Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Paper for presentation at the 2011 EUSA Biennial International Conference, Boston, Massachusetts,
3–5 March 2011.
Note: This paper is in a very preliminary stage. Please do not cite or quote without permission.
Comments and criticisms are most welcome.
1. Introduction
The concept of normative power has dominated the debates about the European Union (EU)’s role in
international politics ever since Ian Manners suggested in 2002 that the EU represents such a novel
kind of power, which would pursue normative aims (as opposed to self-interested material gains)
through predominantly normative means (as opposed to predominantly military and economic
means). The widespread discussion of the concept that has ensued has therefore focused to a large
extent on the question of whether the EU does indeed behave like a normative power on these two
dimensions. There is however also the question of whether the EU does indeed ‘shape conceptions
of the normal’, as it is core to the Manners’ definition of normative power, or in other words,
whether it achieves its normative aims and is able to act as a “normative leader” at least in its own
neighbourhood, if not globally. Focusing on this side of normative power brings to the fore another
concept, which has been floated at various points in the debate (e.g. Diez 2005, Haukkala 2011), but
which has not as yet been fully explored: that of hegemony. Indeed, if one follows the Gramscian
rather than the realist (Hyde-Price 2006) conception of hegemony, the power to shape conceptions
of the normal seems to be at its heart. Can we, therefore, replace normative power with hegemony?
In this paper, I argue that the answer to this question is “yes”. In fact, while normative power is of
course not the same as hegemony, using the concept of hegemony does, as I will argue, address
some of the core problems of the normative power concept as they have been identified in the
literature. I suggest that at least four such problems may be fruitfully tackled when bringing in the
concept of hegemony: the debate about whether EU foreign and external policy is driven by norms
or interests; the problem of inconsistent behaviour due to competing norms; the question of the role
of state and non-state actors in EU foreign and external policy; and the problematic standing of
normative power as an academic engagement, in particular in regard to whether the theory is of
primarily explanatory, descriptive or normative value.
In the following section, I will first summarise the debate about Normative Power Europe and in
particular regarding the four problems identified above. I will then provide a brief outline of the
concept of hegemony before suggesting how this concept may help us tackle the problems of
normative power.
1
2. Normative Power Europe and Its Problems
I have already provided a brief definition of normative power in the introductory paragraph. The
concept becomes clearer if we set it against two other concepts, that of a traditional great power
and that of a civilian power. In the international society, a great power has traditionally been
recognised as such primarily on the basis of its military capabilities. As the wording “has been
recognised” indicates, this is not to say that military capabilities as such are sufficient to become a
great power; rather, such a status is conferred upon a state by other states, and is therefore in a
crucial part discursive in nature (Bull 1977, Buzan 2004). However, it is difficult to think of a case
historically in which such a great power status had been conferred upon a state without the
existence of substantial military capabilities, which therefore seem to have been a necessary if not
sufficient condition for the recognition as a great power. In contrast, while it would be wrong to say
that EU member states are a minor military player in international politics, there continues to exist
what Chris Hill (1993) once famously called the ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ when it comes to EU
military power, recently reconceptualised by Asle Toje (2008) as the ‘consensus-expectation gap’. In
short, the EU has until now, and despite the development of the Common Defence Policy and the
deployment of military missions under EU flag, remained a disappointment to those who would like
to see it develop into a military might. The point is not that a normative power may not use military
means if necessary, even though the exact threshold of “necessary” is disputed, but rather that it
does not build its power on the availability and use of such means, and that such as use is narrowly
circumscribed (Sjursen 2006). Clearly, it would be difficult to argue that EU power is primarily military
power, and in that sense it is different from a traditional great power.
The second point of comparison is civilian power. François Duchêne (1971, 1973) described the EU in
the 1970s as such a civilian power, a power that pursues its interest by non-military means and that
aims to “civilise” international politics in the sense of making war a non-acceptable instrument.
Manners’ conception of normative power was developed in part as a resurrection of this idea of
civilian power, but very much stressed that a normative power does not act only in its own interest
but binds itself to international norms, whether they are in its interest or not, and that its main
influence is not merely through non-military, which often meant economic, means, but through the
force of ideas. This comparison is more difficult to judge than the one against the notion of a
traditional great power. For one, it is possible to read the notion of a “civilian power” in a way that
focuses on its “civilising” mission and thus essentially makes it a kind of normative power. Second, it
is difficult if not impossible to empirically differentiate between foreign policy that is motivated by
norms and foreign policy that is motivated by interest. Thus, there are for instance numerous studies
that try to demonstrate that EU support for international “deep trade” norms is in fact strongest
when it comes to exporting EU norms so as to minimise trading disadvantages that such norms
would entail for the EU if they were not applicable globally (e.g. Lightfoot and Burchell 2005; Young
2007; Young and Peterson 2006).
This brings me to the problems of the concept of normative power. The academic and policy
discussion on this topic has been multifaceted and extensive. I want to therefore focus on four issues
in particular, where I think that the concept of hegemony can make a difference.
Firstly, there is the interest/norm problem already identified above. This has been raised in various
contexts that are even more directly challenging the concept of normative power than the above
case of, including EU policy towards Russia (Zimmermann 2007) if compared to the smaller Central
2
and Eastern European States (Haukkala 2008), EU interventions in Africa regarding the question of
where the EU actually shows engagement (Gegout 2009), and EU human rights policy and democracy
promotion (Youngs 2009). However, it is perhaps the democratic uprising s in the Arab world that is
most challenging to the normative power concept: while claiming to promote democracy on the one
hand, the EU, especially in its Neighbourhood Policy, on the other hand has supported authoritarian
rule in the Arab world for the sake of holding back migration across the Mediterranean or
safeguarding oil supplies.
The second problem concerns the question of whether the EU is in fact effective as a normative
power. In other words, are the norms promoted by the EU indeed influencing the behaviour of third
parties? Worse, are these norms influencing the EU’s own behaviour? The record in this regard is
mixed, and fraught with empirical difficulties, in particular as the EU is often only one among many
factors that explain change, and it continues to present a challenge to dissect EU influence from
other influences. In relation to my own work on EU impact on conflict resolution, for instance, it is
notable that EU impact proved to be mostly dependent on local developments outside the control of
the EU (Diez, Stetter and Albert 2006, 2008). To cite a particularly instructive example, the prospect
of EU membership has not directly caused regime change in Northern Cyprus, but instead the EU
served as reference point to legitimise the opposition and provide political alternatives once a
banking crisis sparked mass demonstrations against Turkey and the old Denktash regime (Diez and
Tocci 2010). Perhaps the clearerst influence on third parties has been in enlargement situations, but
as Haukkala (2011) and others have noted, even the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is running
into difficulties as an instrument to exercise normative power further.
Thirdly, the EU may well do all sorts of good in the world, but what about its member states? Due to
the lack of supranationalisation in EU foreign policy, analyses of normative power in the EU always
need to take into account several levels of actors. Yet what about private actors? Can the export of
weapons by commercial actors be ignored, or is it only relevant because state actors need to approve
such exports? Are civil society actors engaged in EU projects towards third parties part of EU
normative power?
Last but not least, there is also the question of the academic standing of normative power as a
theoretical concept. The problem arises in part because Manners from the start combined three
theoretical purposes in his work: a description of the international role of the EU (the EU is a
normative power), an explanation of EU foreign policy (the EU acts in such a way because of its
normative institutionalisation), and a critique as well as a normative engagement with EU foreign
policy (the EU ought to behave as a normative power) (Manners 2002, 2011).
The point in this paper is not to explore the various details of the debates about these problems.
Instead, what I want to suggest is that the concept of hegemony is able to address all of them and,
while perhaps not providing a solution, transforms them in such a way that we can think in new ways
about normative power.
The debate about normative power emerged out of a discussion about the actor qualities of the EU.
To be a normative power, the EU need not be a sovereign actor in the international system. In fact,
3
as Manners (2002) details, the EU can have normative power both in its actions and by way of its
mere existence. Similarly, I have argued elsewhere that European integration can have an effect on
border conflicts both through EU actions aimed at transcending the conflict and through the
uncontrollable impact of the integration process as such (Diez, Stetter and Albert 2006, 2008).
This discussion is relevant to the concept of hegemony as there are different conceptions of
hegemony, in particular in International Relations. A classic, neorealist notion of hegemony
emphasises the role of a great power as a regional hegemon who provides order through setting up
institutions and providing as well as policing norms (Gilpin 1981). Such a conception does therefore
involve norms, but the spread of these norms is tied to the military capabilities of the (traditional)
great power, which can use them to enforce norms by threatening to apply military force. Following
this conception of hegemony, the EU would turn into a hegemon if it was able to enforce norms in a
regional order and through the threat of military or economic force (for instance in the form of
sanctions).
Against this stands a conception of hegemony which is derived above all from the work of Antonio
Gramsci. Gramsci’s starting point is not International Relations of course, but the failure of
revolutions in southern European societies in particular. As such, the notion of a hegemon as an
actor makes much less sense than in relation to international politics. There is therefore a discursive
and relational rather than an actor emphasis in the Gramscian conception of hegemony. In that
sense hegemony ‘is a relation, not of domination by means of force, but of consent by means of
political and ideological leadership’ (Simon 1982: 21). It is in other words a relation in which those
subject to hegemony consent to the same conceptions of society, broad problem definitions and
principled solutions. This brings hegemony close to Manners’ definition of normative power as being
able ‘to shape conceptions of the normal’ (Manners 2002).
Hegemony is however not without its agents (and indeed, in Haukkala’s rendering of the subject, this
is one of the reasons why he opts for hegemony as the central concept, although it remains unclear
why he thinks the EU is rather passive in normative power, see Haukkala 2011). In Gramsci, these are
social forces and particularly classes (see Simon 1982: 22). These social forces are engaged in a
constant struggle over hegemony, but they do not “own” hegemony: they can acquire hegemonic
status, but they cannot become hegemons. To the extent they can achieve hegemonic status at all,
they need to provide leadership in economic and broader social-discursive terms in what Gramsci
called ‘historic bloc’, in which particular societal meanings and power relationships become fixed for
a limited period (see Simon 1982: 27). The degree to which Gramsci moved away in this conception
from economic determinism is a matter of some dispute. In the famous interpretation of Ernesto
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), hegemony is largely stripped of its economic content. Others, in
particular in Critical International Political Economy, have emphasised the economic, class-based
character of hegemonic struggles (e.g. Bieler and Morton 2001, 2004). These different
interpretations are largely a consequence of Gramsci being less than consistent on this point: while
the general drift of his argument undermines the old Marxian economic determinism, he
nonetheless uses terminology such as base and superstructure with their economic connotations
(Simon 1982: 27).
For the following discussion, a few points are worth noting that clearly speak to the problems
identified above with the concept of normative power:
4
Hegemony combines material (economic) and discursive elements, although their exact mix is
disputed.
Gramsci and Neo-Gramscians including Cox as well as Laclau and Mouffe emphasise
hegemonic struggles rather than hegemony as such.
Social forces are the core agents in these hegemonic struggles.
The theory of hegemony is first and foremost a critical theory that problematises the present,
although this is based on an analysis of the present that involves explanatory elements.
The first problem with normative power that I identified above concerns the question of whether the
EU advocates norms for their own sake or because it is in the interest of its member states. This
would undermine the normative power argument significantly as its core idea is that normative
powers pursue norms even if they are not in their interest. In all of the cases mentioned, the main
empirical evidence against the EU as a normative power relies on inconsistencies in the EU’s
behaviour. Yet as I have argued elsewhere (Diez 2005), this is a problematic argument. At best, it can
draw plausible inferences from the inconsistency of behaviour. However, in most cases, a normative
argument can explain behaviour as much as an interest-based argument, as norms and interest are
ultimately ontological categories that are next to impossible to prove. Thus, what may look like
inconsistencies can often be explained by competing norms (on which more below) or competing
paths to realise norms.
Take EU policy towards the Maghreb, for instance. The insistence on migration control in ENP
agreements may well be in the interest of member states (Geddes 2005; Lavenex 2006, 2009), yet its
normative assessment is much more problematic, as there is no undisputed norm in favour of
migration – the judgement on this issue will therefore always be essentially a political one. Likewise,
engagement with authoritarian regimes is less easy to judge as it is often made out to be: a classic
liberal strategy to achieve change through such engagement stands against calls for a clear
distancing. A strict correlation between engagement and member state preferences may represent a
way out by way of proxy, as would an analysis of the justifications of policy moves, which would not
be able to uncover the real motives of actors, but at least demonstrate the different rationales
provided for policies.
However, this whole discussion rests on the assumption of a distinction between norms and interests
which is problematic itself. While there are on the one hand undoubtedly different logics of actions
on an ontological level, on the other hand norms and interests cannot so easily be separated, and
both are infused by each other (see also Manners 2011). It is on this basis that discourse theorists
tend to question the materialist/idealist divide. And it is on this basis that in the Gramscian
conception of hegemony, there is an emphasis on both economic and cultural-discursive factors, and
that cultural and political factors are not simply determined by an economic base. Rather, norms and
economic interests form one whole: norms shape interests, interests shape norms.
Seen from such a perspective, the findings of Young and Peterson, for instance, are therefore not at
all surprising; it would rather be odd to observe the opposite. It is true that Manners argues that
normative powers also go against their interest if it conflicts with the norms that they subscribe to.
Yet this buys into the distinction between norms and interests, and the example that he gives (EU
5
protest against the death penalty in the US, Manners 2002) does not really help his argument, as the
preferences coming out of economic interest for the EU in this case are rather weak, if they can be
determined at all.
Using the concept of hegemony rather than normative power would therefore circumvent the
endless discussions about the consistency or inconsistency of EU behaviour with certain norms,
which is ultimately a matter of judgement. It would instead focus on discursive positions that entail
both norms and interests in an inseparable complex (see also Haukkala 2011), yet it would still
emphasise the idea that is at the heart of normative power, the shaping of conceptions of the
normal. It would not be as bold in its argument as normative power, as it removes the “acting against
interest” part, but as I have tried to argue, this is at least an unhelpful if not untenable part of the
normative power concept.
The second problem was that normative power may actually not work, at least not beyond
enlargement. This is most likely a problem of the glass being half empty or half full. It would be
surprising if the EU could have it its way everywhere across the globe, or even only within its own
neighbourhood, but it would be equally strange to see the EU not being able to ‘shape conceptions
of the normal’ at all. The truth is probably somewhere in the middle. This is essentially because we
are witnessing a contest over norms at several levels. The focus in the debates about normative
power is mostly on the struggle between EU and competing norms in international society, although
it is worth reminding ourselves that the basis of these EU norms, to Manners (2002), lies in the basic
inner principles of the EU as laid out in the Treaties.
Yet there are at least two more dimensions to these struggles over the preponderance of norms. The
first one is to do with the fact that norms are always, albeit to different degrees, contested (Wiener
2007, 2008). EU norms are therefore not simply passed on to third parties, but reinterpreted in the
process. This also means however that there may well be conflicting interpretations of norms among
EU member states, and other EU actors – the freedom of press and the dispute over its
interpretation between Hungary and other EU member states being only the most recent prominent
example. This leads to the final dimension, which is that there is a broader struggle over norms in the
EU (as in any other society), and that the attempt to impose norms on outsiders may also be an
attempt to settle disputes over norms within the EU, or construct new meanings of the social. In
other words, ‘normative power’ in relation to others is also part of a struggle over hegemony within
the EU.
This is where the Gramscian notion of hegemonic struggles fits much better than the notion of
normative power that emerges from a pre-given set of norms. While the existence of an EU-wide
public space may be much disputed, there are nonetheless continued attempts to settle the future
political, societal, cultural and economic direction of the EU, which a variety of social forces, from
labour unions to the European’s Women Lobby, from individual companies to the European
Roundtable of Industrialists, from classes to parties, from Churches to Think Tanks, are engaged in.
Often this struggle takes the form of equating the European integration project with a particular
political aim (such in the struggles over the interpretation of the Single Market, see Bieler 2003, Van
Apeldoorn 2002). Yet by being able to fix an external representation of the EU, these social forces
6
may also advance a particular interpretation of norms inside the EU. This is the case in advancing
liberal market norms as much as in democracy promotion. The most well-known example of this is of
course the inclusion of minority rights in the Copenhagen Criteria, over which there had previously
been no consensus among member states. Indeed, there is arguably still no consensus in this matter
(the Roma dispute is just one case illustrating this, see Simhandl 2006), but by including minority
rights in the Copenhagen Criteria, it became impossible for member states to ignore these rights, and
policies detrimental to minorities now require special justification.
As the discussion of the last point has already illustrated, putting the concept of hegemony at the
centre of our analysis also re-focuses our perspective away from the EU as a whole and sees
normative power not only as the property of or a characteristic of relations between states and
state-like actors, but as part of a struggle between a great variety of social forces. This struggle takes
place on the EU level, as I have just discussed, and it takes place at member state level. These two
levels often spill over into each other so that governments, representing particular social forces, try
for instance to settle policy disputes on the EU level, which then restrains policy-making options
within member states (Moravcsik 1994). Likewise, social forces can try to build historic blocs within
member states and push for the pursuit of particular policies within the EU in line with their
preferred norms through having “captured” the government, or in order to compete or undermine
EU policies beyond EU borders.
This addresses the problem of the EU’s “actorness”, from which the concept of normative power
wanted to move away but which it did not quite manage to leave behind. Focusing our analysis on
multi-layered hegemonic struggles clarifies that (a) the EU is engaged in such struggles as a whole, (b)
there is a struggle over hegemony within the EU, and (c) social forces try to achieve hegemonic status
by pushing their normative agenda on several levels, including the EU and the national level. This
brings the member states back into the picture as much as it widens our gaze to the social fabric as a
whole.
In particular, the member states in such a conception do not simply figure as inducing inconsistency,
but as playing an important role in the struggle over normative power. Furthermore, the role of civil
society actors has so far been hardly addressed in the literature on Normative Power Europe. Yet
from a Gramscian hegemony-point of view, this is more than problematic, in particular as Gramsci, in
the concept of the integral state, sees civil society organisations and the state not as opposites, but
as a whole. It is therefore important in our analyses not to lose sight, for instance, of private
development agencies, from NGOs to banks, and of the NGOs who receive funding from the EU as
part of democracy promotion projects. To what extent are these part of the hegemonic struggle that
the EU is engaged in? And to what extent do they take part themselves in the hegemonic struggles
within the EU?
Over time, much of the discussion of normative power has focused on an empirical discussion of
whethere the EU is or is not a normative power. Yet as I have stated in section 2 above, one can trace
7
three different epistemological standings in Manners’ original argument: normative power as an
ontological category for classification, as an explanation of EU foreign policy, and as a normative aim
and critique of the present. In a recent article, Manners (2011) himself has yet again stressed the
latter of these three strands in his argument, and situates normative power within a broader
normative argument (see also Manners 2007, 2008).
Clearly, lumping these different epistemological strands together is more than problematic, and so it
is perhaps not all that surprising that most mainstream scholars have jumped on the descriptive,
classificatory purpose of Manners’ theory. In his 2011 piece, Manners suggests as a possible way out
of this conundrum the study of principles, actions, and consequences of EU external and foreign
policy, so as to arrive at a normative critique through a detailed analysis of the different aspects of
normative power. Another reading of the original 2002 piece puts the counterfactual assumption of
normative power into focus: as such, it would be undisputed that EU foreign policy is not consistent
but that at the same time, there is broad agreement that it ought to be a normative power, so that
the focus on the death penalty campaign may serve to remind EU actors of their image and
aspirations, and thus in turn strengthens the normative power position within the EU.
My suggestion is that a turn to the concept of hegemony may again help us find our way out of this
maze. The purpose of the study of hegemony is to problematise how we got to where we are, and
how certain concepts become seen as natural and logical. This then opens up the debate for
discussions about alternative futures, but it also serves to understand better the present results of
our past. This no doubt involves a shift in the analysis of normative power, away from the “what is”
question, and towards the interrogration of representations as well as instantiations of normative
power. From a Foucauldian point of view, Michael Merlingen (2007) has suggested a similar
endeavour in his analysis of EU engagament in police missions in the Balkans, and without having the
space to get into more detail, I would argue that a Gramscian notion of hegemony is compatible, at
least in this respect, with a Foucauldian view of governmentality that Merlingen uses in his research.
Thus, a focus on hegemony would reinstate the critical purpose that, in my reading as well as
arguably in his own reading of Manners, the concept of normative power has always had. It would
then denaturalise the norms that are brought into association with the EU so as to get to the social
forces and their struggles behind them, and the particular interpretations and exlusions of meaning
that emerged as a consequence of these struggles. Normative power would then be treated as what
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) call a ‘nodal point’, a core concept in the political debate through which
social forces try to temporarily fix a particular complex of meaning within the wider societal
discourse. This would then also clearly dissociate work on normative power from the idea that the EU
is “a force for good” in international politics (see Pace 2008), and it would put the politics of
normative power at centre stage.
8. Conclusions
In this short piece, I have tried to take up the suggestion made by Haukkala (2011), myself (2005) and
others that we make more use of the concept of hegemony when analysing normative power.
Indeed, I have gone as far as to suggest that we may wish to replace normative power with
hegemony. I have outlined four advantages that the concept of hegemony may have and which may
8
solve some of the puzzles surrounding the concept of normative power, especially as it was
developed in relation to the EU. These advantages are
that hegemony combines norms and interests, thus transcending the divide that has proved
to result in endless debates about the EU’s standing as a normative power;
that hegemony does not start from a pregiven set of norms with fixed meanings but rather
puts the struggles about these norms at centre stage, thus seeing inconsistencies not as
undermining but as part and parcel of normative power;
that hegemony expands our understanding of the actors involved in the construction and
exercise of normative power, thus bringing not only member states but also social forces in a
much broader sense into the picture;
and that hegemony reorients the debate about normative power so as to reinstate the
critical purpose that the concept was supposed to have from the start.
I do not want to even pretend that such a move towards hegemony would be without a loss from a
normative power perspective. One such possible loss that I have addressed is the idea that a
normative power would pursue global norms even if they are against its own material interests. I
have however argued that this is an argument that seems rather untenable both in light of empirical
evidence and out of principled ontological considerations.
Finally, one may argue that “normative power” is a concept that is easier to swallow for the
mainstream (thus its success) than hegemony with its leftist, post-Marxist associations. This may well
be the case, and as such, Manners’ move was of course a clever one. Yet my hope is that I have been
able to clarify the analytical purchase of the concept of hegemony in relation to the EU’s role in
international society, and that this will make the concept attractive to analysts from a variety of
backgrounds.
9
References
van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan (2002) Transnational capitalism and the struggle over European integration
(London: Routledge).
Bieler, Andreas (2003) ‘Swedish Trade Unions and Economic and Monetary Union: The European
Union Membership Debate Revisited?’ Cooperation and Conflict 38 (4), 385–408.
Bieler, Andreas and Adam D. Morton (eds) (2001) Social forces in the making of the new Europe: the
restructuring of European social relations in the global political economy (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan).
— (2004) ‘A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and historical change: neo-Gramscian
perspectives in International Relations’ Capital & Class 28 (1), 85–113.
Bull, Hedley (1977) The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan).
Diez, Thomas (2005) ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Problematising the Concept of
“Normative Power Europe”’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33 (3), 613–36.
Diez , Thomas, Stephan Stetter and Mathias Albert (2006) ‘The European Union and Border
Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration’ International Organization 60 (3), 563–593.
— (eds) (2008) The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Power of Integration and Association
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Diez, Thomas and Nathalie Tocci (2010) ‘The Cyprus Conflict and the Ambiguous Effects of
Europeanization’ The Cyprus Review. A Journal of Social, Economic and Political Issues 22 (1), 175–
86.
Duchêne, François (1971) ‘A New European Defense Community’ Foreign Affairs 50 (1), 69–82.
— (1973) ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence’, in Max Kohnstamm
and Wolfgang Hager (eds) A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European
Community (London: Macmillan).
Geddes, Andrew (2005) ‘Getting the best of both worlds? Britain, the EU and migration policy’
International Affairs 81 (4), 723–40.
Gegout, Catherine (2009) ‘EU Conflict Management in Africa: The Limits of an International Actor’
Ethnopolitics 8 (3–4), 403–15.
Gilpin, Robert (1981) War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press).
Haukkala, Hiski (2008) ‘The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of
European Neighbourhood Policy’ Europe-Asia Studies 60 (9), 1601–22.
— (2011) ‘The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European
Neighbourhood Policy’, in Richard G. Whitman (ed.) Normative Power Europe: Empirical and
Theoretical Perspectives (Basingstoke: Palgrave), forthcoming.
Hill, Christopher (1993) ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International
Role’ Journal of Common Market Studies 31 (3), 305–28.
Hyde-Price, Adrian (2006) ‘”Normative” Power Europe: A Realist Critique’ Journal of European Public
Policy 13 (2), 217–34.
10
Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical
Democratic Politics (London: Verso).
Lavenex, Sandra (2006) ‘Shifting Up and Out: the Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control’
West European Politics 29 (2), 329–50.
Lavenex, Sandra and Nicole Wichmann (2009) ‘The External Governance of EU Internal Security’
Journal of European Integration 31 (1), 83–102.
Lightfoot, Simon and Jon Burchell (2005) ‘The European Union and the World Summit on Sustainable
Development: Normative Power Europe in Action?’ Journal of Common Market Studies 43 (1), 75–
95.
Manners, Ian (2002) ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ Journal of Common
Market Studies 40 (2), 235–58.
— (2007) ‘Another Europe is possible: critical perspectives on European Union politics’, in Knud Erik
Jørgensen, Mark A. Pollack and Ben Rosamond (eds) Handbook of European Union politics
(London: Sage), 77–95.
— (2008) ‘The normative power of the European Union in a globalised world’, in Zaki Laïdi (ed.) EU
Foreign Policy in a Globalized World: Normative power and social preferences (London:
Routledge).
— (2011) ‘The European Union’s Normative Power: Critical Perspectives and Perspectives on the
Critical’, in Richard G. Whitman (ed.) Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical
Perspectives (Basingstoke: Palgrave), forthcoming.
Merlingen, Michael (2007) ‘Everything Is Dangerous: A Critique of “Normative Power Europe”‘
Security Dialogue 38 (4), 435–53.
Moravcsik, Andrew (1994) ‘Why the European Union Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and
International Cooperation’ Center for European Studies Working Paper Series 52 (Cambridge:
Center for European Studies).
Pace, Michelle (2008) ‘The EU as a “force for good” in border conflict cases?’ in Thomas Diez,
Stephan Stetter and Mathias Albert (eds) The European Union and Border Conflicts. The Power of
Integration and Association (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 203–19.
Simhandl, Katrin (2006) ‘”Western Gypsies and Travellers”–“Eastern Roma”: the creation of political
objects by the institutions of the European Union’ Nations and Nationalism 12 (1), 97–115.
Simon, Roger (1982) Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction (London : Lawrence and Wishart).
Sjursen, Helene (2006) ‘The EU as a “normative” power: how can this be?’ Journal of European Public
Policy 13 (2), 235–51.
Toje, Asle (2008) ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role’
Security Dialogue 39 (1), 121–41.
Wiener, Antje (2007) ‘Contested Meanings of Norms: The Challenge of Democratic Governance
beyond the State’ Comparative European Politics 5 (1, Special Issue), 1–17.
— (2008) The Invisible Constitution of Politics: Contested Norms and International Encounters
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
11
Young, Alasdair R. and John Peterson (2006) ‘The EU and the new trade politics’ Journal of European
Public Policy 13 (6), 795–814.
Young, Alasdair R. (2007) ‘Trade Politics Ain't What It Used to Be: The European Union in the Doha
Round’ Journal of Common Market Studies 45 (4), 789–811.
Youngs, Richard (2009) ‘Democracy promotion as external governance?’ Journal of European Public
Policy 16 (6), 895–915.
Zimmermann, Hubert (2007) ‘Realist Power Europe? The EU in the Negotiations about China's and
Russia's WTO Accession’ Journal of Common Market Studies 45 (4), 813–32.
12