Section 6- Liberty of Abode and of Travel

Marcos vs. Manglapus [G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989]

FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought
to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the
respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to
bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant
by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the
President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section
20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to
the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986]
Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial
courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor
his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The
prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals
seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove,
respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ
commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts
which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction
over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.

Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed
upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave
the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that
the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.

Silverio vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991]

Facts:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in
Criminal Case of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his
provisional liberty.
More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines
filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order
against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the
necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order directing the Department of
Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner’s passport or to deny his application therefor, and the
Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was
based primarily on the Trial Court’s finding that since the filing of the Information, “the accused
has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his
arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the
country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court”. Petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction of his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court
from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return. So it is also that “An accused
released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart
from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending.

Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the
power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts
the allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security,
public safety or public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Genuino vs. Delima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018
Facts:
The case is a consolidated case of Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition against former
DOJ Secretary Delima for her issuance of DOJ circular no. 41. Series of 2010, known as the
“Consolidated Rules and Regulations Governing Issuance and Implementation of Hold
Departure Orders (HDO), Watchlist Orders (WLO) and Allow Departure Orders (ADO)”. The
Petitioners questions the constitutionality of this DOJ circular on the ground that it infringes the
constitutional right to travel. The petitioners in these consolidated cases are former President
Arroyo and her husband, and Efraim and Erwin Genuino. Former DOJ Secretary De lima issued
HDO and WLO against petitioners on the ground that criminal charges of plunder, qualified theft
and violation of the Omnibus Election Code were filed against them. Petitioners, particularly
Spouses Arroyo, file temporary restraining order against the issued HDO and WLO of DOJ
seeking relief and grant from court to allow them to travel so that former president Arroyo may
seek medical treatment abroad. The court granted relief sought on a condition that petition will
file a bond of PhP2M, an undertaking that petitioners shall report to Philippine consulate in the
countries they are to visit (Germany, Singapore, USA, Italy, Spain and Austria) and shall appoint
a representative to receive on their behalf subpoena, orders and other legal processes. Petitioners
complied all the conditions
Instead of following the order of the court, DOJ caused for the refusal to process the
petitioners travel documents. Hence, this case.

Issue:
Whether or not the issued DOJ circular 41 infringes the constitutional rights of the
petitioners to travel and thus an ultra vires to the constitution.

Ruling of the Court:

The constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation; it is
deemed written in every statute and contract. If a law or administrative rule violates any norm of
the constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.
In this case, the right to travel is a guarantee of the constitution under the Bill of rights.
There are allowable restrictions in the exercise of this right which are for the interest of national
security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law.
The ground of the respondent in the issuance of DOJ circular 41 is for the petitioners to
be present during the preliminary investigation of their cases which is outside the allowable
restrictions provided by the constitution, hence, it is an ultra vires and has no effect.

Section 7- Right to Information

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 72119, May 29,
1987]

Facts: The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern
in a special civil action for mandamus against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil
service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu
City. The standing of the petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of
legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of government employees for failure of
petitioner to provide actual interest to secure the information sought.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to information in the case at
bar.

Held: The court held that when the question is one of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen
and as such interested in the execution of the laws. The Constitution provides the guarantee of
adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law as in
regulation in the manner of examining the public records by the government agency in custody
thereof. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not
absolute. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore
exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national
security.

The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner is of
public interest. All appointments in the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit
and fitness while a public office is a public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to
the people even as to their eligibilities to their positions in the government. The court also noted
that the information on the result of the CSC eligibility examination is released to the public
therefore the request of petitioner is one that is not unusual or unreasonable. The public, through
any citizen, has the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any person occupying government
positions.

Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr. [G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989]
FACTS :
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their
right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the
names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were
able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners
with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow
petitioners access to the public records for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently
not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS)
Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for
failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action
necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."

ISSUE :
WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on
behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.

HELD :
Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as
regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on
considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare
what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues
are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves
as the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if
they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at
the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the
interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding
responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to
ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used
here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already
a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though
not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that
government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions
entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are
within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and,
pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord
them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and
the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice [G.R. No. 132601, October 12,

1998]
FACTS :
On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s ten year old
daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the constitutionality of RA
7659 “ The Death Penalty Law”, and the imposition of death penalty for the crime of rape. The
motions were denied with the court finding no reason to declare it unconstitutional and
pronouncing Congress compliant with the requirements for its imposition.
RA 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The mode
of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice
promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and directed the Director of
Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice
and Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and
its implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon
City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a
date of execution.
On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties to
mantain status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for
TRO until resolution of the petition.
The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in
question is unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a
motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the death
penalty is cruel and degrading citing applicable provisions and statistics showing how other
countries have abolished the death penalty and how some have become abolitionists in practice .
Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

ISSUE :
WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for being an undue
delegation of legislative power

HELD:
THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,
BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177
IS INVALID.
The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and each
department has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of
non-delegation of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is : potestas delegata non delegari potest.”
(what has been delegated, cannot be delegated). There are however exceptions to this rule and
one of the recognized exceptions is “ Delegation to Administrative Bodies “
The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of
lethal injection.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of
the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself – it
must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
– and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable –
to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out
the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who
is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map
out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.
Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government [G.R No.
130716, December 9, 1998]
MAHABA READ
Facts:

Petitioner, instituted a case against public respondent to make public any negotiations and/or
agreements pertaining to the latter's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. The
respondents argued that the action was premature since he has not shown that he had asked the
respondents to disclose the negotiations and agreements before filing the case.

Issue:

Does the petitioner have the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition?

Held:

The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to
government records, documents and papers- a right guaranteed under section 7, article III of the
Philippine Constitution. The petitioner a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen, and
because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain
petitioner's standing i.e

(1) ENFORCEMENT OF A LEGAL RIGHT

(2) ESPOUSED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN

we rule, that the petition at bar be allowed.

Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SALN of SC Justices [A.M. No. 09-8-
6-SC, 13 June 2012]
Facts:
Rowena Paraan, Research Director of the PCIJ, sought copies of the SALN of the Justices of the
Supreme Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet of the
Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their database of information on government
officials.

Issue #1:
Can the SALN of justices be accessed via the right to information?

Ruling:
Yes. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure and honesty in the public service

Issue #2:
What are the limitations on the constitutional right to information?

Ruling:
The right to information is not absolute. It is further subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. Jurisprudence has provided the following limitations to that right:(1) national
security matters and intelligence information;(2) trade secrets and banking transactions;(3)
criminal matters; and(4) other confidential information such as confidential or classified
information officially known to public officers and employees by reason of their office and not
made available to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings
and executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme
Court.

Akbayan v. Aquino [G.R. No. 170516, 16 July 2008]

FACTS:
Petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed by the petitioners, as congresspersons, citizens
and taxpayers, requesting respondents to submit to them the full text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).

Petitioner emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates
there right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-
disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation
in all levels of social, political and economic decision making.

Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought
involves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to
information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA.
That diplomatic negotiation are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of the
subsequent event that occurred?

Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered by
the doctrine of executive privilege?

Held:
On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled that t]he principal relief petitioners are praying for is
the disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States
parties,” public disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its signing by the President, during the
pendency of the present petition, has been largely rendered moot and academic.
The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has become
moot and academic to the extent that it seeks the disclosure of the “full text” thereof.
The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text
of the JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.

Moving on to the second issue, The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations,
therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting
no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate
v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be
considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the
claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the
desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.
The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, Wherein petitioners were seeking
information from the President’s representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of
the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that “secrecy of
negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of
speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.

IDEALS v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corp.

[G.R. No. 192088, 09 October 2012]
Law on Natural Resources| Foreign-owned Corporation| Government Agreements| Water Code

Background of the case. A petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to permanently enjoin
the sale of the Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources
Corporation (K-Water) which won the public bidding conducted by the Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM).

FACTS:
Respondent PSALM is a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of RA
9136, also known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA). The EPIRA
provided a framework for the restructuring of the electric power industry, including the
privatization of the assets of the NAPOCOR, the transition to the desired competitive structure,
and the definition of the responsibilities of the various government agencies and private entities.
PSALM is mandated to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC
generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and Independent Power Producer (IPP)
contracts with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract
costs in an optimal manner, which liquidation is to be completed within PSALM’s 25-year term
of existence.
On 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt hydro electric power plant
located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan, which will form part of the Angat Complex which
includes the Angat Dam, Angat Reservoir and the outlying watershed area.
On 2009, PSALM’s Board of Directors approved the Bidding Procedures for the privatization of
the Hydro Electric Power Plant. An Invitation to Bid was published in three major national
newspapers where six competing firms enjoined, namely:
 K-Water US$ 440,880,000.00
 First Gen Northern Energy 365,000,678.00
 San Miguel Corporation 312,500,000.00
 Aboitiz Power-Pangasinan, Inc. 256,000,000.00
 Trans-Asia Oil & Energy Dev. Com 237,000,000.00
 DMCI Power Corporation 188,890,000.00
After a post-bid evaluation, PSALM approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award
to the highest bidder, K-Water.

Contention of the petitioner:

That the participation in the bidding of and award of contract to K-Water which is a foreign
corporation, PSALM clearly violated the constitutional provisions on the appropriation and
utilization of water as a natural resource, as implemented by the Water Code of the Philippines
limiting water rights to Filipino citizens and corporations which are at least 60% Filipino-owned.
Further considering the importance of the Angat Dam which is the source of 97% of Metro
Manila’s water supply, as well as irrigation for farmlands in 20 municipalities and towns in
Pampanga and Bulacan, petitioners assert that PSALM should prioritize such domestic and
community use of water over that of power generation.

ISSUE:
Whether PSALM violated Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution and the Water Code provisions on
the grant of water rights.

RULING:
It is clear that the law limits the grant of water rights only to Filipino citizens and juridical
entities duly qualified by law to exploit and develop water resources, including private
corporations with sixty percent of their capital owned by Filipinos.
Under the Water Code concept of appropriation, a foreign company may not be said to be
“appropriating” our natural resources if it utilizes the waters collected in the dam and converts
the same into electricity through artificial devices. Since the NPC remains in control of the
operation of the dam by virtue of water rights granted to it, as determined under DOJ Opinion
No. 122, s. 1998, there is no legal impediment to foreign-owned companies undertaking the
generation of electric power using waters already appropriated by NPC, the holder of water
permit. Such was the situation of hydropower projects under the BOT contractual arrangements
whereby foreign investors are allowed to finance or undertake construction and rehabilitation of
infrastructure projects and/or own and operate the facility constructed. However, in case the
facility requires a public utility franchise, the facility operator must be a Filipino corporation or
at least 60% owned by Filipino.
Foreign ownership of a hydropower facility is not prohibited under existing laws. The
construction, rehabilitation and development of hydropower plants are among those
infrastructure projects which even wholly-owned foreign corporations are allowed to undertake
under the Amended Build-Operate-Transfer (Amended BOT) Law (R.A. No. 7718).

The Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of

the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain [G.R. No. 183591,
14 October 2008]
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to
prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They
also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the
GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public
concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their
mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of
guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any
branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in
David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged
action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any
other overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal
of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the
dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters
of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information,
while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.
The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject
only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest
in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to
the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and
local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned
sectors of society.

3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest
in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an “associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers
that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It
also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however,
does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does
it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship
with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed,
BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of
association – runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE
being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific
provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the
Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just
quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact
and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of
the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to
the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to
preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be
construed as an unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional

amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will
eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is
submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom
constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines
“Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands
including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their
descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only
“Moros” as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao
and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples
shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The
MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested
exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties
to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department
or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by
mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices
to conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human
ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally
and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants
from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when
he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic
Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was
designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a
whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross
evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

Section 8- Right to Form Associations

SSS Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 85279,
July 28, 1989]

Facts:
The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning
the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer
for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued
a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction
while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on
the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations
Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the
petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to
strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the
petitioners from striking.

Issue:
Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike
Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held:
The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee
among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as
strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules
governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular
No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by
Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation
allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as
“government employees” and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with
an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the
Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of
injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court
for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union [G.R. No. L-25246,

September 12, 1974]
Ponente: Zaldivar Sec. 18, Article II 1987 Constitution:
"The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare."

Facts:
Petitioner Victoriano is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo and was an employee of Elizalde Rope
Factory and was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. Membership with the Union
was mandatory as provided for under a collective bargaining agreement: "Membership in the
Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers
covered by this Agreement."
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic
Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act
No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4
of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".

Being a member of the INC, a religion that prohibits affiliation with labor organizations, the
Petitioner wrote a letter informing the Union of his resignation. Thereupon, the Union wrote a
formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of
the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member.

The CFI ruled in favor of Petitioner and enjoined the company from dismissing him.

In its appeal, the Union claimed that R.A. no. 3350 was unconstitutional on the ground that 1)
prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect
prohibits affiliations of their members thereto; and, consequently, deprives said members of their
constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious [to the] Constitution; 2) Impairs the obligation of contracts;
3) discriminates in favor of certain religious sects and affords no protection to labor unions; 4)
violates the constitutional provision that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of a
civil right; 5) violates the equal protection clause; and 6) the act violates the constitutional
provision regarding the promotion of social justice.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 3350 violates the Constitutional mandate to protect the rights of
workers and to promote their welfare notwithstanding the fact that it allows some workers, by
virtue of their religious beliefs, to opt out of Union security agreements.

Held:
NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be pointed out that the free exercise of
religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must,
therefore, yield to the former.

The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or
religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused
work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded
to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements.

More so now in the [1987 and past in constitutions] [...] where it is mandated that "the
State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate
the relation between workers and employers.
We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the spirit of
the constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons,
of a burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed
that burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), and, certainly,
Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take away the same burden. It is certain that not every
conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with
scrupples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state
interest" intervenes. In the instant case, We see no such compelling state interest to withhold
exemption.

In re: IBP membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial Edillon

[A.C. No. 1928, August 3, 1978]

Facts:
This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues
assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership
fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that the stated provisions constitute
an invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled to be a member of the IBP in order to
practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to liberty and property and thereby null and
void.

Issue:
Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the
respondent.

Held:
The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that
are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP
however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to
the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable annual
fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of regulations in the
practice of law. The provisions assailed does not infringe the constitutional rights of the
respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its existence with
regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of
attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.