G.R. No.

L-56340 June 24, 1983

SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. and MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN Y. REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH I, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF CEBU and LEWELLYN BARLITO QUEMADA, respondents.

FACTS:
1. Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died and was survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio, who later
died, their two legitimatechildren Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an
illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada PASTOR, JR (QUEMADA). Quemada is a
Philippine citizen by reason of his mother’s citizenship.
2. QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the Court
of First Instance of Cebu. The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting
of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation
(ATLAS) of some mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu.
3. The PROBATE COURT appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR., whether or not covered
or affected by the holographic will. As special administrator, he instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for
reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate.
4. Pastor Jr. and his sister Sofia filed their opposition to the petition for probate and order appointing Quemada as the special
administrator.
5. While the reconveyance suit was still being litigated, the probate court issued an order of execution and garnishment,
resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was
not inofficious. It directed ATLAS to remit to Quemada the 42% royalties due to the decedent’e estate.
6. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners. This was denied by the CA. Hence, a petition for Review by
certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, followed by a supplemental petition with urgent prayer for
restraining order was filed by petitioners.

ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the probate court resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity.
2. Whether or not the Order of Execution and Garnishment is proper.

3. Whether or not the certiorari is a proper remedy in this case.

RULINGS:
1. No. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will
such as whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law.As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus,
for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
The Court has acquired jurisdiction over the probate proceedings as it hereby allows and approves the so-called
holographic will of testator Alvaro Pastor, Sr., with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated
pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intestate estate administration aspect must proceed subject to
the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties.

2. There is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate court generally cannot issue a writ of execution. It is not
supposed to issue a writ of execution because its orders usually refer to the adjudication of claims against the estate which
the executor or administrator may satisfy without the necessity of resorting to a writ of execution. The probate court, as such,
does not render any judgment enforceable by execution.
The circumstances that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate court may issue execution (a)to
satisfy (debts of the estate out of) the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the decedent's assets
(Sec. 6. Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment of the expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and (c) to satisfy the costs when a
person is cited for examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142) may mean, under the rule of inclusion unius est
exclusion alterius, that those are the only instances when it can issue a writ of execution.

3. Under the circumstances, recourse to certiorari was the feasible remedy.At the time petitioner PASTOR, JR. filed the
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, appeal was not available to him since his motion for reconsideration of the
execution order was still pending resolution by the Probate Court. In the face of actual garnishment of their major source of
income, petitioners could no longer wait for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration. They needed prompt relief
from the injurious effects of the execution order.

DECISION OF CA IS REVERSED. CASE IS REMANDED TO THE APPROPRIATE RTC FOR PROPER

PROCEEDINGS, SUBJECT TO THE JUDGEMENT RENDERED IN THE CONVEYANCE SUIT.
G.R. No. 160530 November 20, 2007
CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER, petitioner,
vs.
DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER (Deceased), ATTY. ROGELIO P. NOGALES and THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI (Branch 59), respondents.

FACTS:
1. Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for the probate of his holographic will and
for the issuance of letters testamentary to herein respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales. After hearing and due notice to the
compulsory heirs, the probate court issued an order allowing the said will.
2. Thereafter, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters testamentary for the administration of the
estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittscher’s surviving spouse, herein petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of
the said petition. The court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss, and granted respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary.
3. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. The case was elevated to the CA and the CA affirmed
in toto RTC’s decision. Thus, a petition for review on certitiorari was filed where the petitioner contends the following: (a)
the petition for issuance of letters testamentary lacked a certification against forum shopping (b) that RTC has no jurisdiction
since Dr. Nittscher was not a resident of the Philippines and the properties in the will actually belongs to her and lastly (c)
that she was denied due process of law since she did not receive personal service of notices of the proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Nittscher’s petition for the probate of his holographic will lacks the requisite notification
requirement under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:
NO. Under Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, if the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice
shall be sent only to his compulsory heirs.In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child,
and Dr. Nittscher’s children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, of the probate
proceedings.
Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she
also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the letters
testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss. The petitioner was accorded every opportunity to defend her cause.
Therefore, petitioner’s allegation that she was denied due process in the probate proceedings is without basis.
As a final word, petitioner should realize that the allowance of her husband’s will is conclusive only as to its due
execution. The authority of the probate court is limited to ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Thus, petitioner’s claim of title to the properties
forming part of her husband’s estate should be settled in an ordinary action before the regular courts.

PETITION IS DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT. ASSAILED DECISION IS AFFIRMED.

 G.R. No. L-40804 January 31, 1978
ROSARIO FELICIANO VDA. DE RAMOS, MIGUEL DANILA, RAYMUNDO A. DANILA,
CONSOLACION SANTOS, MIGUEL G. DANILA, AMOR DANILA, MOISES MARTINEZ, MIGUELA GAVINO,
MELITON NISTA, PRIMITIVA NISTA, HEIRS OF DANIEL NISTA, MOISES NISTA, DOMINGO NISTA and
ADELAIDA NISTA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARCELINA (MARTINA) GUERRA and THE HEIRS OF BUENAVENTURA
GUERRA, respondents.

FACTS:
1. Adelaida Nista who claimed to be one of the instituted heirs, filed a petition for the probate of the alleged will and
testament of the late Eugenia Danila. The petitioner prayed that after due notice and proper hearing, the alleged will and
codicil be probated and allowed and that she or any other person be appointed as administrator of the testatrix's estate.
2. Buenaventura and Marcelina (Martina) both surnamed Guerra filed an opposition and an amended opposition to the
petition alleging among others (a) that they are the legally adopted son and daughter of the late spouses Florentino Guerra
and Eugenia Danila; (b) that the purported will and codicil subject of the petition were procured through fraud and undue
influence; (c) that the formalities requited by law for the execution of a will and codicil have not been complied with as the
same were not properly attested to or executed and not expressing the free will and deed of the purported testatrix; (d) that
the late Eugenia Danila had already executed on November 5, 1951 her last will and testament which was duly probated and
not revoked or annulled during the lifetime of the testatrix, and (e) that the petitioner is not competent and qualified to act as
administration of the estate.
3. The parties decided to enter into a compromise agreement where the will was abrogated and set aside in view of an
understanding between the parties that the parcel of riceling in San Pablo is given to Nista and all other properties to Guerra.
This agreement was approved by the lower court.
4. In the year 1968, Rosario de Ramos, Miguel Danila Felix Danila Miguel Gavino Amor Danila Consolacion Santos and
Miguel Danila son of the late Fortunato Danila filed a motion for leave to intervene as co-petitioners alleging that being
instituted heirs or devisees, they have rights and interests to protect in the estate of the late Eugenia Danila. They argued that
oppositors repudiated their institution as heirs when they failed to cause the recording of the will and committed acts of
ingratitude when they abandoned and denied support due to the testatrix. They prayed for the probate and allowance of the
will and the appointment of any of them as the administrator. The lower court allowed them to intervene in the proceeding
and thereafter allowed the probate of the will.
5. During probate, two of the attesting witnesses, Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz, testified that they did not see the
testatrix sign the will but the same was already signed by her when they affixed their own signatures thereon. On the other
hand, the testimony of Atty. Ricardo Barcenas corroborated by Atty. Manuel Alvero was given more weight by the court
being the notary public and testifying that the will was executed and signed by the testator and witnesses in the presence of
the Atty. and of one another. The CA however, reversed the trial court’s decision and ruled that the will should be
disallowed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in denying the probate of the will and the codicil.

RULING:
Yes, the CA erred in denying the probate of the will and the codicil. There is ample and satisfactory evidence to
convince us that the will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law.It appears positively
and convincingly that the documents were prepared by a lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero The execution of the same was
evidently supervised by his associate, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before whom the deeds were also acknowledged.
The presumption of regularity can of course be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, but not
easily by the mere expediency of the negative testimony of Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz that they did not see the
testatrix sign the will. A negative testimony does not enjoy equal standing with a positive assertion, and faced with the
convincing appearance of the will, such negative statement must be examined with extra care.
As a rule, if any or all of the submitting witness testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember
having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful ability, the will may, nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from
the testimony of other witness and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner by
law.

DECISION OF THE CA IS REVERSED.

G.R. No. L-21993 June 21, 1966
ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents.

FACTS:
1. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died. Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a
purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez. Thereafter, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel
filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will.
2. The petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr.
Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a
will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate. Subsequently, Apolonia
Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them stating that he
left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.
3.The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on
March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same
date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.
4. The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the
case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.
5. The CFI ruled in favor of Pangilinan and Jacalan. Thus, petitioners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction upon the delivery of the will.

RULING: YES. . The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the
will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being
deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the
corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. — When a will is delivered to, or a
petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving
the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time andplace to be
published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by the testator himself.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is
filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for
its allowance is as yet filed.
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that their commencing intestate
proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith,
patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules.The other reason is that, in
our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place
in the absence of a valid operative will.
WRIT OF CERTIORARI APPLIED FOR IS DENIED
5. EMETERIO A. RODRIGUEZ (in substitution of RUFINO A. RODRIGUEZ, who died during
the pendency of this case in the Court of Appeals), and JOSE AYALA
v.
COURT OF APPEALS and PETRA RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIA RODRIGUEZ and ROSA
RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. L-28734. March 28, 1969

FACTS:
1. Doña Margarita Rodriguez died in July 19,1960 leaving a last will and testament dated
September 30, 1951.
2. The executor presented the project partition and the same was approved by the Court Of First
Instance. Hence, the intrinsic validity could never be again questioned and raised as issue in the
trusteeship proceeding in the same court.
3. however in the decision of the Court of appeals it held that the decedent left no compulsory heir
and she can freely dispose of her properties. Likewise it rule that the testatrix created a trust
relationship, which was objected by the private respondents who claimed to be the cousins of the
deceased.
4. The objection was overruled and the lower court granted the letters of trusteeship to the
petitioners who were executors of the will.
5. A motion for reconsideration was filed and it set aside and modified the assailed decision as to
the validity of the clause creating the trusteeship. It held that perpetual prohibition to alienate the
property mentioned, constitute a clear violation of article 867 and 870 of the civil code. It further
held that intestate succession should be made.
6. Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the clause creating the trust valid?

HELD:
Yes, it is valid.

The wishes of the testatrix constitute the law. Her will must be given effect. This is so even if there
could be an element of uncertainty insofar as the ascertainment thereof is concerned. In the language
of a Civil Code provision: "If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of
doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred." 11 Nor is this
all. A later article of the Civil Code equally calls for observance. Thus: "The words of a will are to
receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will
render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy." 12 The net result would be to reaffirm the conclusion reached
that the challenged resolution of January 8, 1968 is objectionable, in view of its lack of fidelity to the
controlling legal norms.

In no other way can there be deference paid to what the testator had in mind. This Court so
emphatically expressed it in a decision rendered more than sixty years ago. Thus: "Respect for the
will of a testator as expressed in his last testamentary disposition, constitutes the principal basis of the
rules which the law prescribes for the correct interpretation of all of the clauses of the will; the words
and provisions therein written must be plainly construed in order to avoid a violation of his intentions
and real purpose. The will of the testator clearly and explicitly stated must be respected and complied
with as an inviolable law among the parties in interest.

"Where the testator’s intention is manifest from the context of the will and surrounding
circumstances, but is obscured by inapt and inaccurate modes of expression, the language will be
subordinated to the intention, and in order to give effect to such intention, as far as possible, the court
may depart from the strict wording and read a word or phrase in a sense different from that which is
ordinarily attributed to it, and for such purpose may would or change the language of the will, such as
restricting its application or supplying omitted words or phrases."

The resolution of the Court of Appeals is set aside.

 MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Vs. ERNESTO
PALAGANAS,Respondent. January 26, 2011.

Facts:
1. Ruperta Palaganas a Filipino who became a naturalized citizen of U.S died single and childless. In her last will she
designated Sergio as the executor of her will for she has a property left in the Philippines and U.S.
2. Ernesto, another brother of the deceased file in RTC of Bulacan a petition for the probate of the will of Ruperta
and for his appointment as an special administrator of her estate.
3. However it was opposed by Manuel and Benjamin on the ground that the will should be probated in U.S and not in
the Philippines. They further alleged that, the even if the will can be probated in the Philippines it is nonetheless
invalid because it was executed under duress and without full understanding of its consequences.
4. The RTC admitted the probate of the will and appointed Ernesto as special administrator .
5. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does
not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in
the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated
and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel
and Benjamin came to this Court.
Issue: WON a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been
previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

Held:
Yes, it may be probated.
our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been
probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article
816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his
country.[6]

In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of
such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other
person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have
the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent;
(c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and
(e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the
fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. [7] The rules do not require proof that the foreign will
has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

The petition is denied.

 ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR,SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN,
ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR.,
Petitioners,
- versus -
LORENZO LAXA,
Respondent. G.R. No. 174489. April 11, 20

Facts:
1. Pacenciais a spinster, she executed her last will at the age of 78 in the house of Judge Limpin .
2. She bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenze Laxa and his wife Corazon Laxa and their children.
3. Lorenzo is Pacencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son.
4. More than four years after the death of Pacencia, Lorenzo filed a petition in Pampanga for the probate of the will
of Pacencia and for the issuance of the letters of administration in his favor.
5. The petitioner filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition contending that the will is not executed and attested in
accordance with the requirements of the law. that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of
its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution
of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons
for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it
was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her
Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition and Recommendation[29] reiterating their opposition to the
appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his
stead.
6. RTC: The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia
signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary
capacity.[58]
7. CA: reversed the decision and granted the probate of the will of Pacencia.
Issue: whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to warrant its
allowance for probate.

Held:
Faithful compliance with the formalities
laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.

Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a
Will in probate proceedings.[64] This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. [65] These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and
806 of the New Civil Code
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by
law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident
on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the
presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will
may be authentic although they question her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said
act.

In addition, Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencias Will on the ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court was not complied with.the court do not agree. For all intent and purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily
account for the incapacity and failure of the said subscribing witness and the notary public to testify in the court. Will may
be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpins testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the
proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule that [a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting
witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting
witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not
necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner
required by law.[73]

CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, G.R. No. 156021

FRANCIS COLLADO, JOSE
P. COLLADO, JUDITH Present:
PROVIDO, CLARITA PROVIDO,
ALFREDO PROVIDO, MANUEL PUNO, J.,
PROVIDO, JR., LORNA DINA Chairman,
E. PROVIDO, SEVERO ARENGA, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
JR., SERGIO ARENGA, EDUARDO CALLEJO, SR.,
ARENGA, CAROL ARENGA, RUTH TINGA, and
BABASA, NORMA HIJASTRO, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
DOLORES M. FLORES, ANTONIO
MARIN, JR., JOSE MARIN, SR., and
MATHILDE MARIN, Promulgated:
Petitioners,
 September 23, 2005

- versus -

COURT OF APPEALS and

FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO,
Respondents.

Facts:
1. Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the will of Soledad Provido Elevencionado. Alleging te he was
the heir and executor of her will.
2. The RTC allowed the probate of the will.
3. After four months, the petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings claiming that they
are intestate heirs of the decedent.
4. Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have been probated because: (1) the signature of the decedent was
forged; (2) the will was not executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the
attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was
executed by force and under duress and improper pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the
time of affixing of her signature; and (6) she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having included in the
will properties which no longer belonged to her.
5. The RTC denied the motion for being unmeritorious.
6. The CA also dismissed their petition.
7.
Issue: WON respondents offer of a false compromise and his failure to notify them of the probate of the will
constitute extrinsic fraud that necessitates the annulment of the RTCs judgment

Held: No. Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person
interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed.[36] Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province,[37] as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator.[38] Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the
settlement of the estate of the decedent.[39]
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that
brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.[40] Thus, even
though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of
the publication of the notice of hearing.
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator.[48] A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews
and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs[49] who are entitled to be notified of the probate
proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to
personally notify them of the same.
, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the
publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a
jurisdictional requisite.[50]
The petition is denied.
10. Estate of the deceased Agustina Celiz. ROSARIO REY,
vs.
GUILLERMO CARTAGENA, et al.,
G.R. No. L-34288 November 10, 1931.

FACTS:
1. Rosario rey petition in the CFI of Iloilo for the probate of the will of the deceased Agustina
Celiz. She also asked that she be appointed administratrix of the estate.
2. Cartegena et.al filed an opposition alleging that the said will is not the last will and testament of
the deceased and that the signature appearing thereon was not her signature, and the will is not
executed with the formalities prescribed by law.
3. After hearing the evidence Conrado Barrios, auxiliary judge, reached the conclusion that said
will, Exhibit A, was the last will and testament of the deceased Agustina Celiz, and that it was
executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law, and rendered a judgment
admitting said will to probate.

ISSUE: whether or not the attestation clause of the said will is in accordance with the requirements of
section 618 of Act No. 190 as amended.

HELD:

In order to determine whether or not the attestation clause has complied with the requirements
of the said provision, the whole language of the clause must be taken together, and the portion thereof
drawn in question must be read and construed in connection with the rest of the clause. In the
application of section 168 of Act No 190, as amended, the court must bear in mind that the purpose of
the law is not to curtail the exercise of the right to make a will, but to safeguard it. And where a will
has been executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad
faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said will should be admitted to probate.

The judgment appealed from admitting the will to probate should be and is hereby affirmed.
9. Alaban vs Court of Appeals

This is a petition for review of the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) indismissing petitioners petition for annulment
of judgment.

Facts:
Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition, probate of the last will and testament of the late Soledad Provido
Elevencionado. Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will .Regional Trial Court
(RTC) allowed the probate of the will of the decedent and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent. Four
months later, petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings and an opposition to the allowance of
the will of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs
of the decedent. Petitioner’s Contention:RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct
docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs and prayed that the letters testamentary issued to
respondent be withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed of under intestate succession. Ruling of the RTC: It denied
the motion of the petitioners for being unmeritorious. It held that petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by
publication and that the deficiency in the payment of docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. It
merely required respondent to pay the deficiency and that the
Decision was already final and executory even before petitioners filing of the motion to reopen.

Petitioners thereafter filed a petition13 with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA, seeking the
annulment of the RTC’s Decision. The CA dismissed the petition. It found that there was no showing that petitioners failed
to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate
remedies through no fault of their own.

ISSUE:
W/N Petitioners were made parties in the proceedings.

HELD:
Petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate proceedings.
Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding
publication of the petition the court’s jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the
estate of the decedent.
Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties
thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.
On the other hand, according to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator.
Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of
the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for
probate, or to personally notify them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the
publication of the notice.
10. Estate of the deceased Agustina Celiz. ROSARIO REY VS. GUILLERMO CARTAGENA, ET AL.,

FACTS:
Rosario Rey filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the probate of the will of the deceased
Agustina Celiz. She also asked that she be appointed administratrix of the estate.
To said petition Guillermo Cartagena and four others filed an opposition, alleging that said will, was not the last
will and testament of the deceased Agustina Celiz; that the signature appearing thereon was not her signature, and that said
will was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
Upon the issue thus presented the cause was brought on for trial. After hearing the evidence the judge, reached the
conclusion that said will, was the last will and testament of the deceased Agustina Celiz, and that it was executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law, and rendered a judgment admitting said will to probate.
From that judgment the opponents appealed, and now allege that the lower court erred in declaring that said will
was executed in compliance with the requisites of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause of said will is in accordance with the requirements of section 618 of Act No.
190, as amended/ or the said will was executed in compliance with the requisites of law.

RULING:
In the Sufficiency of said attestation clause, we are of the opinion that the same is in substantial conformity with
the requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended. Said attestation clause, among other things states: (a) That the
will, Exhibit A, is composed of six pages; (b) that the testatrix signed the same and on all the margins thereof in the presence
of the witnesses; and (c) that the witnesses also signed in the presence of the testatrix and in the presence of each other.
The appellants earnestly contend that the attestation clause fails to show that the witnesses signed the will and each and
every page thereof because it simply says " (that we the witnesses also signed in the presence of the testatrix and of each
other).
In answer to this contention it may be said that this portion of the attestation clause must be read in connection
with the portion preceding it, which states that the testatrix signed the will and on all the margins thereof in the presence of
the witnesses; especially, because the word also used therein established a very close connection between said two portions
of the attestation clause. This word also should, therefore, be given its full meaning which, in the instant case, is that the
witnesses signed the will in the same manner as the testratrix did. The language of the whole attestation clause, taken
together, clearly shows that the witnesses signed the will and on all the margins thereof in the presence of the testratrix and
of each other.
In the interpretation of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, the court must bear in mind that that purpose of
the law is not to curtail the exercise of the right to make a will, but to safeguard it; and where a will has been executed in
substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is
obviated, said will should be admitted to probate.
For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from admitting the will to probate should be and is hereby
affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
11. PECSON VS. CORONEL

FACTS:
On November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated as the last will and
testament of Dolores Coronel (testatrix) who named as her sole heir Lorenzo Pecson, the husband of
her niece. The relatives of testatrix by consanguinity questioned the genuineness of the will on the
following grounds: First, that it was improbable and exceptional that Dolores Coronel should dispose
of her estate by excluding her blood relatives; and second, that if such will was not expressed in fact,
it was due to extraneous illegal influence.

The opponents contend that it was not, nor could it be, the will of the testatrix, because it is not
natural nor usual that she should completely exclude her blood relatives from her vast estate, in order
to will the same to one who is only a relative by affinity, there appearing no sufficient motive for such
exclusion, inasmuch as until the death of Dolores Coronel, she maintained very cordial relations with
the aforesaid relatives who had helped her in the management and direction of her lands. It appears,
however, from the testimony of Attorney Francisco (page 71, transcript of the stenographic notes) that
Dolores Coronel revealed to him her suspicion against some of her nephews as having been
accomplices in a robbery of which she had been a victim. As to preference given to Lorenzo Pecson,
it is not purely arbitrary, nor a caprice or a whim of the moment. The proof adduced by this appelle,
although contradicted, shows by a preponderance of evidence that besides the services which the
opponents admit had been rendered by him to Dolores Coronel since the year 1914, he had also
rendered services prior to that time and was the administrator and manager of the affairs of said
Dolores in the last years of her life. And that this was not a whim of the moment is shown by the fact
that six years before the execution of the will in question, said Lorenzo Pecson was named and
appointed by Dolores Coronel as her sole heir.

ISSUE: Whether the decedent can exclude her blood relatives in the disposition of her estate.

HELD:
YES. It is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong but we understand
that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The liberty to dispose of one’s
estate by will when there are no forced (compulsory) heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in
force in the Philippines since 1989.

The SC held that nothing is strange in the preterition made by Dolores Coronel of her blood
relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole beneficiary. Furthermore, although the
institution of the beneficiary here would not seem the most usual and customary, still this would not
be null per se.

“In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute dominion over his
property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without regard to natural or legal claim
upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite capacity to make a will, and the disposition of
his property is not affected by fraud or undue influence, the will is not rendered invalid by the fact
that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can prevent the testator from making a will as
eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity, or revenge can dictate.
12.Rodelasv.Aranza
119 SCRA 16

FACTS:
Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the
issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.
Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of:
1.Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the
death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
2.the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not intended to take
effect after death, and therefore it was not a will, it was merely an instruction as to the management and improvement of the
schools and colleges founded by the decedent;
3.the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect
because lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
4.the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by law.
MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition.
The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will stating that “in the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104
Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that ‘in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards
the document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills.”
And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13,
1976. The lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent and the fact that
the original of the will could not be located shows to that the decedent had discarded the alleged holographic will before his
death.
Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas appealed to the CA. Aranza et al. moved to forward the case to
the SC as it involves a question of law not of fact.

ISSUE:
W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.

HELD:
If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated
because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison
between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.
But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made by the
probate court with the standard writings of the testator. The probate court would be able to determine the authenticity of the
handwriting of the testator.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that “the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The
will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity.” But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that “Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic
copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting
of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court,”
15. BERNARDINO PEREZ, vs. CONRADA PEREZ, et al.,.
G.R. No. L-12359 July 15, 1959

The summary settlement of a testate estate should not have been brought directly to the Supreme
Court from the Iloilo Court of First Instance, since there are several questions of fact raised in relation
with testimonial evidence: for example, the soundness of the mind of the testatrix and her freedom
from constraint in signing the will.

The jurisdictional question directly appealable to this Court refers to jurisdiction over the subject
matter, not mere jurisdiction over the persons.

FACTS: The testate estate left by the deceased Carida Perez is worth P6,000.00 according to
petitioner, and P10,000 according to oppositors.

Oppositors-appellants insist the lower court did not "acquire jurisdiction to receive the evidence for
the allowance of the alleged will" because two heirs Melanio and Milagros) had not been notified in
advance of such will.

However, the petitioner-appellee contended that the persons mentioned were not entitled to notice,
since they were not forced heirs — grandnephew and niece — and had not been mentioned as legatees
or devisees in the will of the deceased.

As to Milagros, petitioner asserts that notice had been addressed to her last known residence in this
country.

Lower court held that such "no notice" argument has no legal foundation. It did not affect the
jurisdiction of the court: it constituted a mere procedural error that may or may not be the basis of
reversal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case

HELD: Indeed, this Tribunal has ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested
in the estate through the publication of the petition in the newspapers — which in this case admittedly
took place.

Service of notice on individual heirs or legatees or devisees is a matter of procedural convenience, not
jurisdictional requisite.

So much so that even if the names of some legatees or heirs had been omitted from the petition for
allowance of the will and therefore were not adviced — the decree allowing the will does not ipso
facto become void for want of jurisdiction.

The result is that the matter of "jurisdiction" discussed by oppositors appears to be so unsubstantial as
to furnish no reason to bypass the Court of Appeals authority to appraise the factual issues in the
litigation.
16. ANTILANO G. MERCADO vs. ALFONSO SANTOS, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga
G.R. No. 45629 September 22, 1938

FACTS: Petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a petition for the probate of the
will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa.

The probate court admitted the will to probate. 16 months after the probate of the will of Ines Basa,
intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed a complaint against the petitioner, for falsification or forgery of
the will probated.

The petitioner was arrested on four different occasions. The 4 complaints filed were likewise
dismissed.The Court of First Instance ordered that the case be tried on the merits.

The case proceeded to trial, and forthwith petitioner moved to dismiss the case claiming again that the
will alleged to have been forged had already been probated and, further, that the order probating the
will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the probate of the will of his deceased wife is a bar to his criminal
prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will

RULING: The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by
Publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world, and
when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State.

It is clear, however, that a duly probated will cannot be declared to be a forgery without disturbing in
a way the decree allowing said will to probate. It is at least anomalous that a will should be regarded
as genuine for one purpose and spurious for another.

Section 113 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides for an adequate remedy to any party who might
have been adversely affected by the probate of a forged will.

The aggrieved party may file an application for relief with the proper court within a reasonable time,
but in no case exceeding six months after said court has rendered the judgment of probate, on the
ground of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.

After a judgment allowing a will to be probated has become final and unappealable, and after the
period fixed by section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure has expired, the law as an expression of
the legislative wisdom goes no further and the case ends there.

We hold, therefore, that in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of our Code of Civil
Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a will which had been
duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.

The resolution of the foregoing legal question is sufficient to dispose of the case.
17. PRIMITIVA PARAS, vs. LUDOVICO NARCISO,
G.R. No. 10959 November 2, 1916

FACTS: This is an appeal from a judgment denying probate to a document purporting to be the last
will and testament of Mariano Magsino, deceased, on the grounds that:

1. it had not been executed by the deceased;

2. the signature thereto was forged; and
3. the instrument had been prepared and signed by the witnesses after the death of the alleged testator.

ISSUE: Whether the appellee had sufficient interest in the estate of the deceased to maintain his
opposition to the admission of the alleged will to probate.

HELD: While it is true that the admission to probate of a will may be opposed or contested by, and
only by, persons having some interest in the estate which will be affected and concluded by the
probate of the proposed will, the mere fact that a stranger has been permitted to oppose or contest the
probate of a will is not reversible error and does not invalidate the proceedings where no objection is
interposed by any of the parties in interest.

In the case at bar no objection was made in the court below to the intervention of the contestant, and
no motion was made either in that court or in this to exclude the contestant.

We conclude therefore that, assuming that this contestant had no interest in the estate, his intervention
in the proceedings, in the absence of objection by any interested party, did not constitute reversible
error.

It is to be observed further that the judgment of the court below, denying probate to the instrument
propounded as the last will and testament of Mariano Magsino, deceased, was based on the evidence
introduced at the hearing on the probate proceedings.

That evidence, as we have said, fully sustains the findings of the probate judge that this instrument is
not the last will and testament of the deceased.

Having been admitted to record without objection, and being competent, relevant and material, and
conclusive in support of the judgment of the trial court, it would be absurd for us to hold that the
judgment below erred in basing his judgment thereon, merely on the ground that on appeal it is made
to appear or is admitted that the contestant had no interest in the estate.

Whether the contestant had or had not any right to intervene, the evidence submitted at the trial
without objection, conclusively sustains the findings of the trial judge on which he properly based his
denial of probate.
19. GREGORIA MONTAÑANO vs. SILVESTRE SUESA.

FACTS:
The property described in the complaint was owned by the late Catalino Montañano, father of the
plaintiff Gregoria Montañano; that prior to this death the said Catalino Montañano executed his last
will and testament, by which he declares his children Gregoria, Catalino, and Manuel Montañano, to
be heirs to the property left by him in the shares or portions respectively designated in the said will;
that the said will was duly authenticated on the 2nd of February, 1906, and the defendant herein,
Silvestre Suesa, being appointed administrator of the estate, presented an inventory of the property
left by Catalino Montañano sr., deceased; That in numbers 8 and 38 of the said inventory the two
parcels of land in controversy are described; that the plaintiff has endeavored to prove that the parcels
of land claimed in her complaint were ceded to her as a gift by her father, Catalino Montañano, during
his lifetime, and that she had never since been in possession thereof, but while these facts have not
been fully demonstrated, on the other hand it appears by the evidence and the will executed by
Catalino Montañano, sr., that the person whom he designated to inherit the parcels of land-referred to
was his son Catalino, parcels of land situated in other barrios being left to the plaintiff Gregoria.

The appellant was defeated in the first instance, and excepted to the judgment, moving later on for a
new trial on the ground that the said judgment was contrary to the weight of the evidence adduced in
the case.It was held in the judgment that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, both documentary and
oral, does not establish her pretended ownership to the property in question.

Accordingly to the foregoing considerations of the lower court not only has the plaintiff failed to
prove that she is the owner of the lands in controversy, but there is positive evidence that they belong
to her brother Catalino, against whom they were attached.

ISSUE:
The appellant maintains that the trial erred in attributing such probatory force to the testamentary
provisions of the late Catalino Montañano from the mere fact that his will had been authenticated,
because as she states, although it is true that it is conclusive with respect to the proper execution of the
same, and as to the capacity of the testator, yet, according to the doctrine set up in the matters of
Castañeda vs. Alemany (3 Phil Rep., 426) and Pimentel vs. Palanca (5 Phil. Rep., 436), it is not so
with regard to the validity of the provisions therein contained.

HELD:

The true import and meaning of this doctrine is by its own terms so clear and precise that any further
explanation seems unnecessary. The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as
touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which
the law prescribes for the validity of wills.

From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein contained, it does
not follow that such provisions lack the efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the law
recognizes when they are not impugned by anyone. In matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that
the will of the testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must be punctually complied
with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public morals. With respect to the partition of the
inheritance, there is the definite provision of law that when the testator makes such partition by an act
inter vivos or by a last will, it shall be accepted in so far as it does not prejudice the legal portion of
the heirs by force of law. (Art. 1056, Civil Code.)

From this follows that, as the testator, Montañano, had by his will partitioned his property and
assigned to his son Catalino, as his portion, the lands in question herein, the said testamentary
provision, being binding on the heirs, constitutes prima facie evidence that the said lands were
actually inherited by Catalino, and not by the plaintiff herein; other property was assigned to her in
payment of her legal portion. Therefore, the trial judge committed no error of law when he considered
said evidence in the sense that he has done, inasmuch as it has not been proven, nor has any attempt
been made to prove that the said testamentary provisions was impugned or annulled, or that it has
ceased to be effective for any reason whatever.
17. DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA

FACTS:
Ismaela Dimagiba submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the purported will of the
late Benedicta de los Reyes. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was
set for hearing and Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and
Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked.
Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and
revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the
proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside by this Supreme Court.
After trial on the formulated issues, the Court of First Instance found that the will was genuine and properly
executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely
presented."
Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of
the estate.
The trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and
unrevoked by the deeds of sale."
The CA affirmed CFI's decision.
Issue:
(a) whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal;
(b) whether or not the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-
appellants had likewise become final; and (c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly
revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944.

Held:
A. Oppositors-appellants contend that the order allowing the will to probate should be considered interlocutory,
because it fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation propounded in their opposition.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand is untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and
definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will
and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.

B. We have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that the presentation and probate of a will are requirements
of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a
consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a
custodian of a will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule
75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order
overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals
correctly so ruled.

C. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the
testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943
and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its
decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point by this Supreme Court in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and
Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent
Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her
legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an
alteration or departure therefrom.1 Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that in the
circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.
18. SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. and MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN Y. REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CEBU and LEWELLYN BARLITO QUEMADA, respondents.

Facts:
This is a case of hereditary succession.
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), Spanish, died survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died later),
their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate
child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada.
QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with
the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The PROBATE COURT appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of
PASTOR, SR.
QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for reconveyance of
alleged properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names of the
spouses PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own
rights, and not by inheritance.
PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their opposition to the petition for probate and the order appointing
QUEMADA as special administrator.
For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT, QUEMADA filed pleading after pleading
asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed
these pleadings on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First Instance.
All pleadings remained unacted upon by the PROBATE COURT.
The PROBATE COURT set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection of PASTOR, JR.
and SOFIA on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. While the reconveyance suit was still
being litigated, the PROBATE COURT issued the now assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question
of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to QUEMADA was not inofficious.
There was absolutely no statement or claim in the Order that the Probate Order had previously resolved the issue of
ownership of the mining rights of royalties thereon, nor the intrinsic validity of the holographic will.
The order of August 20, 1980 found that as per the holographic will and a written acknowledgment of PASTOR,
JR. dated June 17, 1962, of the above 60% interest in the mining claims belonging to the Pastor Group, 42% belonged to
PASTOR, SR. and only 33% belonged to PASTOR, JR. The remaining 25% belonged to E. Pelaez, also of the Pastor Group.
The PROBATE COURT thus directed ATLAS to remit directly to QUEMADA the 42% royalties due decedent's estate, of
which QUEMADA was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee and to deposit 25% with a reputable banking
institution for payment of the estate taxes and other obligations of the estate. The 33% share of PASTOR, JR. and/or his
assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of QUEMADA from the time of PASTOR, SR.'s
death, which amounted to over two million pesos.
The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and
Garnishment and in serving the same on ATLAS on the same day. The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the
same date primarily on the ground that the PROBATE COURT gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of
ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of QUEMADA's legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will.
Before the Motion for Reconsideration could be resolved, however, PASTOR, JR., this time joined by his wife
Ma. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with a
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction assailing the order, the writ of execution and garnishment issued. The petition was
denied on the grounds (1) that its filing was premature because the Motion for Reconsideration of the questioned Order was
still pending determination by the PROBATE COURT; and (2) that although "the rule that a motion for reconsideration is
prerequisite for an action for certiorari is never an absolute rule," the Order assailed is "legally valid. "

Issues:
The basic issue is whether the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 resolved with finality the questions of ownership and
intrinsic validity.

Held:
Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is
manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the win, and
the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic win "with
respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed
by law."
That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory was
appropriate, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was
still pending in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. What, therefore, the Court of Appeals and, in effect, the
Supreme Court affirmed en toto when they reviewed the Probable Order were only the matters properly adjudged in the said
Order.
Petitioner MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, wife of PASTOR, JR., is the holder in her own right of three
mining claims which are one of the objects of conflicting claims of ownership. She is not an heir of PASTOR, SR. and was
not a party to the probate proceedings. Therefore, she could not appeal from the Order of execution issued by the Probate
Court. On the other hand, after the issuance of the execution order, the urgency of the relief she and her co-petitioner
husband seek in the petition for certiorari states against requiring her to go through the cumbersome procedure of asking for
leave to intervene in the probate proceedings to enable her, if leave is granted, to appeal from the challenged order of
execution which has ordered the immediate transfer and/or garnishment of the royalties derived from mineral properties of
which she is the duly registered owner and/or grantee together with her husband. She could not have intervened before the
issuance of the assailed orders because she had no valid ground to intervene. The matter of ownership over the properties
subject of the execution was then still being litigated in another court in a reconveyance suit filed by the special
administrator of the estate of PASTOR, SR.
Likewise, at the time petitioner PASTOR, JR. Med the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, appeal was
not available to him since his motion for reconsideration of the execution order was still pending resolution by the Probate
Court. But in the face of actual garnishment of their major source of income, petitioners could no longer wait for the
resolution of their motion for reconsideration. They needed prompt relief from the injurious effects of the execution order.
Under the circumstances, recourse to certiorari was the feasible remedy.
Decision of CA is reversed.