1. What are common Carriers?

The Civil Code defines common carriers in the following terms:

Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations

engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both,
by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.

Calvo v UCPB GR No. 148496

2. What are the legal consequences of a Certificate of Public Convenience?
The procedure for the processing of the application of a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity had been established to ensure the weeding out of
those entities that are not deserving of public service.
Public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility will meet a
reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities do not
adequately afford. It does not mean or require an actual physical necessity or an
indispensable thing.
Petitioner argues that since R.A. 776 gives the Board the authority to issue
"Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity", this, according to petitioner,
means that a legislative franchise is an absolute requirement. It cites a number of
authorities supporting the view that a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity is issued to a public service for which a franchise is required by law, as
distinguished from a "Certificate of Public Convenience" which is an authorization
issued for the operation of public services for which no franchise, either municipal
or legislative, is required by law.
Many and varied are the definitions of certificates of public convenience which
courts and legal writers have drafted. Some statutes use the terms "convenience
and necessity" while others use only the words "public convenience." The terms
"convenience and necessity", if used together in a statute, are usually held not to
be separable, but are construed together. Both words modify each other and must
be construed together. The word 'necessity' is so connected, not as an additional
requirement but to modify and qualify what might otherwise be taken as the strict
significance of the word necessity. Public convenience and necessity exists when
the proposed facility will meet a reasonable want of the public and supply a need
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which the existing facilities do not adequately afford. It does not mean or require
an actual physical necessity or an indispensable thing.
PAL V CAB 270 SCRA 538
3. (a) What is the basis of the liability of the owner of a PUV in case his driver is
found to be negligent and careless?
Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances.
Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it is liable for the death of or
injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the formers
employees.
The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding
against petitioner Mallari Sr., who admittedly was the owner of the passenger
jeepney engaged as a common carrier, considering the fact that in an action based
on contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the payment
of damages sought by the passenger
(b) What defense can be set up, if any, of the owner of the PUV in case his
vehicle figure in an accident?
Defense of extraordinary diligence:
This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof that it exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees. Clearly,
by the contract of carriage, the carrier jeepney owned by Mallari Sr. assumed the
express obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely and to
observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the circumstances, and any
injury or death that might be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable
to the fault or negligence of the carrier.
Mallari v. Court of Appeals GR No. 128607
4. Distinguish action for breach of Contract of carriage from Quasi Delict?

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Breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation.
Quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its
source the negligence of the tortfeasor
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established
because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can
be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the
obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to
his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil
Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof.
Define quasi delict – Art. 2176 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for damages done.
Calalas v. Court of Appeals GR No. 122039
5. What is extra-ordinary diligence? What is the applicable rule concerning it?
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are mandated to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
and for the safety of the passengers transported by them. Owing to this high degree
of diligence required of them, common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to
have been at fault or negligent if the goods transported by them are lost, destroyed
or if the same deteriorated.[8]
Philippine American General Insurance v. Mgg Marine Services GR No.135645
******Extra-ordinary diligence – the extreme measure of care caution which a
person of unusual prudence and circumspection use in securing the safety of
persons or goods transported.
What is the applicable rule concerning it?

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PVE or respondent Solid Distributors, Inc. cannot seek refuge under Article 2180 of
the New Civil Code by claiming that it exercised due care in the selection and
supervision of its employees and that its employees are experienced in their
respective trade. That defense, as provided in the last paragraph of Article 2180 of
the New Civil Code, may be availed of only where the liability arises from culpa
aquilana and not from culpa contractual such as in the case at bar
Herbosa v. CA 210 SCRA 624
6. In what instances are common carriers not responsible for the loss, destruction,
or deterioration of the goods?
In order that the common carrier may be exempted from responsibility, the natural
disaster must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. However, the
common carrier must exercise due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before,
during and after the occurrence of flood, storm or other natural disaster in order
that the common carrier may be exempted from liability for the destruction or
deterioration of the goods (Article 1739, New Civil Code).
Arada v. CA 210 SCRA 624
7. What is a contract of Adhesion?
It is what is known as a contract of 'adhesion', in regards which it has been said that
contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract
on the other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not entirely
prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it
entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent." (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. IV, 1962
Ed., p. 462, citing Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, Lawyer's Journal, Jan. 31, 1951, p. 49).

Petitioner's argument that it is not bound by the bill of lading issued by K-Line
because it is a contract of adhesion, whose terms as set forth at the back are in
small prints and are hardly readable, is without merit. As we held in Servando v.
Philippine Steam Navigation: 9

While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket
(Exh. 12), he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. "Such
provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage, and
valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of

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 knowledge or assent to the regulation". It is what is known as a
contract of "adhesion," in regards to which it has been said that
contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form
of contract on the other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are
contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract
is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent.
(Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. IV, 1962 Ed., p. 462, citing Mr. Justice JBL
Reyes, Lawyer's Journal, Jan. 31, 1951, p. 49).

Servando v. Phil. Stream Navigation 117 SCRA 832; Telengtan Brothers and Sons,
Inc. v. CA 236 SCRA 617
8. What is the effect if there is a stipulation absolving the owner from liability for
loss due to the negligence of its agent?
The Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not be applied where the
carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. The stipulation in the charter
party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent
would be void only if the strict public policy governing common carriers is applied.
Such policy has no force where the public at large is not involved, as in the case of
a ship totally chartered for the use of a single party.
The provisions of our Civil Code on common carriers were taken from Anglo-
American law.7 Under American jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to
carry a special cargo or chartered to a special person only, becomes a private
carrier.8 As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the
negligence of its agent is not against public policy,9 and is deemed valid.

Home Ins. Company v. American Steamship Agencies, Inc. 23 SCRA 24

9. What is the liability of the registered owner, if any, when his vehicle has already
been sold to another person?

The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing with vehicles
registered under the Public Service Law, the public has the right to assume or
presumed that the registered owner is the actual owner thereof, for it would be
difficult with the public to enforce the actions that they may have for injuries
caused to them by the vehicles being negligently operated if the public should be

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required to prove who actual the owner is. How would the public or third persons
know against whom to enforce their rights in case of subsequent transfer of the
vehicles? We do not imply by this doctrine, however, that the registered owner
may not recover whatever amount he had paid by virtue of his liability to third
persons from the person to whom he had actually sold, assigned or conveyed the
vehicle.

Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a
public service, should primarily responsible to the public or to the third persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is being driven on the highways or streets.
The members of the Court are in agreement that the defendant-appellant should
be held liable to plaintiff-appellee for the injuries occasioned to the latter because
of the negligence of the driver, even if the defendant-appellant was no longer an
owner of the vehicle at the time of the damage because he had previously sold it to
another. What is the legal basis for his (defendants-appellant's) liability?

The registered owner, the defendant-appellant herein, is primarily responsible for

the damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiff-appellee, but he (defendant-
appellant) has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount
that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff-
appellant.

BA Finance v. CA, et. al. 209 SCRA 66; G.R. No. 98275

10. What is the presumption of the law when the goods transported by common
carrier are lost, destroyed or deteriorated?
Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods transported by them. Accordingly, they are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated.
There are very few instances when the presumption of negligence does not attach
and these instances are enumerated in Article 1734. In those cases where the
presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption.
Basco v. CA 221 SCRA 318
11. When is common carrier liable for the loss or destruction of the goods even if
there is occurrence of fortuitous event?

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PAL's diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous event.
Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PAL's contract with its passengers.
Being in the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL
is deemed equipped to deal with situations as in the case at bar. What we said in
one case once again must be stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger
continues until the latter has been landed at the port of destination and has left
the carrier's premises. 22 Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise
extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its
stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air carrier
sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites
people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty.
PAL vs. CA 226 SCRA 423
12. Presumption of fault or negligence arises from mere breach.
A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard to all the circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the
common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is
injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This
statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier
exercised extraordinary diligence
Victory Liner vs. Gammad 444 SCRA 355

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