INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES

AND
BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION

Submitted to :- Submitted by:-

Dr. Sital Dishant Mittal

SUBMITTED TO:
130/15

Bcom LLB

Section- C, 5th Sems.

CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES AND BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Any work requires the effort of many people and this is no different. First of all,
I would like to express my heartiest thanks to the Director of University
Institute of Legal Studies, Prof. (Dr.) Rattan Singh for giving me an opportunity
to study in such a great institution. Then I thank my teacher Dr. Sital for firstly
making me understand the contents of my topic and then giving me a wonderful
opportunity to present this topic in form of an assignment. His support and
teaching helped me a lot to complete this assignment.

I would also like to thank my friends who were always available to me for help
and also helped me collect data for my project through various sources. They
also provided me with material I needed and made my work as easy as possible.

Regardless of anything, I wish to express my gratitude to those who may have

contributed to this assignment, even though anonymously.

Dishant Mittal

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgement ..................................................................................................................... 1

Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................... 2

Table of Cases ............................................................................................................................ 3

Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 5

Construction of Penal Statutes ................................................................................................... 6

Principles of Strict Construction of Penal Statutes ................................................................ 6

Construction favourable to accused must be preferred:- ....................................................... 7

Purpose of the Statute must be kept in view .......................................................................... 7

Application of Strict Construction of Penal Statutes ............................................................. 7

Beneficial Construction ........................................................................................................... 10

Application of the Rule of Beneficial Construction ............................................................ 10

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 17

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 18

Webliography........................................................................................................................... 18

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TABLE OF CASES
S.NO CASES CTATION
1. G.N.Verma vs. State of Jharkhand (2014) 4 SCC 282 6
State of Jharkhand vs. Ambay Cements,
2. (2005) 1 SCC 368 6

3. Tolaram vs. State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 496 7

Govind Impex Pvt. Ltd. vs. Appropriate Authority
4. Income Tax Deptt., (2011) 1 SCC 529 7

Gurcharan Singh vs. Directorate of Revenue

5. Intelligence, (2008) 17 SCC 529 7

6. State of Punjab vs. Gurmeet Singh 2014 9 SCC 632 7

7. Sarjoo Prasad vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1961 SC 631 8
8. Kedar Nath vs. State of West Bengal AIR 1953 SC 404 8
9. Rattan Lal vs. State of Punjab AIR 1965 SC 444 8
10. State of Maharashtra vs. Mayer Hans George AIR 1965 SC 722 8
11. Ranjit vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 881 9
12. Kanailal v. Paramnidhi AIR 1957 SC 907 10
13. Manohar Lal v. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 418 11
14. Noor Saba Khatoon vs. Mohammad Quasim AIR 1997 SC 3280 11
15. Jivabhai v. Chhagan AIR 1961 SC 1491 11
AIR 1962 SC 12.
16. U. Unichoyi v. State of Kerala 12

17. Pfizer Corporation v. Ministry of Health 1965 AC 512 12

18. Diwan Brothers v. Central Bank of India AIR 1976 SC 1503 12
19. B. Shah v. Presiding Officer AIR 1978 SC 12 13
20. Kamla Kanhailal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1981 SC 814 13
21. Chinnamarkathian v. Ayyavoo AIR 1982 SC 137 14
Madhya Pradesh Mineral Association v. Regional
22. AIR 1960 SC 1068 14
Labour Commissioner
23. Sudesh Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand AIR 2008 SC 1120 14
Andhra University v. Regional Provident Fund
24. AIR 1986 SC 463 15
Commissioner of Andhra Pradesh and others

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25. Sheela Barse v. Union of India AIR 1986 SC 1773 15

All India Reporter Karmachari Sangh v. All India
26. AIR 1988 SC 1325 15
Reporter Limited
Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Krishan Kumar
27. AIR 2010 SC 3342 16
Vij

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INTRODUCTION
The term interpretation means “To give meaning to”. Governmental power has been divided
into three wings namely the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Interpretation of
statues to render justice is the primary function of the judiciary. It is the duty of the Court to
interpret the Act and give meaning to each word of the Statute.

The most common rule of interpretation is that every part of the statute must be understood in
a harmonious manner by reading and construing every part of it together. The maxim “A
Verbis legis non est recedendum” means that you must not vary the words of the statute while
interpreting it.

The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature

conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used.

In this project, two types of interpretation of statutes is discussed:

1. Construction of Penal Statutes

2. Beneficial Construction

Both these types are discussed in detail along with their application.

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CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES

The Statutes dealing with wrongful acts against the public are called penal statutes. In other
words, penal statutes are those statutes which enact an offence and also prescribe a penalty
for commission of the same. The object of such statutes is to punish the offenders by way of
imprisonment, fine, forfeiture etc. Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Prevention of Corruption
Act,1988 are some examples of penal statutes1.

The penal statutes must always be strictly interpreted. If an Act creates an offence and also
prescribes a penalty for its violation, the words used in such Act must receive strict
construction.

In case of G.N.Verma vs. State of Jharkhand2, the Apex Court held that it is well settled
that when a statute creates an offence and imposes a penalty of fine and imprisonment, the
words of section creating offence/punishment must be strictly construed in favour of subject.

In case State of Jharkhand vs. Ambay Cements3, the Supreme Court held that it is settled
rule of interpretation that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed
and followed.

PRINCIPLES OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES

 The basic rule of strict construction of penal statutes is that a person cannot be penalized
without clear letter of law. Presumptions or assumptions have no role in interpretation of
penal statutes. They are to be construed strictly in accordance with the provisions of law.
Nothing can be implied.

According to FRIEDMANN, the guiding principles of strict construction are:-

1. Courts cannot create a new offence.

2. Where a court is faced with conflicting interpretations of language of a statute, either
of which is with reasonable construction, it must balance the legislative purpose of
statue in light of the objects and policies, with principle that a person, should not be
convicted of an offence which he can reasonably regard as a non-criminal action4.

1
www.lawteacher.com
2
(2014) 4 SCC 282
3
(2005) 1 SCC 368
4
D.N. Mathur, ‘Interpretation of Statutes’, Central Law Publications, 2016.

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CONSTRUCTION FAVOURABLE TO ACCUSED MUST BE PREFERRED:-

It is well founded principle that if words used in a criminal status are reasonably capable of
two constructions, the construction which is favourable to accused be preferred.

According to LORD ESHER, "If there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid
punishment in any particular case, we must adopt that construction. If there are two
reasonable constructions, than lenient one to be adopted".

In case of Tolaram vs. State of Bombay5, it was held if two possible and reasonable
constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the court must lean towards that construction
which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty.

In case of Govind Impex Pvt. Ltd. vs. Appropriate Authority Income Tax Deptt.6, it was
held that the statue which imposes penalty is to be strictly construed, if two views are
possible, one favourable to citizen is to be ordinarily preferred.

However, the principle that penal statue has to be strictly construed in favour of accused
should not be applied to provisions as regards search and seizure because they are procedural
matters.

PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE MUST BE KEPT IN VIEW

While construing a penal statute strictly, the purpose and object of the statute should not be
lost sight of.

In Gurcharan Singh vs. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence7, it was held that though
penal provision is generally construed strictly yet purpose of a statute has to be kept in view.

APPLICATION OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES

In State of Punjab vs. Gurmeet Singh8 it was held that a penal statute should be strictly
construed. Hence the expression "any relative of her husband" occurring in Section 304-B of
Indian Penal Code,1860, should be limited to persons related by blood, marriage or adoption.

In Sarjoo Prasad vs. State of Uttar Pradesh9, the appellant who was an employee in a shop
was convicted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for having sold

5
AIR 1954 SC 496
6
(2011) 1 SCC 529
7
(2008) 17 SCC 529
8
2014 9 SCC 632

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adulterated food. He argued that since he did not know that the food sold by him was
adulterated, he could not be convicted under section 16 of the Act because the enactment
being a penal statue had to be strictly interpreted. Section 16 which penalises selling of
adulterated food and Section 19 which says that absence of a guilty knowledge is not a
defence were interpreted by the court. The Supreme Court maintained the conviction and held
that a penal statute has to be interpreted in favour of the subject only if there are two
reasonable constructions possible. In the present case both the provisions are unambiguous
and the guilty conduct falls under the letter of the law. There being no two interpretations
possible, the conviction was good. The two provisions clearly state that knowledge on the
part of the seller, whether the employer or the employee, is absolutely immaterial for the
purpose of conviction and, therefore the appellant's appeal must fail.

In Kedar Nath vs. State of West Bengal 10, an offence under an Act punishable with the
imprisonment or the fine both was committed by the appellant in 1947. The Act was amended
and the punishment in the form of fine was enhanced to the tune of an amount equivalent to
the amount procured by the offender through his offence. The Supreme Court held that this
enhanced punishment could not be meted out to the offender in view of clear provisions of
Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India.

In Rattan Lal vs. State of Punjab11, the accused, a sixteen year old boy was convicted for
otraging the modesty of a girl aged seven years after having committed house trespass. The
Magistrate awarded him imprisonment for six months and fine. After this sentence was
passed, the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 came into existence. The accused appealed to
the Additional Sessions Judge and then to High Court in revision without claiming benefit
under the Probation of Offenders Act. After the High Court rejected his revision, he pleaded
before the Supreme Court for the benefit of probation as he was below twenty-one years in
age. The Supreme Court, by a majority, held that the benefit of probation could be given to
him.

In State of Maharashtra vs. Mayer Hans George12, the Supreme Court was seized with
interpretation of sections 8(1) and 23(1A) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. It
was held by a majority that a specific guilty mind was not an essential requirement to be
proved under the provisions by the prosecution because mere bringing of gold into the
9
AIR 1961 SC 631
10
AIR 1953 SC 404
11
AIR 1965 SC 444
12
AIR 1965 SC 722

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country constitutes an offence. This only thing necessary is that the bringing must be
voluntary bringing. There was no other way of construing Section 8(1) read with Section
23(1A) because the language was unambiguous.

In case of Ranjit vs. State of Maharashtra13, the appellant was convicted under section 292,
Indian penal code by the High Court for selling an obscene book Titled Lady Chatterley's
Lover the sale of which was banned by the Govt. of India. The accused contended before the
Supreme Court that mens rea of the accused has always to be proved to maintain conviction
under criminal law. It was obligatory for the prosecution to prove, therefore, that the
appellant knew that the book contained obscene matter and with this knowledge he sold, or
kept for selling the book. Since the prosecution failed to discharge the onus, his conviction
should be set aside. He further argued that these days there were such a large number of
books in the stalls that it was virtually impossible to know whether any these contained
obscene matter because the law could not expect that all books kept for sale were to be read
by shopkeeper first. The Supreme court rejected these arguments and held that on a plain
reading of section 292 it is clear that proof of mens rea could not required for the conviction
under this section. Mere selling or keeping for sale an obscene literature has been made
punishable14.

13
AIR 1965 SC 881
14
www.manupatra.com

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BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION
If the natural meaning of the words used in a statute clearly omit certain cases, the words
should not be so strained as to include these. But if the natural meaning of the words are not
able to achieve the object of the statute, extended meaning may be given to them if they are
capable of receiving that meaning. If in legislation, the general object of which is to benefit a
particular class of persons, any provision is ambiguous so that it is capable of two meanings,
one of which would preserve the benefit and another which would take it away, the meaning
which preserves it should be adopted.15 Omissions will not be supplied by the court. But
where a court has to choose between a wide meaning which in its opinion carries out the
object of the legislature more fully, and a narrow meaning carries it less fully, or not at all,
the court will often choose the former. Beneficial construction is a tendency, rather than a
rule.16 Where the language used by the legislature fails to achieve the object of a statute, a
more extended meaning could be given to it to achieve that object if the language is fairly
susceptible to it.

Beneficient statutes have sometimes been called by the name of social welfare legislations
also and they have been interpreted in such a manner as would achieve the beneficial object
for which they have been enacted. The liberal construction must flow from the language used
and the rule does not permit placing of an unnatural interpretation on the words contained in
the enactment, nor does it permit the raising of any presumption that protection of widest
amplitude must be deemed to have been conferred upon those for whose benefit the
legislation may have been enacted.17 A subsequent law cannot be interpreted to defeat the
effect of a beneficial legislation except by a clear provision.18

APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION

In Kanailal v. Paramnidhi,19 a decree of ejectment was sought to be executed by the

respondent against the appellant, a Thika tenant. The appellant argued that under Section 5
(1) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, as amended by the West Bengal Act VI of

15
Mahadeolal v. Administrator General of West Bengal, AIR I960 SC 936.
16
Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, p. 92.
17
Mugni Lal v. Sugan Chand, AIR 1965 SC 101.
18
Noor Saba Khatoon v. Mohammed Quasim, AIR 1997 SC 3280.
19
AIR 1957 SC 907.

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1953, execution proceedings could be entertained by the controller only and not the civil
courts. Since it was a beneficial legislation, the courts were under a duty not to interpret the
Act in such a manner as would harm the interests of the Thika tenants. The Supreme Court
observed that when material words can be construed in two ways one of which is likely to
defeat the object of the statute while the other is likely to achieve it, the latter construction
should prevail. But if the words are capable of giving only one meaning to the enactment, that
meaning alone should be presumed to be the intention of the legislature. It was held that the
provision was inapplicable in situations were a decree of ejectment had already, been
obtained by the landlord.

In Manohar Lal v. State of Punjab20, Section 7 of the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1949
directing that shops and establishments to which the Act applied shall remain closed one day
in a week was held net to violate Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution as it was a reasonable
restriction on the fundamental right because it ensures health and efficiency of the worker.
The position would be same even if the business is being conducted by the owner and his
family members. On similar grounds, hours of employment of employees and opening and
closing hours of shops or establishments cannot be held as violative of fundamental right to
trade and business under Article 19 (1) (g).

In case of Noor Saba Khatoon vs. Mohammad Quasim21, the Supreme Court held that the
rights of maintenance of Children below the age of two years and the mother under Section
125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 are independent of each other and any
subsequent legislation like the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights and Divorce) Act,1986
could not affect the same in absence of clear provision to that effect.

In Jivabhai v. Chhagan22 the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Amending Act, 1952
inserted a new sub-section 2A into Section 34 of the Act. By this provision eviction of a
tenant by the landlord was made more difficult. When an interpretation of this provision read
with sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Act came up before the Supreme Court, it held that
though the vested right of the landlord was not interfered with by the new provision, such a
vested right did not accrue until the period of notice expired. Therefore, the Amending Act
would affect all suits for eviction on notices before the expiry of whose period the Amending
Act had come into force. The Supreme Court, while so holding, stated that the Amending

20
AIR 1961 SC 418.
21
AIR 1997 SC 3280
22
AIR 1961 SC 1491.

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Act, being a piece of beneficient legislation meant for protecting the rights of the tenants, any
ambiguity in the meaning of sub-section (2A) of Section 34 of the Act would be removed in
favour of the tenants.

In U. Unichoyi v. State of Kerala23, the question was whether the Minimum Wages Act,
1948 under which the State Government is empowered to fix minimum wages in an industry
is violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution inasmuch as the Act did not define what is
minimum wage and made no provision for taking into consideration the capacity of the
employer to pay. Holding the Act Valid, the Supreme Court observed that the Act is a
beneficial legislation and must be construed in favour of the worker. In an under-developed
country which faces the problem of unemployment on a very large scale. It is not unlikely
that labour may offer to work even on starvation wages but that should not be allowed to
happen.

In England, the courts have liberally interpreted the provisions relating to continuity of
residence. For instance, in spite of absence from hospital for short span of time frequently on
the basis of trial leave at home, it was held that such a person was receiving treatment for
mental illness as a resident in a hospital within the meaning of Section 1 (1) of the. Divorce
(Insanity and Desertion) Act, 1958.24

In Pfizer Corporation v. Ministry of Health25, a provision under the Patents Act, 1949 was to
be construed under which any government department was permitted to make, use and
exercise any patented invention for the services of the Crown. The court interpreted it to
include not only to be used in public services like army but also patients in national health
service hospital.

In Diwan Brothers v. Central Bank of India26, the Tribunal dismissed under the displaced
Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 a claim of the appellant of a large amount of money
by way of security deposits and commission from the respondent. An appeal was preferred in
the High Court, with a nominal court fee of rupees five only, against the verdict of the
Tribunal. The High Court thought that an ad valorem court fee should be paid by the
appellant. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's notion that ad valorem court fee
should be paid in the present case was wrong. It was observed that the present statute was a

23
AIR 1962 SC 12.
24
Head v. Head, (1963) 3 WLR 326.
25
1965 AC 512.
26
AIR 1976 SC 1503.

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beneficial legislation with the purpose of advancing the interests of such debtors and creditors
who were displaced persons. The legislature would never have intended while passing this
Act that displaced persons, while settling their claims in the Tribunal or preferring appeals
against the orders of the Tribunal should be required to pay a large amount as court fee. The
statute, therefore, had to be beneficially construed.

In B. Shah v. Presiding Officer27, the question before the court was the interpretation of
Section 5 of the Maternity Benefits Act. 1961 under which an expectant mother employee
could take a maximum of twelve weeks of maternity leave, pre-birth and post-birth, on full
salary. The facts in that case were that a woman worker who went on maternity leave was
paid seventy-two days' wages calculated on the basis of six-day week for twelve weeks
omitting twelve Sundays. Her average daily wages were calculated and were then multiplied
by seventy-two. Her argument was that twelve weeks' wages mean eighty-four days' wages as
a week consisted of seven days. The Supreme Court while holding that amount of eighty-four
days' wages should be paid to the woman worker, stated that the statute is a beneficial piece
of legislation intended for the purpose achieving social justice for women workers. Article 42
of the Constitution has recognised it as a Directive Principle of State Policy. The policy
behind Section 5 of the Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 is that the mother worker should not
only be able to meet her both ends during the leave period but also be able to revitalise some
of her diluted energy with a view to maintain her efficiency as a worker as also to be able to
nurse her new-born child. Being a beneficial legislation with such noble objects in view, the
enactment has to be interpreted beneficially. This is in consonance with the intention of the
legislature as well as with the revised Maternity Protection Convention, 1952 adopted by the
General Conference of the International Labour Organisation.

In Kamla Kanhailal v. State of Maharashtra28, the Supreme Court observed that in view of
the decision in Maneka Gandhi's case, Article 22 (5) of the Constitution assumes a new
complexion and has to be construed liberally and meaningfully so as to permit the legislature
to impose the minimum possible curbs on the previous lights of a citizen, by virtue of
preventive detention. If a procedure under Article 21 has to be fair, just and reasonable, then
the expression effective representation appearing in Article 22 (5) must be construed so as to
provide a real and meaningful opportunity to the detenu to explain his case to the detaining
authority in his representation. If the expression effective representation is interpreted in an

27
AIR 1978 SC 12.
28
AIR 1981 SC 814.

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artificial or fanciful manner then it would defeat the very object not only of Article 22 (5) but
also of Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, non-supply of documents- and materials to
the detenu along with the detention order and a delay of twenty-five days in disposing off the
representation of the detenu without any explanation from the State will lead to the
conclusion that the continued detention of the detenu is void.

In Chinnamarkathian v. Ayyavoo,29 the Supreme Court held that the long title of the Tamil
Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 says that it is an Act for the protection from
eviction of cultivating tenants in certain areas in the State of Madras. It is, therefore, a
beneficial legislation for granting security of tenure to cultivating tenants of agricultural
lands. In construing provisions of such an enactment, the court should adopt that construction
which advances, fulfils and furthers the object of the Act rather than the one which would
defeat the same and render the protection illusory.

The discussions above have shown the application of the principle of beneficial construction.
It is, however, important to note that such a construction will be given by the court only if
words of the beneficient statute so disclose. There have been many instances where the courts
have refused to apply the principle because the language of the beneficial statute was
unambiguously pointing out the intention of the legislature to the contrary.

In Madhya Pradesh Mineral Association v. Regional Labour Commissioner30, notification

was issued under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 declaring that breaking and crushing of
stones in a manganese mine would fall within the scheduled employment of breaking and
crushing of stones. The Supreme Court held the notification had in law on the ground that
breaking and crushing of stones mean quarrying which cannot form part of mining operation.
Such an extended meaning was not imaginable under the Act.

In Sudesh Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand,31 the Supreme Court held that the object and
purpose of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 for applying the relevant provisions to the
accused are different and cannot be said in pari materia with the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986
and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Section 6 of the 1958
Act would apply to an accused who is under twenty-one years of age on the date of
imposition of punishment by the triad Court and not on the date of commission of the
offence.

29
AIR 1982 SC 137.
30
AIR 1960 SC 1068.
31
AIR 2008 SC 1120.

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In Andhra University v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner of Andhra Pradesh and

others,32 the Supreme Court held that the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act, 1952 is a beneficient piece of social welfare legislation aimed at promoting
and securing the well-being of the employees and the court will not adopt a narrow
interpretation which will have the effect of defeating the very object and purpose of the Act.
Once it is found that there is an establishment (in the instant cases the Department of
Publications and Press of the University) which is a factory engaged in an industry specified
in Schedule I and employing twenty or more persons, the provisions of the Act will get
attracted to the case and it makes no difference to this legal position that the establishment is
run by a larger organisation which may be carrying on other additional activities falling
outside the Act.

In Sheela Barse v. Union of India,33 a public interest litigation, a petition by the appellant, a
social worker, was brought seeking release of children below 16 years detained in jails. The
Supreme Court observed that Article 39 (f) of the Constitution provides that the State shall
direct its policy towards securing that children are given opportunities and facilities to
development in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood
and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment.
Every State except Nagaland has a Children's Act. It is a fact that some of the Acts have been
in existence prior to inclusion of the clause (f) in Article 39 by the amendment of 1976.
Though the Acts are on the statute book, in some States the Act has not yet been brought into
force. This piece of legislation is for the fulfilment of a constitutional obligation and is a
beneficial statute. There is hardly any justification for not enforcing the State. Ordinarily, it is
a matter for the State Government to decide as to when a particular statute should be brought
into force but in the present setting we think that it is appropriate that without delay every
State should ensure that the Act is brought into force and administered in accordance with the
provisions contained therein.

In All India Reporter Karmachari Sangh v. All India Reporter Limited,34 is a landmark
judgment in which the Supreme Court held that law reports are newspapers within the
meaning of the working journalists and other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of service)
and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 and that the employees employed in production or

32
AIR 1986 SC 463.
33
AIR 1986 SC 1773.
34
AIR 1988 SC 1325.

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publication of law reports are thus entitled to the benefits of the Palekar award. The court
observed that law reports contain judicial decisions which are of public importance. The
contents of the law reports constitute news in so far as their subscribers and readers are
concerned because, inter alia, they contain information about the latest legal position
prevailing in the country on specific issues. The decisions reported in the law reports may
cease to be items of news after some time and become books but when they are received by
the subscribers and readers they do possess the character of works containing news. The Act
of 1955 is a beneficient legislation which is enacted for the purpose of improving the
conditions of service of the employees of the newspaper establishments and hence even if it
is possible to have two opinions on the construction of the provisions of the Act, the one
which advances the object has to be accepted.

In Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Krishan Kumar Vij35, the petitioner claiming relief
of promotional scale filed after eight years without explaining the delay. The Supreme Court
ruled that Services of Engineers (Civil) Regulations, 1965 is restricted only to directly
recruited Assistant Engineers/Assistant Executive Engineers. Possession of requisite
qualification for the higher post is essential. The benefit of promotional scale would not be
available to employees promoted sans qualification.

35
AIR 2010 SC 3342.

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CONCLUSION
The most common rule of interpretation is that every part of the statute must be understood in
a harmonious manner by reading and construing every part of it together. The maxim “A
Verbis legis non est recedendum” means that you must not vary the words of the statute while
interpreting it.

Where a court has to choose between a wide meaning which in its opinion carries out the
object of the legislature more fully, and a narrow meaning carries it less fully, or not at all,
the court will often choose the former. Beneficial construction is a tendency, rather than a
rule.36 Where the language used by the legislature fails to achieve the object of a statute, a
more extended meaning could be given to it to achieve that object if the language is fairly
susceptible to it.

In England, the courts have liberally interpreted the provisions relating to continuity of
residence. The discussions above have shown the application of the principle of beneficial
construction. It is, however, important to note that such a construction will be given by the
court only if words of the beneficient statute so disclose.

There have been many instances where the courts have refused to apply the principle because
the language of the beneficial statute was unambiguously pointing out the intention of the
legislature to the contrary.

Further, It is presumed that the Legislature have enacted a law with a definite purpose. It is
also presumed that Legislature have used precise words to open their mind and have left no
ambiguity in the language of the enactment. the statute should be construed in such a manner
so as to avoid any repugnancy.

An inconsistency should neither be created nor be readily inferred. Where alternative

constructions are possible, that construction should be accepted by which consistency is
achieved and the construction leading to inconsistency should be rejected. The object of
harmonious construction is to avoid any confrontation between two enacting provisions of a
statute and to construe the provisions in such a way so that they harmonize. The basis of this
rule is that the Legislature never envisages to provide two conflicting provisions in a statute,
for the reason that it amounts to self-contradiction.

36
Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, p. 92.

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CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES AND BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION

BIBLIOGRAPHY
 Ian Mcleod, “Legal Method”, Palgrave Macmillan Law Master Series, 9th Edt.
 Justice GP Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Wadhwa & Company Nagpur,
11th Ed., 2008.
 T. Bhattacharyya, ‘The Interpretation of Statutes’, Central Law Agency, 9th edt., 2014.
 A.B Kafaltiya, ‘Interpretation of Statutes’, Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2008.
 D.N. Mathur, ‘Interpretation of Statutes’, Central Law Publications, 2016.

WEBLIOGRAPHY
 www.wikipedia.com
 www.scconline.com
 www.manupatra.com
 www.judis.nic.in
 www.legalservicesindia.com
 www.lawteacher.com
 www.advocatekhoj.com

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