Evidence Cases Partial

1. People v. Resabal Accused Resabal is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Caveat: Super old case. Straight to the point case and 2. People v Cortezano
the facts of what happened during trial are either
Facts:
missing or jumbled up. Emphasized impt parts related
to discussion At 7:00 in the evening of May 30, 1998, when the
victim, Roderick Valentin, and his younger
Facts:
brother, Jerny, were on their way to fetch fresh water
Evidence shows that Primo Ordiz died at his hom in from a well in Daligan, Bonawon on board
Maasin, Leyte, from the effects internal bleeding caused a banca. Then, a flashlight beam originating from some
by a sharp wound in his left lung. RTC found accused point along the shore fell on Roderick and a gunshot
Resabal guilty of murder with treachery and evident rang out. The bullet hit Roderick in the chest. Within
premeditation, conspiring amongst themselves and seconds, the light shifted and focused
acting in common agreement and taking advantage of on Jerny. Another shot was fired, but it missed him.
nocturnity, mutually aiding each other, opened the
window and killed Primo Ordiz by shooting with a caliber The gunman extinguished his light and approached
revolver, inflicting a wound in the upper part of the left the banca. Jerny, recovering from the shock of the
nipple, which produced the instant death of said Primo unexpected attack, got hold of his flashlight and
Ordiz. beamed it on the approaching shooter. From a distance
of about six (6) meters, both Jerny and the wounded
Defense argues that the trial court should have ignored Roderick immediately recognized accused-appellant
Glicerio Orit’s testimony. According to Orit, the accused,
Job Cortezano. Despite the shock and pain, Roderick
armed with a revolver, invited him to the victim’s house
asked Cortezano why he had shot him
to kill Ordiz. Upon reaching the house, Resabal opened
(Roderick). Alarmed that he had been recognized and
the window of the house, opened, looked inside. And at
that moment he left the place, he heard an explosion. identified, Cortezano hurriedly left the
His testimony of hearing an explosion was corroborated scene. Jerny then started paddling the banca towards
by Jose Ordiz, nephew of the deceased. the direction of their house to get help for Roderick.

Jimmy Valentin, father of Roderick and Jerny

Further, the defense argues that Glicerio Orit is not a
credible witness, because of his having been excluded
from the information to be used as a witness for the
prosecution; and, because, moreover, of the
contradiction in his testimony at the preliminary
investigation and during the trial.
Issue: Whether or not Orit’s testimony should be
discredited?
Ruling:
No, it should not.
The mere fact that the witness was an accused,
excluded from the information in order to be used as a
witness for the prosecution, does not prevent him from
telling the truth, especially in the absence of proof
showing his interest in testifying against the appellant.
The apparent contradiction between the testimony
given by the witness in the Court of First Instance and
that given in the justice of the peace court, is not
sufficient to discredit it, if he was not given ample
opportunity to explain it in the Court of First Instance.
The mere presentation of the document containing said
declaration made in the justice of the peace court is not
sufficient; it must be read to him in order that he may
explain the discrepancies noted.
immediately transferred Roderick to a rented
motorized banca to bring him to the nearest
hospital. He died.
At the time of his death, Roderick was only 25
years old, the eldest child and earning P200.00 daily
wage as a fishpond worker. The family was emotionally
traumatized. These events and circumstances were
narrated by Jerny, Jimmy and Tita Valentin on direct-
and cross-examination.
Jesus Alonzo, barangay captain, testifying for the
prosecution averred that the day after Roderick was
shot, Job Cortezanos father informed him that his son
wanted to surrender. Upon Alonzos
questioning, Cortezano admitted having shot Roderick
with a gun which he turned over to a certain
Victor Pelicia, a CAFGU member
from Siruma, Camarines Sur. Alonzo turned
over Cortezano to the police authorities at the
PNP Tinambac Headquarters.
Another prosecution witness, PNP
Investigator Crescencio Arganda, testified that the
crime was reported by Jimmy Valentin and entered in
the police blotter on May 31, 1998, the day after the
shooting. He also recorded therein the surrender and
detention of Cortezano.

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The last witness for the prosecution was Dr.
Salvador Betito, Jr., who conducted the post-mortem
examination of Rodericks remains. His medico-legal
autopsy report showed that the bullet entered Rodericks
back, piercing his chest, then exiting 3 inches away from
the right nipple. Rapid internal and external
hemorrhage secondary to the gunshot wound was the
reported cause of death. Judging from the bullets
trajectory and the location of the entrance and exit
wounds, Dr. Betito explained that the victims back was
turned to his assailant who was standing not too far to
the left and rear of the victim.
The evidence for the defense consisted of the
testimonies of Job Cortezano himself, his father
Hannibal Cortezano, and that of Jovenal Agbones, an
acquaintance.
Accused-appellant Cortezano denied that he shot
Roderick, alleging he was nowhere near the scene of
the crime at the time that it was supposed to have been
committed. He narrated that he was at the house of his
parents in
downtown Daligan, Tinambac, Camarines Sur,
from 7:00 in the evening of May 30, 1998 until 7:00 in
the morning of the following day.
He came from the fiesta celebration of
their barangay and was feeling inebriated, so he
decided to sleep at his parents house.
Accused-appellant Cortezano described Pelicia as
a member of the CAFGU who had the same build, height
and countenance as him. On the night the shooting took
place, Pelicia went to the Cortezanos house for a
drinking session. He brought with him, and even
publicly displayed, a .38 caliber handgun. The following
day, Cortezano stated, he was threatened
by Pelicia when the latter learned that Cortezano was
related to the Valentins.
Cortezano also denied having confessed
to Barangay Captain Jesus Alonzo that he was the one
who shot Roderick. He alleged that Alonzo came to
the Cortezano residence upon the request of accused-
appellants father. The elder Cortezano had wanted his
son to be escorted to the Tinambac Police Station
because they were afraid of Pelicias threats.
However, on cross-examination, accused-appellant
admitted that he confessed to having shot Roderick, but
only because of Pelicias threats against him. He also
described his relations with the Valentin family prior to
the incident as harmonious, such that they had no
reason to testify falsely against him.
Hannibal Cortezano, accused-appellants father,
corroborated his sons testimony. He narrated that in the
late afternoon of May 30, 1998, his son and a certain
member of the CAFGU, later identified as Pelicia, arrived
at the Cortezano residence. Pelicia wanted to take a
bath, so his son gave him directions to the well where
the local residents fetched fresh water. Some thirty
minutes later, Pelicia returned from the
well. Hannibal overheard Pelicia say to the accused,
Even if that person will be brought to the hospital, he
will not survive. Then Pelicia removed the gun tucked
into the waistband of his pants, and took out two (2)
bullets from the chamber of the gun. Pelicia dared the
people around him to take the gun, but they were all
intimidated by his threatening stance. Pelicia warned
them not to say anything or something bad would
happen to them. He left Cortezanos house the following
day, May 31, 1998, at around 2:00 in the afternoon.
Hannibal further denied that he facilitated his sons
surrender before Barangay Captain Alonzo, but
admitted asking Alonzo to accompany Job to the police
headquarters at Tinambac since he had been informed
by police investigator Crescencio Arganda that Job was
the primary suspect.
Jovenal Agbones testified that at about 7:30 of
that fateful evening, he was at the Cortezano residence
to attend the barangay fiesta celebration. While there,
he heard Pelicia remark that a certain person would not
survive even if he were brought to the hospital.
The trial court convicted accused-appellant and
lent much weight to Jerny Valentins eyewitness
account of the events and his identification
of Cortezano as the perpetrator. The trial court held
that Jerny Valentin, who was then 13 years old,
delivered a straightforward, unshaken and convincing
narrative of the incident about the shooting of his
brother, Roderick Valentin by accused-
appellant. Secondly, Jernys testimony was
corroborated by the dying declaration of the victim,
Roderick that he was shot by Job Cortezano and that he
could not bear it anymore. Thus he knew of his
impending death. The trial court ruled that the
declaration of Roderick Valentin is a dying declaration
and an exception to the hearsay rule.
The trial court refused to give credence to accused-
appellants defense of alibi and denial, considering that
he was positively identified as the one who shot
Roderick Valentin. It found the attendance of the
aggravating circumstance of treachery and rejected
accused-appellants claim of the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender.
Accused-appellant assails the eyewitness
testimony of Jerny Valentin as being riddled with
inconsistencies and implausibilities. Firstly, he posits
that it is contrary to normal human behavior for a
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perpetrator to come near his victim after shooting,
when the natural instinct of a gunman would be to flee
and escape detection or identification. Secondly,
accused-appellant points out that while Jerny testified
in court that he recognized accused-appellant from the
beam of his flashlight, in his earlier sworn
statement, Jerny averred that he recognized accused-
appellant when the latter ran towards the forested area
near the seashore. Considering that it was dark
and Jerny was about six meters away from where the
gunman stood, the solitary illumination
from Jernys flashlight could not have been sufficient for
both Jerny and Roderick to identify the gunman with
utmost certainty.
Issue:
W/N the trial court erred in giving credence to the
identification of the accused by the prosecution witness
Jerny. Not.
W/N the trial court in considering the dying declaration
of the deceased in the identification of the accused. Not.
W/N the trial court erred in not considering the alibi of
the accused. Not.
Ruling:
The Court does not agree and upholds the RTC’s
ruling.
On the first issue, the accused assials the
testimony of Jerny as being riddled with inconsistencies
since it is contrary to normal human behavior to come
near the victim after shoot and should have fled. But
the court said there is no standard form of behavior
among perpetrators of crimes. It is not contrary to
known human behavior to approach the banca after
shooting twice to ensure that the work is accomplished.
The accused also points out that Jerny gave
different account of the events in the sworn statement
casting doubt on the veracity of his testimony in court.
But the court said that it is well established that
inconsistencies between an open court testimony and a
sworn statement do not necessarily discredit the
witness since ex parte affidavits are seldom complete.
Also, it appears in the records that Jerny was never
allowed to explain the inconsistencies between her
statement in the court and her sworn statement. It is
clear that while the pertinent portion of his sworn
statement was read to Jerny, counsel for the defense
failed to call his attention to the alleged discrepancy in
order to elicit a response from him. Considering that the
sworn statement was written in English, a language
that Jerny admittedly could not understand, a cursory
reading of that portion of the sworn statement naturally
failed to impress upon Jerny the fact that his testimony
differed from his extrajudicial statement. Moreover, the
defense counsel never asked him to explain the
inconsistency.
We have uniformly held that previous extrajudicial
statements cannot be employed to impeach the
credibility of a witness unless his attention is first
directed to the discrepancies, and he must then be
given an opportunity to explain them. It is only when
the witness cannot give a reasonable explanation that
he shall be deemed impeached.
Besides, there may not even be a conflict at
all. Jerny testified that he focused the flashlight on
accused-appellants face and body, after which the latter
ran away. In his sworn statement, Jerny narrated that
he saw accused-appellants face while he was running
towards the mangrove trees along the seashore. These
two accounts do not necessarily conflict, but rather
clarify further the chronology of events as witnessed
by Jerny. He focused the light on accused-appellant,
enabling him and Roderick to recognize the
latter. When accused-appellant fled, Jerny trained the
flashlight on accused-appellant, following his hasty
flight towards the mangrove trees. Contrary to accused-
appellants postulation, there is no inconsistency or
discrepancy between Jernys testimony and sworn
statement, at least none that would negate his
creditworthiness.
The trial court correctly appreciated the testimony
of Jerny who, at that time, was only thirteen (13) years
old. It is the trial court that has the primary opportunity
to observe the child-witness as he testifies and to weigh
his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, as well
as his understanding of the obligation of an oath. The
honesty and candor of Jerny is reflected in his
testimony before the trial court. Thus, his competence
and credibility to testify were properly considered by the
trial court. Not only was Jerny a reliable eyewitness; his
testimony itself was straightforward and worthy of
credence
On the second issue, the court said that delay in
reporting the ante mortem declaration does not
necessarily affect, much less impair the credibility of the
witness. it is equally established that an ante-
mortem statement or a dying declaration is evidence of
the highest order and is entitled to the utmost credence
because no person who knows of his impending death
would make a careless and false accusation. At the
brink of death, all thoughts of concocting lies are
banished.
The same declaration may even be considered as
part of the res gestae. Rodericks declaration was made
spontaneously after a startling occurrence; his
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statements were made before he had time to contrive
or devise; and his statement concerned his attacker and
the immediately attending circumstances of the attack.
Thus, the statements of Roderick, uttered shortly after
he was shot and hours before his death identifying the
accused-appellant as the gunman qualifies both as a
dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.
The trial court did not err in relying on Jimmys
and Tita Valentins testimonies concerning Rodericks
dying declaration. The trial court had the opportunity to
observe the said witnesses firsthand and to determine
if they were telling the truth or not. Even if it were said
that the Valentins are biased witnesses on account of
their relationship with the victim, in the absence of a
showing of improper motive on their part, their
testimonies are not affected by the fact that the victim
was their son. It is a fundamental precept that
relationship per se does not give rise to a presumption
of bias, or ulterior motive, nor does it ipso facto impair
the credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness
On the third issue, accused said he was sleeping
at the time the crime was committed. But the
corroborating witnesses both declared that he was very
much awake and was seen drinking with others before
and after the crime occurred.
Furthermore, apart from saying that he was asleep
at that time, accused-appellant presented no other
credible evidence to prove that he was not at
the locus delicti or scene of the crime when it was
committed and that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the crime scene at the proximate time of its
commission. The law dictates that the requirement of
time and place must be stringently complied with
3. Bartolome v IAC
PRINCIPLE: An ancient document does not need
another evidence of its execution and authenticity
provided that it is more than 30 years old, presented in
court by the proper custodian thereof and that there are
no alterations or circumstances of suspicion.
FACTS: Epitacio Batara and his wife, Maria Gonzales,
had two children: Pedro and Catalina. Pedro died
without issue while Catalina married one surnamed
Bartolome. Catalina bore 5 children: Isabela, Tarcila,
Calixto, Ruperta and Resurreccion.
In 1912, Epitacio entrusted subject lot to his cousin,
Doroteo Bartolome, before leaving for Isabela. Maria
stayed in the lot before following Epitacio to Isabela
where she allowed Doroteo to continue taking charge
of the property. Five years after Epitacio died, Maria
Gonzales and her grandchildren, Calixto and
Resurreccion, went back to Laoag. Calixto constructed
a bamboo fence around the lot and they cleaned it.
Director of Lands instituted cadastral proceedings over
the land involved. Ursula Cid who is the widow of
Bernabe, the son of Doroteo Bartolome, filed an answer
in Cadastral Case no. 53, claiming ownership over Lot
No. 11165. It was allegedly acquired by Ursula Cid
through inheritance from Doroteo Bartolome with an
area of 1660 sqm.
Resurrecion also filed an answer in the same cadastral
case claiming ownership over a portion of Lot No. 11165
with an area of 864 sqm. It was allegedly acquired by
inheritance from Epitacio and Maria Gonzales. From
then on, no further proceedings were held in the
cadastral case.
In 1934, Resurrection verbally entrusted the portion she
had claimed to Maria Bartolome, whom she later
described as daughter of Doroteo Bartolome.
In 1939, Ursula Cid and her children migrated to Davao
City leaving the house on subject lot to a lessee. They
instructed Maria Bartolome to receive the rentals from
the house. Resurreccion was also given by Maria
Bartolome a small amount in consideration of the lease
contract.
Maria Bartolome filed a motion to admit answer in
intervention alleging that she is one of the children of
Doroteo Bartolome and that she and her co-heirs had
been excluded in Ursula Cid’s answer to the petition.
Ursula Cid failed a motion to amend her answer tor
eflect the complete ground or basis of acquisition. She
alleged that she “acquired such by inheritance from
Bernabe bartolome, who together with her, purchased
the… lot which used to be the three adjoining lots from
their respective owners.”
Ursula presented 3 deeds of sale:
1. Dated March 1, 1917, showing that Bernabe and
Ursula bought a 374 sqm lot for Php15 from
Domingo Agustin and Josefa Manrique
2. Dated February 18, 1913, executed by Ignacia
Manrique in favor of Bernabe
3. Dated February 9, 1917, executed by Maria
Gonzales y Paguyo, ceding to Bernabe and Ursula
772 sum of land. This is the land being claimed by
Resurreccion.
RTC ruled against Ursula Cid in deciding that Exhibit 4
has no probative value as it was incomplete and
unsigned. CA ruled in favor of Ursula Cid in deciding
that the deeds of sale presented are ancient documents
under Sec 22, Rule 132 of ROC and that her continuous
possession of the lot from its acquisition and her
exercise of rights of ownership vested her with the legal
presumption that she possessed it under a just title. SC
set aside CA decision.
Issue: W/N deed of sale is an authentic document
Held: NO.
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Exhibit 4 consists of 3 pcs of paper. First piece is a blank
sheet which serves as cover page. The two other pages
contain the handwritten document in Ilocano stating
that in consideration of the amount of 103.75, Maria
Gonzales sold subject lot to Bernabe Bartolome and
Ursula Cid comprising of 772 sqm. The 3rd sheet
contains a warranty against eviction.
According to Dominador Bartolome, he first saw Exhibit
4 in the possession of his mother, Ursula Cid, when he
was just 11 years old. He noticed that the document
had a fourth page containing the signature of Maria
Gonzales and that all four pages were sewn together.
However, when the document was entrusted to him by
his mother in 1947 as he was then representing the
family in litigation concerning the land, the document's
fourth page was already missing. He stated that his
mother told him that the fourth page was lost during
the Japanese occupation while they were evacuating
from Davao City.
Sec 22, Rule 132 of ROC provides:
"SEC. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary. —
Where a private writing is more than thirty years old, is
produced from a custody in which it would naturally be
found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations
or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its
execution and authenticity need be given."
The deed of sale presented meets the first 2
requirements it appearing that it was executed in1917,
making it more than 30 years old when it was offered
for evidence in 1983. It was presented in court by the
proper custodian thereof who is an heir of the person
who would naturally keep it. However, CA failed to
consider and discuss the 3rd requirement that no
alteration or circumstances of suspicion are present.
Admittedly, on its face, the deed of sale appears
unmarred by alteration. However, the missing page has
nonetheless affected its authenticity. It allegedly bears
the signature of the vendor of the portion of Lot No.
11165 in question and therefore, it contains vital proof
of the voluntary transmission of rights over the subject
of the sale. Without that signature, the document is
incomplete. Verily, an incomplete document is akin to if
not worse than a document with altered contents.Lib
Moreover, if it is really true that the document was
executed in 1917, Ursula Cid would have had it in her
possession when she filed her answer in Cadastral Case
No. 53 in 1933. Accordingly, she could have stated
therein that she acquired the portion in question by
purchase from Maria Gonzales. But as it turned out, she
only claimed purchase as a mode of acquisition of Lot
No. 11165 after her sister-in-law, Maria J. Bartolome
and the other descendants of Doroteo Bartolome
sought intervention in the case.
All these negate the appellate court's conclusion that
Exhibit 4 is an ancient document. Necessarily, proofs of
its due execution and authenticity are vital.
Under Section 21 of Rule 132, the due execution and
authenticity of a private writing must be proved either
by anyone who saw the writing executed, by evidence
of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker, or
by a subscribing witness.
The testimony of Dominador Bartolome on Exhibit 4 and
Ursula Cid's sworn statement in 1937 (which declared
that Maria Gonzales sold subject lot to Bernabe and
Ursula Cid) do not fall within the purview of Section 21.
Even if Exhibit 4 were complete and authentic, still, it
would substantially be infirm. Under Article 834 of the
old Civil Code, Maria Gonzales, as a surviving spouse,
"shall be entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that
corresponding by way of legitime to each of the
legitimate children or descendants who has not received
any betterment." And, until it had been ascertained by
means of the liquidation of the deceased spouse's
estate that a portion of the conjugal property remained
after all the partnership obligations and debts had been
paid, the surviving spouse or her heirs could not assert
any claim of right or title in or to the community
property which was placed in the exclusive possession
and control of the husband as administrator thereof.
Hence, in the absence of proof that the estate of
Epitacio Batara had been duly settled, Maria Gonzales
had no right to sell not even a portion of the property
subject of Exhibit 4.p
4. AZNAR V. CITIBANK
FACTS: Petitioner is a holder of a Preferred Master
Credit Card (Mastercard) with a credit limit of P150,000.
He and his wife planned to take their two grandchildren
on an Asian tour so he made a total advance deposit of
P480,000 with Citibank thereby increasing his credit
limit to P635,000. He claims, however, that when he
presented his credit card in some establishments in
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not
honored. And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan
Tour and Travel Agency in Indonesia to purchase plane
tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason
that his card was blacklisted by the respondent bank.
To add to his humiliation, Ingtan Agency spoke of
swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for damages against
Citibank. To prove that respondent blacklisted his credit
card, Petitioner presented a computer print-out,
denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN
ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan
Agency with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi
which shows that his card in question was “DECL
OVERLIMIT” or declared over the limit.
To prove that they did not blacklist Aznar’s card,
Citibank’s Credit Card Department Head, Dennis Flores,
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presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which
contained the list of its canceled cards covering the
period of Aznar’s trip. Citibank also contended that
Aznar never had personal knowledge that his credit card
was blacklisted as he only presumed such fact because
his card was dishonored.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint at first. Held that the
Warning Cancellation Bulletins presented by respondent
had more weight as their due execution and authenticity
was duly established. Upon MR, the decision was
reversed. It was ruled that the computer print-out was
printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or regular course of
business and Nubi was not able to testify as she was in
a foreign country and cannot be reached by subpoena.
The RTC took judicial notice of the practice of ATMs and
credit card facilities which readily print out bank account
status, therefore the print-out can be received as prima
facie evidence of the dishonor of petitioner’s credit card.
CA: Granted Citibank’s appeal. Ruled that the computer
print-out is an electronic document which must be
authenticated pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence or under Section 20 of Rule 132
of the Rules of Court by anyone who saw the document
executed or written; Petitioner, however, failed to prove
its authenticity, thus it must be excluded.
ISSUE: 1. W/N Aznar has established his claim against
Citibank.
2. W/N the “On Line Authorization Report” is an
electronic document and properly authenticated to be
admitted as evidence.
RULING:
1. NO. In his complaint, Aznar claimed that Citibank
blacklisted his Mastercard which caused its dishonor in
several establishments in Malaysia, Singapore, and
Indonesia. However, in his testimony during the trial,
he admitted that he had no personal knowledge that his
card was blacklisted by Citibank. The dishonor of
Aznar’s Mastercard is not sufficient to support a
conclusion that said credit card was blacklisted,
especially in view of Aznar’s own admission that in other
merchant establishments in Kuala Lumpur and
Singapore, his Mastercard was accepted and honored.
2. NO. As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA,
such exhibit cannot be considered admissible as its
authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently
established by petitioner.
Petitioner puts much weight on the ON-LINE
AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY
REPORT, a computer print-out handed to petitioner by
Ingtan Agency, to prove that his credit card was
dishonored for being blacklisted. On said print-out
appears the words “DECL OVERLIMIT”.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of
the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court. It provides that whenever any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either
by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker.
Petitioner, who testified on the authenticity did not
actually see the document executed or written, neither
was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to
him said computer print-out.
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001, and
which is being invoked by petitioner in this case, the
authentication of the computer print-out would still be
found wanting.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before
any private electronic document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its
authenticity must be proved by any of the
following means:
(a) By evidence that it had been digitally
signed by the person purported to have
signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate
security procedures or devices as may be
authorized by the Supreme Court or by law
for authentication of electronic documents
were applied to the document; or
(c) By other evidence showing its integrity
and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
Petitioner claims that his testimony complies with par.
(c), i.e., it constitutes the “other evidence showing
integrity and reliability of Exh. “G” to the satisfaction of
the judge.” The Court is not convinced. Petitioner’s
testimony that the person from Ingtan Agency merely
handed him the computer print-out and that he
thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot
be considered as sufficient to show said print-out’s
integrity and reliability.
Petitioner merely mentioned in passing how he was able
to secure the print-out from the agency. Petitioner also
failed to show the specific business address of the
source of the computer print-out because while the
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name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by petitioner, its
business address was not reflected in the print-out.
Indeed, petitioner failed to demonstrate how the
information reflected on the print-out was generated
and how the said information could be relied upon as
true.
5. HEIRS OF ARCILLA v. TEODORO (belated
filing of Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping)
Doctrine: Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of
Court basically pertains to written official acts, or
records of the official of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country. This is so, as Sec.
24, Rule 132 explicitly refers only to paragraph (a) of
Sec. 19. If the rule comprehends to cover notarial
documents, the rule could have included the same.
FACTS: Ma. Lourdes A. Teodoro (respondent) initially
filed with the RTC-Virac, Catanduanes an application for
land registration of two parcels located at Barangay San
Pedro, Virac, Catanduanes. She alleged that, with the
exception of the commercial building constructed
thereon, she purchased the lots from her father Pacifico
Arcilla by a Deed of Sale dated December 9, 1966.
Pacifico acquired the lots by partition of the estate of
his father, Jose evidenced by an ExtrajudicialSettlement
of Estate. There is also an Affidavit of Quit-Claim in
favor of Pacifico, executed by herein petitioners the
Heirs of Vicente , brother of Pacifico.
In their Opposition, moving to dismiss the application of
Teodoro and seeking their declaration as true and
absolute owners pro-indiviso and the registration and
issuance of corresponding certificate of title in their
names, the petitioners contended that they are the
owners pro-indiviso of the lots including the building
and other improvements thereon by virtue of
inheritance from their deceased parents, spouses
Vicente and Josefa. Contrary to the claim of Teodoro,
the lots were owned by their father, Vicente, having
purchased the same from a certain Manuel Sarmiento
c. Vicente's ownership is evidenced by several tax
declarations. They and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in possession of the lots since 1906.
Respondent filed a Motion for Admission 7 contending
that through oversight and inadvertence she failed to
include in her application, the verification and certificate
against forum shopping required by Supreme Court
(SC) Revised Circular No. 28-91 in relation to SC
Administrative Circular No. 04-94. Petitioners filed a
MTD on the ground that Teodoro should have filed the
certificate against forum shopping simultaneously with
the petition which is a mandatory requirementof SC
Admin. Circular 04-94 and that any violation thereof
shall be a cause for dismissal of application upon motion
and after hearing.
Opposing the MTD, Teodoro argued that the heir’s
application of Motion to Dismiss was filed out of time
and that the failure to comply with the Circular was not
willful, deliberate or intentional. The MTD was deemed
waived for failure of petitioners to file the same during
the earlier stages of the proceedings
The MTC denied the MTD Application and ordered the
confirmation and registration of the land in Teodoro’s
name having presented sufficient title thereto. The
Heirs then filed an appeal which was dismissed for lack
of merit. The Heirs filed a MR but was denied. The Heirs
then filed a Petition for Review with the CA, which
dismissed the same. The Heirs filed a MR but the same
was denied.
ISSUES: 1. whether or not CA ruled correctly when
it held that the belated filing of a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping was substantial
compliance with SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
2. Whether the certification of non-forum shopping
subsequently submitted does not require a
certification from an officer of the foreign service of
the Philippines as provided under Section 24, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
1. Yes. The belated filing of a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping was substantial
compliance with SC Administrative Circular No. 04-
94.
The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not
to be belittled or simply disregarded, for these
prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. However, it is equally
settled that litigation is not merely a
game of technicalities. Rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be eschewed. In addition, considering
that a dismissal contemplated under Rule 7, Section
5 of the Rules of Court is, as a rule, a dismissal
without prejudice, and since there is no showing that
respondent is guilty of forum shopping, to dismiss
respondent's petition for registration would entail a
tedious process of re-filing the petition, requiring the
parties to re-submit the pleadings which they have
already filed with the trial court, and conducting anew
hearings which have already been done, not to
mention the expenses that will be incurred by the
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parties in re-filing of pleadings and in the re-
conduct of hearings.
2. The certification of non-forum shopping executed
in a foreign country is not covered by Section 24. (wa
ni gmention sa facts but sa ruling na sya discuss nga
issue)
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. From the foregoing
provision [referring to Section 24, Rule 132, Rules of
Court], it can be gathered that it does not include
documents acknowledged before [a] notary public
abroad. For foreign public documents to be admissible
for any purpose here in our courts, the same must be
certified by any officer of the Philippine legation
stationed in the country where the documents could be
found or had been executed. However, after judicious
studies of the rule, Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules
of Court basically pertains to written official acts, or
records of the official of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country. This is so, as Sec.
24, Rule 132 explicitly refers only to paragraph (a) of
Sec. 19. If the rule comprehends to cover notarial
documents, the rule could have included the same.
Thus, petitioners-oppositors' contention that the
certificate of forum shopping that was submitted was
defective, as it did not bear the certification provided
under Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, is devoid
of any merit. What is important is the fact that the
respondent-applicant certified before a commissioned
officer clothed with powers to administer oath that [s]he
has not and will not commit forum shopping.
The ruling of the Court in Lopez v. Court of Appeals ]
cited by petitioners, is inapplicable to the present case
because the Rules of Evidence which were in effect at
that time were the old Rules prior to their amendment
in 1989.
When the Rules of Evidence were amended in 1989,
Section 25, Rule 132 became Section 24, Rule 132; and
the amendment consisted in the deletion of the
introductory phrase An official record or an entry
therein, which was substituted by the phrase The record
of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19. Thus, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court now reads as follows:
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 19(a) of the same Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of
their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private. Public documents are:
a. The written official acts or records of the official acts
of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a
foreign country;
b. Documents acknowledged before a notary public
except last wills and testaments; and
c. Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
It cannot be overemphasized that the required
certification of an officer in the foreign service under
Section 24 refers only to the documents enumerated in
Section 19(a), to wit: written official acts or records of
the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the
Philippines or of a foreign country. The Court agrees
with the CA that had the Court intended to include
notarial documents as one of the public documents
contemplated by the provisions of Section 24, it should
not have specified only the documents referred to under
paragraph (a) of Section 19.
6. Kummer vs People
DOCTRINE(S):
1. Variance between the eyewitnesses' testimonies in
open court and their affidavits does not affect their
credibility;
2. There is no absolute uniformity nor a fixed
standard form of human behavior;
3. Public documents are admissible in court without
further proof of their due execution and authenticity.
FACTS:
As established by Prosecution’s Evidence:
On June 19, 1988, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Jesus
Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the
house of the petitioner. Mallo knocked at the front door
Page 8 of 20
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with a stone and identified himself. The petitioner
opened the door and her son and co-accused, Johan,
shot Mallo twice using a gun about six (6) inches long.
Malana, who was with Mallo immediately ran, followed
by Mallo. When Malana turned his back, he saw the
petitioner leveling and firing her long gun at Mallo,
hitting the latter's back and causing him to fall flat on
the ground.
Thereafter, the petitioner went inside the house and
came out with a flashlight. Together with her co-
accused, she scoured the pathway up to the place
where Mallo was lying flat. Petitioner then uttered,
"Johan, patay na," in a loud voice. The petitioner and
her co-accused then held Mallo's feet and pulled him to
about three (3) to four (4) meters away from the house.
Thereafter, they returned to the house and turned off
all the lights.
The following morning, policeman Danilo Pelovello went
to the petitioner's house and informed her that Mallo
had been found dead in front of her house. Pelovello
conducted an investigation through inquiries among the
neighbors, including the petitioner, who all denied
having any knowledge of the incident.
Version of the Defense:
The petitioner claimed that she and her children, Johan,
Melanie and Erika, were already asleep in the evening
of June 19, 1988. She claimed that they were awakened
by the sound of stones being thrown at their house, a
gun report, and the banging at their door.
Believing that the noise was caused by the members of
the New People's Army prevalent in their area, and
sensing the possible harm that might be inflicted on
them, Johan got a .38 cal. gun from the drawer and
fired it twice outside to scare the people causing the
disturbance. However, the noise continued. This
prompted Johan to get the shotgun placed beside the
door and to fire it. The noise thereafter stopped and
they all went back to sleep.
The RTC found the prosecution's evidence persuasive
based on the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses
Ramon Cuntapay and Malana who both testified that
the petitioner shot Mallo.
The CA affirmed the RTC judgment, holding that the
discrepancies between the sworn statement and the
direct testimony of the witnesses do not necessarily
discredit them because the contradictions are minimal
and reconcilable. Malana and Cuntapay's positive
identification and the corroborative evidence presented
by the prosecution more than sufficient to convict the
petitioner of the crime charged.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the variance between
eyewitnesses’ testimonies in open court and their
affidavits affects their credibility. – NO
2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving credence to
the eyewitnesses’ testimonies which are riddled with
improbabilities and illogical claims. – NO
3. Whether or not public documents are admissible
without further proof of their due execution and
authenticity. – YES
HELD:
1. Variance between the eyewitnesses' testimonies in
open court and their affidavits does not affect their
credibility
In her attempt to impugn the credibility of prosecution
eyewitnesses, the petitioner pointed to the following
inconsistencies:
First, in Malana's affidavit, he stated that after hearing
two gunshots, he dived to the ground for cover and
heard another shot louder than the first two. This
statement is allegedly inconsistent with his declaration
during the direct examination that he saw the petitioner
and Johan fire their guns at Mallo.
Second, the affidavit of Cuntapay likewise stated that
he heard two bursts of gunfire coming from the
direction of the petitioner's house and heard another
burst from the same direction, which statement is
allegedly inconsistent with his direct testimony where
he claimed that he saw the petitioner shoot Mallo.
Third, in his affidavit, Malana declared that he ran away
as he felt the door being opened and heard two shots,
while in his testimony in court, he stated that he ran
away after Mallo was already hit.
The Court held that inconsistencies between the
testimony of a witness in open court, on one hand, and
the statements in his sworn affidavit, on the other hand,
referring only to minor and collateral matters, do not
affect his credibility and the veracity and weight of his
testimony as they do not touch upon the commission of
the crime itself. Slight contradictions, in fact, even serve
to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as these
may be considered as badges of truth rather than indicia
of bad faith; they tend to prove that their testimonies
have not been rehearsed.
2. There is no absolute uniformity nor a fixed
standard form of human behavior
Petitioner pointed out the numerous improbabilities
that, taken as a whole, allegedly cast serious doubt on
the testimonies’ reliability and credibility.
Page 9 of 20
Evidence Cases Partial
She alleged, among others:
(1) that it was abnormal and contrary to the ways of the
farmers in the rural areas for Cuntapay to go home from
his corral at about 9:00 p.m;
(2) that the act of the petitioner of putting down her
gun in order to pull the victim away does not make any;
(3) that it is highly incredible that Malana, who
accompanied Mallo, was left unharmed and was allowed
to escape if indeed he was just beside the victim;
(4) that it is unbelievable that when Malana heard the
cocking of guns and the opening of the door, he did not
become scared at all;
(5) that Malana and Cuntapay did not immediately
report the incident to the authorities; (6) that it was
highly improbable for Malana to turn his head while
running; and
(7) that it was unusual that Cuntapay did not run away
when he saw the shooting.
The Court ruled that human nature suggests that people
may react differently when confronted with a given
situation. Witnesses to a crime cannot be expected to
demonstrate an absolute uniformity and conformity in
action and reaction. People may act contrary to the
accepted norm, react differently and act contrary to the
expectation of mankind. There is no standard human
behavioral response when one is confronted with an
unusual, strange, startling or frightful experience.
3. Public documents are admissible in court without
further proof of their due execution and authenticity.
A public document is defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court as follows:
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. — For the purpose of
their presentation [in] evidence, documents are either
public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official
acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines,
or of a foreign country;
(b) x x x
(c) x x x
The chemistry report showing a positive result of the
paraffin test is a public document. As a public
document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It
is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due
execution and genuineness; the person who made the
report need not be presented in court to identify,
describe and testify how the report was conducted.
Moreover, documents consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.
In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was
Captain Benjamin Rubio who was presented in court to
identify the chemistry report and not the forensic
chemist who actually conducted the paraffin test on the
petitioner, the report may still be admitted because the
requirement for authentication does not apply to public
documents.
Furthermore, the entries in the chemistry report are
prima facie evidence of the facts they state, that is, of
the presence of gunpowder residue on the left hand of
Johan and on the right hand of the petitioner. The
courts will not presume irregularity or negligence in the
performance of one's duties unless facts are shown
dictating a contrary conclusion. Since the petitioner
presented no evidence of fabrication or irregularity, we
presume that the standard operating procedure has
been observed.
The Court noted that while the positive finding of
gunpowder residue does not conclusively show that the
petitioner indeed fired a gun, the finding nevertheless
serves to corroborate the prosecution eyewitnesses'
testimony that the petitioner shot the victim.
Note: dili ko sigurado kung importante ba ni tanan nga
discussions sa case. Pero ako lang gi-apil incase apil.
Pasensya kaayo kung taas.
7. Heirs of Lacsa vs CA
DOCTRINE:
Under the "ancient document rule," for a private ancient
document to be exempt from proof of due execution
and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than
thirty (30) years old; it is also necessary that the
following requirements are fulfilled; (1) that it is
produced from a custody in which it would naturally be
found if genuine; and (2) that it is unblemished by any
alteration or circumstances of suspicion.
FACTS:
This petition involved two (2) cases namely: Civil Case
No. G-1190 and Civil Case No. G-1332.
Civil Case No. G-1190
This is an action for recovery of possession with
damages and preliminary injunction filed by herein
petitioners, the heirs of Demetria Lacsa, against Aurelio
Songco and John Doe alleging that petitioners are heirs
Page 10 of 20
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of deceased Demetria Lacsa who was the owner of a
certain parcel of land consisting partly of a fishpond and
partly of uncultivated open space.
Petitioners alleged that the principal respondent and his
predecessor-in-interest who are neither co-owners of
the land nor tenants thereof, thru stealth, fraud and
other forms of machination, succeeded in occupying or
possessing the fishpond of said parcel of land and
refused to vacate the same despite petitioner's
demands on them to vacate.
Civil Case No. G-1332
This is an action for cancellation of title, ownership with
damages and preliminary injunction, based on the
allegations that they are the heirs of Demetria Lacsa
who was the owner of the land also involved in Civil
Case No. G-1190.
Petitioners alleged that Inocencio Songco, the private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, succeeded in
transferring the title to said property in his name by
presenting to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga
certain forged and absolutely simulated documents,
namely: "TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA
ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" and
"ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA", respectively, and
by means of false pretenses and misrepresentation.
Private respondents denied the material allegations of
both complaints and alleged that the OCT in the hand
of petitioners was merely a reconstituted copy upon
petitioners' expedient claim that the owner's duplicate
copy thereof had been missing when the truth was that
the OCT in the name of Demetria Lacsa, had long been
cancelled and superseded by the TCT in the name of
Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin by virtue of the
document entitled "TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE
LA ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL"
entered into by the heirs of Demetria Lacsa and that the
latter TCT was in turn superseded by the TCT issued in
the name of Inocencio Songco (father of private
respondents) by virtue of a document entitled
"ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA" executed by
spouses Juan Limpin and Alberta Guevarra.
The lower court held that the fishpond in question
belongs to the private respondents, having been
inherited by them from their deceased father Inocencio
Songco based on the two documents presented. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in applying the Ancient
Document Rule on the questioned documents entitled
“ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL” and
“ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA”.
PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT(S):
According to petitioners, the documents entitled
"Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial" and "Escritura de Venta Absoluta",
respectively, cannot qualify under the foregoing rule
since the "first pages" of said documents do not bear
the signatures of the alleged parties thereto.
HELD:
No. Under the "ancient document rule," for a private
ancient document to be exempt from proof of due
execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be
more than thirty (30) years old; it is also necessary that
the following requirements are fulfilled; (1) that it is
produced from a custody in which it would naturally be
found if genuine; and (2) that it is unblemished by any
alteration or circumstances of suspicion.
On the first requirement, the Court held that the first
document entitled "Traduccion Al Castellano de la
Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" was executed on 7
April 1923 whereas the second document entitled
"Escritura de Venta Absoluta" was executed on 20
January 1924. These documents are, therefore, more
than thirty (30) years old.
On the second requirement, the Court noted that
documents which affect real property, in order that they
may bind third parties, must be recorded with the
appropriate Register of Deeds. The documents in
question, being certified as copies of originals on file
with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, can be said to
be found in the proper custody.
As to the last requirement that the document must on
its face appear to be genuine, petitioners did not
present any conclusive evidence to support their
allegation of falsification of the said documents. They
merely alluded to the fact that the lack of signatures on
the first two (2) pages could have easily led to their
substitution. As held in one case, a contract apparently
honest and lawful on its face must be treated as such
and one who assails the genuineness of such contract
must present conclusive evidence of falsification.
Moreover, the last requirement of the that a document
must be unblemished by any alteration or
circumstances of suspicion refers to the extrinsic quality
of the document itself. The lack of signatures on the
first pages, therefore, absent any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to detract
from the fact that the documents in question, which
were certified as copied of the originals on file with the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and free
from any blemish or circumstances of suspicion.
8. VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY vs ONG SU
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Evidence Cases Partial
DOCTRINE:
If your evidence is excluded by the court and you
believe that the exclusion is without basis and you
believe that the excluded evidence is vital to your cause,
this is your remedy:
If your testimonial evidence is excluded and one of your
vital witnesses is not allowed to testify for whatever
reason, the rules provide for a remedy known as
TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE or otherwise
known as OFFER OF PROOF.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Victorias Milling Company, Inc., a
domestic corporation and engaged in the manufacture
and sale of refined granulated sugar is the owner of the
trademark "VICTORIAS" and design registered in the
Philippines Patent Office on November 9, 1961.
The respondent Ong Su is engaged in the repacking and
sale of refine sugar and is the owner of the trademark
"VALENTINE" and design registered in the Philippines
Patent Office on June 20, 1961.
On October 4, 1963, Victorias Milling Company, Inc.
filed with the Philippine Patent Office a petition to cancel
the registration of the Ong Su trademark "Valentine."
The petitioner alleged that its tradermark "Victorias"
and diamond design has distinctive of its sugar long
before the respondent used its trademark; that the
registration of "Valentine" and design has caused and
will cause great damage to petitioner by reason of
mistake, confusion, or deception among the purchasers
because it is similar to its "Victorias" trademark; that
registration was fradulently obtained by Ong Su and
that "Valentine" falsely suggests a connection with Saint
Valentine or with an institution or belief connected
therewith.
Arturo Chicane a witness for the respondent, testified
that he was a distribution agent of Ong Su that he
travelled a lot but he river own across an instance when
the respondent Ong Su product was mistaken for the
petitioner's product; that he found the diamond design
to be quite common in combination with other words
used as trademarks as a background or to enhance their
appearance.
The petitioner sought to present Ernesto T. Duran as
rebuttal witness to prove that there was a confusion
among consumers or buyers of sugar caused by the
alleged sorority of the "Victorias" and "Valentine"
trademarks. The presentation of Ernesto T. Duran as
rebuttal witness was objected to by counsel of the
respondent on the ground that the evidence sought to
be elicited from Duran did not directly contradict the
testimony of witness Chicane. The objection was
sustained by the hearing officer whose ruling was
subsequently confer by the Director of Patents. Counsel
for the petitioner made the following formal offer of
proof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was denial of procedural due
process
HELD:
Having made the foregoing formal offer of proof, the
petitioner cannot complain that it was denied
procedural due process.
The proposed testimony of Emesto T. Duran that in
February 1963 he went to Arangue market and bought
one bag of sugar which he thought was "Victorias" and
when he went home he found out that the sugar was
marked "Valentine" is not sufficient evidence that the
two trademarks are so similar that buyers of sugar are
confused. The words "Victorias" and "Valentine" are not
similar in spelling and do not have a similar sound when
pronounced. Even the diamond designs are different.
The diamond design of the trademark "Valentine" has
protruding fines at the comers. Even an illiterate person
can see the difference between the two diamond
designs.
9. Yu vs CA
FACTS:
Viveca Lim Yu (private respondent) brought against her
husband, Philip Sy Yu (petitioner), an action for legal
separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership on
the grounds of marital infidelity and physical abuse.
During trial, private respondent moved for the issuance
of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to
certain officers of Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. to
compel production of the insurance policy and
application of a person suspected to be petitioners
illegitimate child. The trial court denied the motion. It
ruled that the insurance contract is inadmissible
evidence in view of Circular Letter No. 11-2000, issued
by the Insurance Commission which presumably
prevents insurance companies/agents from divulging
confidential and privileged information pertaining to
insurance policies. It added that the production of the
application and insurance contract would violate Article
280 of the Civil Code and Section 5 of the Civil Registry
Law, both of which prohibit the unauthorized
identification of the parents of an illegitimate child.
ISSUE(S):
(i) Whether or not an insurance policy and its
corresponding application form can be admitted as
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Evidence Cases Partial
evidence to prove a parties extra-marital affairs in an
action for legal separation. -NO
(ii) Whether or not a trial court has the discretion to
deny a parties motion to attach excluded evidence to
the record under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court. – NO
CA’s Contention:
According to the Court of Appeals, private respondent
was merely seeking the production of the insurance
application and contract, and was not yet offering the
same as part of her evidence. Thus, it declared that
petitioners objection to the admission of the documents
was premature, and the trial courts pronouncement that
the documents are inadmissible, precipitate. The
contents of the insurance application and insurance
documents cannot be considered as privileged
information, the Court of Appeals added, in view of the
opinion of the Insurance Commissioner dated 4 April
2001 to the effect that Circular Letter No.11-2000 was
never intended to be a legal impediment in complying
with lawful orders. Lastly, the Court of Appeals ruled
that a trial court does not have the discretion to deny a
parties privilege to tender excluded evidence, as this
privilege allows said party to raise on appeal the
exclusion of such evidence. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but to no avail.
Respondent’s contention:
For her part, private respondent maintains that the
details surrounding the insurance policy are crucial to
the issue of petitioners infidelity and his financial
capacity to provide support to her and their children.
Further, she argues that she had no choice but to make
a tender of excluded evidence considering that she was
left to speculate on what the insurance application and
policy ruled out by the trial court would contain.
HELD:
While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude
evidence, such power is exercised only when the
evidence has been formally offered. For a long time, the
Court has recognized that during the early stages of the
development of proof, it is impossible for a trial court
judge to know with certainty whether evidence is
relevant or not, and thus the practice of excluding
evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality should
be avoided. The SC pointed the case of Prats & Co. v.
Phoenix Insurance Co.:
Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat
of the battle over which he presides a judge of first
instance may possibly fall into error in judging of
the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical
connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake
is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the
Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself
embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the
effects of the error without returning the case for
a new trial, a step which this court is always very
loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of
proof in a court of first instance, even if the
question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is
doubtful, can never result in much harm to either
litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to
know the law; and it is its duty, upon final
consideration of the case, to distinguish the
relevant and material from the irrelevant and
immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause
is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal,
this court then has all the material before it
necessary to make a correct judgment.
In the instant case, the insurance application and the
insurance policy were yet to be presented in court,
much less formally offered before it. In fact, private
respondent was merely asking for the issuance of
subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum
when the trial court issued the assailed Order. Even
assuming that the documents would eventually be
declared inadmissible, the trial court was not then in a
position to make a declaration to that effect at that
point. Thus, it barred the production of the subject
documents prior to the assessment of its probable
worth. As observed by petitioners, the assailed Order
was not a mere ruling on the admissibility of evidence;
it was, more importantly, a ruling affecting the proper
conduct of trial.
Thus, in declaring that the documents are irrelevant and
inadmissible even before they were formally offered,
much less presented before it, the trial court acted in
excess of its discretion.
Anent the issue of whether the information contained in
the documents is privileged in nature, the same was
clarified and settled by the Insurance Commissioners
opinion that the circular on which the trial court based
its ruling was not designed to obstruct lawful court
orders. Hence, there is no more impediment to
presenting the insurance application and policy.
Petitioner additionally claims that by virtue of private
respondents tender of excluded evidence, she has
rendered moot her petition before the Court of Appeals
since the move evinced that she had another speedy
and adequate remedy under the law. The Court holds
otherwise.
Section 40, Rule 132 provides:
Sec.40. Tender of excluded evidence. If documents
or things offered in evidence are excluded by the
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Evidence Cases Partial
court, the offeror may have the same attached to
or made part of the record. If the evidence
excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the
record the name and other personal circumstances
of the witness and the substance of the proposed
testimony.
It is thus apparent that before tender of excluded
evidence is made, the evidence must have been
formally offered before the court. And before formal
offer of evidence is made, the evidence must have been
identified and presented before the court. While private
respondent made a Tender of Excluded Evidence, such
is not the tender contemplated by the above-quoted
rule, for obviously, the insurance policy and application
were not formally offered much less presented before
the trial court. At most, said Tender of Excluded
Evidence was a manifestation of an undisputed fact that
the subject documents were declared inadmissible by
the trial court even before these were presented during
trial. It was not the kind of plain, speedy and adequate
remedy which private respondent could have resorted
to instead of the petition for certiorari she filed before
the Court of Appeals. It did not in any way render the
said petition moot.
10) Abarquez vs People GR 150762, January 20,
2006
Principle:
The rule is that the trial court is in the best position to
determine the value and weight of the testimony of a
witness. The exception is if the trial court failed to
consider certain facts of substance and value, which if
considered, might affect the result of the case. This case
is an exception to the rule.
FACTS:
Abarquez was charged with the crimes of homicide and
attempted homicide by the prosecution
Paz, Quejong and their friends were drinking liquor in
celebration of the birthday of Boyet’s son located in San
Jose St. About 7:45 pm, Paz and Quejong decided to go
home. Boyet Tong, Abarquez’s son Bardie and Masula
also joined Paz and Quejong. They proceeded towards
the exit of San Jose St.
About 6 or 7 meters away from Boyet’s house,
Almojuela, Ising and Abarquez were likewise drinking
liquor. As the group of Paz was passing, Almojuela and
his companions blocked their path.
Almojuela asked Paz, "Are you brave?" Paz replied,
"Why?" Almojuela got angry and attacked Paz with a
knife. Paz parried the attack with his left arm but
sustained an injury. Abarquez held Paz on both
shoulders while Bardie pacified Almojuela. Paz
asked Abarquez, "What is our atraso, we were going
home, why did you block our way?" Abarquez
answered, "Masyado kang matapang. Tumigil ka
na, tumigil ka na .
Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had an
altercation, followed by a scuffle. Paz tried to get away
from Abarquez who continued restraining him. Upon
seeing Almojuela and Quejong fall on the ground, Paz
struggled to free himself from Abarquez. Paz
approached Quejong and found him already bloodied.
It turned out the Almojuela stabbed Quejong with a
knife. Paz tried to pull up Quejong but failed. Paz left
Quejong and ran instead towards the exit of San Jose
St. to ask for help. While Paz was running away, he
heard Abarquez shout, "You left your companion
already wounded!"
When Paz and his companions retured, Quejong was
still on the ground. Almojuela and Abarquex were still
in the area.
Quejong was brought to the UST Hospital however, he
died. The police investigated the incident and learned
that Almojuela, assisted by Abarquez, stabbed Quejong.
Abarque voluntarily appeared at the police station
Defense’s Arguments
Abarquez- he was informed by Almojuela’s wife that
the group of Paz was challenging Almojuela to a
fistfight. Being a kagawad, he shouted at the group to
stop but they did not heed him. He was forced to fire a
warning shot, still they did not heed. When he fired the
2nd shot, Paz, Quejong and Masula scampered away.
Almojuela – he was merely tring to stop the group of
Paz from smoking marijuana as his children were inside
his house. On his way back, he was strangled by
Quejong. He heard then Abarquez shouting “Tumigil
na kayo.”
RTC Ruling
In a decision, the RTC found Abarquez guilty as an
accomplice in the crime of homicide. It ruled that
Abarquez in holding and restraining Paz, prevented the
latter from helping Quejong and allowed Almojuela to
pursue his criminal act without resistance.
CA Ruling
Affirmed. Rejected Abarquez allegation that he was
merely at the crime scene to pacify the quarreling
parties.
In convicting Abarquez, the TC and the CA relied
mainly on the testimony of Paz who testified that
he was held by Abarquez on the shoulders, thus
preventing him from helping Quejong who was
grappling with Almojuela.
ISSUE:
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WON the TC and CA erred in giving more
credence to the testimony of the prosection
witnesses (specifically Paz’s testimony)
RULING:
The petition is meritorious. Abarquez should be
acquitted. (Please see actual case for the TSN medyo
taas siya)
The rule is that the trial court is in the best position to
determine the value and weight of the testimony of a
witness. The exception is if the trial court failed to
consider certain facts of substance and value, which if
considered, might affect the result of the case. This case
is an exception to the rule.
Paz's testimony does not show that Abarquez
concurred with Almojuela's criminal design.
"Tumigil" literally means "stop." Clearly, Abarquez was
trying to stop Paz from joining the fray, not from helping
Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying to talk to
Almojuela. However, Paz could not have been merely
talking to Almojuela, as he tried to portray, because
Almojuela was already grappling with Quejong at that
time. Paz interpreted Abarquez's action as an attempt
to prevent him from helping Quejong. His interpretation
was adopted by the trial court and sustained by the
Court of Appeals. Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted
that while restraining him, Abarquez was scolding or
reprimanding him and telling him to stop. It was not
shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz from helping
Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was trying to
stop Paz from joining the fight. Abarquez's act of trying
to stop Paz does not translate to assistance to
Almojuela.
Paz stated that Abarquez did not do anything to
stop Almojuela. However, Paz testified that
Abarquez's son Bardie, who was one of Paz's
companions, was the one trying to pacify Almojuela.
The trial court in its factual findings confirmed this when
it stated that while Abarquez was holding Paz, his son
Bardie was pacifying Almojuela.
The prosecution argues that Abarquez was remiss in his
duties as a barangay kagawad in not extending
assistance to the then wounded Quejong. This,
however, does not necessarilty show
concurrence in Almojuela’s criminal act. When Paz
ran away, Abarquez shouted at him that he left his
wounded companion. Apparently, Abarquez was not
aware of the extent of Quejong’s injury and he expected
Paz to look after his own companion.
11. Heirs of Reyes v. CA (Carpenter vs. Renter)
G.R. No. 157959, March 28, 2007
Doctrine:
Applying the well-known test of credibility called the
actors rule, it is the witness whose action is more
closely connected to the point at issue that should be
given more credence.
Facts:
The case stems from an action for partition and
accounting filed by the children of the siblings of the
late Eustaquia Reyes against Magno Sarreal (her
husband), Anatalia Reyes and Gloria Reyes-Paulino,
Eustaquias (her nieces). The property was originally
registered in the name of Eustaquia Reyes and was
inherited by her prior to her marriage to Magno Sarreal.
A portion of the property was leased to ACME Abrasive
Manufacturing Corporation (ACME) for twenty (20)
years, and ACME was allowed to introduce any
improvements to the property. After the end of the
lease term, the benefit inures to the lessor. The contract
was thumbmarked by Eustaquia as the lessor, with
Magno Sarreal likewise affixing his signature to the
instrument to indicate his marital consent to the
transaction.
While the lease was on-going, Eustaquia purportedly
sold the property to private respondents in a Deed of
Absolute Sale. In the second paragraph of the deed,
Eustaquia expressly stated that the property was
paraphernal or exclusive in character and did not belong
to the conjugal partnership because it formed part of
her inheritance. Accordingly, it was only her signature
and thumbmark which appeared on the deed.
Respondents subsequently divided the property
between themselves and registered their respective
shares under their own names. Eustaquia then died.
Petitioners filed a complaint in the RTC for partition and
accounting with receivership against private
respondents. They alleged that the property was
fraudulently divided between private respondents who
caused its registration through simulated sale. They
contended that they are co-owners of the subdivided
lots. Being co-owners, they were also entitled to an
accounting of all rents received from the market stalls
which stood on the property.
Respondents in response said that the complainants are
not compulsory heirs of Eustaquia and that the title to
the property has been transferred in the names of
private respondents pursuant to a valid sale long before
the death of Eustaquia.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, concluding
that the Deed of Absolute Sale was void for not
embodying the consent of Eustaquia’s husband. The CA
reversed the RTC’s ruling concluding that the RTC had
gone beyond the scope of the lone issue agreed upon
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Evidence Cases Partial
by the parties during pre-trial, that is, whether the sale
of the property to private respondents was simulated or
fictitious.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in overturning the
ruling averring that the RTC went beyond the
issues agreed to. (Yes, just in case sir asks)
2. Whether or not the property had become
conjugal, and thus required the consent of the
husband
Ruling
1 Issue
st
The issue on the nature of the property was embodied
in the pleadings filed by the parties subsequent to the
complaint and was actively litigated by them without
any objection on the part of private respondents. In
view thereof, the latter are deemed to have given their
implied consent for the RTC to try this issue.
2nd Issue
NO. Property remains paraphernal.
The RTC relied on the testimony of witness Monico
Reyes Palmario, who was a carpenter and mason for
the Spouses, making improvements on the property and
repairs on the buildings at the expense of the conjugal
partnership. This was all in addition to the
improvements by ACME.
The CA considered the improvements by ACME, as
argued by the respondents that the improvements
made by ACME did not transform the character of the
property from being paraphernal into being conjugal.
The CA gave more weight to the testimony of private
respondent, who was a renter of one of the houses or
apartments owned by Eustaquia and Magno. She
declared that the improvements made by the spouses
were made outside the land in issue.
Applying the well-known test of credibility called the
actors rule, it is the witness whose action is more
closely connected to the point at issue that should be
given more credence. As between the two witnesses,
the latter is more reliable since her act of renting and
living in one of the houses or apartments makes her the
actor more closely related to the point at issue, i.e.,
whether or not the houses were on the property in
question. For while a carpenter would not concern
himself with the title of the property, a lessee would
normally look into the title covering the property leased,
including its precise location or boundaries, and in fact
Gloria Reyes-Paulino testified that the lot on which the
house she rented was found had a separate title.
Since the land was sold before the lease expired, the
ACME improvements inure to the purchasers of the
property. And since the plaintiffs failed to show that
improvements within the property were introduced
using conjugal money, the property remains
paraphernal and consent of the husband is not
necessary. Sale is valid.
12. People vs Estibal
Facts:
This is a rape case on automatic review to the Supreme
Court committed by the accused against her 13 year old
daughter, AAA on February 5, 2009. AAA and BBB, her
mother and wife of the accused, reported to PO3 Fretzie
Cobardo, the officer assigned at the PNP Women and
Children Protection Center of Taguig City. It was she
who investigated the above incident and took down the
sworn statement of AAA late in the evening of February
5, 2009. Members of the Barangay Security Force
Michael Estudillo and Ronillo Perlas arrested the
accused. PO3 Cobardo testified in the trial court.
Despite several subpoenas issued by the court, AAA and
BBB did not appear. BBB and AAA manifested their
desistance that AAA had already forgiven her father.
Issue:
Whether or not res gestae, as an exception to the
hearsay rule, must be appreciated from the factual
circumstances of the case.
Ruling:
NO, res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule,
must NOT be appreciated from the factual
circumstances of the case.
In essence, the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule
provides that the declarations must have been
"voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly
contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the
transaction which they illustrate and explain, and were
made under such circumstances as necessarily to
exclude the idea of design or deliberation.
AAA's statements to the barangay tanod and the police
do not qualify as part of res gestae in view of the
missing element of spontaneity and the lapse of an
appreciable time between the rape and the declarations
which afforded her sufficient opportunity for reflection.
It is of particular significance to note that in her sworn
statement to the police, AAA admitted that she first
revealed her ordeal of sexual abuse to her cousin DDD
in the afternoon of February 5, 2009, although her
mother BBB had returned from her overnight guard
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Evidence Cases Partial
duty that morning. Shocked by what AAA told him, DDD
relayed to BBB "na may problema [si AAA]." BBB thus
confronted her, and AAA in her own words narrated
that, "kaya kinausap na po ako ni Mama kung ano ang
problema ko kaya sinab ko na po ang ginawa sa akin ni
Papa ko po kaya nalaman na lahat ni Mama ang
panggagahasa sa akin ni Papa."
After an anguished silence of five years, finally AAA
found the courage to reveal to her mother her heart-
rending saga of sexual abuse by her own father.
Emboldened by her cousin DDD's moral support, AAA
told her mother that she had been hiding her dark
secret since Grade III. But as soon as BBB learned,
events quickly took their logical course. With BBB now
leading the way, BBB and AAA sought the help of the
barangay tanod that same day between 5:00 p.m. and
6:00 p.m. to have the accused-appellant arrested. At
around 6:00 p.m., they were able to arrest him as he
was coming home. Later that night, AAA accompanied
by BBB gave her statement to PO3 Cobardo of the PNP
women's desk.
AAA's revelation to DDD and BBB set off an inexorable
chain of events that led to the arrest of the accused-
appellant. There is no doubt, however, that there was
nothing spontaneous, unreected or instinctive about the
declarations which AAA made to the barangay tanod
and later that night to the police. Her statements were
in fact a retelling of what she had already confessed to
her mother earlier that afternoon; this time however,
her story to the tanods and the police was in clear,
conscious pursuit of a newly formed resolve, exhorted
by her mother, to see her father nally exposed and put
behind bars. AAA made her declarations to the
authorities precisely because she was seeking their help
to punish the accused-appellant. There was then
nothing spontaneous about her so-called res gestae
narrations, even as it is remarkable to note that while
AAA was giving her said statements to the police, her
father was already being held in detention, and the
investigation was conducted exactly to determine if
there was a basis to hold him for trial for rape.
The RTC and the CA held that the inculpatory
statements of AAA to the barangay tanod and the police
are part of the res gestae occurrence of the rape. This
is error. It is obvious that AAA had by then undergone
a serious deliberation, prodded by her mother, whose
own outrage as the betrayed wife and grieving mother
so emboldened AAA that she nally resolved to emerge
from her fear of her father. Here then lies the crux of
the matter: AAA had clearly ceased to act unthinkingly
under the immediate inuence of her shocking rape by
her father, and was now led by another powerful
compulsion, a new found resolve to punish her father.
13. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR P.
PADIT
G.R. No. 202978
One liner: 4-year-old rape
Doctrine: testimonies of child-victims are normally
given full weight and credit, Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity.
FACTS:
In the morning of May 5, 2006, the victim, AAA, went
out of their house to buy bread. But on her way to the
store, she was called by accused-appellant, Victor P.
Padit (Padit), who is their neighbor and the uncle of her
mother. After allowing her to play inside his house, Padit
then brought her upstairs, caused her to lie down and
removed her short pants while he also removed his and
proceeded to rub his penis against AAA's vagina. AAA
felt pain but was rendered helpless and prevented from
making any sound as Padit covered her mouth with his
hand. Padit then threatened to hurt AAA with his knife
if she tells anybody about the incident.
Come lunch time, AAA’s mother went looking for her.
Padit told her that AAA is in his house and brought her
outside. Back at their house, AAA told her mother about
what Padit did to her. AAA's parents filed a complaint
and caused AAA to undergo physical/medical
examination on May 8, 2006 where it was found that
the child's vulva showed a slight hymenal abrasion.
In the Information, the Office of the Public Prosecutor
charged Padit of the crime of Rape penalized under Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code. After trial ensued, both
the RTC and CA found Padit guilty of consummated rape
on which Padit, through his counsel, filed a Notice of
Appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant is
guilty of rape.
RULING:
The Court rules in the affirmative.
At the outset, the Court notes that in the Information
filed, petitioner is specifically charged with rape under
Article 335 of the RPC. Considering that the crime was
committed on May 5, 2006, the applicable law is under
the new provisions on rape now found in Articles 266-A
to 266-D of the RPC as amended by RA 8353. Hence,
the prosecution as well as the RTC and the CA
committed an error in specifying the provision of law
which was violated. Nonetheless, it is settled that the
failure to designate the offense by statute or to mention
the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous
specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the
information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the
facts constituting the crime charged.
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Accused-appellant's arguments harp on the alleged
loopholes, inconsistencies and improbabilities in the
testimonies of the victim and her mother which
supposedly cast doubt on their credibility as witnesses.
Settled is the rule that testimonies of child-victims are
normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape has, in fact, been committed. When the
offended party is of tender age and immature, courts
are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be
exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity. Considering that AAA was only four (4) years
old when she was raped and was only five (5) years old
when she took the witness stand, she could not have
invented a horrible story. For her to fabricate the facts
of rape and to charge the accused falsely of a crime is
certainly beyond her mental capacity.
As to the guilt of accused-appellant, the Court does not
agree with the contention that the prosecution failed to
prove carnal knowledge on the ground that AAA
explicitly stated in her testimony that Padit merely
rubbed his penis against her vagina. AAA, who was then
four years old, was not expected to be knowledgeable
about sexual intercourse and every stage thereof. Rape
is committed on the victim's testimony that she felt
pain. This kind of pain could not have been the result of
mere superficial rubbing. Furthermore, the testimony of
AAA is corroborated by the findings of the physician who
examined her.
Padit also contends that the testimony of AAA's mother
is nothing but hearsay. The Court does not agree. The
term “hearsay” as used in the law on evidence, signifies
evidence which is not founded upon the personal
knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited. The
reason for its exclusion is that the party against whom
the hearsay testimony is presented is deprived of the
right or opportunity to cross-examine and the court is
without opportunity to test its credibility by observing
the demeanor of the person who made them. In the
instant case, AAA herself, was sworn as a witness to the
fact testified to by her mother. Padit's counsel even
cross-examined AAA. Moreover, the trial court had the
opportunity to observe AAA's manner of testifying.
Hence, the testimony of AAA's mother on the incident
related to her by her daughter cannot be disregarded
as hearsay evidence.
As to the penalty, the CA correctly imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death, but it should be
specified that it is without eligibility for parole. The
Court additionally orders accused-appellant to pay
interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality
of this judgment until all the monetary awards for
damages are fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the
Decision dated July 19, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No.00888 is hereby AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS: (I) accused-
appellant VICTOR P. PADIT is sentenced to suffer the
penalty or reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole; and (2) that said accused-appellant is
additionally ordered to pay the victim interest of six
percent (6%) per annum on all damages awarded from
the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
14. Cruz vs CA, G.R. No. 126723, July 27,
1998 “co-ownership or absolute ownership?”
Doctrine:
THE TRANSACTIONS RELATING TO THE OTHER
PARCELS OF LAND ENTERED INTO BY PETITIONERS IN
THE CONCEPT OF ABSOLUTE OWNERS ARE
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AND FALLS UNDER THE
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE.
Facts:
Delfin I. Cruz and Adoracion Cruz were spouses and
their children were Thelma, Nerissa, Arnel and Gerry
Cruz. Upon the death of Delfin I. Cruz, his surviving
spouse and children executed a notarized deed of
partial partition (DPP) by virtue of which each one of
them was given a share of several parcels of land all
situated in Taytay, Rizal. A day after the execution of
the DPP, the same parties executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) wherein they covenanted and agreed
among themselves that they shall alike and receive
equal shares from the proceeds of the sale of any of the
lot or lots allotted to and adjudicated in their individual
names by virtue of the DPP. The DPP was subsequently
registered and title were issued in their names. The
annotation pertaining to the MOA was carried in each of
the title.
The spouses Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo and Nelson Tamayo
were sued by the spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos
for a sum of money in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Quezon City). The Tamayo spouses, after trial,
were condemned by the trial court to pay a sum of
money to the Malolos spouses.
After the finality of the decision, a writ of execution was
issued. Enforcing said writ, the sheriff of the court levied
upon the land in question and thereafter sold the
properties in an execution sale to the highest bidders,
the Malolos spouses. Accordingly, the sheriff executed
a certificate of sale. Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo failed to
exercise her right of redemption within the statutory
period and so the final deed of sale was executed by
the sheriff conveying the lands to the Malolos spouses.
The Malolos couple asked the Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo to
give them the owners duplicate copy of the seven (7)
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titles of the lands in question but she refused. The
couple moved the court to compel her to surrender said
titles to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for cancellation.
The motion was granted, but Nerissa was adamant. She
did not comply with the order so the Malolos couple
asked the court to declare said titles null and void.
At this point, petitioners entered the picture by filing in
said court a motion for leave to intervene and oppose
the Maloloses' motion. They alleged that they are co-
owners of the lands in question. The lower court
rendered a decision for private respondents from which
the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court ruled in favor of herein private
respondents, holding that the DPP was not materially
and substantially incompatible with the MOA. The DPP
conferred absolute ownership of the parcels of land in
issue on Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo, while the MOA merely
created an obligation on her part to share with the
petitioners the proceeds of the sale of the said
properties. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
The central issue was: "Did the Memorandum of
Agreement [MOA] revoke, cancel or supersede the
Deed of Partial Partition [DPP]?" If so, then petitioners
and Spouses Tamayo were co-owners of the land in
issue, and partition should ensue upon motion of the
former; if not, then the latter are its absolute owners
and no partition should be made.
(1) whether the DPP was cancelled or novated by the
MOA; NO
(2) whether the MOA established, between petitioners
and the judgment debtor, a co-ownership of the lots in
question; NO
(3) whether petitioners are barred by estoppel from
claiming co-ownership of the seven parcels of
Land; YES
(4) whether res judicata has set in. NO
Ruling
First issue: No Novation or Cancellation
In their Memorandum, petitioners insist that the MOA
categorically and unmistakably named and covenanted
them as co-owners of the parcels in issue and novated
their earlier agreement, the Deed of Partial Partition.
The Court disagrees.
The MOA falls short of producing a novation, because it
does not express a clear intent to dissolve the old
obligation as a consideration for the emergence of the
new one. Likewise, petitioners fail to show that the DPP
and the MOA are materially and substantially
incompatible with each other. Petitioners admit that,
under the MOA, they and the Tamayo spouses agreed
to equally share in the proceeds of the sale of the lots.
Indeed, the DPP granted title to the lots in question to
the co-owner to whom they were assigned, and the
MOA created an obligation on the part of such co-owner
to share with the others the proceeds of the sale of such
parcels. There is no incompatibility between these two
contracts.
Verily, the MOA cannot be construed as a repudiation of
the earlier DPP. Both documents can exist together and
must be so interpreted as to give life to both.
Second Issue: No Co-ownership in the MOA
Petitioners contend that they converted their separate
and individual ownership over the lands in dispute into
a co-ownership by their execution of the MOA and the
annotation thereof on the separate titles.
The Court is not convinced. The very provisions of the
MOA belie the existence of a co-ownership. The parcels
of land in the MOA have all been partitioned and titled
under separate and individual names. More important,
the MOA stipulated that the registered owner could sell
the land without the consent of the other parties to the
MOA.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the annotation of the
MOA in the certificate of title did not engender any co-
ownership. Well-settled is the doctrine that registration
merely confirms, but does not confer, title.
Third Issue: Estoppel by Deed
Respondent Court found that several deeds of sale and
real estate mortgage, which petitioners executed when
they sold or mortgage some parcels adjudicated to
them under the DPP, contained the statement that the
vendor/mortgagor was the absolute owner of the parcel
of residential land and that he or she represented it as
free from liens and encumbrances. On the basis of these
pieces of evidence, Respondent Court held that
petitioners were estopped from claiming that there was
co-ownership over the disputed parcels of land which
were also covered by the DPP. Petitioners contend that
Respondent Court, in so ruling, violated the res inter
alios acta rule.
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Res inter alios acta,
as a general rule, prohibits the admission of evidence
that tends to show that what a person has done at one
time is probative of the contention that he has done a
similar act at another time.
In this case, petitioners argue that transactions relating
to the other parcels of land they entered into, in the
concept of absolute owners, are inadmissible as
evidence to show that the parcels in issue are not co-
owned. The Court is not persuaded. Evidence of such
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Evidence Cases Partial
transactions falls under the exception to the rule on res
inter alios acta. Such evidence is admissible because it
is relevant to an issue in the case and corroborative of
evidence already received. The relevancy of such
transactions is readily apparent. The nature of
ownership of said property should be the same as that
of the lots in question since they are all subject to the
MOA. If the parcels of land were held and disposed by
petitioners in fee simple, in the concept of absolute
owners, then the lots in question should similarly be
treated as absolutely owned.

In their transactions with others, petitioners have

declared that the other lands covered by the same MOA
are absolutely owned, without indicating the existence
of a coownership over such properties. Thus, they are
estopped.

Fourth Issue: No Res Judicata On Co-ownership

Petitioners argue that the Order (Exhibit J) 33 dated

January 18, 1985, issued by the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 86, which had long become final and executory,
confirmed their co-ownership. This contention is equally
untenable.

The RTC of Quezon City had no jurisdiction to decide on

the merits of the present case or to entertain questions
regarding the existence of co-ownership over the
parcels in dispute, because the suit pending before it
was only for the collection of a sum of money. Thus,
there is a lack a lack of identity of the two actions.

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