .1.. l..i.tht appointmcntwith so-rlnd-so.'We don't think that'sa good idea.'"24
.: .rblc frorn Bcginningin thc rnid-t97os, howevcr,rur"nblings were pickcd up,
: ri urs him as remotelyat first, by the Li.S.irttelligence corrlttunity.Accorclingto
-::;rrifiedhinr sevcralU.S. officials,the first to senst:troLlble wcrc thc British,who
: ::rcrewasn't werc ableto draw on tlreircctrttrrics-long presence itt the c<turrtry,
and
the Israelis,whosc secrctscrvice,the Mossad, was pluggcdinto the
:-rJs of U.S. bazaar."The bestsoLrrces werc the llritish," saysPrecht."Thcy
I l-racl
:: ', i if a n y o f werc rnuch morc informed, lttllch tnore insightful.And their report-
- r r )LlSu n d e r-
were not upbe:rt."Israel,too, senscdthat the
irrg, their assessmcnts
: . n'hcl h a ve shirh was finishedlong bcforc the Unitcd Statcsdid. Around r.)76.
- . : t hc L i n i tcd saysPrccht,while hc wirs cscortinga U.S. senatoron a tour of Iran,
r :'. r t ion a b <l ut thcy beganwith a briefirtgfrotn AtrLrassadorHclns, who told the
:--:( )n trusted scnilt()rthat lran w.ls sccure."Well, wc wcnf to see[Jri LLrbrirni,the
:.i e llnt y sys- nran in chirrgeof representing Israelitt lratr, anclhe saidthat the shah
r: : . th str<tn Sl y was facinga seriousproblctnfrom his religiousopp<tsition. That was
:: J elerg y a n cl the lirst timc I'd hcarclthat. No one in the entbassywas sayingthat."
'.,:t
. () se rve (li n Two ycars later,:tccorclingttl Precht,thc wilrnings from Israelwerc
:: r \cll th e n i t nroreLrrgcnt."ln r c|78,anIsracliforcignserviccof{icercameto secus
' : .: . uhcn Iwa s at thc Department,and he said:''Wcare alreaclyin thc post-shahcra''
. . "lJ ut i t wi rs preparcoursclvcs."25
He tolcl us, we shoLrlc'l At the timc, most U.S.
: it t c llt S.Th e re that the shahwould weatherthc storm'
governmentoflicialsbelicvec'l
. - \ix o n and Startingin the nicl- r 97os,it beganttt dawn on policy makersand
. L . S. o ffi ci a l s U.S.intelligenccofficialsthat the shah would firll. "You could take a
:' . rhc op p o si - calendarof r977 arrd r978," sltysHarold Saunclers, who was then
: t:r Iran was the assistantsecretaryof statefor Near L,astand SouthAsian affairs,
 z jL . I ) l , v r r . 's (i ,qvr,

"and put people on the calendaras ro when rhey decided enoughto nl;\
that the
shah'sregimecould not endure." that he had c':
A critical,but previolrslyunexaminedaspectof U.S.decision knew enougi.
mak-
ing on Iran in the r 97os is related t. the shah'sfatal illness. doo-doo.It r'':
lt is
important becauseif it were known that the shahwas fatally Among t::'
srrickcn,
it would drasticallyaffectall calcurations
abour Iran'sfurure:wererhc finisheds'cr. i
shah to die in oflice, with no clear mode of transferringpower; sans,who ;'-::
a v..ry
real dangerwould crist that Iran c.uld prungeinr. chaos. vive. The L '
The shah's
illnesswas diagnoseclas early as r96c1.accordirrgto H'veyda, the threrrt :
wh.se
brother was Iran'sprime minister."rt was'nly in the rr-rid-r97os more in lLlll: '
th.t
I heardthat he had cancer,"he says,though it was a cl.sery Washingtt':-.
guardecl
secret.But he insists:"The United Statesmust have kn'wn, somcof s:l :
because
secretslikc that cannot be kept, espccialrybecausethe shah gor stand th.r: -::
sec-
ond and third opinions,and he was consultingwith Anrerican close fricr-:-
physi_
cians, 16s."26carter. administratio' policy makers and i'telligence going clt'r":
officialsprovide c'.flicting resrinronyab.ur how rnuch didn't fitl- :
the united
Statesknew ab.ut the shah'scancer,and whe' it lcarned pareclfor ::.
alr.ut it.
Harold saunders,thc Middle lrastchief at thc StateDep:rrrmenr, Arn['r " -.-
says
that the Unitcd statesdid nor know that the shah was sick mer of r"-'
untir after
he'd left Iran. But charles c).gan, the ex-crIA official, said Missitttt:
that the "
Iran crisisin fact began"when thc shah'silrncssbecarne fall, citrn- :
apparenr,nor
to us bur to the French,very early in'72. Anc'lI think thar shahtt, i'.
wc finally
becameaware of the gravity of it in '76.-zt According
fo oogan, the sh.rh'' ':,
RichardHelms, who was U.S.ambassadorto Teheran,suspected lution." - .:.
that
the shahhad cancerand told washingto. s.. "r think ir in thc \\ .:-:
was'7y that
Helms wrore something to that effect back to washingrrn, lr an. ildi. : - :
bur ir
seemedto escapepe'ple's attentio'," sayscogan. "The French som e ( r l : : - :
were
aware of this as far back 2.s tc)7L,because.ne ,f the d'ctors lahs . r r . " .
that was
treating the shah was in some way affiliateclwith the French on tl-r.-'.::
i'telri-
genceservice."28 Another senior cIA official with enormousexperl- m adc : :
ence in Iran says flatly: "we knew the shah was iil. we " r esI ir '. - :t'
had reporrs "
from-well, from a very good source.,'2e By the late r97os,it wasn,t Pakr st r : - . : "
hard for u.s. intelligenceto pur rwo and two rogerher, ernlllcl--: 'i
and to con-
clude that the shah was nearingthe end of the road. David m em ol: '. >
Long, who
worked in the state Department'sintelligencebureau,says neit he: r . .
that lt was
 Hell's Ayatollab 213

:: : : hat th e enoughto make actionablejudgments:"The fact that the shahwas ill,

that he had cancer,was known. But it was very closelyheld. But we
j.. : , rn ma k- knew enough, the worker-bees,to know that this guy was in heavy
. :: : is. It i s doo-doo.It was our iob to handicapthis."3i)
' . . r ric ke n , Among the very last to come to the conclusionthat the shah was
:: I \ \ 'efe th e finishedwere Brzezinskiand the Rockefeller-Kissinger pro-shahparti-
'' ::l'..1VefY sans,who clung to the belief late into rc178that the shah would sur-
l :c s h a h 's vive. The U.S. embassyin Teheranwas slow to realizethe extent of
:' .* - 1. \ \'h OSe the threat to the shah, but U.S. consulatesoutside the capital were
- : - .-cs th a t more in tune with the pulseof the country, and their reporting back to
. ' . Clla rd e d Washingtonwas somewhat more perceptive.Individual CIA experts,
,'.--. lrccllLtse someof whom had spentyearsin lran, were among the first to under-
' . :: t qot se c- stand that Iran was collapsing."I left Iran in r976, and I told four
: - . rn ph ysi - close friends to get their money out of the country, that Iran was
':r llrgen ce going down the tubes," says one CIA officer.3lButthat pessimism
: : : Lln i te d didn't find its way intr the rosy-scenariointelligenceestimatespre-
:,, -rlror-rtit. parcd for the U.S. gclvernment.
-:-- rilr t . si l ys AmbassadorSr-rllivan, in Teheran,held on to the belief in the sum-
" .: : rrrlrrfte r mer of rc178that the shah'sregime would continue. In his memoirs,
r - : t lt rtt th e Mission to Iran, he notcd that somediplomatsfelt that the shahwould
t: , . : - cltt, n o t fall, citing in particular a l"renchembassyofficial who "expectedthe
i: '. c f i n a l l y shah to be overthrown within a year." Yet, said Sullivan:"We felt that
. : C. o g a n , the shahwas in trouble . . . but we did not seethe beginningsof a revo-
):r. t ccl th a t lution."J2A year earlier,in a dispatchto \Washingtonentitled "Straws
'.: .'-s th a t in the 'Wind," Sullivanhad taken notc of growing religiousunrestin
:: : r . ltttt i t Iran, adding: "There are hints that despitetheir right-wing fanaticism,
I :. :rc h rvcrcr some of the more pragmatic conservativeIslamic imams and ayatol-
- . : hirt wa s lahs are willing to ride the human rights horseinto alliancewith those
:-: - r inte l l i - on the left Ii.e., the National Front] whcre mutual interestscan be
.t. exp cri - made to coincide." Obliqueln Sullivan mentioned that religious
: . r .i r cp o rts "restiveness"had been reinforcedby a parallel revival of Islamismin
:. . t l wtl sn 't Pakistan,SaudiArabia, and Turkey,but concludedthat the shah'sgov-
:'- i f o co n - ernmentwould keep the religiousmovement "under control."3'lIn his
: - ' r'1g,wh o memoirs, Sullivanadmits that he was mystified about Islam and that
: : :'. . ] tlt Wa S neitherhis staff nor the CIA could help him:
 ;'34 . Dr,vrr's Gene

My effortsto penetratefurther into the mysteriesof Shiismwere National l,::

constantlyfrustrated.. . . Neither our political officersnor our to Cottirnl-
intelligenceofficerswere able to satisfymy interestin obtaining rate chanrl.-
furtherinsightsinto the workingsof the Shiamind.la "He not.'J :
Richard ( ' :
ued to dtt '
Ricbard Cottam and the " Americans"
forth visrl. :
One former U.S.officialwho purportedto understandthe "Shia mind" Ghotbzac'.
was RichardCottam. In the earlyand mid-r95os, Cottam servedin Iran tcl Hcnrr i
as part of the Cllfs covert operationsteam. "He was a caseofficer of Richard t
'\)7aller, tact for t:'-=
mine," says.fohn the station chief in Iran in the late r94os and
early r95os.35Cottam becamea Universityof Pittsburghprofessorin to conhr::'
r958, but didn't leaveeitherthe CIA or skullduggeryfar behind.During ilbttut t,' . .
the r 96osand r97os, Cottam maintainedclosetiesto Iraniandissidents, em bat . " : -
from the National Front to leadingreligiousfigures.He was especially "T( r t hc : - . ,
closeto two men who would serve,in t978, as Khomeini'sclosestaides it if Dcr.::
during his exile in Paris,while the revolution in Iran was unfolding: But :''
':
Ibrahim Yazdi and SadeghGhotbzadeh-nicknamed "the Americans." betu'cc:',
Both rnen spent many years living in or visiting the United States,and offiglri "'r',
both worked with the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Muslim Students t hat ( { : : '
Ass<riation,which Yazdihelpedto found in t963. Cottam had first met cir cle , : : :
Yazdi in Iran in the r95os, while working as a CIA officer,and the two "sait'l ::- -'-
men becameclosefriends.During the r96os, Yazdi traveledback and ought : :
forth between lran, Paris, and the United States, working with idert, L,'-:
Ghotbzadehand many other religious-mindedIranian activistswho sup- D EC .IL i ::

ported Ayatollah Khomeini. ln 1967, Yazdi settledin Houston, Texas, ti tt.ta :. ::- :

taking up a researchand teachingpost at Baylor Medical College. lvttl't ::' : -:

Early in 1978, Cottam's name beganto show up in secretor confi- did ,,:::-.
dential StateDepartmentand CIA dispatchesfrom Iran. In May, John Shlh: --'.:
Stempelfrom the U.S. embassyin Iran met with a leaderof the pro- l ' . ] l -l > .

Khomeini movement, Mohammad Tavakoli, who "asked if Stempel Ar-,t!, . ---:

knew Professor Richard Cottam." According to a dispatch from lr r r , : "': l
T' :
Stempel,Tavakoli asked "if Stempelhad someway of proving that he
was a StateDepartment officer and whether he would mind his name h.rr'.I
being checkedwith ProfessorCottam."36A few weeks later, Stempel
met Tavakoli with Bazargan, the leader of what was now called the .,' ,. ' t- - -
 Hell's Ayatollah ' zJ 5

'i ;fe National Liberation Movement, and Tavakoli-obviously referring

:ur to Cottam-curiously askedif the Carter administration has a "sepa-
rate channel" into the embassyoutside State Department channels.
"He noted that the Movement had supplied much information to
Richard Cottam when he was a StateDepartment officer and contin-
ued to do so," wrote Stempel.3TCottam continuedto make back-and-
forth visits to Teheranand Paris,where he met Khomeini, Yazdi, and
,: mrnd" Ghotbzadeh.In June 1978, CharlesNaas of the U.S. embassywrote
,: ln lran to Henry Precht, the Iran desk officer: "'$ilefind it fascinatingthat
rcer of Richard Cottam, as severalof us had thought, is still a principal con-
-: :S and tact for the [Liberation Movement] in the U.S., and they were willing
: : :iOf ln to confirm this."18By December,when the revolution was clearly
: Drr ri n s
' -
* "' b about to succeed,a confidential State Department dispatch from the
, ] ---^
.: :L U f l i l,5, embassynoted rumors that Cottam had secretlytraveledto Teheran.
"To the best of our knowledge,Cottam is not here.Would appreciare
-:ccially
o.: aides it if Department could discreetlyconfirm his presencein Pittsburgh."
---- ,l, li' . .rrct'
' ' ' b' But by then Cottam was seeking to establishovert connections
t "
a : :a,ns. betweenYazdi,Ghotbzadeh,and othersin the Khomeini circle with
1 l: . . 3l 1 d official Washington,outsidc State Department channels.Precht says
: :. rd e n ts that Cottam rcpeatedlytried to open a dialoguc betweenKhomeini's
::ir lTlet circle and the U.S. liovernment.ln late 1978, says Precht,Cottam
::: c rw o "said that Ibrahim Yazdi was coming to Washington,and that we
"r,X a nd ought to meethim. And he calledGary Sickat the NSCIwith the sanc
:.: n'ith idea. But Cottam was persona non grata at the State l)epartment,
r , : , I SUP - becausehe had all thosecontactswith Iranian dissidents. . . . Some-
.. Tcras, times,the peoplein the human rights office, under Steve(lohen, dealt
with them." EventuallyPrechtand other StateDepartmentofficials
did open a dialoguewith the revolutionaries,including Yazdi ancl
Shahriar Rouhani, Yazdi's son-in-law.The meetingscontinued in
Paris, and in TeheranCottam introducedU.S. embassyofficialsto
Ayatollah Beheshti, who was Khomeini's official representativein
Iran in the months before the revolution.The Iraniansassuredthe
U.S. officialsthat Khomeini was not to be feared,and that he did not
havepoliticalambitionsfor himself.re
A few months later, Khomeini had seizedpower, and he beganto
construct the institutions that would guarantee that power would
 L36 . D n v r r 's (]anr

remain in the hands of the clergy for the nexf quarter-century:the enough t ' '
komitehs, or Islamic committees the pasdardn, the guard; vanous that vu'cc'
bodiesof Islamic"experts" and jurists;the Islamiccourts;the revolu- incr easc :
tionary council. Hundreds,perhapsthousandsof officialsfrom thc lookins : '
shah'sera were summarilyerecuted,and countless<ttherswere ntur- t r at ioll , ':
D,,, r\
deredby Khomeini'sfollowers. lrLtr

dem t t t r ', :
t o C. ur ': :
AprnR f' H 11 R rrvoLU I' roN t ions r r : : :
llll t () L : -r

The United Statesstruggledto recoverfron-rthe shockof the.Janurrrv- app()ll-.

Februaryt97r1rcvolutionin lran. faterl :
A major cffort was rlade to cstablishsomethingresernblirrg rror- all. h.::
mal diplomaticrelationswith rhe new regimein Teheran,but thcy got vvil|1 , : '
off to a bad start. "I(/e wanted to establish:r dialogue," says Walter Ilr-.-
Cutler,the veteranU.S. diplornatassignedto bc Amcric:r'sambassa- rtutlt..i " ,

dor to the IslamicRepublicin the middle of rr)7r)."1 was to go our llo c \::

thereand try to cstablishsome sorr of rapport with thc ncw reginrc, lllcll: ::--

from Khomeini on down."'10(luder had servcdin Iran as cor.rsulin t hc \ : . '- :

Tabriz in the mid-r96os,and spcntmuch of the rgtlosas U.S.arnbas- lrlIl\'_ -

sador to SaudiArabia. Named to succeedBill Sullivan,the ourlloinr Ir'1f '-

U.S.ambassadorwho was fatally tainted by his associarionwith the ".\i ::' :

shah, Cutler was asked to asscmblean Iran team quickly. "My I I lT i

.'I t

appointmentwas pretty rushed,and I had to pur togethcr ir whole hc i',' : -

new team fast. fSecretaryof State Cyrusl Vance said,'Pick anyone !1\
t,,.
r--:-. -.

you want, and I will break their assignment,"'meaningthat Vancc rrt,_ '_ :

would reassignto Iran anyone Cutler wanted. What Cutler didn't t ! . -' -' _

know, of course,is that many of the people assignedto his team \s -'-

would be taken hostage in November and hcld for fifteen monrhs il ll -:-
-

under brutal conditions.

"We had to prove to the lranians that we were not the Great l1:.

Satan," saysCutler.The fact that the Iranian revolution was basedon ::- : -
Islam, not left-wing nationalism, was something that encouraged l: i i-

many U.S.policy makers,diplomats,and CIA officials,from Zbigniew

Brzezinskiat the NSC on down. "\7e were in the Cold \rVar,"says
Cutler, "and here was an Islamic revolution, and I'd been there long
 Hell's Ayatollah ' L37

-- :: : Llr\': th e enoughto know what suspicionexistedabout the Russians.I thought

, - * : r 'rtri <tu s that we could handle the possibilitythat the SovietUnion might try to
.. : : t c f e vo l u - increaseits influence,becauseof the strength of Islam. . . . If vou're
: . : ront th e looking for common interests,our sharedconcernabout Sovietpene-
' - irL' n l u r- tration of that part of the world was one."
"'.
But Cutler never reachedIran. A congressionalresolutioncon-
demning Khomeini itt rL)79 infuriated the ayatollah, and, according
to Cutler, Yazdi later told hin-rthat Khomeini wanted to break r:ela-
tions with the United Statesentirely.InsteadYazdi persuadedKhome-
ini to take just ir "half step" and to refusethe arnbassador.
Cutlcr's
:. 1: T . l nuary- appointmentwas withdrawn.4rBut other U.S.officials,most of them
fatedto be taken captivcin November,lreganarriving.Some,but not
^- :- .i n g nor-
all, had servedin Iran bcfore but virtually none haclany expcricncc
'. .:: thcv q<lt
with or knowledgeof Islar-nisrrr.
..:,. Waltcr Bruce l,aingcn, who headed tl"rcernbassyin thc abscuceof :rn
r . .inrbrrssa- anrbassador, frankly,"I am
hacltwo bricf stirrtsin Iran before but snrys
:. : t I g( ) ()Ut no cxpert on thc subjcctof Islam." Hc was pluckeclfronr an assllllt-
- - . , . rcg l mc, ment that would havetakcn hirn to.fapanauclhustlcclto lran, bcc:ruse
... -rr11s1i11l the StateDcpartmcntwas "castingrrrounclfor avililirblc,clisprcnsable,
- . . . lrrb a s- transfcrableFSOslforcigrtscrviccofficersl."I)icl he get a l()t of plcp-
aration to clealwith lslanritncll(honreini'sidcology?"No," hc sirys.
:: r i it h th e "Alrnost nonc."4l'l-horrrasAhcrn, the uew (llA strrtionchief,callslris
-,^Li. "\4 y appointmenta "burertucrrrtic arrds'aysthat he receivccl
i:tcciclcnt," ncl
i:- . l \ \'h ()l C help from the U.S. govemmcnt that enablcdhir"nto undcrstanclthe
-
, \ .l l ]\ 'olt c lslamicnt()vcrncl.lt.
clynamicof I(l-ronrcirti's "Yru crtnc'luotcmc as siry-
. .-..rtVrtncc ing that therewas no instructionof an rrcaclcmic sort on the politics,
. . : . r ri i cl n 't culture, and economics of lratt," he says. "lt was strictly a tr:rcle-
: :ris terrrl lne to take overrccrtlrinfr.rnctiorrs
schooltypc of thing, preparir-rg rrncl
:: : : l l l ()DthS certaincontacts."4r .fohn l.irnbcrt,rutothcrvetcrilltLJ.S.
diplornatwho
spokefluerrtF'ilrsi,respondccl to a "voluntccrcirble,sayingsomething
: ::l L' (;reat like,'\Wcneedpcopleto go to lrrrn to help rebLriltl,or salvagcsorre-
... i..rsccl
on thing out of theseevents.'Narveas I wils, I and trany of rny colleagues
: : ' . i r111-11ggCl felt that now we coulclfinally establisha healthy relationshipwith
: Zl'rgniew Iran." But did Limbert, l.aingen,artcltheir fellow officersundcrstand
-tr," sitys lslam, or the nature of Khomeini's religior.rs-right
following? "We
"'.
: :rcre long didn't know it," says Limbert. "We didn't understandit."aa By
 z lil . D l . v r r - 's Clnup.

November, Laingen,Ahern, Limbert, and scoresof colleagueswould pushedasid..

be prisonersof a rnob secretlydirectedby Khomeini. dated por'r'cr.
The new Iranian government was a two-headed creature. There The emi':.
was thc "official" government: Prime Minister Bazargan, Yazdi, failedto Prt':.
(ihotbzadeh,and the man who would eventuallybe electedas the first r979. Sar': \:
presidentof the IslamicRepublic,AbolhassanBani-Sadr.Then there
was the r-rnofficiirl,
parallel government,consistingof Khomeini, a I don'r :t'
handful <rfkcy ayatollahs,the komitehs, the pasdardn, and the hard- \(ln1 \\ ,'-
encot lr - : : -
core set of Islarnistinstitutionsthat were taking shapeto implement
m odcr : : :
Khomeini'stheocracy.The new U.S. embassyteam and visiting CIA
t he r c! : : -
and State Depirrtment officials were con{incd, for the most part, to
ont hr : ';
intcraction with the ever-less-powerfulofficial government, while ir t lst h. , : : :
Khorneinikcpt the Unitcd Statesat arm'slength.Khomeiniembarked
on rr plan to isolatc:rnd dcstrov,one by one, all of the secular,left-
But if t hc t -
wing, and modcratereligiousforcesthat had joinedthe anti-shahrev-
Iran, it s '--.
<rlutionin thc 1c17os. His ultimate goal was the consolidationof
neighl-'or. :-r
virtually all power under his personalcontrol and in the Revolution-
engaged : - -
irry Council, the shadowy body rhar was made up primarily of pro-
than ll il''-' .
Khomeiniayatollahs.
of licial: . ': :
Accordingto [,aingen:
in r 9- ". : '.
Ames-.''. -
We had very little contactwith the clergy.I neversaw Khomeini.
Behesht : . - . :
And we never really talked to rhe RevolutionaryCouncil. We
and ot hr : :
sensedthey were there.$7eknew they were there.But we didn't
appreciarc how much power they reallyhad. We saw our mission was ci: - : - : '
as to reiterateour acceptance of the Islamicrevolution,and to Baz. ar g: : - - :
conrmunicatc thirtwe werea spiritual-minded country.That it was t hem . ": ; - :
feasiblefor the United Statesto come ro an undersranding with t hat t h:
politic:rlIslilm,and that the shahhadno future.\Werecognized that Laing. r - - :
Khomeiniwould not be disestablished. But we werecaughtup rn ttt lr.tn -'-:
the belief that the secularside of the revolutionwould prevail.
Bazargan, Yazcli,and Ghotbzadeh believed that theywould be able
to cope,that theywould manageto containKhomeini'sinfluence.as l-
ri\'>:

i ,,- ., -
--
Embassyofficialsdid talk to a limited number of mostly more moder- Tr,

ate Shiite clergy,but it didn't do much to open doors to Khomeini's di,:

inner circle. Many of the more cooperative Islamist mullahs were

 Hell's Ayatollah ;*19

:: : - i eS W OUId or forced into exile as Khomeini consoli-

pushed aside,assassinated,
dated power.
:i :, : re. Th e re The embassywasn't gettingmuch help from the CIA, either,which
.: i- .. n. Ya zd i , failed to produce any intelligenceestimatesabout the future of Iran in
:: -rsthe first t979. SaysAhern:
: T hen th e re
r: r tme i n i , a I don't recallany estimateor forecastof what would happen.
'WhatWashingtonwantedfrom the embassyas a whcllewas tcl be
r:: : r he h a rd -
: Ilr.rplement encouraging, supportingthe Yazdis,the Bazargarrs, in hope of
, r ililn g cIA
moderating,clrhelpingthen'rrnoderate the regressive ter.rdencies
of
theregime.As I recall,thiswasirll on the levelof rvistfulhope,not
: , ! t pa rt, t()
pl:rnning
on thelevelof seri<>us or basccl <lnindications frornIratti-
-.: :: nt . w h i l e
ansthat thiswasgoingto wclrk.a6
. : . . em b a rke d
. : . ular, l e ft-
But if the CIA wasn'tproducingmany conclusionsabout the futurer f
i: :: -shah re v-
Iran, it was askedto passon to Iran crucial intelligence about Iran's
: . rJ. rti o n o f
neighbor,Iraq. Yet lcss than a year latcr tl-rctwo countrics wor,rldbc
: 3. r 'r'o l u ti o n -
cngagedin a bloodS decacle-longconflict that reportedly left rnore
-.. r : r1rof
' p ro -
than a million dead. llesidesthe CIA station chief, other seniorCIA
officials,including Robert Ames and Georgc(iavc, rnadcvisitsto Irirn
in 1979, before thc embassytakcover.On at lcast onc oceirsi()n,
Ames-who headedthe CllAsNear F.astDivision-rret with Ayatollirh
\.- 'l Ie l n t .
\We
Beheshti,and other agencyofficialsmet Yazdi,Amir Abbas llntezam,
' ':'- rl.
and other non-clergyIraniirnofficials.A systcnrof intclligenccsharing
. , ., Jidn 't
was estab[ished,particularly in connection with Irac1."Oncc thc
- : : : trssi o n
.-.
-rnclto
Bazargangovernment was esttrblished,we triecl to do businesswith
-- .: : them," recallsa CIA official involvcclwith Iran at the tirne, aclcling
r t r.va s
:: : : - . g$' i th that the CIA warned Iran in 1r179 al'tctutIraqi wirr intcnti<'rns.47
:: :r 'd t h a t Laingenconfirms reports that the UnitcclStatespasseclon ir-rtclligence
-: ' r : up rn to Iran about Iraq:
: : r e vail .
- : re a b l e \Wehad concernover Iraq. RelationsbetweenIrln anclIraq were
- ' - .i e nc e. '
closeto their lowestpoint,anclKhomeinihaclenornr<lus distirste
for Saddam Hussein. He hacl
a desiret() exportthc rcvolution t<r
:'.()remoder- Iraq. lraq was certainlya major target.I recallbriefingthe Irani-
Khomeini's anson Americanintelligence on Iraq. $7egavethenrinformatiorr
:-.-:llahswere aboutIraq'smilitarycrrp.tcity.troop enrplircements,intentions. It
 L4o . I ) l v r r . 's (inr,rn

wils a ncw experienccfor rne, suddenly being invcllvedin the intel- the lr.l:.
l i g e n c es i d c o f d i p l ornacy.as U.S. rr:.
Musli::
Wh i l e th e U n i tc c l S t ates prsseclon i ntel l i gence to d-remr.rl l ahs,i ncl ud- Sot ll, : . :
i rrg B e h c s h ti , i t g racl urrl l y bccanc cl c:rr that the' B azargi rns, Y azdi s, lncli.r:-.t
a n d Gh o tb z i rd e h s h acl vi rtual l y no pow cr, and thi rt the S hi i tc cl ergy 'lll'C ( l

c o rrtro l l c c lc v e ry th i ng. That w as cspeci al l y true i n e()nnccti on w i th the f C t l : . ri i

rn i l i ta ry . " T l re rc w a s no coorcl i rrati r)nbctw ccn l l azargi rn and the rni l i - Ii:. .
ta ry . I l < n o w th i s fo r i l i rl ct," si rysi r forrncr C ,tA offi ci al . " The nri l i tary
L.tttI--,::-
w a s u n c l e r th e i ro ncl rrcl control of thc nrul l ahs. A ncl the rnr-rl l ahs '"
tl l t( ):
d i v i d e d l ra n i n to s cventcen vi l l rrgcs,rrnd assi grredpcopl c to run each :
tl l t.:'
one, th rough thc komitch s." 4') u it:-.::
F i v e n s o , a h rrn dfr" rlof LI.S . pol i cy nral < ers began to scc l ran' s
Islr::-'
Is l a rn i s t o ri c n ta ti o n as threatcni nq to thc LIS S I{.One oi thc rrrostsur-
lnlf -
p ri s i n g to re a c h tl -ra tconcl usi on w rrs l l rzezi nski , tl rc hrrcl -l i ne nati onal \
i.llli
s c c u ri ty a c l v i s c r w h o ' cl bccn an advocrrte for usi ng a rni l i tary col rp i r.r rl r,
-
Ira n to s to p Kh o l n e ini ' s revol uti on. C i racl r-ral l y,
B rzezi nski changcd hi s
m i n c l , c u v i s i o n i n g whet hc cal l ecl :l n " A rc of cri si s" stretchi ng from '.
n o rth c i rs t A fri c i r to centl al A sra. l t w as a hi gh-stakes zonc of confl i ct
.\ _ -:
b c tw e c n th c tw o sLrpcrpow ers, and i t subsumed a regi on cnti rel y
l).-.'-
i n rb r.rc cwl i th th e Is l ami c resurgencc.H enry P recht, w ho l -radbeen one
o f th e U .S. o ffi c i a l s most opposeclto thc shah and w ho favorcd tryi ng
to c s ta b l i s h g o o c l rc lati ons w i th the Isl ami c R epubl i c, recal l s the si tr-ra-
ti o n i n th c mi c l d l e ,-rf 1c17c..:

After the revolution, we still consideredlran to be territrly impor-

ta n t to U .S . i n te r ests.A t one poi nt H al S aunders[assi stantsecrc-
tary of state for Near Eirst affairsl went to the White House for a
meeting, :rnd when he came back he told n.re,"You'll be very
p l e a s e d .\7 e ' re g oi ng to try to devcl op new rel ati ons w i th Iran."
There was this icleathat the Islamic f<-rrces could be used against
the Soviet Ur.rion. 'Ihe theory was, there was an arc of crisis, and
s o a n a rc o f Is l a m coul d be mobi l i zedto contai n the S ovi ets.It w as
jo
l Brz e z i n s k ci t.,n eept.

Brzezinski,in his memoirs, says that he began to press for an all-

encompassingU.S. securitypolicy along the arc of crisis even before
 Hell's Ayatollah . L4 |

- : : - . r intel- the Iranian revolution had run its course. By that, he meant strong
U.S. military ties to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,and Turkey, four
Muslim countries inside the arc, flanking U.S. support in Oman,
,,.hs.
includ-
Somalia,and Kenya, and U.S. basesin severalcountriesand in the
- ,:r:. Yarzdis, Indian Ocean."By late r978:'wrote Brzezinski,"I beganto pressthe
.:rriteclergy
'arc of crisis' thesis, [arguingl for a new 'security framework' to
,: ,n u'ith the
reassertU.S.power and influencein the region."-s1
'.:r.lthe rnili-
Brzezinskisaw the lossof the shahas "catastrophic,"accordingto
i:c rnilitary
Cottirm.At first Brzezinskiwanted an IranianPinochet,a military dic-
.rrc rrullahs
tator who would suppressthe Islamic revolution at an)i cost, but
: l o f llf l e?C h
when that becameimpossibleBrzezinskiopted for a "de facto alliance
with the forces of Islarnicresurgenceand with the regime of the
Islamic l{epublic of lran," wrote Cottam. "Stability was not even
' . '- n t()st su r -
implicitly lrisobjective.His primary concernwas to form an cffcctive
-. 'r c r-ra ti o nal
allianccin the regiot-the describedas an 'arc of crisis.'By
.1nti-Soviet
:- : -rrv co u p in
thc summer 9f r.17c1l\rz.ezinskiwas convinccd of the sincerityof
-- ; hr rn g cclhis Khon-rcini's
fierceanti-cornmunism. "'tz
. - - -. l r r' f rrrm
"t A few months lirtcr, il.r pursuit of tl-ratdream, Brzezinskirnet in
: --, of conflict
Algierswith Prime Mir-ristcrBirzargan,F'oreignMinister Yirzdi,and
-- -:, )lr cntircly
l)efenseMinistcr Mustirfa(]hamran.The timing, however,could not
: -..rrlbccnonc
havc been worsc. Weeks earlier. the Clartcr administration had
'.: . ,,rccltrying
allowcd thc dying shah,strickenwith citncer,to comc to Ncw York
'. - , .,. the situa-
for rncdicalcare.If was a rnovethat inflamedKhonreini'smost radical
followcrs,and Khomeini scizedon it to move againstthe Bazargan-
- rl n p()r- Yazdi faction in thc lranian governmcnt,just three days aftcr the
:: " i sccrc- cncolrnterin Algiers.What seemedat thc time tcl
Brzczinski-Bazargan
...r ior ::r be a spontancouslyassembledrnob of studentsinvadedthe grounds
: r c V ery of LJ.S.embassyin Teheran,irnd one of the most significantdiplo-
.: : r Irltr-t."
rnaticcriscsin U.S.historywas l:runched.With its dipkrmatscaprive,
.. : . l qrlit ' t S t
therc w:rs no possibilityfor dialoguebetweenthe Unitcd Statesand
. i: . lllld
--
lran. The lranian govcrnmcntmaintainedthe polite fiction that the
: :.. l t rvas
hostagctakerswere simply militant "studentsr"but there is no doubt
that the entirc action was carefully orchestratedby Khomeini and
.. for an all- his inner circle as a means of consolidatingthe political power of
. r'\ lr.l before the unofficial,parallelgovernmentthat had beengrowing in strength
 L4z . I ) r . : v t t - 's GauP

alongsidethe official one. Vladimir Kuzichkin, the KGB station chief even m or -

in Teheran who defectedto the West a few years later, had direct St at es,t h-

information on who organized the terrorist operation. "!7e knew t er m s t h: : .

from our sourceswho it was who sanctionedand then carried out the t hat t u't ' :
in par t L; : .
seizure of the etnbassy,"wrote Kuzichkin. "The seizurewas sanc-
I r an's st . '. :
tioned at the very summit of the Iranian leadership,and was carried
bilit v or : :
out by a trained team that consistedexclusivelyof membersof the
Guards."i'
(.orps of Revoluti()nery of f . Ft , r : :

The Carter administrationhad not the slightestcluc about how to worr\' -l l

it had . , :
deal with Khomeini after the cmbassytakeover.Coundessbooks,
memoirs,and scholarlypapershave been written about thc hostage
crisis.Br.rtnothing sums up the futility of Carter'scfforts better than a
passagefrom the mentoirof Hamilton.fordan,thc president's chief of
staff, who had a lead responsibilityfor resolvingthe standoff.Jordan
dcscribesseeingCarter at his desk,writing:

"Seeme laterif you don't mind-l'rn writing a letterto Khon-reini."

I wasamusedat the ideaof the SouthernBaptistwriting to the
Moslemfanatic.What will he sayto the man?I thought.Maybe
hc'll signthe letter"The CreatSatan.". . .
"lf Khomeiniis the religiousleaderhe purportsto be," Carter
said,"l don't seehow he cancclndone the hclldingof our people."54

It was the beginningof the end of the Carter administration,too.

The seizureof the U.S. embassycreateda sustainedcrisis that Presi-
dent Carter could not extricatehimselfflsm-no1 by negotiations,not
by threats,not by a bungledmilitary rescuemission.Although Teheran
engagedseveraltimes, often using dubious middlemen, in talks with
Washington, it was clear that Khomeini had an internal political
agendathat precludedthe releaseof the hostagesuntil he was ready.
" ln January r 9 8o," saysHarold Saunders," a prominentIslamicstates-
man said: 'You won't get the hostagesback until Khomeini puts in
placeall the elementsof his Islamicrepublic."'
That proved to be the case.
The revolution in Iran changed everything. For Washington, it
eliminateda reliableally,listeningpost, and baseof operations.For the
other big player in the Cold War, the revolution in Iran was perhaps
 Hell's Ayatollah . z4z

.:.::ion chief even more alarming. Despitethe shah'sopen alliancewith the United
:- :rd direct States,the SovietUnion had grown comfortable dealingwith Iran on
''\\'e knew terms that, more often than not, were marked by the kind of respect
:: ::d out the that two neighboring powers give each other. In economic relations,
: ' . \'.1S S anC- in particular, the USSR and Iran got along well. More important,
,'.,l\ Cafried Iran's stability meant that Moscow did not have to worry about insta-
:. : : r s o f th e bility or irredentismon its flank in southwestAsia. Now, all betswere
off. For the first time since the r9zos, the Soviet Union started to
: , ir ho w to worry about Islam. And the United Stateswas planning to make sure
1 .. . bo o ks, it had somethingto worry about.
: :: : ho sta g e
l: :: ! -r t ha n a
:: - .: '.ch i e f o f
: : i. I o rd a n

: r : ur i ."
i :o t he
: \ 1.1\' t )e

. . .rrter
' . . iJ
,: ::c.

:t. : . : 1 ()n,too.
. :: t r t ] )resi-
: _). : 1 ( )lt s,
not

-.:r Tcheran
: :.rlkswith
^.,l
f
Ulri. i.r -^l
lr!4

: '.',.1sready.
._t::I a states-
:= - . : ] pL rts i n

: n q t on, lt
.. For the
. perhaps
 th a t co ttl :::
of inflr.rcr-
inspir ecl Z
10
adviser . . i: -
I slam - r r t - . :
war ir t . \ : :
l l -tc L I

e r al hu: : : :
JIH A D l : THE "ARC OF ISLAM"
wit h Lr t : : -
Unt il . \ - r
t ht r t P, '. :
Af gh. r r - ': -
i-lccltttt. -.
pt t lr cr :
:.
Sltu,-lr : ,
Alt hr , . . - '
br r t . t . t - : .- .
TsE nEVo LUTIo N I N Iran collapsedthe more importanfof the two
I slr r r l- . : ': '
pillars holding up the American edificein the PersianGulf-thc other
: -: .
Cfr li'.
being Saudi Arabia-and sent Pentagonplannersand Central Intelli-
th r L ,..- - i
gence Agency analysts scramblir-rgto calculate its impact on other
l'.- . --
U.S. allies,on the region, and on the overall American presencein the
()f i :--: -' -
Middle East.From SaudiArabia to Morocco, Americanexpertsfranti-
cally scannedthe horizon to determineif, or when, the Khomeini phe-
$ i ::-. -, ,-
nomenon might replicateitself in other Middle Eastmonarchies.
But along with the threat from Khomeinism,someU.S.policy mak-
ersalsosaw opp()rtuni ty.
The emergenceof hard-coreIslamic fundamentalismas a govern-
ing force in Iran worried all of lran's neighbors-including its biggest,
the SovietUnion. The Khomeini regime was a volatile, unpredictable
new factor in the region, and some analystsbelievedthat the Islamic
resurgenceled by the Iranian ayatollah could inspire sympathies
insidethe SovietUnion's Muslim republics.That idea gavenew impe-
tus to long-held ideasabout using the Islamic right to undermine the
Soviet Union in its own empire, deep in Central Asia. At the same
time, plans were under way to useMuslim Brotherhood-linked orga-
nizationsin neighboringAfghanistanto underminethe Sovietstakein
 libad I: Tbe " Arc of Islam" ' 24 j

that country, which for decadeswas seenas part of Moscow's sphere

of influence.The twin Islamic movements,in Iran and Afghanistan,
inspired Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security
adviser,and Bill Casey,PresidentReagan'sCIA director,to pursuethe
Islam-in-Asiathemeaggressively-mostemphaticallyduring the holy
war in Afghanistirn.
The U.S.proxy war in Afghanistan,which cost $3 billion and sev-
eral hundred thousand lives, fook America'sdecades-long alliance
with ultra-conservative politicalIslamto a new,rnoreaggressivelevel.
Until Afghanistan, the dominant idea was Islam-as-bulwark,
that is,
that political lslam was e-rbarrier againstSoviet expansion.But in
Afghanistan the paradigm was Islam-ars-sworcl. The Islamic right
bccamean offcnsivewcilpon, sigrralinga significantcscalationin the
policy of coopcratirrgwith the Muslim Brotherhoodin Egypt, the
bloc, irnd othcr elementsof politicalIslam.
SaudiArabia-leclIslzrrnic
Although the war in Afghanistan was sometimesportrayed as a
: , : t he tw o broircl-bascclcoalition effort, the nrujahideenwere overwhelmingly
' -: : t c oth e r Islamists,and two-thirdsof the U.S.supportfor the mujahideenfight-
-:: r l I ntcl l i - fundamentalistparties,channelcd
ers in Afghirnistanwent to Islirrr-ric
through Pakistanand SaudiArabi:-r.
-: , n oth e r
: :: - ;c in th e The Afghan jihad also brought about a significanttransformation
: - : : i f ra n ti - of the Islamistmovcmentitsclf.F'irstof atll,the Afghan jihad empow-
- - : : ini p h e - ercclits most raclicalfringe, which took creclit'for battling toe to toe
' -. - . lis. with a superpowcrin Afghanistan.Second,thc Afghan war createda
: . : cVrn a k- new cr:rdreof Islanristsskilleclin gucrrilla wirrfare,intelligencetrade-
skills,and the making of car bombs.And third, it
craft, assassination
r ' . : q ov ef n- v:rstly strcngtheneclthe intcrnational boncls that tied tollether
: :. lriggesr, lslamistsin North Africa, F.gypt,the Clulf, Central Asia and Pakistan.
r: :rJictable ln onc sense,thc nrovementhad zrlreadyrcachcd its takeoff point in
:::.'Islamic the r97os, buoycd by the newfound power of Saudi Arabia's oil
: ' ,: l'lpil th i e s of the highly politicalIslamicbanking system,
wealth,the ernergence
: :- i \ \ ' inl p e - rrndthe establishmcntof powerful new Islamistinstitutionsin Egypt
:: : : llillc th e and other conservativeMuslim countries.But after Afghanistan,the
.. : : hr- sa me movement-radicalized, and feelingits power as neverbefore-flexed
t :' \ cll orga- its muscle.In the late rgflos, Islamistsseizedcontrol of Afghanistan
, :: St a kei n and Sudan,held significantpowcr in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan,and
 L4 6 . D r v r r . 's (ia,vtt

threatenedto capturc Egypt and Algeria. The foundation for Al the RaPidDc:
was laid in theseycars. establishmcn:
Qaedaanclits terroristundergrouncl .l

Some of this, perhapsmost of it, was ignored by or invisiblettr lust weeKS - r - '
U.S. intelligenceand policy makers,who were starry-cyecl abor"rtthc when, in Jr lll'- -

prospectof dealinga body blow to thc SovictUnitx'rin Afghar-ristrn. be called "t l'''

Not only that, hut thc more radicalarnongLJ.S.officialssirw Cjentral claims ttl ri-.';

Asia ils the soft Muslim "urrderbelly"of the SovietUnion, and pic- Delano Ro. ''t '

tured thc disintegrationof thc USSR beginningin its ClentralAsiirn positicln [.'. ''':

rcpublics. forcc to q.l .:' '

Finally,in the broadcststrategictenrs, thc Afghan iihirclcncrgizcd assaultoll : : ;

what until the rgtlos had beerrrmercly a rtc()c()nscrvxtivcpipc clrcaln: Soviet Ur lr '
"'-
of the PcrsianGulf anclirs oil
the military occr-r1-rittion Thcre is ir
ficlds. I r t r 9[ 3o.t l'.

direct linc bctwccnthe war in Afghirnistrtttrrnclthc currcnt U.S.nrili- r epel , r t r r : : '"

tirry presencedeep into Kirzakhstr-rn,tJzbekistrtn,irnd othcr prlrts oi sealif t t h. -

oil-rich (lcntral Asia. It wirs rr conflict thrt brougl-rtthc Unitcd Statcs Soviet L r-' -"

into ir part of thc worlcl which, until thc Igfios, lrry ot-ttsiclc thc U.S. r clucr r t t . t t : : -

sphcreof influerrcc.That beganin the r9[3os,when Afghan clcf et t sir. - '- :

iihaclists
took U.S., Cihinese,Israrcli,ancl othcr weaports to fight the ltccl Arrny. Irlrrr.nist'.': '

Statescooperatccl
It continucdinto the r 99os,whcn thc LJnitccl with t her e er l': t :

the risc of thc militar-rtTaliben movernent.It lasted on into the int cr t lr i. : ''":

prcsent, when yct anothcr Afghan war has fircilitateda lllrlssive I r . r t l t lt i: - --

U.S. entanglernent Muslirn (-lerrtralAsialrl

ir-rthe newly indeperrclent t . 1r \ 'a( ) . 1':

linked its Middle L-astirncl f d.ltt l'll: ' l

republics.The United Strrtes hasscarnlcssly
'' : :
Persian(iulf cnpire, conrplctewith :rn archipelagoof rnilitary bases I ' t r l -, r

and pointswest,with a new necklaceof

in the Gulf, thc Indian C)ceirn, L t - t it c. l': '- : '
(rl :'
basesencirclingIrac1,Afghanistan,anclClcntralAsia.If the conflictsof : l ()l l

the twenty-firstcentury pit the Unitcd Statcsagainsteither Russiaor J-111.1 -

j- l
China, or both, in a strugglefor control of the oil and gas resources l ' . i Z-l t : '

of southwestAsia, the United St:rtesalrcadyhas the upper hirnd.For,

bcgirrningwith the Afghan jihad, the U.S.milit:rry beganto assemble
a proto-occupationforce for the Clulf and surrounding real estate.
None of this existedat the time of the Iranian revolutionand the
start of the jihad in Afghanistan.But the war in that country allowed
the United States,for the Iirst time, to begin to proiect U.S. military
forcesdirectly into southwestAsia and the Gulf. It led to new military
relationshipswith Egypt, SaudiArabia, and Pakistan,the creationof

'.r.irion for Al
: -lf S.
,- rnvisibleto
.'. icl about the
' \fehanistan.
. srru'(lentral
' :.n. anc-lpic-
! clttr:tl Asian
: r p l Pe cl rc ir m :
- , . 1.. fh g rs 1* ' ,
: - "": :tt L J.S .t nili-
. - . : i cr p rrr t s of
- l. n i recl S t at es
: . :.1 c tl -rcLJ . S .
- '- - r.rn j i h e dr s t s
- . rr l tccl Ar r r y .
..rrrrteclwitlt
: . - . - rn i n to t he
' : . : .r rra ss iv e
-
" : :n tl 'l l l A s ian
. ' . -..1 lc l.-asran cl
- : : . l rtrrv b as es
. , '. ', n cckl a c c
of
- r . co n fl i c t s of
.- r i' l 'I{u ssia or
: - . -.1\ T CSO T t T C C S
:' : r' h rrncl. Frtr,
--
- . '- .i() a sse r . nblc
- '-:,tI cstate.
-
: -. : l o n a n C lt hC
: - . . : t rrv i l l l o wed
-, : L. S. rl i l i tar y
:-. I : rcu ,mi l i tar y
- . : r t i arca ti < ln( ) f
lihadI: The"ArcctfIslam" . 247
the Rapid Deployment Forceand the U.S. Central Command, and the
establishmentof new basessurroundingthe region.The processbegan
just weeks after the Soviet Union moved troops into Afghanistan,
when, in January r98o, PresidentCarter proclaimedwhat hascome to
be called "the Carter Doctrine," a forceful restatementof earlierU.S.
claims to the Persian Gulf that had been enunciated by Franklin
DelanoRoosevelt(rc+l) and Dwight D. Eisenhower(ry57). "Let our
position be absolutclyclear," said Carter. "An attempt by any outside
forceto gain control of the PersianGulf regionwill be regardedas an
assaulton the vital interestsof the United States."Aimed mostly at the
SovietUnion, Carter'sannouncementwas, for thc most part, bravado.
In r9[io, thc UniteclStatesdid not havceventoken forcesin the Gulf to
repcl :rn attack by the USSR,and it lacked the ability to airlift and
sealiftthe U.S. military to the Gulf in an emergency.
Of course,the
SovietUnion had no intentionof invadingor occupyingthe Gulf. lts
relucterntmove into Afghanistanin rc)7c)was taken as arlast-ditch
dcfensiveactiorl against a carefully calcr"rlated
threat from Afghan
lslarnistprovocatcursbackcd by the United Statesand Pakistan.If
there existcdany threat to U.S. intercstsin the (lulf, it was entirely
internal,but even in this arcna U.S. cirplcitieswcrc suspect.Sliould
lran or Iraq go to war againstthc Arab Gulf statesor shoulcla n-rili-
tary coup in SaudiArabia unseatthe royal farnily,Anrerica'sability to
reacteffcctivelywirs far from certain.
l-rxrg l'reforcthe crisis in Afghanistan,there had been talk in the
United St.rtesabout a U.S. invasictt'tof SaudiArabia and the occupa-
tion of its oil ficlds.This beganin the mid-r97os, aftcr the Arab oil
ernbargoand fourfold increasein the priceof oil imposedby the Orga-
nization of Petrolcum FlxportingC<;untricsin r 973-74. Stratcgic
thinking about a U.S.military tnoveinto the Gulf originatedwith Sec-
retaryof StateHcnry Kissinger. In r975, an articleheadlined"Seizing
Arab Oil" appearedin Harper's.The author,who usedthe pseudonyrl
Miles lgnotus,was identi{iedby the magazineas "a !flashington-based
professorand defenseconsultantwith intimatelinks to high-levelU.S.
policy makers." Reputedly,the author was Edward Luttwak, a neo-
conservativemilitary analystat the JohnsHopkins Schoolof Advanced
InternationalStudies(though Luttwak deniesbeing its author). At
 z4ll . I ) n v r l _ 's Clanar

around the samc time, another Hopkins professor,Robert

\f. Tucker,
wrote a similar piecefor the American
Jewish committee,s commen-
tLlry tnagazine,and other articlesadvocatingthe seizure
of the Saudi
oil ficlds began popping up elsewhere.According to
JamesAkins,
the U.S.amb:rssador to SaudiArabia in the n-rid_r97os, theHarper,s
articleoutlined "how we could solveall of our econornic
anclpoliti-
cal problemsby takrngover rhe Arab oil fields
landl bringingin Tex-
ans and oklah.mans to operatethem," saysAkins, wh.
trok ..te
the sudden epidemic ,f such arricles:"I kncw that it
'f had t<r
have becn the result ,f a deep backgrrund brie6ng.you
don,r have
eight pcoplec<;mingup with thc samescrewyidea at the
sametime.
independe ntly."l
Then Akins made wherthe cilllshis "fatirrnristake,"ar"rd
rt eventu-
ally got hir-nfired as u.S. ambassad'r."r said on terevisi.n
thirt any-
one who would proposethat is either a madman, a criminal,
or an
irgent'f the SovietLjnio'." S'on afterward,he learned
that the back-
ground briefing had been conductedby his boss,
Hcnry Kissingcr.
Akins was fired later thar ycirr.Kissir-rger
has neverackn.wredgecl his
.le in errc<rurirging thesearticles.But in an intcrvicw with Business
\x/eekthat sameyear,he delivereda thinly veiledthreat t,
the Saudis.
rnusing abour bringing oil prices ckrwn through "mAssive
poritical
warfare againstcountrieslikc Saudi Arabia and Iran
to make thenr
risk thcir prlitical stability erndmaybe their securityif
they did nor
ctoperatc." Something thc flavo.f Kissinger'sattitude towarcl
'f
saucliArabia and the (]ulf sraresis also capturedin a story
told by a
f,rmer senior clA rf{icial wh. served in rhe persian
Gulf in thc
t97os. Determined to make a show of f.rce in orcler
to intimidate
SaudiArabia' Kissingersummoneda cIA execurivewho
was heading
out to the Middle East .n an unrelated mission. ,.'we have
to tcacir
saudi Arabia a less'n," Kissingertold the cIA man. ,.pick
one ,t
thosesheikhdoms,any of them, and .verthrow the government
there.
as a lessonro the saudis." According to the crA official: ,.The
iderr
was to do it in Abu Dhabi or Dubai. But when rny bossgor
out to thc
Gulf, and met with all the cIA station chiefsfrom rhe region,
nor one
of them thought it was a good idea. So it was dropped. And
Kissinger
never brought it up again.',2
 JihadI: The"Arcof Islam" . z4e

:ert V. Tucker, Until Afghanisran's war, U.S. military planners knew that the
::ee'sCommen- united states didn't have the capability to rapidly dispatch tens or
::e of the Saudi hundreds of thousandsof U.s. forces ro rhe Gulf in the r97os, and
, .f:rmesAkins, America's naval presencethere was only a token force, despite the
:i. the Harper's bravado about occupying Arab oil fields. Along with announcing
':lic and politi- the carter Doctrine, Presidentcarter took stepsthat beganto give the
::rnging in Tex- United statesthe ability ro inrervenedirectly into the persian Gulf, if
',r'hotook note only in rudimentary form. carter ordered the creation of the Rapid
:hirt it had to Deployment Force (RDF), an "over-the-horizon" military unit capa-
\iru don't have ble of rushing at leastseveralthousandu.S. troops to the Gulf in a cri-
. :he sametime, sis. Under PresidentRonald Reagan,the RDF would be expanded,
transforming itself into the central command, a brand-newu.s. mil-
" rnd it eventu-
itary structurewith authority for the PersianGulf and the surround-
'ursionthat any- ing region, from East Africa to central Asia and Afghanistan.k was
;rirninal, or an the central command, or centcom, that fought the first persianciulf
J,that the back- war, the 2oor war in Afghanistan,and the zoo3 Iraq war.
{:nry Kissinger. But in r979, a massiveU.S. military presencein the Middlc lrast,
r<nowledged his the Gulf, and central Asia was jusr a gleam in the eye .f Zbigniew
,,'rvith IJusiness Brzezinski. For the national security adviser, the solution to the
r.:ro the Saudis, seething"arc of crisis" was the "arc of lslam."
r,r\sivepolitictrl
: io make thenr
:i they did not EysrNc Moscow's IsLAMrc ..UNDERBF_LLy',
l:ritude toward
:tory told by a The ideaof mobilizingIslam againstthe USSRhad a long hist'ry dur-
-rn Gulf in the ing the cold war. F.r the most part, it was viewed skepticaily by
:: to intimidate mainstreamu.s. strategisrs,especiallyduring the r9_5osand r96os.
:() was heading $Torkingagainsrthe notion that SovietMuslims might be induced or
. have tcl tcach cncouragedto revolt against rule by Moscow was the fact that the
:. "Pick one of Soviets seemed ro have succeededin pacifying its central Asian
',crnmentthere, republics,colonizing Russiansettlersthere, forcibly relocatingMus-
:;r.rl:"The idea lim ethnic populations,and suppressingMuslim religiousmovemenrs.
ii got out to the In addition, it was a remote region, limiting united Statesaccessto
:r'glon,not One the population. But in the r97os severalfacrorscombined to provide
. .\nd Kissinger strongerargumentsto those who, for many years,had sought to play
the Islam card againstMoscow. ln t97o, a censustaken in the Soviet
 z5o . D p v r r - 's Ge,up

Union showedthat the Muslim population of SovietCentral Asia was

growing far more rapidly than the populations of the other Soviet
republics, particularly the Russians.Then revolution in Iran cata-
pulted militant Islam to the forefront of regional politics, in
Afghanistan and in Azerbaijan and other Soviet republics.And sud-
denly,the Soviet-leaningregime in Kabul seemedvulnerableto a rag-
tag coalition of Islamist forces, and Afghanistan itself emergedas a
potential battleground.
At least that's how it looked to a small fraternity of U.S. officials
assembledby Brzezinskiand the CIA.'$Tithin the Carter administra-
tion the NationalitiesWorking Group was the organizationalcenterof
rhis strategicplanning.Thc NWG was a rump organization.an infer-
agcncy task force created with the expressapproval of Brzezinski's
NSC and including officials from the CIA, StateDepartment, Penta-
gon, and other agencies.The chairman of the NWG was Paul Henze,
a Brzezinskiaide and a former CIA official, who worked with a close-
knit group of outside players and consultantswho'd long believed
that restive Soviet minorities would be the undoing of the USSR.
Many of them had been associatedsincethe r95os with the creation
of Radio Liberty, a CIA-supported broadcastingsystem-parallel to
Raclio Free Europe-that beamed propaganda into the Soviet bloc
during the Cold War.
Radio Liberty's focus on Central Asia got off to a modest start in
the r95os. According to James Critchlow, a longtime Radio Free
Europe/RadioLiberty (RF'E/RL)executiveand author of Nationalism
in Uzbekistan,Radio Liberty began its first broadcastsinto Central
Asia through the Turkestan desk in Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh, Tajik,
and Kyrgyz, along with other broadcaststhrough its Caucasusdesk in
Georgian,Azerbaijani,and Chechen.The broadcastswere limited to
half an hour a day in eachlanguage,and they containeda mix of news
and editorials."Commentariescriticizingthe Sovietregime,including
especiallyits repressivepolicies toward Islam and other religions,
were a major componentr" says Critchlow. But, he says,in keeping
with the program's modest goals in the r95os, the broadcastscon-
agitation, a prohibition that was
tained an explicit ban on secessionist
"resentedby someof the staff."3
 JihadI: Tbe"Arc c:fIslam" . 2 sr

. :rrral Asia was From time to time, hard-line Cold \Tarriors would call for an inren-
::.: other Soviet sification of the U.S. propaganda and even subversionaimed at the
-:. Ln Iran cata- Central Asian republics.For example,in r958, Charles'W'.Hosrler,a
:-.l politics, in former u.s. intelligence officer, wrore in the Middle East Journal that
-: lrcs. And sud- "the soviets actively fear combined anti-Sovietaction by the Turkish
:::lble to a rag- peoples" in Asia, that NATO-linked Turkey could inspire rheseMus-
t.: emergedas a lims to "political independencefrom the Soviets,"and that "the rWest
must interest itself more in thesepeoplesand their aspirations." He
i U.S. officials called for an expansionof u.s. radio broadcastsin central Asian lan-
.::;r administra- guagesand an expansionof U.S. governmentfunding for "researchin
..:.::onal
centerof the CentralAsian and Caucasianpeoples,areas,and languages."4
i,i!1on,an inter- In the 196os,Brzezinskihimselfjoined the ranks of thosecalling
. ,t Brzezinski's for strongerU.S. support for Central Asian Muslims. GeneSosin,for-
'i:ir-nent,Penta- mer director of program planning for RFE/RI,, noted:
,i:: PaulHenze,
:=i ri-ith a close- Zbigntew Brzezinskiwas a consistentsupporterof Radio I.ree
i iong believed Europeand Radio Liberty.But he did not alwaysagreewirh some
: ,rl the USSR. of our policies. This became evidentin earlyr966, whenour CIA
:r rhe creation sponsorsaskedhim to join [inl a confidenrial analysisof borh
radios.. . . ProfessorsBrzezinski
and [MIT's Williaml Griffithcrit-
:r-parallel to
icizedRadio Liberty'snationalitypolicy,which they felt was roo
Sovietbloc
passive.They arguedfor adoptinga more militant line in rhc non-
Russianbroadcasts, which would stimula(eanti-Russian antas()-
:'.rrls56start in nism.5
:'.; Radio Free
': \ationalism As a scion of a P.lish elite family, Brzezinskiwas a militant a'ti-
.:. it'tto Central communist who saw the Soviet Union as a powerful but fragile
ii.rzakh, Tajik, mosaic of seethingethnic and religious minoriries. Ar the NSC, he
:.l.Asusdeskin assembleda team of aidesand consultantswho wanted to exacerbate
-,,,
r're limited tct conflicts insidethe SovietUnion in order ro hastenits fall. According
,r rnix of news to Robert Gates, a senior CIA official who later becamethe CIA,s
n e, in cl u d i ng director,the StateDepartment was cauriousabout getting inv'lved in
- : hc r re l i g i o ns , supportingdissidentminorities in SovietCentral Asia. "Brzezinski,on
: i s . in ke e p i ng the other hand, was deeply interested in exploiting rhe Soviets'
t: , t; dca sts co n - nationalitiesproblemr" wrote Gates,in his memoirs. "He wanted tr,r
:r: tt on th a t was pursuecovert action."6
The core of the Brzezinski-Henze
N\WG were acolyresof Alexandre
 z1z . l ) E v r r - 's (le,ral

Bennigsen, a count and lruropeanacademicwho was a prolific writer

and the guru of the scho.l that viewedIslam as a p.werful threat to
Sovietauth.rity. Bennigsen's family backgr.und gave hirn a narural
affinity for Brzezinski.He was born in St. petersburg,Russia,the son
of a Russiancounr whr foughr on rhc side rf thc anti-Bolshcvik
whites in thc civil war that followed the Russianrevrlurion. In the
r95os l3er-rnigsen
establisheclhimsclf firsr ar thc Ecole des Haurcs
Etr-rdes
cn sciencessocialcsin Paris,and later at the lJnivcrsityof
chicirg'. His rnany b.rks and articles Islam in ccntral Asia f.s-
'n
tereda nrovemcnrof scholarsand public officialswho belicvecl irr rhe
viability of thc Islamiccard, and who took up residcnce
at the Univer-
sity .f chicago, the RAND oorporation, in think tanks,ir'd in parrs
of the natio'al security bureaucracy.T
Am'ng thosc influcnceclby
Bennigscr-rwere Brzezinski,PaulHenzc,anclS. Enderswimbrsh, wh<r
later serveclas a RAND Srvict specialistand as a Radi. Liberry offi-
cial in Munich.
From the late r95os on, Bennigsenproduceclerstcadystreamof
b.'ks, arficles,and researchpapers advancingthe n.tion that a.
undergroundnrovementof Islamistswas gaining strengthinsidethc
ussR. In Thc lslamic Thredt to thc souiet,srale,Irennigsensaid that
the movement harkcd back to "armed rcligious resistancc
lthatl
bcgan in the lirte cighteenrhcenrury. . . spearheadcdby mystical Sufi
hrotherho.ds (tariqa) fighting to cstablishthe reign of God rn earrh"
and opposedtr thc Russianimperialpresence.s Despitetrcmencj.us
Soviet eff.rts to fracturc and suppress Islam, says Bennigscn,ir
thrived. Even during the r95os, when Nikita Khrushchevcrackcd
down on Islam, "far from destroyingforever the religiousfeelingsof
the Muslim populati,n, it only gavea new impulseto the fundamen-
talist, conservativetrend representedby the 'parallel,' underground
Sufi lslam."eBennigsenclaimedthat thesesecrersufi brotherhrods led
the resistancero the soviet authority in broad swarhsof central Asia:

Sincethe victory of the Bolsheviksup to the presentday,the onlv

serlolrs,organizedresistance encollnteredby the Sovietsin the
Muslim territorieshas come from the Sufrtariqa, what Sovier
sourcescall the "parallel,""nonofficial,"or ,.sectarian" Islam.
"ParallelIslam" is more powerful and more deeplyrooted than
 libad I: The " Arc of Islam" L53

- :t J \\-n te r official Islam.The Sufi brotherhoodsare closed,but not wholly

: r re a t to secret, societies.
. . . Soviet sourcespresent Sufi brotherhoods
-' : - natu ra l as "dangerous,fanatical,anti-Soviet,anti-socialist,anti-Russian
.. ,. t he so n reactionary forces," but they recognizetheir efficiencyand
: i lsh e vi k dynamism.lo
-: : : . In th e
:: - H rtu te s According to Bennigsen,the mosr significantof the sufi brotherhoods
: : r. si tV o f was a secretsocietycalledthe Naqshbancliya, a Freemason-stylefra_
' . \ ri. r fo s- terniry closely tied to the elite of Turkey, which had long-standing
.. . 'Jinth e connectiousin central Asia. The Naqshbandiyawere especially

- ' : ' 'r'n i f'C -f

:- _.t n p a rts
' - . : : l. c cl b y
* - , . . h. rvh <r
- : : 't r ' o ffi -
strong in chcchnya, Dagcstan,and parts of centrar Asia, incruding
southernUzbekistan."The Naqshbandiyaadeptshave a long
tradi_
tio' of 'Holy \ffar' againstthe Russians,"wrote Bennigsen.His c'n-
clusionwas thaf nati'nalisrnin central Asia was inextricirbly
borrnd
up wrth radicalpoliticalIslam:

. : :-a .l l I
SiuccIw<rrldlfar III sorne.rdersh:rvebecomem()rcand rn're
of
' - : it . rt a n infr-rsecl
with with thc result that irny nati'nalist
'ati":rlisrn,
m()vemert-cvenprogressivc-which is boundto emergewill be
' . t t lc fh c
srronglyi'fluenced by the traditi.naristconservative icrea.f
. - .. t r . l th a t
Sufisnr.
Tharsuchrl movemcntwill cnrerge is bey''cl cloubt.ll
. -, . l r h a t l
. .:: ; . rlSL r t i Ilennigsen,and in hrs circle, urged rl srrorger U.S. effort to
. t'.1I'tl]
'thers
encouragepolitical Islan-rin thc Sovietrepublicsro revolt, even
though,
: r :: lf l l cl O US
as Bcnnigsenwrotc, the most likely would be ..pr'bably, a
:: : j\C l l r it 'rtcomc
conservafivc Islamicrardicalism comparablcto thrrtof the present_day
: . ;rrrcked 'lslamic Rev'luti.'' in lr:lrr."l2 Bennigsen's rather cavirlierattitucle
:.:irngs <tf t.ward the emergence radical-rslamist
' -- : .! l , 1 l len- 'f llovernmentsrn central Asia
prcciselyparalleledBrzczinski'sbeliefthat the unitccl States
ought to
*: :{ l ' O Und fosterthe sprcad.f Islamisrnin Afghanistanwithout worrying
ab'ut
:: ,,rclsled the conseclr-renccs.
:::.rl Asia: "In the t97os1Bennigscnand I taught rr seminar.n
Sovietnation-
': ,tllr' ality affairs," says Jererny Azrael, auth.r of Emergent Nationality
: rhe I'roblems in the u.t,sR ( rc)77).The university of chicago program
) ,\ I e t proclr"rced a cohorr of expcrts on soviet central Asia and Islam,
- - .trtr. mostly followers of Bennigsen'scontroversial the'ries, ano
some,
::l . t n includingPaul Goble,becamenoted crA analysts.n the topic.
Azrael
 :.54 . Dr.vrr_,s (i nvE

himselfjoined the cIA in r97g as a guesranalysr.

"once r was on ca r e e r l l l a -
board there, I becamea charter member of the
SovietNationalities r97os. h.-.
working Gr.up." During the Brzezinskiera,
efforts were at first aS Ol l C { :
restrictedto smallgesturcs,suchas the distribution
of K.rans in cen- U S S Rr n :
tr:rl Asian languagesancl stepped-upefforts, in
c.ordination with tion of i'
saudi Arabia'sintelligenceservice,to contactSoviet
Muslims vrsrting Henzcr'.:
Mecc:rfor the hajj, accorclingt. Azrael.* But the
revolutirn in Iran ring to ., :
stimulatcdthe inraginationof cveryoneinvolved.
Russiilll 'r1
"I br.ught Bennigsento the cIA t, give a recturc
at the timc the Shamil ,::-
'f
the shah," recal[sAzrael.It w.s an excitinga'd chalre'g-
'verthr.w'f coulclh...:
i'g m'mcnt. By toppling thc shah,Kh.rnei'i hird
rewritten the rulesof
what Islan-r accrmplish, and c.lcr \7ar anarystsin rhe United
'right It r ' :
Strrteswerc alivewrth the prssibilities.Thc neoconservatives, c( ) 1 "::.-
in particu-
lar,al.ng with .ther crlcl war hard-lincrs, sirwan for an anti-
S'viet jihad, n.t just in Afghanistan,but rhrrughrut 'peni.g ()\\:-
the region.After
thc S<rvictinvasioir of Afghanistan in Dccember sh , .i -
r979, Zalnay l--
Khalilzad-a neoconservativea'alysr, RAND ll.1\ .:-i

strategist,and futurc
tl { ': --'
U'S. :rrnbassirdor t. Afghrrnistan-wrote a paper in whrch he suggested
u ::.'
thc prrblcms thirt Khrmeini's regimehad createdfor
the uSSR. ,.Thc Ill-L
t_
"
:
_

Khomeirri regime also posesrisks to the Soviets,,,

he wrote..,The
change rf regimc has encouragedsimirar movements
in lraq and Bv t ir . ..
Afghanistan,:rndrnightevenaffe* SovietMuslim
central Asia.,,raHe IJrzcz t:-.- .
added: '.
.l dt t,..,:.
{\'
.1\1.lll
The costfor the SovietUnioncouldinclude. . . possible
domesric ir.rclr.r.l:
unresrin rhoseregirns the USSRreferredt' by
'f rhe sovietsas
their "interralc.l.ny"-the Islamicp.pulatior-r S'viet centrar
L9\ \ :

Asia, which might rcach roo million by the year 'f I)rrt.1.' 1'
zooo_where
despitc.fficial a*empts at assirniration, Isramicconsciousress ttl { t-:.. =
forns a kind of cclunterculture a'cr rnaybe susceptibre i ' c c :' .
to Muslim -
agitatio'rif the Sclviets
c,ntinue t. makewar on their ethnicand :; )'-
religiouscounterpartsacrossthe border.. . . Hostility
to the sclvr-
etsmay incre:rse generally in Muslimcounfries andgroups.ls

It was, of course,straight out of Bennigsen.

Henze,the chairman of Brzezinski'sNationalities
working Group,
was himselfa longtime advocateof the Bennigsen
view. Henze,whose
 " lslam" ' 255
JihadI: The Arcof

the rnid-
CIA station chief in Turkey in
: -r-I was on careerincludeda stint as r98os
views' He earnedrenown in the
\...tronalities rgTos,heldradical and offbeat
for the discreditednotion that the
','.-rra at first as one of the leading advocates
were behind the attemptedassassina-
in Cen-
:...:rs ussR and Bulganan intelligence
as t958'
by a Turkish fascist'r{'Asearly
: -..rtionwith tion of Pope John Paul II refer-
SovietUnion's "shamil problem"'
: :.nsvisiting Henzewrotean artlcle on the
Muslim resistanceleader who opposed
,.:r()nin Iran ring to a nineteenth-century
Henze' like Bennigsen) was inspiredby
Russianexpanslonin Asia' Llnion
eventuallythe collapseof the Sovict
-: i i t l l e of the Shamil and believedthat
ln his r95tl article'Henzewrote:
,-.::.ichalleng- could beginin CentralAsia'
:: :ht-rulesof for SovictCommunists' howevcr'ttl
- :hc United It will be extremelvdifficult
"anti-colonial"policyfor several
continuetheir activepro-Arab
: : . t t l pl rti C u - of provokingunrcstamongtheir
yearswithou' "'n"tni thc risk
Shenrildclrate
,- : ( )r a n a n ti - own Caltcastan ancl(lt'ltt"l Asian peoples'The
intelligentsir
inclirred
narionalisric:rlly
: :: lon. Afte r showsthat ar.rnt.lr, p.,rua, LJniotlts
al'n()n!! thescpe<lples'''' The Soviet
Zalmay l-rasagilindevelopecl the clay
of its <lwtl'though
:.. r n c l fu tu rc nttt immunefrorn Algeriansituatiotrs
which are still in an irrcipient stagcmigl.rtreachsuch
r ::. \Llggestcd when issues
ProPorti()nsis stil l fer off 'l-
, i :5R. "Th e
' ,. : rrt e . "Th c
ltlnger scemcd so far off to Benttigscrr'
: Irrrq and By the latc r 97os, it no
:. \ ri. - t ."Ia He
Brzezinski,andHenze.TheyjtlinedftlrceswithRichardPipes,lltlothcr
Central
who hacl becrrwritirrg about
advocateof the lslarnic card' l9''os'
to the Sovict Union sincethe
Asiar-rMuslims and the threat
': * llleS t l C including",*.,-oo,.analysispublisheclir-rtheMiddleLast.|ournaltrt and
of Sovict Central Asia: Trcrrds
\ '. r c t s as r 95 5 cntitled: "Muslims
areaof ClentralAsia' includ-
:: t . c l l t f al Prospects." In it, Ptpeswrote: "Thc entirc
always
which RussianCentral Asia has
: : - rv h c r e ing ChinescTu'kt't'n with the direc-
well tend to movc with time in
beenclosely.n'-t'-tttttd'may
. . ' t t S n eS S
-
: \ l r rs linr
tionofindependentstatehclod.[tisntltincclnceivablethatthisvasttcr-
l1fld i" a new Turkic' Muslim state
ritory may some day bc enconrpa::t-tl
:: : -:llC

that Soviet
: '. 1 S ovi- East'" ls Pipes'who oncewrote
orientedtoward the Middlc
..."plud. into genocidalfury" againstMoscow,leals<l
Muslims would
Central Asia'
nationalitiesproblem in Soviet
wrote extensivelyon the
PipesassLlmed
pte'ident ReaganreplaceclCartcr in rgtlr'
: \ 1ng G ro u p ' and when
Working Group'
: : : . : lZ e.Wh OSe chairmanshipof the Nationalities
 (i A ME
LS 6'D P vtr,'s

on the Soviet Union disagreed

Many other scholarsand experts anti-Soviet
and in any caseno such
with Bennigsenand his followers' factor in the
revolt.-"';;;' *"dical political Islam was not a
Muslim of the Berlin
pt'"'troika' the collapsc
clissolutionof the uisn uftt' The (lentral
of Ct'-tt'"I Asia's reRublicl'
Wall, and the establishment tinged with
in the I99os were not
Asian regimes that emerged Islamists
themselvesbattling militant
Islarnism. Instead they found casc can be
Al tt' tht Islamic Liberation Party' and a
from Qaeda in Asia
support for political lslanr
made that, if anything,America's Chechnya'
lslamistundergroundin
hasaidedthe growth nf " ""o'i't
in the region'
Uzbekistan,and other countries

rN ApcHANIs'rAN BEFoRE 197')

Tns CIA

in Asia
might underminethe USSR
ln r97.1,the theorY that Islam Arabia offi-
States'Pakistan' and Saudi
becamepracticc' The Unitecl in
the
launchecl t'lu*l't jihad that thrcatenedthe governrnerrt
cially ancl
Union into invading Afghanistan'
Kabul, provoked the Soviet tied
The Afghan war' for Brz-ezinski'
spawned the ten-yearcivil war' of Islam" in
was his idea of an "arc
two conceptstogether'The first
Fawaz Gerges'
argainstthe USSR' As
southwest Asia, as ' bu"it'
Islam' wrote:
author rtfAmerica and Political

arr
said Brzez'irrski'dictared
Containing Sovret Cornmunisn.r' to the
split Israrnicopposition
avoidanceor nnyrni,a-thut,r-,ight "It now
c<l.rfrontation:
rr-rilitary
Soviets,.rpttiutty n fj'S'-ttnni-
to forge an anti-sovietIslamic
seemedto me 'io"-tt-'O"ttant hopedto
r96os'the UnitedStates
coalition."As ln the r95osand tn'
their athtist
uselslam ugui""-'uaiii, "tul"'forces^and lllt' the
officialsnow recognized
SovietUnion' Carter administration
w.ith Islamic resurgenceand
new possibilitiesfor cooperation
and materialresourcesagarnst
hoped to harnessits icleoiogical
in U'S' officials' nrinds
Communtstexpansionisrn'Uppermost was
and r96os' when Islam
were the lessonsof the r95os secular'
weapon in the fight against
employedas an icleological
pan-Arabnationalism'20
 JibadI: The " Arc Of Islam' /57

- -- )lgreed The Bennigsen-Brzezinski notion of mobilizing Islam as a weapon

.': i- So vi e t against Moscow's Asian "underbelly" was the secondsalient of this
, - : , r in th e strategicPlan.
: :'r B e rl i n yet the Afghan Islamists didn't emerge fuily developed,out of

- - : ( c n tr? I nowhere, when they began receiving official cIA support. l,ong
.- . : t l wi th before rg7g, the Islamic right had emergedas a potent force inside
L l . i. r mi sts Afghanistan,where,from the rg5os on, it did battlewith progressive,
:, . ': Ci l n b e left, and secularforcesin Kabul. America'sconnectionto the Muslim
..: : r r 1n Asi a Ilrotherhood-linked Islamic fundamentalistsin Afghanistanbeganat
I . : rcch n ya , leastas early as rhe rg,5os,and u.S. support for the Islamic right's
politicalmovementin the country beganas far back as rc)73'
Although the CIA did not have a great presencei1 Afghanistanin
\i7ar,it did dispatcha team therc thrgugh
the early decadesof the Cold
thc officcsof the Asia Foundation,a CllA fr6nt 11rganiz:rtign. l)uring
the r95osand r 96os,the Asia Foundati<trt provicledsignificantsupport
..i" rn Asia to Kabul Llniversityand had severalmodest proiccts thirt dcalt with
offi-
.:.:.rbrir Afghanistan'sorganizcd Muslirn community. According to Johrr and
,: -:l l l l e n t in RgseBirnnigan,longtimeAsia Foundationofficialswho wgrkcclfor the
.:. -l , l l l . ilnC l foundatiorrir-rbgth Pakistanand Afghanistanin the t96os, the 6rg.rni-
;. :.ki, tied zatign helpeclthe Islamic ResearchInstitute in l.ahore, Pakistrrn,to
: i.lrrnr" in pu$ish the Urdu Encyclopediaof Islam. "'We were also involveclwith
, , ., - ,' LrCf $e Sr through the departmentsof Islamic the<llog5"
the maj6r ur.rivcrsities,
the Brlnrlil]rlrls
end Afgherristen.
.johrr[hrrniBrlnsrys. In hoth Prkistlrr
wgrked with student groups to combat pro-Sovietstudent org.tniza-
tigns."Thc studcntswcre targetnumberone," he says.In Afgh.rnisten,
I . ::.1 il l l

-' :, t h e accordingto Rose Bannigan,the Asia founclationestablishedrelirtions

'' . : t l ()rv with the Muiaddidi family, that country'sleadinglslarnicclericalflm-
:.. . , r rl l i c ily, and with thc minisrry of iustice,which was headedfor ir timc by a
- : c d t() MLrjaddidi. The foundationalsosentShafiqKamawi,the deputyminis-
.-, i. t h c ter 9f justicc,to Henry Kissinger'sseminaron internationalaffairs at
Harvard,shesays."A lot of peoplein the ministry9f justicewere nru[-
- -' . J t l .re
:-.,: J f ld
lahs,includingthe legaladviserto the AsiaFoundation'"
: . :-j. 11l1 St
It is not clear to what extent the CIA maintainedregular contacts
. :r'rrnc{s
\ \ 'i1 s
with Afghan Islamistsin the I96os, sinceAfghanistanwas not a priority
: :tl

: . :at ll ilr.
for U.s. policy until well into the following decade."when I was there
in tg57, Afghanistanwas alreadya Sovietclient state," saysa former
 258 . I ) r v r l 's GauE

senior CIA official. "They wanted me to find out everything I could dentsand ::
about the Sovietpresencein Afghanistan,becausePresidentL,isenhower by manr.,':
wanted a study of the importanceof the country to U.S. strategyand its ies of thc t
'W'roteRo'.:
relevancein Washington." But the study proved only that Afghanistan
was not vcry important. "We concluded that there wasn't any rele-
vance,"he says."Even if the Sovietstook it over,therewas no greatrisk The "::
yeilr , :
to the United States."2lStill,in the r96os, the Asia Foundationmain-
d e n t.;.
tained a presencein Afghanistan, with two or three permanent U.S.
" tr l .:
staffersand perhapsa dozenor more U.S.advisersand consultants.22
Po l r l :- :
During the r96os, the Islamist movement in Afghanistan under- m u a :'-
went a slow but steady politicization. Although Afghanistan society figh:.::
had alwaysbecna conservative, traditional one in which Islam playeda A lrl- :

centralrole, the versionof Islam that prevailedin the country,at least n i sl ..::

until the r 96os,was pious but not political.Islam in Afghanistanwas a n 1 .1 1:.:

'

faith and not a sociopoliticalcredo.But under the influenceof outside

religiousand intellectualforces-especially Egypt's Muslim Brother-
hood, Pakistan'slslamic Group, and the internationalorganizationof
the Brotherhoodbasedin Clenevaand led by Said Ramadan-Afghan
Islarn underwent a critical transformation,becoming politicized and
more militantly anti-communist.Leading Afghan Islamist organizers
and scholarsbeganto return to Afghanistanfrom Egypt, where they
had come into contact with the heirs of Hassanal-Banna'smovement.
According to Olivier Roy, a leadingFrench Orientalist and expert on
Afghanistan and Islam, the origin of political Islam in Afghanistan
beganwith a semi-secretclique called "the professors,"who came to
prominencein Afghanistanafter studyingat Cairo'sAl Azhar mosque,
where they hobnobbedwith the Muslim Brotherhood.The movement
in Afghanistan coalescedin r958, when a leading Afghan religious
scholarclashedwith Muhammad Daoud, the king's cousin and future
leaderof the Afghan republic. Many Islamistswere arrested,and the
nascent organization was forced to operate underground. It called
itself the Islamic Society.23
By the mid-r96os, the Islamic Societyand its offshoots were fol-
lowing in the mode of Islamist organizationsin Egypt, Pakistan, Iraq,
and elsewhere,physically assaultingleft-wing and communist stu-
 lihad I: Tbe" Arc of Islam" ' ;-59

Led
:- :.: I could dents and threateningviolenceagainsttheir political opponents.
by many of the samemen who would , tn :l979,becomethe beneficiar-
: l:.e nhower
.:.iv and its ies of the cIAs largesse,they also began open political agitation.
--.:Ehanistan Wrote Roy:
:': :ny rele-
:. qreatrisk The "professors"greatlyinfluencedtheir pupilsand in r965' the
::::()nmaln- yearof the foundationof the communistparty, the Islamiststu-
dentsdemonstrated openlyby distributinga leafletentitled. . . the
:.-t.:entu.s.
"tract of the holy war." The period from :.965to t'972was one of
-. :.rnts.22 political turmoil on the campusat Kabul' ' ' ' They were verv
::.1;.1Llnder-
much opposedto communism,and a great number of violent
.:-,:l SOCiety fightsbrokeout on Kabul campusbetweenthem and the Maoists'
- ..- ^1..,-,.t a.
:--:
I' rdlLu Althoughat the beginningthey wereoutnumberedby the commu-
nists,the Islamists'influencesteadilyincreased and they gaineda
: ::-.. .lt least
-- .: l.lI l maiorityin the studentelections of t97o'24
WdS 2

; ': t l t ttside
dispatch
::-. Brother- As early as June r97o, a confidential State Department
religious
:: . 'z . lt io n o f from the u.S. embassy in Kabul identified Afghanistan's
Mujadiddis' as a
i-- \tghan leadership,in particular the clerical family of the
.:. ,: Z r -da n d strong ,.tiu" force. It concluded that agitation by the mullahs
"nd
.,setback the leftist cause)at leastin thc countryside" and that "rcli-
: :iJnlzers
vividly demtln-
'.,..11'rethey gious conservatism,for the first time in many years'
government must
:r ,\ enlent. strated that it remains a force with which .the
.,The mullahs are reliably reported to have agrcedto con-
J :\ pert o n contend."
embassy'spolitical
l, :: l anrsta n tinue the good fight in the provinces," wrote the
efforts to keep the
:. i.tme to officer. "Here, in Kabul, there have been some
He added,with some
.-i : : I osq u e , flame of religiousfervor burning in the bazaat..,
not be known for
' -t )\'ement irony given future developments:"It will probably
militancy has'"25
,: : r ' ligio u s sometime how much stayingpower the clerical
movement in the early
.: J ir.rture Among the leadersof the Afghan Islamist
was affiliatcd
rnd th e r97os were Abd.,l Rasul Sayyaf,whose organiz-ation
Burhanuddin Rab-
with the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia;
-: .
: Ir called
led maior components
bani; and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, all of whom
to Roy' "The movement
:: .,\cre fol- of the jihad forces in the r98os' According
Youth' and a more secret
.-): -1t ]Ira
. q, functioned on an open level, the Muslim
leaderof "the professors,"
:. - . r ls r stu - level,centeredupon the 'professors."'The
 260 . D e v t t . 's Gaus

and the man who led the semi-secretOrganization of Muslim Youth,

was ProfessorGholam Muhammad Niyazi of the faculty of theology
at Kabul UniversitS a major beneficiaryof CIA support through the
Asia Foundation.In 1972, Rabbani, Sayyaf,and later Hekmatyar
formed a guiding council for the movement, and Hekmatyar super-
vised its secret military wing. The entire organization operated in
srnallcellsof five members,and in the early r97os-again, following
the pattcrn set by the Brotherhoodin Egypt and Pakistan-they began
to inllftrate the armed forces.26 U.S. embassy
In r972, declassified
documentsrevcal,a member of the Muslim Youth met a U.S. official
"describingin somedetail the anti-
severaltimes to requestassistance,
communist activitiesof his group" (includingthc murder of "four
leftists")andrequestingcovertU.S.aid to buy a printing prcss.But it
was too early for direct CIA help, and the embassyofficial turned
down the request,while expressingsympathy for the group's goals.27
Beginningabout this time, the CIA beganto take a more activerole
on behalf of the Afghan Islamists.Previously,the ClAs assistance
was
modest, rnuch of it funneled through the Asia Foundation to Kabul
University and more establishmentIslamic forces. But then in r971,
PrinceMuhammad Daoud-with the assistanceof the communists-
toppled the king and establishedan Afghan republic. Caught off
guard, bitterly dividcd into factions basedon ego and ideology,the
Islan-ricright in Afghanistannevertheless
moved into open opposition
to Daoud. They soon found a plethora of friends abroad.
The CIA, Pakistan-first under Zulfrkar Ali Bhutto, and then under
the Islamist GeneralZia il-Haq-and the shah of Iran began urgent
efforts to undermine the new Afghan government. It was years before
the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan,long before the r98os jihad, but
the momentum for an Islamistholy war in the landlockedAsian nation
was alreadygathering-with the full complicity of the CIA. Yearslater
a Pakistani government official working for Bhutto's daughter, who
was then prime minister, admitted that the CIlt's support for the
Islamistsin Afghanistanbeganimmediately afterDaoud's r971 coup.
"Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's SpecialAssistantNasirullah Babar
reportedly stated in a press interview in April t989 that the United
 lihad I: Tbe " Arc of Islant" ' z6r

',,:r Youth, Stateshad beenfinancingAfghan dissidentssince r973 and that it had

its
: rheology taken [Islamic PartYJ chieftain Gulbuddin Hekmatyar 'under
to
::,,Lrghthe umbrella' months Prior to Sovietmilitary intervention," according
{:tmatyar one account.28
recently
-"_ii-super- Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, drawing heavily on
the United
:.rated in released soviet archives, described in detail the effort by
Islamic right
:,llowing States, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan to rnobilize the
-:.r began i n s i d e Afg h a n i s ta n :
. :mL'rassy
S hah
S. official It w a s i n th e e a rl y tL)7os' w i th oi l pri ces ri si ng' tl -rat
M o h a m m e d R e z a P a h l i rvi of Iran embarked on hi s :rn.rbi ti ous
:he anti-
and
,r "four e ffo rt to ro l l b a c k So vi et i nfl uencei n nei ghbori ng countri es
of tl.reancient Persiarlernpire. .
' ' Begin-
create a nrodcrn versi<>n
:r r. But it
n i n g i n tg T 4 ,th e s h a h l a unchedadetcrmi nedefforttodraw
:.. rurned rcgiotraI econ<lnlic
'. KabLrIinto a \rVestern-tilted, Teheretn-centered
i,t,rls.27 the Persirrlr
and security sphere err.rbrircinglr-rdia,Pakistiru and
thi s rol l -
;::r c role c i u l f s ta te s .... T h e u n i tecl S tatesrrcti vel yencouraged
::ae was b rrc k p o l i c y a S p a rttl fi tsbroacl partnershi pw i ththeshahi nthe
through-
:, Kabul e c o n o m i ca n d s e c u ri tys pheresas w el l as i n c< l vertacti ol l
. :' r L ) 73t o u t s ()u th w e s Ast i a .2 ' )
--- t 1 1 q 15-
supported by saudi
i-iht off T h e g o a l o f th e U .s .-l ra n i a n effort, w hi ch w as al so
,rnd conservrl ti v('
,gr'. the A re h i t rn c l l h k i s te n . w ts t() strenl l thcn ri ght-w i ng
to pul l A fgheni srarl
l :( ) s l t l on fo rc e s i n D a o u d ' s mo d e rate government, i n order
Harrison:
out of the Soviet orbit. According to Clordovez and
Ll n der
-: r in ltltlsc c<ll-
:. urgent Savak and the CIA workcd lrand in h:lnd' s<lnletimes
fr-rndanrentalist
:. l.cfore laboratior-r with undergrr>und Afghan Islarnic
anti-soviet obiectivesbut had their own
:,r.1,but grotlps that shared their
..g .n d o ,a s w e l l .T h e A fg hanfundarnental i stsw erecl osel yl i nked,i n
i: . n. lt lon
turn, to the Cl:riro-basecl lkhwan al-Muslimeen (Muslim Brother-
:-: .: ilate r (Muslirn \wtrrld l.eague)'a
hood) and the Rabitat al Alam al lslanri
:-:. rvhCl
l e a d i n g e x p ()n e n to fs audi W ahhabi < l rtl -r< l d< l xy.A scl i l prtl fi tssky-
fundamentalist
ior 1l-r" r<lcketed,emissariesfr<lm thesenewly affluent Arab
with bulging bankrolls' Like
-: r'oup . groups arrived on the Afghan scene
identify cjommrrnisr
: Baba r i"u"k, they hired informers who artemptedto
throughout the Afghan government and armed forces'
L'nit e d syn-rpathizers
-
 26 2 . D E v r r . 's Gavr.

The authors added that lran's intelligenceservice

fed weaprns a.d and comnt'.::
other assistance to undergroundgroups in Afghanistantied to the fron the K.-,:
Islamic r:ight,while pakistan'sInterservices
IntelligenceDrrecforare to a small.'-.:
(lSI)helpedcoordinateraiclson Afghan
targers...s:lvak,the crA, ancl ing to (.or.:
Pakistaniagentswere als. involved in the abortive,
fundame'tarist- by SAVAK.:-
backcd coup attemptsagainstDa'ud rn Septe'rber
and Decemlrer Muslinr ii:' ::
1.173andJune r 974.,i0
M ohanr r t t - - -
In r975, Afghan's lslarnistsfert that they had
enough power ro sigltccl il ::. :
Iaunch an all-.ut rebellirn against Da.ud,
who, tlrough wave'rg, S Ll ppOI-tc r: -
was still alliedt. Afghan'sc'rnmunists.But thc
r-rprising wirscrushed, a ssl 1 ssl l l .l i :- -.
many of the rebelswere arrestec] a'd executcd,and others-such as attlrck irS.: '
Hckmatyar and Rabba'ri-fled intr exire,nrostly pakist:rn,
to whcre Thc L :'
thev bcga' to gersignificantsupporrfrorn the pakistani
nriritaryrnter- Afghrtrtr':.,
ligencescrvice.F.r the ncxt f'ur years,thc ISI
crevcr'pecr an incrcas- i :
Mr"rslirrr
ingly closcrelationshipto rhe nr'rrey coaliti'n
Afghanisranrebcrs, et - t t lt r t ssi'. '
cspeciallyits Islamistc.rc. A c'nfidential Statc'f
Departnrenta'arysis t hr t t t hc ' '-
tf the crisis irr Afghanistanin r97; specificaily
lirkcd thc Mr-rsrinr gl ' otl p\ .l ' :
BrothcrhoodanclISI:
1r27r.; th.' .:

i l fotl l l !t : ':
\x/hatwent alrn'sr it r r r lct t . : : .
unnrticeclin trrc excltement.f alresccl
pilk-
i s ta n i i n v o l v e n rc -nw t a s fhc fact that D aoLrdw i l s Af gh. inr . :
IrLrrri l l ld,r1y1l
l 1r
rn a r.ri fe s ta ti c .f l n " i n tcrnati oni rl " l sl arn.
A fgha' nati ol ral s w h' C C l l tf rl L. : .' '
w e rc ri n g l e a d e rsi ' th e i nsurge' cy, i n addi ti .n
to bei ng pers()rs rcbclc,': :-
allegecllysubverted by pakrstani ai'rs, werc
rcp.rtedry rncnrrrers JS l l l l -1 1 . ' . -:
.f ' ' ' th e Mu s l i m B r' therhrrd, and i t w as
the l l r' rherho.d as
part ()f a larger group that was said to have Brtirircr..-.
entereclan agreement
rv i th P a k i s ta n ' sc h i e f o f i ntel l i gence,C i eneral refcrr..-:
l ai l ani .tl
l ) Li : -

t unf ol. l. , - . -
Inside Afghanistan' however, the vacillating
Daoud began to tilt .1i,-l1'.t-r':
right, under pressure from the United
states, the shah of lran, and paki- l. 1. e. t ' ,
s ta n . Be tw e e n r9 7 S a n d r97g, D aoud sw i tched
si cl es,breakrng deci _ ( rIrrr,. .' . : -
sively with his left-wing supporrers and
embracing the army and !LC.1i, -
Afghanistan's conservative establishment.
In r976, Daoud met with l.lLlllvl : -
the shah and Prime Minister Bhufto,
and in response he began ro
install right-wing officers and other pro-wesrern
leaders in key posrs.
By r978, Afghan government death squads
started assassinatingleftist
 JihadI: The"Arcof Islam" ' L63

i: :t s an d and communist leaders,and the communistsand the left were purged

:: iO th e from the Kabul regime.Increasingly,Daoud's power basewas reduced
: t ora te clique and the armed forces,and, accord-
to a small, ultraconservative
-.
- l\ , and ing to Cordovezand Harrison, behind-the-scenes power was wielded
:-. :nf ali st- by SAVAK,the alliesof SaudiArabia's Muslim World l-eague,and the
li: .; c mb e r Muslim Brotherhood.rzThe crisisraged until April r978, when Nur
MohamrnedTaraki, a cornfilunist,stageda pro-Sovietcoup d'6tat and
: )\\-er to signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. The Islamic right,
,,. . r veri n g , sr-rpportcdby the ISI,carricdout a countrywidccampaignof terrorism,
i J . Lis h e d , ass:rssinatinghundrcdsof tcachersand civil servantsin a Pol Pot-style
-.u c h as aftack ilgainstseculirrand educatedAfghanis.
:: - . u'here Thc United States was wcll awarc that the organizationsin
:: r intcl - Afghanist:urcarrying out anti-Soviettcrrorism were affiliertedwith the
: l ! f ell S - Muslirn lJrotherhood,accorclittgto nunlel:rtusState I)epartntentand
r: rcbels, enbassydispatches. One, frotn a CIENTOttreetingin tc)78,saysflatly
..:;t.llvsis drat thc "main thrcat to ucw reqimccould come from tribcs and such
\lLrslinr grollpsas fhc Muslirr Brothcrhood."ilArtothcranalysisnotcd in April
that "sonre of thc clericill opposition could cvct-ttr-rally
1c17c.. coalescc
ar<rundthe Ikbutan-i Muslimin Muslirn Brotherhood."r4In .lune tr.-7r1
in:r lcngthydocunrentcntitlec'l "(lurrent Statusof thc Insurrcctiottitr
.1 \ -

-,' :. .1 Afghanistan," in crlbassy officcr noted that "cntire provinccsin the

' ' : lr l centra[,eastern,atrd wcstern portiotts of Afghrrnistanhave slid undcr
:- :t \ rebelcontrol." It siridthat tl-rerebclsare "known by many uames-such
'- ': i -\
as mujahidccn ('l-rolywirrriors') landl lkhwan-i-Mttslimiz ('Muslim
- -ts Brothcrhoocl')."It r-rotcd tl-ratthe Afghangoverltment
witl-routcot-ltlnent
^ - : llt
as
referrcclto the otr'rposition "madc-in-Londotr mullahs."15
Drrring this pcriocl, even as the rc178-7c.- revolution in Iran
Pakistan's
runfoldecl, tiesto the Afghan Islitmistsgrew strongcr,and so
:. t o t i l t did Pirkistan'sown Islamistlcanings.ClencralZia institutecla regitnc
: . i Prrki - thc growth of Pakistan'sIslamic
b:rscdon lslarniclaw irnd cncouragecl
:: t lc ci - (iroup, lcd by Abul-Ala Mawcludi.As AyatollahKhonreiniwas busili,
:'.) lrnd creatinghis lslamicRepublicof lr:rn,ZbigniewBrzczinskiand the CIA
-.'r: \vith arrnyit.tAfghanistan.But it was nrorethan
launchedthcir Isltrmic-right
' : j . 1l 'l t( ) jr.rstan Afghanistanstrategy.Brzezinski'seffort was designedto imple-
: '. I ]OStS . ment thc cataclysmicview of the Bennigscnschool,to Lrsethe Islamic
- * lritist right as a sword againstthe USSRitself.
 264 . D E v t t - 's Getrr

Zstc AND BILL's MusrIM ARMY

In his oft-quoted 1998 interview with Le Nouuel Obseruateur,

Zbigniew Brzezinski revealed a secret behind a secret,that the CIA's
assistanceto the mujahideenin Afghanistan began before, not after.
the Sovietinvasion:

Accordingto the officialversionof history IsaidBrzezinski],CIA

aid to the mujahideenbeganduring r98o, that is to say,after the
Sovietarmy invadedAfghanistan,on December24,r979. But the
reality, secretlyguarded until now, is completely otherwise:
Indeed,it was J,tly 3, r979, that PresidentCartersignedthe first
directivefor secretaid to the opponentsof the pro-Sovietregime
in Kabul. And that very day I wrote a note to the presidentrn
which I explainedto him in my opinion this aid was going to
inducea Sovietmilitary intervention.36

But behind that secret,of course,was yet another:that the United

Stateshad been involved with the Islamic right in Afghanistan and the
Middle East throughout the r97os.In addition, the Afghan holy war
beganin earnestnot in r98o, after Soviettroops crossedthe border,and
not in 1979, when CIA aid officially beganto flow, but in r978, wherr
the Afghan Islamic right begana coordinated uprising with ISI support.
starting in northeastAfghanistan.In March r979,the westernhalf ot
the country exploded, especiallyHerat, a major provincial capital irr
the west, close to Iran. A hard-core Islamist organization, linked to
warlold Ismail Khan and supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
rose up and slaughterednumerous Afghan government officials. More
than a dozen Soviet adviserswere hacked to death, along with their
wives and children. During this period, the United States main-
tained relations with Iran's military and intelligenceapparatus and
with the new Iranian government of Prime Minister Bazargan,and
the CIA was providing Iran with intelligenceabout the USSR, Iraq.
and Afghanistan-a secret collaboration that continued until the
seizureof the U.S.embassyin Teheranby Khomeini'sagentsin Decem-
ber 1979.
 lihad I: The " Arc of Islam" ' 26 S

In March r979,the CIA completedits first formal proposal for direct

aid to the Afghan Islamists,coinciding with the revolt in Herat. Accord-
ing to Gates, some in the CIA believed that Soviet involvement in
Afghanistanwould "encouragea polarization of Muslim and Arab sen-
timent againstthe USSR." Not only that, bnt there was a practical side,
too: the CIA had surveyedAfghanistan as a possiblesite to replacethe
listeningpoststhat U.S. intelligencehad in Iran untll t979, accordingto
Gates.37 At the beginningof r979, the United Statesbeganto consider
active,covertassistance to the jihadis,and both Pakistanand SaudiAra-
bia were askingthe United Statesto get more involved."In SaudiAra-
bia, a senior official . . . had raisedthe prospectof a Sovietsetbackin
Afghanistan and said that his government was considering officially
proposingthat the United Statesaid the rebels."rsEven though some
U.S.analysts,includingsomeCIA officials,believedthat directU.S.sup-
port for the Afghan rebelscould lead to a Sovietattack on Pakistanand
a worldwide showdown between thc United Statesand the USSR,the
U.S.governmentwent ahead.The CIA contactedSaudiArabia and Pak-
istanabout providingaid to Afghan rebelsand, asBrzezinskiasserted,in
July r979 PresidentCarter signed the first presidential
decision,or
"finding," to havethe CIA supply "nonlethal" aid, includingcommuni-
cationsequipment,to the lslamicright in Afghanistan.
In the Nouuel Obst'ruatcurintcrview,Brzczinskiadmitted that his
intcntionell along was ro pr<lvokert Sovictinvrtsionof Afghanistan-
even though, after:the Sovict action occurrcd, LJ.S.officialsexpressed
shock and surprise."'We didn't push the Russiansto intervene,but we
knowinglyincreased the probabilitythat they would," saidBrzezinski.
'Whenhe was askedif, in retrospect,hc regrettedsupportingthe riseof
Islamic fundamentalismand providing arms ancl training to future
terrorists,hc answered:

What is moreimportantto the historyof thc world?The Taliban

or the collapseof the Sovietempire?Sonrestirred-upMuslimsor
the liberationof CentralEuropeandthe endof thecoldwar?

"No*," he told PresidentCarter in t979, "we can give the USSRits

Vietnamwar."39
 266 . D p v r r 's Gaun

By the end of r979, more than three-fourthsof Afghanistanwas in

open revolt.Just beforeChristmas,the Red Army invadedAfghanistan
to shore up the beleagueredAfghan government.
One of the quirks of the American jihad in Afghanistanwas that
from the start the United Statesallowed Pakistan'sISI and General
Zia to control the distribution of aid to the Afghan muiahideen.
'Wars
"Zia," wrote Steve Coll, a journalist whose book Gbost is a
definitiveaccountof the Afghan jihad, "sought and obtainedpolitical
control over the CIAs weaponsand money.He insistedthat everygun
and every dollar allocatedfor the mujahideenpassthrough Pakistani
hands. He would decide which guerrillas benefited.. . . The CIA
acceptedISI's approach with little dissent."40Prince Turki al-Faisal,
then the head of the GeneralIntelligenceDepartmentof SaudiArabia,
visited\Tashington,metBrzezinskiand the CIA, and agreedto match
U.S. contributionsto the Afghan jihad dollar for dollar.
What unfolded, in the years after r98o, was an alliance between
Pakistan'sISI, GeneralZia, and the Islamistsin Pakistan,on the one
hand, and a nexus of Saudi Arabian government and private net-
'World
works, from Saudi intelligence to the Muslim League to
Osama bin Laden, on the other. Saudi Arabia and Pakistanhad been
closefor years;this included closemilitary ties, with Pakistanitroops
and mercenariesbeing dispatchedto help protect the Saudiroyal fam-
ily and train Saudi forces. "Pakistan'srelations with Saudi Arabia,
and with other Gulf Arab states,dated to the early t96os," wrote
ShireenHunter. "Pakistani military officers,for example,had trained
the Saudi and Gulf militaries. One such officer was General Zia ul-
Hnq.'ot ln addition, in the r97os first Bhutto and then Zia depended
on Saudiaid, especiallysincethe OPEC oil price increasesof ry73-74
drained the Pakistan treasury of hard currency to pay for oil. The
Saudi aid came with political strings attached. The growth of
Islamismin Pakistanwas directly tied to Saudi aid to Islamabad.
For the United States,the Saudi-Pakistanialliance was made to
order, since both countries were staunch U.S. allies that could be
counted on to join in a crusadeagainstthe USSR.The fact that both
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had ulterior motives and their own
grand designswas ignored or overlooked by the Carter and Reagan
 JihadI: The"Arcof Islam" . 267

:t \\'as tn administrations, who were eager to bloody the Soviet Union in

::,rnistan Afghanistan whatever the cost. Pakistan, always concernedwith its
main foe, India, saw Afghanistanas strategicdepth and an ally in the
:i .: th a t subcontinentagainstNew Delhi, and GeneralZia envisioneda kind
"\ 'es
-:-. : Cte nefal of "Greater Pakistan." Saudi Arabia had its own interests,too, and
- . . -: h rd e e n . saw the conflict in Afghanisranas part of its broadercompetirionwith
'.\.lr_s
-.; iS a Iran, whose Shiite fundamentalistregime was threareningIraq and
: . : roli ti ca l the Gulf states.Saudi Arabia saw Afghanistan and Cenrral Asia as a
: i : '' C f \ - BUI I flank in the strugglewith Iran, and Riyadh wanred ro strengrhenthe
l):krstani orthodox Sunni Wahhabi forces in Afghanistan and beyond, ro
-
Tnc CIA weakenIran.
Brzezinski,and then Casey,embracedthe Pakistan-Saudiaxis. But
, ,-*: Ar:rbia, both Pakistanand Saudi Arabia had their favored clients in Afshan-
::*:() I-natch istan.
For Pakistan,it was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,the militant Islamist
- whosegroup was calledthe IslamicParty (Hizb-i Islami).Hekmatyar
-: iretlveen
. :r t h e o n e had a well-earnedreputation for being a brutal fanatic:
:: : , , . 1te n e t-
. - : , lque to Gulbuddinwas the darlingof Zia and the Pakistanintelligence
:- rrd b e e n service.Likc other rnujahideenleaders,he had beenworkine with
. :, : . :l l tfO O pS the ISI sincethe early r97os,when Pakistanhad begunsecrerly
backingfundamentalist studentsat the Universityof Kabul whcr
: - ,r'.rlfam-
were rebellingagainstSovietinfluencein the.Afghangovernment.
i -.- : -\rabia,
BackthcnGulbuddinwasverymucha partof theemerging global
- :: . W fOte waveof Islamicradicalism. By all accounrs,
he wasresponsiblefor
.'-.1
tr:rined the practiceof throwing acid in the facesof Afghanwomen who
:::.tl Zia ul- failedto coverthemselves properly.a2
... .:cpended
-:9-3-74 Hekmatyar'sspecialtywas skinning prisonersalive.asSigbhatullah
: : ,ril. The Mujaddidi, an Islamist of somewhat less radical srripes, called
::, )\\'th Of Hekmatyara "true monster."44But Representative
Charles'Wilson, a
--
-1.:,1 TexasRepublicanwho was the leadingcongressionaladvrcate for the
,.: -. I ri t de to Afghan jihad, approvinglynored thatZia was "torally committedto
:.: ;,ruld be Hekmatyar,becauseZia saw the world as a conflict betweenMuslims
-: :hat both and Hindus, and he thought he could count on Hekmatyar to work
:^cir own for a pan-lslamicentity that could stand up to India."a5
| Re'roen
,- Hekmatyar'sIslamicParty was one of the six to eightAfghan parries
 ;-68 . D E v t l - 's G a 'v E

that made up the anti-Sovietresistance. It was the largest,and it also

was reputed to have the fiercestfighters, which increasedits appeal to
the CIA. "We didn't think, at the beginning,that we would defeatthe
Soviets,"saysa CIA official who helpedoverseethe jihad. "But we did
want to kill as many Russiansas we could, and Hekmatyar seemedlike
the guy who could do that."46 His bone-chiliingruthlessness was il
plus. "The CIA officersin the Near EastDivision who were running the
Afghan program also embracedHekmatyar as their most dependable
and effectiveally," accordingto Coll. "At leastHekmatyar knew who
For those.
the enemy was, the CIlt's officersreassuredthemselves."4T
like Casey and Brzezinski,who envisioned Afghanistan as the key to
weakeningthe SovietUnion among its Muslim republics,Hekmatvar
had appeal, too, since he wanted to expand the war beyond
Afghanistan.Hekmatyar,accordingto Dilip Hiro, "talked of carrying
the guerrilla raids beyondthe Oxus River into SovietCentral Asia and
rolling back communism by freeing the Muslim lands of Bukhara.
Tashkent,and Dushanbe."48
Saudi Arabia's favored client was Abdul Rasul Sayyaf,the Afghan
Muslim Brotherhood leader.As the war evolved, both Hekmatyar anti
Sayyafwould emergeas the Afghan leadersclosestto the legionsof for-
eign, mostly Arab, fighters who flocked to Afghanistan to join the
iihad. By the end of the r98os, it would be these so-calledAralr
Afghanswho would graduateto becomeleadersof the militant and ter-
rorist Islamistsin Egypt, Algeria, SaudiArabia, Iraq, and elsewhere-
including Chechnya and Uzbekistan. Hekmatyar and Sayyaf, though
not allies,were also closeto Osama bin Laden, whose rise to promt-
nencebegana5early as t979-8o, when he enlistedin the Afghan jihad.
"Once in Pakistaniexile, [Hekmatyar] gatheredaround him the most
radical, anti-Western,transnationalIslamistsfighting in the jihad-
including bin Laden and other Arabs who arrivedas volunteers."4e
So the stagewas set for a climactic showdown betweenthe United
Statesand the SovietUnion in Afghanistan.In the wake of the Iranian
revolution, the United Statescontinued to pursue the chimera of ar-r
Islamic bloc against the USSR, leading Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and
Egypt into battle in the remote mountains of Central Asia. Hundreds
of thousands of jihadis, electrifiedby the holy war, flocked to war
 JihadI: The " Arc of Islam" . 269

r- - : - r. .1 n d i t als o camps along the Pakistan-Afghanistanborder from all over rhe

. -: * lli i l p p e al t o
- : -J d e fe a t t he
- r -- "B u t rve did
- r: .l:.:c-Cn-red
like
-'- 1::11CS S Wa S a
world. The United Stateshad little comprehensionof the forcesthat it
was unleashing.But that did not prevent the Reaganadministration
from pushing the war in Afghanistaninto the SovietUnion itself and
trying to enlist evenKhomeini'sIran in the jihad.

' ::: rLlnningthe

.: .lependable
- ,:..rr kncrvwhcl
"'- l-or those,
--
'. :'- .r\ rhe key to
-
-.. Hekmatyar
:-- \.,'.1rbcyor-rd
r . . r.1of carrying
Asia and
r:rtl-.rI
:" -.. of llukhara,

I . .ri. the Afgh:rn

- i i ik rl i rtya r ir nc l
: , . lcsi o n s o f f or -
. : . rn to j o i n t hc
' ', . r r -eirl l e cl A r a[ ' r
: 'rrrI itrrnt irnd ter-
. r : r. 1e l se wh c r e-
: -, \.r\'\'ilf, fh<lr-rgh
. : r is e to p roni-
: :. . \ f g h a n j i had.
-. 't - : him th c n r os t
-: rr th e j i h ad-
tt J(l
, .ilt t ee rs.
:: . . '.. cn th e Unit ed
- r r r r )f th e Ir:r nian
:: : ttf an
'himcri r
' . .. : J i Ara b i .r, and
. . \ s ia. H r-rn dr eds
i: . t lockcd to war
 1l

::---..: --

JIH A D II: INTO CENTRAL ASIA

\wsE N rur AurnrcAN- spoN s oREo jihad in Afghanistanbegan

in the history of
in t979,it took placeduring a criticaltransformation
political lslam.
firmly attachedto
From r945 until r979,the Islamic right seemed
During this
the Western,and anti-communist,camp in the Cold'War'
have seenpolitical
period, it was understandablefor many analyststo
leastsympatheticto
Irlu* n, docile and, if not pro-American,then at
In the Afghan
American political and economic goals in the region'
of communism; in
mountains, fierce mullahs expressedtheir hatred
\wahhabi establishmentthundered againstleftist
the saudi deserr,the
East,and Pakistan;
and nationalistforcesin North Africa, the Middle
Baghdadand Cairo'
and on campusesfrom Kabul and Islamabadto
theMuslimBrotherhoodbattledsecularistsandpreachedagainst
Marxism.
Khomeini's
Starting rn r979, however,things changed'Ayatollah
interests'Moreover'
revolution in lran was a frontal challengeto U'S'
offshoots that
the Islamic right had begun to spawn deadly terrorisf
from the Grand
attacked U.S. interests and pro-Western leaders'
predatory terror in
Mosque in Mecca to Anwar Sadatto Hezbollah's
graspthe lessons
Lebanon.The united stateswas exceedinglyslow to
 Jihad II: Into Central Asta L7 I

of these developments.First, it failed to concentrate resourceson

Islamist terrorism after t979, despite pleas from Arab leaders like
Egypt's PresidentMubarak to do so. More important, the United
Statesfailed to understandthe larger lesson:that the Islamic right was
not just anti-communist,but fundamentallyopposedto the West and
to its most reliablelong-term partnersin the Middle East,namely,the
secular,democraticnationalists.
Despitethe mounting evidencethat the Islamicright was a devil-
ishly dangerousally,the Reaganadministrationjoinedtheir jihad.
The scopeof the U.S.-Islamist
alliancethen is hard to imaginenow,
in the midst of what the Bushadministrationcallsa globrrlwar on ter-
rorism againstAl Qaeda and its ilk. But, just as in r9-yj, when Said
Ramadan of the Muslim Brotherhoodwas usheredinto the C)val
Office to seePresidentEisenhower,in r 9t3r Rcagan'stough-mrnded-
and often neoconservative-nationalsecurityofficialsand intelligcnce
professionalspursued the Afghan jihad with a vcngeance.ln fact,
::.rn began the sameneoconservatives who today lead the chargefor a "clash of
Of
r .-.:ttOry war on terror then presscdthe harclestfor an alli-
civilizations"-style
ance with the Afghan lslamistsand, at the same timc, rcpeatedly
1::.r.hedto reachedout for a dealwith the ayatollahsin Teheran.
l',::ing this The U.S.-Islamistallianceof thc r98os was r.rndcrtakenwith all
.: rtllitical Fnrm rgTc)to r9[iz, thc
deliberateness. (]arter and Reaganadminis-
:.,.rheticto trations consideredthe existenceof a threat from right-wing lslarn,
:: -\fghan and decidedto ignoreit.
-
:..:nism;in Following the Iraniar-rrevolution, Ciarteradministrirtiorrofficials
:.::t leftist conveneda government-widemeeting to analyzepolitical Islam. It
: I'.rkistan; includedStateDepartmentexperts,intclligenceanalysts,and ambas-
,::J Cairo, sadorsfrom the Middle East."There was a big analyticaleffort," says
Harold Saunders,who was rssistant sccretaryof state for Near L,ast
-:.rgainst
affairs, and it centeredon the conservativeArilb statesatndmonar-
Kiomeini's chies."The main focus was to gain an understandingof whether it
-\lrlreover, could happen in Jordan, in Egypt, in Saudi Arabia, or perhapsthis
::-( l o t S that was sui generisto lran." According to Saunders,and to other U.S.
::e Grand officialsand intelligenceofficers,the conclusionof this reevaluation
:', rerror in was that political Islam was not threatening."'We realizedthcre
::'rr-lessons would be a ratchetingup of political Islarn," says Saunders."Thc
 z 7z . D s v t t - 's Genr

question was, could the existing governmentsdeal with it? I pushed

pretty hard on Saudi Arabia, and I couldn't get anyone to say that
Saudi Arabia would fall. In Egypt, at the time, we thought Sadat
could handleit."1
Certainly, no effort was made to discourageSaudi Arabia from
pursuing its long-held notion of a foreign policy basedon right-wing
Islamism.No effort was made to discourageSadatfrom cozying up to
the Muslim Brotherhood. No effort was made to discourageIsrael
and Jordan from supporting the Muslim Brotherhood'scampaign of
terrorism against Syria and the PalestineLiberation Organization.
And, of course, in Pakistan the United Statesjumped into bed with
GeneralZia ul-Haq, whose Muslim Brotherhood-linked regime and
ISI intelligenceservicewere organizingthe Afghan jihad.
In the end, the Islamistmovementwas seenas a force that could be
containedby existinggovernments.No real effort was made to under-
stand how those governments might be changed, how it might affect
the societiesthesegovernmentspresidedover, and how the Islamists
were organizedacrossinternationalborders.Policy makerscontinued
to believethat Islamismwas too diverseto be looked at globally,and
insisted it could be dealt with on a country-by-country basis. "'We
concluded that we couldn't have a policy toward political Islam,"
recallsSaunders.2
In the wake of the Iranian revolution there was a brief flurry of
directivesfrom \X/ashingtonto CIA stations overseasto provide an
evaluation of Iran's impact. Intelligenceanalystsat the CIA and the
StateDepartment took a look at countries that might be threatened
with Khomeini-style revolution, and concluded that the internal
threat seemedminimal. As long as existing,pro-U.S.regimeswere not
at risk, almost no U.S. officials raised alarm about the growing
strengthof political Islam, its effectswithin countriesplaguedby it, or
the eventual possibility that radical Islamistsmight turn against the
United States."At first, there was the assumptionthat it was going to
spread,that it was going to happen in Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi
Arabia, that the monarchieswere an anachronismr" says a former
CIA station chief in Morocco. "I got to Morocco and found nothing
like that. There was a very small Islamist movement." In the CIA's
 .lihad Il: Into Central Asia ' 273

- :ushed field manual for Morocco, there were eight pageson Islam and poli-
..tv that tics, he says."I'd tell my caseofficers:Know it cold. And when they
: :.: Sadat were talking to an Islamist,I told them to say: 'I don't understandthis
or that.'And then listen."3The conclusionreachedin Morocco, as for
'-: .:.I . -i irom other states,w21sthat there was nothing to worry about.
At the CIA, Martha Kesslerwas one of the few analystswho con-
- :'.i -\\'lng
' :'.q tlp to sistendypaid attentionto political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood.
In the ficld, shesays,many CIA operativesmissedit, becausethe most
--.:r israel 'World
,. - l : , l r g tl Of were organizingunder the radar. "rWehad a
militant Islan-rists
:: :'l . Z. 1 tiO ll. War il-era systcmof just plopping our officialsdown in capital cities,
: :-;.1 $'ith irnd the Islamistmovementwasn't happeningin those cities,it was
--- l:. llc - lllld happerringout in thc country and in small towns." In her opinion, it
was taking on a decidedlyanti-Americancharacter.She wrote an
.,:,,,Lrldbe rrnalysisat the time wirrning that when governmentssuch as Egypt,
Sudan,and Pakistanbeginto play ball with Islamists,it would have
- : i L l n d e r-
-' :: lr rl ffcct profound conseqllenccs. "I said that whcn governmentsin the region
: - : l. le rn i sts stirrteclrnaking efforts to co-opt the Islamists,it would change the
:- - ': rti n u e cl characterof tlroselaovernrncnts," shcsays."l was of thc schoolthat it
. -. rllr'.i l n cl woulcl be largely anti-Westernin tone."a Necdlcssto say, Kessler's
:'- . r\ . "WC policy makersfrom the Afghanjihad.
analysisdiclnot dissuacle
: - . - . lsl rl n t," The samc view prevailedarnong U.S. governmentcounterterror-
"After thc Sadatassassination,
ism professior-rals. I was in the coun-
:. : : liLrrry Of terterrorisnr centcr," srlys Robcrt llacr, a former CIA operative. "l
:: , , \ 'i d e a n cilmeilcrosssomedocumcnts,sontctrial transcriptsfor lthc assassins
of Saclatl,and I started:rskirrg,Who arc thesepeople?What's their
-. \ r nc lth c
,: : l ica te n e d irgcncla?What's thc connection?I startedkroking for clocumentsolr
I l: Il l t e f I lill the MLrslirnBrothcrhood." ISut,he says,"It just wasn't in our con-
sciotrsncss "'
to go rtiter thcscpe<lple.
: . :: . \\'e f C f lO t

: 1: : gr o \vi n g Sadat,who had used the Muslim Brotherhoodand the financial

. - - -:J lrv i t, o r
- .-. : . ri n stth e
'.,..:..golng tO
:. .: nd Sa u d i
:. - . r fo rme r
-. : - . 1no th i n g
of its Islamic banking network to strengthenhis grip on
rcsoLlrces
power after becomingprcsidentof Egypt in r97o, was least of all
awarc of how dangcrousthe Islamicright might be. Within days of
joined the
the Sovietinvasionof Afghanistan,Sadirtenthusiastically
United States,Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan in sending jihadists to
Pcshawar.and war.

- : : r he CIAs
So the jihaclin Afghanistanerpandedinto a full-scalewar. And the
 274 . D n . v r r 's Gavr,

'Sfar,
Reagan team, preoccupiedwith the Cold struck a deal with zealotsbc-:-
Iran's ayatollahsin r98o, winked as Israel armed Iran from r98o to U.S. carg, i
1987, gave Khomeini's regime secret intelligenceabout the Iranian suppliest, ::
left, and finally, in the Iran-contra affat, actually sold U.S. arms to "Fqv
-D.
nr'r'-r' -' - __

Iran in searchof mvthical Islamist "moderates." 2IITIS tO : r :-.*

,,
eventu.rii'.
F,-.--.-.
-5.' f '
Tns Anae ATcHANS - \ num b; : :
dent r o : : : - :
The war in Afghanistan was fought, for the most part' by the rh.rt the.. ,'.=
mujahideenof the fractiouscoalition backedby Pakistanand made up L- nit c. l >: . , : =
mostly of guerrillasassociatedwith one of four fundamentalistorgani- r r d of . , : : . . :
zations. "In Afghanistan," says a former CIA official who ran the IllOSf r tl li :1
I
covert operation, "there were about 3oo,ooo fighters, all of whom, --at,- -- -

with the exceptionof about r5,ooo moderates,were Islamists."5The , in; i. : - . '. .

' a:i .
vast majority were Afghans, but some were jihadists drawn to the \ :

fighting from other parts of the world, especiallyfrom Egypt, Jordan, l L:" 1:-: : -
-,.\^ _
Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf. These would be the raw material for
Osama bin Laden and the fledglingAl Qaeda organizationthat grew
out of the jihad. The so-calledArab Afghans included bin Laden him-
self, Ayman al-Zawahiri of Egypt's Islamic Jihad, Al Qaeda'ssecond-
in-command,and tens of thousandsof jihadistsfrom the Arab states,
Indonesia,the Philippines,Chechnya,and other far-flung corners of
the Muslim world.
They were the guerrillaswho, after the war was over, went home
to Algeria, to Egypt, to Lebanon,to SaudiArabia, and to Central Asia
to continue the jihad,. Many, of course, learned terrorism skills-
sabotage,car bombs-at the hands of the United States
assassination,
and its allies.
In January r98o, Brzezinskivisited Egypt to mobilize Arab sup-
port for the jihad.'Within weeks of his visit, SadatauthorizedEgypt's
full participation, giving permission for the U.S. Air Force to use
Egypt as a base,supplying stockpilesof Egyptian arms to the rebels,
and recruiting, training, and arming Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
activistsfor battle. "Sadat and his governmentbecame,for a time, vir-
tual recruiting sergeantsand quartermastersto the secret army of
 lihad ll: Into Central Asia . 27 \

::al with zealotsbeing musteredto fight the Sovietsin south and central Asia."7
'. i 9 80 to U.S. cargo planes took off from Qena and Aswan in Egypt, ferrying
: :' lranian suppliesto the jihad basesin Pakistan,and, accordingto John Cooley,
). ,rrmsto "Egypt's military inventories were being scoured for Soviet-supplied
arms to sendto the jihad. An old arms factory near Helwan, Egypt, was
eventuallyconvertedto supply the samekind of weapons.,'8
Egypt-and other Arab counlliss-supplied more rhan weapons.
A number of counrriesin the Muslim world decidedit would be pru-
dent to send Islamist militants to rhe Afghan war, perhaps thinking
,:: . bv th e that they were killing two birds with one stone:they were pleasingthe
: : : r. rd e u p United States,which was looking for recruirs,and they were geting
:. .: : C )r$ a n i - rid of somerroublemakers. sadat,like other leaders,perhapsfelt that
most of them would be killed during thc jihad. "Muslim governmenrs
. : *'h o m, emptiedtheir prisonsand sentthesebad boys over there," saysa CIA
*. .. : . . "r'Th e official who spentseveralyearsas sration chief in pakistan during rhe
'l ,,.lt to the jihad.'Nrt only were thcy packagedand shippedto Afghanisran,bur
., ^_..- r , , ..1 .- they receivedexperttraining from U.s. SpecialForces.
ll,ru4rrr "By rhc end of
: -,:.nirl for r9flo," wrote Cooley,"U.S. military trainerswerc sent to Egypt tcr
: ::rrt grcw impart the skills of the U.S. SpecialForcesto rhoseEgyptianswh<r
- .:Jcnhim- would, in turn, passon thc training to th.: Iigyptianvolunrcersflying
i ,t . s r ' COnd- to the aid of the mujahidecnin Afghanisran. "l0
-l - : lr rf
'tfeq
The British, for whom Afghanistan was thc playground for the
a - 'rrlerstlf Great Game of the nineteenthcentury and who had long-standing
colonialtics to Pakistan,had an cxtensivehistory of dealingwith thc
'.,.;rtthome tribes and religirus leadersrf thc Pakistan-Afghanisran area. Gus
-: :,rrll Asia Avrak.trs, a cIA official closely involved with the jihad f'r years,
.. ::, rkills- reported that the British "have guys who have Iived over there for
: ::d States twenty yearsas journalistsor authors or tobaccogrowers, Iandl when
the Soviets invaded, MI6 activated these old networks." Added
. .\rlb sup- Avrakotos:
::rJ F-gvpt's
:- c to use The Brits were able to buy things that we couldn't, becauscit
::rc rebels, infringedon murder,assassinationand indiscriminatebombings.
t: ,rherhood They could issuegunswith silencers.\Wecouldn'tdo that because
: ,t ilme, vlr- a silencerimmediatelyimpliedassassination-andheavenforbid
:: : Jfmf Of car bombs!No way I could evensuggestit, but I could sayto the
 276 . Dr , v t r 's GerlE

Brits, "Fadlallah[the radical Shiiteleader]in Beirut was really Afghan muj.rr,-.

effectivelastweek.They had a car bomb that killed 3oo people."I beginningin r9s- ;;
'What
gaveMI6 stuff in good faith. they did with it was always ties on the East t- ,
theirbusiness.lr deadly secrets\\ :. , -
numbered o\-er : ..t
Much of this training in assassination,car bombs, and the like .
timers and er:
found its way to the Arab volunteers who eventually became Al
ammunition.r.-r: .:
Qaeda'sfoot soldiers.Somemujahideenwere eventrained to organize (later used in ti-..
the low-tech, Afghan version of car bombs. "Under ISI direction, the
[and] strategic.,.- :
mujahideenreceivedtraining and malleableexplosivesto mount car The Afghar ' .-
bomb and even camel bomb attacksin Soviet-occupiedcities,usually over the first i'. . -.
designedto kill Soviet soldiersand commanders,"wrote SteveColl. to defeat the > : i
"ICIA Director] Caseyendorsedthesetechniquesdespitethe qualms -'
bleedthe US:F1.. '
of someCIA careerofficers."12And it was not just Sovietsoldierswho h o w e ve r , p f( ) tl u :- -
were blown up by such devices. In at least one instance, the astic support. '- - -. --
mujahideencarried out an extensionof the battlesthat ragedat Kabul grants-rosa :-..: -
University during the r96os and r97os, when a briefcase bomb lion, "as mll,:-. .,- '
explodedunder a universitydining room table.13"This is a rough busi- tinued to sk. r -. :l
ness," said the CIAs Bill Casey."If we're afraid to hit the terrorists The Unitec'lS:.::,. ,
becausesomebody'sgoing to yell 'assassination,'it'll never stop."14 rvar,includin- - -,
Soon, the CIA and ISI were providing stealthlikeexplosivedevicesto U.S. ambrrss.r-
the mujahideen.includingbombsdisguisedas pens,watches.cigarette 56oo million :- - -
"Do I want to order bicycle bombs to
lighters,and tape recorders.l'5 \ot onh' drd t -.- :
park in front of an officers' headquarters?"asked Avrakotos. "Yes.
.rrnbitiolrsin - -
That's what spreadsfear."16Among the targetsof mujahideenbombs i: *
nroresophrsi.--:.
were soft targetssuchas Kabul cinemasand cultural shows. jround-to-rr: :.- .- :
Although the Afghan mujahideen rebelled at the idea of suicide iterl dimenrr,:' ' -
bombs, Arab volunteersdid not: As rhe jrir,'.* :
.\rabsand o::'..:: :.
It wasonly the Arab volunteers-fromSaudiArabia,Jordan,Alge- ,rcllrdinsES..l, -
ria, and othercountries,who had beenraisedin an entirelydiffer-
::'rc Isl.rr.nic: : .--
ent culture, spoke their own language,and preachedtheir own '*,rylJ 1.c.rg,... . , ,.
interpretationsof Islam while fighting far from their homes and
families-who later advocatedsuicideattacks.Afghan jihadists, ,rirghr .frr::,:-...,-
r-1:l C J l l l p.l l !-: . -:
tightly woveninto family,clan,and regionalsocialnetworks,never
-
embracedsuicidetacticsin significant numbers.lT - :ri frl l c : \l -

: , : '. ,..ts re a l l y
: t : : iop l e ."l
,.-r: elways
- - . . . rn d th e lik e
:-: '. ' b re ca m eA l
1 . ,'- : : . i to Org a niz e
. . . - lr rc'cti o n,t he
. - lr ) rlloUnt Car
' : -,
- it ic'S,u su ally
, - : : Sre ve C oll.
:- : : : th c q u alm s
'. : . ol d i crs w ho
' , :. : scd a t Kabul
: - - rf ..tse b o m b
- - . r ro L rg hb us i-
- : : irc te rro r is t s
: : -. rvcr sto p. " l4
r . .,c deviccs to
,' ,: - : rt r. ci g a ret t e
- . ; lc b o mbs t o
- Not'r-rly did c]aseyexpandthe Fundingfor the war, but hc grew more
- . - . , i' o fC l S."Y eS .
' . . r: : : . l ccn b o m bs
': , . : . t ttf sL ric ide
. - . ir n . Al g e -
: '. : : i lv d i ffe r-
- : - , : hc rr o w n
: - :'.rrIl] eS df ld
:-. , : : liha d i sts,
: : . , , 'r ks. n e ve r
Jihad ll: Into Central Asia . z-77
Afghan mujahideen were also rrained inside the united Srates,
beginningin r98o under Brzezinski'soversight,ar various u.S. facili-
ties on the East coast, by Green Beretsand u.s. Navy SEALs. ,,The
deadly secrerswhich rrainers of the Afghan holy warriors passedon
numbered over sixry. They included the use of sophisticatedfuses,
timers and explosives, automatic weapons with armor-piercing
ammunition, remote-controldevicesfor triggering mines and bombs
(laterusedin the volunteers'home countriesand againstthe Israelis)
Iand] strategicsabotage,demolition,and arson."l8
The Afghan war unfolded in severalphases.It started slowly, and
over the first five yearsthc u.S. objectivewas not to win the war) nor
t' defearthe SovietUnirn and force its withdrawal, but simply to
bleedthe ussR, embarrassir, and win prrpaganda points. In r9g4,
hrwever,pr.dded by Rcp. charlie wilson and with casey,senthusi-
asticsupp'rt, clA funding of the war-and saudi Arabia'smatching
grants-rose rapidly.Fundingfor the jihad in r984 totaled$z5o mil-
li'n, "as much as all thc previousyears combined."leAnd it con-
tinued tcr skyrocket:$47o rnillion in r986, $6jo rnillion in r9g7.
The United statcsalso worked hard to bring orher counrriesint, the
wirr, includingchina. Accordingto charles Frecman,who servedas
u.S. ambassad'r to chin:r, "From r98r to r9g4, there was about
$6oo million from Beijingin arms f'r Afghanisran,"sirysFreeman.2,
ambitious in his g.rrls. Now seekingvict.ry, hc s.ught to provide
nrorcsophisticatecl
w.:aponryro thc mujahidcen,includingthc Stinger
ground-ro-airrnissilcs that allegedlyhad a dccisivcimpacton the mil-
itary dimer-rsion
of the conflict.2l
As the jihacl cxpanded i' both goals and scope, more and more
Arabs and foreignerswere drawn in. various Arab governments,
'ther
including Egypt anclSar"rdiArabia, inrernarionalorgirnizationsticd to
the Islan-ricright-such as the Muslim Br.therhoocl, the Muslim
\forld Leagne,the InrernationalIslamic Relief organization, and the
Tablighi .farnaar,a Pakisran-based
Islamic missionary organization-
ran campaignsro recruit jihadis. It was osama bin Laden'sdream
corne trlre: Muslim fundamentalistgroups mobilizing worldwide tcr
rre si*u*inF qffi r*q=*re#ii#sF*,*,-
 L78 . D n v t l 's GRvr.

find militant fighters,bring them to Pakistan,and then smugglethem

into Afghanistanfor a jihad. "Many were offered trips to Pakistanfor
religiousstudies,"wrote Cooley:

Usually,during about six weeks'religiousstudies,the new adepts

were not offeredmilitary training immediately,or even briefed
about the jihad againstthe Russianand Communist"enemiesof
God." This cameat the end of the six-weekperiod.ISI officers,
usuallyin mufti, would then appearand offer opportunitiesfor
training. [Training v,,asprovided forl thousandsof Algerians,
Egyptians,Sudanese, Saudis,and others.22

According to Ahmed Rashid,a Pakistanijournalist and author of Tal-

iban, between r98z and t99z j5,ooo radical Islamistsfrom forty-
three countries fought alongsidethe mujahideen in the war and its
aftermath, and tens of thousandsof additional iihadis trained in the
madrassasthat General Zia created along the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border. "Eventually more than roo,ooo Muslim radicalswere to have
direct contact with Pakistanand Afghanistanand be influencedby the
iihad."23
Some of the recruiting for the mujahideen took place inside the
United States,in Arab and Muslim communities. At the Al Kifah
Afghan RefugeeCenter in Brooklyn, many Arabs signed up for the
iihad. "There were hard-to-tracesuitcasesfull of cashand anonymous
bearer chequesor bank drafts, from the Muslim'STorld League.the
Tablighi Jamaat, and other missionary and charitable organizations
locatedin Pakistan."24One of the key individualsinvolved in the U.S.
recruiting effort in the mid-r98os was Abdullah Azzam, a radical
PalestinianIslamistwho was bin Laden'sprofessorand who would be
the co-founder of the predecessororganizationto Al Qaeda, the Ser-
vices Bureau, which was establishedby bin Laden and Azzam in
Peshawar,Pakistan,in r984. The innocently named ServicesBureau
playedthe centralrole in moving Arab and foreign iihadisinto the war.
Azzam,born in Jenin,Palestine,in rg4r,joined the Muslim Broth-
erhood as a Palestinianyouth in Syria, where he studied Islamic law
in the early r96os, when the Brotherhood was leading the anti-
Nassermovementin the Arab world.2-tAlthough he initially belonged

--i g l e th e m
. ,itrta n fo r
.r.1cpts
:':rricd
: -: l I C S O f
: . l ccrs,
: : . \ fo r
: . l' l i ] t l S ,
. ', r r <>iTd l,
-", , n t fo rty-
' , rr' .rn d i t s
, : rr'tl i n thc
: . -: h rrn i str r n
r -c to h a ve
". r, .1 b y the
,, - : r r r i c lteh c
: . \ i K i f ah
- j- . -i i r ftlr t hc
-. : . llL) l l V l l l O L l S
-- . :'.lqtlC, the
-
-. 1 n izrttiol. lS
,, . n rl re U .S .
: , '- ' . . l ra cl i cal
l'o u l cl b e
. , : ,1. i.th e Se r -
:'-. \ zzrtn t i n
,: - . . i': Brtre at t
.
:ri o 1 [ g 1Y31 ' .
l.l . . . iir l Bro th-
:* l . l. r mi c l i rw
: " - t he a n ti -
: : '. be l o n g cd
lihad II: lntu Cetrlrnl Asia . 27,
to the PalestineLiberation organization, he split with the pl-o during
the showdown with King Husseinin Black September,r97o, when the
Brotherhood backed rhe monarchy. He spenr time ar the Al Azhar
mosquein cairo, during the time that Anwar sadat was bringing the
Muslim Brotherhood back to Egypt, and ended up as a teacher of
Islamic law at King Abdel Azizuniversity in saudi Arabia, where bin
l-adenwas his studenr.The Muslim world l.eaguehired Azzam to
headits educati.nsection,and in r98o he first traveledto pakistan.In
t c184,
in additionto foundingthe Services Bureau,Azzamestablished
Al Iihad magazineand wrore prolificallyon rhe duties of Muslims.
Pr<rvidingan carly roird map tr hrs plan f'r a global jihad, Az.zam
wrotc the oft-quoteclcall to arnrs: "-fihadwill remain an individual
.bligati.n until all other larndswhich f'rmerly were Muslim come
back t' us and Islam reignswithin thcm once again. Bef're r-rslie
Palestine,
Ilukharar,l.ebanon,Clhad,Eritrca,Somalia,the philippines,
Burnru,S<luthYemcn,Tashkcnt,And:rlusia.'J2r, li) sweetenthe prt,
Azzamt.ld potentialjihad recruirsthat osama bin l-adenw.uld pay
g3oo a monrh ro Arirbswho wanredto fight in Afghanistan.
Mikc scheucris rlre cllA official who, in later ycars,w.uld bc in
ch:rrgcof U.S.efforts t' hunt d'wr.r osama bin Ladcrr.In zooz, under
the nanrc "An.nym.us," hc wrote Tbrough ()nr Enemies, Lyes,a
detailcd elccounr the rise bin l-aden and Al eaeda. In it, he
'f 'f-
describedthc role of tlie Servicesllurcau, also knowrr by its Arabic
acronyn MAK:
Bi' l-aderrg.t in .r rhe ground flo'r rf thc development .f
IslanricN(los f.r nrilitary-supporractivities j.i'ed
whenhe with
Shaykh Abdullah Azzarnro found thc Makhtah at-Khidimdt
(MAK)-or ServiceBureau-in Peshirwarin rhe rnicl-r 9flos.
While rhc MAK providec'l reliefto Afghan w:rr vicims, it als<r
received,organized,irnd rnoveclint<lAfghanistanthe v<llunteers,
arnrs,:tnclmoneyflowing t. tl.remujahideenfrom thc MLrslirn
w<rrlcl.In the financialrealnr,Al-tMatdnal-Arahi h.s said thrrt
between1.17.2 and 19[39about $6oo million was sent to bin
Laden's.rga'rizati.nthroughcharitableinstitr-rti.r.rs
in the Gulf,
especiallythose in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, the UAE,
Bahrain,rrnclQatirr.lT
 z8o . D r v t t - 's G,q.ur

to a
According to Scheuer,bin Laden and Azzamwerewell connected
Muslim
host of other Islamic-rightcharities,including IIRO and the
'srorld jihad, the
League.According to cIA officialsinvolved with the
in recruiting
cIA did not directly engagewith Azzam and bin Laden
effort. Robert
Arab volunteers,although the cIA did not opposethe
ways
Gates,then the CIA director,revealedthat "the CIA examined
noth-
ro increasetheir participation." Although no action was taken,
ing was done to discouragethe "Arab Afghans," either'28
jihad was his-
As the CIA beganto figure out long after the Afghan
only source
tory, the joint U.S.-Saudifunding for the war was not the
refersto
of cash for the muiahideen,as the $6oo million that Scheuer
Broth-
indicates.Privateand semi-privatedonationsfrom the Muslim
of it was
erhood and its apparatus poured into the iihad, and none
ISI provided
subject to even the minimal oversight that Pakistan's
According to
over the distribution of the U.S. and Saudi largesse.
jihad pennedby
Afghanistan:The Bear Trdp, ariveting accountof the
a parallel
a former Pakistaniintelligenceofficeq Mohammad Yousaf'
with
war supply systemdevelopedoutsideofficial channels'complete
and a significantpart of it was funded
freelancersand wheeler-dealers,
that saved
with private Arab donations. "It was largely Arab money
individuals
the system,"wrote Yousaf."By this I mean cashfrom rich
government
or private organizationsin the Arab world, not Saudi
gettingto
funds.'s7ithoutrheseexrra millions the flow of arms actually
is it all
the Muiahideenwould have beencut to a trickle. The problem
went to the four Fundamentalistparties'not the Moderates'"2e
Rasul
In particular,Yousaf wrote, a lot of the cash went to Abdul
and one
S"yy"i, the chief.Muslim Brotherhood activistin Afghanistan
society
of the lslamist"professors"who helpedto organizethe secret
along with
that emergedin the tg6osand early r97os' It was Sayyaf'
whose
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar-the fanatical muiahideen leader
in the
Islamic Party was the largestand fiercestof the organizations
jihad-who were closestto Osama bin Laden'
lion's share
Sayyaf,Hekmatyar' and other fundamentalistsgot the &

to the
of the Arab money becausea large part of it was transferred
Group
mujahideenthrough the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islamic
 Jihad II: Into Central Asia . z8 t

to a
- :-.nl-cted of Pakistan,the Islamist political party that was createdby Abul-Ala
Muslim
,"---:i'r.- Mawdudi.3oThe Islamic Group (Jamaat-eIslami), founded rn r94o,
: :rc jihad,the had spent much of the r95os and r96os battling Pakistan'sleft and
-:' rl recruiting secularists.In the r97os, the Islamic Group becamemore powerful as
- - ,-:rrr[. Robert it absorbedsurplus petrodollars funneledits way by the Gulf Arabs,
: , ,:rtiltedways and it helped push Pakistan to the right in the r97os, under Prime
,' ,. :.rketr,noth- Minister Zulfi.qarAli Bhutto and GeneralZia ul-Haq. "The Muslim
Brotherhood was spreadingits money around," says SeligHarrison,
rvashis-
.',.r,.1 an expert on south Asia and the co-author of Out of Afghanistan.
: rrtlt'Source According to Harrison, the head of the Islamic Group was relatedto
., -: .lcl rcterstrl Zia, and he worked closelywith them and helpedthem, and many of
- - '.1,r'limBroth- the key playersin the ISI and the military were membersof the Islamic
.' :rc of it was Group. Through the Muslim World l-eagueand other Muslim Broth-
-
:" I\l providcd erhood elementsin the Gulf, money had startedto flow to the coffers
i - rccorclingt<l of the mujahideen even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanisran,
rJ pennedby says Harrison. "It was all done through Pakistan,with the help of
: . ..rf. rr parirllel Rabitat Ithe Leaguel,and theJamaat-eIslamiwas gettingrich, too."rr
,. -,,nrplctewith At the time, virtually no one sensedthe importance of bin Laden
' ' r: \\'ils fundecl and Az.zam,and the non-Afghan jihad volunteersseemedlike a minor
' r f \ th rrt sa v ec l part in the mobilization of several hundred thousand Afghan
- -
'Warjihad
- rr
i n cl i vi d uals mujahideen.The CIA was so fixated on its Cold that it never
.:--,.: goVernlTlent stopped to consider the consequencesof .empowering a worldwide
: - . -. . rll v g etti ng t o Islamistarmed force.And, in the meantime,Bill Caseywas busy open-
: : : ()blcm i s i t all inpla secondfront, pushinghard to expand the Afghanistanwar into
l r9
': -.:. I C\ . - Central Asia-with resourcesthatZbigniew Brzezinskiand Alexandre
-: :,-\bdul R asul Bennigsenc<luldneverhave dreamedof just a few yearsearlier.
:-. ' :: 11 \tl l lal n d one
I '', . t 'Cfe t so c iet y
: . . rf . a l o n g wit h Acnoss rHe Al.u RrvER
: ' .elrcler whclse
:: : - t z rtti o n s i n t he In carrying the Afghan lihad into the SovietUnion itself, Caseyexhib-
ited both a messianic,religiouslyinspiredversion of anti-communism
:hc lion'ssharc and a high-stakes,high-risk approach to foreign policy. S(ithin the
:rsfcrredto thc Reaganadministration,there were at leasttwo competing schoolsof
lslirmicGrouP thought: The first, hewing to the traditional rules of U.S. diplomacy,
 z8z . D r , v t r 's Gaue

saw the SovietUnion as a mighty competitor that neededto be chal-

lenged worldwide, in order to prevent Soviet gains; and the second,
which includedthe neoconservatives and Casey,advocateda policy of
rolling back the SovietUnion in the Third'World, easternEurope,and
Central Asia. "The real split in the Reagan administration was not
betweenliberalsand conservatives,"saysHerb Meyer, who servedas
Casey'schief of staff at the CIA in the r98os. "The real split was
betweenthose who wished not to lose the Cold War and those who
wished to win it."32 Casey was in the latter camp, and for him
Afghanistanwas the key.
'War,
In order to win the Cold Casey believed, it would take a
strong working alliance among the countries of Brzezinski's"arc of
Islam"-including Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia-and Casey'
paid specialattention to Saudi Arabia as the linchpin of the effort.
The CIA director saw Saudi Arabia as more than a financial resource
to support the jihad, and as more than the center of ultra-orthodox
Islam. According to Meyer, Caseyalso mobilized Saudi Arabia's oil
weapon againstthe USSRin the r98os. "The Saudiswere very helpful
to us in winning the Cold War," saysMeyer. Becausethe SovietUnion
was so dependenton oil exports to earn hard currencS Caseyasked
Saudi Arabia to ramp up its oil output and collapsethe price of oil.
"Bill played a key role in working with the Saudisto get the price of
oil down," says Meyer. "They hated the Soviets." Saudi Arabia
expandedproduction, the price of oil dropped to historic lows, falling
from $28 per barrel to $ro per barrel in a matter of weeks,and Soviet
income was severelycurtailed. "It was a body blow to the Soviets.It
was the equiv4lentof steppingon their oxygen tube."33
Casey,a devout Catholic, combined a fierce belief in the power
and importance of religion with a Machiavellian attitude toward the
political utility of religious belief. "He was a deeply religious man,
and he had a good working relationshipwith the pope," saysMeyer.
"Casey," wrote Coll, in Ghost 'Wars,"saw political Islam and the
Catholic Church as natural allies in the 'realisticcounter-strategy'oi
covert action he was forging at the CIA to thwart Soviet impe-
rialism."3aIn this view, Caseywas encouragedby his chief intelligence

-: - : ,be chal-
-: :--; S eC O ndt
i::: ., PolicYof
:- : -l:ope,and
' :- :l \\'AS not
ierve d a s
- : ,. . iP Ii t was
:- , . : hose wh o
. . ri ior him
-rl.l take a
I - -: l'> "a rc o f
.: - - r. rt tl C a Sey
- I t he e ffo r t .
. '. , ..:.1resource
-- : : - : . -o rth 0 d ox
, - \ r a b i a 's oil
: : 'i'. crv h e l Pf ul
t .: \ \ \ ' i e t Un i on
(- asked
- . .15cv
:-', : ric e o f oil.
. :: : he Pri ce of
- . - , . ild i Ara bia
- tion, with McMahon taking an almost alarmist position and Casey
- 1) \\'S,fa l l i ng
: : r :. . 1[d So v iet
: : li S o vi e ts . I t
: : 'l th c Po wer
: . . *: t o wa rd t he
" , : ': ligi o u s man'
::. \ il\'S Me y er .
, , . irm a n d t he
-.. i :-f -Stra te g} 'of
::: \ ovi e t i m pe-
inte l l i g enc e
-: : f
Iihad II: lnto Central Asia . Lg j
adviseron the Middle East,Robert Ames, who was the CIAs leading
regionalexpert.In a speech,CaseycreditedAmes with having empha-
sized to him the importance of efforts by the Soviet Union and its
allies in the Muslim world to extirpate organizedreligion, becauseof
the threat that it supposedlyposedto communist or nationalist party
control. The communists wanted to "uproot and ultimately change
the traditional elementsof society," said Casey,citing Ames. "This
meant undermining the influence of religion and taking the young
away from their parentsfor educationby the state." For that reason,
the world's two great religionshad to cooperate."Becausethe Soviets
saw all religious faith as an obstacle,they suppressedchurchesand
mosquesalike." Caseywas convincedthat "militant Islam and mili-
tant Clhristianityshouldcooperatein a common cause."lt5
Insidethe CIA, Caseyoften infuriatedprofessionalcolleaguesby
his nonchalant view of the growing power of political lslam. "l
worked with Casey," says Richard Krueger,a formcr CIA operative
who spent the last severalyears of the shah'sreign working right
inside the shah'sown office. "After the revolution, I sponsoredwith
Caseyand the headsof all the intelligcnceagenciesa futurist cxercise
at Camp Perry to analyze the lslan-ricmovcmcnt." According to
KruegeqJohn McMahon, Casey'sdeputy,clashedwith Caseyovcr the
issue."I can remembermajor, major unpleasantriesbctweenCasey
and McMahon over the long-termimplicationsof the Islamicrcvolu-
taking a couldn't-carc-less position," recallsKrueger."Caseywrrnted
to just McMahon jumped in. He
wave it off, and uncharacteristically
how Islamicfundamentalism
was agitated,talking abor.rt was going to
spreadto Indonesia,the Philippincs.He believedthe movementwas a
through all sorts of religiousand social
natural to internationalize,
connections,and that it wouldn't appearto be state-sponsored." But
Crsey ditl not egree.ln
Casey'sviews on religion and politics dovetailedwith President
Reagan'sown rock-ribbed faith, and together the two men had n<r
trouble seeingthe Afghan iihad as a religiouswar in which Chris-
tianity and lslam were alliesagainstthe atheisticSovietUnion. Fawaz
 28 4 . D r v r r 's Gevr.

Gergeswrote that Reaganconrinuedthe U.S. tradition of supporting

Islamic religiousforcesin the Middle East:

Under Reagan,U.S.policy remainedweddedro supportingcon-

servativereligiouselementsagainstsecular,socialistand third
world nationalist forces. ril/hereasthe administrarion'spublic
statements were exceptionallyhostile,no corresponding changes
markedits actualbehaviorrowardthe new Islamists.. . . Reagan's
flirtation with the Islamistmujahideenfactionsin Afghanistan
shouldbe situatedwithin the contextof the secondphaseof the
Cold \War.Like his predecessors in the r95os and 196os,President
Reaganalliedthe United Stateswith Islamistgroupsand srates-
Afghanistan,Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan-ro combat what he
calledthe 'evil empire'and its third world clients.3T

Sometimes, Casey's willingness to encourage political Islam

seemedstrictly cynical. That was especiallytrue when Casey dealt
with SaudiArabia's King Fahd. Gus Avrakotos recountedthe srory of
a discussionabout Casey'svisit to Saudi Arabia to nail down that
year's Saudi matching contribution to the iihad fund. "I told Casey
that he should talk to the king about 'your Muslim brothers,' about
using the money for food for families, for clothing, weapons, for
repairing the mosques.You should talk to him about being 'keeperof
the faith."' Casey replied: "Jesus,fuck, I like that-'keeper of the
faith.' Oh, fuck, I like that-'keeper of the faith."'38 A former CIA
official involved in the jihad confirmed that srory. "We would tell the
Saudis what a good thing it was that the religious Afghans were
expellingthe atheisticcommunists," he adds. "It was rhe politic thing
to sayto King Fahd,"3e
Starting rn t984, Casey pushed the Saudi-Pakistanalliance to
undertake a much more explosive strateg5 launching propaganda,
sabotage,and guerrilla activity acrossthe Amu River into the Soviet
Union's Muslim republics."The bordersin that part of the world are,
well, sort of sloppy," saysMeyer, Casey'saide. "So all sorts of inter-
estingthings happened."40A CIA official who worked with Caseyat
the time says: "There were occasionalforays that took place within
the territory of the Soviet Union, which scared the crap out of
Moscow."4l In taking such provocative steps,Caseydrew on covert
 lihad II: Into Central Asia z8 5

.rlPpofilng action plans that had originally been developedduring the Carter
administration, but which had been rejectedbecauseof the very real
danger that the USSR would counterattack in unpredictableways,
: - : : lg co n -
including either a direct strike at Pakistan or an effort to foment a
: ' ,: third
. nu b l i c rebellion in Pakistan'sunstableprovince of Baluchistan.
: - - - r. l n g e s The ISI's Yousaf provides the most detailedaccount of the jihad's
:,:,rqan's move across Afghanistan'snorthern border. "The people on both
- - - : , . . r.ri sta n sideswere Uzbeks,Tajiks, and Turkomans," he wrote. "They shared
- - ,: : 0 f th e a common ethnic identity and, despitethe communist clampdown on
:' . -: : i d e n t religious activities,they also shared the same faith, Islam."42Casey
_ .--iLq> -
declared, according to Yousaf: "This is the soft underbelly of the
- ,- , .. r .rt h e
Soviet Union." During a visit to ISI's headquarters,Casey "was the
first personseriouslyto advocateoperationsagainstthe Sovietsinside
: .:.:11Islam their own territory. . . . He u'as convincedthat stirring up trouble in
:.. ..ise\- dealt this region would be certain to give the Russianbear a bellyache."At
-: - ::li' StofyOf first, the effort was restricted to smuggling propaganda into the
- .. .io\\.n that USSR'sMuslim republics,seekingto stir up Islamic fervor.During the
. :,rld Casey r98os thor,rsands of Korans were printed in Central Asian languages
': .^-rs.'about and covertly moved acrossthe Afghan border. Some of the Korans
:. , .'-rPons,for were printed in Saudi Arabia, others by the CIA itself, using Muslim
r: :.:'keeper of connectionsin ntresternEuroPe.
- - :','ter of the Saudi Arabia, especially,was interestedin Central Asia becauseit
:. :,,rmer CIA saw lran, and the new Khonteiniregimetirere.as a competitortrying
. , ,rld teli the to spread its version of Shiite fundamentalism into Central Asia,
, r.::hans were againstSaudiArabia's ultra-orthodox'Wahhabibrand of Sunni Islam.
-, ,l i ri, - t h in o A former CIA operationsofficer who worked closelywith SaudiAra-
bia says that Saudi intelligenceofficers told him about their idea of
':.: .rilianceto "colonizingthe'Stans":
_
.^ . . ^^ -t ^
- -r,f'45drru4r

' : :, , the Soviet Theywantedto getin thereand steala marchon the Iranians,and
undercutthe Russians, and make surethat SunniIslamprevailed
: :t: \\'orld are,
over Shialslam.The Saudiswere readyto go. They said,"\(/e've
: ,rrsof inter- got to get in there,into the 'stans,we'vegot to work together,use
',,,
: rih Caseyat Islam to break the grip of communismin the 'stans,in Kazakh-
.. :lrrce within stan,Uzbekistan, all throughthere."It wasopenseason.Different
:.: - r.1p Out of Saudiprincesand clericswould go up thereor sendstuff up there,
Koransand othermaterial.a3
- l: -\\' OI ] CO Ve f t
 ; -86 . D rvrl ' s Gerrr

Beginning in 1984, however, it was more than just Korans and c ' Frr' .' .' -

Islamist books and propaganda. "The United Statespur in rrain a ftc- :.

major escalationof the war which, over the next three years,culmi- Ln'', '
T-
nated in numerouscross-borderraids and sabotagemissionsnorth of 1_ --
- -.

the Amu," wrote Mohammad Yousaf. "During this period we were pri i ' ' : :

specificallyto train and dispatch hundreds of Mujahideen up to zj lc\-,.: -,

kilometresdeepinsidethe SovietUnion. They were probably the most

secretand sensitiveoperationsof the war." He added that the Soviet
Union's "specific worry was the spread of fundamentalism and its ..-
.i-u:!

influence on Soviet Central Asian Muslims."aa The ISI official was : :

-\-
- .:i
prepared to "send teams over the river to carry out rocket attacks, ), l:

mine-laying, derailment of trains or ambushes."45Teams that did -)--1 -..:-.

crossthe Sovietborder soughtcontactsamong Muslim activistsin the

region. "I was impressedby the number of reports of people wanting
to assist," wrote Yousaf. "Some wanted weapons, some wanted to
join the Mujahideen in Afghanisran,and othersto parricipatein oper-
ations insidethe SovietUnion."46Accordine to Yousaf:

Thesecross-border strikeswere at their peak in 1986. Scoresof

attackswere made acrossthe Amu from Jozjan to Badakshan
Provinces. Sometimes Sovietcitizensjoinedin theseoperations,or
cameback into Afghanistanto yointhe Mujahideen.. . . That we
werehitting a sorespot wasconfirmedby the ferocityof the Sovi-
ets' reaction.Virtualiy every incursionprovokedmassiveaerial
bombingand gunshipattackson all villagessouthof the river in
the vicinityof our strike.aT

It was, of course, an offensive that not only risked inflaming latent

Islamist sentimentinside the SovietUnion but which could have pro-
voked Moscow to retaliate against Pakistan itself, something that
could lead to a U.S.-Sovietglobal conflagration-and all of this
unfolded secretly,without the knowledge of the American public.
According to various accounrs of the Afghan conflict, and from
Yousaf's own testimony, eventually cooler heads in \Tashington got
the upper hand, and the cross-borderattackswere halted. "By r98 5, it
becameobvious that the United Stateshad got cold feet," mourned
Yousaf. "Somebody at the top in the American administration was
 .
Jihad II: Into Central Asia 287

. :,rns and getting frightened." But, he asserted,"the CIA, and others, gave us
:r train a every encouragementunofficially to take the war into the Soviet
.:s. culmi- IJnion."48
- . north of In the end, the Casey-lSloffensiveinto the SovietUnion failed to
: \\'e were provoke a Muslim uprising. The Brzezinski-Bennigsen theory of a
- l Pto25 restive Muslim population chafing to revolt against its Soviet over-
'. :he most lords, and loyal to an undergroundnetwork of Sufi Islamists,proved
: :re Soviet flawed, at best. Yet there is no question that the Casey-ISIactions
.::r .rnd its aided the growth of a significant network of right-wing Islamist
::;ral was extremistswho, to this day, still plaguethe governmentsof the former
: , - .--
t I-L^a^l1KS
,^ t Sovietrepublics,now led by regimesof varying authoritarian,but not
. :hat did Islamist, character.In particular, the Islamic Movement of Uzbek-
, :.ts in the istan, the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb ut-Tahrir), the powerful
: .: \\'antlng Islamist $oups in Chechnya and Dagestan, and the shadowy Al
'..,:nted to Qaeda presencein Central Asia all gained momentum in the r98os,
.-- in nner- thanks to the spilloverof the Afghan jihad.

No END ro JrHao

.:.-..ninglatent
-:.J havepro-
::rerhingthat
: - :ll of this
::::.Jn public.
.. ;:. and from
a.-.:i]lngtongof
::. "Br-r985, it
::::." moUfned
::.::trationwas
The Afghan jihad did not end when the Soviet Union withdrew its
forces. The United States had no exit strategy and no plan for
Afghanistanin the wake of the war. Most policy makers in \Tashing-
ton believedthat the weak pro-Sovietgovernmentin Kabul that was
left in place would collapsein short ordeq but it lingered on. The
mujahideen, who fractured into factions after the war and fought
amongst themselves,continued to fight. And Pakistan, which saw
Afghanistan as its partner in a coalition against India, heavily sup-
ported the Islamistsin the shatteredcountry.
None of this seemedto bother top U.S. officials at the time. "'We
knew we were involved with Islamic fundamentalists,"said Caspar
\Weinberger,who served as PresidentReagan'ssecretaryof defense.
"\7e knew they were not very nice people, and they were not all
people attached to democracy.But we had this terrible problem of
making choices.. . . Rememberwhat Churchill said, 'If Hitler invaded
Hell. I would at least make a favorable referenceto the Devil in the
 288 . Dnvrr.'s Gaur,

House of Commons.'"4eIt was an apt characterizationof U.S.policy ^lo

a o , -r , .

toward Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the "arc of Islam" in the and Pak:.
r 9 8os. and u'c
There is no question that the U.S. support for the mujahideen, works. -\1
most of which went to the hard-core Islamists,was a catastrophic rvith -\1,:-
miscalculation.It devastatedAfghanistanitself, led to the collapseof hood. r::
its government,and gave rise to a landscapedominated by warlords, rhe oth.:
-= .
both Islamists and otherwise. lt created a worldwide network of ' -,,i .1",
IllLtlLlrllu-

highly trained Islamist fighters from a score of countries, linked f r eelv r :

together and roughly affiliated to Osama bin Laden's soon-to-be brirtetl .,.
establishedAl Qaeda organization. It left behind a shatterednation t he t r t , . :
that played host to Al Qaeda and other assortedterrorist formarions. rhe n-,
t_
-.

And it set up conditions under which Pakistan'sISI could encourage \airb.: .-

the growth of the Taliban movementin the rgc)os. quick-'. : -
t--...-
Yet advocates of the jihad, even those who in 2ooj are rhe ul.1\\ i -- :

l- .,-
staunchestproponentsof the global war on terrorism directedagainst \lltrl. - _:

Islamist groups, assertthat it was correct policy. "I think it was the
right thing do to," saysDaniel Pipes,the prolific campaigneragainst
political Islam and son of Richard Pipes, who coordinated the
NationalitiesSTorkingGroup in the early yearsof the Reaganadmin-
istration. During those years, Daniel Pipes was a State Department
and National SecurityCouncil official. "\Wesupported Stalin against
Hitler," he says,echoing \Teinberger'srheory of dealing with devils.
"These are real-world choices." The most militant among the
mujahideenwere the best fighters, according to Pipes. "If anything,
the radical Islarnistswere seenas more vehementlyanti-Soviet."50It is
a view echoedby numerousU.S. veteransof the Afghan war, includ-
ing many CIA officials and policy makers. "The people we did sup-
port were the nastier,more fanatic rypesof mujahideen,"said Stephen
P. Cohen, who was a top StateDepartment official in the r9Bos. "If
you want to win the Cold rVar and defeatthe Sovietsin Afghanistan,
you can't usethe SalvationArmy."-it
Needlessto say, the "fanatic types" did not fade away after the
Soviet Union decided to withdraw from Afghanisran, although the
people sponsoringthem changeddramatically: Bill Casey died, and
both General Zra and the head of ISI were killed in an unexnlained

- : L-.S.policy
- .- -rr.r-t"
in the
- -, ::rujahideen,
:-
-.rrastrophic
. :, .ollapseof
r: - ..i' u'irrlords,
i - - : t -t\\ro rk of
: f r e s, l i n k ed
' . io o n -to -be
-:
- -. . -: : : rc'cln a tion
- .: : ( )rma ti o ns .
- .: .t cltcourage
- --. s a re t he
- -',-: i cl a g a i ns t
: - . . i r wa s t he
're r r o a i n cf
: : . : rn i ttcd t he
: . :. , i. 1I1a d min-
I)rn r rf menf
:* .: -ili n a g a ins t
- ' , . r'i thd e v ils .
-
|-- rrn n n c t
'' J I . . - ' t h irrrrrrfr
.taa v
-- t
: \ t ,ie t.'r-5It0 iS
- -,_.,.\'.lrtinclud-
I : '.\'c did sup-
- . . . rrd Ste p hen
- : : -. r9 8 o s. " I f
r \ rqha n i stan,
,'.',,r\'after the
. .:irhoughthe
.r;r' died, and
r : Lrnerplained
Iihad II: Into Central Asia . z8s
plane crash.But the Islamic right was entrenchedin both Afghanistan
and Pakistan.The Islamic Group of Pakistanwas rich and powerful,
and well connectedwith the Muslim Brotherhood'sworldwide net-
works. Most of the top ISI officials were now confirmed Islamists
with Muslim Brotherhood links. The Islamic Group and the Brother-
hood, in turn, maintained strong ties to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and
the other militant Islamists in Afghanistan, and ro the burgeoning
mujahideen network from dozens of countries who came and went
freely though the madrassasystem.The Sovietwithdrawal was cele-
brated as a tremendousvictory at the CIA and the Pentagon,and for
the most part they turned away from Afghanistan, assuming that
the pro-Soviet regime that still ruled in Kabul, led by President
Najibullah, would quickly fall. The CIA drew an analogy with how
quickly the government of South Vietnam fell after the U.S. with-
drawal there, and they assumedthat Najibullah would collapse in
short order. Still, an odd sort of morning-after queasinessdeveloped
in U.S.governmentcircles.
At the StateDepartment,and evenat the CIA, there was somedis-
quiet over the prospectof Hekmatyar and other fundamentaliststak-
ing over in Afghanistan. Soviet officials were among rhose warning
\Washingtonof the dangersinherent in the Islamist movement.Soviet
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadzetried to feel our Secretaryof
StateGeorgeShultz about the possibiliryof a U.S.-Sovietgenrleman's
th e agreementon the terms of a soviet pullout, and he "asked for Ameri-
can cooperationin limiting the spreadof 'Islamic fundamentalism.'"
However, other than Shultz, the adminisrration was unsympathetic
and "no high-level Reagan administration officials ever gave much
thought to the issue.They neverconsideredpressingPakistaniintelli-
genceto begin shifting support away from the Muslim Brotherhood-
connectedfactions." Moscow was exceedinglyworried about Islamic
fundamentalismtaking root along its southernfrontier, however,and
even Vladimir Kryuchkov, the head of the KGB, sat down with CIA
Director Gatesto explain why Sovietleaderswere "fearful about the
rise to power in Afghanistanof another fundamentalistgovernment,a
Sunni complementto ShiiteIran."-52To no avail.
By default, the United States allowed Pakistan and the ISI to
 z9o . Drvrr's Gaue

maintain control of the political levers in Afghanistan. The official

Saudi spigot for cash had largely shut down, but the unofficial, pri-
vate sourcesof funding-through various wealthy princes, through
the Muslim'World League,through the Muslim Brotherhood'snet-
works-were still up and running. According to two U.S. ambassa-
dors who served in Saudi Arabia at this time, the United States
handled the end of the war badly. "\fhere I was, nobody was looking
aheadat what would happen to theseunemployedfreedom fighters,"
says'WalterCutler,who was U.S. ambassadorin SaudiArabia during
most of the r98os. "I don't recallany discussionabout, 'Gee,I won-
der if theseguys are going to pose any threat?' 'Wedidn't really focus
that much on political Islam. Ir was the Cold 'S7ar.The fact that you
had thesezealots,trained and armed with Stingers,didn't come up."-53
"\7e start wars without figuring out how we would end them,"
says Charles Freeman,who was ambassadorto Saudi Arabia at the
'$Var
end of the 198os and during the first Gulf rn rggr. "Afghanistan
was lurching into civil war, and we basically didn't care anymore."
Adds Freeman:

The Afghan struggledidn't stop. Someof us were concerned-I

was, and so was [Robert]Oakley [U.S.ambassador in Pakistan],
who was concernedaboutthe ISI screwingaroundin Afghanistan
and Kashmir,and that the Saudiswere complicit in this. You
couldn't really figureout if the Saudiswere beingused,or were
witting. I talkedto [Prince]Turki [the headof Saudiintelligencel
about it, and to the ClA, and my message was, basically,
that we
needto startthinkingaboutdisentangling ourselves.But therewas
somequestiona.boutwhetherSaudiArabia had beencapturedby
the ISI. The ISI would take their money and start implementing
things,and we didn't know what they weredoing.Certainlya lot
of Saudimoneywas going to Hekmatyar.But we couldn't really
figureout what the Saudiagendawas.There'dbeenup to $3 bil-
lion a year flowing into the war, in all, from the United States,
Saudi Arabia, and others. You can'r just turn the spigot off
overnight.Both Bob and I thoughtwe shouldhavea seriousdia-
logueabout it, but we couldn'tget anyoneelseinterested, includ-
ing [Robert] Gatesand [\X/illiam]Webster[both CIA directors].
Part of the attitude in \Tashingtonwas, "'Sfhy should we go out
 Jihad II: Intc.tCentral Asia )-9 l

-. .-,fficial there and talk to peoplewith towels on their heads?"So we

. - -..1
., . -1 1 . ^Pr
- :r - weren'teffective.5a
. -lrrn rro h

j's net- According to Yousaf, who had a bird's-eyeview of the end of the
,--::rl.assa- war from his post at ISI, as the dust cleared in Afghanistan some
::: States Americansdid becomealarmed at the prospectof Hekmatyar and his
:. ,- .roking fellow fundamentaliststaking power. "The Americansbeganto look
' - -11 lcrc at an Afghanistanwithout the Red Army," he wrote. "'What they saw
- r ,l rrrino alarmed them." But, he said, Gen. Akhtar Abdel Rahman Khan, the
.. =. I rvo n - ISI architect of the jihad, managed to counter the ineffectual U.S.
.' - ', f o cu s efforts to strengthenpotential Afghan non-fundamentalistgroups,
.: : '; 1t yo u including the forcesallied to the exiled king,Zahir Shah,and to other,
__-
....|-.
ttn
!r{l
lessIslamistpartiesand individuals. "General Akhtar understood[the
-
- -
I r].em
lL]\rrr'
" Americans'] aims and methods and opposed their every move."
i t:,:.at the Akhtar also opposedwhat Yousafcalls "the Americans'bright idea of
:::: -rr-iistan bringing back the long-exiled Zahir Shah to head a government of
. :. nlOfe. "
"55
nationalreconciliation.
"
Even had the United Stateswanted to exert itself to minimize the
power of the fundamentalistsafter the war, and to enhancethe strength
:
:T
. '- l of the moderates,centrists,and secularists,it would havebeendifficult-
: -.rlll
: - -i ,-I for the simple reason that most of them were dead. At the same time
: . ) !.111
that the largely Islamist mujahideen were battling the USSR,they were
\tl u
- also killing potential postwar Afghan opponenti by the thousands,in a
: -.,.
cre
little-known secondfront of the jihad directed against non-communist
'-
Afghanis. "In Afghanistan, we made a deliberatechoice," says Cheryl
- -1 : \ \ -e

: :
Benard,a RAND Corporation expert on political Islam, who is married
' \i)

-_ - h.. toZalmay Khalilzad, who servedas U.S.ambassadorin Kabul. "At first,

-' F
everyonethought, There'sno way to beat the Soviets.So what we have
... .r iot to do is to throw the worst craziesagainst them that we can find, and
: ::..rllr- 'We
there was a lot of collateral damage. knew exactly who thesepeople
i: ril- were, and what their organizationswere like, and we didn't care," she
. _ r rp c
says. "Then, we allowed them to get rid of, just kill all the moderate
.: OT I
. l; ^
leaders. The reason we don't have moderate leaders in Afghanistan
- -., . 1
today is becausewe let the nuts kill them all. They killed the leftists,the
:- :,lf Sl. moderates,the middle-of-the-roaders.They were just eliminated, dur-
: , ( )u t ing the r98os and afterward."56
 292 . D nvrl ' s GeuE

Sgc nE T DEALS IN/ITH THE AYAToLLAHS

The wreckageleft behind in Afghanistancould have been evenworse

had the Reagan administration'ssecretinitiatives toward Iran from
r98o to r986 borne fruit. There are three episodesin regard to Iran
that paralleled America's alliance with fundamentalist Islam in
Afghanistan: the so-calledOctober Surprisein r98o, Israel's secret
relationship with Iran during the r98os, and the ry84-86 covert
Reaganadministration approachto Ayatollah Khomeini'sIran.
In r98o, as Carter administration officials frantically tried to
securethe releaseof the U.S. hostagesin Iran, it appearslikely that
membersof the Reagancampaign team, including CaseSestablished
contactswith Iranian officials,in an effort to postpone the hostages'
releaseuntil after the election.
Gary Sick,a U.S.Navy officerwho servedon the National Security
Council staff under Ford, Carter, and Reagan,concludedyears later
that the Reagan-Bushcampaigndid in fact enter into secrettalks with
Iranian leadersto prevent the releaseof the hostagesand to promise
to ship U.S. and Israeli arms to Iran in r98r. He penned a detailed
account of his findings in the book Ocrober Surprise: America's
Hostagesin Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan.In it, he con-
cludes:"The Reagan-Bushcampaign mounted a professionallyorga-
nized intelligence operation to subvert the American democratic
process."57
Sick suspectedthat the basisfor the GOP-Iran talks was a promise
that a Republicanadministrationwould look with favor on the ship-
ment of Israeli and other arms to Iran, possibly including U.S. stock-
piles of weapons that the shah had ordered and paid for. Iran
desperatelyneededweapons for its fight with Iraq, which erupted into
a full-scalewar in September198o. Israel,which had a long military
relationship with Iran going back to the two countries' first major
arms deal in 1966, was eagerto supply Teheran'sclericalregimewith
weapons,despitethe hostagecrisis. "Israel'salmost frantic efforts to
reopen an arms relationship with Iran were being thwarted by Presi-
dent Carter, who stubbornly refusedto acquiesceto even token Israeli
 .lihad II: Into Central Asia z.) \

arms shipmentsuntil the hostageswere free," wrote Sick.s8Interest-

ingly, the key Iranian broker for arms talks betweenIsrael and Iran
was Ahmed Kashani, the son of Ayatollah Seyyed Abolqassem
; -. a 1 \\'O f Se Kashani,the cleric who receivedCIA paymentsin r953 in order to
-:-..nfrom organize mobs demanding the overthrow of Mossadegh and the
.:: ;o Iran return of the shah. Kashani visited Israel in r9t3o, according to Sick,
: i.iam in who adds that "other channelsbetweenIsraeland Iran were function-
. : . 'S SeCf et ing long beforehe arrived." In the spring of r98o, a small Israeliarms
-. - covert shipmentarrivedin lran.'o
-:..:-.. Sick providesa detailedaccountof contactsand meetingsbetween
.'" :rred to Casey,other Reaganofficials,and a host of Iranian go-betweens,sev-
.:ir that eral of whom would turn up as part of the ry84-86Iran-contra scan-
-.::hlished dal.60Some of them, in turn, had close contacts in Israel, and Israel
= - rif rq e q t
-'. . o ' " and Iran begancloser military cooperation in late r98o, including-
most spectacularly-Israel's June 7, r98r, air raid that destroyed
> ecu rl ty Iraq's Osirak nuclearfacility, only days after the outbreak of the Iran-
,:rs later Iraq war. "Israel provided lran with information on how to attack the
:-.ksrvith nuclearfacility but . . . the Iraqi air defensewas too good for the Iran-
:romtse ian air force," reportedSick.nlSo Israeldid it.
ietailed Casey,according to Sick, helped Iran break the U.S. embargo on
.,riericd's Israeli arms for Iran. "'sfilliam Casey struck exactly the kind of
he con- unsentimentalbargain with the Iranian clericsthat the Iran lobby in
..\'orga- Israel had been looking for," wrote Sick. "Isriel was approachedin
:tocratic August not only by Caseybut by officialswithin the CIA who encour-
aged Israel to cooperatewith the Republicaninitiative as a meansof
s -r fromlse freeingthe hostages."52 At the NSC, Sick was gettingreports of Israeli
: :re ship- arms deliveriesto Iran, in defianceof Carter'sopposition. "The Israeli
L .>. stock- leadership,at the very highestlevel,had deliberatelSalmost contemp-
: :(lr. If an tuously turned its back on Jimmy Carter's administration."6sIn the
: '.:ted into end, the hostageswere freed, but only on January zo, t98r, minutes
:: military after Reaganwas sworn in as America'sfortieth president."Few sus-
:.:st major pected," wrote Sick,that the releaseof the hostages"was the denoue-
:::me With ment of an elaborate plot that had been hatched months before by
: to \(iilliam Casey."64
-iforts
rr- Presi- The secretReagan-Casey contactswith Iran in r98o-8r foreshad-
':
s:n Israeli owed efforts during the Reaganadministrationto maintain covert ties
 294 ' D E v r r 's GeuE

with the Iranian ayatollahs.SomeU.S. officials saw Iran as an ally in \1rd.r.

the growing war in Afghanistan,sinceKhomeini was bitterly opposed deri:,'.
to the Soviet Union and wanted to extend Iranian influence inro Il -i rri .:--
Afghanistanand Central Asia. Others saw Iran as a counterweightto irr-L:.

Iraq, for two reasons:first, becauseof the SovietUnion's closetresto

Baghdad,but second,and more important, becausea powerful iraq
was seenas a threat to Israel.
During the Iran-Iraq war, the United Statespursuedtwo policiesat
the same time. \Washington'smain approach was the "tilt" toward
Iraq during its war with Iran. Officialswho supportedthe pro-Iraq tilt
correctly saw Iran as the major threat to American interestsin the
region, sincethe defeatof Iraq by Iran's fundamentalistregimewould
open the way to Iranian domination of the entire PersianGulf, includ-
ing Kuwait and SaudiArabia. Virtually the entire Arab world backed
Iraq in its war with lran, and the United Statesprovided limited sup-
port to Iraq, including intelligenceon lran's capabilitiesand troop
deployments.
But Israel-along with many U.S. neoconservative officials,includ-
ing Casey-saw it differently.
From r98o to t987, evenas the United StatesofficiallybackedIraq,
the IsraelissuppliedIran with a steadystream of arms, ammunirion,
and spare parts. Whether or not it was part of a secretdeal between
Casey,Israel, and lran, the Reaganadministration did norhing to ger
Israel to stop arming the ayatollahs.In doing so, Israel was drawing
on its many contactswith Iran during the shah'srule. \Whenthe shah
was toppled, the Israeliscontinued to work with Iranian army and
intelligence officers.they knew, even though the officers were now
reporting to mullahs and ayatollahs.Israel'sties to Khomeini's Iran
were multifaceted.They had links to lran's armed forcesand the suc-
cessor organization to the shah's SAVAK secret service. In addition,
thousands of Iranian Jews had long been active in the bazaar mer-
chant class,many of whom had immigrated to Israel but maintained
ties to Iran, including links to rhe families of the wealthier,conserva-
tive ayatollahs.Israelcapitalizedon thoseconracrs,roo.
"Israel was dealing with the regime in Iran as a semi-ally," says
Patrick Lang, who headed the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency's
 lihad Il: [nto Central Asia . L9 \

- .r:rrlly in Middle East section.6'5"They were dealingwith the samepeoplethey

- )pposed dealt with under the shah.During theseyears,the Israeliswere having
. . : : ra e i n to meetingsonce a month in Europe with people from the Iranian air
- : -rollr f^
force." According to Lang, theseIsrael-Iranmeetingstook place for
- :r riesto many years. Israel, he said, would ask Iran what sort of arms it
' :::ul Iraq needed,then take Teheran'sshoppinglist to seewhat it could provide.
At the time, the Reaganadministrationhad institutedwhat was called
,, : ) llcl e sa t Operation Staunchin r984, to cut the arms flow to Iran and Iraq, but
- : : torvard the Israelisflouted it and Reagan never used America's influencein
.. - - -i. r ^ tilt
Israelto get them to halt the arms deliveries."The Israeliswere doing
r :- - -lS i n th e this all along," Lang says. "At the DefenseintelligenceAgency,we
' : - rlli N 'Ou l d found out about it when an Iranian air force colonel defectedto us
- . -. in cl u d - and told us about it." Still, saysLang, PresidentReagan'steam looked
, : i b a cke d the other way. "My impressionis that we didn't try too hard to stop
- :- : red su p - it," says Lang. In just the immediate period after the releaseof the
:- ,l :l t1 t f O O p U.S. hostages,Israel supplied Iran with $3oo million worth of mili-
tary equipment.The shipmentsincluded spareparts for U.S. F-4 air-
- ,... includ- craft, M-48 tanks,and M-r r3 armoredpersonnelcarriers.66
An important incident in r983 revealsthe extent to which Casey's
- ...ked Iraq, CIA worked with Iran's intelligenceservicewhen it was in both coun-
-
-- - - rrrrn it inn
tries' mutual interestto do so. In t982, Vladimir Kuzichkin, u'ho had
::-... L'retween servedas the station chief in Teheranfor the SovietKGB, defectedto
:: . : r 1gto g e t Great Britain. During the r:evolution,Kuzichkin had ably represented
" ' , . . .J ra w i n g Soviet interestsin Iran, but in fact the Soviet presencein Iran was
- .: - . t he sh a h quite small, and did not threateneither the United Statesor the shah.
. -'.irnv and According to Kuzichkin, who later wrote a book about his experi-
:- .'.
r-re nOW ence,the KGB had a grand total of two agentsin governmentand offi-
:- Ira n cial Iranian circles."I could not believemy eyes,but it was a fact, and
-r ni's
, ., -: . ,rh
1 e su c- facts do not go away," he wrote. "I was very surprisedat the small
- - r cldi ti o n , number of agentsin Iran."67Kuzichkin also wrote that the USSRval-
- ,t z -t . tr me r- ued the stability of Iran under the shah and that Moscow never had
.: :: : inta i n e d any contactswith either the Islamist revolutionariesor the so-called
. : : . . i )Il S e t V 2- Islamic Manist groups that briefly made common cause with
Khomeini.6sBut the KGB station did support the small and ineffective
: -,,.llr'."says Tudeh Communist Party in Iran.
:,: Agency's When Kuzichkin defected, he decided to win favor in Anglo-
 296 . D E v r r - 's Gaur

Americancirclesby giving MI6 and the CIA everythinghe knew about Persianshad ;'-
the Tudeh and its members. "He provided the British with a list of keep track o: :
severalhundred Soviet agentsoperating in Iran," wrote James Bill. clergy.But F..::
Almost immediately,MI6 and the CIA handed Kuzichkin's informa- PrincessAsh:,::
tion to the Iranian intellisenceservice: her memoir. ::,
what the nr - .::
Kuzichkin'sinformationwas sharedwith the Iranian authorities,
who arrestedover r,ooo Tudehparty members,many of whom
had already been under surveillance.Those arrestedincluded
Nureddin Kianuri [the Tudehleader,who admittedlthat he had
maintainedcontactwith Sovietagentssincer945. This dramatic
destructionof the Tudehparty in r983 completedthe dismantling
of the Iranianleft.6e

None of this, of course,was made public at the time. Americansknew

nothing about the CIAs sub rosa cooperation with Khomeini's Iran,
nothing about Israel'songoing arms supply to lran, and, later,nothing
about the Iran-contra initiative toward Iran, until it was revealedby a
Lebanesenewspaper.Mel Goodman, a former CIA analyst who
headed the agency'steam analyzing Soviet policy in the Third World,
confirms that the CIA was part of the Kuzichkin-Ml6 connection to
Iran. "The CIA was involved in that, too," says Goodman. "They
were working with the ayatollah to wrap up the Tudeh Party. There
was a lot of lcable] traffic on it. Kuzichkin was being run by the
British and he provided a lot of information." According to Good-
man, the CIA and MI6 were working with Iranian intelligenceoffi-
cials who had been part of the old SAVAK organization, and who
simply shifted loyalty to th,enew Islamic republic.T0
Most notorious among the former SAVAK officialsnow cooperat-
ing with the new regimewas HosseinFardoust.Fardoustwas a child-
hood friend of the shah,who had attendedschool in Switzerlandwith
both the shah and future CIA director Richard Helms. Fardoust had
risen to a high position in Iranian intelligencein the r97osr and in
r976he was namedto headthe Organizationof Imperiallnspection,
which was reconstituted by the shah. In his memoirs, the shah
describesthe inspectorateas "a modern version of what the ancient
 Jihad II: Into Central Asia . zs7

-,::-\\'about Persianshad called 'the eyesand ears of the king.'"71 Its lob was to
::r a list of keep track of political currents in the country, including among the
l,rnes Bill. clergy. But Fardoust joined the pro-Khomeini opposition, secretly.
:-'. rrrforma- PrincessAshraf, the shrewd and ruthlesssisterof the shah,recalledin
her memoirs that Fardoust failed, deliberately,to inform the shah of
what the mullahs were doing:
i --t lfl t l e S r

: s'horn Curiously,SAVAK-the supposedly all-seeing, all-knowingintelli-

rcl u d e d
: he h:rd
.: f .l m at lc
-. r, . rlinq
: . : : . - : t ca n skn e w
\ :reini'sIran,
-. ,rter.nothing
.. :.\'ealedby a
rneh'st who
-. TirrrdWorld,
.-
-rl nl l ec t l0n
:man. "They
:: : P.rrty.There
.: :i fltll bY the
iing to G ood -
::.'lligenceoffi-
::::.)ll. and who
.. tr0w cooperat-
-:ir \vasa child-
-.'.rtzerlandwith
:.. Fardousthad
-: I!/oS' and in
:;:ial InsPection'
::t'rirs, the shah
'.,.:ratthe ancient
gence source-made no reports on the extent and manner in
which the mullahswere now using the sanctityof the pulpit to
underminethe throne.. . . Eachday my brothermet with Hossein
Fardoust,. . . the sameFardoustof childhood,whoseassignment
was to gather,evaluate,and distill all intelligencereports.. . . I am
convincedthat Fardoust must have withheld vital information
from the Shah and was, in fact, in active negotiationwith
Khomeini during the last yearsof the regime.I think the events
following the revolution support my view; at a time when anyone
remotelyconnected with the Shahwas beingsummarilyexecuted,
Hossein Fardoust remains alive and well, prosperingunder the
new administration as one of the heads of SAVAMA (which is
Khomeini'snamefor SAVAK).72
tO
'Whether
it was the mysteriousFardoustor someoneelse,both the
CIA and the Israelishad channelsinto Iran's intelligenceservicefrom
the first days of the revolution through the start of the Casey-North
conspiracy in the mid-r98os. Seen in this context, the Iran-contra
affair is not some strange aberration, but simply an extension of a
preexistingrelationshipthat dated back to ry79.Vithin the Reagan
administration,a small clique of conservatives,
and neoconservatives,
were most intimately involved in the Iran-contra initiative, especially
thoseU.S. officialsand consultantswho were closestto the Israelimil-
itary and intelligenceestablishment.
The record of the han affaft has been told and retold in various
books, memoirs, and official governmentreports.T3The entire busi-
nesswas complex and multilayered,and it tied U.S. and Israeli arms
shipments to Iran to illegal financial support for the Nicaraguan
guerrillas backed by the Reagan administration. Critics of the U.S.
 :' 98 . D r' vrr' s Gerl n

approach to Iran accuseReaganand his advisersof seekingto trade I s ra ..

arms with Iran for the releaseof U.S. hostagesin Lebanon held by si-rrFi-
Hezbollah, an Iranian cat's-paw.Indeed,to PresidentReaganhimself,
the deal with Iran may have appearedto be simply an effort to get the L - . : .-
hostagesreleased,although the president(in later testimony)said that se i t:.
he could not recall approving the arms transfersto Iran. To his advis- C( t." i::

ers,however-especially to the neoconservatives and Casey-it had a ilr, -- -

much broader purpose, namely,an attempt to reengagewith Iran, in -:,
direct opposition to the official U.S. policy of supporting Iraq in its
resistance
to Iranianexpansionism.
The context for the secretCasey-North approach to Iran was the
National SecurityCouncil's :r984 reevaluationof U.S. policy toward
Iran. That reevaluationwas pushed by a small clique of U.S. officials
opposedto the American tilt in favor of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war.
Robert McFarlane, the national security adviser,ordered the NSC
review, and severalofficials-including Howard Teicherand Donald
Fortier at the NSC, Graham Fuller at the CIA, and others-began a
two-year-longcampaign to shift U.S. policy in favor of Iran. Their
effort dovetailednicely with parallel Israeli efforts to isolateIraq and
connect with Iran. At the time, Israel was supplying arms to lran,
backing the rise of the Islamic right in the occupiedterritories,fueling
the Muslim Brotherhood'scivil war in Syria, and fiercely supporting
the Islamistsin Afghanistan.
In 1985, Fuller-working along with Teicher and Fortier-
produced an infamous SpecialNational IntelligenceEstimate (SNIE)
that called for the United Statesto provide arms to the ayatollahs'
regimeand a draft policy paper that said that the United Statesshould
'Western
"encourage allies and friends to help Iran meet its import
requirements. . . including provision of selectedmilitary equipment."Ta
'Weinberger
Both Secretaryof State Shultz and Secretaryof Defense
strongly opposedthe idea, but CIA Director Caseybacked it. In the
midst of this internal battle, Israel steppedin, using intermediariesto
propose a joint U.S.-Israelieffort to approach Iran and sell Teheran
weapons. The U.S. contact for the Israeli intelligenceschemewas
Michael Ledeen,a neoconservativeNSC consultant,who was sent to
 lihad II: Into Central Asra . ;-99

Israel by McFarlane to discussthe idea. Specifically,Israel wanred to

ship HAWK antiaircraft and TOW antitank missilesto the Iranians,
weapons consideredcritical in Iran's war with Iraq, along with a
U.S. commitment to resupply Israel with the missilesonce they were
sent. Israel's rationale was the releaseof the U.S. hostages,but of
courseIsrael-and elementswithin the American administration-had
broader,pro-Iranian strategicconcerns,not related to the hostages.
Teicher,in particular,vehementlysupported the Iran initiative. In
r98o, when Iran and Iraq went to war, "l renewed my campaign
against the nascenttilt toward Iraq," wrote Teicher in his memoirs.
t,
- l: th e He added that some U.S. officialsviewed the war as a way to under-
: ',\ard mine the Islamist threat from Iran, which at the time was holding
: :; irlls fifty-three Americanscaptive. "The Arabists in the U.S. government
: J_\\'ar. saw the lraqi invasionas an opportunity to eliminaterhe growing
. \SC threat of Iranian-sponsoredIslamic fundamentalism."T's
l' ,nald Advocatesfor sellingarms to Iran made two seriouslyflawed argu-
',:'lrl t ments. The first was that there were moderates inside Iran who
Their wanted to deal with the United States,and who would look with
-::-;nd favor upon a U.S.goodwill offer to replenishIran's dwindling arsenal.
Iran, The secondwas that Iran was internally weak and unstable,and ripe
- '- l i no for a Soviet takeover that could bring the USSR into the Gulf. Both
: ' r t lng argumentswere wildly inaccurate-and so was the belief that token
arms shipmentscould win freedom for U.S. hostagesin Lebanon. At
- if I - the start of the Iran initiative, an Israeli intelligence official told
}\ I E) McFarlane that "the Israelisplanned to provide somearms to moder-
: ',l.r h s ' ates in Iran who would opposeKhomeini." The idea that somepow-
i10u1d erful faction of Iranian moderateswould emergeto greet the United
::1port Statesand Israel with open arms and take action against Khomeini
-:-tL, captivated many of the U.S. participants in the lran-contra affair,
including Caseyhimself. But it was a mirage. According to a former
, I n t he seniorCIA official, it took a lot of doing in the mid-r9Sos to convince
: : leS tO Caseythat the chimerical "moderates" were not there. "There were
'When
[ : ] erdfl no moderatesto speakof in t986," saysthe CIA official. Ollie
:l ; w as North, McFarlane,and other U.S. and Israeliofficialswere planning a
) ant t O secretvisit to Iran to try to make a deal, the official says,Casey-who
 3 00 D r , v r r 's Ge.vtp

had approved the plan-wanted to know if the plan would work. I slanr i. :
"Casey called me in and asked,Did I think this mission had a chance a na L\ '>: : .
of success?I told him, 'Not much.' And there wasn't really a chance Sovr c: - .
of success."Asked if Caseyultimately believedthat Iranian moderates lahs. I : . :
would respond in a positive way to the U.S. gambit, the official says: . '- . '- -
!.11i

"Probably not after talking to me."76Says'V7.Patrick Lang, who was ah'rlrr'.

:
then director of the DefenseIntelligenceAgency's Middle East sec- F'.:
-:
tion: "Their view was that there were lots of moderatesin lran who Fu l l c.: I r
are not what they seemto be, which was a bunch of jackasses.And I t- ,. . .. ,

said,that's exactly what they 2rs-lackasses." I i,rr:: .,

'
The more significant argument, that Iran might fall to the USSR, L r - i1, , : : . '
was absurd on its face. The Soviet Union was battling insurgentsin ;.-. .r-
--,t\_-:t.-

Afghanistan,it had little or no assetsinsidelran, and Sovietleadershad

no intention of crossingthe red line into the PersianGulf, a region that
FDR, Eisenhower,and Carter had all proclaimed a zone of American
predominance.Yet in a NIay r985 memo to CaseScalled "Toward a
Policy toward Iran," the CIAs Fuller argued,"The Khomeini regrmeis
faitering.. . . The U.S. has almost no cards to play; the USSR has
many." According to Fuller, U.S. intelligenceanalystsfelt that Moscow
was making "progress toward developing significant leverage in
Tehran" and that the U.S. policy forbidding arms salesto Iran "may
now serveto facilitateSovietinterestsmore than our own." He added:

It is imperative,however,that rve perhapsthink in terms of a

bolder-and perhapsriskier-policy which will at least ensure
greaterU.S.voicein the unfoldingsituation.Right now, unlesswe
are very lucky indeed,we standto gain nothingand losemore in
the outcomeof developments in lran, which are all outsideour
control.TT

Fuller was developinga view that made him increasinglysympa-

thetic to fundamentalist Islam, and in his testimony to the Tower
Commission,a three-manpanel, appointed by PresidentReaganand
led by former senatorJohn Tower of Texas,assignedto investigatethe
NSC's role in the Iran-contra scandal,he said that a problem was that
"the Iranian regime perceivedus as implacably hostile towards an
 liht r l l l : l n l e ' ( . r t t t r o l A s i , r . to r

: '.,.f)rk. Islamicrepublicin principle."78In his controversialSNIE and orher

: -: '. , 1 nce analyses,Fuller insistedthe United Statesrvould drive Iran ir-rtothe
i. , : lnce soviet camp unlessit allorvedIsrael and other allies ro arm tl'remul-
' -: i -. l t e S
lahs.It saidthat to the extentthat American"allies," includingIsrael,
. -r i. lV S: "can fill a military gr,rpfor Iran rvill be a critical *easure of the \rvest's
r.1. \ \\-as ability to blunt Sovietinfluence."7"
' : .- \ t rL - Fuller'sanalysiswas hotly disputeclby .ther: intellige.cc officiirls.
:-:-:-\\'ho Fuller'sSNIE said that "the Iran revoluri.n rvasphony, that it was led
. \ndI by a bunch of agricultural reformers who didn't really care alrour
Islam and that they would make common cause with the Soviet
. L SSR, LJnion," saysthe DIA's Lang. "I got another NIE started,which was
' : :: lt S i n finished five months later. And it said exactly the opposite, but it
: :: r had didn't have the same impact." In the rneantime,Fuller, Teicher,and
:: : l r hat others pressedaheadto rranslareFuller'sSNIE into U.S. policy, seek-
:: : . : f iC an ing to draft a presidentialdirectivethat called for "a vigorous policy
' . . '. . r rd
a designedto block Soviet advancesin the short-term while trying to
: : :: lll e iS restore the U.S. position in Iran r,','hichexisted under the shah."'Ihe
>.R has directive,couchedin anti-Soviet,Cold'War rerms,virtually called for
)' I ,scow an alliancewith the Islamic Republicof Iran againstthe USSR,includ-
::.:ie in ing "continued Iranian resistanceto Sovietexpansion(in particular,in
:- . "may Afghanistan)." The draft encouragedIsrael and other U.S. allies to
, rJded: arm Iran, and it called for the United Sratesro "esrablishlinks with,
arrd provide supporr ro. Iranian leaderswho might be receptivero
t.1
efforts to improve relations with the United Stares."It also called on
the Voice of America to "increase efforts to discredit Moscow,s
: .11
Islamic credentials."
: . lf
"Iran still representedthe strategic prize in the modern Great
Game," wrote Teicher."McFarlane agreedwith Fuller'sanalysisand
directed Fortier and me to draft an NSDD [National SecurityDeci-
. :\ Inpa- sion Directivel. The NSDD was based on Fuller's analysis [and it]
. Torver argued that . . . the United States should establish a dialogue with
li. Ir and Iranian leaders.The proposal included the provision of selectedmili-
:: : , lt e t he tary equipment to Iran as determinedon a case-by-case basis."80
'.'.ls rhat The Iran initiative proceededbur was later shot down by Shultz and
'. -.-:dsan lVeinberger.The latter scribbleclthe word "absurd" on Teicher's
draft
 3o z 'D p v t l 's Geun

,,I also added that this is roughly like inviting Qaddafi over
NSDD.
for a cozy lunch," said'weinberger.8lAccording to Teicher,vice Pres-
ident Bush and CIA Director Casey"strongly supportedit.''82
By the end of the Reagan administration, the Iran-contra initia-
tive had come to light, and it was being investigatedby journalists,a
specialprosecutor,and congressionalcommittees.The olive branch to
the Iranians had failed. Only a single hostage had been released
during the initiative, and not necessarilybecauseof it. No Iranian
"moderates" spoke up, and those who cooperatedwith the Reagan
administration and Israel in secfet, such as Ali Akbar Hashemi-
Rafsanjani,a future Iranian president,coveredtheir tracks by appear-
ing to becomeevenmore bellicose.
The Afghan jihad ended-or appearedto end-with the withdrawal
of Soviet forces. But the legacy of that conflict, including well-trained
terrorist operativesand a worldwide Islamist machine,would continue
to plaguethe United Statesand the'West.In the r99os, Afghanistanfell
to the \Tahhabi Taliban movement; Algeria was engulfedin a civil war Tnr C,:
against the Islamic right; and Islamist terrorists wreaked havoc in lVar III. :
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon; and Osama bin Laden put AI Statesi. :
unsuccess-
Qaeda together.Through it all, the United Statesstruggled' Islanric:-
full,v, to adopt a coherent policy toward political Islam. The conse- ism the :-,
quencesof its failure to do so, and its continued benign view of the the Sor':c
Islamicright, would becomepainfully obviouson SeptemberII' zool. ism?An; .
changer',.
The;.*
a valuab..
seded, c,: :
Sovietrr,,=
Islamic r.:_
secular \\ =
comprisri:
Syria, Lr: ,
Iran-conl:"
Since_r=
the Mush;:.
first Iraq r'.'
 * r:Jafi over
-..:.\'ice Pres-
. :
'l
12
-- :.:ia initia-
--:nalists, a
.: lranch to
::,:l released
: \o Iranian C L ASH OF CIVI LIZATIONS?
:: ::e Reagan
:.: Hashemi-
-,..:tV appear-

:.-.'..i'irhdrawal
.: '"'.ell-trained
t ,,J continue
',::lJnistanfell
: .: a civil war TnB coro \7en endedin t99t. But, if the cold war was world
:^-J havoc in war III, doesthat mean, as someconservativesargue,that the united
-,..Jen put Al states is now engagedin world \Var IV, this time against Islam? Is
:,: J . U nS UC Ce SS- Islamic fundamentalismthe "new communism" ? Is the war on terror-
::. The conse- ism the twenty-first-centuryequivalentof the global struggleagainst
i:. r'iew of the the soviet union? How serious,really,is the threat of Islamisrrerror-
. -- !r r
Y
L)
'
AN
-vvL.
T
ism?And how-if at all-did America'srelarionshipto polirical Islam
changewith the end of the Cold \far?
The central theme of this book is that the Islamic right was seenas
a valuable U.s. ally during the cold war. rwas that alliance super-
seded, or rendered superfluous,by the disappearanceof the u.S.-
's7ith
soviet rivalry? the elimination of its communisr enemy,did the
Islamic right direct its wrath insteadroward the Great saransof the
'west?
secular Is the united states now facing a worldwide enem),,
comprisinga hydra-headedmonster tied to a network of srates-Iran,
syria, Libya, sudan, and saudi Arabia-that Michael Ledeen. the
Iran-contra veteran,calls the "terror masters"?
Sinceseptemberrr,2oor, the notion that the United Statesand
the Muslim world are on a collision coursehas gainedcredence.If the
6rst Iraq war in t99r marked the start of the short-lived New world
 304 D r v t t . 's (ierrt

Order, does the second Iraq war in zoo3 symbolize an entirely

different era: the Clash of Civilizations?Proponentsof this view-
popularizeclby BernardLewis and SamuelHuntington-see President
Bush'swil: on terrorism not as a struggle against Al Qaeda and its
radical allies,but as a titanic strugglepitting Judeo-Christianciviliza-
tion againstthe Muslim world. Fittingly, in the Pentagon,the Global
'War
on Terrorism is known by its acronym, G-WOT, pronounced
"geewhat," thus neatlyrhyming with "jihad."
the former CIA
such as James$7oolse1',
I-eadingneoconservatives,
director and Commentary'sNorman Podhoretzproclaimed that the
struggleagainstIslam was indeedWorld'Sfar IV. Joined by key Bush
administration officials, they compared the power of the Islamic
right-and sometimes,the religion of Islam itself-to that of fascism
or communism. It was, they said, a globe-spanningopponent whose
existencethreatenedAmerica'ssurvival, and becauseof it, previouslr'
'S7ar
unthinkable steps had to be taken. To fight World IV would
require a new U.S. doctrine of unilateral, preventivewars, an offen-
sive posture that included wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, and then
other nations, and vast increasesin U.S. military and intelligence
budgets.It would mean the creation of a surveillancestate at home.
with the Department of Homeland SecuritSthe USA Patriot Act, the
Pentagon'sNorthern Command for deployingthe armed forcesinside
the United States,and new JusticeDepartment rules giving the FBI.
the police, and Joint Terrorism Task Forces in fifty-three U.S. cities
significant new authority.
On closerexamination.however.the clash of civilizations,the war
on terror,and the Bushadministrationcampaignto reshapethe Middle
Eastwere rife with paradoxes,contradictions,and outright lies.
$
The enemythat attackedthe United Stateson Septemberr r was not
Islam,nor was it Islarniclundamentalism,nor was it the Muslim Broth-
erhood,Hezbollah,Hamas, or any other group of violence-pronemili-
:
tants on the lslamicright. Rather,it was Al Qaeda.Osama bin Laden'. ;
,iil
organizationis not a global power, and it does not posean existentrt, I
i:i
threat to the United States.It is a group of fanaticswith a tightly discr- ii
il
plined comrnand structure demanding mafia-stylc,blood-oath lo1'al- I
It
'Washinetonin zoor outraged thc
ties. Its attack on New York and
 Clash of Ciuilizations? . 3oj

.. entire world, and an effectivecounterattack-using intelligence,legal

--.i. -1. ,
!rrLrr L i)

. \'iew- action, political and diplomatic pressure,and highly selecrivemilitary

':esident strikes-could have weakenedand then destroyedit. Unquestionably,
:.-. rr-rd its the destruction of Al Qaeda could have been accomplishedwithout
:-;iviliza- a war in Afghanistan,without a war in Iraq, and without a "war on
Cilobal terrorism."
-
, , -n n ce d But the Bush administrationdeliberatelyinflatedthe specificthreat
from Al Qaeda itself. Certainly, bin Laden'sgroup has proved itself
rer CIA capableof inflicting severedamage.Since9/r r, it has struck targetsin
-. -- ii'titt the Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, and elsewhere.Despite Attorney Gen-
r ier Bush eral Ashcroft's unsubstantiatedclaim in zoor that thousands of Al
: -: Islamic Qaeda operativeshad infiltrated the United Srates,however, in the
:-. : frrscism almost four years after glrr not a single violent act by Al Qaeda
--'i:rIwhose occurredin America. And there is no shredof evidencethat Al Qaeda
:.::eviously has acquired or is about to acquire any nuclear,biological, or chemi-
,: i\- rvould cal weapons. In short, while bin Laden can launch terrorist strikes,
::. ,rn offen- and may do so again, the actual threat that Al Qaedaposesis crrcum-
=*. -rnd then scribed and manageable.Many other nations, including Israel, Ire-
:-.:clligence land, and Italy, have weatheredfar more seriousterrorist threatsover
.,:r .]t home, many years.
:: : -\ct, the Equally, neither Al Qaeda, nor its ideologicalcomrades,nor the
: :.-s inside Islamic right as a whole-nor, for that matrer, the entire Muslim
, :.: rhe FBI, world-present the kind of challengeto America'sglobal hegemony
=. L-.S.cities that the Soviet Union clearly did. No combination of Middle East
states,most of which are weak, impoverished,and wracked by inrer-
. : . t he w a r nal divisions,is able to mount a threat to rhe United Statesin a man-
:re Mi d d l e ner that would justify an enterprisecalled "'World \Var IV." But by
describingthe Islamist threat in such an exaggeratedway, the Bush
. r was not administration and its neoconservativeallies createda pretext for an
.. rr-nBro th - imperial expansion of the U.S. presencein the grearerMiddle East,
: rone mi l i - including Pakistan,Central Asia, and the easternMediterranean/Red
-'-:.rnLaden's Sea/IndianOcean region. It is fair to ask if the virtual U.S. occupation
-.: :ristential of the Middle East is related to goals other than anti-terrorism.Is it
: :::htl-vdisci- becauseneoconservatives want to anchor U.S. global hegemony by
:- ,:th loyal- planting the flag in that vital, but unstable region? Is ir becauseas
-.:r.rgedthe much as two-thirds of the world's oil is in SaudiArabia and Ira<r? Is it
 106 D rvrr' s Ger,rr

becausethe Bush administrationhas forged such intimate ties to Ariel

Sharonand the Israeliright?
The notion that Islamist terrorism is really the U.S. government's
target is contradicted by the targets of the Bush administration's
Middle East policy. \7hy, if the enemy is Islamist terrorism, did the
administration invest so much energy against lraq, Syria, and the
PLO? Both Syria'spresident,Bashir Assad, and the late chairman of
the PLO, Yasser Arafat, were implacable opponents of the Muslim
Brotherhood, but they found themselvesadded incongruouslyto the
list of Al Qaeda'sallies. By attacking lraq, the Bush administration
also found an inappropriate target. Sincecoming to power in t968,
SaddamHusseinwas a determinedenemyof the Islamists,from lran's
Ayatollah Khomeini to terrorist Shiite groups to Al Qaeda itself. The
Arab Baath SocialistPartS in both its Iraqi and Syrian branches,is
resolutelysecular,and the Bush administration'sefforts to link Iraq
to Al Qaeda were ridiculed by the CIA and the StateDepartment.In
fact, in invading lraq, PresidentBush made common causewith the
Islamic right: before,during, and after the invasion,the United States
supported the Iraqi National Congressexile coalition, in which two
Shiite fundamentalistparties, the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and the Islamic Call (Al-Dawa), played
prominent roles. Both SCIRI and Dawa had close ties to the Islamic
Republic of Iran, and after the war, both worked closelywith Ayatollah
Ali al-Sistani.
Not only did the Bush administration pick the wrong targets,but
its military-run war on terrorism is exactly the wrong way to reduce
the appeal of the Islamic right. Putting Al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, and
similar terrorist groups to one side, the far broader constellationof
right-wing Islamic groups, institutions, and political parties in the
Muslim world does in fact representa significantthreat-not to U.S.
national securitybut to governments,intellectuals,progressives,and
other freethinkersin the swath of nations from Morocco to Indone-
sia. From Algeria's FIS to Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood to the Pales-
tinian Hamas to Iraq's Shiite fundamentaliststo Pakistan'sIslamic
Group, togetherwith the support of ultra-orthodox \Tahhabi clerics
in Saudi Arabia, organizatronssuch as the Muslim \World League,and
 Clash of Ciuilizations? - 707

: : :> ro Ariel the Islamic banks, there is indeed a rhrear ro rhe Middle East. It is,
however,a threat that cannot be dealt with by military means.Indeed,
. :rnment'S it will get worse in preciseproporrion to the intrusivenessof the U.S.
-..:-
.:tration'S political, military, and economicpresencein the region. Only by rap-
'-::. did the idly withdrawing from Afghanistan and Iraq, by reducing America's
: r. lnd the overweeningpresencein Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and by reversing
j ---:.trman
of U.S. support for Israel'saggressiveopposition to Palestiniannational-
::.: -\Iuslim ism can the United Statesundercut the anger,frustration, and resent-
- ,:s1\-tothe ment that fuelslslamism.
::: r:llstration ReducingAmerica'sfootprint in the Middle Eastis the polar oppo-
,'.:: ill 1968, site of the Bush administration'spolicy, however.Cynically perhaps,
:. -:,lIn Iran'S the administration has wielded the idea of a broad struggle againsr
:.. :rself.The terrorism to pursue a policy aimed at redrawing the entire map of the
iS
::.1r1Ches, Middle East.The radical, or "idealist" neoconservatives, from admin-
: irnk Iraq istration officials to armchair strategistsat think tanks such as the
: .:.:tment.In American EnterpriseInstitute, the Hudson Instirute, and the project
i--:r.u-ith the for a New American Century, announcedthat the wars in Afghanistan
, :::c'd States and Iraq were just the first two salvosin a sweepingplan to seizecon-
: '.'.'hrchtwo trol of Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf srates.Even the more
: :-.c Islamic mainstream Bush administration officials, while eschewingsome of
,.'. .. . played the neoconservatives' visions,support the idea of a greaterU.S. mili-
:::e Islamic tary presencein the region from North Africa to Indonesia.
:r \vatollah Astute critics of the Bush administrarion's military-based anti-
terrorism policies and imperial pretensionshave argued that it is a
: :,1:gets, but strategyguaranteedto backfire,and one that seemsdesignedto create
. .:'. :o reduce more terroriststhan it kills. Anger againstthe occupationof Iraq and
.- i:had, and Afghanistan is likely to draw new jihadists inro battle in those rwo
:.r::ll.rtionof countries,and the conflict could spreadinto both Pakistanand Saudi
:- r::rasin the Arabia, where conservative,Islam-orientedgovernmentscould fall to
-:-.!)f to U.S. far more radical dissident groups associatedwith bin Laden, the
::-rSives,and mujahideen,the Taliban, and a \Tahhabi extremistunderground.
: :,r Indone- A secondprong of the Bush adminisrrarion'sMiddle East policy is
: , rhe Pales- likely to prove equally counterproductive,namely,its vauntedcall for
.:-,r's Islamic democraticreform.
,:. ^: bi clerics The administration'ssupport for democracy in the region is, on
: I cague,and the surfaceat least,a stunningabout-face.For years,especiallyduring
 3o8 . D pvtr' s Gaur,

the Cold'War, the United Statespropped up dictators, kings, emirs'

and presidents-for-lifein the Middle East and around the world. In
the Arab world-in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf-
many of theseautocratsruled in part by forging an alliancewith the
Islamic right, with the support of U.S. policy makers. Throughout
these years, opposition to the region's kleptocraciesand right-wing
regimescame exclusively from the left-from American liberals, from
the Europeanleft, from the SovietUnion. Certainly,the elimination of
dictatorshipsand the establishmentof fledgling democraciesin the
Arab world,Iran, Pakistan,Afghanistan,and Muslim Africa ought to
be a valued goal.
But the Bush administration's version of democratic reform is
suspect.
First, it is opportunistic. Much of the momentum for the Bush
administration'semphasison Arab democracy came only when the
'sfhite
zoo3 invasion of Iraq belied the House's stated objectivesin
launchingthe war: to find Saddam'sweaponsof massdestructionand
'When
to uncover Iraq's supposedties to Al Qaeda. those two ratio-
nalesproved to be fictional, PresidentBush shiftedto a new one-that
America'sraison de la guerrewas to bring democracyto Iraq.
Second,the Bush administration cynically distinguishesbetween
pro-American dictatorships in the Middle East and anti-American
ones,concentratingits pressurefor democracyon the latter. In the con-
text of the Bush administration'simperial Middle East policS its call
for imposing democracycan only be seenas a spearheadfor intensified
U.S.political and military involvementin the region.True democracies
in the oil-producing countrieswould pursue bold, nationalist initia-
tives that are almost guaranteedto run afoul of the Bush administra-
tion's long-range plans for the region. Only the naive believethat the
United States,in pursuing a "regime change" strategyin a part of the
world that contains two-thirds of the world's oil, desiresthe emer-
gence of governmentsthat might resist U.S. regional hegemony.Cer-
tainly, the Bush administration does not favor the developmentof
Arab or Iranian democraciesthat would forge closer ties with, say.
Russiaor China at American expense.Instead,its calls for democratic
change in the Middle East allow the Bush administration to apply
 Clash of Ciuilizations? . 7os

, - .: . 3IT)lf S, greater or less pressureselectivelyon governmentsin the region in

- . ."rid. In order to achieveparticular U.S. national securitygoals.
: - = GLrlf- Thus, Syriais now squeezedbetweenIsraeland U.S.-occupiedIraq,
: -: ',Lrhthe and Iran is positionedbetweenIraq and NATO-occupiedAfghanisran.
, -: ,-rqhout since zoor, the united stateshas achieveda position of unparalleled
: :.:lt-\\-ing supremacyin the region. The neoconservatives who argued success-
-: ,:-s.from fully for war in Iraq want norhing more than a calibratedAmerican
- : ,rrionof effort toward forcible regime change in Syria and Iran, in order to
:,.- :: in the createa block of new statesin combination with Israel, Turkey, and
: -,-.rughtto Pakistan-but organizedand managedunder U.S.tutelage.
And what about the pro-American autocraciessuch as SaudiAra-
: - :,form is bia, Jordan, and Egypt?To the exrenrthat PresidentBush extendshis
pressurefor imperial democracy beyond Iraq, Syria, Iran, and the
: : :i-reBush PLO to the pro-\Testern governmentsin the region, the effort must be
'.-,'hen
the taken with a grain of salt. Becauseit is comprised of constituencies
: ;crivesin with differing perspectives,the administration has senrmixed signals
::: -.-tionand in regard to its two most important Arab allies.Mainstream U.S. pol-
:: l i \ O f 1t iO -
icy makers, officials at the CIA and the State Department, and rheir
: ",. 'ne-that allies with vestedinterestsin the region-the oil companies,banks,
and defensecontractors-want the Bush administrationto go slow on
r - .. h e twe e n pressingCairo and Riyadh for change.Others,more ideological,seem
:. ': . - . \ me ri ca n to exhibit the messianicbelief that the experimenr in Iraq musr be
:, . t he co n - forcibly replicatedin both Egypt and Saudi Arabia. And someradical
': l
neoconservatives,
such as Richard Perleand Michael Ledeen,roughly
; -;)'. its call
: : :lrensified
lump Saudi Arabia with Syria and Iran as a supporter of Al eaeda
. : : : l l l O Cf aCieS
and demand that Riyadh be added ro the president'saxis,of-evilene-
:..riistinitia- mies' list. All of them overlook the fact that both Egypt and Saudi
. -..Jministra- Arabia have beenunder both internal and externalpressureto liberal-
.,. .'\'erhat the ize their regimesfor decades,and from rime to time both have experi-
:. .l f\.lrt of the mented, cautiouslS with democraticreform-only to pull back. The
r::: the emer- needfor delicacyin dealingwith theserwo counrriesoften escapesthe
.::il]ony. Cer- Bush administration'smore ideologicalpartisans.
:',:.opment Of But in the context of examining U.S. policy toward the Islamic right,
:::! \\'ith, Say, the twin casesof Egypt and Saudi Arabia are fraught with dangerous
: : Jemocratic possibilities.Pressingtoo hard for liberalizationin eithercounrry could
result in bringing the Islamic right to power in both Cairo and Riyadh.
-::.,'nto apply
 J IO D i v r r 's Ga,rtr:

As during the Cold 'War, however, when the United Statespre- ^+

ut l-
-. -
' -- -:

ferred Islamism to Arab nationalism,the Bush administration and its Isiar::: -:

neoconservativeallies have sometimesexpressedtheir preferencefor The i.,'.=,,
the Islamic right, too. If forced to choose betweenregimesin Egypt dtzzr::,:
and SaudiArabia led by left-leaningArab nationalistsor right-leaning plune.- :-
.
Islamists,Washingtonwill pick the Islamistseverytime. Despitetheir ^t
wr - :-:-
!11-

rhetoric about a clash of civilizations, the Bush administration has Cr eet - '. , -
not been averseto seekingallies among the Islamic right. In Iraq, the t oppl. J\ r
D . . 1 . , --.
Bush administration after the war found itself in a partnership with r 4Nl:,_t -

Ayatollah Sistani, two lranian-connectedparties, and the forces ol n'oric'. :::

organizedShiitefundamentalism. Leadingneoconservatives also sup- n----
ported the Shiite right elsewhere,including in Saudi Arabia, where Clint,-,:,:,
they went beyond calls for democraticreform to demand the breakup Ft -o . --

of Saudi Arabia and the creationof a Shiitestate in Saudi Arabia's had s.-:.:
easternprovince, where Shiitescomprisea majority. In Gaza and the thre.rrr-:--
West Bank, Ariel Sharoncontinued to toy with using Hamas, Islamic Bush :: :
Jihad, and Hezbollah to undercut the PLO, and in zoo5 Hamas tem J tr ::

emergedas the most powerful electoralforce in Gaza. It seemsthat Al Qa.:,

even those who issuethe most dire warnings about a titanic, Islam- with .: .=-
vs.-Christianitvstrugglereadily manageto find accommodationwith Had t:..' :
right-wing Islamists. the Isi.:: .
Still, for purposesof public relations,the Bush administrationhas o p e fd fi ::
"
beencontent to allow its Middle Eastpolicy to be portrayedas a clash hood a:; :
of civilizations.Someof its allies,especiallymembersof the Christian not har:
right, explicitly disparageIslam as an evil and violent religion. Pro- coheren: :,
claiming that Islamic fundamentalistsand bin Laden "hate our free- notion r:.=
doms," rather than U.S.policies,Bushhas framedthe war on terrorism gainedr:=.
in the starkestterms, as a showdown between a God-fearing America The L.>
and an "axis of evil." Despitethe paradoxesof the war on terror, it is think ra:.n
safeto say that millions of Americanshave beensold on the idea that $eflC€ 3r i::
the Christianand Muslim worlds must battleeachother to the end. hensir.ep
'What
happenedbetween r99r and 2oor to transform Islam from on a c( j * :
an ally to a malignant evil? Islamisrs. '
The easyansweris blame the shock that followed Al Qaeda'szoor U.S. pohc'.
attacks.But 9/r r was precededby a decadeof confusionin the United Cairo, Ar::
States.To follow the transition from the New World Order to the clash idea that c.
 Clashof Ciuilizations? J Il

::-:.icspre- of civilizations, it is necessaryto touch on rhe three crisesof political

: :t Jnd its Islam during the nineties: Algeria, Egypt, and the rise of the Taliban.
::::ancefof The twelve years from the first Iraq war to the secondwas a period of
:. :n Egypt dizzying change for the Middle East. In Algeria, the Islamic right
-- - - l.'-i -- plunged the counrry into a brutal civil war when it was deniedthe fruits
:::rfe their of an electoral victory in r99t.In Egypt, a terrorist underground, dis-
::,,.iionhas creetly supported by the Muslim Brotherhood establishmenr,nearly
.:-,Ir;rq,the toppled Mubarak in the mid-r99os. And then, in Afghanisran, rhe
:: .:llp With Pakistan-backedTaliban movement seized Kabul and imposed the
: : r lf Ce S Of world's strictesttheocracy.
.. -..isosup- During these crises, the administrations of George Bush and Bill
: r:-1.\vhere clinton failed to develop a coherent policy toward political Islam.
:.: :.feakUP Even though the Muslim Brotherhood and right-wing political Islam
: -\rabia's had seizedcontrol of Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sudan-and
.1ndthe
-.-:-.. threatenedAlgeria, Egypt, syria, and the PalestinianAuthority-neither
-. .r. Islamic Bush nor clinton graspedthe implications.The u.S. inteiligencesys-
:: i H a lnas tem and its vauntedcounterterrorismmachineryfirst missedthe rise of
-: -t l l S that Al Qaeda and then, when the organizationmade its presenceknown
: - .- . I s i a m- with a seriesof spectacularattacksin the late r99os, failed to stop it.
:: .: t ()11Wi th Had they responded differently, had they realized the significanceof
the Islamist movement then, and had U.s. intelligenceanalystsand
:: : , . . t iOnh a S operativesmore carefully tracked the violent offshoots of the Brother-
: .,.i i1 clash hood and the Taliban, perhapsthe eventsof zoor and beyond would
:: t . hr is ti a n not have occurred. certainly had the united States mapped out a
.. : 1()n.Pro - coherent policy toward Islamism during the r99os, the dangerous
: : ,)Lr rfre e - notion that America is facing a clash of civilizations would never have
:l :r'rrorism gainedtraction.
r: . \ me ri ca The U.S. government,academia,and the world of policy-oriented
.. -.; L L--^
Lrlr -
:* :^
lL l) think tanks were divided over how to respond to the Islamic resur-
-: r rleath a t genceat the end of the cold 'war. some wanted to developa compre-
: : : . - end . hensivepolicy toward Islamism, others demandedthat it be treated
i. - . r m fro m on a country-by-country basis. some wanted to confront the
Islamists,others to co-opt or placatethem. pragmatistsbelievedthat
,'- :it 's z o o r u.s. policy ought to stick with support for the existing regimes in
I : r e un i te d Cairo, Amman, Algiers, and elsewhere,but idealists supported the
: , the clash idea that democracyhad to flower in the region, even if the Islamists
 3 tz Dsvrr-' s GnnE

were positioned to win elections.In the decade between t99t and

Algeria
zoor, U.S. policy toward the Islamic right was confusedand contra-
'S7hen
dictory. not ignoring it, everyoneagreedthat Islamistterrorism The 199:-*-
was bad, but that's where the agreementstopped.The end of the U.S.- revierr,'or L >
Sovietstrugglein the Middle East left the United Statesfacing a region tion. And. :-
in which political Islam was a major player.The Islamic right covered pulled rhi. .'
a spectrum from the conservativeIslamist regimes in Pakistan and Parisanci.,..
Saudi Arabia, to the radical regimes in Iran and Sudan, to extra- AlgerianI:..:
governmental organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the interestsir, \
Taliban and Hezbollah, to radical-right terrorist cells such as Al The co:-_:
Qaeda. Somewere allies, some were vaguely threatening,some dan- choose be:-.,.
gerouslyhostile.But how to tell friend from foe? -,
advantag- .:. -
that then >--.:
tory. The :....
THnrE CRTsES rN THE r99os directh'-r:
-.:.
in any casc,i _
During the r99os, the United Statesdealt uncertainly with flare-ups port for -\..::
by the Islamic right, first in Algeria, then in Egypt, and finally, once radicallsl.r:,_
again, in Afghanistan. In all three cases,the Islamistswere able to Washingto:--
draw on battle-hardenedveterans of the U.S.-sponsoredAfghan ated the ar:-.',
jihad, who applied the skills acquired in that war-including bomb- h"ppy our. :,
making, assassinations,
and guerrilla-styleattacks-in their struggle. regime ani :.-
As the SovietUnion melted away, the Islamic right beganto emerge consequenaa
as a threat to stability, securitg and U.S. interests."One year after Mus- catastroph:;.
lim rebels ousted the communist government in Afghanistan, the long The usu,r ',
Afghanistan war reverberatesthroughout the Islamic world, as veter- establishmc: :
ans of the conflict take up arms to try to topple governmentsin Algeria, abbreviarit,:,. :
Egypt, and other Arab countries," the New York Times reported in local electr..,:,
t993. "Vestern diplomats and Arab officialssay thousandsof Islamic the Nation,,- -
militants engagingin clandestine,violent campaignsto overthrow gov- seatsto thc : _l
ernments in Algeria, Egypt, Yemen,Tunisia, Jordan, Turkey and other before the Fi>
predominantly Muslim states currently use Afghanistan as a base."1 arrestingr:. : :
Imbued with a new consciousnessand the belief that their insurgency FIS unleashs-_
had defeateda superpower in Afghanistan, the Islamic right tested the assassinate;.::.
limits of its newfound power. cials and p, -:
 Clash of Ciuilizations? J 1.3

:: c r and
Algeria
:i ;ontra -
: : . r rOri Sm The t99z-99 crisis in Algeria triggered the first government-wide
:: he U . S. - review of u.S. policy roward political Islam sincethe Iranian revolu-
'-: I region tion. And, during rhe seven-yearcivil war in Algeria, u.s. policy was
--.:.overed pulled this way and that by contradictory views-amid chargesin
{. :f an a n d Parisand elsewherein Europe that $Tashingtonwas cozying up to the
, :o extra- Algerian Islamistsin order to advanceits own oil, gas, and industrial
' : O o d, th e interestsin North Africa, at Europe'sexpense.
-: ; h as Al The conundrum for the united Statesin Argeria was having to
i, t me d a n - choose between an Islamist insurgencythat had gained an electoral
advantageand an entrenched,military-dominated but secularregime
that then suspendeddemocracyin order to block the Islamists'vic-
tory. The issue was not whether the united states should inrervene
directly-neither side in Algeria wanred that, and it was impractical
in any case.But'vTashingtonhad to choosebetweenaffirming its sup-
: ilare-ups port for Algeria's experiment in democracS thus aligning it with a
::llr', once radical Islamist movemenr,or siding with the Algerian army. Though
r:: able to rJTashingtonlooked for a middle ground, in the
end, correctly, it toler-
=; Afghan ated the army's suppressionof the Islamists.It was not an entirely
:::q bomb- hnppy ourcome. Yet had the united states condemnedthe Algerian
:: struggle. regime and thrown its diplomatic support ro the Islamic right, the
: :o emerge consequences-in Algeria, and across the region-could have been
ifter Mus- catastrophic.
r. the long The usual version of the Algerian crisis srarts in r9g9, with the
a. as veter- establishmentof the Islamic Salvation Front, known by its French
, in Algeria, abbreviation,FIS. In June r99o, the FIS won a resoundingvictory in
:.ported in local elections.Then, in December r99r, FIS stunnedthe ruling party,
s of Islamic the National Liberation Front (FLN), winning rrg parliamenrary
::'rrow gov- seatsto the FLN's r6. But before the secondround of the vote, and
'' :nd other before the FIS took power, the army intervened to annul the vote,
s a base."l arresting ro,ooo FIS membersand supporters.Denied its victory, the
lnsurgency FIS unleasheda campaign of terrorism. The presidentof Algeria was
r: restedthe assassinated,ministrieswere bombed, and hundreds of security offi-
cials and policemen were killed by FIS gunmen. civil war began.
 . D n v r l 's Gelrr
3r 4

During the decade,a second organization called the Armed Islamic Tl ., - - -

Group (GIA) emerged,with a murky relationshipto FIS. As the vio- p o i :. :- :

the :-.. , :
lenceintensified,Islamistvigilantesand shadowy paramilitary groups
,.,....
!d1r .-
carried out a campaign of horrifying slaughter,decimating villages,
saf \ ' : : -
massacringwomen and children.Tensof thousandsdied.2
t he: . . - -
But the FIS did not emergesuddenlyin 1989. As happenedin Pak-
istan, Egypt, Syria, Sudan, and Afghanistan during the Cold \Var, the I I an'. . - . .
Islamic right built its power by battling the left and Algerian national- LULL L1 1L_i

ists, especiallyon campuses.As in Afghanistan, where "the profes- Tunisi.r ,.-':

sors" tied to Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood built a secret society of Algeria r'.
Islamistsin Kabul in the r96os and r97os, in Algeria a host of profes- arm\-'s.1a: :
sors and teachersfrom Egypt, many of whom were membersof the endorse::.,
Muslim Brotherhood and who had studied in Saudi Arabia's Islamic FiS and :::. .,
universities,were imported to teachArabic to the francophoneAlgeri- For r::. !
ans. Mohammed al-Ghazali and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, rwo of Egypt's Order.1r'.'.::
leadingIslamic scholarswho had fled to the Gulf, and who "were fel- uneas\'.1 :. _.
low travelersof the Muslim Brothersand very much in favor with the officiallr .,.:
oil monarchiesfand who encouraged]the 'Islamic awakening' at work" Ie p Oft cJ..:*
in Algeria in the mid-r98os.3 Throughout the 198os, this cadre of position.-,:.:
Islamic-rightactivistscarried out a seriesof terrorist attacks against policr ot ;..-
the Algerian government.Many of the terrorisrsinvolved had beento recognizc.!. ..1.
Afghanistan,or traveledback and forth to the jihad, and one of them, racy."- 8..: -
Abdallah Anas, joined forces with bin Laden and Azzam in the pre-Al contact\\'t:'-:
Qaeda "ServicesBureau." \7hen Azzamwas assassinated, Anas took Accor; :..
over. ior offici.r, .:
By the time the FIS was created,it had seizedcontrol of thousands about rh. i -.
of mosquesacrossthe country and built a political-religiousmachine. the immc;--.:-
Like the Taliban,whereverFIScontrolled municipal or provincial gov- result, \\ c .;.:
ernmentsit instituted its version of Islamic cultural restrictions,forc- later,rve r.-, .:,
ing women to wear the veil, closingliquor and video stores,and often The Br.-
persecutingthosewho did not go along. The FIS denouncedAlgeria's Islamistci:.. =
educated,secular middle classesand announced its intent to "ban hodgepo.i:..,
France from Algeria intellectually and ideologically."4One monrh phenomen,: ,
before the December election that catapulted the FIS to victory, in cians, top ,.::
November r99r, a supposedlyindependentor renegadeband of Alge- utterly ign, :,. ,
ria's Islamistsshockedthe country with an outrageousact of terror: rents had ,:,.=
 Clasb of Ciuilizations? )r 5

Their first spectacular

operationwas a bloodyassaulton a frontrer
post,in the courseof which a group of "Afghan" veteranscut off
the headsof somewretchedarmy conscripts. . . . The date was
carefullychosento celebratewithin four daysthe secondanniver-
saryof the martyrdomof Abdullah Azzamin peshawar. It marked
the beginningof a jihad on Algeriansoil.5
- , , n .t-
r ,1N-
-

-.,. the Many Algerians feared that an Islamisr governmentwould insti-

-.:.
- ": r.rl- tute a reign of terror. Arab governments,including Egypt, Jordan,
:
_- ;-
lc5- Tunisia and Morocco, were alarmed, fearing that an Islamist-run
-::i Of Algeria would be infectious.And for the united Srares,the Algerian
: ::, ,fes- army's action posed a delicatepolitical problem: would \fashington
::' - the endorsethe army's suppressionof the election results,or defend the
-.-.;.- FIS and the Islamic right?
- - . --ilrirL

:' ...*cri- For the Bush adminisrration, preoccupied with the New \forld
- _I -i n t ' q
- r' "
order, it was a puzzle. Bush and secretary of StateJames Baker were
- ' .:r' fel- uneasyabout the prospectof Islamismin Algeria,and they sidedsemi-
',:hthe officially with the Algerian army, adopting a position that a Senate
,.:','..lrk" report called "somethingof a wink and a nod."6 Baker,explaininghis
-..-ireof position later, said: "\7hen I was at the StateDepartment, we pursued a
- ..-:.rinst policy of excluding the radical fundamentalistsin Algeria even as we
: :'-anto recognizedthat this was somewhatat odds with our support of democ-
: - -L- ---
,iLflll! racy."7But many other U.S. officials, including CIA officers who had
:: : f e-Al contactwith the FIS,did nor agreewith the Bush-Bakerpolicy.
:.- -t. took According to Robert Pelletreau,a former u.S. ambassadorand sen-
ior official at the state Department, there was serious disagreement
r ,rsands about the Bush-Bakerpolicy of blocking the Islamistsin Algeria. "In
::-.:chine. the immediateaftermathof the military's decisionto block the election
:,,- rl gov- result, we were very critical," says Pelletreau.,,Twenty-four hours
:-.. forc- later,we reversedourselves,and took a much more nuancedview"8
-:.:.i often The Bush administration,uncerrain about how to deal with the
:.\iEeria's Islamist challengein Algiers, undertook a policy review. But it was a
: :(r "ban hodgepodge,an effort to forge a consensusabout how to deal with a
:. mOnth phenomenonlittle understoodevenby expertsand about which politi-
,: - t o rl r, ln cians, top administration officials, and members of congress were
: ,'f Alge- utterly ignorant. Battle lines had nor yet hardened,but at leasttwo cur-
: ;ffOf : rents had already started to emerge. one was an accommodationist
 1r 6 D nvrl ' s Geun

point of vieq whose adherentsargued that the United Stateshad noth- i . ---
lii- g_

ing to fear from the Islamic right and that U.S. diplomats and CIA offi- j
--- -

cials ought to begin a worldwide effort to open conracts with the

Islamistswho were willing, for the sakeof dialogue,to eschewviolence. r a ta '.. ::
A second (still nascent) point of view was rhe clash-of-civilizations \\--.-_.
school,which believedthat the Muslim world was unalterably and fun- .l n a :- 1 a
damentally hostile to the 'West.According to them, the enemy of the ). 1 i : -! .

United Stateswas not just Al Qaeda, and not even right-wing political I-
l_- --

Islam, but the very nature of the Muslim faith, the Koran, and Islamic bu:.:
civilization as it had evolved over thirteen centuries.Throughout the th c
-
r99os, thesetwo schoolswould gain momentum and confront each Isir:r
other. Two leading academicswould come to represenrthe two sides:
for the accommodationists,John Esposito of Georgetown University;
and for the clash of civilizations,Bernard Lewis of PrincetonUniversity. for :
In t992, a decisionwas taken to haveEdward Djerejian,then assis- forc.
tant secretary of state for Near East affairs, spearheadthe effort to ture.
invent a policy toward Islam, and he was chosento delivera speechin
Junet992, at Meridian House in'STashington. "The StateDepartment -\,--
came to me and said, '\X/eneed an Islam policy,"' saysDavid Mack, n,

then Djerejian's deputy. According to Mack, rhe speech was parrly l: . :

r.
designedto counter administration officials who were starting to argue
t._
that the United Statesshould treat Islam as a new global enemy."Some
c.:.::
of the folks, especiallyRichard Schifter of the bureau of human rights,
Sc; i
were sayingthat Islam was dangerous,and of coursethis was the time e:---: -
when the thesisof the clash of civilizationswas starting to surface," tt-:

says Mack. "'Well, we prerty much managed to head it off. 'We had
a big, in-house conference,with people from [Near East affairs],
[the Bureau of Intelligenceand Research],human rights, and a lot
of outside experts on Islam. And I drafted a speechfor Djerejian.
\7e brought it to Jim Baker, who said, 'Okay, fine, if you want to
do this."'e
Schifter,the assistantsecretaryof statefor human rights, saysthat
he adheresto JeanneKirkpatrick's distinction between "authorirar-
ian" and "totalitarian" regimes.In the Algerian crisis,he saysthat he
supportedthe view that the United Staresought to back the Algerian
army's suppressionof the Islamists.But for Schifter,and for many
 Clash of Ciuilizations! . z L7

:. -:* : lt lt h- hard-liners and neoconservatives,the issue was much larger than

!-- . t t lf f i- Algeria. "what I saw was the developmentof a movement similar to
:-- ' ::: i h e communism," he says. "It's the third totalitarian attack on democ-
racy, after fascismand communism."l0 According to Mack, schifter
. - : . : iolls wanted a much rougher line in the speechthan was adopted. ,,schifter
___: ;.,-
: u lu ll- and the bureau of human rights felt it was a soft-mindedapproach,"
-

)f the saysMack.11
. -: : .rtrcal In the end, Djerejian'sspeechlaid down some rmporrant markers,
. , - : , : l: m i C but it also avoided crucial quesrions.Djerejian rejectedout of hand
' - : - . L1 rth e the clash-of-civilizationsidea. "The u.s. government does not view
- '- : t : e a ch Islam as the new 'ism' confronting the \7est or threatening world
-: : . ', r:i d e S: peace,"he said. "The Cold $Varis not beingreplacedwith a new com_
petition between Islam and the west. The crusades have been over
- ::t" for a long time. Americans recognizeIslam as a historic civilizing
:-t
-rsi ty. force among the many that have influenced and enriched our cul-
-1\\l)-

l-: :l l () f t tO ture." But he went further:

- , i::ech in
-::,lrtment Much attentionis beingpaid to a phenomenonvariouslylabeled
_ . * \lack, politicalIslam,the Islamicrevival,or Islamicfundamentalism. ...
In countriesthroughout the Middle East and North Africa, we
. ' .'-: paftly
thus seegroups or movementsseekingto reform their societiesin
: -.:,rargue
keepingwith Islamicideals.. . . !7e detectno monolithic or coor-
--'-".. "Some
dinatedinternationaleffort behindrhesemovements.lfhat we do
- -.- .: -l :Lg
- LllL5
-- r
- see are believersliving in different countriesplacing renewed
',' :- : he tl me emphasison Islamicprinciplesand governments accommodaring
- r
-i rf ilCe r" Islamistpolitical activity to varying degreesand in differentways.
:: \\ e had
I : rtf rirql Djerejian wenr on to add that the united Stateswanred free elections
--

:: . -: : d a IOt and enhancedcivil rights in the region, but said, in an obvious refer-
: . )rer e i i a n . enceto the crisis in Algeria: "\7e are suspectof thosewho would use
', the democraticprocessto come to power, only to destroy that very
-: \\'ant to
processin order to rerain power and political dominance.,'And he
:.: : . > a l| S that said that the United Stateswas opposedto those who engagein vio-
-..- lence,repression,or "religious and political confrontation."l2
--:horitar-
: .....s that he In other forums, Djerejian spoke favorably, but vaguely, about
- - - . \ l- o "i . - "moderate Islamists," although he failed to definewhat he meant by
1 : l( lr ma n y "moderate."l3 \fhile Djerejian condemnedterrorism and noted that
 _lr 8 D rvrr' s Gaur

the United Stateshas good relationswith countries"whose systemsof Islanr:.:.

governmentare firmly grounded in Islamic principles," such as Saudi po\r.c:i '
Arabia and Pakistan, he completely avoided any discussionof the and \:::,
Islamic right itself and its manifestations."Unfortunately," Gerges menrs-,, i
wrote, "the Meridian addressdid not clarify the Bush administra- aid. cr .:.
tion's approachtoward thosevery Islamistgroups." pable. ",:
If Djerejian's speech failed as an ourline of American policy Islamr.::
toward political Islam, it worked well as a more particular response are lrk. .
to events in Algeria, where the United States tacitly supported the rornts. 1.-
army's suspensionof democracy.But the situation went from bad to Otner. :
worse, as Algeria was engulfedin a cycleof violent attacksand coun- tOf l Il \' . : l l
terattackspitting the army againstbattle-hardenedjihad veterans. with rh. -
In r993, the Clinton administration tried to encouragea dialogue Arabia :
betweenthe Algerian authoritiesand elementsof the Islamist opposi- years.
'Western
tion. But Europe, particularly France, accusedthe United U.S.Ar:.
Statesof using its dialogue with the Algerian Islamists to securea To F.-
political and commercial advantagein Algeria in the wake of what and ont ::
many expectedwould be an Islamic revolution. "The Frenchattacked vier\,s v.
American motives for meetingwith Islamists,suspectingthe U.S. gov- -:
But ma:.'.
ernment of favoring the FIS over rhe Algerian regime," accordingto r n 196. . , ',
Gerges,who reports that CharlesPasqua,the Frenchinterior minister, f r ee- m . r : . : :
accused\Tashingtonof harboring "fundamentalistterrorists."laThat grand p,
was a referenceto Anwar Haddam, the FIS representativein Wash- head or -
ington, who maintained on-and-off contactswith U.S. officialsin the like-n':..:-
early r99os. "The French wanted us to expel the FIS guy here," says
Pelletreau,who servedunder Clinton as assistantsecretaryof statefor
Near East affairs. "But,we neverhad any callto expel him."15 Egypt
The loudest voice calling for a reconciliation with Algeria's On the h.=
Islamistswas none other than Graham Fuller,the former CIA analyst emerged_:
who had worked with Casey to build a justification for the ry84-86 adminrsr:,,
Iran-contra approach to Teheran.Then ensconcedat the RAND Cor- hood, ab,,-
pcrration, Fuller wrote a book entitled Algeria: The Next Fundamen- U.S.poli.'.
talist State?In it, he virtually endorsedFIS as Algeria'snext rulers and force thai i
urged the United Statesnot to worry. "The FIS is unlikely to presenta Algeria. ri.-
massivechallengeto U.S. and'Westerninterests,"wrote Fuller. "Is the Egypt u a,
United Stateswilling to inaugurate democratic processesin which the In the r .,
 Clash of Ciuilizations? . 1re

,: -\ l)l Islamistsstand a very good chance of gaining a significant voice in

. -:udi power?"15Fuller admitted that FIS would suppresswomen's rights
: the and spread the gospel abroad, "emboldening other Islamist move-
r.:geS ments in Egypt, Tunisia,Libya, and Morocco [with] asylum,financial
- .-->ird- aid, evenweapons."17But he argued that its momentum was unstop-
pable. "Ir will be very difficult, if not almosr impossible, ro srop
: , 1t cv Islamistforces," said Fuller. "Islamist governmentsin the Middle East
: : lt lIlS e are likely to multiply in the years ahead, taking numerous different
:: : t he forms. They, and the'west, are going to have to learn to live with each
:,.-i to other."18Fuller arguedthat FIS "is likely to welcomeu.s. private sec-
: - 'lun- tor investmentin Algeria and to undertakeclosecommercialrelations
j. '\
with the united srares.. . . The FIS has long had good ties with saudi
' .:. i l g u e Arabia and received a great deal of Saudi funding until recent
,: : o s l - years'"1eFuller's monograph was written for and sponsoredbv the
- : ir ed U.S. Army.
To Fuller, the FIS movement in Algeria was a grand experiment,
. : ri'ha t and one that the united Statesought not to turn away from-and his
:: , t . k ed views were certainly influential during the clinton administration.
.) . gov- But many Algerians,especiallyveteransof the revolution that ended
-' -o fn in 1962, were not so ready to abandon secularismand socialismfor
:. : . ist er, free-marketIslamism. "It's fine for others to talk about conducting a
' -
T ha t grand political experimenrin Algeria," said Maloud Brahimi, former
- \\'ash- head of Algeria's League of Human Rights. .,Bur what do we look
-) "1 t he like-white rats?"20
:. SaYS

i : l: i fo r
EgvPt
on the heelsof the Algerian explosion,a dire Islamistthreat to Egypt
emerged in the rggos, creating another dilemma for the clinton
'was
administration. Egypt, the original home of the Muslim Brother-
hood, about to fall to an Islamist revolution?And if so, what should
U.S. policy be? The Bush administration'st99z review,and the task
force that Djerejian creared,did not provide much guidance.unlike
Algeria, which after all was on the periphery of the Middle East,
Egypt was its very hearr-and PresidentMubarak a staunchally.
In the r99os, Egyptian Islamistswaged an assaulton the Egyptian
 . D n v r r 's GevB
3z o

regime strong enough to threatenthe country's stability.Hundreds of \ \ ' l-_ _--

people were killed by armed militants, including military and police Anc::..
officers,governmentofficials,and leading Egyptian writers and intel- dip- :: :
lectuals.Despite heavy repressionafter the death of Sadat in r98r, thr :r-
and periodic crackdowns in the r9Sos, the Brotherhood had made
steadygains,especiallyin civil society.The organizationwon control Ar nr.: .
of many of Egypt'sprofessionalassociations-doctors, lawyers,engi- Bror:
-::
neers,and, of course, student groups, its traditional stronghold. In co l t.]:r '.::
r99j, the Sunday Times of London reported that the CIA issued a rr
f , :

National IntelligenceEstimatewarning that "Islamic fundamentalist Egrp: ..

terrorists will continue to make gains across Egypt, leading to the \\' :tr. .1:-:

eventualcollapseof the Mubarak government."2l )LlCl-:-.-

James'Woolseywas the CIA director at the time. "'Wewere very wor- r9E:. .:
ried, and as I rememberwe offered Egypt whatever assistancewe could llzcu
-;--i --
.--:

reasonablyprovide," he says."Generally speaking,therewas a substan- t he I . , - : :

tial amount of support in the U.S. government,certainly in the intelli- St at c. . :
gencecommunity, for Mubarak doing whatever he had to do to prevent t ionl. - - :
an Islamist takeover."22The United Statesprovided security assistance in G c: . : ',
to Egypt'spolice and intelligenceservice."In Egypt we'd trained a Spe- blind . . - =
cial Operationsgroup among the Egyptian authorities,with the help of '. i
on t h.
the CIA," saysEdward \J7.\falker, the U.S. ambassadorftom 1994 to I slanr .
-
1997. "They were usedin cleaningup a few of thesecells."23 t hesc: - . =
The truth, however,is that even though the United Statescooper- "\ '_ -
ated with Egypt to a degreein combating Islamist terrorism in Egypt, For' -.
"b.' i .. -.

that cooperation was far lessthan it ought to have been, for several Cenre:.:
reasons.First, within the U.S. government, there was a persistent
belief that the Muslim Brotherhood was a potentially useful partner Or
in efforts to bring democracyto Egypt, and throughout the r99os that ha',
belief undercut U.S. assistanceto Egypt's security and intelligence St : : .
agencies.Second, the Mubarak regime's often very heavy-handed dc: :
\\r;
repressionof its opponents,including arrestsof all manner of dissi-
dr-r::-
dentsand the use of torture againstprisoners,made the United States
[() _.:
skittish about helping Cairo. Both'Woolsey and'Walker say that the
fin.::-
United Stateshad strong reservationsabout the harshnessof Egyptian
"l

methods. "They were very aggressive,more aggressivethan we were St a: .

willing to support. Some of the people they seizedwere found shot dlL
-:
 Clash of Ciuilizatictns? \zI

:-r-.rdreds of with their hands tied," says'walker."\7e had to stop the program.,,2a
-. .:rd police And third, there was sharp disagreementamong u.s. intelligenceand
.:.:nd intel- diplomatic officials about the narure of the Brotherhood itself: rfas
:.1 : l n rg8r, the organization cooperating with the radical, openly terrorist sub-
: r.rd made groups like Al Gamaa or Islamic Jihad, whose leaders included
',,.,t control Ayman al-zawahiri, osama bin Laden's future chief aide? or was the
: ,..-. engi- Brotherhood a moderate,even establishmentgroup whose rhetorical
-rs, In
- ..qhold. commitment to democracycould be relied upon?
--r rssueda For Mubarak, at least, the answer was provided by Algeria. The
::.'-inentalist Egyptian leaderwatched in horror as that country plunged into civil
'i:.:rg to the war, and he vowed not to allow the Islamistsin Egypt to gain enough
strengthro mounr a frontal challengeto his regime.Beginningin the
: :- \'e f\ - WO f - r98os and continuingthrough septemberrr, zoor, Mubarak criti-
,- a: r\'eCOUId cized the united Statesrepeatedlyfor its failure to take acrion against
, ,.. -: .ubstan- the Islamic right in its basesin western Europe and in the united
: ::e intelli- states itself. Those included overt Muslim Brotherhood organiza-
: :,r prevent tional units in London and GermanS Said Ramadan'sIslamic center
*: .issistance in Geneva,New York-New Jerseycellssuch as the one affiliatedwith
'-- "=,'] (ne-
a
blind sheikh omar Abdul Rahman, the ringleaderof the r993 attack
: ::: helpof on the world Trade center, and other U.S.-basedcells,mosques,and
:: :r r 994 tO Islamic centers.Until zoor, no concertedu.S. effort to investigate
thesenetworks was undertaken.
:':: : . i O O P ef - "Neither Europe nor the United Stareswere cooperatlng wlth
.'-- r F ovnt Egypt, not unril 9/tr," says Abdel Moneim Said of the Al Ahram
:. : , : several Center in Cairo:
,:: : rsl s t ent

' _ _' _ n.1

I
rf n er omar Abdel Rahman was being harbored in the united states,
- =; - e;CS t hdt having escapedin between trials and going t. Sudan. The united
- - - - lli ---- - States was not cooperating. They'd say to Lls, ,,you are not a
: , -,'.'.-h:rnded democracy,you are not making reforms.', So they were creating a
worldwide terrorist network, and we were practically on our own
:. ::: of dissi-
during this period. !7e wanted the United statesro give theseguys
-. :ed States to us, to sabotagetheir propaganda networks, to sabotagetheir
: -.,'. that the
financial networks, to disturb their connection with the trouble
:: : Egvptian
spots in Afghanistan. \we tried several times to get the United
:-.:.:l\\-ewere states involved, first in r986, when president Mubarak called for
': : rund shot an international conferenceon terrorism, announcing it at a meeting
 )zz D pvrr' s Gar.rs

'We
of the Europeanparliamentin Strasbourg. knew a lot by then:
that the internationalcentersfor this movementwere in London,
New Jersey,Frankfurt,with other centersin Hamburg, Geneva,
Copenhagen. They werenot at all sensitiveto this in Europein the
r9Sosand r99os.25

The two U.S. ambassadorsto Egypt during this period had con-
'$falker,who served
flicting views about the Muslim Brotherhood.
from l994 to 1997, was skeptical of the Muslim Brotherhood and
mostly sympatheticto Mubarak's crackdown. Pelletreau'who served
in Cairo from t99l to 1993, was more apt to seethe Brotherhood in
a favorable light-even il it attracted the attention of Egypt's intel-
ligence service. "Ned [\Talker] and I had different policies," says
Pelletreau."I felt we had to be talking to members of the Muslim
Brotherhood. I did [talk to them]." Pelletreau'scontacts with the
Brotherhood angered Mubarak. "At one point I received a very
strong messagefrom the [Egyptian] government, demanding that I
break off those contacts.I said that I would not. I didn't meet with
them myself, but people from the political sectiondid' \7e developed
people as contactswho were inside the movement. But in Egypt you
have to be very careful, becausethe Egyptianshave a very' very effec-
tive counterintelligencecapability."26
T
Pelletreaurecallsa visit to Washington by Mubarak in which the l>

Egyptian presidentlost his temper over U.S. inaction:

Soonafterward,Mubarak cameto Washington,and the secretary

of stateinvitedhim to lunch.'WarrenChristopheraskedMubarak
I'll neverforgetwhat
aboutthe bestway to dealwith the Islamists.
happenednext. Mubarak sat up sharply,rigidly. "This is not a -f
:-.- ^

new phenomenonin Egypt,"he said,gettingangry."Thesepeople t -, ^ -

killed my predecessor!"Then he raised this huge fist, and he
l:l:*
slammedit down on the table hard, and everythingon the table ":
.; -..-,
jumpedand rattled.Bang!"'Whenthey comeout, we haveto hit tr-
- :

them!"27 iit- -!--

tr,-.-.-
But Pelletreausays: "I told Mubarak that it was the right policy to g()l-' -.

crack down on terrorists, but not on the Muslim Brotherhood." The

 Clash of Ciuilizations? . 1;-1

questionof how to rell the differencewas somethingthat u.s. intelli-

gencecould not answer,accordingto U.S. diplomats and intelligence
officers.The line betweenthe overtly terrorist organizationsand the
more establishmentMuslim Brotherhood was not a clear one. The
Brotherhood ran clinics, social welfare centers,and mosques,had a
rtr-
powerful presenceamong professionalgroups, and set up a semi-
-.
. ,, .,1 official political parry.
According to Pelletreauand'walker, the link berweenthe official
-..nd
' -:
Muslim Brotherhood and the underground terrorisr cells was prob-
- rl
:in ably organizedthrough independentmosquesand Islamic cenrersin
. _--l
l-
Egypt run by "emirs." They apparently maintained a membershipin
- .f

> --iVS
the Brotherhood,which was a secretsociety,while giving encourage-
i.tIn ment, support, and theological justification to the terrorists. "The
-
Egyptiansclaimed that they discoveredsome links, and I guessyou
could say that the whole line became blurred between the Muslim
- - -1- .L T
I
Brotherhood and the armed groups," sayspelletreau."A lot of inde-
'.,,rrh pendent emirs start popping up here and there, in various parts of
cairo, and some of the clerics develop a group of folrowers. They
l.d
: -. rltl
don't usually engagein acts of violencethemselves,but they can con-
....-
:--l !-
done violence.Say,someonewill come to them and say,'Is it permit-
ted to do such and such?' and they will say, ,yes, according to
Islam.'"
walker, who followed Pelletreau,had a somewhatdifferentview.
"\fe'd realized it was a much bigger problem,', he says. ,,'Wewere
very closeto the Europeansin cooperatingto roll up thesethreats.'we
createdflow charts of how thesegroups inreractedwith eachother. A
lot of the leaderswere in placeslike Italy and London, and we'd coop-
erate by interceptingcommunicationsback into Egypt, and then the
Egyptianswould roll them up." But,'Walker says,Egypt was not sat_
isfiedwith U.S. and Europeancooperation."I can't count the number
of times that Mubarak yelled ar me about how the British were giving
the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamistssafehaven,,,he says.,.In
Egypt, everybody seemedto see it as a problem, but they couldn't
:-'. t o convinceus."28
-- T1
lne Like Pelletreau,'Walker
maintaineda relationshipwith the Muslim
 J z4 D pvi t-'s GatvtE

,,when I was there in Egypt we engagedwith members

Brotherhood.
of the Muslim Brotherhood, as individuals, on the level of the
embassypolitical counselor.But it was an illegal organization, so it
was sensitive.The Muslim Brotherhood was more acquiescentthan
someof the other groups,such as IslamicJihad. The Muslim Brother-
hood had a lot of sympathy from some people in Washington, who
held it should be accommodated,"he says."For many of those who
support bringing democracyto the region, the Muslim Brotherhood
'Walker,
was seen as a legitimate domestic opposition force." and
someCIA officers,didn't agree."Terrorism had two sources.One was
the Palestinians,and one, the Muslim Brotherhood. They had a
checkeredhistory. One day you're friends, and then they try to assas-
sinateyou," \Talker says."Our intelligencepeople saw it as a kind of
international fraternity of terrorists. Some specific mosques were
involved. It is not a coherentorganizationalstructure.But if someone
comesalong, they help them."2e
Mubarak repeatedly slammed the United States in public, too,
attempt against
especiallyafter the Islamistsmounted an assassination
him in rgg5, murdered severalEgyptian governmentofficialsabroad,
and bombed Egypt'sembassies. To Americanswho urged him to coop-
erate with moderate Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood'
,,'who are the moderates?" he said.
Mubarak dripped with scorn.
.,Nobody has succeededin defining them for me." He ridiculed the

effectiveness of dialoguewith the Islamists."Dialogue with whom? It

'We
will be the dialogueof the deaf. had a dialoguewith them for four-
teen years, and every time we engagedthem, they became stronger.
Dialogue is old-fashioned.The ones who are asking for dialogue do
not know [Islamists].'Weknow them better."30
The shadow of Iran's .-979revolution haunted Mubarak. Again
and again, he accusedthe United Statesof conducting secrettalks
with the Brotherhood. "You think you can cofrect the mistakesthat
you made in Iran, where you had no contact with the Ayatollah
Khomeini and his fanatic groups beforethey seizedpower)" Mubarak
..But, I can assureyou, these groups will never take over this
said.
country, and they will never be on good terms with the United
States."31To a large extent, Mubarak was right that many U.S. offi-
 Clash ofCiuilizations? . 32s

,.:r embers cials expectedthat the Islamistswould seizeconrrol of Egypt, and so

"-l of the they sought an insidetrack with the Islamic right. Foreshadowingthe
:::0n, so it neoconservativedreamsafter zoor of reshapingthe Middle East and
::-ent than imposing somenew democraticorder there,an official at the National
:-- Brother- security council said in early r995 that Egypt's Islamistswere rhe
---:()n,who wave of the future:
::rrtsewho
: 'therhood The existingMiddle Easternregimes,saidthis official,are boundto
disappearin the future becausechangeis inevitable;one of 's7ash-
[,-.iker,and
ington'smajor policy objectivesis to managethe transitionto a new
::. t)ne was
'::, Middle Easternpoliticalorderwith minimal cost.The United states
had a views Islamistsas integral playersamong the broad social forces
:-. to assas- operatingin the region.Thus, to survive,the dominantruling elites
,. l kind of will haveto broadentheir socialbaseby integratingIslamistsrnto
: J. ; 1 eS W ef e the political 6eld.This realityexplainsthe rarionalefor the clinron
:: someone administration'searly decisionto maintaina discreetdialoguewith
the Algerianand EgyptianIslamists.32

: -::.lic,too,
:'.:r against Neither Algeria's government nor Mubarak thought much of that
.,'-,.abroad, "reality," however, and they acted to crush the Islamist insurgency.
:t:t to coop- Following the t995 assassinationamempt, Mubarak launched an
: :herhood, assaultagainst the Muslim Brotherhood that recalledthe r954 and
,: ' he said. t964-66 crackdowns by Nasser.Hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood
::.;r-rledthe leaderswere arrested,their institutionswere dismantled,professional
::. ''i hom? It syndicatesclosed,and show trials held. some U.s. officials predicted
.-. for four- that the repressionwould backfire,but instead,during the secondhalf
:; -ifrOl]Bef.
of the r99os, the Islamic right in Egypt retrearedwith one glaring
exception: a series of spectacular terrorist acts directed against
-., , " , c l gU edO
tourists in Egypt in t997. The Islamic right in Egypt had, once again,
,:.ri. Again been beaten into submission.But it did not go away. Its violence-
::; f et talkS oriented underground scattered,or went into hiding. Its moderate-
-,::.tkesthat seemingideologues,preachers,and politicians sought alliance with
, \r atollah Egypt'sdemocraticopposition,declaringtheir support for electionsto
:." \Iubarak replaceMubarak. Many u.s. governmentofficials, sympatheticori-
i: rlver this entalists,and think tanks-from the Brookings Institution to rhe u.s.
::e United Institute for Peace-insisted that the Muslim Brotherhood was a
promising partner in a reformed Egypt.
-. L'.S.offi-
 . D r v r r 's Gerlp
3L6

The Taliban

The third Islamist eruption to confront U.S. policy makers was the
meteoricrise of the Taliban in war-shatteredAfghanistan.
The most incisive account of the founding, growth and victory of
the Taliban is Ahmed Rashid's Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fun-
damentalism in Central Asia. A veteran Pakistani reporter, Rashid
spent years covering Afghanistan and Pakistan's ISI. According to
Rashid, from the start the Taliban had strong support not only from
SaudiArabia, which financedit, and from Pakistan,whose ISI intelli-
gence servicewas the primary force behind the Taliban's conquest of
warlord-dominated Afghanistan, but from the United Statesas well.
"Between r994 and r996,the U.S.A. supportedthe Taliban politically
through its allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, essentiallybecause
'sflashingtonviewed the Taliban as anti-Iranian, anti-Shia, and pro-
'Western,"he wrote. "Between t995 and
ry97 U.S. support was even
more driven becauseof its backing for the Unocal project [for an
energypipelinefrom Turkmenistanthrough Afghanistan]."Many U.S.
diplomats,he wrote, "saw them as messianicdo-gooders-like born-
again Christiansfrom the AmericanBible Belt."33
The U.S. support for the Taliban was strategic.It preciselyechoed --.
! 1-, i .: r

Brzezinski's"arc of Islam" policy and Casey'sdream of using Islam to p t,..- .. :.

penetrate the Soviet Union. Even in the post-Cold l$far world, the
United Statessought to gain advantagein oil-rich Central Asia, and IllL):_ :
'$Tashingtonjockeyed
throughout the r99os for position' In the rl-11 I .

I .. -
-
American view, its allieswere SaudiArabia and Pakistan,and its com-
petitors were Russia, China, India, and Iran. A ry96 State Depart- Lll.1-- .
-L _ :

.--L-_-
ment memo, written just before the Taliban captured Kabul, warned )LI1C. :.

that Russia,Iran, and India-all of which fearedSunni fundamental- amb::: '

ism in the region-would back an anti-Talibanforce in Afghanistan,3a tl OIl . ::-.

and that is preciselywhat did happen, as the Ahmed Shah Massoud- of fLi :.:,
TL-.--
led Northern Alliance emergedin the late r99os as the chief opponent r lll :,

of the Taliban'sfanaticalregime.(Ironically,it would be the Northern dot i. t=

Alliance that would be the chief ally of the United Stateswhen, after Bc: -ir
the attack on the \7orld Trade Center and the Pentagon,the United in t hc -
StatesinvadedAfehanistan.) I sr ael. : ,
 Clash of Ciuilizations? . 3;-7

Graham Fuller, in The Fwture of political Isram, accurarely described

how the Taliban threatened narions compering with the united Stares
'.'. the in Central Asia:
-ts

Of
Important external forces that shared a stake in Afghan events
. l , lf \ -
,:-i Fun- were disturbed at the implications of a Taliban takeover: Iran
becausethe Taliban were fiercely anti-shiite and treated the Shiite
Rrshid
Hazara population with extreme harshness;and Russia, Uzbek_
::rng to istan, and Tajikistan becausethey feared the Taliban would turn
..,','from
their sightstoward expanding Islamist movementsnorth into cen-
'l :ntelli- tral Asia. India, too, geopolitically sought to deny pakistan strare-
. 1 l e s t of gic dominance in Afghanistan, which a Taliban victory would
represent.washington was initially neutral and hoped, with paki-
-:. rvell.
:ilcally stani urging, that the Taliban had no anti-U.S. agenda, could at
last unify the country so long wracked by civil war; could facili-
r3c ause
tate the passageof Turkmen gas pipelinesthrough Afghanistan to
, -, 1 nro -
the Indian Ocean, skirting Iran; could impose control over rhe
,.-ti even
rampant poppy production, and crack down on the presenceof
:rtr an Muslim guerrillasand training camps in the country sincethe anti_
:-:r U.S. So v i e tj i h a d .3 5
\; Lrorn-
cold'war or nor, the united Sratesexplicitly stated its intenrion to
-. r choe d challenge Russian hegemony in cenrral Asia and Afghanistan. u.s.
i.. r m to policy, said sheila Haslin, an NSC official, was to."promote the inde-
,: r J. t h e pendence of these oil-rich countries, to in essence break Russia's
I' :: : 1.nn d monopoly control over the transporrarion of oil from that region, and
'western
. In t he frankly, to promore energy security through diversity of sup-
: :: s com - ply-"se unocal, the prime backer of plans for a pipeline to guarantee
. I Jrne rf - that diversity, hired numerous former U.S. officials to promote rts
. .'\'arned scheme,from Henry Kissingerto zalmay Khalilzad, the future u.S.
.: :r-Iental- ambassadorin Kabul. Khalilzad, a specialistat the RAND corpora-
:-. . : L d l tt tion, said in t996: "The Taliban does not practice the anti-u.S. style
1 ,. - . so u d - of fundamentalismpraciced by Iran-it is closerro rhe Saudi model.
.:: onen t The group upholds a mix of traditional Pashtunvaluesand an ortho-
)- ,r rt he rn dox interpretationof Islam."37
:. ; f . af te r Besidessaudi Arabia and Pakistan, two orher u.s. ailies ioined
' . . U nite d in the regional straregy for ousting Russia and containing Iran:
Israel and rurkey. In the r99os, Turkey-which was increasingly
 )? -"
28 . I ) p v r r 'r G.qvr

falling under the spell of its own Muslim Brotherhood-linkedIslamist

movement-was being encouragedby'VTashington to extend its influ-
ence into Central Asia, where a large Turkic population was, they
thought, ready to respond to a Turkish-led bloc stretchingfrom the
Bosporusto China.
At eractly the same time that Osama bin Laden was setting up
headquartersin Afghanistan,after beingaskedto leaveSudanin t996,
the Taliban leaderswho hostedhim, and who were becomingincreas-
ingly dependenton bin Laden'sfinancialsupport, were crisscrossing
the United States,meeting U.S. officials, oil men, and academics.
Protestsagainstthe Taliban from women's groups, who opposedthe
Taliban's hateful treatment of Afghan women) were (at first) over-
looked by the Clinton administration and by Unocal, who preferred
to see the Taliban as a mini-version of Saudi Arabia's ruling elite.
"The Taliban," said a State Department official, "will probably
developlike the Saudis.There will be Aramco, pipelines,an emir, no
parliament,and lots of sharialaw.'We can live with that."38
During the U.S.-Talibanera of cooperationfrom ry94 to 1998-
which endedwith the bombings of two U.S. embassiesin Africa, when
the United Statestargeted not only bin Laden but his Afghan allies as
well-a key Unocal consultant was a University of Nebraska academic
named Thomas Gouttierre, director of the Center for AfghanistanStud-
ies there. During and after the Afghan jihad, Gouttierre'scentersecured
more than $6o million in federal grants for "educational" programs in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.Although the funding for Gouttierre'swork
was funneled through the StateDepartment'sAgency for International
Development, the CIA was its sponsor.And it turned out that Gout-
tierre's education pro€lram consisted of blatant Islamist propaganda,
including the creation of children'stextbooks in which young Afghanis
were taught to count by enumeratingdead Russiansoldiersand adding
up Kalashnikov rifles, all of it imbued with Islamic fundamentalistrhet-
oric. The Taliban liked Gouttierre'swork so much that they continued
to use the textbooks he created,and when a delegationof Taliban offi-
cialsvisitedthe United Statesin ry97 they made a specialstop in Omaha
to pay homage to Gouttierre. In 1999, another Taliban delegation,
which included military commanders with ties to bin Laden and Al
 Clash of Ciuilizations? J29

;:: Islanist Qaeda, was escortedby Gouttierre on a tour of Mount Rushmore.3e

: : .:s influ- "You sit down with them and they are relatively regular Joes," said
- .'.-1s,they Gouttierre, according to the Omaha.World Herald.a0'Vfhenthe United
-: :rom the Statesinvaded Afghanistan in zoor, one of its tasks was to purge and
replace Gouttierre'sTaliban-endorsed(and ClA-funded) Islamiststext-
-Washington
j .:irlng uP books in the schools. "The primers," the Pos/ reported,
:- .: n t996, "were filled with talk of iihad."a1
'.::.:increas-
: : .. S c rOS S ing
.--:rdemics. A Cr-asH oF CIVTLTzATToNS?
. ::osed the
j:st) By the end of the r99os, a tense stalemateexisted respectingthe
: over-
:. preferred power of the Islamic right in the Middle East and south Asia. In Egypt
: -r elite. and Algeria, the Islamistshad been beateninto submission,but they
'rng
probably maintaineda low-levelpresence.In Afghanistan,Iran,and Sudanthey
. ..: etnir, no held the high ground, controlling radical Islamic republicsunder dic-
tatorial regimes.In Pakistanand SaudiArabia, the Islamistsexercised
,-r :tr 1998- extraordinary power in alliancewith ruling elites,although the royal
--,::ica,when family in Saudi Arabia and the army in Pakistan were increasingly
:r,rn alliesas edgy about their respectivedealswith the devil. Islamismwas making
i\-1 academic unprecedentedgains in Turkey, whose seventy-yearseculartradition
::lrstan Stud- reaching back to Kemal Ataturk was threatened by right-wing
:=:'.ter SeCUfed Islamiststied to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Naqshbandi Sufi
- :rograms in secretsociety.
.:::erre'swork In the United States,from the Iranian revolution until the late
irrernational r99os, almost no one gavea thought to the problems in the Middle
-: that Gout- East caused by Islamism. Even that violent subset of Islamism-
: :ropaganda' namely,Islamic terrorist groups-was essentiallyignored, according
-:ngAfghanis to'Woolsey and other CIA officials,with the exceptionof Hezbollah.
,:. and adding The CIA and U.S. counterterrorism officials finally respondedto a
::entalistrhet- seriesof wake-up calls (the t996 destructionof the U.S. military's
ier-continued Khobar Towers facility in SaudiArabia, the r998 car bombing of U.S.
,: Taliban offi- embassiesin Kenya andTanzania, and the zooo attack on the U.S.S.
i:(rp in Omaha Cole off the coast of Yemen) by creating a seriesof task forces dedi-
-:r delegation, catedto Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda,and its allies,who becamePub-
L.rden and Al lic Enemy No. r.
 33 0 D r,vrr' s Geus

But the U.S. effort to find and eliminate bin Laden was laughably
incompetent. A $27 billion U.S. intelligencesystem, with perhaps
roorooo employeesspreadamong a dozenagencies,with a vast array
of satellites,surveillancedevices,spies,agents,and informers, failed
to find him. At the sametime, however,countlessjournalistsfrom the
United Statesand Europe, including televisionreporters from CNN
and Frontline, found him with ease and conducted lengthy inter-
views. N7ould-beterroristswith questionablebona fides,such as John
'Vfalker
Lindh, managed to get close to bin Laden, but the CIA
couldn't replicatethe feat. Cruise missile attacks against allegedbin
Laden hideoutsin Afghanistanfailed miserably,and attackson facili-
ties in Sudan allegedlytied to Al Qaeda efforts to produce weapons
of mass destruction managed to destroy that country's only factory
for producing medicines.A schemeto kidnap bin Laden, meticulously
planned,was aborted.
Then, on Septemberrr, zoor, those who believedin the clash of
civilizations got the opening they needed.Their views, until then con-
sideredodd at best and extremist at worst, won a far wider following.
And the Bush administration, while not endorsingthe idea of a struggle
betweenChristianity and Islam, seizedthe notion of a clash of civiliza-
tions to propel the United Statesinto an unprecedentedexpansionof its
imperial presencein the Middle East.

Lewis and Huntington

Until that date, the two men most responsiblefor popularizing the idea
of a clash of civilizations, Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington,
were regardedas curiositiesby mainstreamnational securityand for-
eign policy experts.Their Ivy Leaguecredentialsand accessto presti-
gious publications such as Foreign Affairs, and the edgy radicalism of
their theories,guaranteedthat they would generatecontroversy,and
they did. But few took their ideas seriously,except for a scattered
array of neoconservatives,who, in the r99os, resided on the fringe
themselves.The Lewis-Huntington thesiswas hit by a withering salvo
of counterattacksfrom many journalists,academics,and foreign pol-
icy gurus.
 C l a s ho f C i u i l i z a t i o n s ? ' 3jr

, -:ighably Samuel Huntington, whose controversial book Tbe Clash of Ciui'

-- l Prha n s Iizations amounted to a neoconservativedeclaration of war, wrote that
i '.-rstarray the enemywas not the Islamic right, but the religion of the Koran itself:
:.:.. failed
:: ::Om the The underlyingproblemfor the'Westis not Islamicfundamental-
ism.It is Islam,a differentcivilizationwhosepeopleareconvinced
:: :N CNN
of the superiorityof their cultureand are obsessed with the inferi-
.::_1\'lnter-
ority of their power.The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the
-i: asJohn 'West,a differentcivilization
U.S.Departmentof Defense.It is the
:: :he CIA whosepeopleareconvincedof the universalityof theircultureand
: .:ged bin believethat their superior,if decliningpower imposeson them the
s..,rn facili- obligationto extendthat culture throughoutthe world.a2
;a \i'eapons
'$fhat
:.-'.'factory followed from Huntington's manifesto,of course,was that the
--.::culously Judeo-Christianworld and the Muslim world were locked in a state
of permanent cultural war. The terrorists-such as Al Qaeda, which
::.: clashof was still taking shape when Huntington's book came out-were not
:. :len con- just a gang of fanatics with a political agenda,but the manifestation of
::,llowing. a civilizational conflict. Like a modern oracle of Delphi' Huntington
- : ,..struggle suggestedthat the gods had foreordained the collision, and mere
: : civiliza- humanscould not stop it.
,:.ron of its Huntington acknowledged-without mentioning the role of the
United States-that Islam had beena potent force againstthe left dur-
ing the Cold War. "At one time or another during the Cold'War many
governments,including those of Algeria, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and
Israel,encouragedand supportedIslamistsas a counter to communist
:.:'.cthe idea or hostile nationalist movements," he wrote. "At least until the Gulf
'War,
H -ntington, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf statesprovided massivefunding to
:.:-. and for- the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist groups in a variety of coun-
;:! tO presti- rries."43But he had a neat explanation of how the alliance between
::::;alism of the West and the Islamistsunraveled. "The collapseof communism
:: '.arsv,and removed a common enemy of the West and Islarn and left each the
: -. SCattefed perceivedmajor threat to the otherr" he wrote.aa"In the r99os many
-- - hp [ "i n o e saw a 'civilizational cold war' again developing between Islam and
:- ::ing salvo the'West."4sHuntington, who is not an expert on Islam, observeda
: r :elgn pol- "connectionbetweenIslam and militarism,"46and he asserted:"Islam
has from the start beena religion of the sword and it glorifiesmilitary
 . D r v i t - 's Genrr,
3jz

virtues."47Just to make sure that no one could miss his point, he

quoted an unnamed U.S. Army officer who said, "The southern
1is1"-i.s., the border betweenEurope and the Middle East-"is rap-
idly becomingNATO's new front line."48
Huntington quoteshis guru on matters Islamic, Bernard Lewis, in
order to prove that Islam presentsan existentialthreat to the very sur-
'Sfest:
vival of the

"For almost a thousand years," Bernard Lewis observes,"from

the first Moorish landing in Spain to the second Turkish siegeof
Vienna, Europe was under constant threat from Islam." Islam is
the only civilization which has put the survival of the West in
doubt. and it has done that at leasttwice.4e

How exactly the weak, impoverished,and fragmented countries of

the Middle East and south Asia could "put the survival of the West in
doubt" was not explained.But it was a thesisthat Bernard Lewis had
beenrefining sincethe 195os.
Lewis, a former British intelligenceofficer and longtime supporter
a
nt a:
of the Israeli right, has been a propagandistand apologist for impe-
'.'..
rialism and Israeliexpansionismfor more than half a century.He first
Ilc,'-
used the term "clash of civilizations" in 1956, in an article that
appeared in the Middle East Journal, in which he endeavoredto
explain "the present anti-'Westernmood of the Arab states." Lewis
T -,.
assertedthen that Arab anger was not the result of the "Palestine
problem," nor was it related to the "struggle against imperialism."
T,- -
Instead,he argued,it was "something deeperand vaster":
I]::

lil/hat we are seeingin our time is not lessthan a clashbetween l.

,aa'.
civilizations-more specifically, a revolt of the world of Islam
againstthe shatteringimpact of 'Western civilizationwhich, since
the rSth century,has dislocatedand disruptedthe old order . . .
The resultingangerand frustrationare often generalized against
'Western civilizationas a whole.50

It was a themehe would return to againand again.By blaminganti-

'Western
feeling in the Arab world on vast historical forces, Lewis
 Clashof Ciuilizations? 331

absolvedthe \il/estof its neocolonialpost-World War II oil grab, its sup-

a- 1 1
port for the creation of a Zionist stateon Arab territory, and its ruthless
_ -- a
backing of corrupt monarchies in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, and the Gulf. In his classicr964book,The Middle Eastand the
West,herepeated his nostrum: "'WeImust] view the presentdiscontents
., l r- of the Middle East not as a conflict betweenstatesor nations,but as a
clashof civilizations."5lLewis explicitlymadethe point that the United
Statesmust not seekto curry favor with the Arabs by pressuringIsrael
to make peace."Some speakwistfully of how easyit would all be if
only Arab wishescould be met-this being usually interpretedto mean
thosewishesthat can be satisfiedat the expenseof other parties," i.e.'
Israel.52Instead,he demanded,the United Statesshould simply aban-
don the Arabs. "The \7est should ostentatiouslydisengagefrom Arab
politics, and in particular, from inter-Arab politics," wrote Lewis. "It
.: : of
should seekto manufactureno further Arab allies."53Why seekalli-
ance with nations whose very culture and religion make them unalter-
. r ad
ably opposedto tWesterncivilization?

. rlPr
Over several decades,Lewis played a critical role as professor,
mentor, and guru to two generationsof Orientalists,academics,U.S.
--- 't-'
and British intelligencespecialists,think tank denizens,and assorted
i. irst
neoconsefvatives, while earningthe scorn of countlessother academic
: ihSt
specialistson Islam who consideredLewis hopelesslybiasedin favor
:..i to
of a Zionist, anti-Muslim point of view A British Jeiv born in t9r6,
a \\'1 S
Lewis spentfive yearsduring World'S7arII as a Middle Eastoperative
.:.r ine
for British intelligence,and then settledat the University of London.5a
... i n ] .
In tc)74 he migrated from London to Princeton,where he developed
ties to people who would later lead the fledgling neoconservative
movement. "l.ewis becamefSenatorHenry] Jackson'sguru' more or
less," said Richard Perle,ssa former top Pentagon official who, as
chairman of the Pentagon'sDefense Policy Board, was the most
prominent advocatefor war with Iraq in zoo3, and who is a longtime
acolyte of Lewis's.Lewis also becamea regular visitor to the Moshe
Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University,where he developedclose links
to Ariel Sharon.
- - lntt- By the r98os, Lewis was hobnobbing with top Department of
. Lervis Defense officials. According to Pat Lang, the former DIA official,
BernardLewis was frequentlycalled down from Princetonto provide
tutorials to Andrew Marshall, director of the Office of Net Assess-
ments, an in-house Pentagon think tank.'56Another of Lewis's stu-
dentswas Harold Rhode, a polyglot Middle East expert who went to
work in the Pentagonand stayedfor more than two decades,serving
as Marshall's deputy.Over the past twenty years'Lewis has servedas
the in-house consultant on Islam and the Middle East to a host of
including Perle,Rhode, and Michael Ledeen.Asked
neoconservatives,
whom he drew on for expertiseduring his tenure as CIA director,
'Woolsey
James says, "\7e had people come in and give seminars.I
remembertalking to BernardLewis."i-
Although Lewis maintained a veneerof academicobjectivity,and
though many scholarsacknowledgedLewis'scredentialsas a primary-
sourcehistorian on the history of the Ottoman Empire, Lewis aban-
doned all pretenseof academicdetachmentin the r99os.In r998, he
officiallyjoined the neoconcamp. signinga letterdemandingregime
changein Iraq from the ad hoc Committee for Peaceand Securityin
the Gulf, co-signedby Perle,Martin Peretzof The New Republic, and
'Wolfowitz,
future Bush administrationofficials,including Paul David
'Wurmser,and Dov Zakheim. He continued to work closely with
neoconservativethink tanks, and in the period after Septemberrr,
zooa) Lewis was ubiquitous, propagating his view that Islam was
unalterablyopposedto the'West.Two weeks after 9lrr, Perleinvited
Lewis and Ahmed Chalabi to speak before the influential Defense
Policy Board. inauguratinga rwo-yeareffort by neoconservativesto
prove a nonexistent link between Osama bin Laden and Saddam
Hussein.Chalabi, a friend of Perle'sand Lewis'ssincethe r9Sos, led
an exile Iraqi opposition group, the Iraqi National Congress,and
Chalabi was responsiblefor feedingreamsof misleadinginformation
to U.S. intelligenceofficersthat helpedthe Bush administrationexag-
geratethe extent of the threat posedto the United Statesby Iraq.
Lessthan a month after Lewis and Chalabi'sappearance,the Pen-
tagon createda secretrump intelligenceunit led by Wurmser' which
later evolvedinto the Office of SpecialPlans (OSP).It was organized
by Rhode and Douglas Feith, the undersecretaryof defensefor policy'
"Rhode is kind of the Mikhail Suslovof the neocon movement"' says
 Clashof Ciuilizations? ll5

- -', L de Lang, referring to the late chief ideologuefor the former SovietCom-
l - . >3ss- munist Party. "He's the theoretician."'58It was Rhode and Feith'sOSP,
-
\ \LU_ under neocon Abram Shulsky,which manufacturedfalse intelligence
' : l -:I tO that blamed Iraq for ties ro Al Qaeda.And it was the oSP which cre-
. :::'.'ing ated talking-points papers for Vice PresidentCheney' Secretaryof
^,:' :J as DefenseDonald Rumsfeld, and other top Bush administration offi-
- stof cials claiming that Iraq had extensivestockpilesof chemicaland bio-
- -.sked logical weapons,long-rangemissiles,unmannedaerialvehicles,and a
well-developednuclear program.seChalabi'sfalsifiedintelligencefed
- :--'-fs. I directly into the OSP,from whenceit endedup in speeches by Cheney,
Rumsfeld, and other top Bush administration officials.On the eve of
the Iraq war, Lewis, who was close to Cheney,had a private dinner
with the vice presidentto discussplans for the war in Iraq,60and' in
Loo3, Lewis dedicated his book The Crisis of Islam "To Harold
Rhode."

The War on Terror

In going ro war, first in Afghanistanand then in Iraq, and in declaring

the start of a global war on terrorism with no end in sight, President
Bushwas carefulnot to embracefully the Lewis-Huntingtontheory of
a civilizational clash. In speechafter speech-and despite an initial
clumsy referenceto the campaignin the Middle East25 2 "g1s52ds"-
the president insisted that the United Stateswas engagedin a war
againstterrorists,not a war againstthe people of the Koran. In fact,
however,Bush'swar on terrorism is merely an excuseto implement a
radical new appfoach to the Middle East and Central Asia. It is not a
policy toward Islam, or Islamic fundamentalism,or even toward ter-
rorism, Islamic or otherwise.
From the start, the president'sresponseto glrr displayeda broad
imperial vision. He imagined a domino-like seriesof regime changes
in the Middle East, tied to an expanded U.S. military and political
presencein the region: First the Taliban, then SaddamHussein,then
regimesin Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and beyond would fall before
the onslaught of an imperial democracy.The Bush administration
was heavily influenced by neoconservativesinside and outside
 . D r v r l 's Gel.l.
336

who preachedthe gospel of sweepingregional change. Inside were

\Tolfowitz, Feith, Perle,Marshall, Wurmser,and Shulsky,along with
other key officials in the Pentagon, such as Michael Rubin and
William Luti, Lewis Libby in Vice PresidentCheney'soffice, John
Bolton at the StateDeparrment,Elliott Abrams at the NSC, and many
others; outsidewere a host of think tank and media activists,includ-
ing Tom Donnelly and Gary Schmitt of the Projectfor a New Ameri-
can Century, \Tilliam Kristol of the lMeeklyStandard, Michael Ledeen
of the American EnterpriseInstirure,Max Singerof the Hudson Insti-
tute, and The ltlew Republic's Peretz and Lawrence F'.Kaplan, and
James\Woolsey.
"The mission beginsin Baghdad,but it doesnot end there," wrote
Kaplan and Kristol in The War Ouer Iraq. "Ve stand at the cusp of a
new historical era. . . . This is a decisivemomenr. . . . It is so clearly
about more than Iraq. It is about more even than the future of the
Middle East and the war on terror. It is about what sort of role the
United Statesintends to play in the world in the rwenry-first cen-
tury."61 At a press conferenceon the eve of the invasion of Iraq,
Ledeenput the strategyevenmore bluntly. "I think we are going to be
obliged to fight a regional war, whether we want to or not," he said,
assertingthat the war could not be limited to Iraq. "It may turn out to
be a war to remakethe world."62
Such grandioseideashad long marked rhe neoconservativevision
of the world. In the infamous blueprint for their srraregy,drafted in
r996 as a policy memorandum to then-PrimeMinister Netanyahu of
Israel, Perle,Feith, 'Wurmser,and others describeda comprehensive
regionalpolicy. The memo, entitled, "A Clean Break: A New Strategy
for Securingthe Realm," called on Israel to work with Turkey and
Jordan to "contain, destabilize,and roll back" various statesin the
region, overthrow SaddamHussein,pressJordan to restorea scion of
its Hashemitedynasty in Baghdad,and launch military action against
Lebanon and Syria as a "prelude to a redrawing of the map of the
Middle East [to] threaten Syria's territorial inregriry." Nowhere, in
the long memo, did it suggesta policy of countering fundamentalist
Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood,or evenAl Qaeda.63
Nor is democracythe real oblectiveof the Bush administration in
 Clash of Ciuilizations? 337

the Middle East, despitethe central place that idea occupiesin the
: ::: \\'ith president'srhetoric. Neoconservativeswant to control the Middle
-- ...'.: and East, not reform it, even if that means tearing countries apart and
-- ,.. John replacingthem with rump mini-statesalong ethnic and sectarianlines.
, ..:'.:r-nany The Islamic right, in this context, is just one more tool for dismantling
:: : . : i l i l Ud- existing regimes,if that is what it takes. In "Rethinking the Middle
.. ,. .\rneri- East" in Foreign Affairs, Bernard Lewis forthrightly described a
- .: l-edeen processhe called "Lebanonization":
-: - 'r i nsti-
.-....tn. and [A] possibility,which could even be precipiratedby fundamen-
talism,is what has of late beenfashionableto cail "Lebanonrza-
: l: . \\: f O t e
tion." Most of the statesof the Middle East-Egypr is an obvrous
-'j - -:spof a exception-are of recentand artificialconstructionand are vul-
nerableto sucha process. If the centralpower is sufficientlyweak-
. - clearly
ened,thereis no real civil societyto hold the polity together,no
-: ,-::'of the realsenseof commonidentity.. . . The statethendisintegrates-as
- :rrlethe happenedin Lebanon-into a chaosof squabbling,feuding,fight-
. -:.:st cen- ing sects,tribes,regionsand parties.6a
-- ,,t Ir0e,
: :nq to be That, of course,is indeed one possiblefuture for Iraq in the wake of
." hc said, the U.S. invasion,one foreseenby Chas Freeman."The neoconserva-
:, -:1 1o ut t o tives' intention in Iraq was never to truly build democracythere," he
says. "Their intention was to flatten it, to remove Iraq as a regional
vision
---::'..e threatto Israel."55
. . ::rfted in Not only Iraq is vulnerableto disintegration,but the neoconserva-
: - - --: lIi 1 h Of
U tives have made explicit their intention to collapseSaudi Arabia, too.
*. : : r'hensive .War
In their book, An End to Euil: Hotu to 'Win the on Terror,
;: ', , .S t ra te g y Richard Perle and David Frum, both fellows ar the American Enrer-
, -.:kev and prise Institute, suggestmobilizing Shiite fundamentalistsagainst the
r , .,-:.'s in the Saudistate.Becausethe Shiitesare a powerful force along the shoreof
: : , l s ci o n o f the PersianGulf, where Saudi oil fields are, Perleand Frum nore that
:: : : l aga i n st the Saudis have long feared "that the Shiites might someday seek
:: '-rp of th e independencefor the EasternProvince-and its oil." They add:
\ ,-,r'here,in
-.: ..:nentalist Independence for the EasternProvincewould obviouslybe a cata-
strophicoutcomefor the Saudistate.But it might be a very good
:. ::r.ltion in outcomefor the United States.Certainlyit's an outcometo ponder.
 138 D evrr' s Gaun

Even more certainly.we would want the Saudisto know we are

ponderingit.66

Max Singer,the co-founderof the Hudson Institute,has repeatedly

suggestedthat the United Statesseekto dismantlethe Saudi kingdom
by encouragingbreakawaystatesin both the EasternProvinceand the
western Hrjaz. "After [Saddam] is removed, rhere will be an earth-
quake in the region," saysSinger."If this meansthe fall of the [Saudi]
regime, so be it."67 Ledeenwrote that the fall of the House of Saud
could lead to the takeover of the country by pro-Al Qaeda radicals.
"In that event," he says, "we would have to extend the war to the
Arabian Peninsula,at the very least to the oil-producing regions."68
James Akins, the former U.S. ambassador in Riyadh, says: "I've
stopped saying that Saudi Arabia will be taken over by Osama bin
Laden or a bin Laden clone if we go into Iraq. I'm now convincedthat
that's exactly what [the neoconservatives] wanr ro happen.And then
we take it over."6e
During the first four years of Bush'swar on terror, many critics
argued that by invading Afghanistan and Iraq and by raising Amer-
ica's profile in the Middle East so high, the Bush administrarion was
creating a new generationof radical Islamistswho would blame the
United Statesfor all the ills in the Middle East. Despite its rhetoric
about combating Islamist-inspiredterrorism, in neither Afghanistan
nor Iraq did the Bush administration demonsrratea successfulstrat-
egy for reversing the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Michael
Scheuer,writing as "Anonymous" in Imperial Hubris, statedthe case
most forcefully:

U.S.,British,and othercoalitionforcesaretryingto governappar-

ently ungovernable postwarstatesin Afghanistanand Iraq while
simultaneously fightinggrowing Islamistinsurgencies in each-a
stateof affairs our leaderscall victory. In conductingtheseactivi-
ties, and the conventionalmilitary campaignsprecedingthem,
U.S. forces and policiesare completingthe radicalizationof the
Islamicworld, somethingOsamabin Ladenhas beentrying to do
with but incompietesuccesssincethe early r99os. As a result, I
 Clashof Ciuilizations! ' 339

think it is fair to conclude that the United States of America

remains bin Laden'sonly indispensableally.70

Whether or not Afghanistan can defeat the remnants of the Tal-

iban, reverse decadesof Islamization, dismantle the underground
forcesof the Islamic right, and createa stable,secularstateremainsto
'Whether
be seen. Iraq can produce a seculargovernment,crush the
forces associatedwith Al Qaeda that have collectedthere, suppress
Shiite fundamentalistparties such as SCIRI and Al Dawa that have
dominated postwar Iraq, and hold off efforts by Iran's ayatollahsto
exerciseinfluence inside the territory of their Arab neighbor is also
an open question. Chances are at least fifty-fifty that in the not-roo-
distant future Afghanistanwill fall back under the sway of hard-core
::: bin Islamists and that Iraq will end up with a theocracy only slightly less
: -; that militant that lran's. By the same token, the clerical leadership in
:.: rhen Teheranappearsto have consolidatedits iron grip over power in the
Islamic Republic of Iran. In Pakistan, President Musharraf-who
akeady toleratesthe muscular influenceof Islamistsin Karachi-could
at any moment fall to an Islamist coup d'6tat from the army and the
ISI, in alliancewith the Muslim Brotherhood or other militant parries
and groups on the Islamic right. Indonesiaand Bangladeshare facing
Islamist insurgencies,Turkey has been drifting into the Islamist camp
for more than a decade,and Syria,Lebanon,Jordan, and Palestineare
all facing severepressurefrom the Muslim Brotherhood. The heart of
the Arab world, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are both facing pressureto
open up their political systems,which many observersbelievecould
lead to the establishmentof Islamic republicsin both countries.
The caseof Iraq is most startling. PresidentBush went to war in
-:-":'- Iraq after accusing Saddam Hussein of forging an alliance with Al
. ^...e
'. -. 1
Qaeda.He warned that Saddammight be inclined to give weaponsof
massdestructionto bin Laden'scells.But, as becameevidentin zoo3,
Saddam'sregime had no ties to Al Qaeda and no weapons of mass
:.- 1.

,g
destructionto distribute.The regimein Baghdad,dictatorial though it
.lr l was, was a secularone whose Baath Party leadershipwas a confirmed
-
.-
_.
T
I enemyof the Islamists-both the Shiitevariety and the Sunni Muslim
 34 o . D p v r r 's Gann

Brotherhood. But Bush, consciouslyand with deliberation, encour-

aged Iraq's Islamists to reach for power. American forces and the cIA
brought an ayatollah from London to Najaf, Iraq, and forged a prag-
matic alliancewith anorher ayatollah, Ali al-sistani,an Iranian cleric
who became the kingmaker in Iraq after rhe war. The united states
worked with a radical Iraqi cleric, Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim, who com-
manded the zo,ooo-strong paramilitary Badr Brigade, a force that
was armed and trained by Iran. And it promoted a terrorisr group
called the Islamic call, or Al Dawa, a group thar over its forty-year
history had conducted bombings, assassinations, and other violent
attacks,including an attack againstthe American embassyin Kuwait
in the early r98os. on the sunni front, in central Iraq, the chief politi-
cal party to emergeafter the war in 2oo3 was the Iraqi Isramicparty,
the Muslim Brotherhood'sofficial branch in Iraq.
The Bush administrationhas set into motion a chain of eventsthat
\..
could lead to a repriseof the Algeria crisis of r99z incountlessstates
in the region. Even tiny statessuch as Kuwait, where the Brotherhood
is strong, and Bahrain, with its sunni royal family and its Shiite
majority population, are vulnerable to Islamic revolution or ballot-
box Islamisttriumphs-or both.
Reuel Marc Gerecht is a former cIA officer with experiencein Iraq
and the Middle East, a fellow at the American EnterpriseInstitute, and
a neoconservativehard-liner who was a leading voice in supporr of the
.i:--,
u.s. invasionsof Afghanistanand Iraq. For three yearsafter zooz,he
l-]-
L 1-1-
appearedat AEI forums alongsideperle, Ledeen,and other neoconser-
t ):=
vatives, while writing for the \yeekly standard and many other right-
:-1:
wing publicarions, including the Wall Street
Journal,s op-ed page.
Early in zoo5 Gerecht dropped all pretense of opposing the Islamic
right, issuing a clarion call for the united states to encourage both
sunni and Shiite fundamenralism throughout the entire Middle East.
In a January zoo5 appearanceat AEI, Gerecht announced the
releaseof his new book, The Islamic paradox: Shiite clerics, sunni
Fundamentalists,and the coming of Arab Democracy.In it, Gerecht
declaredthat the future of the Middle East lies with the Islamic right,
and that the united states ought ro welcome it. Although many Amer-
 Clasbof Ciuilizationsi l4r

icans hope that moderate, secular Muslims are the silent malority in
::e CIA the Middle East, Gerecht says, "'Moderate Muslims' may not be the
:- prag- key to a neq less threatening Middle East'"71 He added:

'-: cleric Most American liberals and conservativeswill strongly resist the
: Sta te s
idea that lslam's clergymen and lay fundamentalists,who usually
--,r COITI-
dislike, if not detest, the United States, Israel, and progressrve
:. e th a t causeslike women's rights, are the key to liberating the Muslim
::: grOUP Middle East from its age-old reflexive hostility to the West. These
: : :f\'-\'eaf men, not the much-admired liberal Muslim secularistswho are
:. : : \ 'io l e n t always praised and sometimesdefendedby the American govern-
ment and press, are the United States' most valuable potential
.:. Kurvait
democratic allies.72
:: . : f pol i ti -
:.:c Party,
Gerecht compares Khomeini favorably to Mubarak:

. . nI S th a t Khomeini submitted the idea of an Islamic republic to an up-or-

: :S S Stat es down popular vote in r979, and regular electionswith some ele-
::1erhood rnent of competition are morally essential to the regime's
.rs Shiite conception of its own legitimacy, something not at all the case
.r ballot- with PresidentHusni Mubarak's dictatorship in Egypt.73. . . Anti-
Americanism is the common denominator of the Arab states$'ith
"pro-American" dictators. By comparison, Iran is a profoundiy
in Iraq
.=:-.:c p ro -A m e ri c a nc o untry' -a
:.):ltUte,and
-1;rrrt of the And after acknowledging the direct intellecrual connections between
:a: loo2, he Hassan al-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood and Osama bin Laden's AI
: :'.aoconser- Brotherhood dic-
Qaeda, he concludes, astonishingly, that a Muslim
:rer right- tatorship in Egypt would be better than Mubarak's regime:
:-ed page.
Egypt is probably the Arab country that has the best chance of
: :re Islamic
quickly marrying fundamentaiism and democracy. It is certainly
-.rageboth
possible that fundamentalists, if they gained power in Egypt'
\l.Jdle East.
would try to end representative government. The democratic
:. .,rnced the ethic, although much more common in Egypt than many'Western-
l-.'ris, Sunni ers believe,is not as well anchored as it is among the Shiitesof Iran
i:- :t. Gerecht or in the fatwas of Grand Ayatollah Sistani.But the United States
i'-amic right, would still be better off with this alternative than with a secular
:lanY Amer- dictatorship.T5
 >,1 . h cr ,r r '. (-:
J1 - A M E
-

Sixty yearsearlier,when the United statesbeganits odysseyin the

Middle East,there were other voiceswho wanted conservativeIslam,
and early fundamentalistgroups associatedwith the nascentIslamic
right, to do battle with the secularleft, with Nasser,with Arab com-
munists and socialists.Now, six decadeslater, the Bush adminis-
tration is pursuing a srrategyin the Middle East that seemscalculated
to boost the fortunes of the Islamic right. The united statesis counr-
ing on Shiite fundamentalistsin Iraq to save its failed policy in that
country' and a major theoreticianof that campaignexplicitly calls for
the united states ro casr its lot in with ayatollahs and the Muslim
Brotherhood.
The devil'sgame continues.