CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION

CASE DIGEST

ARUELO V. CA
G.R. No. 107852 October 20, 1993
Quiason, J.

Facts: Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates in the May 11, 1992 elections for the office
of the Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan. Gatchalian won over
Aruelo by a margin of four votes, such that on May 13, 1992, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan. On May 22,
1992, Aruelo filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition docketed as SPC
No. 92-130, seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of "fraudulent alteration
and tampering" of votes in the tally sheets and the election returns.

Issue: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it allowed respondent to file his pleading beyond the five-day period.

Held: No, petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings
are governed by the Revised Rules of Court. The filing of motions to dismiss and bill of
particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. It must be noted that
nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss
and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests orquo warranto cases pending before
the regular courts. Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the
filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court.
MAMERTO T. SEVILLA V. COMELEC

Facts: Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat,
Muntinlupa City during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
On October 26, 2010, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed Sevilla as the winner with a total
of 7,354 votes or a winning margin of 628 votes over So's 6,726 total votes. On November 4,
2010, So filed an election protest with the MeTC on the ground that Sevilla committed electoral
fraud, anomalies and irregularities in all the protested precincts. So pinpointed twenty percent
(20%) of the total number of the protested precincts. He also prayed for a manual revision of the
ballots.
Mamerto asserts that Renato resorted to a wrong remedy hence the Comelec should not have
entertained the petition for certiorari. He also asserts that the dismissal of the election protest
was proper. In his Comment, Renato asserts that the petition was filed prematurely since the En
Banc decision was not a majority decision since the Chairman had yet to be appointed by the
President when the decision was rendered. Since it was not a majority decision, it should be
remanded to the Comelec for rehearing by a full and complete Commission.

CUA V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 80519-21 December 17, 1987

Facts: Private respondent Puzon filed on August 14, 1987 a "motion for reconsideration/appeal"
of the said decision with the COMELEC en banc, where on October 28, 1987, three members
voted to sustain the First Division, with two dissenting and one abstaining (one member having
died earlier). On the strength of this 3-2 vote, Cua moved for his proclamation by the board of
canvassers, which reconvened on November 9, 1987, and granted his motion. Cua took his
oath the same day, but the next day Puzon filed with the COMELEC an urgent motion to
suspend Cua's proclamation or to annul or suspend its effect if already made. On November 11,
1987, the COMELEC set the motion for hearing and three days later it issued a restraining
telegram enjoining Cua from assuming the office of member of the House of Representatives.
The petitioner then came to this Court to enjoin the COMELEC from acting on the said motion
and enforcing its restraining order.

Issue: Whether the 2-1 Decision reached by the First Division of COMELEC is valid.

Held: Yes, the 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision under Article IX-
A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who voted to affirm the First
Division constituted a majority of the five members who deliberated and voted thereon en banc
and their decision is also valid under the aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the
proclamation of Cua on the basis of the two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him
now to assume his seat in the House of Representatives.
ACENA V. CSC
G.R. No. 90780 February 6, 1991

Facts: Acena was assigned as Admin. Officer by then President of Rizal Technological
Colleges and was subsequently promoted as Associate Professor on temporary status pending
his compliance to obtain a Master‘s Degree while assuming the position of Acting Admin Officer
at the same time. The Board of Trustees designated Ricardo Salvador as Acting Admin Officer
and pursuant to the same, the new College President Dr. Estolas revoked the designation of the
petitioner as acting Admin Officer. The latter‘s appointment was withdrawn. He also filed a
complaint for injunction of damages to Dr. Estolas assailing the validity of his dismissal from his
position as violation of security of tenure. He filed another complaint for illegal termination
against Dr. Estolas before the Merit Systems Protection Board The CSC opined that Acena is
still the Admin Officer since his appointment as Asso. Prof. was withdrawn. Dr. Estolas filed
petition for review to the Office of the President. The Presidential Staff Director referred the
complaint back to the CSC. In the dispositive portion of its resolution, the CSC finds the action
of Dr. Estolas valid and set aside the previous opinion made by the CSC and the order of the
MSPB. The petitioner files a petition for certiorari against the CSC decision on jurisdictional
issue.

Issue: Whether or not the appeals from decisions of Merit System and Protection Board (MSPB)
is cognizable by the CSC.

Held: Yes, Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1409 dated June 8, 1978, provides that:
Sec. 8. Relationship with the Civil Service Commission. –– Decision of the Board involving the
removal of officers and employees from the service shall be subject to automatic review by the
Commission. The Commission shall likewise hear and decide appeals from other decisions of
the Board, provided that the decisions of the Commission shall be subject to review only by the
Courts

Vital-Gozon v. CA
G.R. No. 129132 July 8, 1998
Davide, Jr., J.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter of
damages in a special civil action of mandamus.

Held: Yes, CA has jurisdiction to award damages in mandamus petitions. Sec. 3 of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court explicitly authorized the
rendition of judgment in a mandamus action “commanding the defendant, immediately or at
some other specified time, to do the act required to be
done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.” The provision makes plain that the damages
are an incident, or the result of, the defendant’s wrongful act in failing and refusing to do the act
required to be done. It is noteworthy that the Rules of 1940 had an identical counterpart
provision. The Solicitor General’s theory that the rule in question is a mere procedural one
allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another for damages, is untenable, for it implies
that a claim for damages arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of a
mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of damages not being
inextricably linked to the cause of action for mandamus, which is certainly not the case.
FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP v. FERRER
G.R. No. L-31455 February 28, 1985

Facts: While it may be true that the lower court has the jurisdiction over controversies dealing
with the COMELEC's award of contracts, the same being purely administrative and civil in
nature, nevertheless, herein petitioner has no cause of action on the basis of the allegations of
its complaint. "The Comelec shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration
of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may
be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all
administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number of
location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election
officials. The decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the
Supreme Court."

Issue: Whether the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of
the COMELEC dealing with an award of
contract arising from its invitation to bid

Held: The Comelec shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative
questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number of location of Polling
places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials. The decisions,
orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court.
Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with the
Rules of Court or with such rules as may be promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Similarly, Section 17(5) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296), as amended,
provides that, “final awards, judgments, decisions or orders of the Comelec ...” fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court prescribed the manner of appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court
from a final ruling or decision of the Comelec, among other administrative bodies.
In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an
incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the
said resolution may not be deemed as a “final order” reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from
said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order.
Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial
courts.
MATEO V. CA
G.R. No. 113219 August 14, 1995

Facts: The hiring and firing of employees of government-owned and controlled corporations are
governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations. SC Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95. Final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals. In any event, whether under the old rule or the present
rules, RTC’s have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and
employees covered by the Civil Service Law.

Issue: Whether the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has jurisdiction over a case involving dismissal
of an employee of Morong Water District,
a quasi-public corporation

Held: No, MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to P.D. No. 198, known as the
provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. Employees of government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil CSC.
Indeed, the hiring and firing of employees of government-own and controlled corporations are
governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations.

Supreme Court REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1-95 May 16, 1995
1. SCOPE. — These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of
Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are
the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of the President,
Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657,Government Service
Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board,
Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, and
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.
2. CASES NOT COVERED. — These rules shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued
under the Labor Code of the Philippines.
3. WHERE TO APPEAL. — An appeal under these rules may be taken to the Court of Appeals
within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution or from the date of its last publication, if publication is
required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only
one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the
full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition
for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in
no case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days.
5. HOW APPEAL TAKEN. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in
seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the
adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for
the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.
Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs.
Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be
granted by the Court of Appeals upon verified motion setting forth the grounds relied upon. If the
Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees
and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial.
6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. — The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of
the parties to the case, without impleading the courts or agencies either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds
relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified
true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified
true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other
supporting papers; and (d) state all the specific material dates showing that it was filed within
the reglementary period provided herein; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum
shopping as required in Revised Circular No. 28-91.
7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS. — The failure of the petitioner
to comply with the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful
fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient grounds for the dismissal
thereof.
8. ACTION ON THE PETITION. — The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a
comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. The Court,
however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.
9. CONTENTS OF COMMENT. — The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice
in seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such
material portions of the record referred to therein together with other supporting papers. It shall
point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues, and state
the reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be served on
the petitioner, and proof of such service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.
10. DUE COURSE. — If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or documents
as may be required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of period for the
filing thereof, and on the bases of the petition or the record the Court of Appeals finds prima
facie that the court or agencies concerned has committed errors of fact or law that would
warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed, it may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The
findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall
be binding on the Court of Appeals.
11. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. — Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has
been given due course, the Court of Appeals may require the court or agency concerned to
transmit the original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under
review. The record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the
proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or permit subsequent correction of or addition to
the record.
12. EFFECT OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such
terms as it may deem just.
13. SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. — If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals
may set the case for oral argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within a period
of fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing
of the last pleading or memorandum required by these rules or by the Court itself.
14. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. — All petitions for certiorari against the Civil Service
Commission and The Central Board of Assessment Appeals filed and pending in the Supreme
Court prior to the effectivity of this Revised Administrative Circular shall be treated as petitions
for review hereunder and shall be transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition.
Petitions for certiorari against the aforesaid agencies which
may be filed after the effectivity hereof and up to June 30, 1995 shall likewise be considered as
petitions for review and shall be referred to the Court
of Appeals for the same purpose.
In both instances, for purposes of the period of appeal contemplated in Section 4 hereof, the
date of receipt by the Court of Appeals of the petitions thus transferred or referred to it shall be
considered as the date of the filing thereof as petitions for review, and the Court of Appeals may
require the filing of amended or supplemental pleadings and the submission of such further
documents or records as it may deem necessary in view of and consequent to the change in the
mode of appellate review.
15. REPEALING CLAUSE. — Rules 43 and 44 of the Rules of Court are hereby repealed and
superseded by this Circular.
16. EFFECTIVITY. — This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation and shall take effect on June 1, 1995.
TUPAS v. NHA
G.R. No. L-49677 May 4, 1989

Facts: Respondent National Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NHC) is a

corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as
the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations, dated January 1, 1951. Its shares of stock are
and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation
under Act 459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock
are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development
Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the
People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation. It was claimed that its members comprised the
majority of the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter
Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977, holding that NHC “being a
government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form,
join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining. From this order of
dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations where Director Carmelo C. Noriel
reversed the order of dismissal and ordered the holding of a certification election. This order
was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of November 21,
1978 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent NHC.

Issue: Whether or not the employees of NHA are not covered by Civil Service law, rules and
regulations and have therefore the right to unionize

Held: Yes, the civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with
original or legislative charters, that is, those created by an act of Congress or by special law,
and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. The Civil Service does
not include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of
government-owned or controlled corporations under the general corporation law.
The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees’
organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and
granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors.
There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of
NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-
owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Statutory implementation of the
last cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by
Executive Order No. 111.
Salazar vs. Mathay
G.R. No. L-44061, September 20, 1976

Facts: On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor
General ‘confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor General, Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS). Her appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On March
28, 1962 and on February 12, 1965 she was extended another appointment by way of
promotion, as ´confidential agent in the same office. On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a
notice from the Auditor General that her services as ´confidential agent have been terminated
as of the close of office hours on March 31, 1966. On March 31, 1966, the Auditor General upon
favorable recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued an appointment to
petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which was approved by the Commission of Civil
Service. On the same day, petitioner assumed the position. However, no action was taken on
said letter. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the
Auditor General to reinstate her to her former position but the Supreme Court dismissed the
petition without prejudice to her filing the proper action to the Court of First Instance.
Issue: Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not.

Held: The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential.

There are two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential:
When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil
Service Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; or In the absence of
such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists close intimacy
between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters
of state.μ In the case before us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265, declaring confidential
agents in the several department and offices of the Government, unless otherwise directed by
the President, to be primarily confidentialμ brings within the fold of the aforementioned executive
order the position of confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS, as among those
positions which are primarily confidential.
Corpus v. Cuaderno
G.R. No. L-16969 April 30, 1966

FACTS: Marino Corpus, Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank, was
administratively charged with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of the
internal regulations of the office. He was suspended by the Monetary Board desire the
recommendation of the investigating committee that he be reinstated and there was no basis for
actions against Corpus. The Board considered him resigned as of the date of his suspension.
Corpus moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed the petition to CFI of Manila which
favored him and declared the Resolution of the Board as null and void. He was awardedP5, 000
as attorney’s fees. Both Petitioner and respondent appealed the judgment. Petitioner was
appealing the amount awarded to him contending that it was lower than what he has spent for
attorney’s fees. While the respondent claimed that an officer holding highly technical position
may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing power who was Governor
Cuaderno.

ISSUE: Is the lack of confidence by the appointing power being a ground for removing an
employee or a public officer?

HELD: The Constitution distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical
employees, and to the latter the loss of confidence as a ground for removal is not applicable. No
public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a
cause provided by law. Pertaining to the petitioner’s claim for damages, the agreement between
a client and his lawyer as to attorney’s fees cannot bind the other party who was a stranger to
the fee contract. While the Civil Code allows a party to recover reasonable counsel fees by way
of damages, such fees must lie primarily in the discretion of the trial court.
Decision appealed affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Luego v. CSC
G.R. NO. L-69137 August 5, 1986

Facts: The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu
City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on February 18, 1983. The appointment was described as
permanent” but the Civil Service Commission approved it as “temporary,” subject to the final
action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee, and provided
“there (was) no pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against
the appointment nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval
of the appointment.” On March 22, 1984, after protracted hearings the legality of which does not
have to be decided here, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better
qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly, directed “that Felicula
Tuozo be appointed to the position of Administrative Officer 11 in the Administrative Division,
Cebu City, in place of Felimon Luego whose appointment as Administrative Officer II is hereby
revoked.” The private respondent was so appointed on June 28, 1984, by the new mayor,
Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, is now
before us to question that order and the private respondent’s title.

Issue: Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on

the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee?

Held: No, the Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or
reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the
appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service
Laws. Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that
the appointee is qualified for the position to which he has been named. As we have repeatedly
held, such attestation is required of the Commissioner of Civil Service merely as a check to
assure compliance with Civil Service Laws.

PAGCOR v. Rilloraza
G. R. 141141 (June 25, 2001)

Facts: Rilloraza was a casino operations manager. He was dismissed by PAGCOR for gross
misconduct, dishonesty and loss of
confidence. The CSC and CA found Rilloraza guilty only of simple negligence. PAGCOR
contends that since Rilloraza is a confidential employee,
he may be dismissed for lack of confidence.

Issue: Whether CA gravely erred when it failed and refused to consider that respondent was a
confidential appointee or employee whose term had expired by reason of loss of confidence.

Held: Rilloraza is not a confidential appointee. Although his tasks require faith
andconfidence in his competence to perform it, such does not by any means elevate
Rilloraza’s position as primarily confidential. It is the nature, not the name of the position, that
classifies it as primarily confidential.

SSSEA v. CA
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

Facts: The SSS filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged
an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS;
that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor Management Council, which ordered the
strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered
damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the petitioners
be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. The SSSEA went on strike
after the SSS failed to act on the union’s demands, which included: implementation of the
provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union
dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of
temporary or contractual employees with 6 months or more of service into regular and
permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given
to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children’s allowance of P30.00, and
after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly
committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. The position of the petitioners is that
the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue
the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the
Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations Commission, since the
case involves a labor dispute. On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the
ground that the employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and
regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike. Since neither the
DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the
employees from striking.

Issue: Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?

Held: Considering that under the 1987 Constitution “The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters” [Art. IX(B), Sec .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No.
180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees”] and
that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having
been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered
by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the
strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. The general rule is that the terms and
conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof are governed by law. Since the terms and conditions of government
employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind
labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion
by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially
voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare
legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled
through the process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government
which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or
administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements.
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow
negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed
by law.
LOPEZvs.CSC and ROMEO LUZ JR.
G.R. No. 92140 February 19, 1991

Facts: In 1983, petitioner Lopez, along with private respondent Romeo V. Luz, Jr. and Roberto
Abellana, was appointed as Assistant Harbor Master at Manila International Container Terminal,
Manila South Harbor and Manila North Harbor, respectively. Pursuant to EO 125, the Ministry
(now Department) of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) was reorganized. Hence, the
reduction of the number of Assistant Harbor Masters (now designated as Harbor Masters) in the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) from three (3) to two (2). A re-evaluation of the qualifications of
petitioner Lopez, Luz, and Abellana was conducted by a placement committee of the PPA to
determine who should assume the two positions. The PPA the results of which reveal that
petitioner was the most outstanding among the three. The records show that respondent Luz
rated third. Luz protested Lopez's appointment after it was approved by the Assistant Director of
the Civil Service Field Office, Guillermo R. Silva. On February 15, 1989, the protest/appeal was
denied by the PPA General Manager who explained that Luz was not qualified for any of the two
slots according to the over-all standing of the contenders. On November 10, 1989, the PPA
submitted to the Commission the results of the re-assessment conducted by its Placement
Committee which was reconvened for that purpose. The results explained that the Committee
utilized evaluation instruments that have been validated for use in promotions to assess
performance of the candidates, their education and training, experience and outstanding
accomplishments. The Commission ruled that the immediate supervisor of respondent Luz was
in the best position to assess the competence of the respondent and not a psychiatric-
consultant who was merely a contractual employee and susceptible to partiality and directed the
appointment of Luz as the Harbor Master instead of the petitioner. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the CSC gravely and seriously erred in nullifying Lopez appointment and
substituting its decision for that of the PPA that his appointment had been revoked and that
respondent Luz was directed to assume the position.

Held: The role of the CSC in establishing a career service and in promoting the morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and courtesy
among civil servants is not disputed by petitioner Lopez. On the other hand, the discretionary
power of appointment delegated to the heads of departments or agencies of the government is
not controverted by the respondents. In the appointment, placement and promotion of civil
service employees according to merit and fitness, it is the appointing power, especially where it
is assisted by a screening committee composed of persons who are in the best position to
screen the qualifications of the nominees, who should decide on the integrity, performance and
capabilities of the future appointees. The Court is not the least bit convinced by the contentions
of the public and private respondents. It is apparent from the records that the PPA disclosed all
the instruments used, the limitations and the adjustments made to the end that the results would
be fair to all the candidates alike. More important, the Court emphasizes that the Commission
has no authority to substitute its judgment for that of the Philippine Ports Authority when it
comes to evaluating the performance, personality, and accomplishments of candidates who all
have the necessary eligibility and legal qualifications. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. Petitioner REYNALDO LOPEZ is declared to be entitled to the office in dispute by
virtue of this permanent appointment. SO ORDERED.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO DE TORRES vs. CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION
G.R. No. 132860. April 3, 2001

Facts: Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is an Associate Professor of UP Los Baños who went on a
vacation leave of absence without pay from Sept. 1, 1986 to Aug.30, 1989. During this period,
he served as the Philippine Government’s official representative to the Centre on Integrated
Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific (CIRDAP). When the term of his leave of absence
was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an extension of said leave of absence for
another year, but was denied by Dr.Eulogio Castillo, the then Director of the Agricultural Credit
Corporation, Inc. (ACCI) of UPLB. In the same letter, Dr. Castillo advised Dr. De Torres to report
for duty at UPLB not later than Sept. 15, 1989; while the then UPLB Chancellor Raul P. de
Guzman apprised him on the rules of the Civil Service on leaves and warned of the possibility of
being considered on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) if he failed to return and report for
duty as directed. In response thereto, Chancellor de Guzman warned De Torres, in a Letter
dated November 20, 1989 that in case of the latter’s failure to report ‘within 30 days,’ from
today, UPLB would be forced to drop him from the rolls of personnel. Despite the warning, Dr.
De Torres did not report to work. On Jan. 3, 1994 or after almost five years of absence without
leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the incumbent Chancellor Ruben L. Villareal that he was reporting
back to duty at ACCI-UPLB effective January 3, 1994 x xx. However, Chancellor Villareal
notified Dr. De Torres that ‘when an employee reports back for duty, he should have been from
an approved leave. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with UPLB. On June 30, 1994, Dr. De “On
May 5, 1995, the Commission issued CSC Resolution ruled that Dr. De Torres is considered to
have been dropped from the service as of Sept. 1, 1989. However, the commission denied the
MR and further stating that since separation from the service was non-disciplinary in nature, the
appointing authority may appoint Dr. De Torres to any vacant position pursuant to existing civil
service law and rules. Petitioners sought recourse before the CA. But, finding no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or xxx excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent
commission in the issuance of the questioned Resolutions, the appellate court dismissed the
Petition for lack of merit. Petitioners’ MR was denied. Hence, Petition for Review.

Issue: Whether automatic separation from the civil service of Petitioner De Torres is valid
pursuant on Sec. 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which speaks of automatic
separation from the service, even without prior notice and hearing.

Held: We do not agree, insofar as institutions of higher learning are concerned.

Petitioner De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP. He remained in the
University’s roll of academic personnel, even after he had been warned of the possibility of
being dropped from the service if he failed to return to work within a stated period.
All these circumstances indubitably demonstrate that the University has chosen not to exercise
its prerogative of dismissing petitioner from its employ. UP’s actuations, in spite of Section 33,
Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, are consistent with the exercise of its academic
freedom. This freedom encompasses the autonomy to choose who should teach and,
concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of professors and other academic
personnel. Thus, we hold that by opting to retain private petitioner and even promoting him
despite his absence without leave, the University was exercising its freedom to choose who may
teach or, more precisely, who may continue to teach in its faculty. Even in the light of the
provision of the Revised Civil Service Law, the Respondent CSC had no authority to dictate to
UP the outright dismissal of its personnel. The former could not have done so without trampling
upon the latter’s constitutionally enshrined academic freedom. Moreover, the CSC is not a co-
manager, or surrogate administrator of government offices and agencies. In short, on its own,
the CSC does not have the power to terminate employment or to drop workers from the rolls.
Needless to say, UP definitely recognizes and values petitioner’s academic expertise. As the
vice chancellor for academic affairs explained, “dropping him from the rolls will utterly be a
waste of government funds and will not serve the best interest of the country which is suffering
from ‘brain-drain’.” Even UP President Emil Q. Javier advised Complainants Baskiñas and
Medina to “give Dr. de Torres the opportunity to honor his service obligation to the University,”
referring to petitioner’s required return service in view of a fellowship abroad earlier granted him
by the institution.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
and the Respondent Civil Service are SET ASIDE. No costs.SO ORDERED.
MARIO A. NAVARRO vs. CSC and EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY
G.R. Nos. 107370-71 September 16, 1993

Facts: On 21 June 1989, cable drums worth P21, 250.00 owned by Takaoka Engineering
Construction Co., Ltd., were stolen from the Ford Stockyard inside the Bataan Export
Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles, Bataan. Petitioner Mario A. Navarro is one of the
suspect, was administratively charged with grave misconduct. Upon recommendation of BEPZ
Local Board of Inquiry, Discipline and Promotion finding him guilty as charged the Senior
Deputy Administrator of EPZA, with the approval of the Administrator, issued on 18 October
1990 an Order terminating the services of Navarro. Navarro went on appeal to the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) of the CSC, directing the reinstatement of Navarro with
payment of back wages and other benefits due him from the time of his dismissal. Respondent
EPZA moved for reconsideration but the same was denied in a MSPB Decision of 11 December
1991. Meanwhile, the criminal case filed against Navarro and his co-accused for qualified theft
was dismissed by the RTC of Bataan, Branch 4, Balanga, Bataan, in its Decision of 6 November
1990. 1 EPZA sought reversal of the MSPB decision before respondent CSC. On 16 July 1992
CSC set aside MSPB's Decision founding Navarro guilty of grave misconduct and re-imposed
on him the penalty of dismissal. Navarro's MR was denied in the CSC's Resolution of 10
September 1992.

Issue: Whether respondent CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in relying in part on the sworn statement of Rolando Lapitan which was totally
rejected by the RTC of Bataan.

Held: It is undisputed that MSPB rendered a favorable decision for Navarro and this fact alone
should have prevented EPZA from appealing to the Commission. The CSC has no appellate
jurisdiction over MSPB's decisions exonerating officers and employees from administrative
charges(Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission). It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely
a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provision of law (Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal
Affairs. The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision" refers to the government
employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action
which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or
dismissal from office. In Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, 5 also cited in Magpale. The
complainant is not the party adversely affected by the decision so that she has no legal
personality to interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. In an administrative case,
the complainant is a mere witness (Gonzalo v. D. Roda, 64 SCRA 120). Even if she is the Head
of the Administrative Services Department of the HSRC as a complainant she is merely a
witness for the government in an administrative case. No private interest is involved in an
administrative case as the offense is committed
against the government. As it is clear that both public respondents acted without jurisdiction —
EPZA, for appealing MSPB's decision exonerating Navarro from the
administrative charge and CSC, for taking cognizance of, and deciding, the appeal — the
issuance of the writ of certiorari is inevitable. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
GRANTED and the decision of respondent Civil Service Commission and its resolution are
hereby SET ASIDE. The decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board of 25 July 1991 and
11 December 1991 are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

CSC V. DACOYCOY

The law defines nepotismas follows:

"Sec. 59.Nepotism. - (1) All appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or
controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority,
or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over
him, are hereby prohibited. "As used in this Section, the word "relative" and members of the
family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.
(2) The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons
employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such
appointment shall be made to the Commission."

Facts: On November 29, 1995, George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen
Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a complaint
against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism. Civil Service
Commission found respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result
of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker,
respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the
Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the
penalty of dismissal from the service.

Held: Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in
favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Nepotism is one
pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In Debulgado, we
stressed that the basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly
indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one. The Court was unwilling
to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive,
but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict
compliance with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or
circumvention of the law. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and
REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44711. ACCORDINGLY,
the Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated
January 28, 1998 and September 30, 1998, dismissing respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy from the
service.
Santos v. Yatco, 59 0G 548

Facts: This is petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the order of Judge
Yatco disallowing then Secretary of Defense Alejo
Santos from campaigning personally for Governor Tomas Martin in the province of Bulacan.
The petition was granted for the ff. reasons: The position of department secretaries is not
embraced and included within the terms officers and employees in the Civil Service; When
Santos, a Nacionalista campaigned for Gov. Martin, a candidate of the Nacionalista Party, he
was acting as a member of the Cabinet in discussing the issues before the electorate and
defending the actuations of the Administration to which he belongs; The question of impropriety
as distinct from illegality of such campaign because of its deleterious influence upon the
members of the armed forces, who are administratively subordinated to the Secretary of
National Defense and who are often called upon by the COMELEC to aid in the conduct of
orderly and impartial elections, is not justiciable by the court. Adapted.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. LARRY M. ALFONSO

G.R. No. 179452 June 11, 2009

This is a petition assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in, which
reversed Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution as well as its Order formally charging
respondent Larry Alfonso with Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service and preventively suspending him from his position as Director of the Human
Resources Management Department of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP).

Facts: Respondent Larry M. Alfonso is the Director of the Human Resources Management
Department of PUP. On July 6, 2006, an Affidavit-Complaint filed against Alfonso for violation of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6713, charging the latter with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the Service, and violation of Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. The
affidavit-complaint was lodged before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The affidavit alleged
that respondent repeatedly abused his authority as head of PUP’s personnel department.
The CSC charged Alfonso with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the Service, and imposing a 90-day preventive suspension against him. Respondent argued
that the CSC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case filed against him.
The PUP Board of Regents that has the exclusive authority to appoint and remove PUP
employees pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 8292 in relation to R.A. No. 4670.
Without ruling on the motion, the head of CSC-NCR, issued an Order directing the Office of the
President of PUP to implement the preventive suspension order against respondent.
Respondent sought relief before the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition. CA rendered
a Decision in favor of Alfonso.

Issue: Whether the CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed against Alfonso.

Held: We find in favor of petitioner.

SECTION 9.Powers and Functions of the Commission. – The Commission shall administer the
Civil Service and shall have the
following powers and function: (j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted
directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it
on appeal; Section 37.Disciplinary Jurisdiction. – (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal
all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days’ salary,
demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A complaint may be
filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee
in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or
official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the
investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be
imposed or other action to be taken. We are not unmindful of certain special laws that allow the
creation of disciplinary committees and governing bodies in different branches, subdivisions,
agencies and instrumentalities of the government to hear and decide administrative complaints
against their respective officers and employees. Be that as it may, we cannot interpret the
creation of such bodies nor the passage of laws such as – R.A. Nos. 8292 and 4670 allowing for
the creation of such disciplinary bodies – as having divested the CSC of its inherent power to
supervise and discipline government employees, including those in the academe. To hold
otherwise would not only negate the very purpose for which the CSC was established, i.e. to
instill professionalism, integrity, and accountability in our civil service, but would also impliedly
amend the Constitution itself. But it is not only for this reason that Alfonso’s argument must fail.
Equally significant is the fact that he had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the CSC
when he filed his counter-affidavit and his motion for reconsideration and requested for a
change of venue, not from the CSC to the BOR of PUP, but from the CSC-Central Office to the
CSC-NCR. It was only when his motion was denied that he suddenly had a change of heart and
raised the question of proper jurisdiction. This cannot be allowed because it would violate the
doctrine of res judicata, a legal principle that is applicable to administrative cases as well. At the
very least, respondent’s active participation in the proceedings by seeking affirmative relief
before the CSC already bars him from impugning the Commission’s authority under the principle
of estoppel by laches. In this case, the complaint-affidavits were filed by two PUP employees.
These complaints were not lodged before the disciplinary tribunal of PUP, but were instead filed
before the CSC, with averments detailing respondent’s alleged violation of civil service laws,
rules and regulations. After a fact-finding investigation, the Commission found that a prima facie
case existed against Alfonso, prompting the Commission to file a formal charge against the
latter.] Verily, since the complaints were filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has opted to
assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the
exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. To repeat, it may,
however, choose to deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials such as
the BOR of PUP to conduct the investigation, or to delegate the investigation to the proper
regional office. But the same is merely permissive and not mandatory upon the Commission.
We likewise affirm the order of preventive suspension issued by the CSC-NCR against
respondent. WHEREFORE, Civil Service Commission Resolution as well as its Orderplacing
respondent under preventive suspension are hereby REINSTATED. The CSC is ordered to
proceed hearing the administrative case against respondent with dispatch. SO ORDERED.
Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission
on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of
office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years

Held: Yes, Black defines “practice of law” as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages
in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered
by his associate. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity
for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts.
Brillantes v. Yorac
G.R. No. 93867 December 18, 1990

Facts: The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of
Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Comelec, in place of
Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to
investigate the Dec. 1989 coup d’ etat attempt. The petitioner contends that the choice of the
Acting Chairman of the Comelec is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members
themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their
independence. He cites the practice in the Supreme Court, where the senior Associate Justice
serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice. No designation from the
President of the Philippines is necessary.

Issue: Whether the designation of an Acting Chairman of COMELEC is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes, Article IX-A, Sec.1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as “independent.” Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the
control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of
these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules
and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to
review on Certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A,
Section 7. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes
under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the
President of the Philippines. In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Comelec
would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have
appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the
President to make.

Lindo v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127311 June 19, 1997

Facts: In the May 8, 1995 elections, petitioner CONRADO LINDO and private respondent
ROSARIO VELASCO (incumbent mayor of Ternate, Cavite) were the main rivals for the position
of Ternate mayor. On May 9, 1995, petitioner was declared by the board of canvassers as the
duly elected mayor, garnering the highest number of votes at 2,711. Private respondent was
second with 2,195 votes. On May 19, 1996, private respondent, while still discharging her
functions as Ternate mayor, filed an election protest contesting the results of the election in all
the 19 precincts. In June, 1995, prior to petitioner’s assumption of the office of Ternate mayor,
the ballot boxes of all the protested precincts were transferred from the office of the municipal
treasurer to the office of the clerk of court, RTC Naic, for revision of the ballots. Only the ballots
from 24 precincts were revised because private respondent abandoned her protest with respect
to the other 15 precincts. Petitioner was ordered to vacate the office of the Ternate mayor and
turn it over to private respondent. At the hearing on the motion for execution, petitioner claimed
that Judge Agcaoili only examined the photocopies of the ballots in deciding the case. On the
same date, Judge Dilag issued the writ of execution directing the PNP Director of Cavite to
implement the writ and install private respondent as mayor of Ternate, Cavite. Petitioner claims
that the COMELEC issued the preliminary injunction after finding that the trial court did not
examine the original ballots, but relied only on the xerox copies in deciding the protest.
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC should not have allowed the execution of the decision
pending appeal and should have opened the ballots boxes to determine the authenticity of the
ballots therein.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC erred in allowing the implementation of the writ of execution of
the decision pending appeal
Held: Rule 143 of the Rules of Court allows execution pending appeal in election casesupon
good reasons stated in the special order. In its Order of execution, respondent RTC Judge Dilag
cited two reasons to justify execution of his decision pending appeal, viz: (1) the grant of
execution would give substance and meaning to the people’s mandate, especially since the
RTC has established private respondent’s right to office, and; (2) barely 18 months is left on the
tenure of the Ternate mayor and the people have the right to be governed by their chosen
official. In the recent case of Gutierrez v. COMELEC, the same grounds for execution pending
appeal of the decision in the protest case were relied upon by the trial court and we
found them to be valid reasons for execution. COMELEC did not err in applying Section 2, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court. As long as the motion for execution pending appeal is filed before the
perfection of appeal, the writ of execution may issue after the period of appeal. SEC. 2

ANTONIO GALLARDO et al. vs. HON. SINFOROSO TABAMO and PEDRO ROMUALDO
G.R. No. 104848 January 29, 1993

FACTS: On April 10, 1992, private respondent filed his Petition (Special Civil Action No. 465)
before the court a quo against petitioners to prohibit and restrain them from pursuing or
prosecuting certain public works projects as it violates the 45-dayban on public works imposed
by the Omnibus Election Code (Batas PambansaBlg. 881) because although they were initiated
few days before March 27, 1992, the date the ban took effect, they were not covered by detailed
engineering plans, specifications or a program of work which are preconditions for the
commencement of any public works project. Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order. They contend that the case principally involves an alleged
violation of the Omnibus Election Code thus the jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the
Comelec, not the Regional Trial Court.

Issue: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No.
465.

Held: The material operative facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably link the private
respondent's principal grievance to alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section
261 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas PambansaBlg. 881). There is particular emphasis on
the last two (2) paragraphs which read: Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty
of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. -
(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. -
(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. Any public official
or employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and
thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for:
(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:
(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and
issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices. - During the period of forty-five days
preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special election, any person who (a)
undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in the
preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants
or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable
against public funds. Private respondent likewise focuses on Resolution No. 2332 (not 2322 as
erroneously stated in page 10 of his Petition) of the COMELEC, promulgated on 2 Jan.1992,
implementing the aforesaid paragraphs (v) and (w) of Sec. 261 and fixing the duration of the 45-
day ban for purposes of the synchronized elections from 27 March 1992 to 11 May 1922.
Civil Case No. 465 before the trial court is for the enforcement of laws involving the conduct of
elections; provoking whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the same. Even if greater care
and circumspection, than did exist in this case, would be employed by judges thus appealed to,
it is not unlikely that the shadow of suspicion as to alleged partisanship would fall on their
actuations, whichever way the matter before them is decided. It is imperative that the faith in the
impartiality of the judiciary be preserved unimpaired. Whenever, therefore, the fear may be
plausibly entertained that an assumption of jurisdiction would lead to a lessening of the
undiminished trust that should be reposed in the courts and the absence of authority discernible
the from the wording of applicable statutory provisions and the trend of judicial decisions, even if
no constitutional mandate as that present in this case could be relied upon, there should be no
hesitancy in declining to act. It is not true that, as contended by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of
the RTC under the election laws is limited to criminal actions for violations of the Omnibus
Election Code. There is no merit in the petitioners' claim that the private respondent has no
legal standing to initiate the filing of a complaint for a violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
There is nothing in the law to prevent any citizen from exposing the commission of an election
offense and from filing a complaint in connection therewith. On the contrary, under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, initiation of complaints for election offenses may be done
motupropio by the Comelec or upon written complaint by any citizen, candidate or registered
political party or organization under the party-list system or any of the accredited citizens’ arms
of the Commission. As earlier intimated, the private respondent was not seriously concerned
with the criminal aspect of his alleged grievances. He merely sought a stoppage of the public
works projects because of their alleged adverse effect on his candidacy. Indeed, while he may
have had reason to fear and may have even done the right thing, he committed a serious
procedural misstep and invoked the wrong authority. We have, therefore, no alternative but to
grant this petition on the basis our resolution of the principal issue. Nevertheless, it must be
strongly emphasized that in so holding that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Special Civil Action No. 465, We are not to be understood as approving of the acts
complained of by the private respondent. No government official should flout laws designed to
ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections or make a mockery
of our electoral processes. The bitter lessons of the past have shown that only elections of that
nature or character can guarantee a peaceful and orderly change. It is then his duty to respect,
preserve and enhance an institution which is vital in any democratic society.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged order of respondent
Judge of 10 April 1992 in Special Civil Action No. 465 is SET ASIDE and said Civil Case is
hereby ordered DISMISSED, without prejudice on the part of the private respondent to file, if he
is so minded, the appropriate complaint for an election offense pursuant to the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. Costs against the private respondent.SO ORDERED.
Relampagos vs. Cumba
243 SCRA 690 April 27, 1995

Facts: In the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the petitioner and private respondent
were candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, AgusandelNorte.
The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate. Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed
an election protest with the RTC of Agusan del Norte. On June 29, 1994, the trial court, per
Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the
private respondent and rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner. The private respondent
appealed the decision to the COMELEC which was later on given a due course by the trial
court. The petitioner then filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal. The
trial court granted the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal despite the opposition of
the private respondent. The corresponding writ of execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter,
the private respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration which was later on denied. The
private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the
aforesaid order of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of
execution. COMELEC maintains that there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction Section
50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).

Issue: Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction

Held: Sec. 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where,
under par. (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

NORBI EDDING vs. COMELEC and PABLO BERNARDO

G.R. No. 112060 July 17, 1995

Facts: During the May 1992 elections, petitioner NorbiEdding and Respondent Pablo Bernardo
were among the candidates for the office of the municipal mayor of SibucoZamboangadelNorte.
After the canvassing of the election returns, Bernardo was declared winner over Edding by 212
votes. Unconvinced and alleging massive election fraud, Edding filed an election protest on
June 9, 1992 with the RTC of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte. Upon termination of the protest
proceedings and recounting of the ballots, the RTC rendered judgment proclaiming Edding as
the winner of the election for the mayoralty seat of Sibuco, ZamboangadelNorte, and declaring
as null and void the election of respondent Bernardo. On July 8, 1993, Bernardo filed a Notice of
On July 12, 1993, the RTC Approved Bernardo's Notice of Appeal. On the next day however,
July 13, 1993, the RTC granted Edding's Motion for Immediate Execution, and ordered the
records of the case to be forwarded to the COMELEC. Thereafter, Edding replaced Bernardo,
and assumed office on the July 15, 1993. On July 16, 1993, Bernardo filed with the COMELEC
a Petition for Certiorari with Application for Preliminary Injunction and for Issuance of a TRO,
seeking to enjoin the Order of the RTC granting execution pending appeal. The COMELEC
gave due course to the petition, and issued a temporary restraining order on July 19, 1993.
Finally, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order on September 23, 1993, which Edding
received on October 12, 1993. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction to issue Writs of Certiorari against the interlocutory
order of the RTC in election cases.

Held: Last par. of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 provides:

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases. Citing Relampagos case, it
remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under par. (2), Section 1, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. COMELEC has the authority to
issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. In the instant case, COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
enjoined the order of the RTC, dated July 13, 1993, granting petitioner's motion for immediate
execution. Private respondent's petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary
injunction before the COMELEC is anchored on the former's claim that the trial court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in granting execution
despite the filling of a notice of appeal by private respondent within the reglementary period. It
appears however that on July 8, 1993, the same day when private respondent filed his notice of
appeal with the RTC, petitioner in turn filed his motion for immediate execution. Both actions
were therefore seasonably filed within the five-day reglementary period for filling an appeal
since the decision of the RTC was promulgated in open court on July 8, 1993.
Since the court has jurisdiction to act on the motion at the time it was filed, that jurisdiction
continued until the matter was resolved and was not lost by the subsequent action of the
opposing party. Considering however that the term of office for the disputed mayoralty seat will
already expire on June 30, 1995, in addition to the fact that the election for the next term of
office for the contested post has recently been concluded, the instant petition has therefore
become moot. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Comelec

Facts: The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on Election
ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan
filed with the Comelec an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner, on the ground that it contained material
representations.On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the
petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2013, COMELEC en banc denied her
MR. However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On
June 5, 2013, COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the
same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts
at noon of June 30, 2013.According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction
when she was duly proclaimed20Â because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications― of the Members of the House of
Representatives.

Issue: Whether the COMELEC has original jurisdiction over the petition for correction of
manifest error.

Held: Yes, it has jurisdiction over correction of manifest error pursuant to Sec.5, Rule 27 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Sec. 5. Pre-proclamation Controversies Which May Be Filed
Directly With the Commission.

Jose Miguel Arroyo v .Department of Justice

FACTS:

The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with the
Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged
election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.

The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report, the
Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial
elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed
perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.

After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering that
information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that the
charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.

Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and
of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid?

HELD: Petitions are DISMISSED

The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid.

Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and functions of the
Comelec. The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses
as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended to enable
the Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of
elections. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in
Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested
exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same provision of law the
authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Thus,
under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation had been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting
preliminary investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated authority given by the Comelec.
Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-
Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional bodys independence
but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election
offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.

SALIC DUMARPA V. COMELEC

Facts: Dumarpa was a congressional candidate for the 1st District of Lanao del Sur at the 10
May 2010 elections. The COMELEC declared a total failure of elections in seven (7)
municipalities, including the three (3) Municipalities of Masiu, Lumba Bayabao and Kapai, which
are situated in the 1st Congressional District of Province of Lanao del Sur. The conduct of
special elections in the seven (7) Lanao del Sur municipalities was originally scheduled for 29
May 2010.
On 25 May 2010, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8946, resetting the special elections to 3
June 2010. Subsequently, COMELEC issued the herein assailed resolution which provided,
among others, the constitution of Special Board of Election Inspectors (SBEI) in Section 4 and
Clustering of Precincts in Section 12.
Dumarpa filed a Motion for Reconsideration concerning only Sections 4 and 12 thereof as it may
apply to the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur. The COMELEC did not act on Dumarpas
motion.
A day before the scheduled special elections, on 2 June 2010, Dumarpa filed the instant petition
alleging that "both provisions on Re-clustering of Precincts (Section 12) and constitution of
SBEIs [Special Board of Election Inspectors] (Section 4) affect the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao
del Sur, and will definitely doom petitioner to certain defeat, if its implementation is not
restrained or prohibited by the Honorable Supreme Court."
Parenthetically, at the time of the filing of this petition, Dumarpa was leading by a slim margin
over his opponent Hussin Pangandaman in the canvassed votes for the areas which are part of
the 1st Congressional District of Lanao del Sur where there was no failure of elections.

A temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction was not issued. Thus, the
special elections on 3 June 2010 proceeded as scheduled.

Issue: Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic

Held: Yes.

COMELEC's power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election
COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution, in the exercise of its plenary powers in the conduct
of elections enshrined in the Constitution and statute. Thus, it brooks no argument that the
COMELEC's broad power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall,carries with it all necessary
and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections.
The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to
secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its
duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods
that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created - to promote
free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections,
unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered
with. In fact, he confines his objections on the re-clustering of precincts, and only as regards the
Municipality of Masiu. Plainly, it is precisely to prevent another occurrence of a failure of
elections in the fifteen (15) municipalities in the province of Lanao del Sur that the COMELEC
issued the assailed Resolution No. 8965. The COMELEC, through its deputized officials in the
field, is in the best position to assess the actual condition prevailing in that area and to make
judgment calls based thereon. Too often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet
unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our voters. In the process, the
actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable.We cannot,
however, engage in an academic criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult
circumstances. Petition dismissed.

MARC DOUGLAS CAGAS V. COMELEC

FACTS: Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao del Sur, filed
with Hon. Franklin Bautista, then representative of the second legislative district of the same
province, House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a bill creating the province of Davao Occidental.
H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law as Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of
the Province of Davao Occidental. Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the
holding of a plebiscite. Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created,
as provided for in this Charter, upon approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters of
the affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within sixty (60) days from the date of the effectivity of this Charter. As
early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the COMELEC
suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a matter of policy and in view of the preparations for
the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections. During a meeting held on 31 July 2013, the
COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously
with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections to save on expenses. Cagas filed a petition for
prohibition, contending that the COMELEC is without authority to amend or modify section 46 of
RA 10360 by mere resolution because it is only Congress who can do so thus, COMELEC's act
of suspending the plebiscite is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to hold the
plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental on 28 October 2013,
simultaneous with the Barangay Elections?

HELD: No, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The COMELEC’s power to administer
elections includes the power to conduct a plebiscite beyond the schedule prescribed by law.
The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a province. Sections 10 and 11 of
Article X of the Constitution provide that: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The jurisdiction
of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services
requiring coordination. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution emphasizes the direct exercise
by the people of their sovereignty. The Constitution does not specify a date as to when
plebiscites should be held. This is in contrast with its provisions for the election of members of
the legislature in Section 8, 4, Article VII. The Constitution recognizes that the power to fix date
of elections is legislative in nature, which is shown by the exceptions in previously mentioned
Constitutional provisions, as well as in the election of local government officials.

COMELEC V. SILVA

FACTS: The Private Respondents, who were charged of having tampered some
certificates of canvass, moved for the Dismissal of the Cases filed against them. The Chief
State Prosecutor, who had been designated by the Commission on Elections to prosecute the
cases, filed a comment joining in private respondents' request.
Eventually, the cases were dismissed. The COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal of
the cases to the Court of Appeals. When the Chief State Prosecutor was required to
comment, he stated that he cannot give his conformity to the Notice of Appeal filed by the
Comelec as it would not be consistent with his position that he would abide by whatever finding
the court may come up with on the existence of probable cause as against the Private
Respondents. Thus, the judges denied due course to the appeal. The sole basis for the denial
was the fact that the prosecutor, whom the COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the cases,
had earlier taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC.

Issue: Who has the authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of
dismissal — the COMELEC or its designated prosecutor?

Held:
Whether the orders of dismissal should be appealed is for the COMELEC to
decide, not for Chief State Prosecutor whom it has merely deputized to represent in it
court. The 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also
to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is
empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for
the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information
in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. Prosecutors designated by the
COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They derive their authority from
it and not from their offices. Consequently, it was beyond the power of Chief State
Prosecutor to oppose the appeal of the COMELEC. For that matter, it was
beyond his power, as COMELEC-designated prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the
determination of whether there was probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found
none, whether the cases should be dismissed.

ATTY. ROSAURO TORRES VS. COMELEC AND VICENTE RAFAEL A. DE PERALTA

G.R. No. 121031 March 26, 1997
Facts: On 9 May 1995 the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tanza, Cavite, issued a Certificate
of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Municipal Offices
(Municipal Councilors). Petitioner Atty. Rosauro Torres was proclaimed as the fifth winning
candidate for councilor. Private respondent argued for the annulment of the proclamation of
petitioner and prayed for his (private respondent) proclamation as the winning candidate.
Respondent Comelec also ordered the Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene and
proclaim private respondent Vicente Rafael A. de Peralta as the eighth winning councilor of
Tanza, Cavite. On 5 July 1995 the Municipal Board of Canvassers issued a corrected Certificate
of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates which included private
respondent Vicente Rafael de Peralta as the eighth winning councilor and excluded petitioner
from the new list of winning candidates.

Issue: Whether COMELEC acted beyond the limits of its power and authority when it ordered
the Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene and correct its alleged mistake in counting the
votes.

Held: Petitioner's contentions must fail. The position of COMELEC is well-taken. Sec. 7, Rule
27, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The Statement of Votes is merely tabulation per
precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in the election returns. What is
involved in the instant case is simple arithmetic. In making the correction in the computation the
Municipal Board of Canvassers acted in an administrative capacity under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC. Pursuant to its constitutional function to decide questions
affecting elections, the COMELEC En Banc has authority to resolve any question pertaining to
the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers. WHEREFORE, the Petition is
DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated 28 June 1995 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SARMIENTO VS. COMELEC

212 SCRA 307 August 6, 1992
Facts: This special civil action for certiorari seek to set aside the Resolutions of Respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the
following Special Cases:
1) G.R. No. 105628 — SPC No. 92-266
2) G.R. No. 105725 — SPC No. 92-323
3) G.R. No. 105727 — SPC No. 92-288
4) G.R. No. 105730 — SPC No. 92-315
5) G.R. No. 105771 — SPC No. 92-271
6) G.R. No. 105778 — SPC No. 92-039
7) G.R. No. 105797 — SPC No. 92-153
8) G.R. No. 105919 — SPC No. 92-293
9) G.R. No. 105977 — SPC No. 92-087
Issue: Whether the challenged Resolutions above specified (the SPC) as having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took
cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of it Divisions.

Held: The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when
it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the above mentioned Special Cases without first
referring them to any of its Divisions. Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
expressly provides: Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions,
and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals
are deemed pending before the Commission for proper
referral to a Division. Therefore, the instant petitions are DISMISSED but without prejudice to
the filing by petitioners of regular elections protests. If the winning
candidates for the positions involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions have
already been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the
protests shall be deemed suspended by the pendency of such cases before the COMELEC and
of these petitions before this Court.

AQUILES REYES v. RTC OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, BRANCH 39, COMELEC, ADOLFO G.

COMIA, AND THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO
G.R. No. 108886 May 5, 1995

Facts: Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo Comia were candidates for the
position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1992
synchronized elections. On May 13, 1992, during the proceedings of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers, private respondent moved for the exclusion of certain election returns, on the
ground of serious irregularity in counting in favor of petitioner Aquiles Reyes votes cast for
"Reyes" only, considering that there was another candidate (Epitacio Reyes) bearing the same
surname. On June 1, 1992, private respondent filed an election protest before the trial court. He
alleged that "a vital mistake had been committed by the Board of Canvassers in the
mathematical computation of the total number of votes garnered by petitioner [now private
respondent];" On June 4, 1992, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss private respondent's petition
on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period of ten days from proclamation.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC. In addition, he filed a petition for mandamus
and prohibition in the Court of Appeals, to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to recognize him as
the duly proclaimed member of that body and prohibit it from further recognizing private
respondent. On August 26, 1992, the Court of Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan met in
inaugural session on July 3, 1992, during which private respondent was recognized as the
eighth member of the body and thereafter allowed to assume office and discharge its functions.
On July 13, 1992, it informed petitioner that it had recognized the private respondent as its
member. On the other hand, the COMELEC's First Division dismissed on January 22, 1993
petitioner's appeal on the ground that he had failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed
period. Petitioner then brought the present action.

Issue: Whether both the trial court and the COMELEC's First Division committed a grave abuse
of discretion, by assuming trial court jurisdiction over the election contest filed by private
respondent despite the fact that the case was filed more than ten days after petitioner's
proclamation, and COMELEC's First Division, by dismissing petitioner's appeal from the
decision of the trial court for late payment of the appeal fee.

Held: We find the petition to be without merit.

First. COMELEC contends that the filing of the present petition, without petitioner first filing a
motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, violates Art. IX, A, §7 of the
Constitution. This is correct. It is now settled that in providing that the decisions, orders and
rulings of COMELEC "may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari" the Constitution in its
Art. IX, A, §7 means the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, §1. Since a basic
condition for bringing such action is that the petitioner first file a motion for reconsideration, it
follows that petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the First
Division of the COMELEC is fatal to his present action. Petitioner argues that this requirement
may be dispensed with because the only question raised in his petition is a question of law. This
is not correct. The questions raised by petitioner involve the interpretation of constitutional and
statutory provisions in light of the facts of this case. The questions tendered are, therefore, not
pure questions of law.
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB V. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioners herein were representatives of mass media which were prevented from
selling and donating space or air time for political
advertisements under RA 6646.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of
expression.

RULING: NO. The Comelec has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of
communication and information. The fundamental purposes of such power are to ensure "equal
opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of
charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns
and forums among candidates." Of course, the law limits the right of free speech and of access
to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation however, bears a clear and
reasonable connection with the objective set out in the Constitution. For it is precisely in the
unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the
financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Charo.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. VS. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.

(TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was
declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not
able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law.
Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional
challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected
by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881. Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92,
B.P. No. 881 which provides: “Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and
television time to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and
impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations.
For this purpose, the franchises of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of
campaign.” Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to
procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment,
Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it
contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC
Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it
stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that
the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to
advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of
private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22, 498,560.00 in providing free air
time for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58, 980,850.00 in view
of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

Issue: Whether Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of
law and without just compensation.

Held: Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are
more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and
television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and
frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given
the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the
privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state
spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them. The argument that the
subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against
newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space
they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires
spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the
broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry
gets. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is
taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the
COMELEC.

ADIONG V. COMELEC

Facts: Petitoner, Adiong, a 1992 senatorial candidate, assails Comelec Resolution No. 2347
insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limits their location or publication to authorized
posting areas.

ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is constitutional.

RULING: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech.
There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this
case. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places does not endanger any substantial
government or public interest. Under the clear and present danger rule, not only must the
danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided, must be so
substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the prohibition is not so much that of the
candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express
his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker
may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private
vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of
anybody else. Moreover, the restriction is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's
private property, which in this case is a privately owned vehicle. In consequence of this
prohibition, another cardinal right guaranteed under the Constitution is violated which is that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. Charo.

SANIDAD V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 90878 January 29, 1990181 SCRA 529
Facts: Republic Act No. 6766, entitled “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR
THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION” was enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the
City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region,
shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act. Petitioner Pablito V.
Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the “OVERVIEW” for the BAGUIO
MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras,
assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. — During the plebiscite
campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to
campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void
and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of
expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution. Unlike a regular news reporter or
news correspondent who merely reports the news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his
column obviously and necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any
issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner believes that said provision of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2167 constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of
the press.

Issue: Is Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 unconstitutional on the ground that it
violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press?

Held: It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec
was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other
grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication
or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a
franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising
space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a “columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of
absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot
be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to
the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence.
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can
be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and
regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite
periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates
involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory
basis.

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING

CORPORATION v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001

Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social research
institution conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and
social development, and thereafter processing, analysing, and publicly reporting the results
thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corp. publishes the Manila
Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which features newsworthy items of information
including election surveys. Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Comelec
from enforcing §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act).
The Government ‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of
such restraint.’” There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in
every legislation. Nor may it be argued that because of Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, which
gives the COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchise for
the operation of media of communication, no presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure
like §5.4. The ban on media political advertisements, the grant of power to the COMELEC under
Art. IX-C, §4 is limited to ensuring “equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply” as well
as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities for “public
information campaigns and forums among candidates.” The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4)
of the Constitution may be seen to be that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of
exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of
securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such supervision or
regulation may

Issue: Whether public interest in free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections is served
by the regulation of the free enjoyment of
the rights.

Held: The purpose of Art. IX-C, §4 is to “ensure equal opportunity, time, and space and the right
of reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates.” Hence the validity of the ban on media advertising. It is noteworthy that
R.A. No. 9006, §14 has lifted the ban and now allows candidates to advertise their candidacies
in print and broadcast media. Indeed, to sustain the ban on the publication of survey results
would sanction the censorship of all speaking by candidates in an election on the ground that
the usual bombasts and hyperbolic claims made during the campaigns can confuse voters and
thus debase the electoral process. Our inquiry should accordingly focus on these two
considerations as applied to §5.4.
§5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a
direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only
for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved
by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
The COMELEC contends that under Art. IX-A, §7 of the Constitution, its decisions, orders, or
resolutions may be reviewed by this Court only by certiorari. The flaws in this argument is that it
assumes that its Resolution 3636, dated March 1, 2001 is a “decision, order, or resolution”
within the meaning of Art. IX-A, §7. Indeed, counsel for COMELEC maintains that Resolution
3636 was “rendered” by the Commission. However, the Resolution does not purport to
adjudicate the right of any party. It is not an exercise by the COMELEC of its adjudicatory power
to settle the claims of parties. To the contrary, Resolution 3636 clearly states that it is
promulgated to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 9006. Hence, there is no basis for the
COMELEC’s claim that this petition for prohibition is inappropriate. Prohibition has been found
appropriate for testing the constitutionality of various election laws, rules, and regulations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is GRANTED and §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 and §24(h) of
COMELEC Resolution 3636, dated March 1, 2001, are declared unconstitutional. SO
ORDERED.

MITMUGVS COMELEC
G.R. No. 106270-73 Feb 10, 1994

All the law requires is that a winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes,
regardless of the actual number of ballots cast. Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in
the questioned precincts cast their votes, the same must still be respected.
Petitioner SULTAN MOHAMAD L. MITMUG and private respondent DATU GAMBAI
DAGALANGIT were among the candidates for the mayoralty position of Lumba-Bayabao. Voter
turnout for the election was very low. Only 2,330 out of 9,830 registered voters therein cast their
votes. Dagalangitwon. Other candidates filed separate petition for the declaration of failure of
election in some or all precincts in Lumba-Bayabao.

Issue: Whether COMELEC should declare a failure of election on the ground of massive
disenfranchisement of voters due to alleged terrorism and unlawful clustering of precincts.

Held: No, before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of
election; two (2) conditions must concur:
First, no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if
there was voting, the election nevertheless results in failure to elect; and,
Second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election. In the case before us, it is
indubitable that the votes not cast will definitely affect the outcome of the election. But, the first
requisite is missing, i.e., that no actual voting took place, or even if there is, the results thereon
will be tantamount to a failure to elect. Since actual voting and election by the registered voters
in the questioned precincts have taken place, the results thereof cannot be disregarded and
excluded. COMELEC therefore did not commit any abuse of discretion, much less grave, in
denying the petitions outright. There was no basis for the petitions since the facts alleged
therein did not constitute sufficient grounds to warrant the relief sought. For, the language of the
law expressly requires the concurrence of these conditions to justify the calling of a special
election

GUEVARRA V GIMENEZ 6 SCRA 813

FACTS: In 1954, the District Engineer of Sorsogon prepared a program of work and detailed
estimate for the reconstruction of the Sorsogon Central School building. Specifications
consisting of five pages were likewise prepared. The Cost of painting was left out in the detailed
estimate and specifications. The papers were submitted to the Division Engineer
in Lucena, Quezon, who returned them duly approved with an authorized appropriation of
P40,000.00"provided that painting shall be included”. Whereupon, the specification for painting
was accordingly made and appended to the specifications as page six. In August 1954 the
District Engineer advertised an invitation to bid for “furnishing of all materials, labor and plant,
for reconstruction” project. Fernando Guevarra's bid of P37, 500 was declared lowest and the
contract was awarded to him. Eighty five days after completion of the project, Guevarra file with
the Director of Public Works a written claim for the payment of P4, 620.00 representing cost of
painting not covered by the contract. After hearing, Secretary of Public Works and
Communications denied the claim and two MR were also denied. On appeal, the Auditor
General also denied the claim. Guevarra appealed to the Supreme Court pursuant to CA 327.

ISSUE: Whether the contract for the reconstruction of the school building included the painting.

HELD: Yes, testimonies of the employees' should be given more weight than those of the
contractors. These government employees
testified as to what transpired in the performance of their duties. The presumption is that official
duty has been regularly performed.
Note: The main issue of the case has nothing to do with COA.
However, note that, claims and disbursements of public funds should have be coursed to COA.

OROCIO V COA 213 SCRA 109

FACTS: On accident occurred at the Malaya Power Plant of the National Power Corporation
(NPC) where two individuals suffered injury – Ernesto Pumaloy, an NPC employee, and
Domingo Abodizo, a casual employee OPLGS, the janitorial contractor of the NPC. The two
injured personnel were brought to the hospital. NPC initially advanced the amount for
hospitalization expenses for the treatment of Abodizo, and set up this as an account receivable
from OPLGS deducted on a staggered basis from the latter's billing against the NPC until the
same was fully satisfied. Subsequently, OPLGS requested a refund of the total amount
deducted from their billings representing payment of the advances made by the NPC. In the
light of the favourable recommendation of the NPC legal counsel,the amount of hospitalization
expenses was refunded to the contractor OPLGS. The Unit Auditor of the COA disallowed the
refund of the hospitalization expenses of Abodizo contending that under the contract, there is no
employee-employer relation between the NPC and theOPLGS employees.
Hence, NPC is not answerable for such expenses. General Counsel asked for areconsideration
of the said disallowance denied. The COA Regional Director, herein respondent, confirmed the
disallowance. NPC General Counsel submitted a second request for reconsideration and
justifies that his legal opinion is based on Sec 15-A of RA 6395 (NPC Charter) which provides
that “... all legal matters shall be handled by the General Counsel of
the Corporation...”

ISSUE: Whether the disbursement on the basis of the legal opinion of the legal counsel of the
NPC (quasi- judicial function) is within the scope of the auditing power of the COA?

HELD: The Constitution grants the COA the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and
settle all accounts pertaining to the expenditures or uses of funds and property pertaining to the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations. The matter of allowing in audit a disbursement account is not
a ministerial function, but one which necessitates the exercise of discretion.
Besides, the OPLGS, Abodizo’s employer, admitted that the incident was purelyaccidental and
that there is no showing whatsoever in the accident report of any negligence on the part of the
NPC or its employees. The NPC, as a government-owned corporation, is under the COA's audit
power. The COA should not be bound by the opinion of the legal counsel of said agency or
instrumentality which may have been the basis for the questioned disbursements, otherwise it
would become a toothless tiger and its auditing functions would be a meaningless and futile
exercise.

OSMENA V COA 238 SCRA 363

FACTS: Reynaldo de la Cerna was stabbed and was rushed to Cebu City Medical Center but
died in the same day due to severe loss of blood. His parents claimed that Reynaldo would not
have died were it not for the “ineptitude, gross negligence, irresponsibility, stupidity and
incompetence of the medical staff” of the Medical Center. The parents subsequently instituted in
the RTC an action for recovery of damages which the City of Cebu was impleaded as defendant
on the theory that as employer of the alleged negligent doctors, it is vicariously responsible for
the latters' negligence. To put an end to the controversy, a compromise agreement was entered
into by the plaintiffs and Defendant City of Cebu for the payment of the sum of P30, 000. The
agreement was ratified by the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
However, the respondent COA disallowed the financial assistance granted to the spouses de la
Cerna holding that it is not within the power of the Sangguniang to provide financial assistance,
either on general welfare clause or humanitarian grounds, to promote economic and private
interests of certain individual only. Respondent further stressed that not being a party to the
compromise agreement, it was not bound by it and that any money claim arising therefrom was
subjected to its usual audit in the pursuance of the valid exercise and discharge of its
constitutional power, authority and duty. The City of Cebu filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
was denied.

ISSUE: Whether COA committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the city's
appropriation of P30, 000made conformably with the compromise agreement in the civil suit
against the City?
HELD: YES. There can be no question of COA's competence to act on the supplemental budget
for 1989 of the City of Cebu. It appears that respondent COA grievously misconstrued the
undertaking of Cebu City to payP30, 000 to the heirs of the deceased Reynaldo de la Cerna. It
was construed as intended only to promote the private welfare and interest of the de la Cerna
family. The respondent is well aware that the appropriation was a part of the package agreed
upon by all parties in a civil case for the amicable settlement of the controversy. Judicial
compromise is conclusive and binding on all the parties.

SAMBELI V PROVINCE OF ISABELA 210 SCRA 80

FACTS: An agreement was entered into by and between the City of Isabela and ECS Enterprise
for the purchase of 300 units of wheelbarrows, 837 pieces of shovels, and 1 set of radio
communication equipment. Based on the finding of the Price Evaluation Division – COA
Technical Services Office, the Provincial Auditor advised the Provincial Treasurer that an
overpriced in the total amount of P619, 042.20 exists out of the total price of P761, 077.20
offered by ECS Enterprises or an overpayment of P195, 893.10. It recommended that the future
claim of ECS Enterprises be withheld. Provincial Auditor formally forwarded the matter with the
Regional Director who formally endorsed the stand. ECS appealed the decision but was denied
for lack of merit. Petitioner assails the ruling of the COA as not valid. It contends that the
contract of sale has not only been perfected between the Province of Isabela and petitioner but
delivery has been made by it with the corresponding partial payment by the Province of Isabela.
Thus, it is allegedly incumbent upon COA to authorize the payment of the balance because to
act otherwise will constitute an impairment of contract.

ISSUE: Whether the ruling of COA is invalid so far as it will constitute impairment of contracts?

HELD: In the exercises of the regulatory power vested upon it by the Constitution, the
Commission on Audit adheres to the policy that government funds and property should be fully
protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. On the proposition that
improper or wasteful spending of public funds or immoral use of government property, for being
highly irregular or unnecessary, or scandalously excessive or extravagant, offends thesovereign
people's will, it behooves the Commission on Audit to put a stop thereto.. . . No less than the
Constitution has ordained that the COA shall have exclusive authority to define the scope of its
audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures
or use of government funds and properties.

BUSTAMANTE V COA 216 SCRA 134

FACTS: Petitioner is the Regional Legal Counsel of National Power Corporation (NPC). As such
he was issued a government vehicle with plate number SCC 387. Pursuant to NPC policy as
reflected in the Board Resolution No. 81- 95 authorizing the monthly disbursement of
transportation allowance, the petitioner, in addition to the use of government vehicle, claimed
his transportation allowance for the month of January 1989. On May 31, 1990, the petitioner
received an Auditor's Notice to Person Liable dated April 17, 1990 from respondent Regional
Auditor Martha Roxana Caburian disallowing P1,250.00 representing aforesaid transportation
allowance. The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the disallowance of the claim for
transportation allowance which was denied. Petitioner appealed this denial to the COA which
denied do due course. Hence this petition. The petitioner takes exception from the coverage of
said circular contending that such circular did not mention the NPC as one of the
corporations/offices covered by it (COA Circular No. 75-6)
ISSUE:1. Whether such denial to give due course to the appeal of herein petitioner constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction?

HELD: NO, grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as isequivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or in other words where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

SALIGUMBA V COA 117 SCRA 669

FACTS: On the basis of the sworn complaint of EdithaSaligumba, the COA instituted the
administrative case against Leonardo Estella, Auditing Examiner III, in the Auditor's Office of
Misamis Occidental. The charge wasthat the respondent raped EdithaSaligumba on several
occasions. For insufficiency of evidence, the charge was dropped by COA. Saligumba now
wants the Supreme Court of review the COA decision. She insists that the decision of the COA
is contrary to the evidence and the same time raises factual issues.

ISSUE: Whether the action will prosper?

HELD: The petition has to be dismissed for the following reasons:

1. Our power to review COA decisions refers to money matters and not to administrative cases
involving the discipline of its personnel.
2. Even assuming that we have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative matters as
mentioned above, we cannot do so on factual issues; our
power to review is limited to legal issues.

Rebecca Barbo v Commission on Audit (October 10, 2008)

FACTS: Petitioners are officials of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) and
designated members of the Interim Board of Directors of the San Fernando Water District
(SFWD).On December 4, 1995 and February 12 1996, the LWUA Board of Trustees issued
Board Resolution No.313, Series of 1995 and Board Resolution No. 39, Series of 1996
respectively. These Board Resolutions authorized the Board of Directors of SFWD to receive
reimbursable allowances in the form of Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA),
Petitioners were directed to refund the benefits and allowances subject to the disallowance.
Petitioners contend that the COA lacks jurisdiction to declare
whether or not LWUA Board Resolution Nos. 313 and 39 are consistent with Section 13 of PD
No. 198, as amended, on matters pertaining to thecompensation and "other benefits" of the
Directors of the LWD. This is allegedly the function of the courts. The Regional Director affirmed
the disallowance. Petitioners elevated the matter to COA. COA declaredthat the subject
bonuses and allowances received by petitioners constituted additional compensation or
remuneration. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:
1. Whether respondent has the jurisdiction to motuproprio declare LWUA Board Resolution No.
313, S.1995, as amended by Resolution No. 39, S.
1996, to be totally in conflict with Sec. 13 of PD No. 198as amended.
2. Whether Sec 13, PD 198, as amended, prohibiting petitioners' entitlement to RATA, EME,
Bonuses and Other Benefits and Allowances.

HELD: The Court has already settled this issue in a myriad of cases. Particularly, in
Rodolfo S. de Jesus Catbalogan Water District v. COA, the Court upheld the authority and
jurisdiction of the COA to rule on the legality of the disbursement of government funds by a
water district and declared that such power does not conflict with the jurisdiction of the courts,
the DBM, and the LWUA. Citing Section 2, Subdivision D, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution the
Court declared that it is the mandate of the COA to audit all government agencies, including
government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters. Indeed, the Constitution
specifically vests in the COA the authority to determine whether government entities comply
with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular
disbursements of government funds. This independent constitutional body is tasked to be
vigilant and conscientious insafeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the
peoples, property. Anent the second issue, a water district is a government-owned and
controlled corporation with a special charter since it is created pursuant to a special law,
Presidential Decree (PD) 198. It is undeniable that PD 198 expressly prohibits the grant of
RATA, EME, and bonuses to members of the board of Water Districts.

PHILIPPINE AIR LINES V COA 245 SCRA39

FACTS: In this special civil action for certiorariand prohibition, petitioner Philippine Airlines. Inc.
(PAL) seeks to review, annul end reverse Decision No. 1127 of the Commission on Audit (COA)
dated January 5, 1990 and to prohibit, enjoin and prevent COA from enforcing or
in any way implementing Department Order No. 19, s.1974 of the then Department of General
Services as implemented by COA Circular No. 78-84, Memorandum No. 498 and Memorandum
No. 88-565. COA Decision No. 1127 required PAL to purchase its fuel requirements solely from
Petron Corporation (Petron).PAL is a domestic corporation organized and existing under the
Philippine laws, principally engaged in the air transport business, both domestic and
international. At the time of the filing of the petition on February 8, 1990, majority of its shares of
stock was owned by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), a government
corporation. To assure itself of continuous, reliable and cost-efficient supply of fuel, PAL
adopted a system of bidding out its fuel requirements under a multiple supplier set-up whereby
PAL awarded to the lowest bidder sixty per cent (60%) of its fuel requirements and to the
second lowest bidder the remaining forty per cent (40%), provided it matched the price of the
lowest bidder. On August 17, 1989, COA wrote PAL a letter stating “It has come to our attention
that PAL international fuel supply contracts are expiring this August 31, 1989. In this connection,
you are advised to desist from bidding the company's fuel supply contracts, considering that
existing regulations require governmentowned or controlled corporations and other agencies of
government to procure their petroleum product requirements from PETRON Corporation.
”PAL sought reconsideration of the August 17, 1989 advice, reiterating its reasons contained in
an earlier letter, for preferring to bid out and secure its fuel supply from more than one supplier
and for its contention that Department Order No. 19, s. 1974, as circularized by COA Office
Memorandum No. 490, should not apply to PAL. The final appeal for reconsideration however it
was denied. Hence this assailed decision.

ISSUE: Whether the Commission on Audit committed grave abuse of discretion amount to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Department Order No. 19, of the defunct department of
general services applies to PAL?

HELD: [the Court is compelled to dismiss the petition pursuant to the government's privatization
program, PAL's shares of stock were bided out earlier this year, resulting in the acquisition by
PR Holdings, a private corporation, of 67% PAL's outstanding stocks.
PAL having ceased to be a government-owned or controlled corporation, is no longer under the
audit jurisdiction of the COA. Accordingly, the question raised in this petition has clearly become
moot and academic.]Had it not been for this supervening event, PAL would have obtained the
relief sought in the instant petition. For although COA was correct in ruling that Department
Order No. 19 applied to PAL as a government agency at the time, it nonetheless gravely abused
its discretion in not exempting PAL there from. The COA is clothed under Section 2(2), Article
IX-D of the 1987 Constitution with the "exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this
Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods
required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules, and regulationsincluding those
for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties." The authority
granted under this constitutional provision, being broad and comprehensive
enough, enables COA to adopt as its own, simply by reiteration or by reference, without the
necessity of re promulgation, already existing rules and regulations. It may also expand the
coverage thereof to agencies or instrumentalities under its audit jurisdiction.
The reasons given by PAL for seeking exemption from the operation of Department Order No.
19 were, to our mind, meritorious. They far outweigh the policy enunciated in Department Order
No. 19 of givingpreference to government sources in the filling of the needs of the government
for supplies. Thus, PAL's bidding requirement conformed to the accepted policy of the
government to subject every transaction/contract to public bidding in order to protect public
interest by giving the public the best possible advantages thru opencompetition and to avoid or
preclude suspicion of favouritismand anomalies in the execution of public contracts. Its multiple
supplier set-ups were designed precisely to meet every contingency that might disrupt its fuel
supply. It bespoke of foresight, careful planning and sound business judgment on the part of
PAL. As a business operation heavily dependent on fuel supply, for PAL to rely solely on a
single supplier would indeed be impracticable. To compel it to do so would amount to a grave
abuse of discretion on its part as this might well lead to irregular, excessive or unconscionable
expenditures; the very evil sought to be avoided in the creation of the COA.

BAGATSING V COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION 246 SCRA 334

PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
1966 under the corporate name "Esso Philippines, Inc." (ESSO) as a subsidiary of Esso
Eastern, Inc. and Mobil Petroleum Company, Inc. In 1973, at the height of the world-wide oil
crisis brought about by the Middle East conflicts, the Philippine government acquired ESSO
through the PNOC. ESSO became a wholly-owned company of the government under the
corporate name PETRON and as a subsidiary of PNOC. In acquiring PETRON, the government
aimed to have a buffer against the vagaries of oil prices in the international market. It was felt
that PETRON can serve as a counterfoil against price manipulation that might go unchecked if
all the oil companies were foreign-owned.
Indeed, PETRON helped alleviate the energy crises that visited the country from 1973 to 1974,
1979 to 1980, and 1990 to 1991.On December 8, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated Proclamation No. 50 in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution. The Proclamation is entitled "Proclaiming and Launching a Program for the
Expeditious Disposition and Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or the Assets
thereof, and creating the Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust." Implicit
in the Proclamation is the need to raise revenue for the Government and the ideal of leaving
business to the private sector. The Government can then concentrate on the
delivery of basic services and the performance of vital public functions. On March 25, 1993, the
Government Corporate Monitoring and Coordinating Committee (GCMCC) recommended a
100% privatization of PETRON. Petitioners’ claims, among others, that there was a failed
bidding, contend that there were only three bidders. One of them, PETRONAS, submitted a bid
lower than the floor price while a second, failed to pre-qualify. Citing Section V-2-a of
COA Circular No. 89-296 dated January 27, 1989, they argue that where onlyone bidder
qualifies, there is a failure of public auction. Under said COA Circular, there is a failure of
bidding when:
1) There is only one offeror; or
(2) When all the offers are non-complying or unacceptable.
In the case at bench, there were three offerors: SAUDI ARAMCO, PETRONAS and
WESTMONT. While two offerors were disqualified, PETRONAS for submitting a bid below the
floor price and WESTMONT for technical reasons, not all the offerors were disqualified. To
constitute a failed bidding under the COA Circular, all the offerors must be disqualified.
Petitioners urge that in effect there was only one bidder and that it cannot be said that there was
a competition on "an equal footing". But the COA Circular does not speak of accepted bids but
of offerors, without distinction as to whether they were disqualified. The COA itself, the agency
that adopted the rules on bidding procedure to be followed by government offices and
corporations, had upheld the validity and legality of the questioned bidding.
The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight than the
interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer.