PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JAIME “JIMMY” AGUSTIN, ET AL.

circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to authorize a conviction

G.R. NO. 110290 – JANUARY 25, 1995 and which can only tend to establish the ultimate facts of guilt.

FACTS: Order of the Lower Court was reversed.

 There were five separate information filed with the court wherein the  Confession or admission obtained in violation of the constitution shell be
accused were charged with Murder, Frustrated Murder and Attempted inadmissible in evidence.
Murder. The crime resulted to the death of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and  Respondent’s extrajudicial statement is inadmissible in evidence because it
Anna Francisco, and the wounding of Anthony Bayquen, Dominic Bayquen was obtained in violation of Section 12 Article II of the constitution. Since it
and Danny Ancheta. was only evidence which links him to the crime of which he was convicted,
 The information in the murder case charged that the accused acted in he must then be acquitted.
conspiracy and alleged the presence of treachery and evident
premeditation as aggravating circumstances.
 Respondents, pleaded not guilty
 The Trial Court acquitted the accused on the frustrated and attempted
murder charges due to insufficiency of evidence but convicted him as guilty
for two counts of murder.
 The conviction of the Trial court was base on the extrajudicial confession
made by the respondent with the city Fiscal.
 The respondent insist that his extrajudicial confession was taken in
violation of his rights under Section 11 Article III if the constitution. He
argues that the lawyer who assisted him was not of his own choice but was
foisted upon him by the city Fiscal, and that it was only conferred with him
in English and tagalog although he only understood only Ilocano. Also he
mentioned that the lawyer who assisted him was a law partner of the
private prosecutor and had only conferred to him briefly and when he was
interrogated by the fiscal, the later was with his military escorts.
 Respondent asserts that the lawyer who assist the suspect under custodial
investigation should be of the latters choice and not foisted on him by
police investigators or other parties, and that there were doubts on the
voluntariness of his extrajudicial confession and it was inadmissible, and
that his conviction should not stand for there were no other evidence
linking him of the crime charge.

ISSUE: W/N the Extrajudicial confession of the respondent should be considered by

the court at the case at bar as an admissible evidence?

RULING: No

 Confession is an acknowledgement in express terms by the party in a

criminal case of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a
statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue,
and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt.
 Admission is something less than a confession. It tends only to establish
ultimate facts.
 Nothing in the extrajudicial statement of the respondent indicates that he
expressly acknowledge his guilt, he merely admitted some facts or
TUAZON V. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. NO. 113779-80, FEBRUARY 23, 1995)
FACTS:
Madarog, Cipriana Torres‘ maid, was often left alone in Cipriana‘s house. The
incident happened when somebody pretended to buy ice in their residence. When
Madarog was about to hand over the ice to the buyer, one of the robbers jumped in
the house and pointed a gun on Jovina.
Four of the assailants then went inside the house and demanded the keys to the car
and vault. Petitioner Ochoa was their lookout. While ransacking the house, they
were able to find the keys to the car as well as valuable items. They then escaped
using Cipriana‘s car.
Madarog then cried for help and the neighbours, Quintal and Garcia responded and
told Cipriana what happened. Cipriana then reported the robbery to the police.
Madarog and Quintal described the features of the robbers to the NBI.
Subsequently, Ochoa was then arrested and was pointed by Madarog and other
witnesses namely Quintal and Barbietoas one of the perpetrators.
Quintal says that she saw petitioner allegedly among the three (3) men whiling
away their time in front of Alabang's store some time before the crimes were
committed. Quintal is a neighbouring maid. Barbieto likewise declared that she saw
petitioner allegedly with several companions standing-by at Torres' house that
morning of July 19, 1988.
Second, the court resulted to wild guess work when it mentioned that Ochoa could
have covered up the scar to make it look like a mole. This is a grave error. The trial
court cannot convict petitioner on the basis of a deduction that is irrational because
it is not derived from an established fact. The records do not show any fact from
which the trial court can logically deduce the conclusion that petitioner covered up
his scar with black coloring to make it appear as a mole. And thirdly, corroborating
witness Barbieto has serious lapses in her testimony that diluted her credibility. she
and Quintal merely testified they saw petitioner within the vicinity where the crimes
were committed. By itself, this circumstance cannot lead to the conclusion that
petitioner truly committed the crimes at bench. Petitioner, we note, lives in the
same vicinity as the victim.
To use his words, he lives some six (6) posts from the house of Torres. His presence
in the said vicinity is thus not unnatural. The respondent appellate court, however,
dismissed this claim of petitioner as self-serving. Again, the ruling misconstrues the
meaning of self-serving evidence. Self-serving evidence is not to be literally taken
as evidence that serves one's selfish interest. Under our law of evidence, self-
serving evidence is one made by a party out of court at one time; it does not
include a party's testimony as a witness in court. It is excluded on the same ground
as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of opportunity for cross-examination by
the adverse party, and on the consideration that its admission would open the door
to fraud and to fabrication of testimony.

She is a teacher and lives within the block where the crimes were committed. Ochoa
anchored his defence on alibi and insufficiency of identification by the prosecution.
The court however rendered a decision convicting Ochoa. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether the court erred in convicting Ochoa based on thewitnesses?

HELD:
No. evidence to be believed, must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible
witness but the same must be credible in itself. The trial court and respondent
appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of prosecution witness Madaraog that
from her vantage position near the door of the bedroom she clearly saw how
petitioner allegedly participated in the robbery.

After a careful review of the evidence, we find that the identification of petitioner
made by Madaraog and Quintal is open to doubt and cannot serve as a basis for
conviction of petitioner.

Firstly, it must be emphasized that of the four (4) prosecution witnesses, only the
maid Madaraog actually saw petitioner in the act of committing the crimes at bench.
Witnesses Quintal and Barbieto testified they only saw petitioner at the vicinity of
the crimes before they happened. There is, however, a serious doubt whether
Madaraog and Quintal have correctly identified petitioner. At the NBI headquarters,
Madaraog described petitioner as 5'3" tall and with a big mole between his
eyebrows.As it turned out, petitioner has no mole but only a scar between his eyes.
Moreover, he is 5'8 1/2" and not 5'3" tall. There is a big difference between a mole
and a scar. A scar is a mark left in the skin by a new connective tissue that replaces
tissue injured. On the other hand, a mole is a small often pigmented spot or
protuberance on the skin.
MANUEL V. N.C. CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY
G.R. NO. 127553 | NOVEMBER 28, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioners Eddie Manuel, Romeo Bana, Rogelio Pagtama, Jr. and Joel Rea were
employed as drivers at N.C. Construction Supply owned by private respondents
Johnny Lim (Lao Ching Eng) and Anita Sy.
On June 3, 1995, the security guards of respondent company caught Aurelio
Guevara, a company driver, and Jay Calso, his helper ("pahinante"), taking out from
the company premises two rolls of electrical wire worth P500.00 without authority.
Calso was brought to the Pasig Police station for questioning. During the
investigation, Calso named seven other employees who were allegedly involved in a
series of thefts, among them petitioners Manuel, Bana, Pagtama, Jr. and Rea.
Petitioners then received separate notices from company informing them that they
were positively identified by their co-worker, Jay Calso, as perpetrators of the series
of thefts committed at respondent company. They were thus invited to the Pasig
police station for investigation regarding their alleged involvement in the offense.
Atty. Ramon Reyes, private respondents' counsel conducted in their behalf an
investigation regarding petitioners' involvement in the theft. Atty. Reyes
interrogated the petitioners on their alleged participation in the series of thefts
committed at respondent company. Petitioners initially denied the charge. However,
after being positively identified by Jay Calso, petitioners admitted their guilt and
offered to resign. Petitioners Bana and Rea filed separate resignation letters while
petitioners Manuel and Pagtama, Jr. tendered their resignations orally.
Atty. Reyes accepted petitioners' resignation effective June 5, 1995. On July 17,
1995, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents for illegal dismissal.
Petitioners alleged that they were not informed of the charge against them nor were
they given an opportunity to dispute the same. They also alleged that their
admission made at the Pasig police station regarding their involvement in the theft
as well as their resignation were not voluntary but were obtained by private
respondents' lawyer by means of threat and intimidation.
LA ruled in favour of petitioners and found their dismissal to be illegal. He held that
private respondents failed to show a just cause for the termination of petitioners'
services. He declared that petitioners' admission regarding their involvement in the
theft was inadmissible in evidence as it was taken without the assistance of counsel,
in violation of Section 12 of the Bill of Rights.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed and ruled that petitioners were dismissed for a just
cause. It further stated that such admission may be admitted in evidence because
Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to criminal proceedings but not to
administrative proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether the admission may be admitted in evidence
HELD:
NO. We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that such admission was
obtained by means of threat or intimidation as such allegation is couched in general
terms and is unsupported by evidence.
We also reject petitioners' argument that said admission is inadmissible as evidence
against them under Section 12 Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The right to
counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a
criminal case under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage
where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by
the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit
incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon
the start of such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (3)
Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
In the case at bar, the admission was made by petitioners during the course of the
investigation conducted by private respondents' counsel to determine whether there
is sufficient ground to terminate their employment. Petitioners were not under
custodial investigation as they were not yet accused by the police of committing a
crime. The investigation was merely an administrative investigation conducted by
the employer, not a criminal investigation. The questions were propounded by the
employer's lawyer, not by police officers. The fact that the investigation was
conducted at the police station did not necessarily put petitioners under custodial
investigation as the venue of the investigation was merely incidental. Hence, the
admissions made by petitioners during such investigation may be used as evidence
to justify their dismissal.
We likewise agree that employees were dismissed for a just cause. Petitioners'
culpability in the instant case was sufficiently proved by private respondents. Jay
Calso, an employee of respondent company who has personal knowledge about the
series of thefts that has been going on at respondent company, positively identified
petitioners. In addition, petitioners admitted their participation in the theft during an
investigation conducted by private respondents' lawyer.
However, the employer failed to observe due process in terminating the
employment of petitioners. The TWO-NOTICE requirement was not complied with.
PEOPLE V. SOLAYAO admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
GR 119220, 20 SEPTEMBER 1996 commission of the crime charged.

FACTS:
On 9 June 1992, CAFGU members, headed by SPO3 Nino, were conducting an
intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming
around the barangays of Caibiran. In Baragay Onion, they met the 5-man group of
accused Nilo Solayao, who was also wearing a camouflage uniform. His companions,
upon seeing the government agents, fled. SPO3 Niño told Salayao not to run away
and introduced himself as "PC," after which he seized the dried coconut leaves
which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade
firearm locally known as "latong." When he asked Salayao who issued him a license
to carry said firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any
intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no permission to possess the
same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the
custody of the policemen of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and
charged him with illegal possession of firearm.
This Court agrees with the argument of the Solicitor General that "while the
prosecution was able to establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the
police from the possession of appellant, without the latter being able to present any
license or permit to possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that
he was not lawfully authorized to carry such firearm. In other words, such fact does
not relieve the prosecution from its duty to establish the lack of a license or permit
to carry the firearm by clear and convincing evidence, like a certification from the
government agency concerned."[24]
Putting it differently, "when a negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiff's case
depends upon the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact
are equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the
party averring the negative."[25]
In this case, a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the
Philippine National Police that accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of
any kind or caliber would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm.

Salayao did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred that this was
only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes Cenining, when it was still
wrapped in coconut leaves, which they were using the coconut leaves as a torch.
Salayao’s claim was corroborated by one Pedro Balano.

On 15 August 1994, the RTC of Naval Biliran (Branch 16) found Salayao guilty of
illegal possession of firearm under Section 1 of PD 1866 and imposed upon him the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion
perpetua.

Salayao appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the Solayao’s admission that he had no permission to possess the firearm
is sufficient to convict him of illegal possession of firearms

HELD:

Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not prove
beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm that
the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or
permit to possess the same.It does not even establish a prima facie case. It merely
bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not stand as proof of the fact of
absence or lack of a license.

". . . By its very nature, an "admission is the mere acknowledgment of a fact or of

circumstances from which guilt may be inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker,
but not sufficient of itself to establish his guilt." In other words it is a "statement by
defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of
other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to
authorize conviction." From the above principles, this Court can infer that an
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMON CHUA UY
G.R. No. 128046. March 7, 2000
FACTS: Accused-appellant Chua Uy was convicted of drug pushing and possession
in three separate cases filed against him for violation of Sections 15 and 16 of
Article III, R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Accused was arrested during a buy-bust
operation for the illegal sale of 5.8564 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
“shabu,” and possession of 401 grams of the same drug.
After obtaining a tip from an informant regarding the accused illegal activity a team
from the Anti-Narcotics Division planned an entrapment operation where one of the
police officers will act as a poseur-buyer. The sale was consummated and the police
yielded more packets of shabu from the attaché case of the appellant. Appellant was
arrested and brought to the police station. Subsequent search in his house yielded
more packets of the illegal substance. The appellant’s version tells that on that
same evening, he just got home from tending to his garments business and was
carrying a large amount of money, P132,000 to be exact from his collections for the
sales of the day. He said that he saw a white Toyota car outside his residence, the
same being offered to him for sale. He allegedly refused but agreed to test-drive the
said car. It was then that he was allegedly stopped by the police and was ordered to
give up his attaché case and forcible taken to the police station. It was there that he
was accused that said case contained the illegal substance.
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence and testimony of
witnesses despite the non-presentation of the NBI forensics chemist who tested and
confirmed that substance found in the accused possession is indeed shabu. The
accused interposed the defense of frame-up and alleged that the evidence was
merely ‘planted.’
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses and in disregarding the evidence for the defense?
 Trial Court: gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence and testimony
of witnesses despite the non-presentation of the NBI forensics chemist who
tested and confirmed that substance found in the accused possession is
indeed shabu.
 Accused: submitted that without the testimony of NBI Forensic Chemist,
the prosecutions case "falls to pieces."
 Accused: Bravo’s testimony cannot be waived since only he could say
whether the substance allegedly seized is indeed shabu, and also
determine its actual weight upon which depends the penalty to be
imposed. Thus, whatever he said in his report is hearsay and hearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value.
 Accused: insisted that at the pretrial he did not waive the testimony of the
chemist but only "stipulated on the markings of the prosecutions evidence
interposed the defense of frame-up and alleged that the evidence was
merely ‘planted.’
 OSG: argued that Bravo’s finding that the drugs seized from RAMON were
indeed the regulated methampethamine hydrochloride or shabu, is not
hearsay. Bravo did not testify anymore because the parties agreed during
the pre-trial to dispense with his testimony. RAMON never objected to the
order. Neither did he move to reconsider it. The facts thus stipulated and
incorporated in the pre-trial order bound him. Moreover, at the trial RAMON
never raised the question of the non-presentation of the forensic chemist;
what his counsel objected to was with respect to the presentation and
identification of the shabu wherein defense objected to the irregular act of
showing the confiscated drug to SPO1 Nepomuceno without laying the
basis therefore. The defense counsel did not also object to the direct
examination of SPO4 Regalado concerning the whereabouts and
identification of the subject shabu.
HELD: No.
It may at once be noted that neither Chua nor his counsel made
express admission that the contents of the plastic bags to "be marked" as Exhibits
"D," "D-1," "D-2," "D-3," "D-4," and "E" contain methamphetamine hydrochloride.
That Chua agreed to dispense with the testimony of Forensic
Chemist Bravo may not be considered an admission of the findings of Bravo
on the contents of the plastic bag. Strictly, from the tenor of the portion of the
Joint Order, it is clear that Chua and his counsel merely agreed to the marking
of the exhibits, and the clause "thereby dispensing with the testimony of forensic
Chemist Loreto E. Bravo" must be understood in that context.
Even if Chua admitted during the pre-trial the abovementioned Exhibits,
still, the admission cannot be used in evidence against him because Chua and his
counsel did not sign the Joint Order. Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides:
SEC. 40. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or
admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in
evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed and his
counsel.
To bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only by him but
his counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard the
rights of the accused against improvident or unauthorized agreements or
admissions which his counsel may have entered into without his knowledge, as he
may have waived his presence at the pre-trial conference; eliminate any doubt on
the conformity of the accused to the facts agreed upon.
Nevertheless, Chua cannot take advantage of the absence of his and his
counsel’s signatures on the pre-trial order. When the prosecution formally offered in
evidence what it had marked in evidence during the pre-trial, he did not object to
the admission of Bravos Preliminary Report.
Disposition: Appealed decision of RTC was affirned.
PEOPLE V. CEPEDA
G.R. NO. 124832 | FEBRUARY 1, 2000
FACTS:
 Conchita Mahomoc went to the PNP Station to complain that she was raped by
Dante Cepeda (signed her complaint the day after)
 She claims that 2 days prior, in the afternoon, Dante Cepeda went to her house
and asked her to go to his house to massage his wife who was suffering from
stomach ache
 Regina Carba, her neighbor, was in her house and she asked her to go with her
 Cepeda was at his kitchen door when they reached his house
o He told Gina to leave as his wife, who was Muslim, would get angry if
there were many many people in their home
 Cepeda led the complainant to his bedroom
o At the door, Conchita peeped inside and saw a figure covered by a
blanket whom she presumed was Cepeda’s wife
o At that instance, accused immediately placed his left arm around her
shoulders and ponted a knife at the pit of her stomach saying: “Just
keep quiet, do not make any noise, otherwise I will kill you.”
o She elbowed him, stooped and shouted “Help!”
o But, Cepeda carried her to the room
o There, he threatened her with a knife and ordered her to remove her
pany and lie on the bed
o Afraid, she did as ordered and accused also removed his pants and
brief
o He placed himself on top of her, spread her legs with his legs, inserted
his penis inside her vagina and had sexual intercourse with her
o After he was through, she ran towards the kitchen with Cepeda
chasing her
 Regina Carba confirmed this narration of the claimant
o Also said that Conchita had been a masseuse
 A certain Veronica Delmiguez declared that in the afternoon of said date, she
heard a shout for help from the house of Cepeda
o She looked and saw that the windows were closed
 The charge is refuted by the accused claiming that he and Conchita are lovers
o He came to know her as he passes by her house in going to his place
of work
o The complainant has gone to their house a couple of times
o On one time, he courted her by saying: “Sing, I knew that you like me
and I like you.”
 Then they had sexual intercourse (which happened several
times)
o On a certain day, she asked him to leave his wife to elope with her as
she would also leave her husband
 He rejected this proposal because he loved his wife and
Conchita had 3 daughters
 Conchita, according to him, was displeased because he would
not elope with her
o On the day when it was alleged that complainant was raped, he
alleged that Conchita again came to his house and while they were
petting, somebody outside his house said: “You there, what are you
doing?”
 At this Conchita left his house and went home
 In the evening, he was arrested
 The accused’s wife, Dory Cepeda, testified that indeed the complainant has
gone to their house several times
 Trial Court Decision
o Rendered judgment against accused Dante Cepeda
 Insisting on his innocence, accused claims in his defense that he and private
complainant were carrying on an adulterous love affair
o Per him, his request to private complainant that the latter massage his
allegedly ill wife is a pre-arranged lie between the accused and private
complainant in order to mislead Regina Carba
o He asserts that the charge of rape was a contrivance or an
afterthought rather that a truthful plaint of redress of an actual wrong
ISSUE: WON Cepeda guilty of rape
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the appealed decision.
Court provides that Accused-appellant’s allegation of an illicit amorous relationship
is too shopworn to deserve serious consideration and is totally unworthy of
credence. A circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the ‘illicit love affair’
angle appears as a fabrication by accused-appellant. As an affirmative defense, the
alleged ‘love affair’ needs convincing proof. Having admitted to having had carnal
knowledge of the complainant several times, accused-appellant bears the burden of
proving his defense by substantial evidence. The record shows that other than his
self-serving assertions, there is no evidence to support the claim that accused-
appellant and private complainant were in love.
It must be noted that accused-appellant and private complainant are both married
and are living together with their respective spouses. In this case, other than
accused-appellant’s self-serving testimony, no other evidence like love letters,
mementos or pictures were presented to prove his alleged amorous relationship
with private complainant. Neither was there any corroborative testimony supporting
this pretended illicit affair. If accused-appellant were really the paramour of private
complainant, she would not have gone to the extent of bringing this criminal action
which inevitably exposed her to humiliation of recounting in public the violation of
her womanhood. Moreover, she would not have implicated a person, who is
allegedly her lover, as the perpetrator of an abominable crime and thereby lay open
their illicit relationship to public shame and ridicule not to mention the ire of a
cuckolded husband and the withering contempt of her children were it not the truth.
Evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible source but must also be
credible in itself such as one that the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. The Court has taken
judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this country, women by custom
and tradition act with circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is
observed so that their reputation remains untainted. Such circumspection must
have prompted the victim to request Regina Carba to accompany her on the errand
of mercy to accused-appellant’s house. Unfortunately, Carba was shooed away by
accused-appellant on the pretext that his wife who was a Muslim was averse to
having too many people in their house.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that acused-appellant and private complainant
were indeed sweethearts as he claims, this fact alone will not extricate him from his
predicament. The mere assertion of a love relationship’ would not necessarily rule
out the use of force to consummate the crime. It must be stressed that in rape
cases, the gravamen of the offense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her
will or without her consent. Thus, granting arguendo that the accused and the
victim were really lovers this Court has reiterated time and again that “[A]
sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will. Definitely, a man cannot
demand sexual-gratification from a fiancee, worse, employ violence upon her on the
pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust”

As aptly pointed out in People v. Mendoza, a married woman with a husband and
three (3) daughters would not publicly admit that she had been criminally abused
unless that was the truth. Similarly, it defies reason in this case why a mother of
four (4) would concoct a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private
parts and publicly disclose that she has been sexually abused if her motive were
other than to fight for her honor and bring to justice the person who defiled her.

In scrutinizing the credibility of witnesses, case law has established the following
doctrinal guidelines: first, the appellate tribunal will not disturb the findings of the
lower court unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have
affected the result of the case; second, the findings of the trial court pertaining to
the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality since it had
the opportunity to examine their demeanor as they testified on the witness stand;
and third, a witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.

To restate what had been said earlier, it is highly inconceivable visàvis the
prevailing facts of the case for the victim to conjure a tale of ravishment and, in the
process, subject herself and her family to the disgrace, social humiliation and
trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape as well as the stigma of a lifetime of
shame incident thereto. Furthermore, the conduct of the victim immediately
following the alleged assault is of utmost importance so as to establish thetruth or
falsity of the charges of rape. In this case, we find the private complainant’s prompt
report of her defilement to her husband as well as the authorities as convincing
indications that she has been truly wronged. A complainant’s act in immediately
reporting the commission of rape has been considered by this Court as a factor
strengthening her credibility.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ALBERTO LASE, ALIAS "BERT", A. He wanted to pay me but I did not agree.
G.R. NO. 97957 MARCH 5, 1993
Q. You mean that he wanted to settle this case but you refused?
NATURE OF THE CASE: Accused-appellant appeals the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate convicting him of the crime of murder for the death of A. Yes, sir.
Dante Huelva on 18 May 1987 in Barangay Pia-ong, Dimasalang, Masbate.
Q. How much were they offering you for this case to be settled?
FACTS: Two days after the death of Dante Huelva, the Acting Station Manager of
the National Police of Masbate filed a murder case with MTCT. The Judge issued a A. About ten thousand."
warrant of arrest against the accused.
Accused version of the incident:
Accused-appellant was arrested on 20 May 1987 and was released the following day
after posting the required bond. Accused-appellant Alberto Lase testified that on May 18, 1987, at around
5:30 in the afternoon, he was with Miguel Andueza at the house of
Having failed to submit his counter-affidavit for purposes of the preliminary Kagawad Marcelo Tamayo. They waited for Artemio Andueza who was then
investigation, the MCTC considered him as having waived the second stage of the drunk. At around 7:00 in the evening, they were fetched by Mrs. Andueza
preliminary investigation and ordered the records of the case forwarded to the who informed them that something happened in Piaong.
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate.
The charges levelled against him is (sic) not true. In fact, after preliminary
Accused-appellant then sought a reinvestigation of the case; this request was investigation by the fiscal, the case against him was dismissed. The reason
consequently granted. The provincial prosecutor dismissed the investigation for why he was implicated in this case was because Ramon Sayson told the
insufficiency of evidence against the accused. On appeal to the Department of policeman that Dante Huelva's assailant was tall and that victim's (sic)
Justice by the offended party, however, the abovecited resolution was reversed by parents wanted to be paid for the death of the victim."
the then Secretary of Justice.
In his surrebuttal testimony, accused-appellant vaguely denied this offer of
On 9 November 1988, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal filed with the Regional Trial compromise. He, however, insinuated that he could offer a higher amount:
Court (RTC) of Masbate an Information.
Q. Mrs. Huelva testified here that you are offering in this case for P10,000,
Upon being arraigned on 1 September 1989, accused-appellant entered a plea of is that true. (sic).
not guilty.
WITNESS:
Prosecution’s Version of the Incident:
A. I did not say that. If that is true even P50,000 I am going to pay them."
On May 18, 1987, at about 6:30 o'clock in the evening, Domingo (sic)
Pangantihon was on his way home from Piaong, Dimasalang, Masbate, The defense also sought to discredit the testimony of Dominico
when appellant Alberto Lase and Ramon Sayson passed him by. At that Pangantihon because it was months after the incident, and only after
moment, Dante Huelva was about six meters ahead of them and was Ramon Sayson failed to testify, that he decided to come out and testify as
urinating by the roadside. Appellant proceeded directly to the back of an alleged eyewitness to the killing.
Dante Huelva and without any warning stabbed him once with a 7-inch
The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and disregarded the
long Batangas knife in the stomach. Afterwards, appellant ran away. Dante
defense of alibi in view of the positive identification of the accused-appellant and the
Huelva shouted for help. Ramon Sayson came to his rescue and brought
possibility of his being at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
him towards the Poblacion.

ISSUE: Whether the accused offer to settle can be used against him?
In her rebuttal testimony, Godofreda Huelva testified that accused-
appellant offered to settle the case for the sum of P10,000.00.
HELD: Yes. The alleged contradictions or inconsistencies in the testimony of Cpl.
Mitra relate to minor, if not inconsequential, matters. The rule is settled that minor
Q. Now the accused also testified that you filed this case against
inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses; on the contrary, they may
him because you wanted him to be paid about (sic) the death of the
even heighten their credibility.
victim?
Then too, accused-appellant offered to compromise the case for the sum of
P10,000.00. The second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court expressly provides that:

"In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal

negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt."

The accused merely provided alibi as a defense wherein he was identified positively,
there is no motive against him. The testimony of the witness are given respect since
credibility of the witness are left with the trial court to be observed and respected
by this Court except if there are apparent mistake in the interpretation or
appreciation of the testiomony.

The penalty prescribed for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, a penalty which consists of
three (3) periods. 39 There being neither generic aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances present, the imposable penalty is the medium period of the
prescribed penalty - reclusion perpetua. 40 The trial court is therefore correct.
However, conformably with the prevailing jurisprudence, the indemnity should be
increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, except for the above observations with respect to the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime, and the modification of the indemnity which is hereby
increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, the challenged Decision of Branch 45 of
the Regional Trial Court of Masbate in Criminal Case No. 5557 finding the accused-
appellant ALBERTO LASE, alias "BERT" guilty of the crime charged, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES, INC., vs.The COURT OF APPEALS
and ASSOCIATED BANK
G.R. No. 109172 August 19, 1994
FACTS:
 Petitioner applied for and was granted several financial accommodations by
respondent Associated Bank, which were secured by 4 PNs, a REM (three
parcels of land) and a chattel mortgage over petitioner's stock and inventories.
 Unable to settle, petitioner requested, and was granted by respondent bank, a
restructuring of the remaining indebtedness. To secure, 3 new PNs were
executed by Trans-Pacific as follows: (1) Promissory Note No. TL-9077-82 for
the amount of P1,050,000.00 denominated as working capital; (2) Promissory
Note No. TL-9078-82 for the amount of P121,166.00 denominated as
restructured interest; (3) Promissory Note No. TL-9079-82 for the amount of
P42,234.00 denominated similarly as restructured interest.
 The released parcels of land were sold and the proceeds were applied to Trans-
Pacific's restructured loan. Respondent bank returned the duplicate original
copies of the 3 PNs to Trans-Pacific with the word "PAID" stamped thereon.
 Despite the return of the notes, Associated Bank demanded from Trans-Pacific
payment of the amount of P492,100.00 representing accrued interest on PN No.
TL-9077-82. According to the bank, the promissory note PNs were erroneously
released.
 Trans-Pacific initiated an action before the RTC praying that the mortgage over
the two parcels of land be released and its stock inventory be lifted and that its
obligation to the bank be declared as having been fully paid.
 RTC ruled in favor of Trans-Pacific. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the
trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has indeed paid in full its obligation to respondent bank.
HELD: No. Respondent court is of the view that:
Art. 1271 (NCC) The delivery of a private document evidencing a
credit, made voluntarily by the creditor to the debtor, implies the
renunciation of the action which the former had against the latter.
must be construed to mean the original copy of the document evidencing the credit
and not its duplicate.
The above pronouncement of respondent court is manifestly groundless. It is
undisputed that the documents presented were duplicate originals and are therefore
admissible as evidence. Further, it must be noted that respondent bank itself did
not bother to challenge the authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted by
petitioner. A duplicate copy of the original may be admitted in evidence when the
original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice (Sec. 2[b], Rule 130), as in the
case of respondent bank.
This notwithstanding, we find no reversible error committed by the respondent court
in disposing of the appealed decision. The presumption created by the Art. 1271 of
the Civil Code is not conclusive but merely prima facie. If there be no evidence to
the contrary, the presumption stands. Conversely, the presumption loses its legal
efficacy in the face of proof or evidence to the contrary. In the case before us, we
find sufficient justification to overthrow the presumption of payment generated by
the delivery of the documents evidencing petitioners indebtedness.
It may not be amiss to add that Article 1271 of the Civil Code raises a presumption,
not of payment, but of the renunciation of the credit where more convincing
evidence would be required than what normally would be called for to prove
payment. The rationale for allowing the presumption of renunciation in the delivery
of a private instrument is that, unlike that of a public instrument, there could be
just one copy of the evidence of credit. Where several originals are made out of a
private document, the intendment of the law would thus be to refer to the delivery
only of the original original rather than to the original duplicate of which the debtor
would normally retain a copy. It would thus be absurd if Article 1271 were to be
applied differently.
(Relevant to the topic)
That petitioner has not fully liquidated its financial obligation to the Associated Bank
finds more than ample confirmation and self-defeating posture in its letter dated
December 16, 1985, addressed to respondent bank, viz.:
we propose that you permit us to fully liquidate the remaining obligations
to you of P492,100 through a payment in kind (dacion en pago)
arrangement by way of the equipments (sic) and spare parts under chattel
mortgage to you to the extent of their latest appraised values."
Followed by its August 20, 1986 letter which reads:
We have had a series of communications with your bank regarding our
proposal for the eventual settlement of our remaining obligations . . .
we have always been conscious of our obligation to you which had not
been faithfully serviced on account of unfortunate business reverses. ….
But because of interest and other charges, we find ourselves still obligated
to you by P492,100.00. . . .
. . . We continue to find ourselves in a very fluid (sic) situation… Principally
for this reason, we had proposed to settle our remaining obligations to you
by way of dacion en pago of the equipments (sic) and spare parts
mortgaged to you to (the) extent of their applicable loan values.
Petitioner claims that the offer of settlement or compromise is not an admission that
anything is due and is inadmissible against the party making the offer (Sec. 24,
Rule 130, Rules of Court). Unfortunately, this is not an iron-clad rule.
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the
circumstances of the case and the intent of the party making the offer should be
considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but offers to pay the
same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement
is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the
existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably,
then, the admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness. Indeed, an offer of
settlement is an effective admission of a borrower's loan balance. Exactly, this is
what petitioner did in the case before us for review. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. VEVINA BUEMIO
G.R. NOS. 114011-22. DECEMBER 16, 1996
FACTS:
1. Herein accused Buemio was charged with several information on illegal
recruitment and estafa.
a. She is charged with illegal recruitment by several people. Her
modus is that she would tell the victims that she can help them
place jobs in Japan, earning 10,000 yen per day. She would
collect 60k as placement fee, and when the time comes, they
would get a ticket to Korea instead, Buemio claiming that it’s
“easier” to get into Japan if they are in Korea.
b. However, this would turn out to be a hoax as the victims would
never go to Japan and would be forced to use their return tickets.
Buemio would also fail to return the money they paid even though
she promised to do so.
2. Hence, her victims filed a complaint with the NBI, who later found probable
cause.
3. RTC found her GUILTY. SC AFFIRMED.
4. Based on the facts, some of those complainants were never mentioned in
the award of damages.
5. SC found that the reason why RTC did not mention the other complainants
was due to an affidavit of desistance they filed.
ISSUE: W/N the complainant’s affidavits of desistance would be enough to
exonerate the accused of the crime charged
Ruling: NO.
Ratio: Generally, the court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance,
especially when it is executed as an afterthought. Some of the complainants may
have had a change of heart as the offense on their person is concerned, but this will
not affect the public prosecution of the offense itself.
The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by
a natural law belongs to the sovereign power instantly charged by the common will
of the members of society to look after, guard and defend the interest of the
community
The cardinal principle which states that to the State belongs the power to prosecute
and punish crimes should not be overlooked since a criminal offense is an outrage
to the sovereign State.
PEOPLE VS. AMACA
GR NO. 110129 AUGUST 11, 1997
FACTS: Accused Amaca and another known as “Ogang” were charged for shooting
Wilson Vergara. During the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Edgar Pialago, a
resident physician on duty when the victim was brought to the hospital after the
shooting. The doctor testified that he was able to attend to the victim who had
undergone a surgical operation conducted by another doctor. At that time, the
major organs of the victim were no longer functioning normally, while his pancreas
was likewise injured due to the 2 gunshot wounds at his back. The victim was
admitted at 10:45PM but expired the following evening at 10PM. According to Dr.
Pialago, even with immediate medical attention, the victim could not survive the
wounds he sustained.
Another witness testified, PO Mangubat, a police officer , who interviewed the
victim (Wilson Vergara) right after the shooting. Mangubat testified that he saw the
victim already on board a Ford Fiera pick-up ready for transport to the hospital. He
inquired from the victim about the incident, and the former answered he was shot
by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon query why he was shot, the victim said he did not
know the reason why he was shot. Upon being asked as to his condition, the victim
said that he was about to die. He was able to reduce into writing the declaration of
the victim and made latter affixed his thumb mark with the use of his own blood in
the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor.
Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her son-in-law Jose Lapera both
desisted from further prosecution of the case. the former because of the "financial
help" extended by the accused to her family, and the latter because Segundina had
already "consented to the amicable settlement of the case." Despite this, the
Department of Justice found the existence of a prima facie case based on the
victim's ante mortem statement.
The lower court convicted Amaca on the basis of the victim's ante mortemstatement
to Police Officer Mangubat positively identifying accused. The dying declaration was
deemed sufficient to overcome the accused’s defense of alibi. However, due to the
voluntary desistance of the victim's mother from further prosecuting the case, the
court a quo declined to make a finding on the civil liability of the appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not offer of compromise is admissible against the accused
HELD: YES. The "financial help" when viewed as an offer of compromise may be
deemed as additional proof to demonstrate appellant's criminal liability. The victim's
mother desisted from prosecuting the case in consideration of the "financial help"
extended to her family by the accused-appellant.
It is a well-settled rule that that the desistance of the victim's complaining mother
does not bar the People from prosecuting the criminal action, but it does operate as
a waiver of the right to pursue civil indemnity. Hence, in effectively waiving her
right to institute an action to enforce the civil liability of accused-appellant, she also
waived her right to be awarded any civil indemnity arising from the criminal
prosecution. This waiver is bolstered by the fact that neither she nor any private
prosecutor in her behalf appealed the trial court's refusal to include a finding of civil
liability. But the heirs, if there are any may file an independent civil action to
recover damages for the death of Wilson Vergara.
FELICIANO B. GARDINER, AS ACTING PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PAMPANGA privy to the acts of the others; the act of one conspirator is the act of all the
V. HONORABLE PEDRO MAGSALIN, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF coconspirators.
PAMPANGA, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 48185. AUGUST 18, 1941 DISPOSITION: Let the writ of mandate issue as prayed for by the petitioner.

PETITION: Petition for the writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to
admit the testimony of Catalino Fernandez, one of the accused, to prove the alleged
conspiracy between him and his five co-accused.

FACTS: Gardiner, filed an information against the Catalino Fernandez and

respondents Pedro Yalung, Eugenio Villegas, Maximo Manlapid, Magno Icban, and
Rufino Maun, charging them with having conspired together to kill, and that they did
kill, Gaudencio Vivar, with evident premeditation.

Upon arraignment Catalino Fernandez pleaded guilty and his five co-accused, not
guilty. At the trial of the latter, Catalino was called by the fiscal as his first witness,
to testify to the alleged conspiracy. Upon objection of counsel for the defense, the
Respondent Judge Magsalin did not permit the witness Catalino Fernandez to testify
against his co-accused, on the ground that he being a conspirator, his act or
declaration is not admissible against his co-conspirators until the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration, under section 12, rule 123 of
the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Catalino can validly testify to the conspiracy. YES.

RULING:

SEC. 12. Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator

relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration.

It is one of the exceptions to the "res inter alios" rule. It refers to an extrajudicial
declaration of a conspirator — not to his testimony by way of direct evidence.

For illustration, let us suppose that after the formation but before the
consummation of the alleged conspiracy between Catalino Fernandez and his five
co-accused, the former borrowed a bolo from a friend, stating that he and his co-
accused were going to kill Gaudencio Vivar. Such act and declaration of Fernandez
could not be given in evidence against his co-accused unless the conspiracy be
proven first. The testimony of Fernandez’s friend to the effect that Fernandez
borrowed his bolo and told him that he (Fernandez) and his co-accused were going
to kill Gaudencio Vivar would be admissible against Fernandez, but not against his
co-accused unless the conspiracy between them be proven first.

But, without proof of conspiracy, it is not admissible against Fernandez’s co-accused

because the act and declaration of Fernandez are res inter alios as to his co-accused
and, therefore, cannot affect them. But if there is conspiracy, each conspirator is
PEOPLE VS CONDEMENA Extrajudicial confessions, independently made without collusion, which are identical
G.R. NO. L-22426 | MAY 29, 1968 with each other in their essential details and are corroborated by other evidence on
record, are admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to
FACTS: show the probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of the
crime. As this Court has said:
On October 6, 1962, at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon, Barcelisa Lamoste was
sitting by the side of the cradle of her child facing her husband Fermin Lamoste who While confession of a co-conspirator are not ordinarily admissible as
was on the yard of the house. Their eldest daughter, Esmeralda Lamoste, 14 years evidence against another co-conspirator, the fact that they implicate the
old at that time, was at the door of their house together with her younger brothers latter and were made soon after the commission of the crime, is
and sisters. Suddenly, four men arrived at their house. That Simplicio Aniel and circumstantial evidence to show the probability of their co-conspirator
Casamero Patino were armed with guns, and Pelagio Condemena and Ricarido having actually participated therein. (People vs. Lumahang et al., L-6357,
Causing were armed with bolos when these four men arrived in their house on May 7, 1954.)
October 6, 1962, at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon. That upon their arrival,
Simplicio Aniel rushed towards her and pointed the gun, about one foot long, at her The appellant Simplicio Aniel is liable as principal because the evidence does not
face, telling her the following words: "Do not shout. If you shout. I will kill you." show that he had attempted to prevent the assault and the killing of Fermin
Lamoste. (People vs. Garduque, et al., L-10133, July 31, 1958.)
Barcelisa Lamoste, out of fear, did not in fact shout. While Simplicio Aniel was thus
pointing the gun at her, the three other men went directly towards where her
husband was. Two of them, Casamero Patino and Ricarido Causing, each held the
hands of her husband and when resistance from Fermin Lamoste was already
impossible, Pelagio Condemena, with the use of his bolo, stabbed her husband on
the right side of the breast. Upon being hit with the bolo-stab, she heard her
husband said: "Dong, why did you stab me when I did not commit any wrong?"
After Fermin Lamoste was stabbed, Pelagio Condemena, Ricarido Causing and
Casamero Patino dragged her husband towards the kitchen of the house. Pelagio
Condemena stayed outside while Casamero Patino and Ricarido Causing went up the
house through the kitchen and took the amount of P200.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant Simplicio Aniel has been sufficiently identified as one of
the four men who participated in the commission of the crime charged?

HELD: YES.

Well settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is weak where the prosecution
witnesses positively identified the accused. To prosper such a defense, it must be
established by clear and convincing evidence and not merely supported by
witnesses who bear close ties of relationship to the accused. The degree of the
evidence trust be such as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have
been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity, at the
time of its commission.

The positive identification of appellant Simplicio Aniel was further bolstered when
Pelagio Condemena and Casamero Patino, in their sworn statements Exhibits "B"
and "C", named Simplicio Aniel as one of them in the group when they killed Fermin
Lamoste and robbed the house of P200.00 on October 6, 1962, at about 6:00
o'clock in the afternoon.
PEOPLE VS PROVO
GR L-28347 | January 20, 1971
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CFI decision.
FACTS:
 On October 9 1958, MATIGNAS SERRANO,a security guard in a guard post
in “Pisok” (a small plateau) near Clark Airfield, was forcibly taken by FIVE
men shortly after dusk. The security guard was then found dead two days
later in a sugarcane plantation near the post, with a broken jaw and spine.
 On December 2 1958, an Information was filed charging (1) Jose Messina,
(2) Leonard David, (3) PAN PROVO, and two other John Does for the
offense of kidnapping with murder.
 The prosecution presented the testimony of Armstrong, the superintendent
of the police at CLARK AIRFIELD, and some other people, including the
testimony of the victim’s brother Anastacio, and the victim’s wife Benita
(the testimony of the second group were lumped together).
o ARMSTRONG testimony –
 Clark Airfield used to maintain communications with
Camp O’Donnel by radio and underground cables. To
protect the installation of the cables, the US engaged the
PH Scouts and a non-Christian Tribe (the BALUGA, of
which the victim Serrano is a member).
 Early 1958, the comms were experiencing technical
difficulty, due to the pilferage of cables.
 He saw Pan Provo conversing with Jose Messina on
several occasions.
 Pan Provo is another BALUGA chief in the region, and
that Provo asked Armstrong to engage the services of
Matignas Serrano as sentry.
o Second group’s testimonies –
 Anastacio claimed that Jose Mesina once went to him
with 3 other people on the morning of that fateful day,
and after having lunch, asked Anastacio to let him get
some “pipes” (referring to the cables) near the area
guarded by his brother.
 Anastacio refused, to which Jose Messina remarked that
“if you don’t know how to talk with people, you will not
live long”. Mesina left at 3PM
 Benita claimed that she gave a flashlight to her husband
just after sunset. Afterwards, Jose Mesina arrived with
four other masked men, and asked for a light for his
cigarette from Matignas, and then grabbed hold of
Matignas’ rifle and dragged him down the hill.
 Benita screamed for help, and her nephew called
Anastacio, who reported the kidnapping to the Air Base.
The next morning a search team looked for clues.
 The story of the search team’s efforts were relayed by
LAXAMANA. Apparently, Jose Mesina joined the search
team. At a certain juncture, he implored the team to go a
left (despite Laxamana wanting to turn right to follow a
small set of footprints), at which point the team found
nothing. Upon their return, Benita for the first time
claimed Jose Mesina is the one who kidnapped
Matignas.
 The defense presented these testimonies:
o Leonard David claimed his brother Federico, was the one who
urged him to come with Jose Mesina. His brother was the one who
apparently held Matignas on the shoulder before wresting the
Carbine rifle from the victim. Matignas was then led to the bottom
of the hill and hit with fist blows and the butt of the rifle until he
was unconscious. This was subscribed and sworn before the
Justice of Peace in Pampanga.
o Emilio Provo, the son of the accused PAN PROVO, in his statement
before the Fiscal of Tarlac at the preliminary investigation, claimed
that Jose Mesina frequently met with his father Pan Provo.
Apparently In 1958, Pan Provo was the supervisor in the digging
of cables in Clark Airfield, along with Jose Mesina and Emilio, and
that they were selling the stolen cables to a Chinaman in
Pampanga.
 ON the fateful day, just after twilight, Emilio and Pan
Provo went to the house of Jose Mesina, whom the latter
invited to go to “Pisok”, the area guarded by Matignas;
that on the way thereto, Federico David, alias "Pedring,"
and Leonardo David, alias "Benaring," joined them; that
before reaching the place, Emilio's companion said that
they would get Matignas Serrano, the guard in that place,
"because of the tubes" they were taking "and that one
that was enclosed in a tank which were being guarded by
Matignas Serrano. Then the kidnapping and killing of
Matignas was again narrated. Afterwards, Emilio and Pan
Provo fled to the mountains after the body of Matignas
was found.
 Emilio Provo DENIED however that this testimony in the
lower court, and merely claimed he gave it upon the
instructions of an Angel Manipon who assured him he
would free after giving the same.
o Jose Messina claimed he did go to Anastacio’s house on the fateful
day, but claimed he attended religious service with the INC which
lasted until 8PM that day. At about 8:30 p.m. he and Ruben Villas
attended a barrio meeting called by barrio lieutenant Remigio
Ocampo; that, upon adjournment of the meeting, around 10:00
p.m., they returned to the house of Mesina and then went to bed.
 RTC acquitted Leonard David and Pan Provo based on reasonable doubt,
but CONVICTED Jose Mesina.
 Jose Mesina filed the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mesina’s case can be harmed by the admissions/confessions
of David and Provo.
HELD: YES. The circumstantial evidence of the David and Provo admissions are
admissible against Mesina.
RULING:
It should be noted that, although extrajudicial confessions are in general admissible
only against those who made the same, this rule is subject to an exception.
Extra-judicial confessions independently made without collusion, which are identical
with each other in their essential detailsand are corroborated by other evidence on
record, are admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to
show the probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of the
crime.

The applicability of the foregoing exception — which has been repeatedly

acknowledged and applied by this Court — to the case at bar becomes apparent
when we bear in mind that the statements contained in the statements of Leonardo
David and Emilio Provo were made — obviously without collusion and
independently of each other — for the purpose of establishing the guilt of
Federico David and Pan Provo, respectively, and that they corroborate one
anotherand the testimony of Benita Mayuyu, Anastacio Serrano and Kudiaru
Laxamana with respect to the fact that Matignas Serrano was dragged away from
his guard post in the evening of October 9, 1958, by Mesina and several other
persons — apparently for not allowing them to steal and take away electric cables
from Clark Field Air Base — and then killed. Hence, said Exhibits were properly
admitted as circumstantial evidence tending to show the probability of the
participation of appellant in the commission of said offense, as testified to by said
witnesses for the prosecution.

Furthermore, this is coupled with the weak defense of the appellant, which cannot
stand as against the evidence stacked against him by the prosecution, namely the
positive identification by the wife, and corroborated by the extrajudicial
admissions/confessions.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: the Decision of the Court of FIRST INSTANCE is

AFFIRMED, with modification on the indemnity.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARCADIO PUESCA alias "Big Boy",
WALTER, APA, FILOMENO MACALINAO, JR. alias "White", MAGNO
MONTANO alias "Edol", JOSE GUSTILO alias "Peping" and RICARDO
DAIRO alias 'Carding"

G.R. No. L-27909 December 5, 1978

Nature of the case: Automatic review of the judgment

FACTS:

Puesca, Apa, Gustilo, Macalinao, Dairo, Montano (6 in all)were charged

with robbery in band with homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty. Sgt. Lucio
Bano, testified as a prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made
to him by the accused Arcadio Puesca. He said that Puesca, aside from admitting his
participation in the commission of the offense charged, revealed that other persons
conspired with him to commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and
everyone of them. Following up to the testimony, the prosecuting officer asked the
witness to mention in court the names of Puesca's alleged co-conspirators. Counsel
for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground that
whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were
concerned. The judge resolved the objection directing the witness to answer the
question but without mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had
interposed the objection. In other words, the witness was allowed to answer the
question and name his co-conspirators except those who had raised the
objection. The prosecution filed a certiorari to allow the witness to answer in full.

ISSUES:

WON Sgt. Bano should be allowed to mention all the names of the alleged
conspirators

RULING:

Yes, he should be allowed.

RATIO:

- Hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the
testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended
to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay
evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is
merely to establish the fact that the statement was made.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARCELINO CEDON
G.R. NO. 101117 – JUNE 15, 1994
Facts:
 The Respondent Accused, who being a member of a terrorist group and
armed with assorted firearms, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another with other individuals who are still
at large, did and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and illegally kidnap
and carry away the person of Felimon Gerona from his house to an
unknown island and kept the same under heavy guard to better secure the
consent of the victim through fear the ransom in the amount of 5,000
pesos.
 Felimon while having lunch in his house, several armed men ordered him
to go down his house. His hands were bound and he recognize some of
them as Teofilo Bulan and Ruben Bolito who belong to a gang of robbers
called “Sabarra”. He also noticed appellant standing on the concrete
pavement near the beach.
 Felimon was being accussed by the perpetrators on being an intelligent
agent which he denied, and he was taken eventually to Aripuyok island
known as the killing fields.
 Felimon agreed to give 5,000 pesos and he was taken back to his
Barangay. When they arrived on the said barangay he again saw the
respondent sitting on the concrete fence near the beach.
 Felimon withdrew the ransom money and had his wife sent it to Bulan.
 Felimon did not immediately report the incident to the police authorities
but informed the same only after the town people had organized the “alsa
masa” as a counter insurgency movement. He also enlisted as a CAFGU as
a means to retaliate against the extortionist.
 Respondent was later on arrested by Felimon. Respondent claimed his
innocence and that he was force by Bulan to come with them for fear of his
life.
 Respondent assert that he was only apprehended by Felimon for the latter
wanted him to testify against Bulan, from which he refused.
 RTC find the respondent guilty of Kidnapping for Ransom
Issue: W/N Respondent should be held liable as conspirator for the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom in relation to the testimony for Felimon Gerona and Pedro
Comeque?
Ruling: No
 Testimony of Felimon cas doubt as to whether respondent was really an
active participant on the said crime.
 Comeque’s testimony had an admission that his testimony that respondent
was a member of the group of Bulan was based on heasay.
 Another witness (Rudito Basilan) supports the respondent’s protestation of
innocence. According to him he was also forced to go to the said barangay
by Bulan to gather bamboo.
 If respondent’s culpability was based on the sole fact that he was seen
near the house of Felimon when the latter was kidnapped, then Basilan
should have been indicted also for he was also in the crime scene.
 Conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The court does not
find respondent to be a conspirator for his was a passive presence in the
scene of the crime. Mere presence of the accused at the scene of the crime
does not imply conspiracy.
 The prosecution failed to prove any overt act showing that respondent
joined the gang of Bulan to perpetrate the crime. Mere knowledge,
acquiescence to or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one
as a party to a conspiracy, absent an active participation in the commission
of the crime.
SC reverse decision of the lower court and Acquit the accused.
People v. Camiling (424 SCRA 698)
FACTS:
Masterline Grocery was robbed by men with firearms. Upon escaping they killed a
cop and wounding the owner of a nearby bread store. When an investigation was
being conducted after the apprehension of theaccused robbers, one NatyPanimbaan
testified that she was present when all the other robbers were planning the heist.
Camiling, among the robbers, denied liability and impugned the credibility of Naty,
as she was allegedly a polluted source, hence making her testimony inadmissible.
ISSUE:
Whether Naty‘s testimony is admissible?
RULING:
The rules on Admission by Conspirator prescribe that any declaration made by a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy is admissible against him alone but not
against his co-conspirators unless the conspiracy is first shown by other
independent evidence. However, such rule only applies to extrajudicial declarations
or admissions and not to testimony given on the witness stand where the party
adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Naty made
the testimony in open court sooo....alamna.
US V. BAY
G.R. NO. L-9341 | AUGUST 14, 1914
FACTS: The information in this case charges the appellant, Servando Bay, with the
crime of rape committed against Florentina Alcones.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is substantially as follows: That
the complaining witness and the accused are neighbors: that about 7 o'clock in the
evening of June 7, when turning from her rice field she was joined by the accused,
and that a short distance from the mouth of Subaan River he caught hold of her,
picked her up, and carried her to the edge of some thickets, where he threw her on
the ground and attempted to have carnal intercourse with her; that angered by her
resistance he drew his dagger, and forced her under threat of her life to accede to
his desires; that a party who were passing near the place where the crime was
committed heard her cries, and put into shore; that one of the parties stepped
ashore, and seeing the accused get up from the place where the woman claims the
crime was committed, asked "What's this?"; that the accused made no explanation
of his conduct or his presence there, and left the place forthwith; that immediately
thereafter the woman, accompanied by some of the party from the boat, went to
the councilman of the barrio and made the complaint; that the accused, having
been brought before the councilman and asked had he committed the crime of
which he was charged, admitted that he had; that thereafter the accused was sent
to the justice of the peace, who held him for trial.
Counsel for appellant lays great stress upon certain apparent contradictions and
inconsistencies in the testimony of some of the witnesses for the prosecution, and
vigorously contends that the trial court erred in accepting as true the testimony of
the complaining witness and of the witnesses called by the prosecution to
corroborate her. He emphasizes what he calls the inherent improbability of the story
told by the offended woman, and points to the facts that she appears to be much
more than twice the age of the accused, and anything but attractive in her personal
appearance . His contention is that the charge of rape is a pure fabrication, and that
it was brought by the woman for the sole purpose of wreaking her vengeance and
spite upon the accused, with whom she had a quarrel over the trespass of one of his
carabaos on her land.
the arrival of those aboard was a fortunate coincidence which she could not well
have anticipated, had she planned the filing of false charges against the accused.
There can be no question also that she went immediately to the councilman of her
barrio to make complaint against the accused, accompanied by some of the
passengers on the boat. And there can be no question also that as a result, these
proceedings were instituted forthwith in the court of the justice of the peace.
There is a direct conflict in the testimony as to whether the accused, when the
complaint was made to the councilman of the barrio, did or did not admit his guilt,
and this evidence is so contradictory that it would be difficult if not possible to make
an express finding on this point. But whatever be the truth as to these alleged
admissions of his guilt, the evidence leaves no room for doubt that neither at the
moment when the party in the boat came upon him in company with his victim nor
when he appeared before the councilman upon her complaint did he claim, as he
does now, that her charge that he had assaulted her was a pure fabrication,
invented for the purpose of wreaking vengeance upon him.
Under such circumstances, we are convinced that an innocent man would instantly
and indignantly repudiate such a charge, and attempt there and then to establish
his innocence, explaining how he came to be there present with the woman, and the
conditions under which she had made the false charge.
The witnesses called both for the prosecution and the defense go into considerable
detail as to all that occurred at the time when the party on board the boat
responded to the calls of the woman and immediately thereafter, and yet there is
not the slightest indication in the evidence that there was on the part of the accused
any such indignant denials and protests as would be expected from an innocent
man suddenly confronted with such a charge under such circumstances. Indeed his
conduct at that time was, to our minds, wholly at variance with that which might
fairly be expected from him, granting the truth of his testimony and that of the
other witnesses for the defense.

ISSUE: Whether the conduct of the accused on the day he was brought to the
councilman showed his attempt to establish his innocence

HELD: NO. It is true that there are some apparent contradictions and
inconsistencies in the testimony of some of the ignorant witnesses called for the
prosecution, and that it is somewhat difficult to understand how the accused, a
young married man, could have been so lost to all sense of right and decency as to
assault a woman so much older than himself, a neighbor, and an old friend of his
family. But her evidence, supported by that of other witnesses for the prosecution,
is so convincing and conclusive that we are forced to believe that he did it in fact
commit the atrocious crime with which he is charged.

It conclusively appears that the offended woman sought assistance and made
formal and official complaint immediately after the commission of crime under such
conditions as practically to preclude the possibility of a conspiracy between herself
and the other prosecuting witnesses to press a false charge against the accused.

There can be no possible doubt that the party passing in a boat the deserted place
where the crime was committed was attracted by her cries and complaints, and that
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MANUEL NAVOA Y MARTINEZ AND
BERNARDO LIM Y RAMIREZ ALIAS "JACK ROBERTSON," ALIAS "LIM MING
TAK," ALIAS "CHRISTOPHER KELLY,"
G.R. NO. L-59551 AUGUST 19, 1986
FACTS:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Manila, Sixth Judicial District, Branch XXX convicting defendants-appellants Manuel
Navoa and Bernardo Lim of the crime of Arson.
Allegedly, Navoa and his companions, set fire to and burn the MANILA CINEMA
BUILDING with the use of gasoline, which resulted to substantial loss of property
and the death of fourteen (14) victims
Navoa's confession was far from being the product of his free will. Assuming there
was no torture, there was, at the very least, improper pressure and intimidation.
The written waiver of appellant Navoa purportedly waiving his constitutional rights
to silence and to counsel should have been excluded by the trial court.ch In the
case at bar, there was no such voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Exhibit
"O" is so pat and aptly worded, so contrived as to be exactly suited to meet legal
objections that it could have been prepared only by a veteran police investigator
and not by an ordinary layman like appellant Manuel Navoa.
When Navoa waived his right to counsel and executed the extra-judicial confession,
he was alone in the company of the police interrogators, deprived of outside
support. The Supreme Court is far from satisfied that the waiver of counsel and the
subsequent confession were indeed products of Navoa's free will.

Further, the alibi of Navoa is well-supported by the collective testimonies of his

Defendant-appellant Bernardo Lim informed the latter that it was Manuel Navoa who
teachers who categorically testified that on those dates, he was present in their
was responsible for the fire that destroyed Manila Cinema 1 and 2.
classes based on their recollections and evidenced by their class records.

Relying solely on the credibility of Bernardo Lim and without first securing a warrant
aIn this particular case, the police should have been more aware of the protections
of arrest, Corporals Palmon and Harrison Tolosa arrested appellant Manuel Navoa.
afforded by Article IV, Section 20 of the Bill of Rights to persons undergoing
At the police headquarters, appellant Navoa allegedly executed statements waiving
custodial interrogation. In the belief that the extrajudicial confession and the re-
his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel and giving an extra-judicial
enactment, taken without the required constitutional safeguards, were enough to
confession
sustain conviction, determined efforts to apprehend the six other arsonists or to get
admissible and more convincing evidence were no longer taken.
Appellant Bernardo Lim likewise executed a waiver of his constitutional rights to
silence and to counsel and also gave an extra-judicial confession
Section 20 of the Bill of Rights which provides:

Solely on the basis of the extra-judicial confessions of both defendants-appellants

the trial court rendered the appealed judgment of conviction.
Thus, both defendants appealed to the Supreme Court
ISSUE:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

Whether the defendants’ extra judicial confession is sufficient to sustain a conviction WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellants Manuel Navoa and Bernardo Lim are ACQUITTED of the crime charged on
grounds of reasonable doubt.
RULING:

No. The main thrust of the defendants-appellants' arguments on appeal is that they
were not afforded the opportunity to avail of their rights under Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution; that there was no intelligent waiver of their rights, and as
such, their extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible against them.

The records show that the extra-judicial confessions of the accused formed
the only basis for the judgment of conviction. The confessions were taken
without the assistance of any counsel for the accused. The confessions were
preceded by waivers of the right to counsel. During the trial, accused Navoa
repudiated the waivers and the confessions. He testified that the police investigators
employed force and intimidation, including outright torture to secure his confession.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERNESTO LUVENDINO y COTAS
G.R. No. 69971. July 3, 1992.
Facts:
 Lifeless body of Rowena Capcap was found in a grassy vacant lot within the
Deva Village Subdivision, Autopsy report stated that the victim’s death was
due to asphyxia by manual strangulation.
 An information has been filed in the trial court charging Luvendino , Borca
and de Guzman with the crime of rape with murder. Warrants of arrest
were issued against all the accused. Luvendino, who was apprehended,
pleaded not guilty at the arraignment where his counsel, Atty. Sardillo,
assisted him.
 TC - found Luvendino guilty and sentenced him to death.
 Luvendino contends that TC committed grievous error in admitting and
giving credence to the evidence of re-enactment and admission of guilt,
both of which were uncounseled.
Issue: Did the court err in holding that his "demonstration" or re-enactment of the
crime as well as his confession and subsequent written admission of guilt as
admissible for having been made without the benefit of counsel.
Held: For the re-enactment of the crime – Yes.
 Appellant Luvendino: contends that the "demonstration" or re-
enactment and his extrajudicial confession were effected and secured in
the absence of a valid waiver by him of his constitutional rights and that
the re-enactment and the confession should be held inadmissible in
evidence because they had been involuntarily made.
 TC: records indicate that immediately after his apprehension, the police
officers brought him to the Deva Subdivision where he demonstrated how
the victim was boxed, dragged and taken to the vacant lot, where she was
raped and throttled to death. According to the evidence for the
prosecution, Luvendino in the re-enactment, had not only admitted his
presence in the commission of the crime but had likewise admitted he was
with Borca in abusing Rowena. Significantly, the evidence for the
prosecution in this regard was not rebutted nor denied by the accused.
 TC: found that the accused was informed of his constitutional rights
"before he was investigated by Sgt. Galang in the police
headquarters" and cited the "Salaysay" 11 of appellant Luvendino.
For the extrajudicial confession of Luvendino – No.
 Appellant Luvendino: claimed first of all that the extrajudicial confession
had been extracted from him by means of a beating administered by many
policemen at the police station and that a chain had been wrapped around
his neck.
 TC: disbelieved and rejected Luvendino’s claim that he had been beaten
into making his confession. In an extra-judicial confession, the
confessant carries the burden of convincing the court that his
admissions are involuntary and untrue. (People v. Manabo, 18
SCRA 30). This Luvendino had failed to do.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court declined to uphold the admissibility of evidence relating
to the re-enactment. The decision of the trial court itself, however, states that the
re-enactment took place before Luvendino was brought to the police station. Thus,
it is not clear from the record that before the re-enactment was staged by
Luvendino, he had been informed of his constitutional rights including, specifically,
his right to counsel and that he had waived such right before proceeding with the
demonstration.
The presumption of the law is one of spontaneity and voluntariness of an
extrajudicial confession of an accused in a criminal case, for no person of normal
mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to being the perpetrator of a crime,
especially a heinous crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.
Court has ruled that where the confessant failed to present any evidence of
compulsion or duress or violence on his person for purposes of extracting a
confession; where he failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths,
such as the Fiscal in this case; where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where he
did not have himself examined by a reputable physician to buttress his claim of
maltreatment; and where the assailed confession is replete with details which could
not have been known to the police officers if they merely concocted the confession,
since the statements were inculpatory in character, the extrajudicial confession
may be admitted, the above circumstances being considered as factors
indicating voluntariness.
Disposition: The decision of TC was modified changing the enforceable penalty
from death to reclusion perpetua; Luvendino was required to pay heirs of Rowena
Capcap actual and moral damages.
PEOPLE V. AGUSTIN (PEOPLE V. JAIME “JIMMY AGUSTIN, WILFREDO
“SONNY” QUIANO, MANUEL “JUN” ABENOJA, JR., AND FREDDIE “BOY”
CARTEL, ACCUSED. JAIME “JIMMY” AGUSTIN, ACCUSED-APPELLAN)
G.R. No. 110290 | Janaury 25, 1995
Nature:
Appeal from a decision of the RTC
FACTS:
 Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son, Anthony; Anthony’s
girlfriend, Anna Theresa Francisco; his daughter, Dominic; and Danny Ancheta,
a family friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the doctor’s residence
from his clinic
o Anthony as driving the car
 While they were cruising, near a Baptist Church, a man came out from the right
side of a car parked about 2 meters to the church
o The man approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its
window, and fired at the passengers
o The Brasilia swerved and hit a fence
o The gunman immediately returned to the parked car which then sped
away
 All those in the car were hit and Dr. Bayqueen and Anna Theresa died on the
spot
o Dominic was able to get out of the Brasilia to run to the Alabanza store
where she telephoned her mother and told her what had happened
o Later, she and her mother brought her father and Anthony to the
hospital
o Danny Ancheta went home and was then brought to the Notre Dame
Hospital for treatment
o Anna Theresa Francisco was brought to the funeral parlor
 The police later arrived at the crime scene and conducted an investigation
 Later, accused Wilfredo “Sonny” Quiano, an alleged former military agent or
asset who had been picked up by the police authorities, confessed during the
investigation that he was the triggerman in the fatal shooting of Dr. Bayqueen
and Anna Theresa Francisco
o He implicated Manuel “Jun” Abenoja, Jr., allegedely a fellow military
agent and the “bagman” who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayqueen for a
fee, Freddie “Boy” Cargel, who provided the armalite, and certain
“Jimmy.”
 Subsequently, “Jimmy,” who turned out to be appellant Jaime Agustin, was
picked up by military personnel and was investigated in connection with the
crime
 The defense presented the appellant and his wife
o The appellant impugned the validity of his extrajudicial statement
o He alleged that on the day of the crime, he went to buy some fertilizer
and upon his return he was met by 2 armed men who took him to
their car where 2 other companions, armed with armalites, were
waiting
o Inside the car, he was asked if he knew Boy and Jun, and he answered
that he did not
o He was also made to kneel at gunpoint in order to force him to admit
his involvement in the shooting, which he finally did out of fear
o While giving his statement at the fiscal’s office, the armed men stayed
with him and their presence deterred him from telling the investigating
fiscal that he was being threatened
o He further declared that although he was given a lawyer to assist him,
he, nevertheless, asked for his uncle who is a lawyer, Atty. Oliver
Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom, assisting counsel, interviewed him for
only 2 minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he
understands
o He eventually asserted that he was promised by his captors that he
would be discharged as a state witness if he cooperates, but the plan
did not push through because his co-accused, Quiano, escaped
 Elizabeth Agustin corroborated her husband’s story
 The Trial Court admitted the appellant’s extrajudicial statement and gave scant
consideration to his claim of force, intimidation, and other irregularities
 The trial court then concluded that there was conspiracy and the accused was a
direct participant in the crime, and that while he tried to minimize his
culpability, his extrajudicial confesion shows that he was in on the plan, and
even expected to be paid, to be rewarded monetarily; and that he decided to
give a statement only when he was not given the money
o Since the proof of corpus delicti required in Section 3, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court was established by the prosecution’s evidence, it found
his conviction for murder inevitable
 On appeal, the appellant insists that his extrajudicial confession was taken in
violation of his rights under Section 11, Article III of the Constitution
o He argues that the lawyer who assisted him, Atty. Reynaldo, was not
of his own choice but was foisted upon him by the City Fiscal
o Worse, the said lawyer is a law partner of the private prosecutor and
conferred with him in English and Tagalog although he understood only
Ilocano.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements are admissible as
evidence to warrant conviction
HELD: No. The Supreme Court reversed the challenged decision of the RTC and
acquitted Jaime “Jimmy” Agustin.
Contrary to the pronouncement of the trial court and the characterization given by
the appellant himself, the assailed extrajudicial statement is not an extrajudicial
confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. We take this opportunity to once
more distinguish one from the other. Sections 26 and 33, Rule 30 of the Rules of
Court clearly show such a distinction. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment
of guilt. Admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the
accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or
of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged
Wharton defines a confession as follows: “A confession is an acknowledgment in
express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while
an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to
the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In
other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but an
acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to
authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.”
It was examined the assailed extrajudicial statement of the appellant, and we are
satisfied that nothing therein indicates that he expressly acknowledged his guilt; he
merely admitted some facts or circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to
authorize a conviction and which can only tend to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of admissibility in evidence under
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant because
Paragraph thereof expressly refers to both confession and admission. Thus: “(3)
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.”
Thefirst two paragraphs of Section 12, Article III of the present Constitution have
broadened the aforesaid Section 20 in these respects: (1) the right to counsel
means not just any counsel, but a “competent and independent counsel, preferably
of his own choice”; (2) the right to remain silent and to counsel can only be waived
in writing and in the presence of counsel; and (3) the rule on inadmissibility
expressly includes admissions, not just confessions.
Theright to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates
“the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.” It is not enough for
the investigator to merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution or Section 12, Article III of the
present Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of such provision
inpractical terms, e.g., what the person under investigation may or may not do? and
in a language the subject fairly understands. The right to be informed carries with it
a correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, and contemplates
effective communication which results in the subject understanding what is
conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of
explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence,
and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing the
investigation.
the City Fiscal for the purpose of giving free legal aid to the appellant, These
possibilities are not remote but whether it was one or the other, it is clear to us that
Atty. Cajucom was in fact foisted upon the appellant, for as shown in the
abovequoted portion of Exhibit “C,” the City Fiscal immediately suggested the
availability of Atty. Cajucom without first distinctly asking the appellant if he had a
counsel of his own choice and if he had one, whether he could hire such counsel;
and if he could not, whether he would agree to have one provided for him; or
whether he would simply exercise his right to remain silent and to counsel. In short,
after the appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City Fiscal,
through suggestive language, immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was
ready to assist him. While it is true that in custodial investigations the party to be
investigated has the final choice of counsel and may reject the counsel chosen for
him by the investigator and ask for another one, the circumstances obtaining in the
custodial interrogation of the appellant left him no freedom to intelligently and
freely do so. For as earlier stated, he was not even asked if he had a lawyer of his
own choice and whether he could afford to hire such lawyer; on the other hand, the
CityFiscal clearly suggested the availability of Atty. Cajucom.
Then too, present at that time were Capt. Antonio Ayat and Sgt. Roberto Rambac,
military officers of RUCI, who brought him to the City Fiscal’s Office for investigation
in the afternoon of the day when he was unlawfully arrested in Sto. Tomas,
Pangasinan. Along Kennon Road, on the way to Baguio City, he was coerced and
threatened with death if he would not admit knowing “Jun” and “Sonny” and his
participation in the crime. This testimony was unrebutted by the prosecution. The
presence of the military officers and the continuing fear that if he did not cooperate,
something would happen to him, was like a Damocles sword which vitiated his free
will.

In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed
of such right; he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should
be told that he can ask for counsel if he so desires or that one will be provided him
at his request. If he decides not to retain counsel of his choice or avail of one to be
provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver,
to be valid and effective, must be made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel
must be a lawyer.

Thewaiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

Consequently, even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the
absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.

Theextrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in twenty-two pages of yellow

pad, does, indeed, appear to be signed by him and Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. What
we find in these yellow pads are stenographic notes. These were transcribed by the
stenographer who took down the stenographic notes, but for reasons not explained
in the records, the transcript of the notes (Exhibit “C”),

Secondly, Atty. Cajucom can hardly be said to have been voluntarily and
intelligently “accepted” by the appellant as his counsel to assist him in the
investigation. Atty. Cajucom’s presence in the Office of the City Fiscal at the time
the appellant was brought there for investigation is unclear to us. At least two
possibilities may explain it: it was a mere coincidence in the sense that he
happened to be attending to some professional matter, or he was earlier called by
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SATURNINA SALAZAR y PALANAS
G.R. No. 98060. January 27, 1997
NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal seeks the reversal of the Decision in Criminal Case No. 925 of the
Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 13, finding appellant Saturnina
Salazar y Palanas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4, Article II
of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1675, and imposing upon her the penalty of life
imprisonment and payment of P20,000.00 as fine, with costs.
The Facts
In a buy-bust operation, the accused Salazar sold and delivered to a NARCOM Agent
posing as a buyer, marijuana sticks and leaves. Found in Salazar’s possession was
the 5.00 marked bill and marijuana. Salazar was then arrested.
At the PC headquarters in Camp Naranjo, Sgt. Cubillan interrogated appellant while
Cpl. de Guzman took her bio-data. Her fingerprints were also taken. Thereafter,
Cpl. de Guzman made her sign her bio-data and the paper containing her
fingerprints. It was Sgt. Cubillan who instructed her to sign the piece of bond paper
which was used to wrap the marijuana sticks before they were submitted to the
laboratory for examination.
The Trial court find the accused, Salazar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling a
prohibited drug without being authorized by law, she is hereby sentenced to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00
The accused appeal that arguing the her right to counsel has been violated.
ISSUE: Whether the right of the accused to counsel has been violated, hence any
confession made by her is inadmissible.
RULING: Yes. But there is still enough evidence to convict the accused
Violation of Appellant's Right to Counsel
We find appellant's claim that she was not informed of her right to counsel
during custodial investigation to be correct. Moreover, the NARCOM agent's
admission that they made her sign and thumbmark the bond paper which
they used to wrap the marijuana found in her possession was violative of
her constitutional right to counsel. While the bond paper does not appear to
have been considered as a pivotal piece of evidence against appellant, such act of
the NARCOM agents is worth noting if only to provide guidance to law enforcement
operatives. In People vs. Simon, where the accused was made to sign the booking
sheet and arrest report stating that he was arrested for selling two tea bags of
suspected marijuana and the receipt for the seized property, the Court said:
"x x x. Appellant's conformance to these documents are declarations
against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged. They were
obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation
for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to
show that he was assisted by counsel. Although appellant manifested
during the custodial investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the
waiver was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel, hence
whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted from
him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence. Besides, the
arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can easily be concocted to
implicate a suspect."
Prosecution's Other Evidence
Sufficient for Conviction
Appellant's contention that she could not have taken the risk of selling the five (5)
marijuana sticks for only five pesos and therefore the contraband was "planted," is
totally baseless. She herself did not bring out this alleged irregularity in the
performance of the NARCOM agents' duty at the witness stand. On the other hand,
the testimony of the two (2) peace officers carried with it the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions.
Appellant claims that the prosecution evidence is weak because Sgt. Cubillan was
allegedly caught lying on the witness stand. She alleges that the prevarication of
said witness was reflected by his testimony that after arresting appellant, they
proceeded to the PC headquarters. Later, he testified that they still dropped by
Bayotas' residence to arrest her. This alleged change in testimony which was
explained by the witness himself, [43] is too inconsequential to dent the
prosecution's compelling evidence on the fact of sale of illegal drugs.
The Court also finds too preposterous to merit scrutiny appellant's contention that in
convicting her, the trial court relied on her previous conviction for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Law. Her being under probation was not alleged in the
Information. It was brought out in the trial where she herself admitted that she was
on probation when she committed the offense in this case. However, while the trial
court mentioned that fact in the Decision of March 1, 1991, it based its findings on
evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense and not on the fact
that appellant was a probationer convicted of engaging in the abominable trade of
illegal drugs when she committed the offense.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision convicting appellant Saturnina Salazar y
Palanas of the crime of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act. No 6425, as
amended, is hereby AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EUTROPIO TIOZON y ACID
G.R. No. 89823, June 19, 1991
FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged for violation of Presidential Decree 1866,
(possession, custody and control one .38 cal. revolver, marked Squires Bingham
with SN 180169 with three live ammunitions without authority of law), which
firearm was used with treachery and evident premeditation in shooting one
Leonardo Bolima y Mesia, which caused death. Accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty. The court a quo found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of P.D. 1866 and
Murder qualified by treachery. Accused-appellant filed a motion to reconsider the
decision which, however, was denied.
The facts as found by the court a quo are as follows: That in the evening of
February 24, 1989, while Rosalina and her husband (Leonardo Bolima) were
sleeping inside their house, they were awakened by the loud knocks on their door;
Her husband opened the door and they saw that the person who was knocking was
their "Pareng Troping", accused herein; her husband invited the accused, who
appeared to be very drunk, to come inside their house; she saw the accused
showing a gun to her husband and the latter even toyed with it; she took a few
steps away from the two, however, when she looked back to the place where her
husband and the accused was, she found out that the two had already left; five
minutes later and/or after she had heard two successive gunshots, she heard
accused knocking at their door and at the same time informing her that he
accidentally shoot (sic) her husband, "Mare, mare, nabaril ko si Pare, hindi ko
sinasadya"; accused extended his help by helping them in carrying the victim
towards the main road, however, after a few steps, he changed his mind and put
down the victim; accused reasoned out that the victim was already dead; she
pushed the accused and even without the latter's help, they were able to reach the
main road; thereafter, Kalookan policemen arrived and so she caused the arrest of
the accused.
The version of the defense: That while passing infront of the house of Nardo, his
Pareng Nardo called him up; when he was about to enter the door of the house of
the victim, the latter, poked a gun at him; he grabbed the gun from his Pareng
Nardo and at that instance, Rosalina Bolima emerging from her room, saw him
holding the gun; he returned the gun to his Pareng Nardo and the latter tucked it in
his waistline; accused was left behind to answer the call of nature; while in the act
of urinating, he heard two successive gunshots; he followed the victim and he saw
the latter already sprawled on the ground; he inquired from his Pareng Nardo as to
what had happened to him, "Pareng Nardo, ano ang nangyari sa iyo? and the
victim's replied (sic) was "Pare, binaril ako",
In holding the accused-appellant guilty as above-stated, the court a quo relied on
circumstantial evidence because the prosecution failed to present an eyewitness
who could give an account as to the actual shooting incident. It considered seven
circumstances, including the following:
The testimony of the wife that accused, immediately after the
shooting incident took place admitted to her having accidentally
shoot (sic) the victim is admissible evidence against the accused
declarant since this is covered by the rule on res gestae or one of
an exception to the hearsay rule.
Part of the res gestae — Statement made by a person while a
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior tor (sic)
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstance thereof, may
be given in evidence as a part of res gestae . . . (Sec. 36, Rule
130, Revised Rules of Court, as amended).
In support of the assigned error accused-appellant submits, among others, that:
(d) The testimony of the wife of the victim that after hearing two
successive gunshots accused-appellant went back to her house
and informed her that he accidentally shot her husband, should
not have been considered by the trial court as part of the res
gestae.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statement made by the accused-appellant to the wife of
the victim immediately after the shooting incident that he accidentally shot the
victim is covered by the rule on res gestae
HELD:
No. The first to the sixth circumstances mentioned by the trial court were duly
established and constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused-appellant, and no other else, shot and killed the victim.
We do not, however, agree with the additional observation of the trial court, in
respect to the sixth circumstance, that the statement made by the accused-
appellant to the wife of the victim immediately after the shooting incident that he
accidentally shot the victim is covered by the rule on res gestae. This is a
misapplication of the rule in the instant case. Statements as part of the res
gestae are among the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The rule is that a witness "can
testify only to those facts which he knows of or his own knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perceptions.17 Accordingly, a testimony of a witness as to
what he heard other persons say about the facts in dispute cannot be admitted
because it is hearsay evidence. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. One of
them is statements as part of the res gestae under Section 36 of Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The exceptions assume that the testimony offered is in fact
hearsay; but it is to be admitted in evidence. Under the aforesaid Section 36,
statements may be deemed as part of the res gestae if they are made by a person
while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof. Statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue and giving it a legal significance may also be
received as part of the res gestae.
In the instant case, however, the questioned testimony of the wife of the
victim is not hearsay. She testified on what the accused-appellant told her,
not what any other party, who cannot be cross-examined, told her. The
accused-appellant's statement was an "oral confession", not a part of res
gestae, which he can easily deny if it were not true, which he did in this
case. In People vs. Tulagan, 143 SCRA 107,116-117, We declared that a
statement allegedly made by one of the accused to Natalia Macaraeg that
"we killed him" (referring to himself and his co-accused) and which Natalia
repeated in her testimony in open court was merely an "oral confession"
and not part of the res gestae. Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of
the wife of the victim on the alleged statement of the accused-appellant is hearsay,
the latter is barred from questioning its admission due to his failure to object
thereto at the time the testimony was given.
PEOPLE VS. TUJON
G.R. NO. 66034. NOVEMBER 13, 1992

FACTS: Tujon, Parola and Paredes were charged with Robbery with Homicide.
Paredes remained at large. Tujon and Parola were convicted. They allegedly robbed
and killed a taxi driver.

There is no eyewitness for the prosecution. To establish the case against the
accused, the prosecution relied mainly on the extra-judicial confession of Tujon and
Parola. The confessions were signed by police detective and by the accused.

During trial, Tujon denied the charges against him. He testified that he came from
the province and looked for a job in Manila. He was arrested for unknown reasons.
He also testified that he did not know his other co-accused. The policemen asked
him to sign a paper the contents of which he did not know.

ISSUE:

WON the confession is admissible

HELD: No. This Court has consistently ruled that waiver of right to counsel to be
valid, must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. Extra-judicial confessions
taken without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence (People v.
Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 [1987]). Hence, while the right to counsel may be waived,
such waiver must be done voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, and made in the
presence of the accused’s lawyer. If the records do not show that the accused was
assisted by counsel in making his waiver, this defect nullifies and renders
inadmissible in evidence his confession (People v. Nolasco, 163 SCRA 623, [1988]).
In the case of People v. Hizon, 163 SCRA 760 {1988}, this Court, citing the
procedure laid down in the case of People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 [1985]), ruled
that the suspect must be informed that he has a right to the assistance of counsel
and assured that he will be provided with one for free. While he may choose to
waive the right, such waiver must be a knowing and intelligent one and in any case
must be made only with the assistance of counsel. Any waiver made without
observance of these requirements is null and void. Indeed, the ban against
uncounselled confessions is even more pronounced under Sec. 12, Art. III of the
1987 Constitution.

It is a matter of record that the interrogation was made in the absence of counsel
de parte or de oficio and the waiver of counsel, if made at all, was not made with
the assistance of counsel as required.

It is not clear that the accused were actually offered the services of a lawyer and
they refused. In any event, it is undisputed that the waiver of the accused of their
right to counsel was made without the assistance of counsel.

Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that waiver of right to counsel to be
valid, must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. Extra-judicial confessions
taken without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence
PEOPLE VS. MACAM of custodial identification of an uncounseled accused can not be applied. On the
G.R. NOS. L-91011-12 NOVEMBER 24, 1994 other hand, appellants did not object to the in-court identification made by the
prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who made the identification of
appellants at the police line-up at the hospital, again identified appellants in open
FACTS:
court. Appellants did not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by the
illegal line-up. In the absence of such objection, the prosecution need not show that
Prosecution’s version: On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio
said identifications were of independent origin
Cawilan Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito Macam
(uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43 Ferma Road QC. Upon the arrival of the
The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. However, they are estopped
accused, Benito invited the former to have lunch. Benito asked his maid Salvacion
from questioning the legality of such arrest because they have not moved to quash
Enrera to call the companions of Eduardo who were waiting in a tricycle outside the
the said information and any irregularity attendant to their arrest was cured when
house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered the house while E. Roque
they voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by
remained in the tricycle. After all the accused had taken their lunch, Eduardo
entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial
Macam grabbed the clutch bag of Benito Macam and pulled out his uncle’s gun then
declared a hold-up. They tied up the wife (Leticia Macam), children, maid
The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while remaining
(Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara and brought them to the room upstairs. After a while
outside the house served as a looked out.
Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after she screamed she was stabbed and
killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo and Salvacion was also stabbed but survived. The
Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque is
total value of the items taken was P536, 700.00.
guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as co-conspirators of the other accused
to suffer reclusion perpetua.
Defense’s version: Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4
accused to Benito’s house for a fee of P50.00. Instead of paying him, he was given
a calling card by Eduardo Macam so that he can be paid the following day. Upon
arriving, he went with the accused inside the house to have lunch. Thereafter he
washed the dishes and swept the floor. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun and
announced the hold-up, he was asked to gather some things and which he abided
out of fear. While putting the said thins inside the car of Benito (victim) he heard
the accused saying “kailangan patayin ang mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga
yan”. Upon hearing such phrase he escaped and went home using his tricycle. He
also testified that his brother Ernesto Roque has just arrived from the province and
in no way can be involved in the case at bar. On the following day, together with his
brother, they went to the factory of the Zesto Juice (owned by the father of Eduardo
Macam) for him to get his payment (50.00) . He and his brother was suddenly
apprehended by the security guards and brought to the police headquarters in Q.C.
They were also forced to admit certain things.

After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and bore contusions on
their faces caused by blows inflicted in their faces during investigation, was brought
to the QC General Hospital before each surviving victims and made to line-up for
identification. Eugenio Cawilan was also charged with Anti-fencing Law but was
acquitted in the said case.

Issue: Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the arrest
was valid. WON the evidence from the line-up is admissible.

Held: It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of

prosecution even before trial. A police line-up is considered a “critical” stage of the
proceedings. Any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up
is inadmissible. After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly
true in the case at bench where the police officers first talked to the victims before
the confrontation was held. The circumstances were such as to impart improper
suggestions on the minds of the victims that may lead to a mistaken identification.
Appellants were handcuffed and had contusions on their faces. However, the
prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant's identification at the
police line-up. Hence, the exclusionary sanctions against the admission in evidence
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAFAEL OLIVAREZ, JR., and DANILO
ARELLANO
G.R. NO. 77865. DECEMBER 4, 1998
FACTS: A case for robbery with homicide committed during the season of yuletide.
Prosecution witness Sgt. Eduardo Marcelo testified that he took the statements of
appellant Rafael Olivares, Jr. and Purisimo Macaoili and verbal investigation of
appellant Danilo Arellano because the latter refused to give any statement.
Prosecution witness Cpl. Tomas Juan testified that in the morning of December 28,
1981, he was assigned by his station commander to follow-up the robbery with
homicide that took place at Tanada Subdivision. He learned from Patrolman Bote
that a regular employee of the Cardinal Plastic Industries (where the crime was
committed) had not yet reported for work. With that information, Cpl. Juan and
others proceeded to the business establishment and were able to confirm from the
workers that appellant Danilo Arellano failed to report for work since the
commission of the crime. elchor Salle (cousin of appellant Arellano) volunteered to
bring them to Danilo Arellano, in a factory situated in San Juan. Melchor Salle was
able to secure information from the barkada of appellant Arellano who turned out to
be appellant Olivares, Jr. Appellant Olivares accompanied them to Broadway where
they found appellant Arellano. After being asked about the incident that took place
at the Cardinal Plastic Industries, appellant Arellano readily admitted to the police
authorities his participation in the commission of the crime. Thereafter, appellant
Arellano was invited to the police station. On further direct examination, Cpl. Juan
identified in open court the Sanyo cassettes, the tapes and the wristwatch they
recovered from the place where appellant Arellano pointed to them.
Prosecution witness Purisimo Macaoili testified that he found the dead body of Mr.
Sy in the morning of December 26, 1981 inside the building where the business
establishment is situated. Mr. Sy was residing alone inside his room because at that
time his wife was in Hongkong. Some of the workers also reside inside the business
establishment. Mr. Macaoili also saw the dead body of the father of Mr. Sy in the
same building. is companion Erning phoned Mr. Sys brother. The same brother
asked for the assistance of the police who arrived at the scene of the crime and who
conducted on-the-spot investigation.
Mr. Macaoili testified that he came to know that the wristwatch, the cassettes, and
other personal items of the victims were missing when appellants were
apprehended. He knew the cassette and the wristwatch because said items had
been used by the victim. He knew appellant Arellano because he is his barriomate at
Tuburan, Iloilo. He also knew appellant Olivarez, Jr. as they are also barriomates.
He testified that appellant Olivarez, Jr. twice visited the factory and saw him two or
three weeks before said date
Prosecution witness, Sgt. Eduardo Marcelo testified that he conducted an
investigation on the person of Rafael Olivarez, Jr. Sgt. Marcelo apprised him of his
constitutional rights. When informed, appellant Olivarez, Jr. declined any assistance
of a lawyer during the investigation considering that he will tell the truth about the
incident. Mr. Melchor Salle and the chief of Sgt. Marcelo were present during the
police investigations. Sgt. Marcelo prepared a statement signed by appellant
Olivarez, Jr. relative to the investigation.
For the death of the two victims and the loss of some items, appellants were charge
with the complex crime of robbery with double homicide. In the commission of the
said crime, other aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and unlawful entry were
present.
LOWER COURT DECISION: Lower court rendered a decision convicting appellants
of the crime charged, sentenced them to suffer the death penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the confessions obtained from the accused are admissible in
evidence. NO
RULING: Initially, the categorization by the prosecution of the crime of robbery
with double homicide is erroneous because the word homicide in Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code should be taken in its generic sense absorbing not only acts
which results in death but also all other acts producing anything short of death. The
indictable offense is the complex crime of robbery with homicide.
The essential elements of which are:
a.) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person;
b.) the property thus taken belongs to another;
c.) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi;
d.) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide was
committed.
In this case, there were no eyewitnesses to the killing and robbery and; thus, no
direct evidence points to appellants criminal liability. The prosecutions principal
evidence against them is based solely on the testimony of the police officers who
arrested, investigated and subsequently took their confession. Such evidence when
juxtaposed with appellants constitutional rights concerning arrests and the taking of
confessions leads to a conclusion that they cannot be held liable for the offense
charged despite the inherent weakness of their defenses of denial and alibi, not
because they are not guilty but because the evidence adduced against them are
inadmissible to sustain a criminal conviction.
First, appellants were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest and their arrest
cannot even be justified under any of the recognized exceptions for a valid
warrantless arrest. At the time appellants were apprehended, two days have
already lapsed after the discovery of the crime they were not doing nor have they
done any criminal act. Neither were they caught in flagrante delicto or had escaped
from confinement. Probably aware of the illegality of the arrest they made, the
arresting officers testified that appellants were merely invited to the police
precinct. Such invitation, however, when construed in the light of the circumstances
is actually in the nature of an arrest designed for the purpose of conducting an
interrogation. Mere invitation is covered by the proscription on a warrantless arrest
because it is intended for no other reason than to conduct an
investigation. Thus, any evidence obtained in violation of their right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. By virtue of said constitutional
protection, any evidence obtained, including all the things and properties alleged to
be stolen by appellants which were taken by the police from the place of the illegal
arrest cannot be used as evidence for their conviction.
Even assuming arguendo that by entering a plea without first questioning the
legality of their arrest, appellants are deemed to have waived any objection
concerning their arrest, yet the extrajudicial confession of appellant Olivares, Jr. on
which the Under the Constitution, any person under investigation for the
prosecution relies, is likewise inadmissible in evidence. commission of an offense
shall have the right among others, to have a counsel which right can be validly
waived. In this case, the said confession was obtained during custodial investigation
but the confessant was not assisted by counsel. His manifestation to the
investigating officer that he did not need the assistance of counsel does not
constitute a valid waiver of his right.

Consequently, the invalid waiver of the right to counsel during custodial

investigation makes the uncounselled confession, whether verbal or non-
verbal obtained in violation thereof as also inadmissible in evidence.

Under the present laws, a confession to be admissible must be:

1.) express and categorical;
2.) given voluntarily, and intelligently where the accused realized the
legal significance of his act;
3.) with assistance of competent and independent counsel;
4.) in writing; and in the language known to and understood by the
confessant; and
5.) signed, or if the confessant does not know now to read and write,
thumbmarked by him.

In this case, the absence of the third requisite above makes the confession
inadmissible. The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial
investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession even by the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. What is
sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person
undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with
which to prosecute and thereafter convict him.

With the inadmissibility of the material circumstantial evidence which were premised
on the likewise extrajudicial confession upon which both the prosecution and the
lower court relied to sustain appellants conviction, the remaining circumstances
cannot produce a logical conclusion to establish their guilt. In order to sustain a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the same
satisfies the following elements:

1. there is more than one circumstance;

2. the fact from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, appellants conviction is herein REVERSED and both

are ACQUITTED for the crime charged. The person detaining them is ordered to
IMMEDIATELY RELEASE appellants UNLESS they are held for some other lawful
cause.
PEOPLE V. MAGPAYO 1993
G.R. NO. NOS. 92961-64 SEPTEMBER 1, 1993
DOCTRINES:
- It is well settled that the testimony of a single witness free from any signs
of impropriety or falsehood is sufficient to convict an accused even if
uncorroborated.
- Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to
warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his
observation as been inaccurate.
- As a rule, evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to show, that
the accused in a criminal case has committed a crime wholly independent
of the offense for which he is on trial. It is not competent to prove that he
committed other crimes of a like nature for the purpose of showing that he
committed the crime charged in the complaint or information.
- An exception to this rule is when such evidence tends directly to establish
the particular crime, and it is usually competent to prove the motive, the
intent, the absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other
that proof of one tends to establish the other, or the identity of the person
charged with the commission of the crime on trial.
- The evidence in one was not offered and admitted to prove the other but
only to show the plan, scheme or modus operandi of the offender.
- It is well-settled that for a conviction to occur, absolute certainty of guilty
is not demanded.
FACTS:
Appellant Benjamin C. Magpayo was charged with Rape, Robbery, Robbery with
Hold-up and Forcible Abduction with Rape before the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon in four (4) separate complaints and informations. Upon arraignment,
appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all the charges. After trial, he was found
guilty of all the offenses charged in a joint decision rendered by the trial court.
Appellant appeals from the aforementioned joint decision of the court a quo.
At 9:30 in the morning of April 10, 1988, the 10-year old complainant Lilibeth Bobis,
went to the Malabon market to get money from her parents to buy milk for her
younger sister. After receiving P26.00 from them, she proceeded to the store near
their house but before reaching it, she paused in front of Betsy's Restaurant near
the municipal building. There she was approached by appellant, who accused her of
involvement in a theft of coffee. Lilibeth denied the accusation but appellant told her
that the thief had a tattoo on the back (tsn, July 25, 1988, pp. 2-3). Appellant then
demanded threateningly that she go with him as they would look at some boxes and
broken bottles, and for her to tell fully that she had nothing to do with the theft.
They proceeded to the San Bartolome Church, which they circled twice, and then
entered the cemetery beside the church. Once inside, Lilibeth, upon the prodding of
appellant, raised her blouse to show that she had no tattoo. But appellant said:
"Ano ang gusto mo, kakantutin ka o makakauwi ka ng buhay." For fear of her life,
Lilibeth pleaded with appellant not to kill her. Then appellant removed his shorts
and inserted his organ into her mouth while she was seated on the ground. He
removed Lilibeth's shorts and panty and she was made to sit on a bench. Appellant
parted her legs and inserted his organ into hers while he was in a standing position.
After his coitus with her, appellant took the P26.00 of Lilibeth and warned her to
keep quiet as he was not alone and that she should not leave until he has gotten
out of the cemetery. Lilibeth told appellant to leave and that she would not complain
to the police (Ibid., pp. 4-7).
When she was certain that appellant had already left, Lilibeth put on her clothing
and went back to her mother at the market, to whom she told that she was raped.
Thereafter, both of them informed her father of the matter and they all proceeded
to the police station, where they were advised to go to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to have Lilibeth examined.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo erred in convicting him in all charges?
HELD: No, he is guilty and judgment affirmed.
In resolving whether or not rape was committed, the evidence for conviction must
be clear and convincing to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence
Appellant vehemently questions the trial court's decision finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt because the prosecution witnesses allegedly failed to positively
identify him. He avers that when he was arrested to answer for an alleged
wrongdoing on May 22, 1988, complainants were hesitant to point at him and kept
on looking at their parents. However, the Court is of the opinion that the lingering
shock caused by such harrowing experience at the hands of appellant could have
caused the minor complainants to hesitate in directly identifying him.
Hence, the fact that complainants kept on looking at their parents is of no moment.
They were simply scared, looked at their parents for assurance, and such initial
hesitation could by no means indicate that complainants were guilty of fabrication.
Also, although Lilibeth Bobis admitted that she was not able to immediately identify
the appellant at the police station after his arrest, she declared that she thought it
over very carefully if the appellant was indeed the offender Also, what is important
is that Bobis remembered the square shape of appellant's face, his eyes to be
"singkit" and his nose as "matangos" Indeed, familiarity with the physical features,
particularly those of the face, is actually the best way to identify the person
Furthermore, It is well settled that the testimony of a single witness, free from any
signs of impropriety or falsehood, is sufficient to convict an accused, even if
uncorroborated. In the instant case, the testimonies of eight-year old Daniel and the
pedicab driver would have been merely corroborative. Furthermore, there is no
showing that the privilege to present Chico's brother and the pedicab driver was
withheld from appellant. In any event, the prosecution has the prerogative to
present as many witnesses it deems proper and the non-presentation of some does
not militate against the State for the number of such witnesses is addressed to the
sound discretion of the prosecuting officers.
NELLY LIM vs CA, Juan SIM
GR 91114 | September 25, 1992
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Review of Certiorari assailing the CA resolution
denying due course to a petition to annul the order of the trial court allowing a
Psychiatrist of the National Mental Hospital to testify as an expert witness and not
as an attending physician of petitioner.
FACTS:
 Nelly Lim and Juan Sim are married to each other.
 Juan Sim filed a petition to declare the nullity of the the marriage on the
ground of Article 36 of the Family Code, for schizophrenia before, during,
and after the marriage and until the present.
 At a certain point in the trial, Juan Sim’s counsel announced he would
present as witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental
Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in
Psychiatry, and sought a subpoena to have the doctor testify.
 Nelly Lim’s counsel opposed on the ground that the testimony sought to be
elicited from the witness is privilegedsince the latter had examined
the petitioner in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be
suffering from schizophrenia.
 The trial court denied the opposition and isued the subpoena.
 Nelly Lim’s counsel filed an omnibus motion to quash the subpoena and
hold the proceedings in abeyance pending such resolution.
 The next day, the doctor appeared in court, and the court held a hearing
on the motion before the doctor could testify. Nelly Lim’s counsel reiterated
their objection arguing it was privileged. Juan Sim’s counsel however
merely averred that the doctor was being presented as an EXPERT
WITNESS, and was going to be asked HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS about
her field of specialization.
 The RTC then allowed her to testify as an expert witness only. The court
further advised Nelly Lim’s counsel to object as soon as it becomes
apparent that privileged information might be disclosed.
o On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered routinary (sic)
questions to qualify her as an expert in psychiatry; she was asked
to render an opinion as to what kind of illness (sic) are stelazine
tablets applied to; she was asked to render an opinion on a (sic)
hypothetical facts respecting certain behaviours of a person; and
finally she admitted she saw and treated Nelly Lim but she never
revealed what illness she examined and treated her (sic); nor (sic)
the result of her examination of Nelly Lim, nor (sic) the medicines
she prescribed
 Upon a R65 petition to the CA, the CA dismissed the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Acampado can testify as an expert witness.
HELD: YES. This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and
make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts,
circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent
and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the
physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to
treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the
community.
The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he
attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only
disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and
efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be
emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The
mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the
number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the
subject communicated is not stated."
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites
must concur:
1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient
in his professional capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the
reputation (formerly character) of the patient.
These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the
establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to
wit:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.
Nelly Lim’s counsel has failed to discharge the burden of proving that the
information is covered by the privilege. In the first place, Dr. Acampado was
presented and qualified as an expert witness. As correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, she did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination,
interview and treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions
alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever
information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the patient. There is,
as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the questions propounded to
her relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the information
obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded
whatever information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired
by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert
witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded.
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado’s testimony that the petitioner was
never interviewed alone. Said interviews were always conducted in the presence of
a third party. She was first accompanied by her husband during the consultations,
and then afterwards always with Nelly Lim’s father. There is authority to the effect
that information elicited during consultation with a physician in the presence of third
parties removes such information from the mantle of the privilege.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE V. GALLENO
G.R. NO. 123546 JULY 2, 1998
FACTS:
Evelyn Obligar Garganera 5year old daughter of Rosita Obligar Garganera,
together with her 3-year old Eleazar brother, live under the care and custody of
their uncle, Emetario Obligar, and aunt, Penicola Obligar.
Less than kilometer away from their place of residence lived accused-
appellant, 19-year old Joeral Galleno, known well Evelyn's family. On August 16,
1994, at around 4pm, JOERAL GALLENO passed by the Obligars' residence and
found the two children left to themselves.
According to Prosecution JOERAL took advantage of the situation by sexually
molesting Evelyn. The penetration caused the child's vagina to bleed, making
her cry in pain Accused tried to stop the bleeding by applying, with his finger,
the sap of "madre de cacao" leaves on her vagina. Unsuccessful in his attempt,
he left Evelyn grimacing and crying in pain.
Shortly, Emeterio and Penicola came home from work. They arrived to find
Evelyn crying. Emetario noticed that there was blood in Evelyn's dress and she
was pressing a rug against her genital organ. He saw that her vagina had been
lacerated and blood was oozing therefrom. He summoned a "quack" doctor
who applied herbal medicine on Evelyns's vagina but did not stop the bleeding.
The following day, August 17, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the clinic of
Dr. Alfonso D. Orosco, the Rural Health Physician of Maayon, Capiz. After
examining EVELYN, he affirmed that Evelyn's vaginal laceration could have
been by blunt instrument inserted into the vigina, that it was possible that a
human penis in full erection had been forcibly inserted into her vagina, and
that a human penis in full errection is considered a blunt intrument. While he
was examining Evelyn, Dr. Orosco asked Evelyn what caused her injuries. The
child told him that a penis was inserted into her vagina and that its insertion
caused her pain.
Since his clinic lacked the proper medical facilities needed to treat Evelyn, Dr.
Orosco, after dressing the victim's wound which continued to bleed, advised
Emeterio and Penicola to bring the child to the hospital for further medical
treatment
On August 18, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the Roxas Memorial General
Hospital were she was examined by resident physician Dr. Ma. Lourdes
Lañada. Dr. Lañada, upon examining Evelyn found that "there was a 3 cm.
lacerated wound at the left anterior one-third of the vagina" and "the
pressence of about 10-15cc of blood" at the vaginal vault.
Dr. Lañada opined that "a lot of things will cause the lacerated wound in the
vagina. According to Dr. Lañada, the vaginal laceration may be caused (1) by
trauma to the area, when a girl falls and hits her genital area on a blunt
instrument; (2) by medical instrumentation, like the insertion of a speculum
into the vagina; or (3) by the insertion of blunt foreign object into the vagina,
like a finger or a penis of a man in full erection.
On August 19, 1994, Emetario brought Evelyn back to the Roxas Memorial
General Hospital where she was attended to by Dr. Machael Toledo, the
resident physician on duty, who found blood clots and minimal bleeding in the
genital area. Dr. Toledo " … pack(ed) the area to prevent further bleeding and
(he) … admitted the patient for possible repair of the laceration and blood
transfusion because she has anaemia 2ndary to bleeding." Two hundred fifty
five (255) cc of blood was transfused to Evelyn and she was given antibiotics
to prevent infection. Five days later, Evelyn was discharged and sent home
with medication.
Upon his examination of Evelyn on August 19, 1994, Dr. Toledo disclosed that
the child suffered severe compound laceration which could have been caused
by a normal and fully developed penis of a man in a state of erection that was
forcibly inserted into her vagina and that the insertion caused her vagina to
hemorrhage which thus required the transfusion of 255 cc of blood
Prior to her confinement in the Roxas Memorial General Hospital on August 19,
Emetario and Penicola Obligar brought Evelyn to the Maayon Police Station on
August 18, 1994, where they reported the crime to SPO1 Paulino Durana. That
same day, appellant was apprehended in a house near the Balighot Elementary
School and brought to the police station
Defense allegation. Accused-appellant testified that when he arrived at the
Obligar residence that afternoon of August 16, 1994, he found the two
children, Evelyn and Eleazar While seated at the balcony, accused-appellant
was approached by Evelyn, who knew him. He cajoled her by throwing her up
and down, his right hand holding the child and his left hand covering her
vagina. Upon lifting up the child the first time, his left ring finger was
accidentally inserted into the vagina of child since his fingernail was long and
the child was not wearing any underwear. Consequently, Evelyn began to cry
because her vagina started to bleed. Upon seeing this, he immediately went
down the house and got some bark or leaves of madre de cacao tree and
applied the sap on the child's wound. The bleeding ceased and Evelyn stopped
crying. Thereafter, accused-appellant went home
Accused's father Raul Galleno was called to the witness stand and he testified
that he learned about the arrest of his son on August 18, 1994. The following day,
he went to the house of the Obligars to ask Evelyn what happened to her. The child
allegedly answered that a finger was accidentally inserted into her genital organ,
but that Penicola who was then present, butted into the conversation and told Raul
Galleno that the penis of accused-appellant was likewise inserted.
ISSUE: WON the accused raped the victim Evelyn Obligar?
RULING:
As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give
opinions. It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form
opinions upon the facts proved. However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are
received in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony, based on the
principle that either because of the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness,
or because of the nature of the subject matter under observation, of for other
reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment.
The trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert
testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's
laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witness, especially the
victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of
the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the
exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated
various possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean the trial court's
interference is wrong.
The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not negate the
conclusion that it was his penis which was inserted in the victim's vagina. In rape,
the important consideration is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the
female genitalia by the male organ. Verily, it is entirely probable that climax on the
part of accused-appellant was not reached due to the cries of pain of the victim and
the profuse bleeding of her vagina.
Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "(e)vidence must have
such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nor-
existence." This simply means that relevancy is determinable by the rules of logic
and human experience. There is no precise and universal test of relevancy provided
by law. However, the determination of whether particular evidence is relevant rests
largely at the discretion of the court, which must be exercised according to the
teachings of logic and everyday experience
There is no explanation how the left ring finger (allegedly with long fingernail)
of accused-appellant penetrated the victim's vagina by a depth of one fourth of an
inch.
The trial court's conclusions finds supports in the testimony of accused-
appellant's own witness, Dr. Lourdes Lañada (who was earlier presented during the
trial as a prosecution witness), who testified that a laceration is caused by a blunt
instrument and that a fingernail is not a blunt but a sharp instrument.
CEBU SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING WORKS VS WILLIAM LINES INC AND
PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE COMPANY INC.
G.R. NO. 132607 – MAY 5, 1999
FACTS:
 Petitioner Cebu Shipyard is a domestic corporation engaged in the business
of dry-docking and repairing of marine vessels. Private respondent
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Inc, is a domestic corporation
engaged in the non-life insurance business. Private Respondent William
Lines Inc is in the shipping business and owner of M/V Manila City, a luxury
passenger-cargo vessel which would be the main topic of the issue of this
case.
 William lines brought its vessel (M/V Manila) to the Cebu Shipyard for
annual dry-docking and repair.
 When The Vessel M/V Manila City was transferred to the docking quay, it
caught on fire and sank, resulting to its eventual total loss. At the time of
the unfortunate occurrence, subject vessel was insured with Prudential for
hull and machinery.
 William lines filed a complaint for damages against petitioner alleging that
the fire broke out in the vessel was caused by Petitioner’s negligence and
lack of care. Later on the complaint was amended to implede Prudential
Guarantee after the later had paid for the insurance value with William
Lines. Prudential was subrograted to the claim of William Lines.
 Trial court decided against Cebu Shipyard and in favour of William lines and
Prudential.
 A partial dismissal was ordered by the CA due to the amicable settlement
of the parties. CA also affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: W/N the Court erred on the inadmissibility of the expert testimonies
presented by the petitioner, that introduced the cause and origin of the fire.
RULING: No
 Courts are not bound by the testimonies of expert witness.
 Although they have probative value. The reception of evidence of expert
witness is within the discretion of the court.
 Under section 49 of Rule 30 it provides that opinion of expert witness,
maybe received in evidence.
 The word “may” signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness as
evidence is a prerogative of the court. It is never mandatory for the judge
to give substantial weight to expert testimonies.
 If from facts and evidence on record, a conclusion is readily ascertainable,
there is no need for the judge to resort to expert opinion evidence.
 In the case at bar, the testimonies of the fire experts were not the only
available evidence on the probable cause and origin of the fire. There were
witnesses who were actually on board the vessel when the fire occurred.
 Between the testimonies of the fire expert who merely based their findings
and opinions on interviews and testimonies of those present during the fire,
the latter are of more probative value.
 The trial court did not err in giving more weight to said testimonies.
Petition denied
PEOPLE V. SOLIMAN improbability of the commission of an offense, such is not necessary in
101 SCRA 767, G.R. NO. L-9723 crime of murder where killing is committed through treachery
premeditation.
FACTS o Proof of character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show
"that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in
 Ernesto Basa was sleeping in a pushcart with Ernesto Balaktaw sleeping on the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt
a box situated near the pushcart with heads opposite each other. defensive action was necessary."
o Suddenly Balaktaw’s hand was kicked
o Woke up and saw a Sofronio Palin hold Basa by the shoulders RULING:
while his companion Geronimo Soliman stabbed Basa with a
balisong many times WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense of imposing upon
o Then assailants raw away. appellants merely the penalty of reclusion perpetua, affirming the decisions in all
 Took Basa to the hospital but he still died. other respects, with costs.
 Appellant Soliman testified that he acted on self-defense since he claims
that deceased beat him up previous to the incident since he didn’t let him
borrow his pushcart; then the deceased provoked him and boxed him
which prompted Soliman to pull out his knife and in the course of the
fighting, appellant stabbed the deceased.
o Appellant Palin corroborated the testimony claiming that he was
eating at a restaurant when he saw Soliman and deceased
grappling with each other and that he tried to separate them and
even advised Soliman to surrender which he followed.
 Conviction in mainly predicated on the testimony of one eyewitness –
Ernesto Balaktaw

ISSUE/S

 W/N testimony of Balaktaw is credible?

HELD: YES

 TC was careful in taking notice not only of conduct of witness during trial
but also the extraneous matters that may help in reaching a correct
conclusion. (i.e. corroborated by testimony of appellant who admitted in
having inflicted the wounds and also supported by nature of wounds as
found by Dr. in autopsy)
 TC also made careful observation of the conduct and demeanor of
the two accused during trial
o Soliman: well built, robust and apparently strong
o Palin: a little bigger than other accused, stronger physique
o Deceased: slightly higher in stature thart Soliman but has a
thinner constitution and also much smaller than Palin
o Manner of testifying: Apparent indifference to all court
proceedings despite seriousness of crime; short, curt and
confused manner convinced Court they gave little importance to
the case and the proceedings
 Although initially Balaktaw was confused in identifying accused by their
names, when asked by court immediately thereafter to put his hands on
each of them, he was able to identify them correctly. Initial mistake must
have been due to accused being seated together.
 TC also did not err in not allowing the defense to prove that the
deceased had a violent, quarrelsome or provocative character.
While good/character may be availed as an aid to determine probability or