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INTRODUCTION
Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or the meaning of the word
is understood.[i] The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is
not a question of law. The proper construction of a statute is a question of law.
The purpose of the interpretation of the statute is to unlock the locks put by the
legislature. For such unlocking, keys are to be found out. These keys may be
termed as aids for interpretation and principles of interpretation.
According to Gray,[ii] the process by which a judge (or indeed any person,
lawyer or layman, who has occasion to search for the meaning of a statute)
constructs from words of a statute book, a meaning which he either believes to
be that of the legislature, or which he proposes to attribute to it, is called
‘interpretation’.[iii]
Since framers of statutes couch the enactments in accordance with the same
rules as the judicial interpreter applies, application of those rules in the analysis
of a statute naturally brings up the intended meaning to the surface. It is at least
doubtful whether, in a case of framers of Indian statutes of the present times,
especially of the provincial legislature, the same assumption can always be
made.
Lies in its spirit, nor in its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the
external manifestation of the intention that underlies it. Nevertheless, in all
ordinary cases, the courts must be content to accept the litera legis as the
exclusive and conclusive evidence of the sententia legis. They must, in general,
take it absolutely for granted that the legislature has said what it meant, and
meant what it has said.
Ita scriptumest is the first principal of interpretation. Judges are not at liberty to
add to or take from or modify the letter of the law simply because they have
reason to believe that the true sententia legis is not completely or correctly
expressed by it. It is to say, in all ordinary case grammatical interpretation is the
sole form allowable.
Parke B in Becke v. Smith[xi] formulated the following well-known rule for the
interpretation of statutes:
If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment, we are
bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead, in our
view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified
or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure, but we assume the function
of legislators when we depart from, the ordinary meaning of the precise words
used merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice
from adherence to their literal meaning.
I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now I
believe universally adopted at least in the courts of law in Westminster Hall that
in construing wills, and indeed statutes and all written instruments, the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that
would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest
of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the
words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no
further.
We must, therefore, in this case have recourse to what is called the golden rule
of construction, as applied to Acts of parliament, viz to give to the words used
by the Legislature their plain and natural meaning, unless it is manifest, from
the general scope and intention of the statute, injustice, and absurdity would
result from so construing them.
Thus, if the meaning of the words is at variance with the intention of the
legislature to be collected from the statute itself and leads to some absurdity or
repugnance, then the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such
inconvenience, absurdity or repugnance and no further. The modern positive
approach is to have a purposeful construction, which is to effectuate the object
and purpose of the Act.
The word ‘absurdity’ also means ‘repugnance’: Repugnancy appears when there
is a direct conflict or inconsistencies like one provision says, “do” and other
says, “don’t.” A situation may be reached where it is impossible to obey the one
without disobeying the other.[xv] In all such cases, the statute becomes
equivocal i.e., double meaning or questionable, suspicious or uncertain in
nature. Whenever the meaning of the word, phrase, expression or sentence is
uncertain, it may be a case of departing from the plain grammatical meaning,
and there may be a need for application of the golden rule.[xvi]
And in this order again, the only safe course is to read the language of the
statute in what seems to be its natural sense. When we say that the ordinary and
grammatical sense of the words must be adhered to in the first instance, it
means that most words have primary meaning in which they are generally used,
and such a meaning should be applied first. Words have a secondary meaning
LITERAL GOLDEN RULE
Firstly, the literal rule that, if the meaning of the section is plain, it is to be
applied whatever the result. The Second is “golden rule” that the words should
be given their ordinary sense unless that would lead to some absurdity or
inconsistency with the rest of the instrument; and the “mischief rule” which
emphasizes the general policy of the enactment and the evil at which it was
directed.”[xix]
For the application of the literal rule, a clear and unequivocal meaning is
essential. In Jugal Kishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.[xx]The Supreme
Court held that the cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes
literally, that is by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical
meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are
susceptible of another meaning, the court may adopt the same. But when no
such alternative construction is possible, the court must adopt the ordinary rule
of literal interpretation.
In New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar,[xxi] the
Apex Court had held: “It is a recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that
expressions used therein should ordinary be understood in a sense in which they
best harmonies with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of
the legislature. Therefore, when two constructions are feasible, the court will
prefer that which advances the remedy and suppress the mischief as the
legislature envisioned. The Court should adopt a project oriented approach
keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as
interpretative possibility permits.”
Crawford has discussed the various ways by which the meaning of statutes is to
be ascertained.[xxiii] He writes:
“The first source from which the legislative intent is to be sought is the words of
the statute. Then an examination should be made of the context, and the subject
matter and purpose of the enactment. After the exhaustion of all intrinsic aids, if
the legislative intent is still obscure, it is proper for the court to consult the
several extrinsic matters for further assistance. And during the consideration of
the- various sources of assistance, further help may, of course, be found on the
use of the numerous rules of construction.”
The House of Lords took the former view and, in delivering their opinions, Lord
Macnaughten adopted the Golden Rule from Grey v. Pearson[xxvi] Lord
Atkinson followed the literal approach in the case of Cooke v. Charles A
Vageler,[xxvii] while Lord Moulton discussed the history of the statute and
applied the mischief method.
If the choice is between two interpretations, said Viscount Simon, L.C. in Nokes
v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd.[xxix] “We should avoid a
construction which would reduce the legislation to futility or the narrower one
which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation. We should
rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would
legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. Thus, if the
language is capable of more than one interpretation, one ought to discard the
literal or natural meaning if it leads to an unreasonable result, and adopt that
interpretation which leads to reasonably practical results.”
In this case[xxx] Section 154 of the Companies Act, 1929, was in question.
This provision provided machinery for the transfer of the undertaking (an old
company) to a new company. Under the section, “transfer” includes all
property, rights, liabilities and duties of the former company vest with the latter.
An issue therefore was whether a contract of service previously existing
between an individual and transferor company automatically becomes a contract
between the individual and the latter company.
Hence, an action was taken against him; however, no notice was given to him
about the proposed amalgamation either by the transferor or the transferee
company. It was contended that the contract of service could fall under the term
“property”. Rejecting the contention, the House of Lords held that the benefits
of a contract entered into between the former company and the employee cannot
be transferred (by X company to Y company) without the consent of the
employee.
As in the present case, neither the provision of law provides such a primary
meaning as applicable to the transfer of personal service, and nor there is any
overt act on the part of the transferor or the transferee company informing the
worker as regards the amalgamation The contract did not exist between the
appellant and the respondent and therefore the latter company cannot take any
action against the employee regarding service.
The court observed: “if the section properly construed, gave an accused person
a right to have a solicitor at the trial, it would mean that he could repeatedly
refuse to have the solicitor assigned when he got advice which he did not like
and go to others, and there would be no means whatever to prevent that, with
the result that there might be added expense to the country, delays and abuse of
the whole procedure.” Such an unreasonable intention of Parliament cannot be
imputed.
In Day v. Simpson[xxxvi], it was held that the Theatres Act, 1843, which
prohibited under a penalty the performance of plays without license, would
extend to a performance where the players did not come on the stage, but acted
m a chamber below it, their fingers being reflected by mirrors so as to appear to
the spectators to be on the stage. To carryout effectually the object of a statute,
it must be so construed as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing, in an
indirect or circuitous manner that which it has prohibited or enjoined.
This manner of construction has two aspects; one is that the courts, mindful of
the Mischief Rule will not be astute to narrow the language of a statute so as to
allow persons within its purview to escape its net. The other is that the statute
may be applied to the substance rather than the mere form of transactions, thus
defeating any shifts and contrivances, which parties may have devised in the
hope of thereby falling outside the Act. When the courts find an attempt at
concealment, they will, “brush away the cobweb varnish, and shrew the
transactions in their true light.
In Inland Revenue Commissioner v. J.B. Hodge & Co. (Glasgow) Ltd., (1961)
1 WLR 92 held; “Where possible, a construction should be adopted which will
facilitate the smooth working of the scheme of legislation established by the
Act, which will avoid producing or prolonging artificiality in the law and which
will not produce anomalous results. Where two possible constructions present,
the more reasonable one is to be chosen.
In Gill v. Donald Humberstone & Co. Ltd., (1963) 1 WLR 929 per Lord Reid:
‘Beneficial laws are addressed to practical people, and ought to be construed in
the light of practical consideration, rather than a meticulous comparison of the
language of their various provisions. If the language is capable of more than one
interpretation, we ought to discard the more natural meaning if it leads to an
unreasonable result, and adopt that interpretation which leads to a reasonably
practical result.”
INDIAN CASES
In India, there are several good examples where the Supreme Court or High
Courts have applied the Golden Construction of Statutes. Certain confusion one
may face when it appears that even for the literal rule, this rule is named. As
golden rule initially starts with the search of the literal meaning of the provision,
and if there is unequivocal meaning, plain and natural and no repugnancy, an
uncertainty of absurdity appears, apply the meaning.
But when there is a possibility of more than one meaning, we have to go further
to avoid the inconvenience by even modifying the language by addition,
rejection or substitution of words so as to make meaning accurate expounding
of intention of the legislature.[xxxviii]
The Court further said that “any landless person” did not include a landless
businessman residing in a city. The object of the Act was to implement the
Bhoodan movement, which aimed at distribution of land to landless labourers
who were verged in agriculture. A businessman, though landless cannot claim
the benefit of the Act.
In Lee v. Knapp,[xl] Section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960, provided that
“a driver causing accident shall stop after the accident”, the interpretation of the
word “stop” was in question. In this case, the driver of the motor vehicle
stopped for a moment after causing an accident and then ran away. Applying the
golden rule the court held that the driver had not fulfilled the requirement of the
section, as he had not stopped for a reasonable period so as to enable interested
persons to make necessary inquiries from him about the accident at the spot of
the accident.
This conclusion reached having regard to the object of the Act. The object of
the Statute is to prevent the turning of the youthful offenders into criminals by
their association with the hardened criminals of mature age within the walls of
the prison. An accused below 21 years is entitled to the benefit of the Act by
sending him under the supervision of the probation officer instead of jail.
Lord Moulten in Vacher & Sons v. London Society of Compositor [xlv] had
explained the reasons for adopting caution before application of the golden rule
of construction in these words: “There is a danger that it may generate into a
mere judicial criticism of the propriety of the Acts of the legislature. We have to
interpret statutes according to the language used therein, and though
occasionally the respective consequences of two rival interpretations may guide
us in our choice in between them, it can only be where, taking the Act as a
whole and viewing it in connection with the existing state of law at the time of
the passing of the Act, we can satisfy ourselves that the words cannot have been
used in the sense the argument points.
“It may sometimes happen that laws made for the benefit of the public at large
may come in the conflict of some individual interest or take away his legal right
and cause injustice to him. That is to say, like public policy, absurdity,
uncertainty or repugnance, are very unruly horses.
In State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money [xlvi], the Supreme Court said
that “it is the duty of all courts of justice, to take care for the general good of the
community, that hard cases do not make bad law. Referring earlier cases the
court observed that absurdity should be understood in the same sense as
repugnance that is to say something which would be as absurd with reference to
the other words of the statute as to amount to repugnance
“There is a tendency in our systems, less evident in some recent decisions of the
courts but still perceptible, to over emphasise the literal meaning of a provision
(i.e. the meaning in the light of its immediate and obvious context) at the
expense of the meaning to be derived from other possible contexts; the latter
include the ‘mischief’ or general legislative purpose, as well as any
international obligation of the United Kingdom, which underlie the
provision”.[xlviii]
They also stated that to place undue emphasis on the literal meaning of words is
to “assume an unattainable perfection in draftsmanship”[xlix] This was written
in 1969 and in the light of more recent judicial developments,[l] it seems that
the courts have shifted somewhat from the literal approach. Zander[li] contends
that: “The main principles of statutory interpretation-the literal rule, the golden
rule and the mischief rule-are all called rules, but this is plainly a misnomer (A
misnomer is a term that suggests an interpretation known to be untrue).
They are not rules in any ordinary sense of the word since they all point to
different solutions to the same problem. Nor is there any indication, either in the
so-called rules or elsewhere, as to which to apply in any given situation. Each of
them may be applied but need not be” Zander, in his more recent
book,[lii]criticized the golden rule for being silent as to how the court should
proceed if it does find an unacceptable absurdity
1. It suffers from the same difficulties as the literal approach vis a lack of
wider contextual understandings of “meanings.”
2. The idea of “absurdity” covers only a very few cases. Most cases involve
situations where difficult choices have to be made between several fairly
plausible arguments, not situations where the words lead to obvious
absurdities.
3. The use of the “absurdity” safety valve can be very erratic as pointed out
by Professor Willis in his famous article, “Statute Interpretation in a
Nutshell” (l938) l6 C.B. Rev.l. Willis at l3-l4:
The result is that in ultimate analysis the ‘golden rule’ does allow a court to
make quite openly exceptions which are based not on the social policy behind
the Act, not even on the total effect of the words used by the legislature, but
purely on the social and political views of the men who happen to be sitting on
the case …
What use do the courts make of the ‘golden rule’ today? Again the answer is the
same – they use it as a device to achieve a desired result, in this case as a very
last resort and only after all less blatant methods have failed. In those rare cases
where the words in question are (a) narrow and precise, and (b) too ‘plain’ to be
judicially held not plain, and yet to hold them applicable would shock the
court’s sense of justice, the court will if it wishes to depart from their plain
meaning, declare that to apply them literally to the facts of this case would
result in an ‘absurdity’ of which the legislature could not be held guilty, and,
invoking the ‘golden rule,’ will work out an implied exception. It was defined
in Grey v. Pearson “the ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless it
would lead to absurdity, when the ordinary sense may be modified to avoid the
absurdity”
CONCLUSION
[i] State of Jammu and Kashmir v Thankur Ganga Singh [1960] 2 SCR 346, P
351, per Subba Rao J.
[ii] Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law, second edn, pp 176-78.
[iv] Bhatia International v Bulk Trading SA & Anor (2002) 4 SCC 318.
[v] Ibid.
[vi] State of Kerala & Ors v Dr SG Sarvothama Prabhu (2001)9 SCC 673.
[xi] (1836) 2 M&W 191, 195,6LJEx54, 150 ER724; Allen, Law in the
Making, fourth edn, pp 402-03; Abbey v Dale, Jervis (1851) 20 LJCP 233, p
235; followed in State of Kerala v West Coast Planters MR 1958 Ker 41, p
43; Sirsilk Ltd v Govt ofAndhra Pradesh AIR 1960 AP 373, p 375.
[xv] T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Regachari, AIR 1969 SC 701: (1969) 3 SCR 65: (1969)
72 1TR 787 (SC)
[xvi] For example, Robert Wingram Crawford v. Richard Spooner. MIA 179
(PC)
[xviii] Ibid
[xxv] [ 1913] AC 107, p 117, per Lord Macnaughten, Lord Atkinson, Lord
Moulton.
[xlviii] “The Interpretation of Statutes”, (Law Com No 21) (Scot Law Com No
11), Report No 21, paragraph 80 (1969).
[lv] Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer AIR 1989 SC 505.