Requisites for Admission of Parole on the Ground of Mistake

LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 126006 January 29, 2004

FACTS:
Elias Q. Tan, the President of Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., obtained four loans from Allied
Banking Corporation covered by four promissory notes. The entire obligation amounted
to P493,566.61 and despite demands made on them by the Bank, the Tan and Lapulapu
Foundation, Inc. failed to pay the same. The trial court issued decision requiring Elias Q.
Tan and Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. to pay jointly and solidarily Allied Banking Corporation.
On appeal, the appellate court disbelieved Tan’s claim that the loans were his personal
loans as the promissory notes evidencing them showed upon their faces that these were
obligations of the Foundation, as contracted by Tan himself in his official and personal
character. Applying the parole evidence rule, the CA likewise rejected Tan’s assertion that there
was an unwritten agreement between him and the Bank that he would pay the loans from the
proceeds of his shares of stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corp.

ISSUE:
Are the promissory notes sufficient proofs of the foundation’s liability?

RULING:
Yes.
The parol evidence rule constrains this Court to reject Tan’s claim regarding the
purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the payment of the
obligation Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that “when the
terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.”
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to
vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to
explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless
there has been fraud or mistake. No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this
case.

Requisites for Admission of Parole on the Ground of Mistake

EDENBERT MADRIGAL AND VIRGILIO MALLARI vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 142944 April 15, 2005
FACTS:
Jose Mallari and his wife Fermina Mallari executed a document denominated as Deed of
Absolute Sale, where the couple appeared to have conveyed to their son Virgilio Mallari the
house and lot in question for a consideration of P50,000.00 although the property easily
commands much more at that time.
Jose Mallari, without his knowledge, his son Virgilio, via a document entitled Kasulatan
ng Bilihang Tuluyan, sold the same property for the same amount of P50,000.00 to Edenbert
Madrigal. Jose was then demanded by Edenbert Madrigal to vacate the subject property. It was
then that Jose came to know for the first time of the sale of his property by his son Virgilio in
favor of Edenbert Madrigal thru the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan.
The trial court rendered judgment for Jose Mallari by ordering Edenbert Madrigal to allow
the former to redeem the subject property based on the same amount it was sold to him by
Virgilio Mallari. The appellate court affirmed such judgment. Madrigal faults the two (2) courts
below for construing the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Jose Mallari and his wife Fermina
Mallari in favor of their son Virgilio Mallari as an equitable mortgage and not as an outright sale
as the document itself proclaims.

ISSUE:
Is the contract entered by spouses Mallari and their son in deed a contract of sale or an
equitable mortgage?

RULING:
No.
Even when a document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property may
prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an issue the fact that the
document does not express the true intent of the parties. In this case, parol evidence then
becomes competent and admissible to prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact given
merely as a security for the repayment of a loan. And upon proof of the truth of such allegations,
the court will enforce the agreement or understanding in consonance with the true intent of the
parties at the time of the execution of the contract.

Requisites for Admission of Parole on the Ground of Mistake

BALDOMERO INCIONG, JR., v. COURT OF APPEALS

and PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. 96405 June 26, 1996
FACTS:
Baldomero Inciong, Jr.’s liability resulted from the promissory note in the amount
of P50,000.00 which he signed with Rene C. Naybe and Gregorio D. Pantanosas on
February 3, 1983, holding themselves jointly and severally liable to Philippine Bank of
Communications, Cagayan de Oro City branch.
Inciong Jr. alleged that he was approached by his friend, Rudy Campos, who told
him that he was a partner of Pio Tio, the branch manager of private respondent in
 Cagayan de Oro City, in the falcata logs operation business. Campos also intimated to
him that Rene C. Naybe was interested in the business and would contribute a chainsaw
to the venture. He added that, although Naybe had no money to buy the equipment, Pio
Tio had assured Naybe of the approval of a loan he would make with Campos. Campos
then persuaded Inciong Jr. to act as a "co-maker" in the said loan. Inciong Jr. allegedly
acceded but with the understanding that he would only be a co-maker for the loan of
P5,000.00.
He alleged that five (5) copies of a blank promissory note were brought to him by
Campos at his office. He affixed his signature thereto but in one copy, he binds himself
only for the amount of P5,000.00. Thus, it was by trickery, fraud and misrepresentation
that he was made liable for the amount of P50,000.00. Further, Inciong Jr. asserts that
since the promissory note "is not a public deed with the formalities prescribed by law but
a mere commercial paper which does not bear the signature of attesting witnesses, parol
evidence may overcome the contents of the promissory note.

ISSUES:
(a) Can the parol evidence be used to prove that Inciong Jr. agreed to a different loan
amount?
(b) Should a written contract be in a particular form, or be both signed by the parties
before the parole evidence ruled be applied?

RULING:
(a) Yes.
Parol evidence can be used to prove that petitioner agreed to a different loan amount.
(However, he was not able to prove that there was fraud in the case).
By alleging fraud in his answer, petitioner was actually in the right direction towards proving
that he and his co-makers agreed to a loan of P5,000.00 only considering that, where a
parol contemporaneous agreement was the inducing and moving cause of the written
contract, it may be shown by parol evidence. However, fraud must be established by clear
and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence, not even being adequate.
Petitioner’s attempt to prove fraud must, therefore, fail as it was evidenced only by his own
uncorroborated and, expectedly, self-serving testimony.

(b) No. The first paragraph of the parol evidence rules states:
"When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered
as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties
and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement."
Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be a public document. What
required is that agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on "long experience
that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in
fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of
their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to
show that the parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing
signed by them." Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not
by in any particular form, or be signed by both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and
 other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or contradicted by parol
or extrinsic evidence.

Requisites for Admission of Parole on the Ground of Mistake

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Court of Appeals and Chong Bian
G.R. No. 139495 November 27, 2000

FACTS:
In 1995, Chiong Bian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the RTC of
Cebu, alleging that sometime in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC) ventured to
expand the Cebu Lahug Airport. As a consequence, it sought to acquire by expropriation or
negotiated sale several parcels of lands adjoining the Lahug Airport, one of which was Lot 941
owned by Chiongbian. Since she and other landowners could not agree with the NAC’s offer for
the compensation of their lands, a suit for eminent domain was instituted, before the then CFI of
Cebu against 45 landowners, including Chiongbian, which was finally decided in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Some of the defendants-landowners appealed the decision to the CA which rendered a
modified judgment allowing them to repurchase their expropriated properties. Chiongbian, on
the other hand, did not appeal and instead, accepted the compensation for Lot 941 upon the
assurance of the NAC that she or her heirs would be given the right of reconveyance for the
same price once the land would no longer be used as airport by an alleged written agreement
by Chongbian without presenting the agreement. Consequently, the TCT of Chiongbian was
cancelled and a TCT was issued in the name of the Republic. Then, with the creation of the
MCIAA, it was cancelled and a TCT was issued in MCIAA’s name. However, no expansion of
the Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its predecessors-in-interest. Thus, the
purpose for which Lot 941 was taken ceased to exist.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Chiongbian and MCIAA was ordered to restore
to plaintiff the possession and ownership of the Lot No. 941 upon reimbursement of the
expropriation price paid to plaintiff. MCIAA appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the
RTC decision. MCIAA argued in its petition that the CA erred in admitting the oral evidence on
Chiongbian claim. And that the Claim of repurchase agreement is not supported by
documentary evidence.

ISSUE:
Should the presentation of parol evidence be allowed to prove the existence of a written
agreement containing the right to repurchase in this case?

RULING:
No.
The parol evidence rule provides that “when the terms of a written agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and
there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.” It applies to written agreements
and has no application to a judgment of a court. To permit Chongbian to prove the
existence of a compromise settlement which she claims to have entered into with the
Republic of the Philippines prior to the rendition of judgment in the expropriation case
would result in a modification of the judgment of a court which has long become final
and executory.
And even assuming for the sake of argument that Chongbian could prove the
existence of the alleged written agreement acknowledging her right to repurchase Lot
No. 941 through parol evidence, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the evidence
presented by Chongbian was admissible. Under 1403 of the Civil Code, a contract for
the sale of real property shall be unenforceable unless the same, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent; evidence, therefore of the agreement cannot be received without the writing or a
secondary evidence of its contents.

Requisites for Admission of Parole on the Ground of Mistake

VICTORIA LECHUGAS v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARINA LOZA, et. al.

G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300, August 6, 1986
FACTS:
Victoria Lechugas bought a land from a certain Leoncia Lasangue. After the purchase of
the land, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Leoncia Lasangue in her favor specified a
certain land Lot No. 5456 stated in the contract. Then the defendants occupied Lot No. 5456,
petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages against the defendants but it was
dismissed. Petitioner appealed the case to the CFI of Iloilo. While the appeal for the ejectment
case was pending, petitioner filed another case in the RTC for the recovery of the possession
against the same defendants involving the same Lot No. 5456.
During the trial, the defendants presented their witness in the person of Leoncia Lasangue
herself. Leoncia Lasangue testified during the trial that according to her, the lot that she sold to
the petitioner was not Lot No. 5456 but another lot, Lot 5522. Lasangue did not know how to
read and write, so the document of sale was prepared by the petitioner, thereafter, the former
was made to sign it. Based on her testimony, the lot indicated in the Deed of Sale which she
sold to petitioner was erroneous. It was clear that she did not intend to sell a piece of land
already sold by her father to the predecessor in interest of the defendants. This was objected by
the petitioner under the parole evidence rule.

ISSUE: Is the parol evidence rule applicable in this case to prove that the transaction is not a
sale?

RULING:
No.
 As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of Court, the parol evidence rule
does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the
other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written
instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating
in the instrument or the relation established thereby.
The petitioner’s reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not
applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third
persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas.
The dispute over what was actually sold is between petitioner and the private respondents. In
the case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what she really
intended to sell and to be the subject of sale was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to read and
write and fully relying on the good faith of her first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her
thumbmark on a piece of paper which petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale
of land. The deed of sale described the disputed lot instead.

Rule on Examination of a Child Witness

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RENE SANTOS

G.R. No. 172322, September 8, 2006

FACTS:
Rene Santos was charged and found guilty of Rape by the RTC of Pampanga for
sexually assaulting 5year-old Veverly Ann Cabanes. The trial court and the CA gave credence
to the testimony of Veverly who was only six years old when she narrated the sordid details of
the incident.
Santos questions the credibility of the witness and further faults the trial court with acting
as the prosecutor and the judge at the same time for allegedly initiating and propounding the
questions, short of supplying the desired answer from the witness.

ISSUE:
Is form of questioning to the child witness violated the uniformity rule?

RULING:
NO.
The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control
over the questioning of a child witness. Under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rules on Examination of
a Child Witness, child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be
allowed by the trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will further the interest of
justice. It must be borne in mind that the offended party in this case is a 6-year old minor who
was barely five when she was sexually assaulted. As a child of such tender years not yet
exposed to the ways of the world, she could not have fully understood the enormity of the
bestial act committed on her person.
 Studies show that children, particularly very young children, make the perfect victims.
They naturally follow the authority of adults as the socialization process teaches children that
adults are to be respected. The child's age and developmental level will govern how much she
comprehends about the abuse and therefore how much it affects her. If the child is too young to
understand what has happened to her, the effects will be minimized because she has no
comprehension of the consequences. Certainly, children have more problems in providing
accounts of events because they do not understand everything they experience. They do not
have enough life experiences from which to draw upon in making sense of what they see, hear,
taste, smell and feel. Moreover, they have a limited vocabulary. With her limited comprehension,
the child could not have a perfect way of relating that she had been sexually abused.

Rule on Examination of a Child Witness

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALVADOR GOLIMLIM @ "BADONG"

G.R. No. 145225; April 2, 2004

FACTS:
Evelyn Canchela is a mental retardate. When her mother, Amparo Hachero, left for
Singapore to work as a domestic helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody of her
sister Jovita Guban and her husband Salvador Golimlim.
One day, Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet someone, leaving Evelyn with
Salvador. Taking advantage of the situation, Salvador instructed Evelyn to sleep, and soon after
she had lay down, he kissed her and took off her clothes. As he poked at her an object which to
Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina. When Jovita arrived,
Evelyn told her about what Salvador did to her. Jovita, however, did not believe her and in fact
she scolded her.
Lorna Hachero, Evelyn’s half-sister, received a letter from their mother instructing her to
fetch Evelyn and allow her to stay where Lorna resided. A week after, Lorna suspected that her
sister was pregnant as she noticed her growing belly. Examinations at the hospital would later
confirm that Evelyn was indeed pregnant. She asked her sister how she became pregnant, to
which Evelyn replied that Salvador had sexual intercourse with her while holding a knife.
Salvador, on being confronted with the accusation, simply said that it is not true because
Evelyn’s mind was not normal and that she mentioned many other names of men who had
sexual intercourse with her. The trial court convicted Salvador for the crime charged. On
appeal, Salvador argues that Evelyn’s testimony is not categorical and is replete with
contradictions, thus engendering grave doubts as to his criminal culpability.

ISSUE:
Did the court err in giving weight and credence to the allegedly contradictory and
implausible testimony of Evelyn Canchela, a mental retardate?

RULING:
 No. Evelyn as a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her
testimony bereft of truth.
In People v. Trelles, where the trial court relied heavily on the therein mentally retarded
private complainant’s testimony regardless of her monosyllabic responses and vacillations
between lucidity and ambiguity, this Court held: A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is
not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her
credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it
assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still
give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.
It cannot then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or
her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is
admissible in court. To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity
as a ground to disqualify a witness. As observed by McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a
witness who may be the only person available who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive.
Our rules follow the modern trend of evidence. Thus, in a long line of cases, this Court has
upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly on statements given in court by the victim
who was a mental retardate.

Rule on Examination of a Child Witness

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUEL TAMANO y PASIA

G.R. No. 188855; December 8, 2010

FACTS:
Ruel Tamano and Danny Alcanices stand charged with the crime of rape as defined and
penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. Informations state that
Tamano willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge to one AAA, 17-year old
"mongoloid," a mental retardate or feeble-minded girl with a mental age of a child below 12
years of age.
Among the witnesses presented by the prosecution was AAA herself. The court noted
that AAA has down syndrome, thus, considered a special child. Unlike other girls of her age,
AAA could not do simple tasks on her own. She must be assisted in taking a bath and in eating
her food. She also stutters when she speaks. Despite her being a special child, AAA is
attending school as she was enrolled by her mother, BBB, in a school near their place, which
offered a special program for special children.
In AAA’s testimony, on the day of the rape she was at the house of her uncle DDD,
which was merely adjacent to their own house. Both Tamano and Alcanices were also at the
house of DDD as boarders. In the presence of Alcanices, Tamano suddenly kissed AAA and
touched her breasts. Tamano likewise removed AAA’s t-shirt and undergarments. When AAA
was already naked, Tamano sucked her breasts. Then, he went on top of AAA and ordered her
to hold his penis, but AAA refused. Tamano inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Alcanices then
took his turn in ravishing AAA also in the presence of Tamano. Alcanices tied AAA’s hands and
forced her to lie down. He then kissed AAA on the lips, parted her legs, went on top of her and
inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. After Alcanices was fully satisfied, he gave AAA ₱100.00
to keep her from reporting the incident. AAA did not immediately tell anyone about her ordeal.
Her behavior, however, changed a lot after such a harrowing experience in the hands of
Tamano and Alcanices. Such sudden change in AAA’s behavior became noticeable to her
cousin, CCC. When AAA was confronted for her strange behavior, AAA began confiding to
CCC’s sister her ordeal.
The Regional Trial Court found Tamano to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Tamano appealed the
decision asserting that AAA’s story of defloration was merely concocted for she was only
prodded by her mother and cousin to testify in court. Thus, the credibility of such testimony was
highly questionable.

ISSUE:
Was Tamano correct in questioning the credibility of AAA’s testimony considering her
mental state?

RULING:
No, Tamano was incorrect.
While it is true that the credibility of one who is a mental retardate may be difficult to
determine, still, it can be ascertained by deducing from the manner she testifies in court as to
the surrounding facts of the crime committed. For as long as her testimony is straightforward,
candid and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, and her
demeanor is consistent with one who has been a victim of rape, bolsters her credibility with the
verity born out of human nature and experience, thus, must be given full faith and credit.
Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally retarded may be a
credible witness. The acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions
and the manner she can make them known to the court.

Rule on Examination of a Child Witness

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ANTONIO BALCUEVA y BONDOCOY

G.R. No. 214466; July 1, 2015;

FACTS:
Around 2 o’clock in the afternoon of February 15, 2007, AAA just returned home from
school and took an afternoon nap. At that time, Balcueva approached AAA who was lying in
bed, removed her shorts and underwear, and threatened to spank her if she told anybody about
this incident. Balcueva inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. While Balcueva was ravishing AAA,
the latter’s sister sought the help of their neighbor, who then peeped through a hole, interrupting
Balcueva in his dastardly act.
Balcueva interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that he was repairing
appliances when AAA and a friend arrived from school and asked him if they can roam around.
When he did not allow them to do so, AAA and her friend got angry. In retaliation, they went to
the barangay hall and fabricated the story that he raped AAA.
ISSUE:
Is the testimony of AAA admissible as evidence to indict his father in the crime of rape?

RULING:
Yes.
AAA’s clear, categorical, and unwavering testimony reveals that she was indeed raped
by Balcueva, her own father. Suffice it to say that Balcueva’s flimsy defense of denial and alibi
cannot prevail over AAA’s positive and categorical testimony and identification of him as the
perpetrator of the crime. Verily, a young girl would not concoct a sordid tale of a crime as
serious as rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the examination of her private part,
and subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was other
than a fervent desire to seek justice. Hence, there is no plausible reason why AAA would testify
against her own father, imputing to him the grave crime of rape, if this crime did not happen.

Marital Disqualification Rule

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR.

G.R. No. 117401; October 1, 1998; Romero, J.

FACTS:
Bernardo Quidato Jr. was accused of parricide. He and two co-conspirators allegedly
attacked with a bolo and iron bars, hacked and stabbed the victim, Bernardo Quidato Sr.,
accused’s father and namesake, which caused the victim’s untimely demise.
Among those presented as witness were accused’s wife and brother. Also presented
were the extrajudicial confessions of the other co-conspirators in perpetuating the crime.
Accused’s wife Gina Quidato testified that while the accused were drinking tuba, she overheard
them saying that they were planning to go to the victim’s house on the night of the incident in
order to get money and that she had no idea of what later transpired. Accused objected to his
wife’s testimony as it was prohibited by the rule on marital disqualification. Accused Quidato Jr.
likewise denies the allegations of his co-accused who in their extrajudicial confession pointed to
the participation of Quidato Jr. in killing his own father.

ISSUE:
Is the testimony of Gina Quidato admissible as evidence despite the rule on marital
disqualification?

RULING:
No.
With regard to Gina Quidato’s testimony, the same must also be disregarded, accused
having timely objected thereto under the marital disqualification rule. The disqualification is
between husband and wife, the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other
parties or accused. Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case against Reynaldo and
Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused’s case. This testimony cannot, however, be used
against accused directly or through the guise of taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the
murder case without violating the marital disqualification rule. “What cannot be done directly
cannot be done indirectly” is a rule familiar even to law students.

Marital Disqualification Rule

MAXIMO ALVAREZ v. SUSAN RAMIREZ

G.R. No. 143439; October 14, 2005

FACTS:
Susan Ramirez is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for
arson pending before the RTC. The accused is Maximo Alvarez. He is the husband of
Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of Susan.
Esperanza Alvarez called to the witness stand as the first witness against Maximo, her
husband. Maximo and his counsel raised no objection. Esperanza testified for the purpose of
proving that the accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the crime being
charged. Maximo filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.

ISSUE:
Can Esperanza Alvarez testify against her husband in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN?

RULING:
Yes.
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “Sec. 22. Disqualification
by reason of marriage.—During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for
or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one
against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.” The reasons given for the rule are: 1. There is
identity of interests between husband and wife; 2. If one were to testify for or against the other,
there is consequent danger of perjury; 3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and
confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent
domestic disunion and unhappiness; and 4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is
danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.
The act of Maximo in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez,
knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter,
is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the
disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of
directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and
domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there
is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. This Court held that in such a case,
identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the
law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence merely leave a void in
the unhappy home. Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification
Rule.

Survivorship Disqualification Rule

SUNGA-CHAN and SUNGA vs. CHUA

G.R. No. 143340 August 15, 2001
FACTS:
Chua alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the
distribution of Shellane LPG and registered Shellite Gas Appliance Center under the name of
Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. They have initial capital contribution of P100, 000.00 each with
the intention of dividing the profits between them.
The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy, sister of
the wife Chua, Erlinda Sy. As compensation, Jacinto would receive a manager's fee or
remuneration of 10% of the gross profit and Josephine would receive 10% of the net profits, in
addition to her wages and other remuneration from the business.
Upon Jacinto's death, his surviving wife, Cecilia and his daughter, Lilibeth, took control of
Shellite without Lamberto’s consent. Despite Lamberto’s repeated demands for accounting, they
failed to comply. Lilibeth allegedly continued the operations of Shellite, converting to her own
use and advantage its properties. The trial court ruled in favor of Chua and ordered Sunga to
make an accounting. The CA affirmed the lower court’s decision.

ISSUE:
Are the testimonies of Chua and Josephine to prove the alleged partnership three years
after Jacinto's death proscribed under the Dead Man's Statute or Survivorship Rule?

RULING:
No.
The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not
entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of
the transaction. But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of
testimonial evidence, it is necessary that: 1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case
or persons in whose behalf a case in prosecuted; 2. The action is against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind; 3. The
subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against person of unsound mind; 4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred
before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
 Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case. First,
petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against Chua in their answer before the trial court,
and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case
from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute". Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the
executor or administrator or representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the
plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to
defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, Chua is not disqualified
from testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not
having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased. Second, the
testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the simple reason that
she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted." Records show that Chua offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the
existence of the partnership between him and Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that Josephine is
the alter ego of Chua does not make her an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party
means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned
before any cause of action has arisen." Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of Chua, the
latter being the party plaintiff.

Survivorship Disqualification Rule

ENRIQUE RAZON vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN

G.R. No. 74306; March 16, 1992

FACTS:
Vicente B. Chuidian filed a complaint praying that Enrique B. Razon, E. Razon, Inc.,
Geronimo Velasco, Francisco de Borja, Jose Francisco, Alfredo B. de Leon, Jr., Gabriel Llamas
and Luis M. de Razon be ordered to deliver certificates of stocks representing the shareholdings
of the deceased Juan T. Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc.
In their answer they alleged that all the shares of stock in the name of stockholders of
record of the corporation were fully paid for by Razon; that neither the late Juan T. Chuidian nor
the Razon had paid any amount whatsoever for the 1,500 shares of stock in question.
The Intermediate Appellate Court ruled that Juan T. Chuidian is the owner of the shares
of stock. According to Razon, the shares of stocks were merely registered in the name of Juan
as nominal stockholder and that the said shares were owned and held by Razon as he was the
one who paid the subscription. And that Juan was given the option to buy the same but he did
not do so. The IAC excluded the testimony of Razon under the doctrine of Dead Man’s Rule.

ISSUE:
Is the Dead Man’s Statute applicable in the case at bar?

RULING:
No.
 In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant
(to the effect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of
the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the
1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the
deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by
the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon,
Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the
petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the
administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. Furthermore, the
records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as
regards the true nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner’s testimony
was subject to cross-examination by the private respon-dent’s counsel. Hence, granting that the
petitioner’s testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.

Survivorship Disqualification Rule

GENARO GOÑI, et al vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR VICENTE,

G.R. No. L-27434 September 23, 1986

FACTS:
The three (3) haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria
were originally owned by the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas. Sometime in 1949,
the late Praxedes T. Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest of Goni, negotiated with TABACALERA
for the purchase of said haciendas. However, as he did not have sufficient funds to pay the
price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to one
Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas. Allegedly because
TABACALERA did not agree to the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas, without a
guaranty Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor, for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA. The
guarantee was embodied in a document denominated as "Escritura de Traspaso de Cuenta."
Either because the amount realized from the transaction between Villanueva and
Villegas still fell short of the purchase price of the three haciendas, or in consideration of the
guaranty undertaken by private respondent Vicente, Villanueva contracted or promised to sell to
the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of P13,807.00.
This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by petitioner Genaro Goni as attorney-in-fact
of Villanueva,
Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings were instituted. Among the properties included in
the inventory submitted to the court were parcels of land of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.
The day before the intestate proceedings were ordered closed and the estate of the late
Praxedes Villanueva delivered to his heirs, Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property
and damages against Goñi in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of Praxedes
Villanueva. In his complaint, Vicente sought to recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda Dulce
Nombre de Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the contract/promise to sell executed by the
late Praxedes Villanueva in his favor. Vicente presented two (2) witnesses: then party-plaintiff
Gaspar Vicente, himself, who over the objection of defendants testified on facts occurring before
the death of Praxedes Villanueva, and Epifanio Equio a clerk of TABACALERA Agency in the
Bais Sugar Central. Defendants presented Genaro Goni, who testified on the alleged verbal
lease agreement.

ISSUE:
May Gaspar Vicente testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T.
Villanueva, which constitutes a claim or demand upon his estate in violation of Section 20(a) of
Rule 130?

RULING:
Yes.
Under ordinary circumstances, Vicente would be disqualified by reason of interest from
testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such
disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the
Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute. Such protection, however, was
effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined Vicente. “A waiver occurs when
plaintiff’s deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for the
representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased’s lifetime.” It
must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent
Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the
action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and
surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not
disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes
Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate or representatives of
the estate/deceased person.
Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to
transactions or communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made
with an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify.
But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions or
communications which were had with the agent. The contract/promise to sell under
consideration was signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney-in-fact (apoderado) of Praxedes
Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such contract and
therefore could either confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent Vicente with
respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of
Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the
testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed the former’s lips, does not
actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that petitioner Goñi could and did not negate the
binding effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said
contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goñi testified that the same was subsequently novated into a
verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.

Survivorship Disqualification Rule

FELICITO G. SAMSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MELECIA T. SY

 G.R. No. 127745; April 22, 2003

FACTS:
Samson, the creditor of the intestate estate of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy, filed a case in
court aimed at collecting the latter’s unpaid debt. During the hearing of the claims against the
estate, Sanson, Celedonia, and Jade Montinola, wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr.,
testified on the transactions that gave rise thereto, over the objection of the administratrix who
invoked Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court otherwise known as the Dead
Man’s Statute. Nonetheless, there are documents/checks that were also offered in evidence to
prove the alleged unpaid obligation.

ISSUE:
Will the Dead Man’s Statute properly apply in this case so as to bar collection of the
loan?

RULING:
No.
As for the administratrix’s invocation of the Dead Man’s Statute, the same does not lie.
The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted. The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope
by implication so as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not
included in the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or
transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein.
In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial
evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is
confined to the giving of testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are
supported by checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of
said checks.

Privileged Communication Rule; Marital Relationship

CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN

G.R. No. 107383; February 20, 1996

FACTS:
Cecilia Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers
and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
ISSUE:
Will the documents/papers gathered by the wife in his husband’s office drawer, without
her husband’s consent, be admissible in evidence?

RULING:
No.
The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and
correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is
a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent
of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Privileged Communication Rule; Attorney-Client Relationship

TEODORO R. REGALA vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996

FACTS:
The Complaint before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government alleged that Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J.
Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U.
Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello
law offices (ACCRA) plotted, conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through
the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led
to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty
other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation
shares and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly.
Through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment arm,
ACCRA Investments Corporation, and lawyers became the holder of outstanding capital stock in
the aforesaid corporations.
ACCRA lawyers alleged that the acts with which they are charged with, was in
furtherance of legitimate lawyering; that they became holders of shares of stock in the
corporations listed under their respective names as incorporating or acquiring stockholders only
and, as such, they do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of stock.
PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a)
the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners
executed in favor of its client covering their respective shareholdings.
Consequently, Roco was excluded as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33. Regala et
al. contend that the exclusion of Roco as party-defendant grants him a favorable treatment, on
the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his client. Regala et al. further
argue that they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn
mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information
obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.
PCGG refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of the
client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.

ISSUE:
Does the attorney-client privilege prohibit ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of
their clients and the other information requested by the PCGG?

RULING:
Yes.
As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be shrouded in mystery. Under
this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer
may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.
Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s
name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. For instance,
the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation, prompted the
New York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer’s claim to the effect that he could not reveal the
name of his client because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as
exceptions to the general rule. For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer
lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the
client seeks legal assistance. Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has
been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity
of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in
disclosure of the entire transaction.

The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege and lawyer’s loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists
not only during the relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship.
Privileged Communication Rule; Attorney-Client Relationship

GREGORIO R. CASTILLO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 138231 February 21, 2002

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against several persons one of
which is Castillo. The complaint alleged that Gregorio R. Castillo acted as a dummy, nominee
and/or agent of Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al. in establishing Hotel properties Inc. in order to
acquire beneficial interest and control, and conceal ownership, of Silahis International Hotel.
Castillo argues that the suit against him is violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege and must be dismissed pursuant to this Court’s decision in Regala vs. Sandiganbayan.
On the other hand, Republic contends that the ruling in Regala does not apply to the
present case, because Castillo is being sued as principal defendant for being in conspiracy with
the other defendants in the commission of the act complained of, and he is not being required to
name his clients. Moreover, the rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is not a
valid ground to dismiss a complaint against a party. It is merely a ground for disqualification of a
witness and may only be invoked at the appropriate time, such as, when a lawyer is under
compulsion to answer as witness.

ISSUE:
Can Castillo validly invoke the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege?

RULING:
Yes.
The Court emphasizes the Decision in Regala:
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of
attorney-client confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they
should wait until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters
learned in confidence before they can raise their objection. But petitioners are not mere
witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth.
They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to
testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right against
self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of
attorney-client confidentiality.

Privileged Communication Rule; Physician-Patient Relationship

 MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994

FACTS:
Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at the Saint Vincent de Paul
Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The relationship between the couple developed into a stormy
one. Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain.
The effort however proved futile. Then, they finally separated in fact. In 1975, Edgar was able to
secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs.
Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. Presenting the report among others, he obtained a
decree from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church marriage
with Ma. Paz on the ground of incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of discretion
existent at the time of the wedding.
This confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the
trial court in a petition for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. Ma. Paz
Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient,
seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents of the report.
Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that the rules are very explicit and the prohibition
applies only to a physician. Thus, the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case at
bar where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged communication is the
husband and not the physician of the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Is the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient applicable in
order to prevent Edgar Krohn from testifying against Ma. Paz Fernandez?

RULING:
No.
Requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is
claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information
while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if
disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient.”
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient’s husband who
wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does
not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention
of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the
physician who examined the patient and executed the report.