FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987 ]

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES. IRENEA C. ROSALES,

PETITIONER, VS. FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES,
MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES AND ANTONIO ROSALES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu the question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased
his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.

It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra
V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her
husband Fortunato T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales
Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased
her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C.
Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the deceased has an estimated
gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).

On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-
R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix
of the said estate.

In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order
dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following individuals the legal heirs of the
deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate

Fortunato T. Rosales (husband), ¼;

Magna R. Acebes (daughter), ¼;

Macikequerox Rosales, ¼' and

Antonio Rosales (son), ¼.

This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order dated February
4, 1975.

These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of

the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio
Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her
mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.

Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned

Orders. The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.

In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution. First is a
widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second
are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a
share of the estate in question final as against the said widow?

Our answer to the first question is in the negative.

Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who
inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation.[1] Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his
own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil
Code[2], or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the
same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:

"Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in
their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares."

"Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other

children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right,
and the latter by right of representation."

"Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several
heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in
equal portions."
"Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or
their descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the
same share as that of a legitimate child."

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving
spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid
of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law either
by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the
Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014)
enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with
the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision
which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the
more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the
surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so
provided in the Code.

Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the

provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:

"Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate

parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with

respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those

in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes

mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent
established by this Code."

The aforesaid provision of law[3] refers to the estate of the deceased spouse
in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory
heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.

Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the

estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation
in Lachenal v. Salas[4], to wit:
"We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case
No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee
thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married
to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with
respect to his estate. xxx." (Emphasis supplied).

By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited
does not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article
confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased
spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate
proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the
mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of
representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles
970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz
"Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of
which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.

"Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not
by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded." (Emphasis supplied.)

Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to

succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed
his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his
grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have
succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she
has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.

Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband
Corterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of
Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her
husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son
Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of
representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio
Rosales.

On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it

unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving
spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for

lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
[ GR No. L-30977, Jan 31, 1972 ]

CARMEN LAPUZ SY v. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO +

150 Phil. 204

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review
by certiorari of an order, dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387, dismissing said case
for legal separation on the ground that the death of the therein plaintiff,
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case,
abated the cause of action as well as the action itself. The dismissal order
was issued over the objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased
plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and
to have the case prosecuted to final judgment.

On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation

against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married
civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that
they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when
her husband abandoned her, that they had no child; that they acquired
properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband
cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street,
Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of
legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.
In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio
S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several
other claims involving money and other properties, counterclaimed for the
declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on
the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to
Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their
respective evidence. But before the trial could be completed (the
respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9 and
18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident
on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her
death.
On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for
legal separation"[1] on two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal
separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102
of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation.
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio
opposed the motion.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the
case.[2] In the body of the order, the court stated that the motion to dismiss
and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the question of
whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which the court
resolved in the negative. Petitioner's counsel moved to reconsider but the
motion was denied on 15 September 1969.
After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the
order of dismissal issued by the juvenile and domestic relations court, the
petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969. The same was
given due course and answer thereto was filed by respondent, who prayed
for the affirmance of the said order.[3]
Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio,
filed counterclaims, he did not pursue them after the court below
dismissed the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by
praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition
for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz
marriage to be null and void ab initio.
But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute
for the lower court did not act on the motion for substitution) stated the
principal issue to be as follows:
"When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into
one for a declaration of nullity of a marriage, does the death of a party abate
the proceedings?"
The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a
legal separation suit to one for declaration of nullity of a marriage, which is
without basis, for even petitioner asserted that "the respondent has
acquiesced to the dismissal of his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page
22). Not only this. The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim
to declare the nullity of the self same marriage can stand independent and
separate adjudication. They are not inseparable nor was the action for legal
separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the
counterclaim, for legal separation presupposes a valid marriage, while the
petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a precondition.
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final
decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will
abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-
and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in
this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines
recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and
no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing
that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings
and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being
personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action
causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.
* * * When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because
the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the
death of the spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244,
Section 3). The action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81;
Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D.H. 1933, 332."[4]
"Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law,
and an action for divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of
effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a personal
nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the
parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has
settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the
court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and
of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are
almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce
proceeding, before final decree, abates the action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208;
Wren vs. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth vs. Danforth, 111 III. 236; Matter of
Grandall, 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578, 134 Am St. Rep. 830, 17 Ann. Czas.
874; Wilcon vs. Wilson, 73 Mich. 620, 41 N.W. 817; Strickland vs.
Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S. W. 659; McCurley vs. McCurley, 60 Md. 185,
45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbie vs. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L. R. A.
141."[5]
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and
maintenance (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris 208).

A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses

shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence,
they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the
decree. On this point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
"(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the
marriage bonds shall not be severed;
"(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community
of property shall be dissolved and liquidated, but the offending spouse shall
have no right to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or
community, without prejudice to the provisions of article 176;
"(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent
spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in the interest of said
minors, for whom said court may appoint a guardian;
"(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the
innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of
the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent one shall be revoked
by operation of law." * * *
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property),
the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned
by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by
intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of
testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the
innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the
Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and
by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to
conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not
a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section
17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action
through a substitute of the deceased party.
"Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted. * * *."
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the
actions that survive for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of
the Revised Rules of Court:
"SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against
executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of
money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor
or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an
interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to
recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may
be commenced against him."
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be
deemed fairly included in the enumeration.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of
the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are
mere effects of a decree of separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before
the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If
death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and
the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain
unborn.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of
nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such
action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there
could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights
acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines[6] could be resolved and determined in a proper action for
partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only
voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the
second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an
absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally
believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon
as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87,
paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be
brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And
furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have
resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse," as expressly provided in
Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY , the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile
and Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as
to costs.
[ GR NO. 82233, Mar 22, 1990 ]

JOSE BARITUA v. CA +

262 Phil. 618

SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary to
existing relevant laws and applicable jurisprudence the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1987 which reversed and set aside that
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXII, at Pili, Camarines Sur.[2] The
challenged decision adjudged the petitioners liable to the private
respondents in the total amount of P20,505.00 and for cost.

The facts are as follows:

In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by

Bienvenido Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano,
in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven
by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated by petitioner Jose
Baritua.[3] As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger
died,[4] and the tricycle was damaged.[5] No criminal case arising from the
incident was ever instituted.[6]

Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial

settlement of the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus' insurer--
Philippine First Insurance Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity) --
Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. deNacario, received
P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed
on March 27, 1980 a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and
PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them from all actions, claims, and
demands arising from the accident which resulted in her husband's death
and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving. Alicia
likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which she formally
manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case, either civil or
criminal, against the petitioners.[7]

On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of
the accident on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the
parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the
petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur.[8] In
their complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for
their deceased son, the petitioners through their representatives promised
them (the private respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement, they shall
be indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral expenses incurred
by reason thereof, and for the damage to the tricycle the purchase price of
which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim. The
petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and
settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The
Nacario spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered
to indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son
Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for
compensatory and exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and
for moral damages.[9]

After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the
payment by the defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her child,
who are the preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased
Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents, the plaintiffs (herein private
respondents), extinguished any claim against the defendants
(petitioners).[10]

The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment
of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that the release executed by
Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario did not discharge the liability of the
petitioners because the case was instituted by the private respondents in
their own capacity and not as "heirs, representatives, successors, and
assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not have validly waived the damages
being prayed for (by the private respondents) since she was not the one
who suffered these damages arising from the death of their
son. Furthermore, the appellate court said that the petitioners "failed to
rebut the testimony of the appellants (private respondents) that they were
the ones who bought the tricycle that was damaged in the
incident. Appellants had the burden of proof of such fact, and they did
establish such fact in their testimony x x x."[11] Anent the funeral expenses,
"(T)he expenses for the funeral were likewise shouldered by the appellants
(the private respondents). This was never contradicted by the appellees
(petitioners). x x x. Payment (for these) were made by the appellants,
therefore, the reimbursement must accrue in their favor."[12]
Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay
the private respondents P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle,
P5,000.00 for "complete" funeral services, P450.00 for cemetery lot,
P55.00 for oracion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees.[13] The
petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court's
decision[14] but their motion was denied.[15] Hence, this petition.

The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in
holding that the petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents
the aggregate amount of P20,505.00 despite the agreement of extrajudicial
settlement between the petitioners and the victim's compulsory heirs.

The petition is meritorious.

Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by

payment. Article 1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:

(1) By payment or performance;

(2) By the loss of the thing due;
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.

(Emphasis ours.)
There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation arising
from the accident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question
now is whether or not Alicia, the surviving spouse and the one who received
the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it.

Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to
whom payment to extinguish an obligation should be made.

Art. 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the
obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person
authorized to receive it.
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased
are the successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to
receive payment. The Civil Code states:

Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate

parents and ascendants;

2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with

respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

3. The widow or widower;

4. Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in

Nos. 1 and 2. Neither do they exclude one another.

(Emphasis ours.)

Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the

deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the
exclusion of collateral relatives.

(Emphasis ours.)
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the
latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the
surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been
established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a
child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido;
they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in
settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the
natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been
estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for
the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.

Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido,

seek relief and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true
that the private respondents loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the
damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said
purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the estate of
their deceased son.[16] These money claims are not the liabilities of the
petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the agreement of the
extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda.
de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of
their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of
Claim" in favor of the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of

Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.