See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/41124552

Human factors in safety and business management

Article  in  Ergonomics · February 2010

DOI: 10.1080/00140130903248801 · Source: PubMed

CITATIONS READS

17 749

4 authors, including:

Birgit Köper Stefan Pennig

Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin 8 PUBLICATIONS   46 CITATIONS   
44 PUBLICATIONS   107 CITATIONS   
SEE PROFILE
SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

International Meeting of Peers from Air Traffic Control Agencies View project

PhD Thesis View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Birgit Köper on 11 June 2014.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

This article was downloaded by: [Bundesamt fuer Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit]
On: 06 June 2014, At: 02:28
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,
37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Ergonomics
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/terg20

Human factors in safety and business management

a b c d
Joachim Vogt , Jörg Leonhardt , Birgit Köper & Stefan Pennig
a
Technische Universität Darmstadt, Work and Engineering Psychology , Alexanderstr. 10,
64283, Darmstadt, Germany
b
DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH , Am DFS Campus 10, 63225, Langen, Germany
c
Federal Institute of Occupational Safety and Health , Friedrich-Henkel-Weg 1–25, 44227,
Dortmund, Germany
d
Leadership.Performance.Consulting , Am Stadtwald 26, 45219, Essen, Germany
Published online: 22 Jan 2010.

To cite this article: Joachim Vogt , Jörg Leonhardt , Birgit Köper & Stefan Pennig (2010) Human factors in safety and business
management, Ergonomics, 53:2, 149-163, DOI: 10.1080/00140130903248801

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00140130903248801

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained
in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the
Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and
are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and
should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for
any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of
the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic
reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
 Ergonomics
Vol. 53, No. 2, February 2010, 149–163

Human factors in safety and business management

Joachim Vogta*, Jörg Leonhardtb, Birgit Köperc and Stefan Pennigd
a
Technische Universität Darmstadt, Work and Engineering Psychology, Alexanderstr. 10, 64283, Darmstadt, Germany; bDFS
Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH, Am DFS Campus 10, 63225 Langen, Germany; cFederal Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health, Friedrich-Henkel-Weg 1–25, 44227 Dortmund, Germany; dLeadership.Performance.Consulting, Am Stadtwald 26, 45219
Downloaded by [Bundesamt fuer Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit] at 02:28 06 June 2014

Essen, Germany
(Received 28 August 2008; final version received 10 August 2009)

Human factors in safety is concerned with all those factors that influence people and their behaviour in safety-critical
situations. In aviation these are, for example, environmental factors in the cockpit, organisational factors such as
shift work, human characteristics such as ability and motivation of staff. Careful consideration of human factors is
necessary to improve health and safety at work by optimising the interaction of humans with their technical and
social (team, supervisor) work environment. This provides considerable benefits for business by increasing efficiency
and by preventing incidents/accidents. The aim of this paper is to suggest management tools for this purpose.
Management tools such as balanced scorecards (BSC) are widespread instruments and also well known in aviation
organisations. Only a few aviation organisations utilise management tools for human factors although they are the
most important conditions in the safety management systems of aviation organisations. One reason for this is that
human factors are difficult to measure and therefore also difficult to manage. Studies in other domains, such as
workplace health promotion, indicate that BSC-based tools are useful for human factor management. Their mission
is to develop a set of indicators that are sensitive to organisational performance and help identify driving forces as
well as bottlenecks. Another tool presented in this paper is the Human Resources Performance Model (HPM). HPM
facilitates the integrative assessment of human factors programmes on the basis of a systematic performance analysis
of the whole system. Cause–effect relationships between system elements are defined in process models in a first step
and validated empirically in a second step. Thus, a specific representation of the performance processes is developed,
which ranges from individual behaviour to system performance. HPM is more analytic than BSC-based tools
because HPM also asks why a certain factor is facilitating or obstructing success. A significant need for research and
development is seen here because human factors are of increasing importance for organisational success. This paper
suggests integrating human factors in safety management of aviation businesses – a top-ranking partner of
technology and finance – and managing it with professional tools. The tools HPM and BSC were identified as
potentially useful for this purpose. They were successfully applied in case studies briefly presented in this paper. In
terms of specific safety-steering tools in the aviation industry, further elaboration and empirical study is crucial.

Statement of Relevance: The importance of human factors is recognised by operators at the sharp end of aviation,
where flights are conducted or coordinated. At the blunt end, measurement tools are needed to manage operational
resources.
Keywords: balanced scorecard; human factors; human resources performance; management; safety; soft facts

Introduction the same issue impressively demonstrated that the

In 2003, a special issue of Applied Ergonomics
addressed the necessity for human factors experts to
talk business language in order to convince managers
that ergonomics is good value for money (Stanton and
Baber 2003). The Stanton and Baber (2003) special
issue provided a series of cost–benefit analyses (CBA)
and business cases to support the argument in favour
of organisations paying for ergonomics and human
factors initiatives. Chang (2008) also referred in the
preface of a special issue of Ergonomics to the
substantial losses that ergonomic problems, in this
example slips and falls, may cause. Bell et al. (2008) in
implementation of a broad-scale prevention
programme can significantly reduce injury claims.
Although the number of CBA in ergonomics has
increased from less than 20 (Beves and Slade 1970) to
more than 1300 (Beves 2003), ergonomics and human
factors still do not receive the due management
attention. More evidence is needed from CBA and one
must go beyond the financial justification of human
factors initiatives. This is especially important for
human factors in safety management, for example, in
aviation because here not only staff safety but also
passenger and public safety are at risk.

*Corresponding author. Email: vogt@psychologie.tu-darmstadt.de

ISSN 0014-0139 print/ISSN 1366-5847 online

Ó 2010 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/00140130903248801
http://www.informaworld.com
 150 J. Vogt et al.
Future challenges in aviation
Aviation is facing major changes and challenges in
technology, airspace and air traffic organisation as
described in the USA (NextGen) and European future
operational concepts (Single European Sky Air Traffic
Management Research; SESAR Consortium 2006).
These concepts aim at allowing a two- or three-fold
increase of today’s traffic. Since the relationship
between traffic and accident rate is assumed to be
Downloaded by [Bundesamt fuer Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit] at 02:28 06 June 2014
quadratic (e.g. Debels 2007), the required safety
improvement is by factor 10 in the long-term to avoid
an increase in the absolute number of accidents. The
SESAR safety performance objective builds on the
EUROCONTROL (2003) Air Traffic Management
(ATM) 2000 þ Strategy:
To improve safety levels by ensuring that the numbers
of ATM induced accidents and serious or risk bearing
incidents (includes those with direct and indirect ATM
contribution) do not increase and, where possible,
decrease.
The expected increase in traffic volumes requires
that safety levels gradually improve by factor 3 in
order to meet the safety objective in 2020 and in the
longer term by factor 10 to be prepared for a
possible three-fold increase in traffic. The three-fold
improvement in safety by 2020 accommodates a 73%
increase in traffic in that period (SESAR Consortium
2006).
These are per se ambitious challenges, even more so
as aviation organisations will increasingly compete
with each other. They primary compete as providers of
air navigation services and thus come increasingly
under cost pressure. They also compete as employers
of highly qualified operational, management and
research staff. Hence, organisational performance,
cost effectiveness, human factors and human resources
(HR) management will become key performance areas
in the developing ATM concepts.
In the past, staff has been considered mainly under
cost issues. In aviation, the perceived cost has been
financial (staff costs) but also operational (human
error). It is increasingly being realised that, on the
benefit side, it is also mainly the human operational
and managerial contribution that makes the system
work safely and efficiently. The negative view on the
human in the loop has to be changed to a more positive
perspective. This positive side of the coin may be called
resilience in safety management and its proactive,
innovative and systemic approach is a necessary
precaution to meet the above-mentioned challenges
of future ATM. In this regard, the development of
safety management deserves equal attention just like
technological aspects of the system (e.g. state of system
engineering) and finance (e.g. business turnover
figures). This is especially true since current studies
show that organisations with systematic and
continuous human factors/HR (HF/HR) management
tools perform better than those without (Glaser et al.
2007, Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und
Arbeitsmedizin 2008). The systemic view will change
the focus from human error as a cause to human error
as a symptom of underlying systemic problems (e.g.
understaffing or poor ergonomics). The performance
variability of humans should be seen as a resource to
be managed and taken advantage of. The traditional
linear causation perspective (e.g. in fault/event trees)
needs replacement by systemic views integrating
interaction and complexity (Dekker 2006). Overall
concepts such as resilience engineering (Hollnagel et al.
2006) provide the theoretical basis to change the
human factors perspectives. On this theoretical basis,
an integration of methodologies must be achieved.
This includes human factors tools, such as, for
example, Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM)
as well as management instruments such as balanced
scorecard (BSC) or the Human Resources
Performance Model (HPM), which will be covered in
this article.
Aims of this paper
The aims of this paper are to shift the representation of
human factors as a mere error management to an
existential part of core business and, accordingly, to
provide measurement and management tools. This is
especially important as professionals are facing
existential challenges in all branches and in aviation in
particular. In detail, the aims are:
(1) To promote the positive view of the human role
in safety.
(2) To present the HPM as an evaluation and
management tool for human factors
interventions; the HPM application to CISM in
air traffic control is briefly described as a case
study because it shows how a human factors
initiative such as CISM can improve hard (e.g.
productivity) and soft (e.g. safety culture)
performance facts of an organisation. (Soft
factors or soft facts are factors/facts that are
important for organisational success but
difficult to measure. Examples are health and
motivation of employees and also leadership
style, corporate identity and organisational
strategy. Human factors in safety is a
sub-domain of soft factors. In contrast to the
soft factors, a lot of experiences and measuring
concepts exist for hard factors/facts, such as,
 Ergonomics
for example, financial control, balance sheets,
sales figures, etc.)
(3) To learn from a similar domain, health
management in general and in the automobile
production in particular; to consider the
experience of health managers in applying the
BSC to soft factors such as health, which are
complex and difficult.
(4) To transfer the experiences from 2) and 3) to
human factors in safety and to suggest a BSC-
Downloaded by [Bundesamt fuer Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit] at 02:28 06 June 2014
like tool to human factors in safety.
The rationale of aim 3) is that both safety and
health rely on similar enablers (Vogt 2002). Safety
culture, for example, supports not only safety but also
employee health because overload and/or degraded
mode conditions are better recognised and resolved,
which reduces the stress of employees. Safety and
health also have in common the fact that they are
jeopardised by similar organisational conditions, for
example, production pressure. Therefore, health man-
agement is a similar domain from which safety
managers can learn and vice versa. The paper will try
to achieve its aims by elaborating on ideas from
previous research in the health management of
companies (Thul and Zink 2003, Gamm et al. 2007,
Möller et al. 2008) and the human factors in safety
management of an air navigation service provider
(Vogt et al. 2004, 2007a,b). This previous research
included interviews with 70 managers at all levels. At
the top management level, the necessity to integrate
human factors into safety management is recognised
and awarded a high priority (Riedle 2006).
Human factors in safety management as a competition
advantage
Human factors are traditionally seen as significant
contributors to critical incidents and accidents in
aviation. To quote from the Transport Canada
(2002): ‘Approximately 80% of aviation accidents are
primarily caused by a human error, while the remain-
ing 20% almost always involve a human factors
component’.
In the past this one-sided view has led to the
conclusion that the human part should be substituted
by presumably reliable technical solutions. The tradi-
tional trust in technical solutions is still prevalent;
however, technology once implemented is constant for
some time while human performance varies every day
(Pennig 2008). The positive view of the human in the
system would see human error in a critical incident as
the symptom of underlying technical or organisational
issues, for example, a poor human–machine interface
or understaffing. Moreover, relative to the millions of
151
safe movements every year, the number of critical
incidents or even accidents is very low. Dekker (2002)
recommends that sources of failure should be sought
not only in the single human errors of operators but
higher up, away from the local sharp end in the
organisation. Human ability to adjust performance to
changing circumstances is a key to success (Hollnagel
et al. 2006). Most of the time, things go right, but
occasionally, and inevitably, an unforeseen
combination of the same trade-offs between
thoroughness and efficiency results in critical incidents
or even accidents (Hollnagel 2009). The origin of both
success and failure is the same: system performance
(including the human), which is good or poor. Some
authors see the humans in the system as the guarantor
for safe operations in times of trouble (e.g. Vogt and
Kastner 2002). Highly selected, well-trained and
motivated staff is the central resource for safety and
performance. This is, for example, the case in air
navigation service providers, in which the air traffic
controllers (ATCOs) and their assistants always are
the central resource (Köper 2001). Certainly, they have
a lot of technical support today but they are
responsible, not the machines. Humans, operational
staff and managers in their respective domains of
responsibility, create air traffic safety, the value or
product of the business. If need be, they do so without
any technical support, for example, in the case of the
Düsseldorf airport fire in 1996 (Vogt and Kastner
2002).
The aviation branch has a long tradition in
human factors research and reliability assessment (e.g.
Kirwan 1990). Callan et al. (2004) evaluated, for
example, different task analysis approaches (see also
Kirwan and Ainsworth 1992) considering human
error assessment. However, most of this work tends
to be organised bottom-up (task-related) rather than
top-down (strategy-deduced). For efficient and
sustainable human factors in safety management, a
top-down strategy alignment as well as a bottom-up
behaviour and process consideration is needed. From
the top management strategic point of view, soft
factors such as human performance issues are often
considered less important than the hard facts in
technology and finance. The reasons for this are
manifold. They range from the long-standing
tradition in technology focus on the one hand to the
performance-related payment (based on hard
indicators) of managers on the other. As long as
managers and decision makers focus on hard short-
term financial goals, because their own success and
performance-related payment is based on this
information, soft factors will remain a lower priority.
Rost and Osterloh (2008) have shown that this
practice of priority setting does not significantly
 152 J. Vogt et al.
correlate with organisational performance. However,
detached from tradition and current priority setting,
there is another predominant issue inhibiting the
systematic and active soft factor management,
namely, the lack of broadly accepted management
tools for soft facts.
Logical configuration of the paper
The following sections will present different models
Downloaded by [Bundesamt fuer Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit] at 02:28 06 June 2014
and tools to integrate soft factors into the management
instruments, which currently mainly rely on hard facts.
Data from several case studies will be presented,
conducted in the human factors management of air
traffic control and in health management of other
domains. With the HPM, a framework will be
presented that facilitates the integrative assessment of
human factors programmes on the basis of a systema-
tic performance analysis of the whole system. Cause–
effect relationships between system elements are
defined in process models in a first step and validated
empirically in a second step. Thus, a specific repre-
sentation of the performance processes is developed,
which ranges from individual behaviour to system
performance. In the case study, the individual beha-
viour concerns the performance loss after critical air
traffic control incidents; as system performance the
resulting air traffic control safety and capacity are
considered. In analogy, HPM applied to safety in
general would connect the individual safety behaviour
with overall company safety indicators on the organi-
sational level.
The other presented approach (workplace health
management with BSC) is a so-called indicator-based
approach. The mission here is to develop a set of
indicators that are sensitive to organisational perfor-
mance and help identify driving forces as well as
bottlenecks. The indicator-based models are less
analytic than HPM as they do not ask why a certain
factor is facilitating (as driving force) or obstructing
(as bottleneck) success. Their mission is fulfilled after
statistical correlations are proven between influence
and result variables. While HPM supports the assess-
ment of single interventions or multiple intervention
programmes, the scorecard-based models focus on the
capture of the overall system status and subsequent
management of the organisation.
First, the HPM will be presented as an evaluation
and management tool and it will be shown how it was
applied to a human factors programme in air traffic
control. After this, similar approaches from other
domains, namely, integrative workplace health promo-
tion management tools and a BSC for the health
activities of an automobile manufacturer in par-
ticular, will be described. The applicability of these
management tools to aviation safety and human
factors in particular will be discussed at the end of the
paper.
Methods in aviation and similar domains
Any management tool requires three premises
(Sutherland 2009):
(1) Continuous strategy alignment, facilitated, for
example, in strategy workshops.
(2) Continuous networking between units,
facilitated, for example, by a steering group
with representatives of all organisational units,
unions and top management.
(3) Absolute management commitment on the
operational and strategic levels.
Recently, many evaluation and management tools
for single interventions or holistic intervention
programmes and also literature reviews describing and
assessing these tools were made available. The
literature review (Pennig et al. 2006) provides an
overview of management tools and case studies in
which these were applied to soft factors HR domains.
On this basis, Pennig and Vogt (2008) developed three
modes of HF/HR evaluation:
(1) The function-oriented evaluation considers the
effects, efficiency and profitability of single HF/
HR interventions on the level of the individual
worker (function).
(2) The performance-process-oriented evaluation
analyses and optimises the value creation chain.
Thus, it gives particular consideration to
process costs, process quality and process
time.
(3) The strategy-oriented evaluation investigates
whether the HF/HR work is aligned with the
organisational strategy and to what extent it
supports strategic success. Therefore, the
strategy-oriented evaluation focuses HF/HR
effects on an organisational level.
The interrelations of human-related factors and
economic success, for example, earnings before interest
and taxes, cash-flow, quality, productivity and
absenteeism, were analysed by Glaser et al. (2007) with
the result that efficient HF/HR work affects these
overall success figures. Two of the more strategic
approaches to soft factor management, HPM and
BSC, were applied and assessed in different studies by
the authors and their colleagues. These two concepts
and some application results are presented below. At
the end of the paper it is suggested that the general
 Ergonomics
concepts be adapted to the specific needs of aviation
safety.
Human Resources Performance Model and its
application in air traffic control
The HPM was recently developed (Pennig 2006; later
also called Behavioural Impact on Organisational
Success (BIOS-Model); Pennig and Vogt 2007). It
provides a structural and a process model for the
Downloaded by [Bundesamt fuer Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit] at 02:28 06 June 2014
evaluation and profitability assessment of HF/HR
programmes. The evaluation of HF/HR programmes
is seen as part of HF/HR control. The aim is to
provide information about cost, efficiency and effec-
tiveness of HF/HR management. Evaluation in this
sense serves not only for assessing but also for steering
HF/HR initiatives. In analogy to the conception of
financial control, the HF/HR evaluation coordinates
decisions and rationalises HF/HR management. An
economic evaluation links behavioural changes (due to
the HF/HR activities) with financial information in an
interdisciplinary approach (i.e. social/behavioural
sciences and economics). The links will be provided
to managers and leaders in the organisation. HPM
provides a structure for this kind of HF/HR evalua-
tion. It was developed, tested and validated in several
studies within and outside the aviation branch.
Human Resources Performance Model assumptions
HPM relies on the following assumptions:
(1) Criteria for the evaluation of HF/HR manage-
ment activities are derived from the strategy
and the success indicators of the company in
general and the company’s HF/HR manage-
ment in particular. A clear strategy is the
precondition for the planning of the evaluation.
(2) The strategic aims are to be defined on the
following three levels: the organisational level
(success of the company); the process level (the
single production/service process contributes to
company success); the functional level (the
single employee contributes to process
performance).
(3) The three levels are linked in an effect model so
that effectiveness can be evaluated on each level
and across all levels.
(4) The evaluation serves different interest groups
or stakeholders at the three levels, for example,
team leaders, who are active mainly at the
functional level, department heads, who will
mainly use process information, and strategic
leaders, who are responsible for the overall
organisational strategy and success. They have
153
target perspectives with different scopes. To
make the evaluation valuable for management,
the generated information must be aligned to
the targets of the stakeholders at the different
levels.
The assumptions enable the structure to be built
and facilitate the processes described in the following
section.
Human Resources Performance Model structure and
process
The core piece of the HPM is the seven-step process
model, as shown in Figure 1.
With the application of HPM, the importance of
employee behaviour for the company’s success will
become apparent. The effects of performance variability
in and between employees on the work process and the
company strategy will be visible. With this information,
HF/HR activities can be tailored to the company’s
strategic goals. Interdependencies between HF/HR and
technical investments will become obvious so that
synergies can be utilised and bottlenecks prevented. An
example is the introduction of a new ATM investment in
technology, which must be accompanied at the earliest
stage by a re-analysis of training requirements and
pertinent HF/HR investments to utilise the technical
advantages of the new system.
The following process should be followed:
(1) Analysis of the performance system on the
three levels of organisation, process and
function/task.
(2) The resulting understanding of bottleneck and
success factors will be the basis for investment
decisions. The detailed planning of the
investment and the implementation follows.
(3) During and after the implementation, an
assessment of costs and benefits will be
conducted. The benefit analysis needs to
distinguish between the effectiveness of the
investment (impact analysis), for example, with
regard to employee behaviour, and the
significance of these effects (profit analysis), for
example, with regard to the strategic goal of
costumer orientation.
Human Resources Performance Model-based evaluation
of the human factors programme Critical Incident Stress
Management
The method of global performance estimation was
used to carry out a profitability assessment of a CISM
programme according to Mitchell and Everly (2001).
 154 J. Vogt et al.
Downloaded by [Bundesamt fuer Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit] at 02:28 06 June 2014
Figure 1. The seven major steps of the Human Resources Performance Model frame guideline.
The programme in this case supports ATCOs in coping
with stress reactions after so-called critical incidents in
the workplace. These include, for example, all types of
incidents involving a less-than-required distance between
aircraft. As a rule, such an incident is not immediately
dangerous for air traffic as the safety distances are set
generously. However, it often represents a personally
stressful experience for an ATCO since he/she may see
his/her professionalism jeopardised. In the evaluated
CISM programme of the German air navigation service
provider DFS, elected ATCOs had become CISM peers
after several years of CISM training and practice. The
CISM peers professionally support their colleague
ATCOs after critical incidents. Within the framework
of HPM, several steps were conducted to investigate
whether the various measures in the programme were
also worthwhile for the organisation.
The evaluation began according to HPM with an
analysis of targets, interactions and bottlenecks on the
three levels of organisation, process and function/
task. Especially, the impact of performance variability
after critical incidents was considered. The analysis
included interviews of 11 chief executive officers
of major air traffic control units. Moreover, 38
operational managers and 352 ATCOs (including all
CISM peers of the 11 units) participated in the
interview and questionnaire survey. On the basis of
interviews and questionnaires, causal models
connecting ATCO behaviour and performance on the
individual, process and organisational level were
derived (Vogt and Pennig 2006, Vogt et al. 2007b).
Among the 352 participating ATCOs were 66 who
clearly described work-related incidents of aircraft
separation infringements; 48 were treated with CISM,
18 did not consult a CISM peer.
All critical incidents were described as emotionally
stressful. On a scale, the average rating of emotional
upset was 80%. The stressful period lasted on average
10.8 d. During this period, the ATCOs reported
feelings of guilt and uncertainty connected with a
more-than-required separation of aircraft.
In the week of the critical incident, the self-reported
average performance loss was 15–20%. No ATCO took
sick leave so absenteeism indicators were unaffected. The
self-reported performance loss is considered a
presenteeism effect: the ATCOs were present at work but
they did not perform as before the critical incident. The
performance loss cumulated to 5.4 d per ATCO on
 Ergonomics
average (weekly performance losses summed up over the
recovery period). The ATCOs were asked to what
percentage their performance recovery was due to
CISM and this figure was on average 36%. During this
recovery period, the ATCOs reported significant impacts
of their critical incidents. The ATCOs who participated in
the CISM programme reported reduced stress resistance
and impaired emotional stability while those without
CISM reported reduced work abilities and rigid work
execution (e.g. airspace user preferences were rejected).
Downloaded by [Bundesamt fuer Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit] at 02:28 06 June 2014
Among the impaired abilities of untreated ATCOs were
mental flexibility, selective attention and vigilance. The
impaired mental abilities of untreated ATCOs correlated
higher with work performance than the reduced stress
resistance of CISM-treated ATCOs. Hence, only the
untreated ATCO group reported impaired work such as
deficiencies in planning traffic flow, in checking data, in
gathering traffic picture information and in interacting
with technical systems.
In most cases of treated ATCOs, the CISM peers
immediately after the incident started to facilitate the
CISM one-on-one intervention (stabilising the situa-
tion; acknowledging the crisis by talking about facts
and reactions; facilitating normalisation of responses
as normal in the unusual situation; encouraging the
adaptive coping functions; recovering; referring, if
need be, to other professional help such as psychother-
apy; see also Leonhardt 2006a). In particular, ac-
knowledging the crisis is connected with significant
emotions. These are necessary for a long-sighted and
sustainable coping process but, in the short term, they
have the power to unbalance emotional stability as
could be seen in the reduced stress resistance of treated
ATCOs described above. This process is accompanied
by the CISM peers, who are well trained in observing
stress reactions and supporting recovery. They can also
assess the recovery process in general and – since they
are ATCOs themselves –work ability in particular. The
operations room supervisor usually consults the CISM
peer in the decision as to when and at which position
the affected ATCO will work again. In the past, the
DFS CISM peers after one or two consultations
observed a nearly complete recovery of affected
colleagues. This is a positive exception to CISM
practice outside air traffic control, which waits for
three to five consultations before a referral is manda-
tory (Mitchell 2008). The quicker recovery of ATCOs
could be due to their strict selection, medical require-
ments and monitoring, or the nature of critical
incidents, which usually do involve incidents and not
accidents (Leonhardt 2006b).
The ATCOs who chose not to consult a CISM
peer pondered more or less alone about the critical
incident, which cost mental capacity for work tasks.
They reduced their workload by separating aircraft
155
with much more space than required and they
rejected airspace user preferences, for example,
higher flight levels or direct routings to the
destination.
No ATCO reported a safety problem due to
impaired performance after critical incidents.
However, the moving air traffic, the airspace capacity
and cooperation between airspace sectors was
affected. Performed capacity and cooperation were
significantly more reduced in the group of untreated
ATCOs. No presenteeism effects and performance
losses were observed in a sub-group of treated
ATCOs who received immediate CISM and
spent the rest of the work day outside operations
(CISM no operations group; Vogt et al. 2007b,
Pennig 2008).
With regard to the strategic goals on the
organisational level, CISM thus contributed verifiably
to productivity. Half of the ATCOs who did not
receive CISM reported impairments of traffic flow in
the 2 weeks after the critical incident. Delays of flights
were explicitly mentioned. The productivity loss in the
untreated group was on average 10% over a period of
7.7 d. The CISM no operations group reported no
productivity loss. The prevented productivity loss in
the CISM no operations group was calculated on the
basis of controlled flight minutes and relevant air
traffic control fees; for 100 critical incidents it
cumulated to e4.68 million. On the cost side, only
e33,500 were due for giving the ATCOs time off
operations after a critical incident for the CISM
consultation and the rest of the work day.
In conclusion, the application of HPM in the study
generated cause–effect process models (Figure 2),
validating the mode of functioning of CISM, proving
its effectiveness on the individual (Figure 2 no. 1), the
operational (Figure 2 no. 2) and the strategic level
(Figure 2 no. 3). The HPM structure and process
model as well as the results of the study (and several
further studies published in Pennig and Vogt 2007,
2008) are a solid basis for an integrative management
of safety, i.e. integrating behavioural and
microeconomic approaches into human factors
management. In the following, the development of an
integrative management tool for a domain of similar
complexity – workplace health promotion – will be
described.
A balanced scorecard approach for soft factor
management
As mentioned above, there is no standard management
concept for soft factors such as health or human
factors in safety management. In this section, such a
model will be introduced on the basis of the BSC
 156 J. Vogt et al.
Downloaded by [Bundesamt fuer Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit] at 02:28 06 June 2014

Figure 2. Cause–effect process models of how Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) works on the individual
1, the operational 2 and the strategic level 3 (figure translated and modified according to Pennig 2008). ATCO ¼ air
traffic controller; HR/HF ¼ human resources/human factors.

concept. The BSC is the most prominent example for (1996) and defines four perspectives, which enable the
an advanced performance measurement system. heuristic relations of factors to be mapped within
Human-related factors contribute significantly to the and across these perspectives. In its original form the
enterprise’s performance, especially in aviation. How- four perspectives are:
ever, the amount of this contribution and the inter-
relations between specific issues of health, motivation, (1) Success and finance.
leadership, etc. and performance indicators are difficult (2) Customers and other stakeholders.
to measure and thus difficult to manage. In order to fill (3) Organisation internal processes.
this gap, the BSC concept emphasises relationships (4) Learning and growth.
between performance on the one hand and facilitating
as well as obstructing factors on the other. The BSC For each of these perspectives, the BSC
was developed in the USA by Kaplan and Norton operationally defines objectives, targets, measures and
 Ergonomics
initiatives. Figure 3 shows a picture of a BSC in which
examples of health management are used.
According to Kaplan and Norton (1996), the BSC
is a management approach helping to implement
corporate strategies. Strategy clarification, specifica-
tion and communication support the BSC develop-
ment, implementation and use. The ideal development
process (Kaplan and Norton 1996) begins with the
deduction of strategic goals of the organisation. A
specific BSC for health or human factors in safety
Downloaded by [Bundesamt fuer Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit] at 02:28 06 June 2014
management must be a sub-BSC of the organisation’s
overall BSC. Thus, it can map the cause-and-effect
relationships between health or human factors in
safety initiatives and organisational performance.
Key performance indicators must be defined for every
goal. These can be, for example, turnover on an
overall BSC, sick days on a health BSC or the number
of human errors in critical incident investigations on a
human factors in safety management BSC. Valid and
reliable performance indicators allow a comparison of
planned and actual performance. The authors follow
Kaplan and Norton’s (2004) suggestion to develop
BSCs in the direction of strategy maps (Figure 4) as
visual representations of how intangible soft factors
such as health or human factors in safety management
can best be converted into tangible outcomes. Devel-
opment programmes as well as single interventions to
promote overall health or safety performance can be
easier identified and (strategic) budgets assigned more
reasonably on the basis of the relationships displayed
on the strategy map. Before the strategy map study in
the automobile industry, some earlier and more
Figure 3. Hypothetical balanced scorecard for health management.
157
general BSC work on health is reviewed in the next
paragraph.
In cooperation with the local German health
insurance AOK, Thul and Zink (2003) developed and
evaluated workplace health management systems. The
authors followed the EFQM (European Foundation
for Quality Management) model of business
excellence. They developed a business indicator set
(BSC-like) linking employee health changes to
organisational health promotion activities. Three
stakeholder groups were considered: the society; the
company; the individual worker. Further to the HPM
study presented above, Thul and Zink (2003) added a
macroeconomic perspective in considering the society as
the next level interest group beyond the company. The
indicator set was as follows (the stakeholders are shown
in parentheses; example indicators; weights (%)):
(1) Expenditures for performance (society; e.g.
hospital expenditures, sick pay; 15%).
(2) Absenteeism rate (company; e.g. sick leave due
to muscle-skeleton or respiratory tract disease;
25%).
(3) Accident rate (company and employee;
accidents per 1000 employees, insurance pay;
25%).
(4) Employee health state (employee;
general health, pain and strain-related disease;
15%).
(5) Employee satisfaction (company and employee;
satisfaction in general, with colleagues and
leaders; 20%).
 158 J. Vogt et al.
Downloaded by [Bundesamt fuer Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit] at 02:28 06 June 2014

Figure 4. Strategy map of empirically found relationships between health and success factors in regression analysis. Red
dashed lines represent positive relations (example of a positive relation: the more health impairments are reported, the more
absenteeism is registered); solid black lines represent negative relations (example of a negative relation: the more social support is
reported, the less rework is needed). Available in colour online.

In the evaluation, the following prerequisites of a The focus of the companies differed in that some
good corporate health management system were concentrated on enablers of health and others on
studied on the basis of employee reports (weights (%)): health outcomes. Thul and Zink (2003) clustered the
companies according to their shift of focus from the
(1) Leadership (10%). first assessment to the fourth assessment. Five
(2) Strategy and planning (8%). companies focused on the outcome of health
(3) Human resources management (9%). management in the first assessment. In the fourth
(4) Other resources management (9%). assessment the outcome decreased by 3.8%. Five other
(5) Corporate health management system and companies reported that they focused on enablers and
processes (14%). outcome alike in the first assessment and the outcome
also decreased but only by 0.8%. In six companies the
The following result criteria were used (weights enablers dominated the first assessment. Here, the
(%)): outcome at the fourth assessment was best and about
8.5% higher than in the first assessment. The results of
(1) Corporate health promotion situation (24%). Thul and Zink (2003) show that companies investing in
(2) Employee satisfaction (4%). health management as enabler were significantly more
(3) Customers and suppliers health (6%). successful in reducing absenteeism and accident rate.
(4) Impact on society (6%). Moreover, employees reported that their health
problems had decreased and satisfaction increased in
Thul and Zink (2003) classified their data into the mentioned dimension.
two main categories: 1) the enablers or prerequisites Thul and Zink (2003) concluded that an indicator-
of health management, for example, the quality of based management tool combining employee reports
implemented health programmes; 2) the outcome of with objective success criteria (absenteeism, accident
the health management, for example, fewer sick days. rate) is appropriate to validate that health management
 Ergonomics
is effective (doing the right things) and efficient (doing
them well and with optimum use of resources).
Moreover, as the next section will show, soft factor
management in general and health promotion as an
example can also be linked to business success.
Transferred to human factors in safety management, a
combination of soft (e.g. employee reported safety
culture) and hard indicators (e.g. number of separation
infringements) will be a promising approach and
discussed in the last two sections of this paper.
Downloaded by [Bundesamt fuer Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit] at 02:28 06 June 2014
Beyond balanced scorecard: Integrative workplace
health management with strategy maps
The BSC approach depends on valid and reliable key
performance indicators. These are difficult to obtain in
soft factor domains such as health and human factors in
safety management. The authors therefore follow Kaplan
and Norton’s (2004) suggestion to develop BSCs further
in the direction of strategy maps (Figure 4). These are
visual representations of how intangible soft factors such
as health or human factors in safety can best be converted
into tangible outcomes. While the BSC focuses on
quantifying goal achievement in each perspective, quan-
tification is not the primary aim of the strategy map;
instead it aims at identifying relationships and using them
for goal achievement by offering orientation, by over-
coming bottlenecks and by utilising synergies. In the
following, the authors describe their experiences with the
development of a strategy map in an enterprise’s work-
place health promotion (Köper 2006, Gamm et al. 2007).
The findings might well be transferable to human factors
in safety management. However, the strategy map is a
mere framework, which – in the case of human factors in
health and safety management – has to be ‘fed’ by other
(behaviour-related) models. Therefore, a combined
model integrating the top-down strategy map and a
bottom-up approach of personal, situational and orga-
nisational premises is the best solution. HPM as described
above was combined with the top-down strategy map and
a bottom-up behavioural evaluation model (Kastner
2006). The authors of this paper participated in the
application of the combined models in a workplace health
promotion study of the automobile industry, which is
briefly described below.
The soft factor strategy map acquires, in a bottom-
up process, indicators that represent relevant human
behaviours such as soft factors determining health.
Valid and reliable data of business-management sys-
tems and employee surveys must be integrated. For this
purpose the study combined steering tools of business
management on the one hand and the behavioural
evaluation model approach on the other hand. The
continuous and systematic management concept for
workplace health promotion was developed and
159
implemented. For this purpose the strategic targets of
the manufacturer’s health system were achieved in the
different perspectives. The data basis consisted of 31
interviews with health and production managers on the
one hand and 959 questionnaires filled in by production
workers on the other. The data contained information
about:
. health performance (absenteeism, productivity,
quality);
. health customers (staff members and their state
of health);
. health processes (health impact factors due to
curative and preventive processes including
organisational and personal development);
. health potentials (knowledge and abilities of
health-promoting staff).
In order to analyse the interrelations between these
target issues (across and within the four perspectives),
the staff members were asked health-relevant questions
by means of a comprehensive questionnaire. This
questionnaire consisted of 145 items of perspectives
2–4 (stakeholders, processes, potentials). The
accessible data for perspective 1 (success) were
gathered from the enterprise’s financial control system.
The statistical interrelations were analysed by
means of regression analysis. Figure 4 displays some of
the central findings of basic linear regressions. Most of
these regressions were in line with the literature-based
expectations, though some of them deviated. The
statistical findings are discussed in detail elsewhere
(Gamm et al. 2007, Möller et al. 2008, Horvath et al.
2009). For the purpose of this paper, the study and the
derived strategy map indicate that the study concept,
including the statistical analysis, is a reliable and valid
instrument to develop an indicator-based tool for soft
factors and to re-check whether expedient and success-
related indicators are represented on the different
strategy map layers.
The workplace-health-promotion strategy map
seems to be a feasible and reasonable approach to the
consistent advancement of health-related targets and
to steer the workplace-health promotion in a
systematic, continuous and cost-effective way.
A balanced scorecard approach to manage human
factors in safety
In the aviation branch, safety was and still is the core
business. Although other key performance indicators
such as capacity, productivity and cost-effectiveness
are also gaining importance, safety will remain the
backbone of aviation. The question arises as to whether
the safety management processes can be supported by
 160 J. Vogt et al.
the effective, systematic and continuous use of
management models described above. The results of
the health promotion BSC and the HPM application to
CISM suggest a BSC or HPM approach to human
factors in safety management as well. Safety issues and
their implications are – like health – complex and,
especially, human factors in safety is important but
difficult to manage. On the other hand it is of
fundamental importance to the aviation branch. To
manage safety both the hard technical and the soft
Downloaded by [Bundesamt fuer Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit] at 02:28 06 June 2014
human factors need to be measured. Hard factors are,
for example, reporting and assessment of safety
occurrences as described in the EUROCONTROL
Safety Regulation Requirements ESARR 2:
. . . as a priority, the successful implementation of
harmonised occurrence reporting and assessment
schemes. Such schemes will lead to more systematic
visibility of safety occurrences and their causes, and
will allow identification of appropriate corrective
actions as well as areas where flight safety could be
improved by changes to the ATM system.
Many aviation organisations systematically moni-
tor these kinds of hard data on a regular basis. More
difficult and an explicit weakness of BSC-like
approaches (Horvath and Partners 2003) is the
monitoring and managing of soft factors. A good
example here is safety culture because it positively
interacts with human factors initiatives such as CISM.
It could be shown that ATCOs who never consulted a
CISM peer reported improved handling of errors,
improved communication and safety culture due to
CISM in their unit (Vogt et al. 2004). An evaluation of
CISM implementation in an air traffic control unit
with good vs. one with poor safety culture revealed
that a good safety culture significantly improves CISM
implementation and innovation in general (Mosmann
2009). In his doctoral thesis, Pennig (2008) traced back
safety performance and business success in general to
CISM-induced safety leadership. Taken together, the
three publications document that the synergy of CISM
and safety culture enable safety performance (Vogt
et al. 2007a). Thus, safety culture enhancement and
monitoring would be an important output of a human
factors-oriented BSC/HPM approach in safety man-
agement. The following paragraph elaborates on
safety culture to illustrate one probable positive
outcome of integrated human factors in safety
management.
Safety culture is defined as:
The product of individual and group values, attitudes,
competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an
organisation’s health and safety management.
(EUROCONTROL/FAA 2008)
A lack of safety culture was identified as one
contributing factor in many accidents: The
Chernobyl nuclear power Plant disaster
(International Atomic Energy Agency 1986); the
King’s Cross underground station fire (Fennell 1998);
the loss of the Herald of Free Enterprise (Sheen
1987); the Clapham Junction train accident (Hidden
1989); the loss of the space shuttles Challenger
(Rogers 1986) and Columbia (Gehman 2003); the
mid-air collision of Überlingen (Leonhardt et al.
2006). Safety culture interacts with human factors
initiatives and organisational performance in general
(Vogt et al. 2007a). Therefore, safety culture is an
important part of human factors in safety
management. It is an important aspect of safety
culture that mangers of high reliability organisations
always decide in favour of safety: ‘An effective
Safety Culture produces a belief that when safety
and production goals conflict, managers will ensure
that safety will predominate’ Flin (2006).
Hollnagel et al. (2006) underline that safety culture
is ‘what a system does rather than has’ and it becomes
clear that it is not sufficient to only have human factors
and safety initiatives. They need to be put into
practice, effectively and sustainably, i.e. integrated,
networked and actively managed. A BSC/HPM-based
human factors in safety management is an important
contribution to doing this because it will help to find
the enablers of safety and to systematically allocate
resources to them.
Conclusions
BSC/HPM-based human factors in safety
management must be tailor-made in accordance with
the strategic safety targets of the organisation it is
developed for. This is the basic finding of both the
HPM and the BSC study described above. Ideally, the
human factors in safety management BSC/HPM is
top-down, derived from the organisation’s overall
BSC. In analogy to the classic BSC structure, the
following perspectives focusing on safety can be
defined:
. ‘Success and finance’ contains key performance
indicators for safety results, for example, the
number of level busts or separation
infringements. Also, customer ratings, i.e. safety
levels and safety efficiency perceived by airline
pilots and airline managers, could be considered
in this perspective.
. ‘Stakeholders’ includes all safety-relevant
cultures, attitudes and behaviours of operational
staff such as ATCOs and how they perceive the
support offered by the safety processes.
 Ergonomics
. The ‘processes’ belong to the third perspective and
contain all safety programmes, for example, hu-
man error analysis (HERA) (EUROCONTROL
2002, Isaac et al. 2002) and CISM (Leonhardt and
Vogt 2006). The resources spent and the efficiency
of these processes could be potential indicators.
HERA and CISM results can lead to further
initiatives, such as human–machine interface
improvements, if they reveal, for example, that
critical incidents are connected to no or late
Downloaded by [Bundesamt fuer Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit] at 02:28 06 June 2014
detection of visual information (as a symptom of
underlying human–machine interface problems).
. The fourth perspective ‘employees and potentials’
incorporates, for example, indicators of the
qualifications and power of safety and human
factors managers as well as financial budgets for
the development of human factors in safety
management.
It is currently planned to develop the four
perspectives of a BSC for human factors in safety
management in one participating aviation organisa-
tion. The definition of the strategic targets and suitable
indicators to measure them needs to be developed in a
top-down process with all relevant stakeholders (e.g.
employees, unions, managers, departments, customers)
of this organisation.
A management tool for human factors in safety –
based on the experience of the health BSC and the
HPM application described above – will facilitate
integrated human factors in safety management. A
multitude of human factors and safety initiatives was
developed and is used in today’s operation of aviation
organisations (Vogt and Leonhardt 2005). These
initiatives are, however, not well networked. A manage-
ment instrument, combining frame models of business
administration and behaviour-related concepts (as
suggested in this paper), will support the coordinated
and synergetic use of soft factors. At the same time, it
will draw top management’s attention to the impor-
tance of soft factors because they are made measurable
and manageable. A human factors in safety manage-
ment tool will help managers to identify the drivers of
human contributions to safety and to allocate resources
to them (Sveiby 1997). It will, so to speak, help identify
the long- and short-term ‘ingredients’, which – well-
dosed and interacting – enable safe operations and help
avoid incidents/accidents. Thus, managers will be able
to steer effectively the human factors in safety manage-
ment of their organisation by a few selected key
performance indicators. The identification of these
leverage points in a validated, interconnected cause and
effect framework (the human factors in safety manage-
ment BSC/HPM) is thus an important challenge of
future ATM.
161
References
Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin, 2008.
Scoring system in terms of competitiveness based on human
resource factors [online]. BAuA Research Project 2127.
Dortmund: BAuA. Available from: http://www.baua.de/
nn_7554/en/Research/Research-Project/f2127.html?__
nnn¼true [Accessed 5 October 2009].
Bell, J.L., et al., 2008. Evaluation of a comprehensive slip,
trip and fall prevention programme for hospital
employees. Ergonomics, 51 (12), 1906–1925.
Beves, D., 2003. Ergonomics – costs and benefits revisited.
Applied Ergonomics, 34 (5), 491–496.
Beves, D. and Slade, I.M., 1970. Ergonomics – costs and
benefits. Applied Ergonomics, 1, 79–84.
Callan, K., et al., 2004. Review of task analysis techniques for
use with human error assessment techniques within the
ATC domain. EUROCONTROL Report EEC-2004–061.
Brétigny: EEC.
Chang, W.R., 2008. Preface to the Special Issue on slips, trips
and falls. Ergonomics, 51 (12), 1797–1798.
Dekker, S.W.A., 2002. The re-invention of human error.
Technical Report 2002–01. Ljungbyhed, Sweden. Lund
University School of Aviation.
Dekker, S.W.A., 2006. The field guide to understanding human
error. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Debels, P., 2007. Air traffic management validations.
Presentation held at the Hungarian Aeronautical Research
Workshop, November 2007. Budapest:
EUROCONTROL CEATS Research Development and
Simulation Centre.
EUROCONTROL, 2002. Technical review of human
performance models and taxonomies of human error in
ATM (HERA). Brussels: EUROCONTROL.
EUROCONTROL, 2003. Air traffic management strategy for
the years 2000þ. Brussels: EUROCONTROL.
EUROCONTROL/FAA, 2008. Safety culture in air traffic
management: A white paper. Brussels/Washington:
EUROCONTROL/FAA.
Fennell, D., 1998. Investigation into the King’s Cross
underground fire. London: Department of Transport, Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office.
Flin, R., 2006. Erosion of managerial resilience: From VASA
to NASA. In: E. Hollnagel, D.D. Woods, and N.
Leveson, eds. Resilience engineering, concepts and
precepts. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Gamm, N., et al., 2007. A performance measurement
framework for workplace health promotion in
manufacturing environments. First exploratory insights
from the automobile industry. Presentation held at the
European Accounting Association EAA annual congress,
February 2007, in Lisbon. Brussels, EAA.
Gehman, H.W., 2003. Report of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board, volume I [online]. Available from:
http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html
[Accessed 5 October 2009].
Glaser, J., Hornung, S., and Labes, M., 2007. Indikatoren für
die Humanressourcenförderung – Humankapital messen,
fördern und wertschöpfend einsetzen. Bremerhaven: Neuer
Wirtschaftsverlag.
Hidden, A., 1989. Investigation into the Clapham Junction
railway accident. London: Department of Transport, Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office.
Hollnagel, E., 2009. The ETTO principle – efficiency-
thoroughness trade-off: Why things that go right
sometimes go wrong. Aldershot: Ashgate.
 162 J. Vogt et al.
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D.D., and Leveson, N., 2006.
Resilience engineering. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Horváth, P. and Partners, 2003. Study 100*balanced scor-
ecard. Stuttgart: Horváth and Partners.
Horváth, P., et al., 2009. Evaluation der betrieblichen
Gesundheitsförderung mit Hilfe der Balanced Scorecard
am Beispiel eines Unternehmens in der Automobilindustrie.
Dortmund: Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und
Arbeitsmedizin.
International Atomic Energy Agency, 1986. Summary report
on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl
Accident. Vienna: International Safety Advisory
Downloaded by [Bundesamt fuer Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit] at 02:28 06 June 2014
Group.
Isaac, A., Shorrock, S., and Kirwan, B., 2002. Human error
in European air traffic management: the HERA project.
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 75 (2), 257–
272.
Kaplan, R.S. and Norton, D.P., 1996. The balanced scorecard –
translating strategy into action. Boston: Harvard Business
School Press.
Kaplan, R.S. and Norton, D.P., 2004. Strategy Maps – Der
Weg von immaterialen Werten zum materiallen Erfolg.
Stuttgart: Schäffer Poeschel.
Kastner, M., 2006. BEM, Behaviour Evaluation Model.
Forschungs- und Arbeitsbericht des IAPAM, 1. Aufl.,
Herdecke: Maori.
Kirwan, B., 1990. Human reliability assessment. In: J.R.
Wilson and E.N. Corlett, eds. Evaluation of human work,
chapter 28. London: Taylor and Francis.
Kirwan, B. and Ainsworth, L.K., 1992. A guide to task
analysis. London: Taylor and Francis Ltd.
Köper, B., 2001. Neue Anforderungen und Beanspruchung in
der Flugsicherung durch moderne technische Systeme.
Doctoral thesis. University of Dortmund. Available
from: http://eldorado.uni-dortmund.de: 8080/FB14/lg3/
forschung/2001/Koeper/Koeperunt.pdf [Accessed 5 Oc-
tober 2009].
Köper, B., 2006. More health can mean higher profits.
Dortmund: BAuA.
Leonhardt, J., 2006a. Critical incident stress management
intervention methods. In: J. Leonhardt and J. Vogt, eds.
Critical incident stress management (CISM) in aviation.
Aldershot: Ashgate, 53–63.
Leonhardt, J., 2006b. Critical incident stress management in
Air Traffic Control (ATC). In: J. Leonhardt and J. Vogt,
eds. Critical incident stress management (CISM) in
aviation. Aldershot: Ashgate, 81–91.
Mitchell, J.T., 2008. Critical incident stress management
refresher course, December 2008. Langen, Germany:
DFS.
Mitchell, J.T. and Everly, G.S., Jr., 2001. Critical incident
stress debriefing: An operations manual for CISD, defusing
and other group crisis intervention services, third edition.
Ellicott City, MD: Chevron.
Möller, K., et al., 2008. Strategische Steuerung der betrie-
blichen Gesundheitsförderung mit Strategy Maps. Zeits-
chrift für Management, 3/2008, 225–280.
Mosmann, H., 2009. Zum Zusammenhang zwischen Be-
triebsklima und der organisationsinternen Diffusion von
Innovationen – eine Evaluation am Beispiel des ‘Critical
Incident Stress Managements’ (CISM) in der DFS
Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH. Thesis (Master of Eva-
luation). Saarbrücken.
Pennig, S., 2006. HPM: A model to relate costs, benefits, and
strategic impact of human resource programs. Perfor-
mance Improvement, 45 (6), 17–22.
Pennig, S., 2008. Verhaltensvariabilität in erfolgskritischen
Aufgabenbereichen: Eine strategische Steuerungsgröße?
Entwicklung und Testung eines Rahmenmodells zur
ökonomischen Evaluation von Personalmaßnahmen
[online]. Unpublished doctoral thesis. University of
Dortmund. Available from https://eldorado.uni-
dortmund. de/dspace/bitstream/2003/25071/1/
Gesamtdokument%20 Endfassung.pdf
[Accessed 5 October 2009].
Pennig, S. and Vogt, J., 2007. Entwicklung einer
Evaluationsroutine zur Prüfung der Nachhaltigkeit von
Vorhaben im Rahmen des Modellprogramms zur
Bekämpfung arbeitsbedingter Erkrankungen.
Abschlussbericht F2145. Berlin: Bundesanstalt für
Arbeitsschutz und -medizin (BAuA).
Pennig, S. and Vogt, J., 2008. Profitability assessment and
economic evaluation of human performance management
programmes - Guidelines and tools [online]. Dortmund:
Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin
(BAuA). Available from: http://www.baua.de/nn_21712/
en/Publications/Expert-Papers/F2105–3,xv¼vt.pdf
[Accessed 5 October 2009].
Riedle, R., 2006. Importance of CISM in modern Air Traffic
Management (ATM). In: J. Leonhardt and J. Vogt, eds.
Critical incident stress management (CISM) in aviation.
Aldershot: Ashgate, 5–13.
Rogers, W.P., 1986. Report on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident. Presidential commission on the space
shuttle Challenger accident, 6 June 1986, Washington,
DC.
Rost, K. and Osterloh, M., 2008. Management fashion pay-
for-performance for CEOs. In: M. Vartiainen, C. Antoni,
X. Baeten, N. Hakonen, R. Lucas, and H. Thierry, eds.
Reward management – Facts and trends in Europe.
Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers.
SESAR Consortium, 2006. Air transport framework: the
performance target. D2, DLM-0607–001–02–00a.
Brussels: European Commission and EURO
CONTROL.
Sheen, M.J., 1987. M.V. Herald of Free Enterprise. London:
Department of Transport, Her Majesty’s Stationery
Office.
Stanton, N.A. and Baber, C., 2003. On the cost-
effectiveness of ergonomics. Applied Ergonomics, 34 (5),
407–411.
Sutherland, P., 2009. Organisation focus [online]. Available
from: http://suthassociates.com/service1.html [Accessed
29 May 2009].
Sveiby, K.E., 1997. The new organisational wealth: Managing
and measuring knowledge-based assets. San Francisco:
Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
Thul, M.J. and Zink, K.J., 2003. Evaluation of workplace
health-management systems. In: H. Strasser, K. Kluth,
H. Rausch, and H. Bubb, eds. Quality of work and
products in enterprises of the future, 49.
Frühjahrskongress der Gesellschaft für
Arbeitswissenschaft, 7–9 May 2003 Munich. Stuttgart:
Ergonomia, 845–848.
Transport Canada, 2002. Aviation safety letter, 3/2002
[online]. Available from: http://www.tc.gc.ca/
civilaviation/systemsafety/ newsletters/tp185/3–02/
399.htm [Accessed 27 August 2007].
Vogt, J., 2002. Contributions of psychology to the sustainable
development of air traffic management. Professorial thesis
(Habilitationsschrift), Technical University of
Dortmund, Germany.
 Ergonomics
Vogt, J. and Kastner, M., 2002. Psychophysiological
responses under exceptional stress: Air traffic control
during the Duesseldorf airport fire on April 11th 1996.
Journal of Human Factors and Aerospace Safety, 2 (1),
87–96.
Vogt, J. and Leonhardt, J., 2005. Increasing safety by stress
management. Safety Science Monitor, 9 (1). Article 6.
Vogt, J., Leonhardt, J., and Pennig, S., 2007a. Safety culture
and organisational performance. FAA EUROCON-
TROL R&D-Seminar. October 2007, Rome, Brussels:
EUROCONTROL.
Downloaded by [Bundesamt fuer Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit] at 02:28 06 June 2014
View publication stats
163
Vogt, J. and Pennig, S., 2006. Cost-benefit-analyses of critical
incident stress management (CISM). In: J. Leonhardt
and J. Vogt, eds. Critical incident stress management
(CISM) in aviation. Aldershot: Ashgate, 153–170.
Vogt, J., Pennig, S., and Leonhardt, J., 2007b. Critical
Incident Stress Management in air traffic control and its
benefits. Air Traffic Control Quarterly, 15 (2), 127–156.
Vogt, J., et al., 2004. Economic evaluation of the Critical
Incident Stress Management Program. The International
Journal of Emergency Mental Health, 6 (4), 185–196.