Philippine Transmarine Carriers v.

Leandro Legaspi
June 19, 2013|
J. Mendoza| NLRC;
LADigester: Bea, Aelxis

SUMMARY: A seafarer, Legaspi, was claiming disability benefits under a CBA to the amount of
USD80,000.00 and sick pay to the amount of USD1,320. After the proceedings with LA, he was
awarded his claim plus 10% attorney’s fees. The LA decision was affirmed by the NLRC. NLRC
also denied PTC’s MR and an entry of judgment was issued to certify that the decision was
already final. Legaspicommenced execution proceedings and the company was constrained to
pay the full judgment award. Paying Legaspi, they executed a document recognizing that the
payment would not bar PTC’s right to file a petition for Certiorari (elevating it to the CA) and if it
succeeds, Legaspi would return the money paid to him becauseof the execution proceedings. CA
ruled that Legaspi was entitled to only USD60k and PTC manifested that the decision should be
modified and asked Legaspi to return the excess amount of USD29,452.00 to the company. CA
denied this motionand ruled that the petition should have been dismissed for being moot and
academic because the NLRC decision had already become final and executory ten days after the
denial of MR and that the company had already paid the money (in fact it was paid before petition
was filed). SC held that NLRC decision was subjectto judicial review of the CA by filing a petition
for certiorari within 60 days from notice of decision or resolution being assailed. Thus, the NLRC
decision could stillbe modified or nullified.

DOCTRINE: In cases where a petition for certiorari is filed after the expiration ofthe 10-day period
under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure but within the 60-day period under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, the CA can grant the petition and modify, nullify and reverse a decision or resolution of
the NLRC.

PEREZ VS POMAR

Facts:
August 27, 1902, Don Vicente Perez filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, asking for the rate of compensation for the
services he rendered being an English interpreter between the
defendant and the military authorities at Tabacalera Company. Ruled in
his favor for such sum. The complaint also asked that the defendant be
condemned to the payment of damages in the sum of $3,200, gold,
together with the costs of suit. Petitioner also asked that Eugenio Pomar
be condemned to pay damages.

According to the complaint it was alleged that Eugenio Pomar, as

general agent of the Compañia General de Tabacos, verbally requested
the plaintiff last December, 8, 1901, to act as interpreter until May 31,
1902.
Perez services were ready whenever needed. Because of that he
abandoned his own soap company business, Pomar assured him that
Tabacalera Company always generously repaid services. The
defendant even gave him flattering promises of employment with the
company, but Perez refused. his only proof as to the same was Mr.
Pomar’s word as a gentleman.

To answer the complaint, Pomar denied everything. Instead, he said

that Perez borrowed money from him for his business, and that he
delivered 36 arrobas of oil worth $106, and three packages of resin for
use in coloring his soap. Respondent only accompanied him in his trips
because he wanted to extend his business relations, and Pomar
occasionally accompanied him because of friendship, and especially
because of the free transportation given him. Because of that Perez
acted as interpreter in the conferences by his own free will, without
Pomar requesting him, so no legal relation between him and the
company existed.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is oblige to pay the continued service
rendered by the petitioner.

Held:
Yes, because from the testimonies at trial, it appears that Perez indeed
rendered services as interpreter of English. He obtained passes and
accompanied Pomar in his journeys in Laguna. But, it doesn’t appear on
record whether Perez was at the disposal of Pomar for 6 months. No
contract was filed or any other innominate contract, but there was tacit
and mutual consent as to the rendition of services.

Pomar accepted the service, and Perez rendered it expecting that the
benefit would be reciprocal. An obligation arises from this scenario.
There was an innominate contract facio ut des. No salary was fixed for
the services, so the court must determine its value, to be determined by
the custom and frequent use of the place in which such services were
rendered. The court ruled to Perez. Pomar should pay 200 Mexican
pesos, less 50 pesos as to the costs of the suit.