HON.

JUSTICE PERLAS-BERNABE DECISIONS ON

EVIDENCE
(2012 to 2018)

2012 Decisions

BANGIS V. HEIRS OF ADOLFO

G.R. No. 190875, 13 June 2012
Best Evidence Rule

FACTS: Sps Serafin, Sr. and Saludada Adolfo were the original registered owners of a lot in
Valencia, Malaybalay, Bukdinon (the “subject property”). In 1970, Adolfo’s wife died. In 1975,
Adolfo allegedly mortgaged the subject property to Aniceto Bangis who immediately took
possession of the land. The said transaction was, however, not reduced into writing. When
Adolfo died, his heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition; hence, the said property was
subdivided and separate titles were issued in names of the Heirs of Adolfo.

In June 1998, the Heirs of Adolfo expressed their intention to redeem the mortgaged
property from Bangis but the latter refused, claiming that the transaction between him and
Adolfo was one of sale. Hence, the Heirs of Adolfo filed a complaint before the RTC to annul
the deed of sale and declaration of the purported contact of sale as antichresis.

During the trial, one of the Heirs of Bangis, Rodolfo Bangis, presented a photocopy of an
Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Deed of Sale dated December 30, 1971 for the purpose
of proving the sale of the subject lot by Adolfo and his heirs in favor of his predecessors-in-
interest, Aniceto Bangis and Segundino Cortel. Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of the
Heirs of Adolfo declaring the transaction to be a mere mortgage or antichresis and since the
Heirs of Bangis have been in possession of the subject property from 1975 to 2005 enjoying all
its fruits and income, the loan is deemed extinguished.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in not giving probative weight to the Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Absolute Deed of Sale to support a finding of sale between Bangis and Adolfo?

HELD: No. The Heirs of Bangis presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Deed of
Sale dated December 30, 1971 to justify their claimed ownership and possession of the subject
land. However, notwithstanding that the subject of inquiry is the very contents of the said
document, only its photocopy was presented at the trial without providing sufficient
justification for the production of secondary evidence, in violation of the best evidence rule
embodied under Section 3 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

The bare testimony of one of the Heirs of Bangis, Rodolfo Bangis, that the subject
document was only handed to him by his father, Aniceto, with the information that the original
thereof "could not be found" was insufficient to justify its admissibility. Moreover, the
identification made by Notary Public Atty. Valentin Murillo that he notarized such document
cannot be given credence as his conclusion was not verified against his own notarial
records. Besides, the Heirs of Bangis could have secured a certified copy of the deed of sale from
the Assessor's Office that purportedly had its custody in compliance with Section 7, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.

In sum, the Heirs of Bangis failed to establish the existence and due execution of the
subject deed on which their claim of ownership was founded. Consequently, the RTC and CA
were correct in affording no probative value to the said document.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF AMPARO IN

FAVOR OF LILIBETH O. LADAGA v. MAJ. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU
G.R. No. 189689-91, 13 November 2012
Substantial Evidence

FACTS: Petitioners share the common circumstance of having their names included in what is
alleged to be a JCICC “AGILA” 3rd Quarter 2007 Order of Battle Validation Result of
the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division (10th ID). They perceive that by the inclusion of
their names in the said Order of Battle (OB List), they become easy targets of unexplained
disappearances or extralegal killings – a real threat to their life, liberty and security.

Atty. Ladaga first came to know of the existence of the OB List from an undisclosed
source on 21 May 2009. In the OB List, it was reflected that the ultimate goal is to try to oust
PGMA on 30 November 2007. On the other hand, Atty. Angela Librado-Trinidad delivered a
privileged speech before the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to demand the removal
of her name from said OB List. The Commission on Human Rights, for its part, announced the
conduct of its own investigation into the matter.

According to Atty. Librado-Trinidad, in the course of the performance of her duties and
functions, she has not committed any act against national security that would justify the
inclusion of her name in the said OB List. She said that sometime in May 2008, two suspicious-
looking men tailed her vehicle. Also, on June 23, 2008 three men tried to barge into their house.
Meanwhile, Atty. Carlos Isagani T. Zarate was informed that he was also included on the OB
List. In his petition, he alleged that the inclusion of his name in the said OB List was due to his
advocacies as a public interest or human rights lawyer.

The Petitioners assert that the OB List is really a military hit-list as allegedly shown by
the fact that there have already been three victims of extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths
can be linked directly to the OB List. On 16 June 2009 the petitioners filed before the RTC a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo. The RTC subsequently issued separate Writs of
Amparo, directing the respondents to file a verified written return. In the return of the

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respondents, they denied authorship of the OB List, and alleged that petitioners failed to show
that they were responsible for the alleged threats. After submission of the parties’ respective
Position Papers, the RTC issued Orders finding no substantial evidence to show that the
perceived threat to petitioners’ life, liberty and security was attributable to the unlawful act or
omission of the respondents. The privilege of the Writ was therefore denied.

ISSUES: Does the totality of evidence satisfy the degree of proof required under the Writ of
Amparo?

HELD: No, the evidence does not satisfy degree of proof for the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo. The Writ of Amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making
powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced disappearances and
extrajudicial killings. It is an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, or threats
to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary character, is
not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty.
Justifying allegations must support the issuance of the writ, on the following matters:

1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

2. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the
threat, act or omission;
3. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent and
how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
4. The investigation conducted specifying the names, personal circumstances and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals;
5. Actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible
for the threat, act or omission;
6. The relief prayed for.

Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the parties shall establish their claims by
substantial evidence, and if the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence,
the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. Petitioners sought to prove that the inclusion of their
names in the OB List presented a real threat to their security by attributing the violent deaths of
the other known activists to the inclusion of their names or the names of their militant
organizations in the subject OB List. However, the existence of the OB List could not be directly
associated with the menacing behaviour of suspicious men or the violent deaths of certain
personalities.

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 Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their names in the OB List is as real a threat
as that which brought ultimate harm to the other victims without corroborative evidence from
which it can be presumed that the suspicious deaths of these three people were in fact, on
account of their militant affiliations. Petitioners therefore were not able to prove by substantial
evidence that there was an actual threat to their rights to life, liberty and security. The mere
inclusion of their names in the OB List is not sufficient enough evidence for the issuance of the
Writ of Amparo.

2013 Decisions

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. P/SUPT. ARTEMIO E. LAMSEN, PO2 ANTHONY D.

ABULENCIA, and SPO1 WILFREDO L. RAMOS
G.R. No. 198338, 13 November 2013
Circumstantial Evidence

FACTS: Appellants Artemio E. Lamsen (“Lamsen”), PO2 Anthony D. Abulencia (“Abulencia”),

and SPO1 Wilfredo L. Ramos (“Ramos”) were convicted for the crime of robbery with homicide,
which was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

In arguing for his acquittal, Abulencia contends that the trial court convicted him on the basis of
mere circumstantial evidence, which is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt.

HELD: Yes, the Supreme Court held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the guilt
of an accused.

Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that indirectly proves a fact in issue through
an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. It is sufficient for
conviction if: [a] there is more than one (1) circumstance; [b] the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and [c] the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial

evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The test
to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the
accused is that the series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with each other and
that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused's guilt and inconsistent
with the accused's innocence.

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Contrary to Abulencia's contention in his brief, there are numerous circumstances sufficient to
prove his participation in the crime, to wit: [a] it was established that Lamsen was an active
participant to the crime; [b] Lamsen and Abulencia both admitted they were together in the
vicinity of the crime scene when it happened; [c] his car with plate number PEW 781 was
subjected to a flash alarm in connection with the crime; [d] Abulencia admitted he was driving
his car when the flash alarm was raised and [e] the dents and bluish green streaks of paint
found on Sy's jeep matched the dents and scratches found on Abulencia's car. The combination
of the aforementioned circumstances forms an unbroken chain which irrefragably points to
Abulencia as among the perpetrators of the crime.

RAMON MARTINEZ y GOCO/RAMON GOCO y MARTINEZ @ MON v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 198694, 13 February 2013
Exclusionary Rule

FACTS: Petitioner Ramon Martinez y Goco (“Martinez”) was convicted before the trial Court
for violation of Section 11, R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.”

In arguing for his innocence, Martinez contends that there was no search incidental to a lawful
arrest because he was not committing any crime when the purported arrest transpired. Hence,
the pieces of evidence seized are inadmissible in evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the pieces of evidence seized are inadmissible in the absence of any
showing that its seizure was not incidental to a lawful arrest.

HELD: Yes, the Court held that the pieces of evidence are inadmissible in evidence.

Enshrined in the fundamental law is a person’s right against unwarranted intrusions by

the government. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) states
that:

Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same sacrosanct right remains revered, effects
secured by government authorities in contravention of the foregoing are rendered inadmissible

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in evidence for any purpose, in any proceeding. In this regard, Section 3(2), Article III of the
Constitution provides that:

2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section [referring

to Section 2] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Commonly known as the "exclusionary rule," the above-cited proscription is not,

however, an absolute and rigid one. As found in jurisprudence, the traditional exceptions are
customs searches, searches of moving vehicles, seizure of evidence in plain view, consented
searches, "stop and frisk" measures and searches incidental to a lawful arrest. This last-
mentioned exception is of particular significance to this case and thus, necessitates further
disquisition.

A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried out
under the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which requires that the
apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person caught in
flagrante delicto. To be sure, the term probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested. In this light, the determination of the existence or absence of
probable cause necessitates a re-examination of the factual incidents.

2014 Decisions

CANDELARIA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 209386, 8 December 2014
Circumstancial Evidence

FACTS: The accused was employed as a driver of Unioil. One day, the accused was tasked to
deliver 14,000 liters of diesel to Viron Transport. Romano, the helper assigned to the accused
returned to Unioil to report that he was threatened by the latter with a balisong. The police
authorities were then informed. After a few days, the truck which contained the liters of diesel
was found abandoned in Calamba, Laguna empty. Thus, the accused was charged with
Qualified Theft. The accused demurred to the prosecution’s evidence arguing the lack of direct
testimony pointing to him as the perpetrator given that Romano’s statements are considered
hearsay due to the latter’s untimely demise. The RTC and the CA found the accused guilty as
charged.

ISSUE: Did the CA correctly find Candelaria guilty of the crime of Qualified Theft on the basis
of circumstantial evidence?

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HELD: Yes. The elements of Qualified Theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Article
309 29 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are: (a) the taking of personal property;
(b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be
done without the owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused only if the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person; the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and, at the
same time, inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt. Corollary thereto, a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent
with innocence.

Here, the RTC, as correctly affirmed by the CA, found that the attendant circumstances
in this case, as duly established by the prosecution's evidence, amply justify the conviction of
Candelaria under the evidentiary threshold of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. These
circumstances are: (a) on August 23, 2006, Viron ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel from Lao's
Unioil; (b) as driver of Unioil, Candelaria was given the task of delivering the same to Viron in
Laon Laan, Manila; (c) Candelaria and his helper Romano left the company premises on the
same day on board the lorry truck bearing plate number PTA-945 containing the diesel fuel; (d)
at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Viron informed Lao that its order had not
yet been delivered; (e) Candelaria failed to reply to Lao's phone calls; (f) later in the day,
Romano returned to the Unioil office sans Candelaria and reported that the latter threatened
him with a weapon; (g) Lao reported the incident to the MPD and Camp Crame; (h) the missing
lorry truck was subsequently found in Laguna, devoid of its contents; and (i) Candelaria had
not reported back to Unioil since then.

Threading these circumstances together, the Court perceives a congruent picture that the
crime of Qualified Theft had been committed and that Candelaria had perpetrated the same. To
be sure, this determination is not sullied by the fact that Candelaria's companion, Romano, had
died before he could testify as to the truth of his allegation that the former had threatened him
with a balisong on August 23, 2006. It is a gaping hole in the defense that the diesel fuel was
admittedly placed under Candelaria's custody and remains unaccounted for. Candelaria did not
proffer any persuasive reason to explain the loss of said goods and merely banked on a general
denial, which, as case law holds, is an inherently weak defense due to the ease by which it can
be concocted. With these, and, moreover, the tell-tale fact that Candelaria has not returned or
reported back to work at Unioil since the incident, the Court draws no other reasonable

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inference other than that which points to his guilt. Verily, while it is true that flight per se is not
synonymous with guilt, unexplained flight nonetheless evinces guilt or betrays the existence of
a guilty conscience, especially when taken together with all the other circumstantial evidence
attendant in this case. Thus, all things considered, Candelaria's conviction for the crime of
Qualified Theft stands.

OMNI HAULING SERVICES, INC. v. BON

G.R. No. 199388, 3 September 2014
Substantial Evidence Required in Administrative Bodies

FACTS: Omni Hauling Services, Inc. (Omni) was awarded a one (1) year service contract by
Quezon City to provide garbage hauling services for the period July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003. For
this purpose, Omni hired respondents as garbage truck drivers and paleros who were then paid
on a per trip basis. When the service contract was renewed for another year Omni required each
of the respondents to sign employment contracts which provided that they will be "re-hired"
only for the duration of the same period. However, respondents refused to sign the
employment contracts, claiming that they were regular employees since they were engaged to
perform activities which were necessary and desirable to Omni's usual business or trade. For
this reason, Omni terminated the employment of respondents which, in turn, resulted in the
filing of cases for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of Emergency Cost of Living Allowance
(ECOLA) and 13th month pay, and actual, moral, and exemplary damages. The LA and NLRC
ruled that respondents were project employees which the CA reversed.

ISSUE: Is the CA correct in reversing the NLRC?

HELD: Yes.

In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter
alia, its findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by substantial
evidence. This requirement of substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court which provides that "[i]n cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion."

Guided by these considerations, the Court finds that the CA correctly granted
respondents' certiorari petition since the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it held that
respondents were project employees despite petitioners' failure to establish their project
employment status through substantial evidence.

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HEIRS OF VICTORINO SARILI v. LAGROSA1
G.R. No. 193517, 15 January 2014
Proof of Private Document (Defective Notarization)

RURAL BANK OF CABADBARAN, INC. v. MELECIO-YAP

G.R. No. 178451, 30 July 2014
Proof of Private Document

FACTS: Erna, Jorgita, Lilia, Reynaldo, Rosie, and Sarah Sarah are the children of the late
spouses Isaac and Trinidad Melecio (“Melecio Heirs”). They inherited a 3,044 square meter-
residential lot in Tolosa, Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, together with the ancestral house and
two (2) other structures erected thereon (“subject properties”). On August 24, 1990, the Melecio
Heirs purportedly executed a notarized Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing Erna to
apply for a loan with Rural Bank of Cabadbaran, Inc. (RBCI) and mortgage the subject
properties. Erna applied for and was granted a commercial loan by RBCI. The loan was secured
by a Real Estate Mortgage over the subject properties. Upon Erna’s default, RBCI extra-
judicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties with RCBI as the highest bidder. The
respondents denied any knowledge of the loan and the execution of the SPA claiming that their
signatures thereon were forged; hence, they filed an action to annul documents and recover
ownership of the subject properties.

ISSUE: Is the presumption of regularity accorded to the notarized SPA rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence?

HELD: Yes. Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it
with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in
their favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence. However, the presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only
so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. A defective notarization will
strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private document. Hence, when
there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure
to test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence.

In the present case, RBCI failed to show that the subject SPA which it relied upon as
proof of Erna's ostensible authority to mortgage the entirety of the subject properties was
regularly notarized. Aside from the respondents who denied having participated in the
execution and notarization of the subject SPA, the witnesses to the instrument categorically

1 Please see Spouses Reyes v. Malance, August 2016.

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denied having appeared before Notary Public on August 24, 1990 to witness the respondents
sign the SPA in the notary public's presence. Despite this irregularity, RBCI did not present
Atty. Famador to refute the same and establish the authenticity of the contested SPA. It may not
be amiss to point out that the principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents.
When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of a document under his hand
and seal, he gives the document the force of evidence.

Thus, having failed to sufficiently establish the regularity in the execution of the SPA,
the presumption of regularity accorded by law to notarized documents can no longer apply and
the questioned SPA is to be examined under the parameters of Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court which provides that "[b]efore any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either (a) [b]y anyone who saw the
document executed or written, or (b) [b]y evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker."

Correspondingly, the burden falls upon RBCI to prove the authenticity and due
execution of the subject SPA. In the case at bar, RBCI merely relied on the presumption of
authenticity and due execution accorded to a notarized document, without presenting any other
evidence to bolster their case. However, these presumptions had been overcome and effectively
negated by respondents' claims of forgery which had been duly substantiated by them through
their testimonial and documentary evidence. Hence, absent any cogent reason to the contrary,
the Court hereby sustains the CA's conclusion that respondents were able to prove, by
preponderance of evidence, that the subject SPA was a forgery.

PEOPLE v. VITERBO Y REALUBIT

G.R. No. 203434, 23 July 2014
Chain of Custody

FACTS: The accused-appellants in this case were brothers who were arrested in a buy-buys
operation conducted by the police officers for sellig shabu. In their defense, the accused
claimed that they were victims of police harassment and frame-up. Thus, an information for
violation of Section 5, in relation to paragraph (b) of Section 26, Article II of RA 9165 (Dangerous
Drugs Act) was filed against the accused as co-conspirators. The RTC and the CA convicted the
accused.

ISSUE: Is the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD: No. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165, the following elements must concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and seller, object,
and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. As the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is

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therefore essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over
the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was
presented in court as proof of the corpus delict.

In relation thereto, Section 21 (1), Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure on the
chain of custody of confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs, viz.:

Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the

drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted
at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the

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 seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not

automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, this is true only
when (a) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Hence, any divergence from the
prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value
of the confiscated items.

Here, it has been established that P/Insp. Clemen received the plastic sachets from their
clerk, Ofelia Garcia (Garcia), who, in turn, accepted it together with the laboratory request from
a representative of the PDEA. However, the records are devoid of evidence to indicate the PDEA
member/agent who specifically delivered the items to her.

Clearly, while the custodial link began and ended with SPO4 Cardona, there were
substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized items, particularly the events that
transpired from the time the items left the hands of SPO4 Cardona on the night of the arrest and
turned over to the possession of "Captain Vargas," as well as the identity of the PDEA agent
who brought them together with the laboratory request to Garcia, the receiving clerk of the
crime laboratory, in the morning of the following day. While the laboratory request was
prepared and signed by PS/Insp. Vargas, whom the Court reasonably presumes to be the same
"Captain Vargas" referred to in SPO4 Cardona's testimony, there is dearth of evidence showing
that he was the same person who brought the items to Garcia, taking into consideration the fact
that the laboratory request accompanying the items was signed/delivered by "PO2
Zamora." These are crucial missing links in this case which should have been clearly accounted
for in order to establish the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.

The prosecution's case is further weakened by the fact that the seized items were
delivered not on the same day of the buy-bust operation, but only the following day. To the
Court's mind, the considerable amount of time that had transpired from the conduct of the buy-
bust operation until the same were brought for laboratory examination, especially when viewed
together with the above-mentioned considerations, figures into a gaping hiatus in the chain of
custody of the said items, which is extremely fatal to the cause of the prosecution.

2015 Decisions

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. DE ZOSA2

G.R. No. 205433, 21 January 2015
In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required
to support any findings

2 Please see Omni Hauling Services, Inc. v. Bon.

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PEOPLE V. SUMILI
G.R. No. 212160, 4 February 2015
The corpus delicti in crimes involving dangerous drugs
call for the necessity of proving with moral certainty
that they are the same seized items.

FACTS: PDEA received a report from a confidential informant that Sumili was selling shabu.
Acting on the same, SPO2 Englatiera dispatched SPO2 Cabahug to conduct surveillance on
Sumili, which confirmed the truth and veracity of the aforesaid report. The buy-bust team
headed to the target area. Upon arrival, the poseur-buyer approached Sumili’s house to buy
shabu. After Sumili let the poseur-buyer in, the latter gave the pre-arranged signal that the sale
has been consummated. Almost immediately, the buy-bust team stormed the house but Sumili
escaped by jumping through the window, throwing the marked money at the roof beside his
house. The poseur-buyer turned over the sachet of suspected shabu to SPO2 Englatiera, who
marked the same with "DC-1," representing the initials of SPO2 Cabahug. SPO2 Englatiera then
prepared a request for laboratory examination and instructed Non-Uniform Personnel Carlito
Ong (NUP Ong) to bring the sachet together with the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. However, NUP Ong failed to do so on the same day as the PNP Crime Laboratory
was already closed. It was only two (2) days after the buy-bust operation, that NUP Ong was
able to bring and turn-over the seized sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Upon examination,
it was confirmed that said sachet contained 0.32 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or
shabu.

In his defense, Sumili denied selling shabu. He and his daughter claimed that he was a
fishball vendor, and that on the date and time of the incident, he was at the market buying
ingredients.

ISSUE: Whether Sumili’s conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 should be
upheld.

HELD: No. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165, the following elements must concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and the seller,
object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the corresponding payment
for it. As the dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the
crime, it is therefore essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the
time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti. Elucidating on the custodial chain
process, the Court, in the case of People v. Cervantes, held:

As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding

13
 that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this
would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure
of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way
that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it
was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it
was delivered to the next link in the chain. x x x.

To expand, Section 21 of RA 9165 provides the "chain of custody rule" outlining the
procedure that the apprehending officers should follow in handling the seized drugs, in order
to preserve its integrity and evidentiary value. It requires, inter alia, that: (a) the apprehending
team that has initial custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take
photographs of the same in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items
were seized, or the accused’s or the person’s representative or counsel, a representative from
the media, the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall then sign the
copies of the inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory
within 24 hours from its confiscation for examination purposes. While the "chain of custody
rule" demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers, Section 21 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as well as jurisprudence nevertheless provide that
noncompliance with the requirements of this rule will not automatically render the seizure and
custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such non-
compliance; AND (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Hence,
any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.

After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to
establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from Sumili due to unjustified gaps
in the chain of custody, thus, militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

NUP Ong failed to do [bring the sachet to PNP Crime Laboratory] within 24 hours after
the buy-bust operation as he only delivered the sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory on June 9,
2006, or two (2) days after the buy-bust operation. No other than SPO2 Englatiera and NUP Ong
attested to these facts in their respective testimonies xxx

To justify the delay in the turn-over of the corpus delicti, SPO2 Englatiera and NUP Ong
insist that the PNP Crime Laboratory was already closed on June 7, 2006, and since it was a
Friday, the delivery of the seized sachet was only done on June 9, 2006. However, contrary to
their claims, June 7, 2006 is not a Friday, but a Wednesday. Thus, if the PNP Crime Laboratory
was indeed closed on June 7, 2006, the delivery of the seized sachet could have easily been done
on the next day, or on June 8, 2006, instead of doing it two (2) days after the buy-bust operation.
This glaring fact, coupled with the absence in the records as to who among the apprehending
officers had actual custody of the seized sachet from the time it was prepared for turn-over until
its delivery to the PNP Crime Laboratory, presents a substantial and unexplained gap in the

14
chain of custody of the alleged shabu seized from Sumili. Undoubtedly, the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.

It must be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the

presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity
of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items. Failing in which, the
acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right, as in this
case. Thus, since the identity of the prohibited drugs had not been established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, Sumili's conviction must be immediately set aside.

PEOPLE V. CASAS
G.R. No. 212565, 25 February 2015
Treachery cannot be presumed, it must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence.

FACTS: Casas, accompanied by a certain "Ron-Ron", went to a certain taho factory looking for a
certain Jesus. Failing to find the person he was looking for, Casas brandished a knife and stuck
it into a pail used for making taho. Consequently, Eligio, an employee of the taho factory,
confronted Casas, saying to the latter, "Benjie[(referring to Casas)], bakit ang yabang mo? Kung
hindi mo makita ang kalaban mo, dapat hanapin mo na lang." Casas replied "Gusto mo ito?
(referring to his knife)." Eligio told Casas to get rid of the knife, which the latter gave to Ron-
Ron. Eligio and Casas then had a fistfight. During the ensuing melee, Casas took the knife from
Ron-Ron and stabbed Eligio twice while the latter was fleeing. Casas, during his continued
pursuit of Eligio, then ran into Joel, who, for his part, tried to help Eligio with the use of a
bamboo pole. However, Joel slipped, fell face first on the floor, and was prostrate. There and
then, Casas stabbed him twice, the first blow entering his back and exiting at the front of his
torso, and the second blow hitting the left side of his abdomen. Casas managed to overtake
Eligio, and stabbed him again on the stomach. Fearing that Casas would kill him, Eligio
grabbed a plastic stool and hit Casas on the head with it, forcing the latter to drop the knife and
cease the attack.

PO1 Silverio R. Fuentes (PO1 Fuentes) claimed that he was riding his motorcycle on the
date of the incident when he met PO3 Eduardo Fronda (PO3 Fronda) who asked for assistance
as the latter saw a bloodied male. The two immediately proceeded towards the victim, who
turned out to be Casas, and asked him what happened. The latter replied that he had just
stabbed someone. After confirming that there was indeed a stabbing incident nearby, PO1
Fuentes and PO3 Fronda arrested Casas.

Two (2) criminal Informations were filed before the RTC charging Casas of the Murder
of Joel Tabile y Gulla (Joel) and the Frustrated Murder of Eligio5 Ruiz y Ricardo (Eligio). Casas
admitted that he stabbed both Joel and Eligio but interposed self-defense to justify his actions.

15
RTC convicted Casas of Murder (of Joel) and Attempted Homicide (of Eligio). CA affirmed
conviction.

ISSUE: WON Casas’ conviction for the crimes of Murder and Attempted Homicide should be
upheld

HELD: Not entirely. He is guilty of Homicide (of Joel) and Attempted Homicide (of Eligio).

After a careful review of the records, the Court is satisfied that the RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, correctly pronounced that Casas failed to prove self-defense. It is significant to point
out that upon invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, Casas assumed the
burden of proving the justification of his act with clear and convincing evidence. This is
because his having admitted the killing required him to rely on the strength of his own
evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, which, even if it were weak, could
not be disbelieved in view of his admission.

Preliminarily, Casas failed to prove any unlawful aggression on the part of either Joel or
Eligio, which is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense to obtain.
As case law puts it, there can be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.

The Court, however, disagrees that Casas should be convicted of the crime of Murder
with respect to the incidents in Crim. Case No. 136842, i.e., the death of Joel, considering the
prosecution’s failure to prove the existence of treachery.

Under Article 14 of the RPC, "[t]here is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make." In other words, to appreciate treachery, it must
be shown that: (a) the means of execution employed gives the victim no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate; and (b) the methods of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted; indeed, treachery cannot be presumed, it must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.

PEOPLE V. SORIN Y TAGAYLO3

G.R. No. 212635, 25 March 2015
To establish the identity of dangerous drugs confiscated,
the gaps in the chain of custody must be justified.

PEOPLE V. PALANAS
G.R. No. 214453, 17 June 2015

3 Please see People v. Sumili.

16
A statement may be admissible both as a dying
declaration and as part of the res gestae; Alibi is an
inherently weak defense

FACTS: SPO2 Borre took his grandson outside his residence. PO3 Leopoldo Zapanta (PO3
Zapanta), who slept at SPO2 Borre’s residence, was watching television when four (4)
successive gunshots rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked through the open door and saw two (2) men
armed with .38 caliber revolvers standing a meter away from SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas
deliver the fourth shot to SPO2 Borre. Thereafter, the assailants fled. PO3 Zapanta, with SPO2
Borre’s stepson Ramil, brought SPO2 Borre to the hospital. On the way to the hospital, SPO2
Borre told Ramil and PO3 Zapanta that it was "Abe," "Aspog," or "Abe Palanas" – referring to
his neighbor, Palanas – who shot him. This statement was repeated to his wife, Resurreccion.
Thereafter, SPO2 Borre died.

Palanas interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that he was attending to the
needs of his sick father.

ISSUE: Whether the statements of SPO2 Borre are admissible to justify Palanas’s conviction.

HELD: Yes. SPO2 Borre’s statements on his way to the hospital are admissible as evidence, both
as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.

Dying Declaration

For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four (4)
conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the
declarant is conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and
(d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the
declarant is the victim.

Here, SPO2 Borre’s statements qualify as a dying declaration, given that they pertain to
the cause and circumstances of his death, and taking into consideration the severity of his
wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his
own death was already imminent. This declaration is considered evidence of the highest order
and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a
careless and false accusation. Every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by
the most powerful considerations to speak the truth.

Res gestae

17
 A statement to be deemed to form part of the res gestae, and thus, constitute another
exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence
in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

SPO2 Borre’s statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the res gestae. The test
of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration,
or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.

SPO2 Borre’s statements refer to a startling occurrence, i.e., him being shot by Palanas
and his companion. While on his way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the
identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity and only in
reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is relevant because it identified
Palanas as one of the authors of the crime.

Alibi

Court does not find credence in Palanas’s defense of alibi. Alibi is an inherently weak
defense, and may only be considered if the following circumstances are shown: (a) he was
somewhere else when the crime occurred; and (b) it would be physically impossible for him to
be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.

Under the circumstances, there is the possibility that Palanas could have been present at
the locus criminis at the time of the shooting. Accordingly, his defense of alibi must fall.

GO TONG ELECTRICAL SUPPLY CO., INC. V. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 187487, 29 June 2015
The failure to comply with the rules on specific denial
results to an implied admission of the genuineness and
due execution of the loan documents; Burden of proof in
civil cases

FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc.
(Go Tong Electrical) and its President, George C. Go (“Go”), seeking that the latter be held
jointly and severally liable to it for the payment of their loan obligation in the aggregate amount
of ₱87,086,398.71. As alleged by respondent, as early as 1996, Go Tong Electrical had applied for
and was granted financial assistance by the then Bank of South East Asia (BSA). Subsequently,

18
DBS Bank of the Philippines, Inc. (DBS) became the successor in interest of BSA. The application
for financial assistance was renewed through a Credit Agreement. On even date, Go Tong
Electrical, represented by Go, among others, obtained a loan from DBS in the principal amount
of ₱40,491,051.65, for which Go Tong Electrical executed Promissory Note. Under the PN’s
terms, Go Tong Electrical bound itself to pay a default penalty interest at the rate of one percent
(1%) per month in addition to the current interest rate, as well as attorney’s fees equivalent to
twenty-five percent (25%) of the amount sought to be recovered. Go executed a Comprehensive
Surety Agreement (CSA) covering any and all obligations undertaken by Go Tong Electrical,
including the aforesaid loan. Upon default of petitioners, DBS – and later, its successor-in-
interest, herein respondent – demanded payment from petitioners, but to no avail, hence, the
aforesaid complaint.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners merely stated that they "specifically
deny" the allegations under the complaint.

RTC ruled in favor of respondent, thereby ordering petitioners to jointly and severally
pay the former. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners be ordered to pay respondents.

HELD: No. The genuineness and due execution of the loan documents in this case were deemed
admitted by petitioners under the parameters of Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. To add,
Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court further requires that the defendant "sets forth what he
claims to be the facts," which requirement, likewise, remains absent from the Answer in this
case.

Thus, with said pleading failing to comply with the "specific denial under oath"
requirement under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules, the proper conclusion, as arrived at by the CA,
is that petitioners had impliedly admitted the due execution and genuineness of the documents
evidencing their loan obligation to respondent.

Accordingly, with petitioners' admission of the genuineness and due execution of the
loan documents, the competence of respondent's witness Suñio to testify in order to
authenticate the same is therefore of no moment. As the Court similarly pointed out in
Permanent Savings & Loan Bank, "[w]hile Section [20], Rule 132 of the [Rules] requires that
private documents be proved of their due execution and authenticity before they can be
received in evidence, i.e., presentation and examination of witnesses to testify on this fact; in the
present case, there is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to the loan
documents because of respondent's implied admission thereof

While the failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document
does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise,
payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and want of consideration nor bar a party from raising

19
the defense in his answer or reply and prove at the trial that there is a mistake or imperfection
in the writing, or that it does not express the true agreement of the parties, or that the
agreement is invalid or that there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing, none of these defenses
were adequately argued or proven during the proceedings of this case.

Of particular note is the affirmative defense of payment raised during the proceedings a
quo. While petitioners insisted that they had paid, albeit partially, their loan obligation to
respondent, the fact of such payment was never established by petitioners in this case.
Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving
it; the burden rests on the defendant, i.e., petitioners, to prove payment, rather than on the
plaintiff, i.e., respondent, to prove non-payment. When the creditor is in possession of the
document of credit, proof of non-payment is not needed for it is presumed. Here, respondent's
possession of the Credit Agreement, PN, and CSA, especially with their genuineness and due
execution already having been admitted, cements its claim that the obligation of petitioners has
not been extinguished. Instructive too is the Court's disquisition in Jison v. CA on the
evidentiary burdens attendant in a civil proceeding, to wit:

Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and
upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial
in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must
be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's. The concept of
"preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing,
that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.

COMERCIANTE Y GONZALES V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 205926, 22 July 2015
The exclusionary rule admits search incident to a lawful
arrest as an exception

FACTS: Agent Radan of the NARCOTICS group and P03 Calag were aboard a motorcycle,
patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per
hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two men - later
identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla (Dasilla) - standing and showing
"improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other.
Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached
Comerciante and Dasilla At a distance of around five meters, P03 Calag introduced himself as a
police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said
sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

20
 After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was
granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own
demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present
his evidence.

In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok",
who was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just
standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station.
RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of
RA 9165, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of
₱300,000.00. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether the exclusionary rule justifies the acquittal of Comerciante.

HELD: Yes. Although the exclusionary rule admits search incident to a lawful arrest as an
exception, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest. Here, there was none.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general
rule, "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect people
from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution provides
an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of
such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being
the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the
recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest. In
this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the
process cannot be reversed. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays
down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests.

There could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. P03 Calag
himself admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers
per hour when he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and showing "improper and
unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. On the basis of
the foregoing, he decided to effect an arrest.

Court finds it highly implausible that P03 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect
vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy - especially from a distance of
around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour -

21
miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held
by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to
Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of P03 Calag that the former had just committed,
was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a
companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal
acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant
movements" as put by P03 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a
lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

V. NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 194159,21 October 2015
In preliminary investigations, probable cause can be
established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay

FACTS: In the Affidavit-Complaint, the PCGG alleged that then President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans (“Ad Hoc Committee”) in order to identify various anomalous behest loans
entered into by the Philippine Government in the past. Thereafter, the Ad Hoc Committee, with
the assistance of a Technical Working Group (TWG) consisting of officers and employees of
different government financial institutions (GFIs), examined and studied documents relative to
loan accounts extended by GFIs to various corporations during the regime of the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos one of which is the loan account granted by the DBP to Galleon.

After examining the aforesaid loan account, the TWG found, inter alia, that: (a) DBP,
approved guarantees in favor of Galleon in the aggregate amount of US$90,280,000.00 for the
purpose of securing foreign currency borrowings from financial institutions related to Galleon’s
acquisition of vessels; (b) Board Resolution No. 3002 specifically stated that such
accommodation "shall be undertaken at the behest of the Philippine Government;" (c) as a
condition for the grant of the guarantees, Board Resolution No. 3002 required Galleon to raise
its paid up capital to ₱98.963 Million by 1981, but Galleon was only able to raise its capital to
₱46,740.755.00; (d) despite Galleon’s failure to comply with such condition, DBP still granted the
guarantees; (e) Galleon’s arrearages had already amounted to ₱40,684,059.37, while the
aggregate DBP obligations of Galleon already totaled ₱691,058,027.92; (f) despite the
outstanding debts, DBP still issued Board Resolution Nos. 4008and 3001, approving further
accommodations in Galleon’s favor in the form of one-year foreign currency loans to refinance
the latter’s arrearages, which amounted to ₱58,101,718.89

The Ad Hoc Committee concluded that the loans/accommodations obtained by Galleon

from DBP possessed positive characteristics of behest loans. PCGG filed an Affidavit-Complaint
against former officers/directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).

22
 The Ombudsman found no probable cause against private respondents and,
accordingly, dismissed the criminal complaint against them. It found that the pieces of evidence
attached to the case records were not sufficient to establish probable cause against the
individual respondents, considering that the documents presented by the PCGG consisted
mostly of executive summaries and technical reports, which are hearsay, self-serving, and of
little probative value.

ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to
indict respondents of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.

HELD: Yes. In view of the accusations that they were involved in the grant of behest loans,
Roque, Zalamea, Tengco, and Castell merely denied liability by maintaining that they had no
participation in such grant. Suffice it to say that these are matters of defense that are better
ventilated during the trial proper. On the other hand, Ferry, Zosa, Cuenca, Tinio, and Sison
miserably failed to debunk the charges against them by not filing their respective counter-
affidavits despite due notice. Indubitably, the foregoing establishes probable cause to believe
that individual respondents may have indeed committed acts constituting the crimes charged
against them, and as such they must defend themselves in a full-blown trial on the merits.

Finally, it was error for the Ombudsman to simply discredit the TWG’s findings
contained in the Executive Summary which were adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee for being
hearsay, self-serving, and of little probative value. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to
the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be
applied in the course of its proceedings. In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, the Court
declared that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary
investigations because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.

Citing a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that
probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay, viz.:

Justice Brion’s pronouncement in Unilever that "the determination of probable

cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party’s accusation or defense or on
the admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented" correctly recognizes the doctrine in
the United States that the determination of probable cause can rest partially, or even
entirely, on hearsay evidence, as long as the person making the hearsay statement is
credible.

In United States v. Ventresca, the United States Supreme Court held:

While a warrant may issue only upon a finding of "probable cause," this Court
has long held that "the term ‘probable cause’ . . . means less than evidence which would

23
 justify condemnation," x x x and that a finding of "probable cause" may rest upon
evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial. x x x

As the Court stated in Brinegar v. United States, "There is a large difference between two
things to be proved (guilt and probable cause), as well as between the tribunals which
determine them, and therefore a like difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to
establish them." Thus, hearsay may be the bases for issuance of the warrant "so long as there …
[is] a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay”.

An affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct
personal observations of the affiant," so long as the magistrate is "informed of some of the
underlying circumstances" supporting the affiant’s conclusions and his belief that any
informant involved "whose identity need not be disclosed…" was "credible" or his information
"reliable."

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining
probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary,
and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.

In this case, assuming arguendo that the factual findings contained in the Executive
Summary prepared by the TWG from which the Ad Hoc Committee based its conclusions are
indeed hearsay, self-serving, and of little probative value, there is nevertheless substantial basis
to credit the same, as such factual findings appear to be based on official documents prepared
by DBP itself in connection with the behest loans it allegedly extended in favor of Galleon. In
this regard, it must be emphasized that in determining the elements of the crime charged for
purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to support a prima
facie case against the respondents are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies
mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion, but less than
evidence that would justify a conviction. To reiterate, the validity of the merits of a party's
defense or accusations and the admissibility of testimonies and evidences are better ventilated
during the trial stage than in the preliminary stage.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. BORJA

G.R. No. 201830 & 201882, 10 November 2015
The dismissal of the criminal case is not a ground for the
dismissal of the administrative case; in criminal cases,
guilt must be established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt while in administrative cases, substantial evidence
is sufficient.

24
FACTS: The Board of Directors of San Pablo City Water District (SPCWD) passed separate
resolutions dismissing its division chiefs, Evelyn Eje (“Eje”) and Racquel Tolentino
(“Tolentino”), on the basis of the administrative complaint filed by its General Manager, Borja.

Eje and Tolentino appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), which affirmed their dismissal from service. The case was,
thereafter, elevated to the CA which, set aside Eje and Tolentino's dismissal and awarded them
backwages and other employment benefits. The CA, however, ruled that the backwages could
not be charged against SPCWD, in view of the doctrine that where a public officer removes or
dismisses another officer wrongfully, he acts outside the scope of his authority and hence, shall
be held personally liable. The CA decision attained finality. Eje and Tolentino were reinstated
and paid their backwages which were, however, taken from SPCWD's funds upon Borja's
approval.

Members of the San Pablo City Bar Association instituted a civil action on behalf of the
water concessionaires seeking to compel the members of the Board of Directors of SPCWD and
Borja to reimburse SPCWD for the amount paid to Eje and Tolentino. RTC ordered Borja to
refund to SPCWD the amount of P1,942,031.82 paid to Eje and Tolentino within 60 days from
receipt of the decision.

Borja was also criminally charged in Criminal Case Nos. 13758-SP, 13759-SP, and 13760-
SP for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, for causing undue injury to
SPCWD, when he paid Eje and Tolentino's backwages and other benefits from the water
district's funds. RTC dismissed the criminal complaints against Borja.
Meanwhile, Borja and the other officers of SPCWD were charged administratively. The
complaint alleged that Borja and the other respondents therein used public funds to settle a
private obligation, considering that Eje and Tolentino's backwages and other benefits were
Borja's personal liabilities.

Ombudsman held Borja guilty of conduct prejudicial to the service and accordingly,
suspended him from service for one (1) year without pay. CA found that Borja should not be
held administratively liable on the ground that he made the payment in good faith, as found by
the COA En Banc.

ISSUE: Whether the administrative complaint against Borja is proper.

HELD: The fact that the criminal charge against Borja for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019
had been dismissed upon the Ombudsman's manifestation that it lacked basis to prosecute him
is of no moment. As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, the dismissal of the criminal case
is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case, in consonance with the rule that a
criminal case is separate from an administrative case and each must be disposed of according to
the facts and the law applicable to each case. Moreover, in criminal cases, the guilt of the
accused must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt before a conviction could be

25
had, while liability in administrative cases is only hinged on the lesser threshold of substantial
evidence, defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.

VDA. DE MILLER V. MIRANDA

A.C. No. 8507, 10 November 2015
Notarial seal converts a document from a private to a
public instrument, after which it may be presented as
evidence without need of proof of its genuineness and
due execution

FACTS: Complainant alleged that she filed a complaint for ejectment against a certain
Magbuhos, before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Angeles City, Branch III (MTCC). A
certain Corazon P. Manansala (Manansala), who claimed to be Magbuhos's attorney-in-fact,
appeared in the latter's behalf alongside with her counsel, herein respondent. To prove her
authority as attorney-in-fact, she presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) duly notarized
by respondent and entered into his notarial register. However, upon scrutiny of the original
SPA, complainant's counsel pointed out that Manansala's authority to represent Magbuhos
pertained to an alleged "cash loan extended to one Nestor Cabais" and not to the ejectment case.
Insisting that she was authorized to represent Magbuhos in the ejectment case, Manansala, thru
respondent, submitted another SPA (altered SPA), which turned out to be almost identical to
the original SPA earlier submitted, with the following notable changes: (a) the phrase "the cash
loan extended to one Nestor Cabais" was enclosed with a handwritten parenthesis; and (b) the
handwritten phrase "my property located at Purok 6, Aguinaldo St., Sapang Bato, Angeles
City," was inserted in its stead, with all handwritten iterations not having any initials or
counter-signatures of Magbuhos, as well as any indication as to when the aforesaid alterations
were made.

MTCC denied the admission of the altered SPA, thus, ruling that Manansala has no
authority to represent Magbuhos in the ejectment case. It held that the handwritten insertions
made on the altered SPA were made after the document's notarization and were without any
counter-signatures from Magbuhos, and as such, cannot be given any effect.

The foregoing incidents led to the filing of the instant administrative complaint, with
complainant arguing that respondent's act of submitting before the MTCC an altered and/or
falsified document which he himself had notarized is blatantly and patently immoral, improper,
and unlawful, and thus, he should be accordingly penalized for the same.

ISSUE: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of?

HELD: Yes. A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common
of which are the acknowledgement and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the
performance of these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the

26
notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a
public instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need of proof of its
genuineness and due execution. Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty,
meaningless or routinary act. A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and
faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they
should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal transactions.

In the instant case, records reveal that respondent prepared the original SPA to show
that Manansala was authorized by Magbuhos to appear in the latter's behalf in the ejectment
case instituted by herein complainant. However, upon the original SPA's submission before the
MTCC, it was pointed out that the authority given by Magbuhos to Manansala only pertained
to "the cash loan extended to one Nestor Cabais" and not to the ejectment case. In order to
remedy the situation, handwritten alterations were made on the said SPA, such as the enclosing
of the aforesaid phrase with a parenthesis and the insertion of the phrase "my property located
at Purok 6, Aguinaldo St., Sapang Bato, Angeles City," and thereafter, the altered SPA was then
re-submitted to the MTCC. In this regard, respondent explained that in the preparation of the
original SPA, he merely asked his secretary to get a similar document from his files and insert
his corrections. Respondent then admitted that he did not bother checking the draft of the
original SPA as he simply assumed that his secretary did her job properly. Finally, respondent
reasoned out that the error made on the original SPA was only due to "honest mistake and
oversight" and upon discovery thereof, he himself caused the alterations on the SPA with the
knowledge and verbal consent of Magbuhos.

These factual circumstances only show that respondent's failure to carefully double-
check the draft of the original SPA submitted to him by his secretary led him to notarize a
document which did not reflect the true intent of his client. xxx

DIAZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 208113, 2 December 2015
The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is
to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome
the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no
contrary proof is offered, will prevail.

FACTS: On March 11, 1999, an Information4 for estafa was filed against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5 (RTC) for her alleged failure to return or remit the
proceeds from various merchandise valued at P32,000.00 received by her in trust - i.e., on
consignment basis from respondent.5 During arraignment, petitioner entered a negative plea.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution anchored its case on the testimony of respondent who claimed to be a
businesswoman engaged in the business of selling goods/merchandise through agents (one of
whom is petitioner) under the condition that the latter shall turn over the proceeds or return the

27
unsold items to her a month after they were entrusted. Respondent averred that on February 20,
1996, she entrusted merchandise consisting of umbrellas and bath towels worth P35,300.00 to
petitioner as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt. However, petitioner was only able to
remit the amount of P3,300.00 and thereafter, failed to make further remittances and ignored
respondent's demands to remit the proceeds or return the goods.

RTC acquitted petitioner of the charge of estafa but held her civilly liable to pay respondent the
amount of P32,000.00. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner civilly is liable to respondent.

HELD: Yes. Petitioner's claim that she was required to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and
a trust receipt in blank during her transactions with respondent, which she allegedly failed to
retrieve after paying her obligations, is a bare allegation that cannot be given credence. It is
well-settled that "[h]e who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is
not evidence."

On the contrary, the CA correctly found that respondent was able to prove by
preponderance of evidence the fact of the transaction, as well as petitioner's failure to remit the
proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in
case such merchandise were not sold. This was established through the presentation of the
acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996, which, as the document's name connotes,
shows that petitioner acknowledged receipt from respondent of the listed items with their
corresponding values, and assumed the obligation to return the same on March 20, 1996 if not
sold.

In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case
law dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3 (p) of the same
Rule, it is equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves
every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and
delivers it. The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of
presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof
is offered, will prevail. In this case, petitioner failed to present any evidence to controvert these
presumptions.

Also, respondent's possession of the document pertaining to the obligation strongly

buttresses her claim that the same has not been extinguished. Preponderance of evidence only
requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence. All things
considered, the evidence in this case clearly preponderates in respondent's favor.

2016 Decisions

28
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, RENATO D. TAYAG, ET AL.
G.R. No. 193176, 24 February 2016
Evidence necessary in determining probable cause

FACTS: Former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked
to investigate alleged behest loans granted by the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
among others, during the Marcos years. Assisted by a Technical Working Group (TWG),
the Committee investigated the loans granted by PNB to Hercules Minerals and Oils,
Inc. (HMOI), a domestic corporation engaged in mining copper ores to produce copper
concentrates.

The Committee's investigation revealed that on June 27, 1978, the HMOI, through
its Chairman of the Board, respondent Potenciano Ilusorio (Ilusorio), filed with the PNB
an application for a guarantee loan in the amount ofUS$17,000,000.00 (US$17M), which
the latter approved via PNB Resolution No. 548 dated July 16, 1979. The US$ I 7M loan
was purportedly secured by several collaterals amounting to P138,783,000.00, which
exceeded the maximum amount of loan in proportion to the value of the mortgaged
assets fixed by Section 78 of RA 337, 15 otherwise known as the "General Banking Act."
Sometime in 1982, HMOI ceased operations. Consequently, it was unable to meet its
overdue and maturing obligations with PNB. Nonetheless, despite stoppage of its
operations, PNB granted another loan to HMOI amounting to P650,000.00. By this time,
the Total PNB Exposure had already ballooned to P203 ,610,000.00, while its collateral
was only P94,656,000.00.

With the foregoing findings, petitioner PCGG, through its Legal Consultant, Atty.
Liezel G. Chico (Atty. Chico), filed on December 15, 2004 an affidavit-complaint 25
before the Ombudsman accusing respondents of violating Sections 3 ( e) and (g) of RA
3019 for their participation in the alleged behest loans extended by PNB to HMOI.

The Ombudsman dismissed the Complaint for lack of probable cause. The Ombudsman
found that there was nothing on the loan agreements to indicate that HMOI unduly
influenced PNB into granting it loans or that unwarranted favors had been extended to
it. Thus, the presumption that regular duty was observed and exercised stands.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it
found no probable cause to hold respondents liable for violation of Sections 3 ( e) and
(g) of RA 3019 and consequently, dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.

HELD: It bears stressing that the duty of the Ombudsman in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation is to establish whether there exists probable cause to file an

29
information in court against the accused. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that more likely than not, the accused committed the crime. Taking
into account the quantum of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause,
the Court finds that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.

That the PCGG failed to make or submit an independent valuation of the

properties in order to support its that the loans were under collateralized is of no
moment. Included in the records of this case is the Executive Summary 52 of the TWG,
citing as evidence numerous documents from PNB showing, on its face, that the loans
granted to HMOI by PNB were under collateralized. Hence, the lack of independent
valuation alone is· not sufficient to dismiss the case for insufficiency of evidence to
establish mere probable cause. To be sure, preliminary investigation is not the occasion
for the full' and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence. It is for the presentation of
such evidence only as may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. The validity and merits of a
party's accusation or defense, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are
better ventilated during the trial proper.

In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds probable cause to hold respondents
for trial on the offenses charged, except for Domingo, whose criminal liability is
extinguished in accordance with Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code on account of
his death on June 26, 2008. With respect to respondents Tanseco, Morales, and Syquio,
the facts of their deaths must be confirmed with sufficient evidence before the same
provision may apply to them.

JOSE B. LURIZ v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 208948, 24 February 2016
Entries in official records

FACTS: Luriz filed before the RTC a verified Amended Petition for reconstitution
(reconstitution petition) of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 12976 of the Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City (RD-QC) in the name of his predecessor-in-interest, Yoichi Urakami (Urakami).
Luriz alleged that Urakami was the registered owner of the subject properties who sold the
same to Tomas Balingit (Balingit) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 12, 1948
(February 12, 1948 deed of sale) who, in turn, sold the same to him through a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated January 31, 1975 (January 31, 1975 deed of sale). However, the original copy of TCT
No. 1297 with the RD-QC was destroyed by the fire that gutted the Quezon City (QC) Hall in
June 1988; hence, the reconstitution petition based on the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
1297 (questioned certificate). The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed its Supplemental
Opposition declaring that it is the registered owner of the subject properties, as evidenced by
the Vesting Order No. P-89 dated April 9, 1947 of the Philippine Alien Property Administration

30
of the United States of America (US) confiscating the same as properties belonging to citizens of
an enemy country, Japan.

RTC granted Luriz's reconstitution petition and thereby, ordered the Register of Deeds-
QC to reconstitute the lost/destroyed original copy of TCT No. 1297. In a Decision dated May
15, 2013, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling and, instead, dismissed Luriz's
reconstitution petition. It found that the sale in Luriz's favor
as simulated or fictitious considering: (a) his admissions that he was not aware of such sale until
sometime in 1996 when his mother-in-law handed him the documents pertaining thereto, and
that he did not pay the consideration therefor; and (b) the absence of his signature on the deed
of sale. Since the document where Luriz anchors his claim is void, he does not have any interest
in the properties in question and has no legal standing to seek reconstitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for reconstitution.

HELD: The Supreme Court found that Luriz was not able to prove that TCT No. 1297 sought to
be reconstituted was authentic, genuine, and in force at the time it was lost and destroyed.

At the forefront of this pronouncement is Vesting Order No. P-89 dated April 9, 1947,
which was promulgated pursuant to the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act of the
US, as amended (Trading with the Enemy Act), the Philippine Property Act of 1946, and
Executive Order No. 9818, with the document entitled "Exhibit A," which seized or vested the
subject properties "to be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold or otherwise dealt with in
the interest and for the benefit of the US" in accordance with the foregoing Acts.

Being an official record of a duty especially enjoined by laws in force in the Philippines
at the time it was issued, Vesting Order No. P-89 is, therefore, prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. The Vesting Order No. P-89 dated April 9, 1947 stated that, after proper
investigation, the Philippine Alien Property Administration had found that the properties
particularly described in Exhibit A, i.e., the Transcript of TCT No. 1297; Book T-9 P[age] 47,
were owned or controlled by "nationals of a designated enemy country (Japan)." The legal
effect of a vesting order was to effectuate immediately the transfer of title to the US by operation
of law, without any necessity for any court action, and as completely as if by conveyance,
transfer, or assignment, thereby completely divesting the former owner of every right with
respect to the vested property. It is worthy to note that under Section 39 (a) of the Trading with
the Enemy Act, properties of Japanese nationals vested after December 17, 1941 shall not be
returned to their owners, and the US shall not pay 'compensation therefor. Instead, the vested
properties were to be conveyed to the Republic as part of its over-all plan of rehabilitation.

Furthermore, doubt was cast on the authenticity and genuineness of the questioned
certificate because save for the TCT number, the metes and bounds, and the OCT details, all the
other details of the properties (i.e., [a] the registered owner, [b] the respective areas of the subject
lots, and [c] the details of the entry in the registration book, such as the book and page number

31
where entered, as well as the date of entry) are materially different from the recitals in Exhibit A
of Vesting Order No. P-89. The evidentiary value of the said order and the corresponding
exhibit duly published in the Official Gazette which, as mentioned, are official records of a duty
especially enjoined by laws in force at the time of its issuance, must be sustained in the absence
of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity, and must prevail over the
questioned certificate.

JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES v. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN/JESSICA LUCILA G.

REYES VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES/JANET LIM NAPOLES VS. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER
CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
SANDIGANBAYAN/JO CHRISTINE NAPOLES AND JAMES CHRISTOPHER NAPOLES
VS. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN/JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS VS.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 212593-94/G.R. Nos. 213163-78/G.R. Nos. 213540-41/G.R. Nos. 213542-43/G.R. Nos.
215880-94/G.R. Nos. 213475-76, 15 March 2016
Res Inter Alios Acta should not be rigidly applied in preliminary investigations.

FACTS: Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the
anomalous Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, involving, as reported15 by
whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas), the illegal
utilization and pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
(Senator Enrile) for the years 2004 to 2010, in the total amount of P172,834,500.00. The charges
are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint for Plunder filed by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on September 16, 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0318 (NBI
Complaint); and (2) a Complaint for Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 filed by
the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) on November 18, 2013, docketed as
OMB-C-C-13-0396 (FIO Complaint).

The Ombudsman issued the assailed 144-page Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014
finding probable cause against, inter alia, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis of one (1) count of
Plunder, and against Reyes, Janet Napoles, De Asis, and the Napoles siblings for fifteen (15)
counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Accordingly, separate motions for
reconsideration were timely filed by Reyes, Janet Napoles, the Napoles siblings, and De Asis.

Consequently, a total of sixteen (16) Informations were filed by the the Ombudsman
before the Sandiganbayan, charging, inter alia, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis with one (1)
count of Plunder, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238; and Reyes, Janet Napoles,
the Napoles siblings, and De Asis with fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0241 to 0255, which were raffled to the
Sandiganbayan's Third Division.

32
 On July 3, 2014, resolving Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, "along with several other
related cases," the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against "all the accused," opining therein that the filing of a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause was a mere superfluity given that it was its bounden
duty to personally evaluate the resolution of the Ombudsman and the supporting evidence
before it determines the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused.

The Napoles siblings urgently moved for the reconsideration of the judicial finding of
probable cause against them and requested that their arraignment be held in abeyance pending
the resolution of their motion. However, the Napoles siblings alleged that the Sandiganbayan
acted on their motion for reconsideration through the latter's Resolution dated November 14,
2014, declaring that the presence of probable cause against them had already been settled in its
previous resolutions. Hence, the Napoles siblings caused the filing of the petition, docketed
as G.R. Nos. 215880-94, assailing the September 29, 2014 and November 14, 2014 Resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman and/or the Sandiganbayan committed any grave abuse
of discretion in rendering the assailed resolutions ultimately finding probable cause against
petitioners for the charges against them.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the Ombudsman did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in finding probable cause against the Napoles siblings.

The Supreme Court held that the Napoles siblings cannot discount the testimonies of the
whistleblowers based on their invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence, which states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under the
parameters of Section 30 of the same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a technical
rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary investigation
proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman's appreciation of hearsay
evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on evidence, during the
preliminary investigation "as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. This is
because "such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties." Applying the same logic, and with the similar observation that there lies
substantial basis for crediting the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection
interposed by the Napoles siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter.
Ultimately, as case law edifies, "[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal
who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation," as in this
case.

33
 Therefore, on account of the above-mentioned acts which seemingly evince the Napoles
siblings' participation in the conspiracy involving Senator Enrile's PDAF, no grave abuse of
discretion may be ascribed against the Ombudsman in finding probable cause against them for
fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 as charged.

TING TRUCKING/MARY VIOLAINE A. TING VS. JOHN C. MAKILAN

G.R. No. 216452, 20 June 2016
Substantial evidence

FACTS: Petitioner Ting Trucking is a sole proprietorship owned by Mary Violaine A. Ting
(petitioner), and is engaged in hauling services to and from Negros, Cebu, and Iloilo. On
February 12, 2010, respondent was hired as a driver. On August 20, 2010, respondent claimed
that while on his way to work, he received a call from petitioner informing him to stop
reporting for work purportedly to avoid his regularization, prompting him to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner before the NLRC.

On the other hand, petitioner denied that respondent was illegally dismissed. She stated
that the latter was never hired on a probationary basis and that he was a regular employee.
Nonetheless, respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed on him after learning from
Chavez the several anomalies he had committed while in the performance of his duties.

In a Decision dated March 3, 2011, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that respondent's
actions constituted serious misconduct, a just cause for termination under Article 297(a) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the "Labor Code of the Philippines," as
amended (Labor Code). NLRC affirmed LA’s Decision. n a Decision dated February 25, 2014,
the CA gave due course to the petition and reversed the NLRC's decision, and, accordingly,
ordered the remand of the case to the LA for computation of respondent's backwages,
13th month pay, attorney's fees and separation pay.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC in ruling that respondent's dismissal was valid.

HELD: In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter
alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

For serious misconduct to be a just cause for dismissal, the concurrence of the following
elements is required: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of
the employee's duties showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent.

In the case at bar, all of the foregoing requisites have been duly established by
substantial evidence. Records disclose that respondent was charged of misappropriating fuel

34
allowance, theft of fuel and corn, and sale of spare parts while in the performance of his duties.
Submitted as proof thereof was the affidavit of his co-employee, Chavez, among others.
Contrary to the findings of the CA, the Court finds the same to be substantial evidence. Other
than respondent's claim that the charges were fabricated and that Chavez was a biased witness,
no evidence was presented that would taint the latter's credibility. In fact, it was not shown that
Chavez was impelled by dubious or ill-motive to testify falsely against respondent. Hence, his
testimony should be accorded full faith and credence.

Indeed, it bears stressing that while there may be no direct evidence to prove that
respondent actually committed the offenses charged, there was substantial proof of the
existence of the irregularities committed by him. It is well to point out that substantial proof,
and not clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient as basis
for the imposition of any disciplinary action upon the employee. The standard of substantial
evidence is satisfied where the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is
responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust
and confidence demanded by his position, as in this case.

In fine, having established the various infractions committed by respondent that is

tantamount to serious misconduct warranting his dismissal by substantial evidence, no grave
abuse of discretion can be imputed against the NLRC in sustaining the finding of the LA that
his dismissal was proper under the circumstances.

NYMPHA S. ODIAMAR VS. LINDA ODIAMAR VALENCIA

G.R. No. 213582, 28 June 2016
Judicial admissions

FACTS: On August 20, 2003, respondent filed a complaint for sum of money and damages
against petitioner, alleging that the latter owed her P2,100,000.00. Petitioner purportedly issued
China Bank Check No. GHB1147212 (the check) for the said amount to guarantee the payment
of the debt, but upon presentment, the same was dishonored. Respondent lamented that
petitioner refused to pay despite repeated demands.

Petitioner asserted that respondent merely persuaded her to issue the check to guarantee
her deceased parents' loan. She further claimed that the check was blank when she issued it and
that despite having no authority to fill up the same, respondent wrote the amount and date
thereon. She also maintained that from December 29, 2000 to May 31, 2003, she made, in almost
daily installments, payments to respondent ranging from P500.00 to P10,000.00, and that while
she tried to make succeeding payments, respondent refused to accept the same, demanding,
instead, the payment of the entire balance.

35
 RTC ruled in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to pay. CA affirmed the ruling
of the RTC. It agreed that petitioner cannot deny her liability to respondent in view of her
admission that she borrowed money from the latter several times.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be held liable to respondent for the entire debt in the
amount of P2,100,000.00.

HELD: At the outset, it must be emphasized that the fact of petitioner's liability to respondent is
well-established. As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, while respondent
acknowledged that petitioner's deceased parents owed her money, petitioner also admitted
obtaining loans from respondent.

Having admitted that she obtained loans from respondent without showing that the
same had already been paid or otherwise extinguished, petitioner cannot now aver otherwise. It
is settled that judicial admissions made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the
trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence to
prove them. They are legally binding on the party making it, except when it is shown that they
have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was actually made,
neither of which was shown to exist in this case. Accordingly, petitioner is bound by her
admission of liability and the only material question remaining is the extent of such liability.

Based on the records of this case, respondent, for her part, admitted that petitioner's
deceased parents owed her P700,000.00 of the P2,100,000.00 debt and that petitioner owed her
P1,400,000.00 only.

Applying the same principle on judicial admissions above, it is therefore

incontrovertible that petitioner's debt to respondent amounted to only P1,400,000.00 and not
P2,100,000.00. Thus, respondent only remains liable to petitioner for such amount. Considering
that petitioner had already paid P389,951.00 in installments as evidenced by the receipts
submitted by petitioner - the genuineness and due execution of which were not put in issue -
the unpaid balance of petitioner's P1,400,000.00 debt to respondent stands at P1,010,049.00. On
the other hand, the remaining P700,000.00 of the total P2,100,000.00 debt to respondent is
properly for the account of the estates of petitioner's deceased parents and, hence, should be
claimed in the relevant proceeding therefor.

DAMASO T. AMBRAY & CEFERINO T. AMBRAY, JR.

V. SYLVIA A. TSOROUS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 209264, 5 July 2016
Forgery; Genuineness of handwriting/ Admissibility of former testimony/ prima facie presumption of
authenticity and due execution as well as the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument

FACTS: Petitioners, Damaso and Ceferino, Jr. and, respondents, Sylvia, Carmencita, Hedy,
Vivien, Nancy, Maristela, Elizabeth, Ma. Fe Luisa, and Cristina are siblings. With the exception

36
of Sylvia, they are the children of the late Ceferino Ambray (Ceferino, Sr.) and Estela Trias
(Estela), who passed away on February 5, 1987 and August 15, 2002, respectively.

During their lifetime, Ceferino, Sr. and Estela owned several properties, one of which
was a parcel of land located in San Pablo City, Laguna denominated as Lot 2 of subdivision
plan Pcs-12441, with an area of 4,147 square meters, more or less, covered by TCT No. T-
11259 of the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City (Lot 2). On December 28, 1977, Ceferino, Sr.
mortgaged Lot 2 with Manila Bank for the amount of P180,000.00. The mortgage was
discharged on September 16, 1984.

Prior to the discharge of the mortgage, Lot 2 was subdivided into three (3) lots: Lot 2-A,
Lot 2-B, and the subject property, Lot 2-C, resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. T-11259. Lot
2-C was registered in Ceferino, Sr.'s name in accordance with his letter dated August 29, 1984
requesting the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City to register Lot 2-C in his name. Thus, TCT
No. T-22749 was issued covering the said parcel under the name of Ceferino, Sr., married to
Estela.

Maristela discovered that TCT No. T-22749 covering Lot 2-C had been cancelled and in
its stead, TCT No. T-41382 was issued in the name of petitioners. It appears that by virtue of a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 16, 1978, Ceferino, Sr., with the consent of Estela,
allegedly sold "a portion of lot 2 of the consolidation subd. plan (LRC) Pcs-12441" to petitioners
for a consideration of P150,000.00. The Deed of Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of
San Pablo City only on February 5, 1996.

This prompted respondents to file a criminal case for falsification of public document
against petitioners, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Damaso T. Ambray and Ceferino T.
Ambray.”In a Decision dated October 30, 2000, the MTCC acquitted petitioners of the charge for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Thereafter, respondents filed the instant complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance,
and damages against petitioners and Estela (defendants), docketed as Civil Case No. SP-
5831(01), alleging that TCT No. T-41382 and the Deed of Sale were null and void because the
signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela thereon were forgeries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC's nullification of the Deed of Sale
dated January 16, 1978 and TCT No. T-41382 covering Lot 2-C in the name of petitioners.

HELD:

Forgery

As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One who

37
alleges forgery has the burden to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence
which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. The
fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature
and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have
been forged.

Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may
be proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the witness or
the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party, against whom the evidence
is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. Corollary thereto,
jurisprudence states that the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of
forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was
physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the
testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best.

In this case, the only direct evidence presented by respondents to prove their allegation
of forgery is the Questioned Documents Report No. 266-397 dated March 24, 1997 issued by
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), stating that the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on
the Deed of Sale, when compared to standard sample signatures, are not written by one and the
same person. In refutation, petitioners offered in evidence, inter alia, the testimony of their
mother, Estela, in the falsification case where petitioners were previously acquitted. In the
course thereof, she identified the signatures on the Deed of Sale as hers and Ceferino, Sr.'s,
which was fully corroborated by Atty. Zosimo Tanalega (Atty. Tanalega), the notary public who
notarized the subject Deed of Sale and was present at the time the Ambray spouses affixed their
signatures thereon.

Estela's testimony constitutes direct evidence of the authenticity of the signatures on the
Deed of Sale, having personal knowledge thereof, which undeniably prevails over the written
findings of a purported handwriting expert that can only be considered indirect or
circumstantial evidence.

Admissibility of former testimony

Notably, the admissibility of Estela's former testimony in the present case finds basis in
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence or the "rule on former testimony"

The reasons for the admissibility of testimony taken at a former trial or proceeding are
the necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness. However, before the former testimony
can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefor, i.e.,
the party must establish the basis for the admission of testimony in the realm of admissible
evidence.

38
 Records show that Estela died during the pendency of these proceedings before the RTC
or on August 15, 2002. Her death transpired before the presentation of the parties' evidence
could ensue. However, she was able to testify on direct and cross-examination in the
falsification case and affirmed that the alleged forged signatures appearing on the Deed of Sale
were, indeed, hers and her deceased husband, Ceferino, Sr.'s. The parties in the falsification case
involved respondents and petitioners herein, and the subject matter therein and in this case are
one and the same, i.e., the genuineness and authenticity of the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and
Estela. Clearly, the former testimony of Estela in the falsification case, being admissible in
evidence in these proceedings, deserves significant consideration.

Further lending credence to the validity of the Deed of Sale is the well-settled principle
that a duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due
execution as well as the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. To overturn this
legal presumption, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant to
establish that there was forgery that gave rise to a spurious contract.

SPS. CHARITO M. REYES AND ROBERTO REYES, ET AL. V. HEIR OF BENJAMIN

MALANCE, et al.
G.R. No. 219071, 24 August 2016
Authenticity of Notarized Documents; Genuineness of Handwriting

FACTS: Benjamin Malance (Benjamin) was the owner of a 1.4017-hectare parcel of agricultural
land covered by Emancipation Patent No. (EP) 615124. During his lifetime, Benjamin obtained
from the Magtalas sisters, who are distant relatives, a loan in the amount of ₱600,000.00, as
evidenced by a Kasulatan Ng Ukol sa Utang. Under the Kasulatan, the Magtalas sisters shall have
the right to the fruits of the subject land for six (6) years or until the loan is fully paid.

After Benjamin passed away on September 29, 2006, his siblings, the Malance heirs,
inspected the subject land and discovered that the Magtalas sisters were cultivating the same on
the basis of the Kasulatan. Doubting the authenticity of the said Kasulatan, the Malance heirs
filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession, Declaration of Nullity of the Kasulatan and
Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
against petitioners. They claimed that: (a) during his lifetime, Benjamin accumulated enough
wealth to sustain himself, was unmarried and had no children to support; (b) the Kasulatan was
executed during the time when Benjamin was seriously ill and mentally incapacitated due to his
illness and advanced age; and (c) the Kasulatan was simulated as the signature of Benjamin
appearing thereon was not his signature.

In a Decision dated August 31, 2010, the RTC dismissed the complaint for failure of the
Malance heirs to substantiate their claim that Benjamin's signature was forged, and upheld the

39
validity of the Kasulatan on the ground that it is a notarized document which enjoys the
presumption of regularity in its execution. CA upheld RTC’s ruling.

The CA upheld the validity of the Kasulatan between Benjamin and the Magtalas sisters
for failure of the Malance heirs to prove their challenge against its due execution and
authenticity, ruling further that being a notarized document, it has in its favor the presumption
of regularity and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents

ISSUE: Whether or not the kasulatan is valid.

HELD: Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their
favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence. However, the presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only
so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. A defective notarization will
strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private document. Consequently,
when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure
to test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence.

In this case, the Court observes that the Kasulatan was irregularly notarized since it did
not reflect any competent evidence of Benjamin's identity, such as an identification card (ID)
issued by an official agency bearing his photograph and signature, but merely indicated his
Community Tax Certificate Number despite the express requirement of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. Consequently, having failed to sufficiently establish the regularity in the
execution of the Kasulatan, the presumption accorded by law to notarized documents does not
apply and, therefore, the said document should be examined under the parameters of Section
20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[b]efore any private document offered
as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either: (a) [by] anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) [by] evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker."

The burden falls upon petitioners to prove the authenticity and due execution of
the Kasulatan, which they were, nonetheless, able to discharge. Records show that while the
notary public, Atty. Cenon Navarro (Atty. Navarro), did not require an ID when he notarized
the Kasulatan, when confronted with Benjamin's ID issued by the Office of Senior Citizens
Affairs of Pulilan, Bulacan (Senior Citizen ID), he identified the person in the picture as the
person who signed the Kasulatan, and received money from the Magtalas sisters in his presence.

On the other hand, respondent Bienvenido Malance's self-serving and uncorroborated

testimony that Benjamin's signature on the Kasulatan was forged purportedly because he does
not know how to write was contradicted by the Malance heirs' own manifestation that
Benjamin has a Senior Citizen ID and that the signature affixed thereon is different from his

40
signature appearing on the Kasulatan. The said ID, however, was not offered in evidence as to
enable the RTC, the CA, and the Court to make an examination of the signature thereon vis-a-
vis that on the Kasulatan. It is important to note that a finding of forgery does not depend
exclusively on the testimonies of expert witnesses and that judges must use their own
judgment, through an independent examination of the questioned signature, in determining the
authenticity of the handwriting.

Hence, the evidence as to the genuineness of Benjamin's signature, and the consequent
due execution and authenticity of the Kasulatan preponderate in favor of petitioners, who were
likewise able to prove Benjamin's receipt of the amount of ₱600,000.00 reflected in the Kasulatan.

CARRIE-ANNE SHALEEN REYES V. ATTY. RAMON F. NIEVA

A.C. No. 8560, 6 September 2016
Preponderance of evidence

FACTS: Carrie-Anne Shaleen Carlyle S. Reyes (complainant) filed against respondent Atty.
Ramon F. Nieva (respondent), praying that the latter be disbarred for sexually harassing her.
Complainant alleged that she has been working at the Civil Aviation Authority of the
Philippines (CAAP) as an Administrative Aide on a Job Order basis since October 2004.
Sometime in January 2009, she was reassigned at the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary under
the supervision of respondent, who was then acting as CAAP Acting Board Secretary. During
complainant's stint under respondent, she would notice that during office hours, respondent
would often watch "pampagana" videos saved in his office laptop, all of which turned out to be
pornographic films. Complainant also averred that whenever respondent got close to her, he
would hold her hand and would sometimes give it a kiss. During these instances, complainant
would remove her hands and tell him to desist.

Complainant further recounted that on the following day, April 2, 2009, respondent
called her on her cellular phone, asked if she received his text message, and told her he would
tell her something upon his arrival at the office. At about 9:30 in the morning of even date,
respondent asked complainant to encode a memorandum he was about to dictate. Suddenly,
respondent placed his hand on complainant's waist area near her breast and started caressing
the latter's torso. Complainant immediately moved away from respondent and told him
"sumosobra na ho kayo sir." Instead of asking for an apology, respondent told complainant he was
willing to give her P2,000.00 a month from his own pocket and even gave her a note stating "just
bet (between) you and me, x x x kahit na si mommy," referring to complainant's mother who was
also working at CAAP. At around past 11 o'clock in the morning of the same day, while
complainant and respondent were left alone in the office, respondent suddenly closed the door,
grabbed complainant's arm, and uttered "let's seal it with a kiss," then attempted to kiss
complainant. This prompted complainant to thwart respondent's advances with her left arm,
raised her voice in order to invite help, and exclaimed "wag naman kayo ganyan sir, yung asawa
nyo magagalit, sir may asawa ako." After respondent let her go, complainant immediately left the

41
office to ask assistance from her former supervisor who advised her to file an administrative
case against respondent before the CAAP Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI).

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner recommended the

dismissal of the instant administrative complaint against respondent. He found that
complainant failed to substantiate her allegations against respondent, as opposed to
respondent's defenses which are ably supported by evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR)

HELD: The excerpts of the Transcript show that at around past 11 o'clock in the morning of
April 2, 2009, complainant and respondent were left alone in the CAAP Office of the Board
Secretary as complainant's officemates were all out on errands. In this regard, it was error on
the part of the IBP to hastily conclude from the testimonies of complainant's officemates who
were interviewed by the CODI that nothing out of the ordinary happened. Surely, they were
not in a position to confirm or refute complainant's allegations as they were not physically in
the office so as to make a credible testimony as to the events that transpired therein during that
time.

Furthermore, the IBP should have taken the testimonies of the witnesses in the CODI
proceedings with a grain of salt. It bears noting that all those interviewed in the CODI
proceedings were job order and regular employees of the CAAP. Naturally, they would be
cautious in giving any unfavorable statements against a high-ranking official of the CAAP such
as respondent who was the Acting Board Secretary at that time - lest they earn the ire of such
official and put their career in jeopardy.

Thus, the IBP erred in concluding that such Transcript shows that respondent did not
perform the acts complained of. On the contrary, said Transcript proves that there was indeed a
period of time where complainant and respondent were left alone in the CAAP Office of the
Board Secretary which gave respondent a window of opportunity to carry out his acts
constituting sexual harassment against complainant.

In the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation adopted by the IBP

Board of Governors, the quantum of proof by which the charges against respondent were
assessed was preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence "means evidence which is
of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it." Generally,
under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, this evidentiary threshold applies to civil
cases:

SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. - In civil cases, the party

having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In
determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the

42
 witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing
the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The
court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number.

Nonetheless, in non-civil cases such as De Zuzuarregui, Jr. v. Soguilon cited by the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, the Court had pronounced that the burden of proof by
preponderance of evidence in disbarment proceedings is upon the complainant. These rulings
appear to conflict with other jurisprudence on the matter which contrarily hold that substantial
evidence is the quantum of proof to be applied in administrative cases against lawyers. The
latter standard was applied in administrative cases such as Foster v. Agtang, wherein the Court
had, in fact, illumined that:

[T]he quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of
evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is
required. Preponderance of evidence is "a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto." In administrative cases, only
substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla
but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.49(Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)

Similarly, in Peña v. Paterno, it was held:

Section 5, in [comparison with] Sections 1 [(Preponderance of evidence, how

proved)] and 2 [(Proof beyond reasonable doubt)], Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in
administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable
doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.

Based on a survey of cases, the recent ruling on the matter is Cabas v. Sususco, which was
promulgated just this June 15, 2016. In the said case, it was pronounced that:

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of

guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden
of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that
mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere
suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence.

43
 Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement ought to control and therefore, quell any
further confusion on the proper evidentiary threshold to be applied in administrative cases
against lawyers.

Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence - as opposed to

preponderance of evidence - is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential
considerations attending this type of cases. As case law elucidates, "[d]isciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of
its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor."

With the proper application of the substantial evidence threshold having been clarified,
the Court finds that the present charges against respondent have been adequately proven by
this standard. Complainant has established her claims through relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion - that is, that respondent had
harassed her and committed despicable acts which are clear ethical violations of the CPR. In
fine, respondent should be held administratively liable and therefore, penalized.

NANITO Z. EVANGELISTA VS. SPS. NEREO V. ANDOLONG III, ET AL.4

G.R. No. 221770, 16 November 2016
Preponderance of evidence

Richard A. Cambe Vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. Vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, et al./Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. Vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al./Richard A. Cambe Vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./John Raymund
De Asis Vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al./Ronald John Lim Vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et
al./Janet Lim Napoles Vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al./Mario L. Relampagos, et al. Vs.
Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines

4 Please see Carrie-Anne Shaleen Reyes v. Atty. Ramon F. Nieva.

44
G.R. Nos. 212014-15/G.R. Nos. 212427-28/G.R. Nos. 212694-95/G.R. Nos. 213477-78/G.R. Nos.
213532-33/G.R. Nos. 213536-37/G.R. Nos. 218744-59, December 6, 2016
Forgery/ Res inter alios acta/ Independent relevant statement

FACTS: Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the
illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010, in the total amount of P517,000,000.00. The
charges are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint for Plunder 17 filed by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Atty. Levito D. Baligod on September 16, 2013,
docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0316; and (2) a Complaint for Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019 filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) on November 18, 2013,
docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0395, both before the Ombudsman.

In the Orders dated November 19, 2013 and November 29, 2013, the Ombudsman
directed petitioners, along with several others, to submit their respective counter-affidavits, to
which petitioners complied with, except for Napoles and Lim.

In his defense, Revilla filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, contending
that: (a) his and Cambe's signatures in the PDAF documents were forgeries; (b) the utilization of
his PDAF had "always been regular and above-board"; (c) his involvement in the release of his
PDAF is limited; and (d) there is "no credible proof" to show that he committed said illegal acts
and that conspiracy exists between him and all the other persons involved in the PDAF scam.

In a Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014 (March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution), the
Ombudsman found probable cause to indict, among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla, Cambe,
Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder, and all the petitioners (along with
several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section3 (e) of RA 3019.

The Ombudsman found that the diversion and/or misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF was
coursed through a complex scheme involving various participants from Sen. Revilla's Office, the
DBM, the IAs, and the JLN-controlled NGOs. The Ombudsman then went on to conclude that
through the said scheme, they were able to siphon out government funds in the aggregate
amount of P517,000,000.00, with at least P224,512,500.00 received by Sen. Revilla.

In the same manner, the Ombudsman established probable cause to indict all the
petitioners (along with several others), except Lim, for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in
light of the following: (a) Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and Relampagos, et al. are all public officers,
while private individuals Napoles and De Asis all conspired with these public officers; (b) said
public officers exhibited manifest partiality to Napoles and her cohorts by favoring her
controlled NGOs without the benefit of public bidding and without having been authorized by
an appropriation law or ordinance, as legally mandated; (c) said public officers likewise
exhibited their bad faith by unduly benefiting from the "ghost" PDAF-funded projects through

45
the receipt of "commissions," "kickbacks," and the like; and (d) their collective acts caused undue
injury to the government in the aggregate amount of P517,000,000.00.

On June 19, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, finding probable cause against
petitioners and their co-accused and, thereby, issued the corresponding warrants of arrest
against them.

Sen. Revilla questioned the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause on the

following grounds:
1. His signatures in the documentary evidence were forged; and
2. The whistleblowers' testimonies should not be considered based on the res inter
alios acta rule.

ISSUE: Whether or not the findings of probable cause against all petitioners should be upheld.

HELD:

Forgery

Anent Sen. Revilla's claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented
were forged, it must be emphasized that "the findings of the prosecutor [on the issue of forgery]
should be ventilated in a full-blown trial[.] [This] is highlighted by the reality that the
authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. The duty to
determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must conduct an independent
examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity. [As such], Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the
court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine." Accordingly, Sen. Revilla's evidence of forgery, including the findings of his
purported handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores (Azores) and Forensic Document Examiner
Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, (Pagui) cannot be readily credited at this stage of the proceedings.

It is significant to emphasize that the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the
veracity of Sen. Revilla's signatures on the PDAF documents. As explicitly stated in the March
28, 2014 Joint Resolution: "[a]t all events, the Special Panel members, after a prima
facie comparison with their naked eyes of the questioned signatures appearing in the PDAF
documents and the original signatures of [Sen.] Revilla and Cambe in their respective counter-
affidavits, opine that both sets of signatures, which bear the same style and flourish, were
written by one and the same hands." Verily, the Ombudsman's own factual finding on the
absence of forgery, at least for the purpose of determining probable cause, should be regarded
with utmost respect. "[F]indings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence," as in this case.

46
Res Inter Alios Acta

Sen. Revilla opposes the admission of the whistleblowers' testimonies based on the res
inter alios actarule. However, in Reyes, citing Estrada v. Ombudsman, this Court had unanimously
ruled that the testimonies of the same whistleblowers against Jo Christine and John Christopher
Napoles, children of Janet Napoles who were also charged with the embezzlement of the PDAF,
are admissible in evidence, considering that technical rules of evidence are not binding on the
fiscal during preliminary investigation. This Court was unequivocal in declaring that the
objection on res inter alios acta should falter:

Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers
based on their invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence, which states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under the
parameters of Section 30 of the same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a
technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary
investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman's appreciation
of hearsay evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on
evidence, during the preliminary investigation "as long as there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay." This is because "such investigation is merely preliminary, and does
not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties." Applying the same logic, and with
the similar observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting the testimonies of the
whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by the Napoles siblings under the
evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, "[t]he
technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control
over the conduct of a preliminary investigation," as in this case.

Absent any countervailing reason, the rule on stare decisis mandates a similar application
of the foregoing ruling to this case.

In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to apply during
preliminary investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay is bound
by the exception on independently relevant statements."Under the doctrine of independently
relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been
made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as
evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence
of such a fact. Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the whistleblowers are independently relevant to
prove the involvement of Sen. Revilla and his coaccused in the present controversy, considering
their respective participations in the entire PDAF scam. Therefore, the statements made by
whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy, who were employees of JLN Corporation and privy to the
financial transactions of Napoles concerning, among others, Sen. Revilla's PDAF, should be
given consideration as they are directly, if not circumstantially, relevant to the issue at hand.

47
 In any case, this Court has resolved that "probable cause can be established with
hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." The
substantial basis for crediting the whistleblowers' testimonies, even if so regarded as hearsay,
rests on their key functions in JLN Corporation as above-mentioned, as well as the collective
evidence gathered by the prosecution tending to support the same conclusion that Sen. Revilla
and his alleged co-conspirators acted in concert to pillage his PDAF funds.

2017 Decisions

REPUBLIC V. CARMEN GALENO

G.R. No. 215009, 23 January 2017
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or
not, has no probative value unless the
proponent can show that the evidence falls
within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence
rule

FACTS: Respondent Galeno filed a petition for correction of the area of Lot No. 2285 of the
subject property before the RTC. She alleged therein that she is one of the co-owners of the
subject property by virtue of a Deed of Sale. The survey and subdivision of the subject property
was duly approved by the DENR. Galeno further alleged that when she and her co-owners had
the subject property resurveyed for the purpose of partition, they discovered a discrepancy in
the land area of the subject property in that the title reflects an area of 20,948 square meters,
white the Certification issued by the DENR shows an area of 21,298 square meters. Hence, she
sought to correct the area of the subject property in order to avoid further confusion, and
claimed to have notified the adjoining owners.

There being no opposition to the petition, the RTC allowed the presentation of respondent’s
evidence ex parte. The RTC granted the petition upon a finding that respondent was able to
substantiate the allegations in her petition to warrant a correct of the area of the subject
property. Herein petition Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for reconsideration
claiming that the adjoining owners had not been notified, stressing that such notice is a
jurisdictional requirement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence offered by respondent is sufficient to warrant the
correction prayed for.

HELD: No. The documentary evidence presented by the respondent is not sufficient to warrant
the correction prayed for.

Records reveal that respondent offered in evidence a) the Certification of the DENR; b)
the technical description of Lot No. 2285; and c) the approved subdivision plan of Lot No. 2258
certified by the DENR. The Court cannot accord probative weight upon them in view of the fact

48
that the public officers who issued the same did not testify in court to prove the facts stated
therein.

In Republic v. Medida, the Court held that certifications of the Regional Technical
Director of the DENR cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein,
holding that public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence as follows: (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section
19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy.

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: “Documents consisting
of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a
third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall
within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule
132. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original
official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even
records of public documents.

As such, the testimonies of the public officers who issued respondent’s documentary
evidence to confirm the veracity of its contents, the same are bereft of probative value and
cannot, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. At best, they may be considered
only prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance.

In fact, the contents of the certifications are hearsay because respondent's sole witness
and attorney-in-fact was incompetent to testify on the veracity of their contents, as she did not
prepare any of the certifications nor was she a public officer of the concerned government
agencies. Notably, while it is true that the public prosecutor who represented petitioner
interposed no objection to the admission of the foregoing evidence in the proceedings in the
court below, it should be borne in mind that "hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has
no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions
to the hearsay evidence rule," which do not, however, obtain in this case. Verily, while
respondent's documentary evidence may have been admitted due to the opposing party's lack
of objection, it does not, however, mean that they should be accorded any probative weight.

49
RE: COMPLAINT OF ENGR. RECI AGAINST COURT ADMINISTRATOR MARQUEZ and
DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR BAHIA5
A.M. No. 17-01-04-SC, 7 February 2017
Evidence necessary to find an individual
liable for Dereliction of Duty is substantial
evidence or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.

BPI V. AMADO MENDOZA and MARIA MENDOZA

G.R. No. 198799, 20 March 2017
Best Evidence Rule; exceptions.

FACTS: This case stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money with Application for Writ of
Attachment filed by BPI against respondents before the RTC. BPI alleged that respondents: (a)
opened a foreign currency savings account at BPI-Gapan Branch and deposited therein the total
amount of US$16,264.00; and (b) placed the amount of US$2,000.00 in a time deposit account.
After the lapse of the 30-day clearing period, respondents withdrew the amount of US$16,244.00
from the US savings account, leaving only US$20.00 for bank charges. However, BPI received a
notice from its correspondence bank, Bankers Trust, that the subject check was dishonored due
to "amount altered" as evidenced by (1) an e-mail advice from Bankers Trust and (2) a
photocopy of the subject check with a notation "endorsement cancelled" by Bankers Trust as the
original copy of the subject check was allegedly confiscated by the government of the United
States of America. This prompted BPI to inform respondents of such dishonor and demand
reimbursement. BPI then claimed that respondents allowed BPI to apply the proceeds of their
time deposit account to their outstanding obligation; upon exhaustion of the said time deposit
account, Amado gave BPI a promissory note containing his promise to pay and when
respondents failed to fulfill their obligation despite repeated demands, BPI was constrained to
give a final demand letter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the photocopy of the subject check and e-mail advice presented by BPI
are admissible in evidence.

HELD: Yes. Anent the subject check, while the Best Evidence Rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court states that generally, the original copy of the document must be presented
whenever the content of the document is under inquiry, the rule admits of certain exceptions,
such as "[w]hen the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror." In order to fall under the aforesaid exception, it is crucial
that the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and
destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of
bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.

5 Please see Omni Hauling v. Bon.

50
In this case, BPI sufficiently complied with the foregoing requisites. First, the existence or due
execution of the subject check was admitted by both parties. Second, the reason for the non-
presentation of the original copy of the subject check was justifiable as it was confiscated by the
US government for being an altered check. The subject check, being a US Treasury Warrant, is
not an ordinary check, and practically speaking, the same could not be easily obtained. Lastly,
absent any proof to the contrary and for the reasons already stated, no bad faith can be
attributed to BPI for its failure to present the original of the subject check. Thus, applying the
exception to the Best Evidence Rule, the presentation of the photocopy of the subject check as
secondary evidence was permissible.

As to the e-mail advice, while it may not have been properly authenticated in accordance with
the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the same was merely corroborative evidence, and thus, its
admissibility or inadmissibility should not diminish the probative value of the other evidence
proving respondents' obligation towards BPI. Besides, it should be pointed out that respondents
did not proffer any objection to the evidence presented by BPI. It is well-settled that evidence
not objected to is deemed admitted and may validly be considered by the court in arriving at its
judgment.

Considering that BPI had proven its cause of action by preponderance of evidence, the petition
must be granted.

SPOUSES EDGARDO AGUINALDO and NELIA AGUINALDO V. TORRES, JR.

G.R. No. 225808, 11 September 2017
Private document, how authenticated;
genuineness of handwriting, how proved.

FACTS: On March 3, 2003, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of sale, cancellation of
title, and damages against respondent before the RTC. They claimed that they are the registered
owners of three (3) lots covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-93596, T-87764,
and T-87765 situated in Tanza, Cavite (subject properties). Sometime in December 2000, they
discovered that the titles to the subject properties were transferred to respondent who, in bad
faith, and through fraud, deceit, and stealth, caused the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated July 21, 1979 (1979 deed of sale), purportedly selling the subject properties to him, for
which he was issued TCT Nos. T-305318, T-305319, and T-305320 (subject certificates of title).
Respondent filed his Answer with Counterclaim, denying participation in the execution of the
1979 deed of sale, and averring that the subject properties were validly sold by petitioners to
him through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 10, 1991 (1991 deed of sale). He claimed that
petitioners caused the registration of the 1979 deed of sale with the Register of Deeds of Trece
Martires City, and the transfer of title in his name, hence, they are estopped from impugning
the validity of his title. Moreover, the action has prescribed, having been filed beyond four (4)
years from discovery of the averred fraud, reckoned from the registration of the said deed on
March 26, 1991. He further alleged that petitioners only filed the instant baseless suit to harass

51
him in view of their acrimonious relationship, and thus, interposed a counterclaim for moral
damages and attorney's fees.

The RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that petitioners failed to establish their claim by
preponderance of evidence. Said dismissal was upheld by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in ruling that there was a valid
conveyance of the subject properties to respondent.

HELD: No, the Court agrees with the CA's conclusion that a valid conveyance of the subject
properties to respondent was established.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that the 1991 deed of sale was improperly notarized,
having been signed by respondent and witness Bucapal in Makati City and by petitioners in the
USA, but notarized in Tanza, Cavite, which is in violation of the notarial officer's duty to
demand that the party acknowledging a document must appear before him, sign the document
in his presence, and affirm the contents and truth of what are stated therein. As aptly observed
by the CA, the evidence on record amply shows that Nelia could not have been in the
Philippines at the time the said deed was signed.

Private document; how authenticated

The improper notarization of the 1991 deed of sale stripped it of its public character and
reduced it to a private instrument. Hence, it is to be examined under the parameters of Section
20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court (Rules) which pertinently provides that "[b]efore any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
be proved either: (a) [b]y anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) [b]y
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker."

Genuineness of handwriting, how proved

In relation thereto, Section 22, Rule 132 of the same Rules provides the manner by which the
genuineness of handwriting may be proved, i.e., : (a) by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged; (b) by a comparison,
made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.

In this case, the claimed forgery was ruled out by a comparison of petitioners' questioned
signatures with their standard/sample signatures, but other than their own declaration that
their signatures on the 1991 deed of sale were forged, petitioners failed to present any evidence
to corroborate their claim. Although the improper notarization of the 1991 deed of sale did not
affect the validity of the sale of the subject properties to respondent, the same, however,

52
rendered the said deed unregistrable, since notarization is essential to the registrability of deeds
and conveyances.

HILARIO LAMSEN v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 227069, 22 November 2017
Genuiness of handwriting; genuiness and
due execution of a photocopy; and
circumstantial evidence.

FACTS: Hilario Lamsen (Lamsen) was convicted for the crime of falsification of public
documents, particularly the owner’s duplicate title of a parcel of land located at Barrio Malabo,
Valenzuela City, allegedly owned by Aniceta Dela Cruz. Lamsen however claims that while he
was renting the place of his uncle Nestor sometime in 1993, he validly bought and acquired the
subject property from spouses Tandas in the amount of ₱150,000.00. He added that the subject
deed was executed, signed, and notarized by spouses Tandas in the presence of a certain
Nicasio Cruz and Francisco Capinpin in the GSIS Office, Manila. He averred that he
subsequently left a xerox copy of the subject deed at the Notary Public and took the original
with him. Ultimately, he contended that he no longer informed the relatives of Aniceta about
the sale, as they already have a gap.

The METC found Lamsen guilty, and his conviction was upheld by the RTC and CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of Lamsen for the crime of falsification of public under
Article 172 (1) should be upheld.

HELD: No. Here, Lamsen was charged of the crime of falsification of public document under
Article 172 (1) of the RPC. Relatedly, the prosecution must likewise establish the fact of
falsification or forgery by clear, positive, and convincing evidence, as the same is never
presumed. Withal, the fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the
alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature
is theorized to have been forged.

Genuineness of handwriting

Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may be
proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the witness or
the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party, against whom the evidence
is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. Corollary thereto,
jurisprudence states that the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of
forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was

53
physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the
testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best.

In this case, the prosecution presented an expert witness, Batiles, to prove its allegation of
falsification or forgery. While Batiles testified during cross-examination that the questioned
signatures were not written by one and the same person, and that there is a certainty that the
subject deed was falsified, the Court, however, finds this declaration unreliable and
inconclusive, as it is inconsistent with the Questioned Document Report No. 130-03. In the said
Report, which Batiles himself issued after examining the allegedly falsified subject deed, Batiles
found that no definite conclusion can be rendered because the documents submitted by the
prosecution were mere photocopies of the original.

Genuineness and due execution of a

photocopy

Notably, the genuineness and due execution of a photocopy could not be competently
established without a copy of the original. Photocopies are considered secondary evidence
which can be rendered inadmissible absent any proof that the original was lost, destroyed, or in
the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered. Here, not
only did the prosecution fail to present the original copy of the subject deed in court, it likewise
did not provide ample proof that the same was lost, destroyed, or in the custody or under the
control of Lamsen. Since mere photocopies of the subject deed were used to examine the
questioned and standard signatures of spouses Tandas, no valid comparison can be had
between them, thereby rendering Batiles' declaration inconclusive to support a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt against Lamsen.

Circumstantial evidence

Aside from the findings of Batiles, the courts a quo also relied on circumstantial evidence to
convict Lamsen of the crime of falsification of public document. Circumstantial evidence
consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main fact in issue may be
inferred based on reason and common experience. It is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence presented must therefore constitute an unbroken
chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of the others, as the guilty person.

While it is true that the courts can rely on circumstantial evidence in order to establish the guilt
of the accused, the circumstantial evidence which the courts a quo relied upon in this case did
not sufficiently create moral certainty, since they appear to be too insignificant and
unconvincing.

54
ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC. v. LWV CONSTRUCTION CORP.
G.R. No. 217426, 4 December 2017
Negligence cannot be presumed and must be
proven by him who alleges it; an unverified
and unidentified private document cannot be
accorded probative value

FACTS: Respondent is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for deployment in
Saudi Arabia. Petitioner is an accredited member of the GAMCA and as such, authorized to
conduct medical examinations of prospective applicants for overseas employment. Respondent
referred prospective applicant Raguindin to petitioner for a pre-deployment medical
examination in accordance with the instructions from GAMCA. After undergoing the required
examinations, petitioner cleared Raguindin and found him “fir for employment” as evidenced
by a Medical Report. Based on the foregoing, respondent deployed Raguindin to Saudi Arabia.
When Raguindin underwent another medical examination with the General Care Dispensary of
Saudi Arabia, he purportedly tested positive for HCV or Hepatitis C Virus thereby leading to
Raguindin’s repatriation to the Philippines. Claiming that petitioner was reckless in issuing its
Medical Report stating that Raguindin is “fit for employment” respondent filed a complaint for
sum of money an damages against petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is proven negligent in issuing the Medical Report declaring
Raguindin is “fit for employment.”

HELD: No. Under our Rules of Evidence, it is disputably presumed that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and regular. In effect,
negligence cannot be presumed, and thus, must be proven by him who alleges it. In Huang v.
Philippine Hoteliers, it was held that if the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was
damaged because of the negligent acts of the defendant, he has the burden of proving such
negligence. It is even presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns.

The records of this case show that the pieces of evidence mainly relied upon by respondent to
establish petitioner’s negligence are: a.) the Certification; and b.) the HCV Confirmatory Test
Report. However, these issuances only indicate the results of the General Care Dispensary and
Ministry of Health’s own medical examination of Raguindin finding him to be positive for
HCV. Notably, the examination conducted by the General Care Dispensary, which was later
affirmed by the Ministry of Healt was conducted on after petitioner issued its Medical Report.
Hence, even assuming that Raguindin’s diagnosis for HCV was correct, the fact that he later
tested positive for the same does not convincinlg prove that he was already under the same
medical state at the time petitioner issued the Medical Report. In this regard, it was therefore
incumbent upon respondent to show that there was already negligence at the time the Medical
Report was issued may it be through evidence that show that standard medical procedures
were not carefully observed or that there were already palpable signs that exhibited

55
Raguindin’s unfitness for deployment at that time. This is hardly the case when respondent
only proffered evidence which demonstrate that months after petitioner’s Medical Report was
issued, Raguindin, who had already been deployed to Saudi Arabia, tested positive for HCV
and as such, was no longer fit for employment.

At any rate, the fact that Raguindin tested positive for HCV could not have been properly
established since the courts a quo, in the first place, erred in admitting and giving probative
weight to the Certification of the General Care Dispensary, which was written in an unofficial
language. Rule 132, Section 33 of the Rules of Court states that documents written in an
unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation
into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are
directed to have such translation prepared before trial.

A cursory examination of the subject document would reveal that while it contains English
words, the majority of it is in an unofficial language. Sans any translation in English or Filipino
provided by respondent, the same should not have been admitted in evidence; thus their
contents could not be given probative value, and deemed to constitute proof of the facts stated
therein.

Moreover, the due execution and authenticity of the said certification were not proven in
accordance with Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court which states that before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; (b) By evidence of
the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker; or (c) Any other private
document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

Notably, the foregoing provision applies since the Certification does not fall within the classes
of public documents under Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court - and hence, must be
considered as private. It has been settled that an unverified and unidentified private document
cannot be accorded probative value. In addition, case law states that "since a medical certificate
involves an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be given
weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications.
It is precluded because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and
opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements or writings are attributed. Its
executor or author should be presented as a witness to provide the other party to the litigation
the opportunity to question its contents. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the
author of the medical certificate renders its contents suspect and of no probative value," as in
this case.

56
 2018 Decisions

PEOPLE V. CIRBETO
G.R. No. 231359, 7 February 2018
In issues involving matters of credibility of witnesses,
findings of the trial court are accorded high respect

Facts: Roger Dalimoos (Dalimoos) was outside a fast food restaurant he saw his friend
Ferdinand Casipit (Casipit) together with Crisanto Cirbeto (Cirbeto) walking towards a nearby
mall, then the latter suddenly pull a knife from the right side of his back, held Casipit's shirt
with his left hand, and stabbed him with the knife using his right hand. Cirbeto attempted to
flee but he was seized by PO1 Jayson Rael and P/Sr. Insp. Fabian Ribad, who responded to a
radio message relaying the stabbing incident. They were also able to recover the knife used to
stab the victim. The RTC and CA convicted Cirbeto of Murder.

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Murder.

Held: Yes. Based on the foregoing testimony, Dalimoos had consistently, straightforwardly, and
positively identified accused-appellant as the person who was walking with the victim Casipit
and who later on stabbed the latter. Dalimoos' testimony did not waver; neither did it suffer
from any grave or material inconsistency as would strip away his credibility as an eyewitness to
the crime.

Time and again, the Court has held that when the issues involve matters of credibility of
witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of
the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded
high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether
or not they are telling the truth. Hence, it is a settled rule that appellate courts will not overturn
the factual findings of the trial court unless there is a showing that the latter overlooked facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case. The foregoing
rule finds an even more stringent application where the findings of the RTC are sustained by
the CA. As such, the Court finds no reason to depart from the assessment of the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, with respect to the probative value of Dalimoos' testimony in this case.

GUBATON V. AMADOR6
A.C. No. 8962, July 9, 2018
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof is
substantial evidence

6 Please see Carrie-Anne Shaleen Reyes v. Atty. Ramon F. Nieva.

57
ALAG V. ATTY. SENUPE7
A.C. No. 12115, 15 October 2018
In administrative proceedings, complainants bear the
burden of proving the allegations in their complaints
by substantial evidence

2019 Decisions

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LITO PAMING y JAVIER8

GR No. 241091, 14 January 2019
To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with
moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to account
for each link of the chain of custody.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REY BARRION y SILVA9

GR No. 240541, 21 January 2019
The failure to show earnest efforts to secure the presence
of the required witnesses is insufficient to trigger the
operation of the saving clause of the chain of custody
rule.

7 Please see Carrie-Anne Shaleen Reyes v. Atty. Ramon F. Nieva.

8 Please see People v. Viterbo.
9 Please see People v. Viterbo.

58