Alternative Models of Categorization: Toward a Contingent Processing Framework

Author(s): Joel B. Cohen and Kunal Basu

Source: The Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Mar., 1987), pp. 455-472
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2489368
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Alternative Models of Categorization:
Toward a Contingent Processing Framework

JOEL B. COHEN
KUNALBASU*

Widely different accounts of how people categorize new instances have been ad-
vanced in recent years. This article reviews these alternative formulations with a
particularfocus on the use of concrete category exemplars (from priorexperience)
as an alternative to category-defining rules and prototypes. Itadvances a contingent
processing formulation that emphasizes the flexibilityof the information processing
system in its response to important contextual factors, and describes empirical
procedures useful in identifying categorization processes.

A significant amount of money is spent creating
and communicating specialized product "posi-
tionings" to appeal to the wants and situational re-
quirementsof particularmarketsegments.At the con-
sumerlevel this translatesinto a judgmentof a product's
categorymembership.The outcome of this process is
not only a particularidentification of a product, but
the increasedsalience of information relevant to that
category(and the correspondingsuppressionof infor-
mation relevantto other categories)together with the
category-basedinferencesthat result. How consumers
go aboutdecidingwhat an objectis (andby implication
whether-it is seen as differentfrom other products in
the class) should, therefore,be of particularconcern to
consumerresearchers.
Whilethe perceivedsimilarityof one productto oth-
ers can be studied directlyusing a variety of measure-
ment procedures,these methodsby themselvesprovide
very little insight into how consumers actually make
categorizationjudgments. Identificationof a subset of
attributesas particularlyimportant to a judgment of
similarityis useful, but this only speaksto the "what"
and not the "how"of the process.Is categorizationtyp-
ically an informationintegrationprocess involving an
attribute-basedrule, or are there other accounts of the
processthat may fit many consumerjudgmentcontexts
better?What is the link between object identification
and categorization,on the one hand, and object eval-
uation on the other-and if there is such a link, are the
*Joel B. Cohen is Professor, Marketing Department and Director
of the Center for Consumer Research, University of Florida, Gainesville,
FL 32611. Kunal Basu is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Man-
agement, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec H3A lG5. The authors
acknowledge the helpful comments provided by John Lynch and
financial assistance from the Center for Consumer Research, University
of Florida.
455
information processingassumptions of our most fre-
quently used attitude models apt descriptions of the
underlyingcognitive process?
This article takes the view that identification and
evaluationare fundamentallyintertwinedand are out-
comes of a process designed both to provide meaning
and to facilitate a readinessto respond. Accordingly,
those interestedin either or both of these topics might
benefit from giving added considerationto alternative
viewsof the categorizationprocessper se. The objectives
of this articleare,then to (1) reviewthe most frequently
advancedmodels of the categorizationprocess,empha-
sizing the distinctions between feature-basedand ex-
emplar-basedaccounts of the process, (2) present a
contingency-based"mixed model" incorporatingthe
effectsof categorylearningandtask-relatedfactorslikely
to be important in categorizationepisodes similar to
those faced by consumers, and (3) introduce research
paradigmsdesignedto examinethe effectsof contingent
processingfactors on the categorizationprocessesuti-
lized by the individual. A number of researchpropo-
sitions will be presentedthat offer specific predictions
of when feature-basedand exemplar-basedprocessesare
most likely to be observed.
CATEGORIZATION: CONCEPTS
AND MODELS
From the categorization perspective, consumers'
knowledge about products/brandsforms at least par-
tially integrated(i.e., schema-like)structuresin mem-
ory. Such memory structuresare composed, at a min-
imum, of similarlyperceived/judgedobjects(whichwe
referto as a category)and associatedobject-basedand
category-basedknowledge. In evaluating alternative
categorizationmodels it may be usefulto recallthat the
rationaleunderlyingthis orientationis primarilyfunc-
?3 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH0 Vol. 13 0 March 1987
456
tional rather than structural or representational:by
groupingobjects/eventstogether that are alike in im-
portant respects, we enhance information processing
efficiencyas well as cognitive stability (Bruner,Good-
now, andAustin 1956;Lingle,Altom,and Medin 1984).
Also, such organizedknowledgestructuresallow us to
identify (give meaningto) novel items/events, respond
to them in terms of their class membershipratherthan
theiroften irrelevantuniqueness,drawinferencesabout
featuresand interactionoutcomes, and make causal or
evaluativejudgments.
Indeed, categorizationis considereda fundamental
cognitive activity encompassingall forms of stimulus
situations (Mervis and Rosch 1981). Initially investi-
gated in the cognitive literatureon object perception
and conceptidentification,this perspectivehas recently
receivedmuch attentionin social information-process-
ing research.Cantor and Mischel (1979) develop the
view that a categorizationscheme allows one to give
coherence to one's general store of knowledge about
people:"applyingour categoriesabout otherpeople of-
ten allows us to feel an almost instant general under-
standingof someone we hardlyknow." Workingwith
trait categoriesand social roles, Wyerand Srull (1981)
posit that people categorizesocial experiencesand as-
sociatedexpectationsand activelyor passivelyuse such
integratedknowledgestructuresto attend to informa-
tion, interpretand infer meanings,solve problems,set
goals, or select a behavior.
The relationshipbetween categorizationand evalu-
ation has only begunto be discussedand explored(e.g.,
Barsalou 1983; Fazio 1986; Fiske 1982). Yet a key
premise underlyingthe hypotheticalexistence of cate-
goriesis thatthey arefunctionaland may thus be shaped
by personal goals, values, or the need to respond in
specific ways. In the context of a general product cat-
egory, then, subcategoriesmay form not only around
discriminably different subsets but also (or instead)
around evaluatively different subsets (Cohen 1982).
Since consumers' interaction with various products
usually occurs in an evaluativecontext, categorization
and evaluation may be intertwinedfrom the very for-
mation of the category(i.e., evaluativediscriminations
serving the same function as purely descriptive attri-
butes).Subsequentaffectiveresponsesto products,then,
may be derived from their identificationas a member
of a particularcategory(Cohen 1982;Hutchinson and
Alba 1985;Sujan 1985).In addition,productcategories
may be defined particularly.well in terms of clear in-
stancesof the categoryas well as (or instead)of feature-
based rules. These may be conceived of as alternative
routes to product identificationand evaluation. Since
the bases for such consumerjudgments may be quite
differentdependingon which route is taken, processes
of category formation and subsequent product cate-
gorizationshould be of particularimportanceto those
with both theoreticaland appliedinterestsin consumer
behavior.
THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
InformationProcessingIssues
in Categorization
Categorization,in essence, involves comparisonbe-
tween a target and categoricalknowledge. Some fun-
damental information processingissues that differen-
tiate alternativemodels are: (1) the nature of category
knowledgethat forms the basis/standardfor the com-
parison,(2) the natureof the comparisonprocessitself,
and (3) the degree of automaticityassociatedwith the
process. Possible conceptualizationsof the categoriza-
tion process, then, may be arrangedin a 3 X 2 X 2
frameworkdependingon a model'sposition on each of
the three key factors:type of categoryrepresentation,
analyticvs. non-analyticcomparisonprocesses,and the
degreeto which the mechanismsare seen as being au-
tomatic ratherthan deliberative.'(See Exhibit 1.)
Whilenot all cells representwell-definedor even well-
understoodprocesses,this frameworkis usefulboth for
comparingalternativemodels and for pinpointingkey
(and often unstated)assumptionsand unresolvedcon-
ceptual issues of each. The most frequentlyadvanced
models, often discussedas the "classical,""prototype,"
and "exemplar"views of the categorization process
(Smith and Medin 1981), will be discussed in the fol-
lowing sections. They are distinguishable,first, on the
issue of categoryrepresentation(although as we shall
see, prototype conceptualizationsoften do not take
unambiguouspositionson this topic);this issue will be
given particularattentionbecauseof the importanceof
the basis against which a target (e.g., new product
offering)is to be compared.The "how" of the process
is treated in two ways: first, in terms of whether the
processis presumedto buildup piecemealfromindivid-
ual features(i.e., analytical)or is somehowmore "holis-
tic" (i.e., nonanalytical);and second, in terms of how
automaticor deliberatethe specificmechanismis likely
to be.
While positions on these issues imply alternative
views of categorization,they also reflectthe breadthof
the topic and the fact that researchershave a somewhat
differentfocus.Most cognitivescientistsagree,however,
that the types ofjudgments ultimatelyinvolved in pro-
cessessuch as categorizationare the outcome of various
computationsacrossunderlyingdimensions(Smithand
'To our knowledge,the earliestattemptto drawsimilartypes of
conceptualdistinctionsamong categorizationmodels can be found
in Alba and Hutchinson 1985. Alba and Hutchinson(1985, 1987)
use the terms"analytic"and "nonanalytic"in a somewhatdifferent
sense,conformingmoreto Brooks(1978). In that view, analyticpro-
cesseshavethe directeffectof identifyingcriterial(e.g., rule-defining)
aspectsof a categorydefinition.Nonanalyticprocesses,in contrast,
wouldimply thatjudgmentof categorymembershipis basedon sim-
ilarityto one or severalcategorymemberswhetheror not the aspects
being reliedupon in such a comparisonare necessarilycategory-de-
fining.Whilethis is an importantdistinction,feature-basedcompar-
isonsareat the heartof both.Ourconceptualization hereseeksinstead
to isolatethe differencesbetweenfeature-by-feature comparisonsand
the use of overallsimilarityin makingthe categorizationjudgment.
ALTERNATIVEMODELS OF CATEGORIZATION
Comparison processes
Analytic
Automatic mechanisms
Deliberative mechanisms
Nonanalytic
Automatic mechanisms
Deliberative mechanisms
a Two somewhat different representations of a prototype have been discussed in the literature:(1) a category-defining rule specified in terms of characteristic features of a prototypical category
member (permitting a probabilistic rather than "all or nothing" appraisal of a target), and (2) some overall representation of a hypothetical "ideal" category member (possessing the average
value for the category on all relevant features).
INFORMATIONPROCESSING ISSUES IN CATEGORIZATION
Rule defined
Preconscious dimensional analysis
of target (e.g., brightness, shape,
location for visual inputs)
instigates serial comparisons to
hierarchicallyorganized memory
representations until a
"satisfactory" match is found.
Illustrated in models of stimulus
detection/identification and word
recognition. Not treated explicitly
in models of categorization.
(1)
Emphasis is on more conscious
and top-down mechanisms. Key
features of target are singled out
for explicit comparison against a
category-defining feature-based
rule (which itself may be
abstracted from prior learning
experiences). Illustrated by much
of the work described under the
"classical view."
(4)
Same as (1) except configural or
template representation of target
and feature-based rule are
compared directly using some
overall "automatic" response to
similarity/dissimilarity(possibly
activation level following an
unsuccessful comparison). No
clearly specified model is available
for this cell.
(7)
Same as (4) except a configural or
template representation of target
and feature-based rule are
compared directly, and criterion
centers on degree of overall fit
(e.g., pattern matching). No clearly
specified model is available for
this cell.
(10)
EXHIBIT1
Category representation
Prototype defineda
Target is compared to either a
probabilistic rule or an ideal
category member possibly via
automatic (and exhaustive)
retrieval of features associated to
some degree with a category. The
larger the number of "successful"
comparisons, the closer the target
is to the centroid of the category.
Possible mechanisms are
insufficientlyexplored.
(2)
Same as (2) except mechanism is
more similar to hypothesis testing
wherein either a prescribed
number of critical features tests
must be confirmed or the matches
must be "sufficiently close" on a
requisite number of features to
establish family resemblance.
(5)
Though both representational
versions of a prototype model are
possible, a more "holistic"
comparison to some hypothetical
"ideal" category member is
suggested. The mechanism is
unspecified, possibly similar to (7)
wherein a significant departure
from a "good fit" leads to
continued memory search.
(8)
Differs from (8) in that a more "top
down" comparison process is
suggested. The criterion,
therefore, may be similar to a
"nearest neighbor" rule
proceeding from the most
"plausible" or available category.
Nonfeature-based comparisons
are not well specified and may be
difficultto distinguish from well-
learned and rapid feature-based
automatic mechanisms.
(11)
457
Exemplar defined
Category is represented by a number of
"good" examples. These are specific
concrete instances. Comparison to a
target is carried out on a feature-to-
feature basis following initialretrieval of
"plausible" or available exemplars as in
(1). Mechanisms tailored to such a multi-
stage process have not been specified.
(3)
Exemplar retrieval is probably guided by
top-down or contextual factors.
Closeness of match is determined by
individualfeatures tests based most
likely on some combination of number of
feature matches and closeness of
individualmatches. Once exemplar(s)
is (are) identified, idiosyncratic features
may play an important role in all
exemplar comparisons.
(6)
Preconscious processing of target
feature-level information produces an
overall representation that is compared
directly against an overall representation
of an exemplar. Significant dissimilarity/
incongruity leads to search for better
fitting exemplars. No well-specified
model exists for this cell.
(9)
Similarto (1 1) except that the matching
process and criterion center on some
direct determination of degree of overall
similarityto one or several exemplars.
Configural properties (at a minimum,
correlations among features) are
possible as a basis for comparison;
however, no more global model has
been clearly specified.
(12)
458
KemlerNelson 1984).However,accessto such feature-
level informationduring initial stages of perceptionis
almostcertainlyoutsideof awareness.Suchinformation
may alreadyhave been compiled in a more unifiedrep-
resentationof the stimulus at the stage at which it is of
interestto those studyingcategorization.In additionto
focusingon differentlevelsof analysis,manyresearchers
who are more interested in judgment and decision
making (e.g., category accessibilityeffects, the use of
concreteinstances in analogicalreasoning)are willing
to defer some of the "how" questionspertainingto in-
formationprocessingoperations.Our focus will be on
processingissues beyond the level of perceptualinput,
at which point there is likely to have already been a
rapidand automaticread-inof featureinformationand
initial representationof the stimulus.
The ClassicalView
The classical view of categorizationdeparted from
an S-R responsegeneralizationaccount of behaviorto-
wards "like" objects in its emphasis on formalization
of informationin memory based on some concept ac-
quisition principle.A guiding premisewas that people
(consciouslyor not) adopt concept identificationstrat-
egies that maximize the informationgained from each
stimulus presentation,ensure that the concept will be
attainedwith certainty,minimize errorson the way to
solution, and minimize cognitive strain (Bruneret al.
1956; Dominowski 1974). Such identification"strate-
gies" would presumablylead to formal structuresof
knowledgein memory,and such categoricalknowledge
would act as input in a problem-solvingcontext to de-
termine behavior.The classical theory has viewed the
concept acquisition process as a search for necessary
and sufficientattributesthatjointly determinecategory
membership.Any entity possessing the set of critical
featuresis a member of the category,while any entity
lackingeven one of the attributesis not a member.This
impliesthat all membersof a categoryshouldbe equally
representativeand that learninga categoryconsists of
discoveringits definingattributes.
For example, if an individual'sconcept of an econ-
omy car were to include a definingattribute"cramped
seatingspace"and s/he should ever encountera single
economycarwith ampleleg room, the classicalposition
requires either a change of concept, since "cramped
seating space" would no longer be true of all category
members,or assignmentof this carto a different(maybe
new) category,e.g., "comfortableeconomy cars."
In Exhibit 1, the classical model seems to fit best in
the rule-analyticsection of the framework.While no
specificprocessingmechanismis explicit in its formu-
lation, comparisonagainst a feature-basedrule repre-
sentation seems to imply an attribute-by-attributean-
alyticprocess.It also appearsthat such an analyticpro-
cess may be deliberateas well as automatic depending
on task and other contextual aspects.
THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
Significant developments in cognitive psychology
overthe lastdecadehavechallengedthe "allor nothing"
perspectiveof the classicaltheory,however.It has been
arguedthat in realitythereare few categorieswith clear-
cut boundariesjustifyingan exclusivenessof properties
for all membersof one category.It thus becomes con-
ceptually and operationallydifficultto achieve a con-
sensus on a unique set of defining propertiesfor most
objects and events. Also, empirical researchhas dem-
onstrated that subjects' ratings of category typicality
differsystematicallyacrosscategorymembers,as do the
speedand accuracyof theirclassification(Rips, Shoben,
and Smith 1973; Rosch 1973). The reality of such a
gradedcategorystructureor variabilityin representa-
tivenessamong memberscame to be appreciatedas re-
searchmoved from the learningof artificialstimuli to
the learningof naturalobjectscharacterizedby greater
dimensional variability.Moreover, to the extent that
attributelistings reflect categoryrepresentation,some
generatedfeaturesare neither necessarynor sufficient,
but are merely characteristicof particular category
members.Further,we categorizethe same item differ-
ently in differentcontexts (e.g., orangejuice may be
viewed as a memberof the class of breakfastnutrients
as well as a refreshmentoption along with carbonated
beverages).
The classicalview, in summary,betteraddresseseas-
ily definable and unambiguous concepts and related
learning contexts; as such, it may not provide a very
accuratedescriptiveaccount of the categorizationpro-
cess in most consumersettings.
The Prototype/ProbabilisticView
Categorizationresearchershave advanced a signifi-
cant variety of models that incorporatea "prototype"
construct.The characterizationof naturalcategoriesas
"fuzzysets"and the recognitionof a continuum of cat-
egory membership(high to low in representativeness)
led Rosch and Mervis (1975) to define a prototype in
terms of a set of features commonly associated with
members of a category (hence, abstractedfrom expe-
rience), with each featureassigneda weight according
to its degree of association with the category. Such a
view de-emphasizesthe search for necessary and sig-
nificant critical features and emphasizes instead a
"goodnessof membership,"where degreeof prototyp-
icality is operationallydefined by people's judgments
of how well variousobjectsfit with their concept of the
meaning implied by a category label. Though Rosch
and Mervis do not preclude memory for specific ex-
emplars,they seem to imply that the latterwill undergo
some type of abstractiveprocess.It is unclearwhether
this abstractiveprocess occurs entirely at the level of
features(i.e., formationof a probabilisticfeature-based
rule) or whetherthere might even be a representation
of such a hypotheticalentity that could be used more
directly in categorizing target instances. Some have
ALTERNATIVEMODELS OF CATEGORIZATION
simply assumed the latter. The major thrust of this
stream of research is toward development of taxonomies
or hierarchies of categories and delineating intra-cate-
gory relationships. There is less attention to the specific
mechanisms people are likely to employ in the cate-
gorization process.
Other discussions of a prototype continue to stress
that categorization is best seen in terms of some overall
criterion of fit rather than the application of a fixed set
of defining features. But the nature of a prototype be-
yond that of a probabilistic rule remains vague: "it is
probably the degree of family resemblance, not the
continuous surpassing of a few critical properties tests,
that determines category membership in everyday per-
son perception" (Cantor and Mischel 1979). Cantor
(1982) makes a nice case for a prototype model over a
more classical model since it can better represent one's
response to the variety of possible subsets of features
encountered in the social domain. Yet there is some
question about whether these abstracted features (i.e.,
of typical category members) are thought to combine
into a constructed representation of a hypothetical pro-
totype or to merely comprise a probabilistic rule:
This prototype-matchingmodel assumesthat in typing
an object(person,situation,self) the perceiverestimates
the degree of similaritybetween the object and a pro-
totype for each category into which the object might
plausibly fit. Categorizationis a probabilisticprocess
based on degreeof overlapin featuresbetween the new
object and the prototypefor each differentcategory.
A similar process of categorization is advanced by Reed
(1972).
Though primarily concerned with category accessi-
bility using a memory bin model, Wyer and Srull ( 198 1)
describe a process in which specific aspects of infor-
mation drawn from the target stimulus are compared
to features of the most accessible schema, and where
interpretations are drawn on the basis of the outcome
of such a comparison. However, they also mention the
possibility that an instance may be categorized on the
basis of a comparison of the configuration of its features
with configurations contained in additional bins with-
out prior encoding of the individual features comprising
the configuration. This is clearly a different (and cer-
tainly more nonanalytical) view of the process from the
traditional perspective in which one views the prototype
as the central tendency, defined as the mean value of
the set of stimulus objects on each relevant feature di-
mension (Posner and Keele 1968). Such a central ten-
dency prototype would not necessarily be descriptive
of any actual or imagined member of a category. Cat-
egory members may be viewed as varying in represen-
tativeness in relation to their departure from the cen-
troid of mean values. Homa and Vosburgh (1976) have
also departed from this interpretation in seeing the Pos-
ner and Keele findings as providing evidence that people
abstract a prototype during interaction with exemplars
459
of a categoryand utilize the former in making subse-
quent categorizationjudgments for new instances. A
relatedpossibilityis that prototypesresultfromthe loss
of individuatinginformation pertainingto previously
categorized instances, such that one is left with a
schema-likerepresentationthat resemblesthe "typical"
categorymember.
In comparingthe differentperspectiveson the "pro-
totype view" to the frameworkdescribedin Exhibit 1,
thereappearsto be hardlyany consensusvis-a-visboth
representationalform and processingmethod or mech-
anism.Both abstractentities(including"ideal"category
representatives)and probabilisticrules have been sug-
gestedas categorycomparisonstandards,and the nature
of the processingitself has receivedless than adequate
attention.The traditionalemphasiswas on the structure
of prototypesin terms of "fundamentalunits" of cog-
nition (i.e., features),and this seems more consistent
with a piecemeal. analytic categorization process.
However,recenttrendsin socialinformationprocessing
researchreflecta tendency to assume the possibilityof
alternativemechanisms (e.g., based on family resem-
blance or the overall configurationof attributes)that
while incompletely specified,are certainlyless mecha-
nistic (Cantorand Mischel 1979;Wyerand Srull 1981).
As Exhibit 1 shows, level of conscious deliberation/au-
tomaticityhas not been adequatelydiscussedin special
relationto prototypemodels (or any other model of the
categorizationprocess).Such operationsmay be similar
to alertingmechanismsin signalingshifts of attention
and in directingresponsesto incongruity. These pro-
cesses may also not be very differentfrom those un-
derlyingdeliberative(or at leastconscious)mechanisms,
but they may operatewith minimal thought and effort
due to prior learningand repetition.2
In summary,there is considerabledivergencein the
meaningand implicationsof the prototypeconcept.On
one hand the term is used simply to referto a category-
definingrule specifiedin termsof characteristicfeatures
of a prototypicalcategorymember. Other uses of the
term, however, suggestsome overall representationof
a hypotheticalcategory member. In this event a pro-
totype could be an abstractedrepresentationof either
individualinstances(i.e., a composite) or an ideal cat-
egorymemberbased on a computationalprocessto ar-
rive at the centroid of feature-basedvalues. Or, finally,
a prototypemay simply resultfrom the loss of individ-
2Furtherdiscussionof the natureof possible (and unresearched)
automaticmechanismsin categorizationwouldbe speculative.There
is a considerableliteraturedealing with preconsciousprocessesin
perceptionthat may offersome suggestionsto the interestedreader
(e.g., Posner and Snyder 1975). The literaturedescribingmultidi-
mensional stimulus comparisons has incorporatedvery fast and
probablypreattentiveholisticcomparators(Krueger1973;Smithand
KemlerNelson 1984) that appearto supportoverallsimilaritycom-
parisons.A few sourcesfrom other domainsinclude Bargh's(1984)
discussion of automatic and conscious processingand Mandler's
(1982) ideas relatingincongruityto arousal.
460
uating information associated with particular category
members (hence, a by-product of memory decay).
In addition to (and somewhat as a result of) confusion
resulting from the variety of uses of the term, the pro-
totype views have been critiqued in a number of aspects:
1. Categoriesare frequently modified when complex
concepts are learnedover time. Yet if an abstracted
representationhas been formed, it is not clear how
the new informationis to be combined with it (e.g.,
some complex type of weightingscheme) depending
on variouscharacteristicsof the alreadyexistingpro-
totype.
2. Systematicbiasingeffectsin categorizationare found
for memorableinstances(Lingleet al. 1984). That is,
there is a propensityto categorizesomewhatambig-
uous targetitems consistentwith "similar"concrete
instancesexperiencedin the past when the latter are
used as primes prior to the judgment. Central ten-
dency notions by themselvesdo not seem to handle
this.
3. People appear to use information beyond just the
characteristicpropertiesof a concept. One such ad-
ditional type of informationis correlationsbetween
attributes.In fact, some authors(Medin et al. 1982)
have claimed that most of the complex entities we
encountermay not be representableby differentcom-
binationsof a basic set of orthogonalattributes.
4. 'Aprototypeviewimpliesthatcategorylearningshould
be easiest when membersof two categoriesare sepa-
rableby a linearfunctioncorrespondingto a summing
of feature information. However, there is evidence
that this is unnecessaryand that a more important
criterion is the frequency of within-group close
matches to the target (Medin and Schwanenflugel
1981).
The Exemplar View
In the exemplar view, target instances are categorized
by cuing the retrieval of specific category exemplars.
The more similar the target instance is to concrete ex-
emplars of a category, the more likely it will be placed
in that category. This view emphasizes the importance
of the particular category exemplars that are accessible
during the categorization process. So, factors that in-
fluence exemplar retrieval (e.g., frequency, recency, sa-
lient goals, distinctiveness) rather than a more general
rule (even a probabilistic one) are likely to be important
in object classification. The exemplar view, then, differs
from the others initially in a "quasi representational"
sense-namely, that it assumes that a molar represen-
tation of specific category members is brought to mind
(regardless of how such information in fact may be
stored in memory).
Two distinct types of comparative processes may then
follow. The first is a type of aspect-by-aspect matching
process. In this event the major difference between the
three models would lie in their treatment of what the
THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
target object is matched against-a stored or con-
structedprobabilisticrule or hypotheticalcategorypro-
totype versus salient "good instances"of the category
(see exemplar-analyticsection of Exhibit 1). Such a
version of an exemplarmodel would differfrom a pro-
totype model in that "rule-irrelevant"or idiosyncratic
aspects of salient exemplarscould prove to be critical
in the categorizationjudgment, and these featuresare
likely to differdependingon which exemplarsbecome
salient. Since categorymembersalience is likely to de-
pend substantiallyon contextualfactorsthat influence
category member retrieval, exemplar models would
predict variable categorizationoutcomes better than
would prototypemodels, unless one assumesthat sep-
aratecategories(each with a prototype)are createdfor
each situation or task the individualfaces. This would
clearly imply the existence of a large set of categories
and would seem to undermine the usefulness of pro-
totype constructionrelativeto more parsimoniousex-
emplaraccounts.3
A second possible exemplar comparison process is
more holistic. Its premiseis that "psychologicalmean-
ing" exists at the level of the entitywhetheror not more
elemental (feature-level)information is also stored in
memory. The rapid assembly of feature-level infor-
mationinto a moreintegralrepresentationof a stimulus
may also imply that access to entity-level representa-
tions is more immediate than access to feature-level
information (Smith and Kemler Nelson 1984). This
suggeststhat nonanalyticoverallsimilaritycomparisons
may indeed be primary,with attribute-basedanalytic
processes"available"when necessaryto meet task re-
quirements(Cohen 1982). One parallelhere is with the
Gestalt view of perception,whereinobject recognition
seems almost to bypass accumulation of "elemental"
sensory impressions (i.e., building up to a "whole"
which is subsequentlyrecognized)but instead reflects
"fitting"entire configurationsof sensory impressions
to immediate prior expectations (Bruneret al. 1956).
Further,items are often recognizedthrougha top-down
processguidedby prioranticipationand consideration
of the entire pattern of representation.In object cate-
gorization,prior mental states and/or situationalcues
may evoke certainexpected items (e.g., brands),and a
configuralrepresentationof the targetobjectcould then
be comparedto the salientexemplar(see the exemplar-
nonanalyticsection of Exhibit 1).
Brooks(1978) has probablyreportedthe most com-
pelling evidence for the use of an exemplar-matching
3A similarargumentis made by Lingleet al. (1984). In addition,
normtheory(Kahnemanand Miller1986)assignscategoryexemplars
a pivotal role-not only in the representationof categories,but in
establishinga normativebaselineafterthefactas a functionof memory
accessibility.Such a derivednorm guides interpretationand evalu-
ationmuchas a precomputedexpectationor schemaprovidesa frame
of reference.However,normtheoryquestionsthe flexibilityand gen-
eral usefulnessof such precomputedknowledgestructuresmuch as
we have questionedthe ubiquityof storedprototypes.
ALTERNATIVEMODELS OF CATEGORIZATION
strategyfor acquisition of complex concepts. His sub-
jects learnedto pair structuredletter stringsgenerated
from two Markov grammarswith the names of cities
and animals in a paired associate task. The two types
of labels were not correlated with the grammatical
membershipof the letter strings. Also, subjects were
unawarethat the letter strings could be classifiedinto
two categories.Subjectswere presentedwith new letter
stringsand were asked to classify them into three cat-
egories (i.e., the two grammar-generatedletter strings
and those belongingto neithercategory).Subjectsper-
formed the task with 60-65 percent accuracy,but ap-
parentlywithoutbeing able to specifythe categoryrules
and defining attributes.Subjects, therefore, appeared
to havelearnedthe basisof categorizationin some other
way duringthe pairedassociatetask. Brooksconcluded
that given a sufficientlycomplex concept or difficult
task environment,subjectsappearto fall back on clas-
sificationthroughmemorizationof the exemplarsand
matchingnew instancesto these.
Workingin a differentresearchdomain,Smith(1981)
investigatedthe perceptualprocessesthat childrenuse
across differentdevelopmentallevels. The traditional
view in the developmental literaturewas that young
children perceive objects as wholes and classify them
by holistic similarityrelationswhile older childrenand
adultsperceiveobjectsas conjunctionsof attributesand
classify objects by those attributes. Smith's studies
showedthat this was true only in the case of extremely
simple stimulus variations.As the variationsbetween
objects became more complex, overall similarityrela-
tions were used by children as well as adults in classi-
fying objects. Smith and Kemler Nelson (1984) argue
furtherthat holistic similarity may be the most basic
categorizationprocessin that access to components of
a successfullyunitized representation(from an earlier
stage in the perceptualprocess) may deteriorateat a
faster rate. The advantagesof overall similarity seem
even more pronounced as the speed or complexity of
the classificationtask is increasedand unless people are
given instructions to process in a more analytical
fashion.
In another study, Kossan (1981) examined whether
concept-acquisitionstrategiesvaried as a function of
the complexity of the internal structureof the concept
to be learned,and whetherchildren at differentdevel-
opmental levels preferredone form of strategyto an-
other.In her experiment,conceptsdefinedby necessary
and sufficientfeatures(a two-featureconjunctive rule)
wereacquiredthrougha featureabstractionstrategyby
both secondand fifthgradesubjects.However,for more
complex concepts, the common feature-abstraction
strategywas found not to be the optimal approach,and
an exemplar-matchingstrategyseemed to be used by
both second and fifth graders.Workingwith hypothet-
ical medical case studiesas stimuli, Medin et al. (1982)
found that subjects were sensitive to correlationsbe-
tween symptoms and actively used such configuralin-
461
formationin diagnosis,even if it meant violatingsome
independentfeature-basedrule learnedpreviously.
Medin and Schaffer( 1978) sought to account for the
Posnerand Keele (1968) findings(suggestedas provid-
ing evidence for use of prototypes)by a model based
solely on exemplar information. Their cue-context
model proposes that a probe stimulus functions as a
retrievalcue to access informationstored with stimuli
similar to the probe. They claim that the various cue
dimensions comprisingstimuli are combined in an in-
teractive (multiplicative) manner to determine the
overall similarity of two stimuli. In a similar model
buildingeffort,Hintzmanand Ludlum(1980) wereable
to simulatethe Posner and Keele findingswith a com-
puter model (MINERVA)that used the exemplarsas
the sole basis for generalization.While both the cue-
context model and MINERVA demonstratethat the
"pureexemplar"and the "pureprototype"basedmod-
els are often equivalent in terms of predicting target
classification(since categoryexemplarswill themselves
often be similarto an idealizedprototype),this research
does not provide sufficientinsight into the underlying
mental process that distinguishes comparisons to an
exemplar model from comparisonsto the product or
elements of a cue-combinatorialmodel.
Followinga differentline of inquiry,Read (1983) and
Gilovich(1981) demonstratedthat as a particularcause-
effectrelationshipbecomes complex, or in the absence
of a known causal relationship,people tend to make
predictionsbased on the overall similarityof the new
instance to a similar instance experiencedin the past.
In Read's studies, subjectslearned about members of
a foreignculture,some of whom performeda rule-gov-
erned behavior. Subjectsthen predictedthe behavior
of othermembersof the culture.One memberwas sim-
ilar to an individualwho performedthe behavior,but
the rule predictedthat this new memberwould not per-
form the behavior. The studies showed that subjects
reliedon the similarityof this memberto the previously
encountered individual in making these predictions.
Further, it was found that people were increasingly
likely to use a single similar instance as the rule gov-
erning the behavior became more complex, and that
suchjudgmentswere made quite confidently.Gilovich
demonstratedthe same type of reliance on presumed
correlatedaspectsof highly similarcategoryexemplars
in two separatedomains:ratingof college footballplay-
ers in terms of their potential to play professionally,
and recommendationsof how to solve a hypothetical
international crisis. Neither Read nor Gilovich at-
tempted to specify a formal categorizationmodel be-
yond relianceon analogousreasoning.
The use of exemplarsas a basisfor comparativejudg-
ments seems to be consistent with introspective ac-
counts of the process and of the importanceof easily-
brought-to-mindinstances in various domains of hu-
man judgment.As indicatedin Exhibit 1, however,the
lack of well-specifiedinformation processing mecha-
462
nismsto accountfor exemplar-basedcategorization(as
well as the use of concrete instances in analogousrea-
soning)remainsan obstacleto the acceptanceof often
closely linked nonanalyticexplanationsof the process.
Analyticand more computationallydriven models are
better developed, and there is a sense at least that we
aremakingprogressin understandingtheirinnerwork-
ings and relatingthem to broadly based work in cog-
nitive science.
Exemplar-basedconceptualizationsemploying ana-
lytic bases for comparison(see Exhibit 1) may steer a
middle coursebetweenthe importancein everydayex-
periencesof concrete instancesand episodic playback,
on one hand, and the wide acceptanceof feature-based
processeson the other (see Alba and Hutchinson 1985
for a related ctiscussion).Nevertheless, there is now
considerableevidence for the kinds of preattentivefea-
ture-basedprocessingnecessaryto createa moreintegral
representation.Having created such a holistic repre-
sentation, it would seem pointless to immediately at-
tempt to retrieve the underlying features in order to
carryout fairlycommonplacecategorizationtasks.The
latterwould appearto be a slowerand less efficientpro-
cess.
We think it is reasonableto begin the study of cate-
gorizationwith the assumptionthat preconsciousfea-
ture extraction/analysismechanisms are undoubtedly
at work at an earlierstagein the perceptualprocess.At
the level at whichwe begin to focus attentionon a stim-
ulus, however, information processing operations are
likely to reflect the natural co-occurrenceof features
and overallcharacteristicsthat enable one to deal with
the objectas a concreteentity.Garner(1978) has argued
that as objects become complex and heterogeneous,
separabledimensionsareperceivedto be more integral,
which may even tend to inhibit analyzabilityby parts.
In part,this may be a resultof the very automaticityof
initial featureextractionprocesses.A mechanism that
providesa rapidand exhaustive"reading-in"of feature-
based information can set the stage for more holistic
processingsimplyby makingthe necessaryinformation
available. It then becomes easier to discover overall
patternsamong the more elemental information, and
this becomes a plausiblealternativeto a serial,self-ter-
minating analysis based on individual features.4This
suggeststhat categorizationjudgments are likely to be
particularlysensitiveto correlatedfeaturesas well as to
overall,unique configuralpropertiesof the targetstim-
ulus.
A CONTINGENCY-BASED, MIXED
MODEL APPROACH
Given the diversity of categorizationmodels, a key
question is, "which ones are likely to be most appro-
4Thisissue has been discussedin relationto the retrievalof infor-
mation from short-termmemory.For a summaryof particularrel-
evanceto consumerbehaviorsee Lynchand Srull 1982.
THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
priate and useful in the study of consumer behavior?"
Some reduction in scope and complexity can be
achieved by concentrating on the underlying infor-
mation processingdimensions identified in Exhibit 1
that are deservingof the most emphasis.While each is
importantin its own right,the "level of automaticity"
issue is probablyless directlyrelevantto consumerbe-
havior and the most difficult to investigate in a con-
sumer setting. By contrast,alternativerepresentations
of product-definedcategoriesand comparisonprocesses
used to assess product similarity fall more directly
within the domain of consumer behavior. These may
be shaped by specific learning histories of individuals
(including marketingand advertisinginfluences) and
the contextual influences of choice and consumption
environments.
As evidencedin Exhibit 1, even after such a dimen-
sional reductionthere remain severaldiverse views of
the categorizationprocess. Most of these are at least
plausible(e.g., examplesof each can easilybe generated
if not recalled).5It may be most productive,therefore,
to assumean extremelyflexibleinformationprocessing
system and to carry out researchdesigned to explore
the conditions under which various routes to catego-
rizationarefollowedalongwiththe implicationsof each
(e.g., for subsequentevaluation and inference as well
as susceptibilityto bias in initial categorization).So,
ratherthan ask, "which model is correct?"one could
assumethat people have or could constructdescriptive
or hypotheticalfeature-levelas well as entity-levelrep-
resentations of category members and, in addition,
could process information in an analytical or nonan-
alyticalfashion(i.e., that people have the requisiteabil-
ity and cognitiveflexibilityto do so). The questionthen
becomes, "underwhat conditions do people engagein
each type of informationprocessing?"
Within a consumer context, for example, an evalu-
ative category might be "departmentstores I love to
shop in." Knowledge about such a category may be
representedin the form of concrete stores the person
has frequented in the past as well as more abstract
featuresextractedfrom priorexperiences(such as, "de-
partment stores I love to shop in usually have high-
quality merchandisein contemporarystyles, a distinc-
tive environment in terms of lighting, aisle space, ex-
pensive decorativefixtures,etc."). On encounteringan
unfamiliardepartmentstore, the person could adopt
(deliberatelyor as a quasi-automaticresponse to con-
textual stimuli) severalcategorization"strategies"(ig-
noringthe detailed processingmechanismsof each):
1. Bringto mind one or severalexemplarsof the cate-
gory,select focal featuresand comparefeaturesof the
'While the representationalaspectsimplied in cells 7 and 10 are
logicallyseparablefromthe others,when the individualfeaturesare
integratedinto some type of composite the process so stronglyre-
semblesa prototypeview (i.e., cells 8 and 11) that we are merging
these togetherin the interestof parsimony.
ALTERNATIVEMODELS OF CATEGORIZATION
unfamiliardepartmentstore to them; make the cat-
egorizationjudgmenton the basisof surpassinga crit-
ical number of individual features tests (Exhibit 1,
cells 3 and 6).
2. Bringto mind a criterialset of featuresthat definethe
categoryor the categoryprototypeand comparefea-
tures of the unfamiliar department store to them;
makethe categorizationjudgmenton the basisof sur-
passinga critical numberof individualfeaturestests
(Exhibit 1, cells 1, 2, 4, and 5).
3. Bringto mind one or severalexemplarsof the cate-
gory;make the categorizationjudgment on the basis
of overallsimilarityof the unfamiliardepartmentstore
eitherto a focal exemplaror exemplarsor on the basis
of an acceptablematch againsta criterialnumberof
exemplars'(Exhibit1, cells 9 and 12).
4. Bringto mind a categoryprototype(or constructone
based on representativeperformanceon individual
features);make the categorizationjudgment on the
basisof the degreeof overallsimilarityto the prototype
(Exhibit 1, cells 8 and 11).
There are two senses in which these models may be
"mixed" (see related discussions in Cohen 1982; Elio
and Anderson 1981; Lingle et al. 1984). First, they may
be mixed in the sense of each being included in the
individual's repertoire, so that depending on contextual
variables, one or the other might be used. Second, we
advance the argument that in any given categorization
instance there may be a "first cut," using the most ef-
ficient means of making a quick judgment, and that
this could be followed by processes that would give
greater precision, ifthey are deemed necessary (by some
deliberate or automatic mechanism).
In the latter sense, a process similar to item 3, or
possibly item 4 if a prototype were already available in
memory, would seem advantageous either when there
is relatively low motivation to make a careful catego-
rization judgment or, conversely, when the costs asso-
ciated with delay are very high, even when the judgment
is a difficult one to make. Suppose, for example, that
an object needs to be categorized as one that a person
should either immediately approach or one that should
be immediately avoided, and no isolated high validity
cue(s) is (are) available. In this instance, one rationale
for using a category exemplar is that it may be brought
to mind quickly, and yet it incorporates considerable
feature-level information. So, if an exemplar of each of
two opposing action-directed categories is compared
against the target instance, with the best "match" al-
lowed to determine the outcome, this is likely to be
optimal under the circumstances. We frequently ob-
serve that people seem almost predisposed to utilize
concrete "good examples" in making judgments even
though they have access to more precise feature-based
information known or assumed to have greater cue va-
lidity (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982). Per-
haps people are relying on a generally useful exemplar-
based strategy that tends to be successful in the less
463
malevolently engineered(i.e., nonexperimental)envi-
ronmentsin which they live.
When we consider typical consumer settings, there
is at least an intuitive sense that the type of evidence
producedby studies such as those of Read (1983) and
Gilovich (1981) is quite pertinentto product categori-
zation.Thatconsumerswould have recourseto familiar
categoryexemplarseither apartfrom or instead of cat-
egory-definingrules seems to squarewith conventional
thoughtand practice.Brandsare often viewedas having
an "identity"of their own. At the veryleast this implies
that consumers recognize patterns of relationships
among featuresand possibly configuralpropertiesbe-
yond merelycorrelatedfeatures.With productsas with
people, necessaryand sufficientfeaturesand the idio-
syncratic combine to create a distinct identity, and
consumers seem able and willing to think about and
decide among products as intact entities. In a super-
marketsetting,for example, it seems likely that an un-
familiarproductofferingwill be categorizedand eval-
uated on the basis of a high degreeof overallsimilarity
to an exemplarof a particularcategory.This notion has
been exploitedin packagedesignand sometimesresults
in the purchaseof a productthat, on closer inspection
at home, is differentfrom the product the person was
intending to buy. Whetherthis happens because con-
sumersdo not haveor do not use category-defining rules
under certain conditions, and what those conditions
may be, would seem to be interestingquestionsfor con-
sumerbehaviorresearch.
Analytic and nonanalytic operations at the level of
assessing the category membershipof a target object
requiremore precise specification.Feature-basedpro-
cessingimplies that either all or a necessarynumberof
individualfeaturecomparisonsneed to be successfully
made for categorizationto occur. Clearlythis is not as
cut and dried as it might first appear, since different
criteria could be used both at the individual feature
level and to determine a successfulfit across a feature
set. Such criteriaare probablynot fixed, but are likely
to vary as a function of involvement and the salience
of contrastcategQries(to the extent that the fit of other
potential"matches"aretaken into account).Thereare
clear links here to researchon decisions rules.
A simply stated criterion for an exemplar-based,
nonanalytic processingmodel is simply the degree of
"overall fit" to one or several salient exemplars. But
this also raises a great many issues, such as specifying
how any type of template-matchingprocess would be
carriedout (i.e., how the degree of fit is determined),
as well as how the numberof exemplarsinvolved would
be determined. Lingle et al. (1984) have proposed a
criterion that essentially involves the number of ex-
emplarrepresentationsthat a targetobjectis ableto cue
from within a given category. The probability of re-
trievingany given exemplarshouldbe a function of the
similarity of the encoded representationof the target
stimulusto the memoryrepresentationof the exemplar.
Perhapssome "automatic"responsemechanismto the
464
lack of a close fit (see Mandler 1982, for a discussion
of responses to incongruity)-possibly involving af-
fect-would be worth investigating.
Demonstratingthe operation of nonanalytic versus
analytic processingin a categorizationtask is a formi-
dable undertaking.Categoryassignmentitself will not
normallybe a sensitiveenoughmeasureunlessdifferent
outcomesfollow directlyfrom individualfeature-based
comparisonsratherthan from more complex patterns
of featureassociation(e.g., KemlerNelson 1984;Medin
and Schwanenflugel1981). Even here one needs to be
able to demonstrate that some multiple feature rule
(e.g., having conjunctive and disjunctive properties)
would not provide the same results. Process-oriented
measures have the potential to tap or at least reflect
alternativeinformation processingoperations.To the
extent that memorytracesare made more accessibleby
the use of the correspondinginformation,for example,
we may be able to infer the use (or nonuse) of various
units of information (though determiningappropriate
baselines against which comparisonsshould be made
is not alwayseasy when differentlevels of information
areat issue).We will look furtherat some of theseissues
in a subsequentsection of the paperdevotedto research
paradigms.
In summary,our contingency-basedmixed model is
derivedfrom the followingassumptions:(1) that a rea-
sonableamountof feature-basedinformationaboutany
given stimulushas been automaticallyreadin upon ex-
posureto that stimulus, (2) that both analytic(i.e., fea-
ture-by-feature)processing of this information and
nonanalytic(i.e., basedon correlatedfeaturesand con-
figuralproperties)processingare possible, and (3) that
the information processorhas the flexibility to adopt
one or the other mode, or both sequentially,as a func-
tion of contextual factors. These factors, then, should
be expected to have a major role in selecting an indi-
vidual'scategorizationresponse,whetherin the natural
consumerenvironmentor in a studyexaminingaspects
of the process.We will discuss these contextual factors
in terms of initial categorylearning,task involvement,
rule complexity, and the judgment setting, with each
followed by some summaryresearchpropositions.
The CategoryLearningContext
Beginning in childhood, natural ongoing concept
learningis focused around a name-picture paired as-
sociateratherthan a definitionalrule (e.g., pointingand
saying "cat"). We typically acquire a considerable
amount of informationabout a particularobject or in-
dividual present in each situation, and this rich store
of instance/episodicinformationis availablein memory
for subsequent information processing activities. At-
tribute-basedrules for category membership, on the
other hand, are more easily developedthroughformal
training and exposure to more abstract(i.e., nonper-
ceptual)concepts. Such rules may also coexist with ex-
emplars as part of category-basedknowledge, though
THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
they may differin initialaccessibilityand responsiveness
to contextual cues. This suggeststhat attribute-based
rules are more likely to exist and to prove to be valued
functionally for categories learned through a defini-
tional process or for categoriesinvolving formal rela-
tionshipswith otherconcepts.In such casesthe objects/
conceptsthemselvesare initially thoughtof in terms of
collectionsof properties.For example,generallyspeak-
ing, consumersmay have and use formalrulesforjudg-
ing members of categories such as "financial instru-
ments" ratherthan for categorieswhose members are
accumulatedsequentially over time as a result of in-
dividual experiences (e.g., preferredfast food Trestau-
rants, country music).
Also, learningthat accompaniesexposure to exem-
plarsfrom contrastingcategoriesof products(e.g., Bur-
gundy versusBordeauxwines) may focus attention on
characteristicsthat separatethe two groups and may
encouragesubsequentuse of simple heuristicsbasedon
such features(e.g., bottle shape).On the other hand, in
the naturalecology we typically experienceindividual
entities in some depth and richness(e.g., we meet "Joe
Jones,"we read a particularbook, we taste a hot fudge
sundae),and we groupitems into categoriesby observ-
ing similaritiesamong individual entities ratherthan
by seeking to identify differencesbetween contending
sets. Then upon encounteringa targetinstance, a com-
parison can be made to those previously experienced
instancesof a categorythat appearto offera good match
quite apart from any explicit or even implicit consid-
erationof alternativecategories.One reasonfor the so-
called "confirmatorybias" in reasoningmay be that it
simply does not occurto people to think about counter
examples (e.g., Holyoak and Glass 1975; Tverskyand
Kahneman 1973), which are in fact exemplarsof plau-
sible contrastcategories.Thus, the impact of category
learningconditions on subsequentcategorizationpro-
cesses may be investigatedfocusing on the following
researchpropositions:
P1: Conditions that favor category acquisition
througha definitionalprocess (i.e., involving
learning the formal relationships between
more abstract/nonperceptualaspects of an
entity or entities) lead to greaterreliance on
rule-based and analytic processes in subse-
quent categorizations.
P2: Conditionsthat favor "in-depth"exposureto
exemplarsof a category,in a contextfreefrom
any explicit or implicit consideration of al-
ternative(contrast)categories,lead to greater
reliance on exemplar-basedand nonanalytic
processesin subsequentcategorizations.
Task Involvement/Motivation
By its very nature,a mix of categorizationheuristics
is likely to be particularlysensitiveto task-relatedcon-
ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF CATEGORIZATION
textual cues. Among the most important of these are
cues that signalthe natureand importanceof the prob-
lem for which categorizationof stimuli is a necessary
step.
Severalauthors(Brooks 1978;KemlerNelson 1984)
have arguedthat when categoryinformationis acquired
from experiencesthat are incidental ratherthan goal-
directedin nature, subsequentclassificationsare more
likely to be characterizedby exemplar-based(and pos-
sibly nonanalytic)processing.On the otherhand,when
informationis acquiredvia a task explicitly involving
a categorizationdecision, subsequentanalyticprocess-
ing is more likely (Martinand Caramazza1980).
If consumersfindthemselvesin a tasksettingin which
they are confrontedby a problemto solve, thereshould
firstof all be heightenedattention to a narrowerrange
of cues relevantto the problem.A key issue, then, is to
understand(or correctly manipulate) people's assess-
ment of the nature of the problem. If the problem is
perceivedto be one of object identificationand assign-
ment, then aspects of the stimuli that are pertinentto
differentiatinginstances from each other yet that are
perceived to be systematic (i.e., homogeneous within
the set of similar instances and heterogeneousacross
dissimilarinstances)are probablybroughtinto sharper
focus. Such settings,then, promotethe constructionof
a categorizationrule (if one had not already existed)
and prompt its use. This tendency is heightened con-
siderablyby a task structurethat stresseschoice among
alternativecategories.It is lowered to the extent that
the problem focus is not explicitly linked to categori-
zation (e.g., how much money to spend on a record
album ratherthan which of severalcategoriesof music
a particularalbum best fits in), and it is loweredwhen
contrastingcategoriesare not explicitly suggested.
In the consumer context, task involvement may co-
vary with product type (Lastovicka 1979), with rele-
vance and centralityto the need system governingthe
level of attention and effortdevoted to the product or
message.Moregenerally,the wide rangeof well-learned
activities that people carry out with little thought at
normal levels of activation may be carried out more
deliberatelyat moderatelyhighlevelsof activation.Both
general and task-specific increases in involvement,
therefore,will likelylead to greaterattentionbeinggiven
to analyticalbases for categorization(unless attention
is directed elsewhere). Much of consumer behavior
seems to involve incidental exposure to products and
marketingactivities, and many decisions are either re-
petitiveor of minor importance.Under such conditions
nonanalyticalcategorizationprocessesmay well be the
norm.Adequatelysimulatingsuch importantfactorsin
consumer categorization research would provide an
opportunityto test the following researchproposition:
P3: Conditions that increase an individual's in-
volvement (i.e., level of processing activity)
with an entity lead to greaterrelianceon rule-
based and analytic categorizationprocesses.
465
Rule Complexity
In our exposure to the objects in our environment
thereis no shortageof clearinstancesof most categories.
We generallyhave no difficultybringingthese category
exemplarsto mind; indeed, we can hardly keep from
doing so. On the other hand, some analytic rules are
both easy to discover and easy to apply;some are dif-
ficult in one of these respects,and some are difficultin
both. Discoveringa ruleimplies,first,a desireto engage
in some abstractiveprocess and, second, being able to
do so. Conditionsof exposureto categorymembersmay
simply not favor isolation of features,especiallywhen
we regardinstances for their own sake (ratherthan as
membersof categories)and do not seek to differentiate
membershipin one categoryfrom membershipin an-
other. As has been pointed out in connection with the
classicalview of categorization,many categoriesdo not
appearto have straightforward definingrules,but rather
involve disjunctivecombinations of featuresand cor-
related attribute patterns. Such rules are not easy to
acquire, at least in the natural course of things, and
appearto demandmore ideal acquisitionopportunities
(e.g., simultaneouspresentationof multiple instances
that encourageshypothesistesting).Even if such a rule
wereacquired,its applicationwould depend on the op-
portunitiespresentin the categorizationsetting (as dis-
cussed in the following section).
For the ad hoc and evaluative categoriesimportant
in product categorization,some types of advertising
may be instrumentalin focusing attention on features
that implicitlydifferentiatebrands,while othertypes of
advertisingmay simply provide a richerportrayalof a
particular brand. Similarly, some distribution and
productpresentationsystems either encourageor mit-
igate against the development of rules to discriminate
among product offerings(e.g., one may have to visit
several stores to compare products).These factors, in
additionto inherentdifferencesin products(e.g., com-
plexity of rule structure;consumers' desire to "see"
certainproducts-cigarettes, beer, etc.-in a more ho-
listic fashion,possiblyto the degreethat they arelinked
to the self-concept),provide ample opportunityto ex-
plore the full range of categorizationmechanisms im-
plied by the following proposition:
P4: Increasingthe structuralcomplexityof an an-
alytic rule describing category membership
leads to greater reliance on exemplar-based
representationsand nonanalyticclassification
processes.
The JudgmentSetting
The environmentin which a categorizationis made
may be characterizedby a numberof aspectsthat work
for or againstthe use of an analyticalor nonanalytical
strategy.Time constraintsrelativeto the amount of in-
formationa personwould need to processusing a par-
ticularrule, and the opportunityto engagein a careful
466
analysisof individual featuresmay be key factors de-
terminingthe use of alternativeprocesses.Conditions
of viewingmay be less than ideal, and distractionsmay
be present-both potentiallyleadingto greaterreliance
on nonanalytic processing. On the other hand, cues
presentin the judgmentsetting(e.g., point-of-purchase
displays)can serveto prime eitherspecificaspects/rules
or storedexemplarsand increasethe likelihood of one
type of comparisonover another.
Of particularimportanceis the accessibilityof alter-
native categories.If two or more categoriesare salient,
categorizationper se becomes a focal problem, and a
more deliberativecomparativeprocessis likely (rather
than a more automatic assignment as soon as a good
fit is foundto a categoryexemplar).This type of activity
is more likely to involve the use of a rule. Increasing
the salience of multiple categoriesalso contributesto
the constructionof "rationalsettings"in that multiply
salient categoriesseem to evoke a rational, problem-
solvingorientationas well as the use of analyticalstrat-
egies (especiallywhen these are well learned and nor-
matively appropriate-typical laboratoryexperiments
being a case in point). The categorizationprocess is
likely to be quite differentdepending on whether the
settingemphasizesa rangeof behaviors/judgmentsper-
taining to a focal targetobject or instead increasesthe
salienceof the categoryitself or categoryinstances(e.g.,
exemplars,an ideal prototype).In the formercase, the
distinctiveattributesof the targetwill tend to be given
more weightsince it (ratherthan the category)becomes
the point of reference(see Tversky1977)in any retrieval
or matchingprocess-culminating perhapsin the iden-
tificationof a comparablecategoryexemplarthat shares
the target'smost prominentfeatures.Increasingthe sa-
lienceof a categorymay haveverydifferenteffects(since
the category becomes the referent) depending on
whethera feature-basedrule is readilyaccessible.Cat-
egorizationexperiments(and settings) can thus easily
tip the balance in the direction of a particularmodel
as follows:
P5: Conditionsthat reducethe availabilityof cog-
nitive resourcesin a given context (e.g., time
pressure,distractions,etc.) lead to greaterre-
liance on exemplar-basedand nonanalytic
processing.
P6: Increasingthe accessibility of previously ex-
periencedexemplars(prototypes)in memory
leads to greater reliance on exemplar-based
(prototype) processing. Similarly, rule-ana-
lytic processing is encouragedby priming a
storedrule or retrievalof features.
P7: Increasingthe salience of multiple categories
(i.e., those that are potential "fits to a target
item") leadsto greaterrelianceon rule-based,
analytic processing.
The precedingset of factorsis intended to illustrate
the contingent nature of categorizationprocesses.It is
THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
by no means exhaustive of those factors likely to
heightenthe chances of people using one type of cate-
gorization process or another (others have been de-
scribedin Homa 1984 and Alba and Hutchinson 1987).
As a startingpoint, however, researchersinterestedin
studyingconsumers'categorizationprocessesmay want
to considerthe choice of "level"of such variables,since
these are likely to have a strong impact on a respon-
dent's processingstrategy.If, for example, one is inter-
ested in exploringthe use of exemplarprocessing,cat-
egory learningshould certainlyoccur in a context that
allows in-depth exposureto individual instances, and
thejudgmentcontext shouldavoid a stresson precision
in assigninginstancesto contrastcategories.If the ob-
jective is to understandwhen various categorization
processesare likely to be adoptedby consumers,it may
be usefulto developa betterunderstandingof potential
purchasesituationsand otherjudgmentsettings(as well
as conditions of knowledgeacquisition)in terms of the
types of factorsjust discussed.
RESEARCH PARADIGMS
In orderto choose among alternativeinterpretations
of categorizationprocesses it is necessaryto develop
researchparadigmsthat are sensitive to the retrievalof
exemplar versus merely feature-levelinformation. In
addition, such researchparadigmsshould be appropri-
ate to the types of phenomenaand levels of psycholog-
ical functioningcharacteristicof consumerbehaviorif,
indeed,we wish to examinethe conditionsunderwhich
these presumablyflexibleresponsemodes operate.Ac-
cordingly,this section emphasizes methodologicalas-
pects of researchto distinguishstrictlyrule-basedpro-
cessing (i.e., analytic)from exemplar-basedprocessing
(i.e., initialaccessof storedexemplarsfollowedby either
an overall or feature-basedcomparison process). The
two major research paradigmsand their operational
predictions(i.e., ways of identifyingparticularmodels)
will be discussednext.
The CategoryJudgmentParadigm
The identification of categorization strategies has
been typically undertaken using a concept acquisition
research design (Bruner et al. 1956; Kemler Nelson
1984; Posner and Keele 1968). In these experiments,
subjects categorizestimuli and receive feedback (e.g.,
typicallywhetherthey are "correct"or not). Following
this, they are tested (without feedback) on another
stimulusset comprisingboth new and old (i.e., learning
set) instances. Differentaspectsof performanceon the
new instancesformthe basisfor inferenceregardingthe
categorizationprocessesadopted.The generalpremise
of this paradigmis that exemplar-based,nonanalytic
processingand rule-based,analytic processingshould
be differentiallysensitive to manipulations of overall
similarity between a test item and specific category
learningitems. Since an exemplar-basedprocessentails
ALTERNATIVEMODELS OF CATEGORIZATION 467

a comparison between the categorization object and in- EXHIBIT2

dividual instances stored in memory, its adoption THE CATEGORY-JUDGMENTPARADIGM
should lead to responses that are more sensitive to vari-
ations in overall similarity than responses arising out Features
of a process that involves the use of an attribute-based Category
rule. Likewise, rule-based processing should exhibit members Fl F2 F3 F4
more sensitivity (in specific categorization tasks) when
Learning Stimuli
test items differ in terms of their "match" to a specific Category X
rule, even if they are equivalent in terms of overall sim- 1 0 0 0 0
ilarity to a specific set of exemplars. Thus, one may 2 0 1 0 0
examine categorization performance on specially se- 3 0 0 1 0
lected test items, chosen to reflect different patterns of 4 0 0 0 1
rule and/or exemplar similarity characteristics, to infer Category Y
whether the predicted processing differences were in- 1 1 1 1 1
deed operative. 2 1 0 1 1
3 1 1 0 1
Individual studies vary in stimulus construction and 4 1 1 1 0
other details, depending on their respective goals. Ex-
hibit 2 is the sketch of a typical use of such a paradigm. Test (Transfer) Stimuli
As depicted, the learning stimuli consist of two cate- a 0 1 1 1
gories (X and Y) with four members in each. Each b 1 0 0 0
member in both of the categories is described in terms Predictions
of four category-relevant attributes (F1 to F4), with 0
and 1 representing two different values on each of the Category Y - -
features. Thus, while F 1 always has a value 0 for all
four members of category X, its value is 1 for all four Category X - -
members of category Y. Also, each member of X has
more 0's than l's in its profile. The reverse is true for (a) (b)
members of Y. The test stimuli are also described in
terms of profiles consisting of the same four attributes. NOTE: Analytic processing.
---- Nonanalytic processing.
Given such configurations of learning and test stimuli,
the specific predictions of each model are as follows. If
respondents categorize test item a as belonging in cat-
egory X and b as belonging in Y, then the basis of their categorization process. First, respondents could have
judgments is probably the defining value of Fl. Such induced or discovered the feature-based rule used to
an outcome is believed to reflect an analytic categori- create the similar/dissimilar configurations and em-
zation process. If, on the other hand, respondents clas- ployed it in an analytic fashion in making their judg-
sify a as belonging in Y and b as belonging in X, then ments. Alternatively, respondents might have relied
the process is termed nonanalytic because it reflects upon the autonomous item-level impressions of the
sensitivity to the entire profile rather than to a critical category members and used a nonanalytic matching
value on a single attribute. Obviously, the paradigm mechanism to make their judgments. Since judgment
can be extended to allow for the use of a multiple-feature outcome patterns in almost all cases may be made to
rule through the use of a larger number of stimuli. "fit" potential feature-based rules, data from this par-
It does not, however, directly address the question of adigm are not likely to be entirely convincing for pur-
what type of category representation was retrieved from poses of identifying specific categorization processes.
memory (i.e., rule versus exemplar/prototype) and then Put another way, very different processes may yield the
used in the categorization judgment. In addition, while same categorization result (though related outcomes
allowing one to choose with some confidence between and inferences may differ in important respects).
some alternative analytic models (especially specific Among other issues related to this paradigm is the
forms of single-cue and/or multi-cue models), the par- question of ecological validity. Stimulus sets are quite
adigm is less successful in differentiating between a artificial and are created specifically to meet a relatively
nonanalytic process and a number of competing ana- narrow range of theoretical considerations. Hence, ex-
lytic models. To illustrate, note (from Exhibit 2) that ploring the full range of the categorization phenomenon
overall similarity is operationalized in terms of certain and important contextual factors may be problematic.
configurations of features that are used to describe cat-
egory members. Subsequently, if subjects in certain The VerificationAccuracyParadigm
conditions demonstrate sensitivity towards the pres-
ence/absence of such configurations (say the "nonan- In the verification accuracy paradigm, subjects ini-
alytic pattern" in Exhibit 2 is found), two alternative tially learn about a category of products and are sub-
explanations are confounded in any description of the sequently asked to determine whether or not new in-
468
stances would fit into this learned category. The initial
learning conditions vary the form of categorical knowl-
edge acquired by subjects. Some subjects are only ex-
posed to the set of learning stimuli while others are also
provided with a feature-based rule. Equivalent learning
of the category exemplars is maintained for all subjects.
The major difference between the two research para-
digms is that the verification accuracy paradigm differ-
entiates between categorization mechanisms in terms
of the strength of memory traces that are implied by
the underlying information processing requirements of
each.
An exemplar-based categorization process involves
a comparison between the to-be-categorized new in-
stance and members of a previously categorized (i.e.,
learning) set. The key, then, is that in rule-based cate-
gorization no retrieval of these stored exemplars is as-
sumed. Thus, when compared to rule-based processing,
exemplar-based processing should lead to a memory
advantage for subsequent recall of previously learned
instances of a category (based on greater recency of ac-
tivation). This advantage should extend to all salient
features of an exemplar when it is used in a subsequent
effort to categorize a target object. Say, however, that
an exemplar was not used, and the person had instead
used a feature-based rule to categorize the target object.
Then there should have been no retrieval of particular
exemplars and no beneficial effect on subsequent recall
of information uniquely linked to any particular ex-
emplar. Let us work through an example to see what
memory differences should result.
Say an individual (following categorization of a new
instance) was asked to verify whether a certain "luxury"
feature had been included in a particular model (i.e.,
exemplar) of a previouslyencountered appliance. S/he
could either scan memory in an attempt to recall such
a feature or make an inference based on the "category
label" s/he had earlier assigned to the model.6 So if the
earlier model (i.e., exemplar) had been included in a
category of "economy" appliances, the person might
infer "no," based on the aspect-category incongruence.
Which of the two processes-memory-based feature re-
call or category-based inference-would dominate in
verifying a feature's presence in a previously seen cat-
egory member? The answer would seem to depend on
the strength of the memory trace for the category mem-
ber and feature, on one hand, and the confidence one
has in the placement of the object in a category plus
the "cue validity" or prototypicality of the feature on
the other.
6Category-based inferenceis a potentiallypowerfulheuristicin this
or any otherjudgmentsetting.Indeed,muchof the functionalbenefit
accruingto a personas a resultof categorizingobjects,people, and
eventslies in his/herresultingabilityto respondquicklyandefficiently
when "educatedguesses"are necessary(i.e., the "correctanswer"
cannotbe knownor is not available).Unfortunately,relianceon such
inferencescan produceerrorsin judgments(e.g., halo effects,stereo-
typing).
THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
Accordingly, the memory advantage in feature ver-
ification that results from further reliance on a (learning
set) exemplar when categorizing new instances is pre-
dicted to lead to differential accuracy over rule-based
processing in the following cases: (1) when a to-be-ver-
ified aspect of a category exemplar is inconsistentwith
its category designation, but the feature hadindeed been
associated with the exemplar, and (2) when a to-be-
verified aspect is consistentwith its category designation
but it had not, in fact, been associated with the exem-
plar. For the remaining aspects, both memory-based
and purely categorical inference would lead to similar
"correct" verification responses. This, then, provides
one fundamental basis for demonstrating the use of ex-
emplars in categorization. A second prediction is that
idiosyncratic (i.e., non-rule-relevant) features of ex-
emplars should display considerable improvement in
verification accuracy as a function of their (automatic)
rehearsal if exemplars are used during subsequent cat-
egorization of new instances.
Enhanced memorability (resulting from activation
of an exemplar or exemplars during categorization of
a test item) should result in faster retrieval in addition
to higher accuracy in verification of the retrieved ex-
emplars' predicted aspects. As such, reaction time pre-
dictions should not only parallel verification accuracy
patterns, but potentially provide an even more sensitive
measure of exemplar retrieval as a way of identifying
categorization processes.7
The major advantage of the verification accuracy
paradigm is that it allows one to differentiate among a
larger set of potential processes. By systematically de-
lineating the processing assumptions underlying each
model and creating appropriate verification items, one
can rely on memory measures for processing activity
to infer particular strategies. Categorization judgment
data, per se, are not as revealing, since different pro-
cessing operations may lead to a similar categorization
outcome.
Unfortunately, however, the systematic variance in
verification accuracy data may be small, making it dif-
ficult to detect a difference in processing operations. If
past exemplars of the category are well learned (through
repeated usage or memorization in the context of a
study), then memory advantages arising out of a single
instance of exemplar retrieval (that during categoriza-
tion of a test item) may not be substantial enough to
lead to significant accuracy or time differences. Such
differences may reflect a nonequivalence of prior
knowledge of category exemplars in studies that do not
utilize artificial (or "new") instances.
One potential source of experimental demand may
be unwanted special attention to rule-relevant aspects
7A lengthy discussionof alternativetechniquesfor assessingthe
strengthof memorytracesis beyond the scope of this paper.An ex-
tremely helpfuldiscussionof recall, recognition,and reaction-time
proceduresas appliedto the domainof socialcognitioncan be found
in Srull 1984.
ALTERNATIVEMODELS OF CATEGORIZATION
(and "nonattention"to backgroundaspects)on the part
of subjectsif they are providedwith a category-defining
rulepriorto being exposedto exemplarsfromthe target
category or categories. Precautions for this include
postponement of rule information until exemplar
learninghas been completed, since it is essential that
initial acquisition of categoryinformation be equiva-
lent.
Several other measures can be used to supplement
the key indices of both the categorization-and verifi-
cation-basedparadigms.In makinga categoryjudgment
for a new instance,one's perceivedsuccessin beingable
to execute a chosen strategy(i.e., accessingappropriate
memoryrepresentationsand performingnecessaryop-_
erations) should be reflectedin his/her level of confi-
dence in that judgment. For a rule-analyticprocessor,
confidence should be a function of prior expertise in
rule usage and the relative ease with which the latter
may be applied vis-a-vis a given stimulus set and in a
givenjudgment setting.The extent of ambiguityof the
target stimulus, perhapsrelating to the proportion of
featuresit shareswith the exemplars/prototypesfrom
two or more alternativecategories,should also lead to
differentfeelingsof confidence.For an exemplar-based,
nonanalyticprocessor,confidenceshouldbe a function
of the relative availability of past exemplarsthat are
similarin an overallsense to the test item/s. To explore
processingdifferences,stimulus sets (e.g., product as-
sortments)may be created that reflect differentlevels
of ease of featureidentificationand ambiguityand/or
overallsimilaritybetween to-be-categorizeditems and
trainingexemplars.
Confidencein verifyingthe presence or absence of
specific aspects of past exemplars,on the other hand,
shouldbe a functionof the memorabilityand respective
cue validities of each specific aspect. Communication
aspects (e.g., prominence, attentional aspects) may,
therefore,be quite important.Theoretically,the overall
pattern of verification confidence ratings in a given
study should parallelthat of verificationaccuracies.
Following categorizationof new instances, respon-
dents may be asked to describetheir mental processes.
Eventhoughthe level of consciousawarenessassociated
with suchjudgmentsremainan issue, to the extent that
theseare somewhatavailableto consciousintrospection
they may provide supplementaryevidence, and at the
very least, expose proceduralproblems(e.g., unantici-
pated rule inductions). Collecting concurrent self-re-
portsduringcategoryjudgmentsis stronglydiscouraged
on grounds of interferencewith the mental processes
of interest. Either free-format elicitation or forced
choices between severalpotential process descriptions
may be collected at little additional cost following the
judgment/s.
Whileno studyreportedin the literaturehas yet done
so, the two researchparadigmsmay be usefully com-
bined within a single experimentalframeworkby fol-
lowing a categorizationtask by the verificationproce-
duresdiscussedabove. The advantagesof doing so may
469
be seen by recallingthe example discussedin conjunc-
tion with Exhibit 2. We noted that a categoryassign-
ment that might appearto result from a nonanalytic
processmightin fact resultfromthe use of a more com-
plex analyticrule (say, one involving all four features).
In the latter case, however, respondentsusing such a
strategyshould fare no betterthan those employingan
analyticrulebasedsolelyon F I in verifyingthe presence
or absence of the category-relevantfeatures (i.e., Fl-
F4) or the category-irrelevantaspects of the set of ex-
emplarsencounteredin the learning phase. Yet if ex-
emplar-basedprocessingmechanisms had been oper-
ative, then there should be enhancedmemorabilityfor
these featuresof specificlearningset exemplars,result-
ing in higheraccuracy,fasterretrieval,and greatercon-
fidence.Thoughthis is more speculative,one difference
between exemplar analytic mechanisms (i.e., a test
stimulusis comparedto a storedexemplaron a feature-
by-featurebasis) and exemplar nonanalytic processes
maybe seen in the somewhatgreatermemoryadvantage
the former would give to shared, ratherthan unique,
featuresof the exemplar.This patternshould be most
evident in the more subtle responsetime measures.
The researchstrategyjust introducedalso appearsto
be useful in accommodatingdifferentresearchobjec-
tives. If the objective is to understandwhen each cat-
egorizationstrategyis likely to be adoptedby consum-
ers, it may be helpfulto develop a generaltaxonomy of
potentialcategorylearningand productevaluationsit-
uationsin termsof contingentfactorsdiscussedearlier.
If, for example,categoryformationoccursin a discrim-
ination learningcontext (such as throughcataloguead-
vertisementsof brands grouped by specific classifica-
tions or contiguous displays of two or more different
brandlines), and an unfamiliarbrand is subsequently
encountered,both exemplarand rule-basedprocessing
are possible;thus judgment task and involvement fac-
tors are likely to be critical. Such factors could be in-
corporatedinto the researchdesign. If the researcher's
objectiveis ratherto documentdifferentcategorization
strategies,then "levels"of the contingentfactorsshould
be chosen so that it is reasonablefor subjectsto adopt
each strategy.
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
In this final section, we returnto a broaderconsid-
eration of the categorizationperspectiveto summarize
some of its majorimplicationsfor consumerbehavior.
It is difficultto talk meaningfullyabout product class
boundaries,evoked sets, product substitutability,and
relatedways of describingbetween-product(or brand)
homogeneityof responsewithoutrecognizingthat these
ideas are intimately linked to categorization.
One failingof manycontemporaryviewsof consumer
behavioris that they focus to such a degree on the re-
lationship (and often the process underlyingthe rela-
tionship) between a consumer and a single, specific
470
consumptionobject that they tend to ignore the struc-
turalcontextwithinwhich this relationshipexists. Such
a "one-on-one"perspective-whetherin termsof brand
beliefs, evaluation, advertisingresponse, or overt be-
havior (e.g., brand loyalty)-is artificial. Consumers
rarelyconceive of a product in isolation, much to the
dismayof wishful-thinkingbrandmanagerswho would
preferthat a givenbrandoccupycenterstageall to itself.
In contrast, the categorizationperspectiveprovides a
way of thinking about the relationshipbetween a con-
sumerand an individuallydefinedassortmentof prod-
ucts. In doing so it recognizesthe importanceof both
instrumentalaspects(i.e., relatedprimarilyto product
use and function) and expressivefactors,whethermar-
keter-initiatedor basedon generalor personalizedgoals
and desires. At the individual level, then, the catego-
rizationperspectiveemphasizesthe viewthatconsumers
tend to organize their belief systems about products
around category-relevantfactors (e.g., consumption
goals, productfunctions, common properties,clear or
idealinstances)ratherthana set of singlebrandattitudes
or beliefs.
The researchagendafollowingfrom this orientation
is quite varied. We have very little systematic knowl-
edge, for example, about the respectiveinfluences on
productcategoryformationand change.There is not a
grevatdeal of researchon how productcategoriesdevelop
in consumers'minds despitethe fact that this may well
be a more fundamentallevel at which to look at the
organizationof productknowledge.For example,brand
or product salience or accessibilityin memory, while
interesting in its own right, may largely be a conse-
quence of categorystructureonce we escape the tran-
sitoryeffectsof experimentalmanipulations.It may thus
be more importantto take a carefullook at these more
fundamentalissuesand processes.Thereis the realpos-
sibility, for example, that the consumer environment
favorscategorydefinitionin termsof specificexemplars
ratherthan category-definingfeatures(at least for cer-
tain types of products),and this has considerableim-
plicationsfor evoked-setformationand change.For the
latter,productpresentationstrategiesthat have a direct
impact at early stagesof productperception(e.g., that
increase the likelihood of perceived similarityto par-
ticular exemplars)are likely to be of considerableim-
portance.Conditionsunderwhich consumersare likely
to createdifferentiatedsubcategoriesof productsalmost
certainly would benefit from closer scrutiny. This is
likely to have considerablepracticalsignificancesince
so much marketingeffortis directedat producingthis
type of effect.
One of the most interestingfeatures of future con-
sumer categorizationresearchis likely to be its focus
on both evaluativecategoriesand the link between ob-
ject identificationand evaluation. The traditionallit-
eratureon categorization,much of it springingdirectly
from researchon concept learning, has tended to use
affectivelyneutral stimuli (e.g., geometric forms, arti-
ficiallanguage)or generalclassesof objects(e.g., tables,
THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
birds). Social psychologists as well as consumer re-
searchers have long recognized the importance of per-
ceiving an instance as a member of a general class in
terms of subsequent judgments and inferences (e.g.,
stereotyping, price-quality inferences).8 Categorization
research in both person perception (e.g., Cantor 1982;
Fazio 1986; Fiske 1982; Fiske and Pavelchak 1986) and
product perception has the potential to greatly sharpen
our understanding of the interplay between "purely
cognitive" and affective processes. In consumer behav-
ior, for example, affectively neutral categories may be
the exception: many categories may be goal-related.
Further, if the assumption of a rule-like judgment
process (e.g., multiattribute model) is in fact incorrect
in many situations, our views of how attitudes are
formed or changed may need to be modified. While an
analytically based categorization model would also
suggest that favorable evaluation follows from the per-
ceived presence of features that place an object in a
positively evaluated category, an exemplar-based model
might stress perceived similarity to an exemplar or pro-
totype to accomplish a similar purpose. Since catego-
rization produces a reduction in uncertainty, positive
affect may result from a successful fit and negative affect
from an inability to categorize an item-particularly if
the resulting judgments or inferences are important.
When a consumer has little experience with a product,
for example, being able to categorize it with products
that are familiar may permit a set of important infer-
ences to be made. How such categorization will be ac-
complished may depend importantly on the degree of
product complexity and the consumer's background
knowledge. If preattentive, automatic processes can
create a unitized representation, overall similarity-based
processes become more likely. If, however, increasing
complexity or a lack of product knowledge make it dif-
ficult to combine feature-level information using au-
tomatic processes, more analytical treatment of indi-
vidual attributes becomes necessary. Since, however,
this may also be more effortful (particularly under time
constraints) there may be a tendency to focus on a re-
duced number of features, perhaps those that are most
prominent, which may lead to errors of categorization
and suboptimal product choice.
Many comparison ads seem to be based on the prem-
8Aconsiderableamountof researchhasexaminedthe consequences
of makingvariouscategoriesmoreaccessibleto people.Situationally
inducedprimingeffects,for example,arewell knownto increasecat-
egoryaccessibility.Whenattemptingto generalizefromthesestudies,
however,it is importantto recall that such effectstend to be short
lived.Also, as Herr,Sherman,and Fazio(1983)point out, sucheffects
arenot robustin the absenceof ambiguousstimuli.Indeed,marketers
may wish to note with caution that increasingcategoryaccessibility
may even producea contrasteffect when the product that follows
enhancedcategoryaccessibilityis not ambiguousand also seems to
be a poor match with the category.In that event, some judgments
may actuallybe displacedfrom the category.Finally, we ignore at
considerablerisk the probabilitythat initial accessibility-likeeffects
on categorizationwill give way to more deliberativecategorization
judgmentsas informationprocessingprogresses.
ALTERNATIVEMODELS OF CATEGORIZATION
ise that simply presentinga less well-knownbrandto-
getherwith a brand that is favorablyevaluated(i.e., a
memberof a desiredsubcategory)leads to not only fa-
vorableattitudes toward the former but similar infer-
ences on unmentioned features.The implication here
is thatthe assignmentof affectto a new instance,which
has been viewed as a function of some type of feature-
basedcognitive algebraby traditionalattitude models,
may alternativelyresultfrom exemplar-basedcompar-
ison processes.By relatingthe assignmentof affect to
morefundamentalcategorizationprocesseswe are also
more likely to anticipate the type of inferences that
consumersuse to fill in "informationgaps"when direct
product knowledge is absent or when the motivation
to seek such information is low. Obviously, this may
not always result in positive outcomes for consumers
to the extent that such inferences are incorrect. Ex-
emplar-based(and possibly nonanalytical) processes
may also provide some insight into affect-transferphe-
nomena that have previouslybeen discussed in terms
of classicalconditioningand generalizationor, simply,
"affectreferral"(Wright1975), particularlyas they oc-
cur in low involvement settings.
Finally, while describingand attempting to under-
stand consumer decision making in terms of funda-
mental information processingconcepts has attracted
numerousresearchers,there appearsto be growingdis-
enchantmentwith what some would describeas "overly
cognitiveapproaches."Some of this criticismseems to
be -directedat what is seen as mechanistic and "com-
puter-like"assumptions that underlie many of these
approaches.While it would clearly be unwise to turn
away from the analyticaland networktypes of models
that have proven so useful, it might be equally unwise
to ignorethe possibilityof developingmore integrated
and holistic accounts of consumers'judgmentsand be-
havior.Categorizationmay be a good meeting ground
for researcherswho are seriouslyinterestedin consumer
decision making and in exploringthe nature and role
of self-definedproduct categories (including category
formation, assignment of instances to categories,and
category-based inferenceprocesses)fromboth analytical
and nonanalyticalperspectives.We believe that cate-
gorization is a topic of considerable conceptual and
practicalimportancewithin the field of consumer be-
havior, and we hope that this article will be a spur to
researchin this area.
[ReceivedMay 1985. Revised October1986.]
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