Geopolitical Strategic importance of Pakistan

 The new Cold War (Munir Akram)

US Vice President Pence last week declared a new Cold War against China. America has now
decisively stepped into the Thucydides Trap — the Ancient Greek historian’s thesis that a
confrontation between an established and a rising power is almost always inevitable.

China was accused by Pence of multiple wrongs: unfair trade, technology theft, targeted
tariffs, interference in the US electoral process, a military buildup, militarisation of the South
China Sea islands (to keep the US out), ‘debt diplomacy’, anti-US propaganda and internal
oppression. Pence declared that the US “will not stand down” in opposing these alleged
Chinese policies.
Some believe that the US salvo was mainly designed to divert attention from the ongoing
investigation into Trump’s possible collusion with Russia in the 2016 presidential elections
and/or to mobilise votes for next month’s mid-term elections.

The confrontation between the US and China is

likely to escalate in words and deeds.
Yet, a deeper analysis indicates that Pence’s broad anti-China indictment reflects the
American ‘establishment’s’ considered policy. The speech was preceded by national
strategy papers describing China and Russia as America’s adversaries, trade tariffs and
investment restrictions, sanctions on Chinese military entities, renewed weapons sales to
Taiwan and expanding US Freedom of Navigation operations in the South China Sea.
Chinese efforts to build a so-called ‘win-win’ relationship through trade concessions and
cooperation on Korea and Afghanistan have clearly failed.
Chinese anger was visible during US State Secretary Pompeo’s Korea-related visit to
Beijing a few days ago, when Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly demanded that the US
stop its confrontational ‘behaviour’. The confrontation is likely to escalate in words and
deeds. It will become increasingly difficult for either side to ‘stand down’.
Apart from the raves of right-wing Americans, the Trump administration is unlikely to get
much joy from the open confrontation with China.
The trade tariffs Trump has imposed are unlikely to return many manufacturing jobs to
America since most Chinese goods will continue to be cheaper than their alternatives. US
consumers will pay higher prices. The China-located supply chains of many US
corporations will be disrupted, while China’s supply chains are mostly outside of the US.
Nor will technology restraints significantly dent China’s 2025 technology programme, since
it has already achieved considerable technological autonomy.
The Sino-US economic confrontation will have extensive consequences for the global
economy. The IMF estimates that the US and China may lose one per cent and two per
cent of growth respectively, while global growth would be trimmed by around half a
percentage point. There are fears of another global recession as other economies become
infected by the Sino-US trade war.
The prospects of the US “containing” China in the Indo-Pacific are also marginal. This is
China’s front yard. The US allies and friends in East Asia — even Japan, Australia and
South Korea — are economically intertwined with China and will be reluctant to confront it.
US Freedom of Navigation operations could lead to accidental conflict, as almost happened
recently. Short of war, the US cannot wrest the South China Sea islands from China. A
reckless US decision to discard the One-China policy could unleash a Chinese invasion of
Taiwan.
Despite US objections, and Western propaganda, China’s Belt and Road Initiative is
unlikely to be derailed. Developing countries will not forego the opportunity to build
infrastructure with Chinese financing. The ‘debt trap’ argument is misleading. Infrastructure
investment rarely offers commercial returns. But no country can industrialise without
adequate infrastructure. The US, with its parsimonious outlays on development cooperation,
cannot offer an alternative to China’s BRI.
The new Cold War will change the structures of global interaction and governance.
Cooperation among the major powers on global issues (non-proliferation, climate change,
terrorism) and in regions of tension (North Korea, Afghanistan, the Middle East) may be
frozen. China, Russia and the countries in the Eurasian ‘heartland’ will draw closer together.
Alternative trade, finance and development organisations will emerge to circumvent US
domination of existing institutions.
The strategic dynamics of South Asia could also be transformed. Although India is attracted
to America’s overtures for an anti-China alliance, it also wishes to avoid the ‘cost’ of
confrontation (Doklam) and to secure the benefits of trade and investment with China (the
‘Wuhan spirit’) as well as to maintain its arms supply relationship with Russia. The
escalating Sino-US confrontation will compress the time and space for India to get off the
fence and make a strategic choice between America and Russia-China.
Unlike India, Pakistan’s choice is clear. Its strategic partnership with China is critical for its
national security and socioeconomic development. This choice automatically implies a
strategic divergence with the US. The only question is whether Pakistan can maintain a
modicum of cooperation with the US despite the strategic divergence. Pakistan has some
room for manoeuvre so long as the US remains in Afghanistan, with or without a political
settlement there.
If India chooses to remain aloof from an alliance with US, and moves closer to China and
Russia, it could radically alter the calculus of the political and economic relationships in the
entire region. A Sino-Indian rapprochement would increase the prospects of Pakistan-India
normalisation and a compromise ‘solution’ for Kashmir. The visions of regional ‘connectivity’
would become reality. However, this scenario is highly unlikely until after the 2019 Indian
elections.
Although the new Cold War is wider and more complex than the old one, there is hope that
it may not be as prolonged. US public opinion will soon see that confrontation with China
(and Russia) is costly and counterproductive. A post-Trump Democratic administration may
well decide to opt for the ‘win-win’ relationship proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

 View from abroad (Shada Islam)

China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) gets top international billing this weekend
as delegations from over 100 states, including 28 world leaders, gather in Beijing for a
summit showcasing the world’s first massive cross-continental connectivity master plan.
It’s going to be quite a party. And so it should. With billions of dollars of planned
investments ranging from ports in Pakistan and Sri Lanka to high-speed railways in Europe
and Africa to gas pipelines in Central Asia, the BRI is unparalleled in its scope, vision and
the amount of money involved.
And the multi-trillion dollar initiative to connect China with Europe, Asia and Africa is
gathering momentum as more and more countries sign up, old and new projects are
brought under the BRI umbrella and China begins to address some of the concerns voiced
by partner countries and critics.
Estimates about the amount of money involved in the plan vary enormously. Credit Suisse
Group AG says the BRI could funnel investments worth as much as $502 billion into 62
countries over five years. Other estimates put the BRI bill much higher.
The main point to remember is that the blueprint is an evolving one. Projects in New
Zealand, Britain and the Arctic are now within the BRI embrace. Others could come in later.
And while the money at stake is important for the countries engaging in the plan, the BRI is
about more than just investments.
Make no mistake: this is about fashioning a new world order, one where Washington no
longer calls the shots. And that’s exactly what is scaring many.
First mentioned by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, the BRI clearly articulates China’s
vision of its role in a changing and increasingly uncertain global order.
The timing is perfect. As US President Donald Trump continues to send mixed messages
on his international commitments and the strength of his global engagement, including on
trade and investments — and Europe grapples with Brexit and other crisis — the Chinese
initiative is securing additional traction and credibility.
Not surprisingly, Washington and Tokyo are not too pleased. Europe is interested but
cautious. Other countries are happy to engage and see how they can best benefit from the
plan.
So what do we know about the BRI?
First, it’s undoubtedly and unabashedly about geopolitics and geo-economics and China’s
self-confident repositioning of itself on the global stage.
While Washington and Tokyo — and some countries in Europe — may think such a
rejigging of the world could be dangerous, many other states aren’t too worried.
After all, “Brand America” isn’t too popular in many parts of the globe. And while China isn’t
always the gentlest of interlocutors, many countries are ready for a change.
Second, the BRI is only part of the story. Significantly, China’s Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) is working in tandem with the BRI, to meet the world’s enormous
infrastructure investment needs. The $40bn Silk Road Fund is also an important tool to
finance infrastructure projects.
And even as the US withdraws from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the pan-Asian
(excluding China) trade pact, China and countries in the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (Asean) are moving ahead with the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP) trade deal to boost trade within the region.
Importantly, President Xi, who made a strong stand for globalisation and trade liberalisation
at the Davos World Economic Forum in January this year, is expected to do so again at the
BRI Forum.
Third, there’s little doubt that the world needs to get better connected. Global infrastructure
needs are enormous. Better connectivity is crucial for trade, to attract investments and to
achieve some of the most crucial anti-poverty goals included in the Agenda 2030
sustainable development goals.
Fourth, BRI is not just about helping others. Search for new engines for domestic economic
growth are the main driver. China wants to boost growth in the western regions which lag
behind the well-developed east coast. Steel and cement are in oversupply and will be used
in the BRI projects. There will be job creation for thousands of Chinese workers but also
foreign nationals involved in the project.
Fifth, this is about learning by doing. Chinese academics admit that Beijing is using the BRI
to learn more about operating on the global stage. “China is a late-comer as a global
player,” according to a Chinese scholar. “We are in the process of learning how to act.”
While doing so, China is also changing. Slowly but surely, the focus is shifting to ensuring
that the BRI becomes more transparent, procurement rules become more rigorous and
projects fit in with the sustainable development goals, including environmental standards.
Significantly, as the initiative gains additional traction, China will have to conduct itself as a
“traditional” development partner, abandoning its “non-interference” policies for a stance
which is more concerned about the domestic affairs of its partner states, including issues
like governance and terrorism.
Beijing insists that the BRI will be inclusive and open to other countries, as well as
complement existing regional frameworks such as European Union, the African Union and
Asean.
Finally, for all the Western concerns that the BRI will allow China to steamroll its partners,
destroying everything and everyone in its path, the facts on the ground are very different.
In most countries, China is not the only actor in town. Most states still have access to US
and European funds, not to mention aid from Japan and Saudi Arabia.
It’s not a zero-sum game. Most governments taking part in the BRI will also keep their
contacts with Western governments, Japan and other international donors.
“We are not taking sides. The BRI will help us to fund our massive infrastructure needs. It’s
a great opportunity — but we’re also doing our homework,” a Southeast Asian diplomat told
this correspondent. “We will be in the lead. China knows and understands that.”