Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-32066 August 6, 1979

MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner,

vs.
MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Diosdado P. Peralta for petitioner.

Manuel S. Tonogbanua for private respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review by certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 34703, promulgated on January 13, 1970, affirming the Decision of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, dated June 30, 1964, in Civil Case No. 6414 entitled "Maria Soto Vda. de
Gonzales vs. Manuel Lagunzad," for a Sum of Money and Attachment.

The present controversy stems from a "Licensing Agreement" entered into by and between petitioner
Manuel M. Lagunzad and private respondent Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales on October 5, 1961,
which contract petitioner claims to be null and void for having been entered into by him under
duress, intimidation and undue influence.

The antecedental facts follow: Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a
newspaperman, began the production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" under the name
of his own business outfit, the "MML Productions." It was based mainly on the copyrighted but
unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in Negros" subtitled
"The Moises Padilla Story," 1 the rights to which petitioner had purchased from Atty. Rodriguez in the
amount of P2,000.00. 2

The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises Padilla sometime between
November 11 and November 17, 1951. Padilla was then a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista
Party (then the minority party) for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the
November, 1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power
and his men were tried and convicted for that murder in People vs. Lacson, et al. 3 In the book,
Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political history."

Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions
which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother,
Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girl friend. 4

The movie was scheduled for a premiere showing on October 16, 1961, or at the very latest, before
the November, 1961 elections.
On October 3, 1961, petitioner received a telephone call from one Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of
Moises Padilla, objecting to the filming of the movie and the "exploitation" of his life. Shown the early
"rushes" of the picture, Mrs. Amante and her sister, Mrs. Gavieres, objected to many portions thereof
notwithstanding petitioner's explanation that the movie had been supervised by Ernesto Rodriguez,
Jr., based on his book "The Long Dark Night in Negros." On October 5, 1961, Mrs. Amante, for and
in behalf of her mother, private respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and
deletions in the movie. 5 Petitioner contends that he acceded to the demands because he had
already invested heavily in the picture to the extent of mortgaging his properties, 6 in addition to the
fact that he had to meet the scheduled target date of the premiere showing.

On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some bargaining as to the amount to be paid, which was
P50,000.00 at first, then reduced to P20,000.00, 7 petitioner and private respondent, represented by
her daughters and Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, at the law office of Jalandoni and Jamir, executed a
"Licensing Agreement" reading as follows:

LICENSING AGREEMENT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This Agreement, made and executed at the City of Manila, Philippines, this 5th day of
October, 1961, by and between:

MANUEL M. LAGUNZAD, of legal age, married, presently engaged in

the business of producing motion pictures under the style of "MML
Productions" with residence at 76 Central Boulevard, Quezon City
and with offices at 301 Cu Unjieng Bldg., Escolta, Manila and
hereinafter referred to as LICENSEE,

— and —

MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES, of legal age, widow, resident of

the Municipality of Moises Padilla, Province of Negros Occidental,
represented in this Act by her Attorneys-in-fact Atty. Ernesto
Rodriguez, Jr. of legal age and resident of 393F-Buencamino St., San
Miguel, Manila; Maria Nelly G. Amazite, of legal age and resident of
121 South 13, Quezon City; and Dolores G, Gavieres, of legal age,
and resident of 511 San Rafael Street, Quiapo, Manila, also duly
authorized and hereinafter referred to as LICENSOR,

WITNESSETH:

That, the LICENSEE is currently producing a motion picture entitled "The Moises
Padilla Story" (hereinafter referred to as the PICTURE, for short) based on certain
episodes in the life of Moises Padilla, now deceased:

That the LICENSOR is the legitimate mother and only surviving compulsory heir of
Moises Padilla, the latter not having married during his lifetime and having died
without any descendants, legitimate or illegitimate;

That, in the PICTURE and in all incidents thereof, such as scenarios,

advertisements, etc., the LICENSEE has, without the prior consent and authority of
LICENSOR, exploited the life story of Moises Padilla for pecuniary gain and other
profit motives, and has, furthermore encroached upon the privacy of Moises Padilla's
immediate family, and has in fact, included in the PICTURE'S cast, persons
portraying some of MOISES PADILLA's kin, including LICENSOR herself;

That, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the other covenants and
conditions hereunder stated, the LICENSOR hereby grants authority and permission
to LICENSEE to exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for
purposes of producing the PICTURE, and in connection with matters incidental to
said production, such as advertising and the like, as well as authority and permission
for the use of LICENSOR's name in the PICTURE and have herself portrayed
therein, the authority and permission hereby granted, to retroact to the date when
LICENSEE first committed any of the acts herein authorized.

THE CONDITIONS AND OTHER COVENANTS OF THIS AGREEMENT ARE AS

FOLLOWS:

1. For and in consideration of the authority and permission hereby granted by

LICENSOR to LICENSEE, LICENSEE shall pay LICENSOR, through Atty. Lope E.
Adriano at the Pelaez and Jalandoni Law Office, 6th Floor, Magsaysay Bldg., San
Luis, Ermita, Manila, the following:

a) The sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00),

Philippine Currency, payable without need of further demand, as
follows: P5,000.00 on or before Oct. 10, 1961; P10,000.00 on or
before Oct. 31, 1961; and P5,000.00 on or before November 30,
1961. In default of the payment of any of these amounts as they fall
due, the others become immediately due and demandable.

b) A royalty in such amount corresponding to TWO AND A HALF

PER CENTUM (2-½ %) of all gross income or receipts derived by,
and/or for and in behalf of, LICENSEE as rentals and or percentage
of box office receipts from exhibitors and others for the right to
exploit, use, distribute and/or exhibit the picture anywhere here in the
Philippines or abroad.

2) The LICENSEE agrees to keep complete, true and accurate books of accounts,
contracts and vouchers relating to the exploitation, distribution and exhibition of the
PICTURE, the bookings thereof and the rentals and gross receipts therefrom, and to
give to LICENSOR and/or her accredited representatives, full access at all
reasonable times to all of the said books, accounts, records, vouchers and all other
papers.

3) The LICENSEE shall furnish LICENSOR monthly statements in duplicate, showing

in detail the gross receipts accruing from the picture, which monthly statements shall
be delivered to the LICENSOR with reasonable promptness, and upon verification
and approval of said statements by LICENSOR, the LICENSEE shall pay the
corresponding royalties due to the LICENSOR.

4) The authority and permission herein granted is subject to the condition that
LICENSEE shall change, delete, and/or correct such portions in the PICTURE as the
LICENSOR may require, in writing before final printing of the PICTURE, and shall,
 furthermore, not be understood as a consent to anything in the picture that is, or
tends to be, derogatory to the deceased MOISES PADILLA or to LICENSOR.

5) The LICENSOR shall not in any way be liable on any claim from third persons as a
result of, or arising from, the manner by which the PICTURE is put together, nor on
any claim arising from the production, distribution and exhibition of the PICTURE,
and in the event of any such claim being asserted against LICENSOR, the
LICENSEE undertakes to hold LICENSOR harmless thereon.

6) This agreement shall be binding upon the parties hereto, their representatives,
administrators, successors and assigns.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their hands on the date and
at the place first above stated.

MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES MANUEL M. LAGUNZAD

Licensor Licensee

By:

(Sgd.) ERNESTO R. RODRIGUEZ, Jr.

(Sgd.) MARIA NELLY G. AMANTE
(Sgd.) DOLORES G. GAVIERES
Attorneys-in-fact

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

LOPE E. ADRIANO ILLEGIBLE

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Petitioner takes the position that he was pressured into signing the Agreement because of private
respondent's demand, through Mrs. Amante, for payment for the "exploitation" of the life story of
Moises Padilla, otherwise, she would "call a press conference declaring the whole picture as a fake,
fraud and a hoax and would denounce the whole thing in the press, radio, television and that they
were going to Court to stop the picture." 8

On October 10, 1961, petitioner paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 but contends that
he did so not pursuant to their Agreement but just to placate private respondent.9

On October 14, 1961, the filming of the movie was completed. On October 16, 1961, a premiere
showing was held at the Hollywood Theatre, Manila, with the Moises Padilla Society as its
sponsor. 10 Subsequently, the movie was shown in different theaters all over the country.

Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, on December
22, 1961, private respondent instituted the present suit against him praying for judgment in her favor
ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the amount of P15,000.00, with legal interest from the filing of the
Complaint; 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the corresponding
2-1/2% royalty therefrom; 3) to pay attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the amounts claimed; and 4)
to pay the costs.
Traversing the Complaint, petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the life of Moises
Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and occurred at or about the same
time that the deceased became and was a public figure; that private respondent has no property
right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or consideration
and that he signed the same only because private respondent threatened him with unfounded and
harassing action which would have delayed production; and that he paid private respondent the
amount of P5,000.00 in October, 1961, only because of the coercion and threat employed upon him.
By way of counterclaim, petitioner demanded that the Licensing Agreement be declared null and
void for being without any valid cause; that private respondent be ordered to return to him the
amount of P5,000.00; and that he be paid P50,000.00 by way of moral damages, and P7,500.00 as
attorney's fees.

Private respondent duly filed her Answer to Counterclaim alleging that the transaction between her
and petitioner was entered into freely and voluntarily.

On June 30, 1964, the trial Court rendered a Decision, and decreed in its dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Manuel

Lagunzad to pay the plaintiff the sum of P15,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from December 22, 1961 up to its complete payment; to order the
defendant to render an accounting of the gross income or proceeds derived from the
exhibition, use and/or rental of the motion picture of "The Moises Padilla Story" and
to pay the plaintiff 2- 1/2% of said gross income; to pay the plaintiff the amount
equivalent to 20% of the amount due the plaintiff under the first cause of action as
attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter Court affirmed the judgment. Reconsideration having
been denied by the Court, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Initially, or on June 16, 1970, this Court denied the Petition for lack of merit, but resolved
subsequently to give it due course after petitioner moved for reconsideration on the additional
argument that the movie production was in exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of
expression, and that the Licensing cement is a form of restraint on the freedom of speech and of the
press.

In his Brief, petitioner assigns the following errors to the appellate Court:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN EXERCISING JURISDICTION IN THE

CASE BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM WAS INTERLOCUTORY IN
NATURE AND CHARACTER;

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO MAKE COMPLETE

FINDINGS OF FACTS ON ALL ISSUES BEFORE IT;

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE LICENSING

AGREEMENT, EXHIBIT "A", NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF, OR FOR HAVING
AN ILLEGAL CAUSE OR CONSIDERATION OF CONTRACT, PETITIONER
HAVING PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED THE AUTHORITY AND/OR PERMISSION
PURPOSELY GRANTED TO HIM BY RESPONDENT UNDER SAID LICENSING
AGREEMENT;
 IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LICENSING
AGREEMENT, EXHIBIT "A", IS NULL AND VOID; RESPONDENT NOT HAVING
HAD ANY PROPERTY NIGHTS OVER THE INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF MOISES
PADILLA WHO WAS A PUBLIC FIGURE.

V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LICENSING

AGREEMENT, EXHIBIT "A", WAS NULL AND VOID, PETITIONER'S CONSENT
HAVING BEEN PROCURED BY MEANS OF DURESS, INTIMIDATION AND
UNDUE INFLUENCE;

VI. THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN UPHOLDING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF

RESPONDENT AS DEFINED IN ART. 26 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OVER THE
RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO FILM THE PUBLIC LIFE OF A PUBLIC FIGURE,
INFRINGED UPON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO FREE
SPEECH AND FREE PRESS.

We find the assigned errors bereft of merit.

Petitioner's contention that because an accounting had been ordered, respondent Court of Appeals
did not have jurisdiction over the case as the Decision of the lower Court was not yet final and
appealable, is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso 11 relied upon by
petitioner, which held that whether or not the action for accounting is the principal action or is merely
incidental to another, the judgment requiring such accounting cannot be final, has been abandoned
in Miranda vs. Court of Appeals 12 which ruled:

For the guidance of bench and bar, the Court declares as abandoned the doctrine
of Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso and adopts the opposite rule that judgments for
recovery with accounting are final and appealable (without need of awaiting the
accounting) and would become final and executory if not appealed within the
reglementary period.

In other words, where there is complete adjudication and determination of the rights and obligations
of the parties, as in the instant case, an order for accounting in that judgment does not affect its final
character, said accounting being merely incidental to the judgment.

Petitioner's contention that respondent Court failed to make complete findings of fact on all issues
raised before it is without basis. A careful study of the Decision reveals that respondent Court has
substantially and sufficiently complied with the injunction that a decision must state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The rule remains that the ultimate test as to the
sufficiency of a Court's findings of fact is "whether they are comprehensive enough and pertinent to
the issues raised to provide a basis for decision." 13 The judgment sought to be reviewed sufficiently
complies with this requirement.

Neither do we agree with petitioner's submission that the Licensing Agreement is null and void for
lack of, or for having an illegal cause or consideration. While it is true that petitioner had purchased
the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for
prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's
life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis,14 "a
privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the
privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their
own rights in the character and memory of the deceased."
Petitioner's averment that private respondent did not have any property right over the life of Moises
Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is neither well taken. Being a public figure ipso facto does
not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to
disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person,
no matter how public a figure he or she may be. 15 In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner
exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a
little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality. 16

We also find it difficult to sustain petitioner's posture that his consent to the Licensing Agreement
was procured thru duress, intimidation and undue influence exerted on him by private respondent
and her daughters at a time when he had exhausted his financial resources, the premiere showing of
the picture was imminent, and "time was of the essence." As held in Martinez vs. Hongkong &
Shanghai Bank, 17 it is necessary to distinguish between real duress and the motive which is present
when one gives his consent reluctantly. A contract is valid even though one of the parties entered
into it against his own wish and desires, or even against his better judgment. In legal effect, there is
no difference between a contract wherein one of the contracting parties exchanges one condition for
another because he looks for greater profit or gain by reason of such change, and an agreement
wherein one of the contracting parties agrees to accept the lesser of two disadvantages. In either
case, he makes a choice free and untramelled and must accordingly abide by it. The Licensing
Agreement has the force of law between the contracting parties and since its provisions are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy (Art. 1306, Civil Code), petitioner
Should comply with it in good faith.

Lastly, neither do we find merit in petitioner's contention that the Licensing Agreement infringes on
the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press, in that, as a citizen and as a
newspaperman, he had the right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla
without prior restraint. The right of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position in
the "hierarchy of civil liberties." 18 It is not, however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales vs.
Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 (1969):

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the
right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the
freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society
preclude however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute.
It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should
remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for
recognition.

The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion
for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the
mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test." 19 The principle i
requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable
in a given situation or type of situation."20

In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the
right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those
interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations
assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will
have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when
expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is denied and the judgment appealed from hereby affirmed.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, (Chairman), J, concur in the result.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 127930 December 15, 2000

MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JASPER BRIONES, JEROME GOMEZ, RELLY CARPIO,
ELIZABETH VALDEZCO, JOSE MARI RAMOS, CAMILLE PORTUGAL, JOEL TAN and GERALD
GARY RENACIDO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

"Obscene," "vulgar," "indecent," "gross," "sexually explicit," "injurious to young readers," and devoid
of all moral values."1 This was now some members of the Miriam College community allegedly
described the contents of the September-October 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14) of Miriam College's
school paper (Chi-Rho), and magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho). The articles in
the Chi-Rho included:

. . . a story, clearly fiction, entitled 'Kaskas' written by one Gerald Garry Renacido . . .
Kaskas, written in Tagalog, treats of the experience of a group of young, male, combo
players who, one evening, after their performance went to see a bold show in a place called
"Flirtation". This was the way the author described the group's exposure during that stage
show:

"Sige, sa Flirtation tayo. Happy hour na halos . . . he! he! he! sambit ng kanilang
bokalistang kanina pa di maitago ang pagkahayok sa karneng babae na kanyang
pinananabikan nuong makalawa pa, susog naman ang tropa.
 ". . . Pumasok ang unang mananayaw. Si 'Red Raven' ayon sa emcee. Nakasuot
lamang ng bikining pula na may palamuting dilaw sa gilid-gilid at sa bandang utong.
Nagsimula siya sa kanyang pag-giling nang tumugtog na ang unang tono ng
"Goodbye" ng Air Supply. Dahan-dahan ang kanyang mga malalantik at mapang-akit
na galaw sa una. Mistulang sawa na nililingkis ang hangin, paru-parong padapo-
dapo sa mga bulaklak na lamesa, di-upang umamoy o kumuha ng nektar, ngunit
para ipaglantaran ang sariling bulaklak at ang angkin nitong malansang nektar.

"Kaskas mo babe, sige . . . kaskas."

Napahaling ang tingin ng balerinang huwad kay Mike. Mistulang natipuhan, dahil sa
harap niya'y nagtagal. Nag-akmang mag-aalis ng pangitaas na kapirasong tela. Hindi
nakahinga si Mike, nanigas sa kanyang kinauupuan, nanigas pati ang nasa gitna ng
kanyang hita. Ang mga mata niya'y namagnet sa kayamanang ngayo'y halos isang
pulgada lamang mula sa kanyang naglalaway na bunganga. Naputol-putol ang
kanyang hininga nang kandungan ni 'Red Raven' ang kanyang kanang hita. Lalo
naghingalo siya nang kabayuhin ito ng dahan dahan . . . Pabilis ng pabilis.'

The author further described Mike's responses to the dancer as follows (quoted in
part):

. . . Nagsimulang lumaban na ng sabayan si Mike sa dancer. Hindi nagpatalo ang

ibong walang pakpak, inipit ng husto ang hita ni Mike at pinag-udyukan ang kanyang
dibdib sa mukha nito.

"Kaskas mo pa, kaskas mo pa!"

Palpakan at halagpakan na tawanan ang tumambad sa kanya ng biglang halikan

siya nito sa labi at iniwang bigla, upang kanyang muniin ang naudlot niyang pagtikim
ng karnal na nektar. Hindi niya maanto kung siya ay nanalo o natalo sa nangyaring
sagupaan ng libog. Ang alam lang niya ay nanlata na siya."

After the show the group went home in a car with the bokalista driving. A pedestrian
happened to cross the street and the driver deliberately hit him with these words:

"Pare tingnan natin kung immortal itong baboy na ito. He! He! He! He! Sabad ng
sabog nilang drayber/bokalista."

The story ends (with their car about to hit a truck) in these words: . . . "Pare . . . trak!!!
Put . . .!!!!

Ang Magasing Pampanitikan, October, 1994 issue, was in turn, given the cover title
of "Libog at iba pang tula."

In his foreword which Jerome Gomez entitled "Foreplay", Jerome wrote: "Alam ko,
nakakagulat ang aming pamagat." Jerome then proceeded to write about previous reactions
of readers to women-writers writing about matters erotic and to gay literature. He justified the
Magazine's erotic theme on the ground that many of the poems passed on to the editors
were about "sekswalidad at iba't ibang karanasan nito." Nakakagulat ang tapang ng mga
manunulat . . . tungkol sa maselang usaping ito . . . at sa isang institusyon pang katulad ng
Miriam!"
Mr. Gomez quoted from a poem entitled "Linggo" written by himself:

may mga palangganang nakatiwangwang -

mga putang biyak na sa gitna,

'di na puwedeng paglabhan,

'di na maaaring pagbabaran . . ."

Gomez stated that the poems in the magazine are not "garapal" and "sa mga tulang ito
namin maipagtatanggol ang katapangan (o pagka-sensasyonal) ng pamagat na "Libog at iba
pang Tula." He finished "Foreplay" with these words: "Dahil para saan pa ang libog kung
hindi ilalabas?"

The cover title in question appears to have been taken from a poem written by Relly Carpio
of the same title. The poem dealt on a woman and a man who met each other, gazed at
each other, went up close and "Naghalikan, Shockproof." The poem contained a background
drawing of a woman with her two mammary and nipples exposed and with a man behind
embracing her with the woman in a pose of passion-filled mien.

Another poem entitled 'Virgin Writes Erotic' was about a man having fantasies in his sleep.
The last verse said: "At zenith I pull it out and find myself alone in this fantasy." Opposite the
page where this poem appeared was a drawing of a man asleep and dreaming of a naked
woman (apparently of his dreams) lying in bed on her buttocks with her head up (as in a
hospital bed with one end rolled up). The woman's right nipple can be seen clearly. Her
thighs were stretched up with her knees akimbo on the bed.

In the next page (page 29) one finds a poem entitled "Naisip ko Lang" by Belle Campanario.
It was about a young student who has a love-selection problem: ". . . Kung sinong pipiliin:
ang teacher kong praning, o ang boyfriend kong bading." The word "praning" as the court
understands it, refers to a paranoid person; while the word "bading" refers to a sward or
"bakla" or "badidang". This poem also had an illustration behind it: of a young girl with large
eyes and sloping hair cascading down her curves and holding a peeled banana whose top
the illustrator shaded up with downward-slanting strokes. In the poem, the girl wanted to eat
banana topped by peanut butter. In line with Jerome's "Foreplay" and by the way it was
drawn that banana with peanut butter top was meant more likely than not, to evoke a
spiritedly mundane, mental reaction from a young audience.

Another poem entitled "Malas ang Tatlo" by an unknown author went like this:

'Na picture mo na ba

no'ng magkatabi tayong dalawa

sa pantatluhang sofa -

ikaw, the legitimate asawa

at ako, biro mo, ang kerida?

 tapos, tumabi siya, shit!

kumpleto na:

ikaw, ako at siya

kulang na lang, kamera."

A poem "Sa Gilid ng Itim" by Gerald Renacido in the Chi-Rho broadsheet spoke of a fox
(lobo) yearning for "karneng sariwa, karneng bata, karneng may kalambutan . . . isang bahid
ng dugong dalaga, maamo't malasa, ipahid sa mga labing sakim sa romansa' and ended
with 'hinog na para himukin bungang bibiyakin."2

Following the publication of the paper and the magazine, the members of the editorial board,3 and
Relly Carpio, author of Libog, all students of Miriam College, received a letter signed by Dr. Aleli
Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College Discipline Committee. The Letter dated 4 November 1994
stated:

This is to inform you that the letters of complain filed against you by members of the Miriam
Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five student have been forwarded to the
Discipline Committee for inquiry and investigation. Please find enclosed complaints.

As expressed in their complaints you have violated regulations in the student handbook
specifically Section 2 letters B and R, pages 30 and 32, Section 4 (Major offenses) letter j,
page 36 letters m, n, and p, page 37 and no. 2 (minor offenses) letter a, page 37.

You are required to submit a written statement in answer to the charge/s on or before the
initial date of hearing to be held on November 15, 1994, Tuesday, 1:00 in the afternoon at
the DSA Conference Room.4

None of the students submitted their respective answers. They instead requested Dr. Sevilla to
transfer the case to the Regional Office of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
which under Rule XII of DECS Order No. 94, Series of 1992, supposedly had jurisdiction over the
case.5

In a Letter dated 21 November 1994, Dr. Sevilla again required the students to file their written
answers.

In response, Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, lawyer for the students, submitted a letter6 to the Discipline
Committee reiterating his clients' position that said Committee had no jurisdiction over them.
According to Atty. Valmonte, the Committee was "trying to impose discipline on his clients on
account of their having written articles and poems in their capacity as campus journalists." Hence, he
argued that "what applies is Republic Act No. 7079 The Campus Journalism Act and its
implementing rules and regulations." He also questioned the partiality of the members of said
Committee who allegedly "had already articulated their position" against his clients.

The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte. Thereafter, the Discipline Board,
after a review of the Discipline Committee's report, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the
students, thus:
 1. Jasper Briones Expulsion. Briones is the Editor-in-Chief of Chi-Rho and a 4th
year student;

2. Daphne Cowper suspension up to (summer) March, 1995;

3. Imelda Hilario suspension for two (2) weeks to expire on February 2, 1995;

4. Deborah Ligon suspension up to May, 1995. Miss Ligon is a 4th year student
and could graduate as summa cum laude;

5. Elizabeth Valdezco suspension up to (summer) March, 1995;

6. Camille Portugal graduation privileges withheld, including diploma. She is an

Octoberian;

7. Joel Tan suspension for two (2) weeks to expire on February 2, 1995;

8. Gerald Gary Renacido Expelled and given transfer credentials. He is a 2nd year student.
He wrote the fiction story "Kaskas";

9. Relly Carpio Dismissed and given transfer credentials. He is in 3rd year and
wrote the poem "Libog";

10. Jerome Gomez Dismissed and given transfer credentials. He is in 3rd year. He
wrote the foreword "Foreplay" to the questioned Anthology of
Poems; and

11. Jose Mari Ramos Expelled and given transfer papers. He is a 2nd year student and
art editor of Chi-Rho.7

The above students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary
injunction/restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City questioning the
jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam College over them.

On 17 January 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, presided by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.,
issued an order denying the plaintiffs' prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order. It held:

There is nothing in the DECS Order No. 94, S. 1992 dated August 19, 1992 that excludes
school Administrators from exercising jurisdiction over cases of the nature involved in the
instant petition. R.A. 7079 also does not state anything on the matter of jurisdiction. The
DECS undoubtedly cannot determine the extent of the nature of jurisdiction of schools over
disciplinary cases. Moreover, as this Court reads that DECS Order No. 94, S. of 1992, it
merely prescribes for purposes of internal administration which DECS officer or body shall
hear cases arising from R A. 7079 if and when brought to it for resolution. The said order
never mentioned that it has exclusive jurisdiction over cases falling under R.A. 707.8

The students thereafter filed a "Supplemental Petition and Motion for Reconsideration." The
College followed with its Answer.

Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order dated 10 February 1995 granting the writ of
preliminary injunction.
 ACCORDINGLY, so as not to render the issues raised moot and academic, let a writ of
preliminary injunction issue enjoining the defendants, including the officers and members of
the Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary Board, or any similar body and their agents, and
the officers and members of the Security Department, Division, or Security Agency securing
the premises and campus of Miriam College Foundation, Inc. from:

1. Enforcing and/or implementing the expulsion or dismissal resolutions or orders

complained of against herein plaintiffs (a) Jasper Briones; (b) Gerald Gary Renacido;
(c) Relly Carpio; (d) Jerome Gomez; and (e) Jose Mari Ramos, but otherwise
allowing the defendants to impose lesser sanctions on aforementioned plaintiffs; and

2. Disallowing, refusing, barring or in any way preventing the herein plaintiffs (all
eleven of them) from taking tests or exams and entering the Miriam campus for such
purpose as extended to all students of Miriam College Foundation, Inc.; neither
should their respective course or subject teachers or professors withhold their
grades, including final grades, if and when they meet the requirements similarly
prescribed for all other students, this current 2nd Semester of 1994-95.

The sanctions imposed on the other plaintiffs, namely, Deborah Ligon, Imelda Hilario,
Elizabeth Valdezco, Camille Portugal and Daphne Cowper, shall remain in force and shall
not be covered by this Injunction: Provided, that Camille Portugal now a graduate, shall have
the right to receive her diploma, but defendants are not hereby prevented from refusing her
the privilege of walking on the graduation stage so as to prevent any likely public tumults.

The plaintiffs are required to post an injunction bond in the sum of Four Thousand Pesos
(P4,000.00) each.

SO ORDERED.9

Both parties moved for a reconsideration of the above order. In an Order dated 22 February 1995,
the RTC dismissed the petition, thus:

4. On the matter raised by both parties that it is the DECS which has jurisdiction, inasmuch
as both parties do not want this court to assume jurisdiction here then this court will not be
more popish than the Pope and in fact is glad that it will have one more case out of its
docket.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the parties
going to another forum.

All orders heretofore issued here are hereby recalled and set aside.

SO ORDERED.10

The students, excluding Deborah Ligon, Imelda Hilario and Daphne Cowper, sought relief in this
Court through a petition for certiorari and prohibition of preliminary injunction/restraining
order11 questioning the Orders of the RTC dated 10 and 24 February 1995.

On 15 March 1995, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for
disposition.12 On 19 May 1995, the CA issued a resolution stating:
 The respondents are hereby required to file comment on the instant petition and to show
cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should be issued, within ten (10) days from notice
hereof, and the petitioners may file reply thereto within five (5) days from receipt of former's
comment.

In order not to render ineffectual the instant petition, let a Temporary Restraining Order be
issued enjoining the public respondents from enforcing letters of dismissal/suspension dated
January 19, 1995.

SO ORDERED.13

In its Decision dated 26 September 1996, respondent court granted the students' petition. The CA
declared the RTC Order dated 22 February 1995, as well as the students' suspension and dismissal,
void.

Hence, this petition by Miriam College.

We limit our decision to the resolution of the following issues:

(1) The alleged moot character of the case.

(2) The jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the petition for certiorari filed by the students.

(3) The power of petitioner to suspend or dismiss respondent students.

(4) The jurisdiction of petitioner over the complaints against the students.

We do not tackle the alleged obscenity of the publication, the propriety of the penalty imposed or the
manner of the imposition thereof. These issues, though touched upon by the parties in the
proceedings below, were not fully ventilated therein.

Petitioner asserts the Court of Appeals found the case moot thus:

While this petition may be considered moot and academic since more than one year have
passed since May 19, 1995 when this court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from enforcing the dismissal and suspension on petitioners . . .14

Since courts do not adjudicate moot cases, petitioner argues that the CA should not have proceeded
with the adjudication of the merits of the case.

We find that the case is not moot.

It may be noted that what the court issued in 19 May 1995 was a temporary restraining order, not a
preliminary injunction. The records do not show that the CA ever issued a preliminary injunction.

Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to perform to refrain from
performing a particular act or acts.15 As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve
or maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts,
until the merits of the case can be heard.16 A preliminary injunction persists until it is dissolved or
until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.

The basic purpose of restraining order, on the other hand, is to preserve the status quo until the
hearing of the application for preliminary injunction.17 Under the former 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge (or justice) may issue a temporary
restraining order with a limited life of twenty days from date of issue.18 If before the expiration of the
20-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary order would thereby
be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary
injunction within the said 20 days, the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the
20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.19 In the
instant case, no such preliminary injunction was issued; hence, the TRO earlier issued automatically
expired under the aforesaid provision of the Rules of Court.20

This limitation as to the duration of the temporary restraining order was the rule prevailing when the
CA issued its TRO dated 19 May 1995.21 By that time respondents Elizabeth Valdezco and Joel Tan
had already served their respective suspensions. The TRO was applicable only to respondents
Jasper Briones, Jerome Gomez, Relly Carpio, Jose Mari Ramos and Gerald Gary Renacido all of
whom were dismissed, and respondent Camille Portugal whose graduation privileges were withheld.
The TRO, however, lost its effectivity upon the lapse of the twenty days. It can hardly be said that in
that short span of time, these students had already graduated as to render the case moot.

Either the CA was of the notion that its TRO was effective throughout the pendency of the case or
that what is issued was a preliminary injunction. In either case, it was error on the part of the CA to
assume that its order supposedly enjoining Miriam from enforcing the dismissal and suspension was
complied with. A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy
between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.22 To determine
the moot character of a question before it, the appellate court may receive proof or take notice of
facts appearing outside the record.23 In the absence of such proof or notice of facts, the Court of
Appeals should not have assumed that its TRO was enforced, and that the case was rendered moot
by the mere lapse of time.

Indeed, private respondents in their Comment herein24 deny that the case has become moot since
Miriam refused them readmission in violation of the TRO. This fact is unwittingly conceded by Miriam
itself when, to counter this allegation by the students, it says that private respondents never sought
readmission after the restraining order was issued.25 In truth, Miriam relied on legal technicalities to
subvert the clear intent of said order, which states:

In order not to render ineffectual the instant petition, let a Temporary Restraining Order be
issued enjoining the public respondents from enforcing letters of dismissal/suspension dated
January 19, 1995.

Petitioner says that the above order is "absurd" since the order "incorrectly directs public
respondent, the Hon. Jaime Salazar, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City not
to dismiss or suspend the students."26

We do not agree. Padua vs. Robles27 lays down the rules in construing judgments. We find these
rules to be applicable to court orders as well:

The sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by its substance rather than its
form. In construing a judgment, its legal effects including such effects that necessarily follow
 because of legal implications, rather than the language used, govern. Also, its meaning,
operation, and consequences must be ascertained like any other written instrument. Thus, a
judgment rests on the intent of the court as gathered from every part thereof, including the
situation to which it applies and attendant circumstances. (Emphasis supplied.)

Tested by such standards, we find that the order was indeed intended for private respondents (in the
appellate court) Miriam College, et al., and not public respondent Judge. In dismissing the case, the
trial judge recalled and set aside all orders it had previously issued, including the writ of preliminary
injunction. In doing so, the trial court allowed the dismissal and suspension of the students to remain
in force. Thus, it would indeed be absurd to construe the order as being directed to the RTC.
Obviously, the TRO was intended for Miriam College.

True, respondent-students should have asked for a clarification of the above order. They did not.
Nevertheless, if Miriam College found the order "absurd," then it should have sought a clarification
itself so the Court of Appeals could have cleared up any confusion. It chose not to. Instead, it took
advantage of the supposed vagueness of the order and used the same to justify its refusal to
readmit the students.

As Miriam never readmitted the students, the CA's ruling that the case is moot has no basis. How
then can Miriam argue in good faith that the case had become moot when it knew all along that the
facts on which the purported moot character of the case were based did not exist? Obviously, Miriam
is clutching to the CA's wrongful assumption that the TRO it issued was enforced to justify the
reversal of the CA's decision.

Accordingly, we hold that the case is not moot, Miriam's pretensions to the contrary notwithstanding.

II

"To uphold and protect the freedom of the press even at the campus level and to promote the
development and growth of campus journalism as a means of strengthening ethical values,
encouraging critical and creative thinking, and developing moral character and personal discipline of
the Filipino youth,"28 Congress enacted in 1991 Republic Act No. 7079. Entitled "AN ACT
PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION OF CAMPUS JOURNALISM AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"29 the law contains provisions for the selection of the editorial board30 and
publication adviser,31 the funding of the school publication,32 and the grant of exemption to donations
used actually, directly and exclusively for the promotion of campus journalism from donor's or gift
tax.33

Noteworthy are provisions clearly intended to provide autonomy to the editorial board and its
members. Thus, the second paragraph of Section 4 states that "(o)nce the publication is established,
its editorial board shall freely determine its editorial policies and-manage the publication's funds."

Section 7, in particular, provides:

A member of the publication staff must maintain his or her status as student in order to retain
membership in the publication staff. A student shall not be expelled or suspended solely on
the basis of articles he or she has written, or on the basis of the performance of his or her
duties in the student publication.

Section 9 of the law mandates the DECS to "promulgate the rules and regulations necessary for the
effective implementation of this Act."34 Pursuant to said authority, then DECS Secretary Armand
Fabella, issued DECS Order No. 94, Series of 1992, providing under Rule XII that:
 GENERAL PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) shall help ensure and
facilitate the proper carrying out of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
7079. It shall also act on cases on appeal brought before it.

The DECS regional office shall have the original jurisdiction over cases as a result of the decisions,
actions and policies of the editorial board of a school within its area of administrative responsibility. It
shall conduct investigations and hearings on the these cases within fifteen (15) days after the
completion of the resolution of each case. (Emphasis supplied.)

The latter two provisions of law appear to be decisive of the present case.

It may be recalled that after the Miriam Disciplinary Board imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the
students, the latter filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Regional Trial Court raising, as
grounds therefor, that:

DEFENDANT'S DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE AND DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF

DEFENDANT SCHOOL HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.35

II

DEFENDANT SCHOOL'S DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE AND THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD

DO NOT HAVE THE QUALIFICATION OF AN IMPARTIAL AND NEUTRAL ARBITER AND,
THEREFORE THEIR TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE AGAINST PLAINTIFFS WILL
DENY THE LATTER OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.36

Anent the first ground, the students theorized that under Rule XII of the Rules and Regulations for
the Implementation of R.A. No. 7079, the DECS Regional Office, and not the school, had jurisdiction
over them. The second ground, on the other hand, alleged lack of impartiality of the Miriam
Disciplinary Board, which would thereby deprive them of due process. This contention, if true, would
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court. These were the same grounds invoked by the students in their refusal to answer the charges
against them. The issues were thus limited to the question of jurisdiction - a question purely legal in
nature and well within the competence and the jurisdiction of the trial court, not the DECS Regional
Office. This is an exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. As the Court held in Phil. Global
Communications, Inc. vs. Relova.37

Absent such clarity as to the scope and coverage of its franchise, a legal question arises
which is more appropriate for the judiciary than for an administrative agency to resolve. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction calls for application when there is such competence to act on
the part of an administrative body. Petitioner assumes that such is the case. That is to beg
the question. There is merit, therefore, to the approach taken by private respondents to seek
judicial remedy as to whether or not the legislative franchise could be so interpreted as to
enable the National Telecommunications Commission to act on the matter. A jurisdictional
question thus arises and calls for an answer.

However, when Miriam College in its motion for reconsideration contended that the DECS Regional
Office, not the RTC, had jurisdiction, the trial court, refusing to "be more popish than the Pope,"
dismissed the case. Indeed, the trial court could hardly contain its glee over the fact that "it will have
one more case out of its docket." We remind the trial court that a court having jurisdiction of a case
has not only the right and the power or authority, but also the duty, to exercise that jurisdiction and to
render a decision in a case properly submitted to it.38 Accordingly, the trial court should not have
dismissed the petition without settling the issues presented before it.

III

Before we address the question of which between the DECS Regional Office and Miriam College
has jurisdiction over the complaints against the students, we first delve into the power of either to
impose disciplinary sanctions upon the students. Indeed, the resolution of the issue of jurisdiction
would be reduced to an academic exercise if neither the DECS Regional Office nor Miriam College
had the power to impose sanctions upon the students.

Recall, for purposes of this discussion, that Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act prohibits the
expulsion or suspension of a student solely on the basis of articles he or she has written.

A.

Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for
itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.39 The essential freedoms
subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on
academic grounds:

(1) Who may teach,

(2) What may be taught,

(3) How it shall be taught, and

(4) Who may be admitted to study.40

The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it
shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires
rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and
the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations
are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property.41

Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline.
Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."

Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students. The
Constitution no less imposes such duty.

All educational institutions shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity,
respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical
 development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and
spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and
creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational
efficiency.42

In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to carry out its
responsibility to help its students "grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy
citizens of the community."43

Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than in "who may be
admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also
has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser
sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.

Thus, in Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong,44 the Court upheld the expulsion of students found guilty of
hazing by petitioner therein, holding that:

No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent

students who have been investigated and found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to have
violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the
authority of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to do.

More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which has
been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.45

Tracing the development of academic freedom, the Court continued:

Since Garcia vs. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary
proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school,
the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the
Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject,
as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution.

"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the
admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well to parents . . .
as parents under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to
assist and cooperate with the schools."

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the
successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student
discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of the rules governing university-student
relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves
as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the panoply of
academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education"
forgetting that, In Hohfeldian terms, they have the concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to
learn under the rules laid down by the school.
 . . . It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the
intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; may, the
development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.

In essence, education must ultimately be religious - not in the sense that the founders or
charter members of the institution are sectarian or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a
religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is 'an
education which inculcates duty and reverence.' It appears that the particular brand of
religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila University has been lost on the
respondent students.

Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo de Manila
University as their own a minute longer, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence
on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them. 1avv phi 1

Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals that:
"The maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly educational environment will be
seriously imperilled, if, under the circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is forced to
admit petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to the student body." Thus, the decision of
petitioner university to expel them is but congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds.46

B.

Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the State's power to regulate educational
institution:

The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the
educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all
educational institutions.

As may be gleaned from the above provision, such power to regulate is subject to the requirement
of reasonableness. Moreover, the Constitution allows merely the regulation and supervision of
educational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights.

C.

In several cases, this Court has upheld the right of the students to free speech in school premises. In
the landmark case of Malabanan vs. Ramento,47 students of the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation, believing that the merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of
Agriculture would result in the increase in their tuition, held a demonstration to protest the proposed
merger. The rally however was held at a place other than that specified in the school permit and
continued longer than the time allowed. The protest, moreover, disturbed the classes and caused
the stoppage of the work of non-academic personnel. For the illegal assembly, the university
suspended the students for one year. In affirming the students' rights to peaceable assembly and
free speech, the Court through Mr. Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, echoed the ruling of the US
Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines School District.48

Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to
do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and
communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this
case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines
Community School District, 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
 expression at the schoolhouse gate.' While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions
over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of
constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level there is persuasive force to this Fortas
opinion. "The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students
during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities
is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only inevitable part of the
educational process. A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom
hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the
authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the
conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and substantially interfering with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding
with the rights of others. . . . But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - materially disrupts classwork
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.49

The Malabanan ruling was followed in Villar vs. Technological Institute of the Philippines,50 Arreza vs.
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation,51 and Non vs. Dames II.52

The right of the students to free speech in school premises, however, is not absolute. The right to
free speech must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.53 Thus, while we upheld the right of the students to free expression in these cases, we
did not rule out disciplinary action by the school for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it,
which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - which materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."54 Thus,
in Malabanan, we held:

6. Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the student
leaders. That there would be a vigorous presentation of view opposed to the proposed
merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture was to be expected.
There was no concealment of the fact that they were against such a move as it confronted
them with a serious problem ("isang malaking suliranin.") They believed that such a merger
would result in the increase in tuition fees, an additional headache for their parents ("isa na
naman sakit sa ulo ng ating mga magulang.") If in the course of such demonstration, with an
enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances extremely critical at times, even vitriolic,
were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid, different
types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally
they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a
sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They
take into account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate,
the exuberance of youth. They may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but with
the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present
danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary
action for conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker, "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."55

It is in the light of this standard that we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act. Provisions of
law should be construed in harmony with those of the Constitution; acts of the legislature should be
construed, wherever possible, in a manner that would avoid their conflicting with the fundamental
law.56 A statute should not be given a broad construction if its validity can be saved by a narrower
one.57 Thus, Section 7 should be read in a manner as not to infringe upon the school's right to
discipline its students. At the same time, however, we should not construe said provision as to
unduly restrict the right of the students to free speech. Consistent with jurisprudence, we read
Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student
solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such article materially disrupt
class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

IV.

From the foregoing, the answer to the question of who has jurisdiction over the cases filed against
respondent students becomes self-evident. The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its
power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations
and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning.58 That
power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions
of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. We therefore rule that Miriam College has the
authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students. 1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Miriam College is ordered to READMIT private respondent Joel Tan whose suspension has long
lapsed.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2990 December 17, 1951

OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Carlos P. Garcia, Cosme P. Garcia and B.E. Enerio for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor Jesus A. Avanceña for respondent.

BENGZON, J.:

Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes those who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous
libels against the Government of the Philippines or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof or
which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the people againts the
lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community.

The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted in the Court of First Instance of
Bohol of a violation of the above article. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
because according to said court.
"About the time compromised between June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town
of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he
were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth
and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel (Exhibit A, C-I). After securing copies of his
photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers and weeklies of general
circulation (Exhibit C, F, G, H, I), not only in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the
Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear
that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed
wife translation of which letter or note in hereunder reproduced:

Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over my grave don't plant a cross or
put floral wreaths, for I don't need them.

Please don't bury me in the lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic cemetery. Although I have
committed suicide, I still have the right to burried among Christians.

But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and don't feel sorry. Wipe me out of your lives.

My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I
was not pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world about this.

And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the situation
in Central Luzon, the Leyte.

Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our
government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis. lawphil.net

Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one.

I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas. I cannot hold
high my brows to the world with this dirty government.

I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas
people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self.

The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter above quoted and caused its
publication in the Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang and other local periodicals
and that he had impersonated one Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in said
note or letter and posed himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken wherein he was shown
hanging by the end of a rope tied to a limb of a tree."

The latter is a scurrilous libel against the Government. 1 It calls our government one of crooks and
dishonest persons (dirty) infested with Nazis and a Fascistis i.e. dictators.

And the communication reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with
the disposition to remain loyal to the government. 2

Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or to weaken the
confidence of the people in the government are against the public peace, and are criminal not only
because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but because they are conducive to the
destruction of the very government itself (See 19 Am. Law Rep. 1511). Regarded as seditious libels
they were the subject of criminal proceedings since early times in England. (V op. cit.).

As explained by Paterson, 3 ". . . the great factors of government, consisting of the Sovereign, the
Parliament, the ministers of state, the courts of justice, must be recognized as holding functions
founded on sound principles and to be defended and treated with an established and well-nigh
unalterable respect. Each of these great institutions has peculiar virtues and peculiar weaknesses,
but whether at any one time the virtue or the weakness predominates, there must be a certain
standard of decorum reserved for all. Each guarded remonstrance, each fiery invective, each burst
of indignation must rest on some basis of respect and deference towards the depository, for the time
being, of every great constitutional function. Hence another limit of free speech and writing is
sedition. And yet within there is ample room and verge enough for the freest use of the tongue and
pen in passing strictures in the judgment and conduct of every constituted authority."

Naturally, when the people's share in the government was restricted, there was a disposition to
punish even mild criticism of the ruler or the departments of government. But as governments grew
to be more representative, the laws of sedition became less drastic and freedom of expression strife
continue to be prohibited.

The United States punished seditious utterances in the act of July 14, 1798 containing provisions
parallel to our own article 142. Analogous prohibitions are found in the Espionage Act of June 1917
and the seditious libel amendment thereto in May, 1918.

Of course such legislation despite its general merit is liable to become a weapon of intolerance
constraining the free expression of opinion, or mere agitation for reform. But so long as there is a
sufficient safeguard by requiring intent on the part of the defendant to produce illegal action-such
legislation aimed at anarchy and radicalism presents largely a question of policy. Our Legislature
has spoken in article 142 and the law must be applied.

In disposing of this appeal, careful thought had to be given to the fundamental right to freedom of
speech. Yet the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to
speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that
gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse
this freedom. 4" So statutes against sedition have guaranty, although they should not be interpreted
so as to agitate for institutional changes. 5

Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticize his government officials and to submit
his criticism to the "free trade of ideas" and to plead for its acceptance in "the competition of the
market." However, let such criticism be specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered,
and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up. Such wholesale attack is
nothing less than an invitation to disloyalty to the government. In the article now under examination
one will find no particular objectionable actuation of the government. It is called dirty, it is called a
dictatorship, it is called shameful, but no particular omissions or commissions are set forth. Instead
the article drip with male-violence and hate towards the constituted authorities. It tries to arouse
animosity towards all public servants headed by President Roxas whose pictures this appellant
would burn and would teach the younger generation to destroy.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail to impress thinking
persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere
effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what
with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on persuading the
readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of free speech cannot apply and the speaker or
writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President
Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government
but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the
Government obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to
whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the
conviction could be upheld. 6

As heretofore stated publication suggest or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir
up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who may seek
to silence the writer. 7 Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to
the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than
those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds. 8

"The idea of violence prevades the whole letter" says Justice Paredes of the Court of Appeals. "The
mere fact that a person was so disgusted with his "dirty government" to the point of taking his own
life, is not merely a sign of disillusionment; it is a clear act to arouse its readers a sense of
dissatisfaction against its duly constituted authorities. The mention made in said letter of the situation
in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps, Julio Guillen and the banditry in Leyte, which are instances of
flagrant and armed attacks against the law and the duly constituted authorities cannot but be
interpreted by the reading public as an indirect justification of the open defiance by the Hukbalahaps
against the constituted government, the attempt against the life of President Roxas and the ruthless
depredations committed by the bandits of Leyte, thus insinuating that a state on lawlessness,
rebellion and anarchy would be very much better than the maladministration of said President and
his men.

To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he committed suicide because he had "no
power to put under juez de cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power." Knowing, that the
expression Juez de Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary and
arbitrary execution by the knife", the idea intended by the appellant to be conveyed was no other
than bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free the government from the administration of
Roxas and his men.

The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question of fact, making the findings
of the court of appeals conclusive upon us. 9

Anyway, it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or assassination of all Roxas officials (at
least members of the Cabinet and a majority of Legislators including the Chief Executive himself).
And such suggestion clinches the case against appellant.

In 1922 Isaac Perez of Sorsogon while discussing political matter with several persons in a public
place uttered theses words: "Filipinos must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head" — referring to the
them Governor-General, Leonard Wood. Perez was found guilty of inciting to sedition in a judgment
of this court published in Volume 45 of the Philippine Reports. That precedent is undeniably
opposite. Note that the opinion was penned by Mr. Justice Malcolm probably of speech. Adopting his
own words we could say, "Here the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the
Philippine Islands. His official position, like the President of the United States and other high office,
under form of government, instead of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather
to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the President passes the furthest bounds
of free speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech was intended. There is a
seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and
a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to
the laws."

The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to the
legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.

Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Jugo, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

TUASON, J., dissenting:

Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, entitled "Inciting to Sedition", provides:

The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding 2,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any person without taking any direct part the crime of sedition,
should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition, by
means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other
representations tending to the same end, or upon any person or persons who shall utter
seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government of the United States or the Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or
obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his office, or which tend to instigate
others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities
or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who
shall knowingly conceal such evil practices.

In the case of U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332, this Court traced the origin and history of the predecessor
of Article 142 and expounded its meaning. Mr. Justice Ladd, who wrote the decision, said:

Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense are defined in that
section, viz: (1) The uttering of seditious words or speeches; (2) the writing, publishing, or
circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippines Islands; (3) the writing, publishing or circulating of libels which
tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office; (4) or which tend to
instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes; (5) or which suggest or
incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful
 authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government;
(7) knowingly concealing such evil practices.

Referring to case (2) — scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippines Islands which the Court said may stand on a somewhat different
footing from the rest-the Court went on to say:

In the determination of the question we have encountered great difficulty, be reason of the
almost entire lack of American precedents which might serve as a guide in the construction
of the law. There are, indeed, numerous English decisions, most of them of the
"Government, the constitution, or the law generally," attacks upon the Houses of Parliament,
the Cabinet, the Established Church, and other governmental organisms, but these decisions
are not now accessible to us, and, if they were, they were made under such different
conditions from which prevail at the present day, and are founded upon the theories of
government so foreign to those which have inspired the legislation of which the enactment in
question forms a part, that they would probably afford but little light in the present inquiry. In
England, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, any "written ensure upon public men for
their conduct as such", as well as any written censure "upon the laws or upon the institutions
of the country," would probably have been regarded as a libel upon the Government. (2
Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, 348.) This has ceased to be the law in
England, and it is doubtful whether it was ever the common law of any American State. "It is
true that there are ancient dicta to the effect that any publication tending to 'posses the
people with an ill opinion of the Government' is a seditious libel (per Holt, C.J., in R. vs.
Tuchin, 1704 St. Tr., 532, and Elenborough, C.J., in R. vs. Cobbet, 1804, 29 How. St. Tr.,
49), but no one would accept that doctrine now. Unless the words used directly tend to
foment riot or rebellion or otherwise to disturb the peace and tranquility of the Kingdom, the
utmost lattitude is allowed in the discussion of all public affairs." (11 Enc. of the Laws of
England 450.) Judge Cooley says (Const. Lim., 901): "The English common law rule which
made labels on the constitution or the government indictable, as it was administered by the
courts, seems to us unsuited to the condition and circumstances of the people of America,
and therefore never to have been adopted to the States."

After citing the Act of Congress of July 14, 1798, commonly and historically known as the "Sedition
Act," and after nothing that "the term 'government' would appear to be used here in the abstract
sense of the existing political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the
Government — the House of Congress and the Executive — which are also specially mentioned,"
the Court reached the opinion that "this is the (abstract) sense in which the term is used in the
enactment under consideration." The Court pointed out that, "while libels upon forms government,
unconnected with defamation of individuals, must in the nature of things be of uncommon
concurrence, the offenses is by no means imaginary one," and cited a case (Republic vs. Dennie, 4
Yeates [Pa.], 267) in which the defendant was indicted for bringing into contempt and hatred
the independence of the United States, the constitution of this Commonwealth and of the United
States; for exciting popular discontent and dissatisfaction against the scheme of polity instituted; for
condemning the principles of the Revolution, and revailing the characters of the patriots and
statesmen; for endangering, subverting, and totally destroying the republican constitutions andfree
governments of the said United States and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

In consonance with the principles laid down, the Court held that the article published by Dorr, in
which he virulently attacked the policy of the Civil Commission in appointing Filipinos to office, did
not come within the purview of the law, although it "may have had the effect of exciting among
certain classes dissatisfaction with the Commission and its measures." It found that there was
nothing in the article which could "be regarded as having a tendency to produce anything like what
mat be called disaffection, or, other words, a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to
remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws."

The message which the accused herein caused to be published with his picture contained no libel or
criticism against the instituted system of government as distinct from the administration. On the
contrary, the gist of the message was that the author was desperate and was going to kill himself
because many men in the government were following the practices of absolute and despotic rulers in
other parts of the world. He wanted President Truman and Mr. Churchill, leading exponents of such
democratic institutions as are consecrated in the Philippine Constitution, to be informed that
President Roxas and others in his administration were unfaithful to the tenets of constitutional
government. He pointed to the turbulent situation in Central Luzon, the rampant banditry in Leyte,
the attempted assassination of President Roxas by Guillen, etc., not as examples to be emulated to
be emulated but as the direct outcome of what he claimed widespread graft and corruption in the
Government. He pretended to have decided to take his life because he was impotent to remedy or
suppress this deplorable state of affairs, and he ashamed of the way the Government was being
conducted. He likened some men in the Government, whom he did not specify, to Hitler and
Mussolini, not that he idolized those notorious characters but because, he felt, evil forces that
undermined the ideas and ideals of the Constitution were at work in our republic. In short, far from
advocation the overthrow or change of the present scheme of polity, the article evinced intense
feeling of devotion to the welfare of the country and its institutions.

President Roxas was the only official named in the article. But the defendant did not counsel
violence in his reference to the President and the unnamed officials. In his statement to the effect
that he was going to kill himself because he could not kill President Roxas and the men who
surrounded the Executive, it is not a necessary deduction that he wished others to do it. Let it be
remembered that the message was addressed to the writer's "wife" and "children" who, it turned out,
were imaginary.

At best, the meaning of the sentence is doubtful and the norm is that, where the defendant's
intention is ambiguous he should be given the benefit of the doubt. The courts may not subject an
act or utterance to a microscopic examination in an endeavor to find in it germs of seditious utmost
caution is called for lest the freedom of expression be impaired. Although statutes against sedition
have been held not to violate the constitutional guaranty to the freedom of expression, the courts are
warned to so construe or interpret them as not to abridge that freedom. (33 C.J., 164, citing
U.S. vs. Apurado et al., 7 Phil., 422.) It is axiomatic that the Constitution is the paramount law and
that legislation has to be adjusted thereto. Accordingly in the solution of clashes, which frequently
occur, between liberty or free speech and prosecution for sedition, the criterion, it is submitted,
should be the presence or absence of real, not imaginary, danger of the utterance materializing or
inciting others to disloyalty to the Government and its laws.

There is no inciting to sedition unless, according to Mr. Justice Holmes' theory expressed in
connection with a similar topic, "the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." In the very law punishing inciting to sedition there is the
requirement that the words alleged to be seditious or libelous lead or tend to the consummation of
the evils sought to be prevented. Even in the ordinary offenses of threat and defamation, words are
not taken at face value, but their import or gravity is gauged by the circumstances surrounding each
particular case.

The term "lead" and "tend" are used in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code in their ordinary
signification. Thus understood, lead as a verb means "to draw or direct by influence" or "to prevail
on," and tend means "to conduce to an end." (Webster's International Dictionary.)
Judge by these tests, and granting for the present purposes that the defendant did intend to incite
others to sedition, the article was harmless as far as the safety of the Government and its officers
was concerned, and should have been ignored, as many others more serious than this one have
been. The message, like an evil imagining from which no harm proceeds except to the individual
himself, was not conducive to the attainment of the prisoner's aims. If words are "the keys of
persuasion" and "the triggers of action," the article under consideration was far from possessing
either of these qualities, taking into consideration the personality do the man who wrote it and what
he "did." that the while thing was comical if it were not "tragic." The general reaction, it is fairly safe
to say, was one of regret for a man of eccentric and unbalanced mind or ridicule and curiosity for a
grosteque stunt. The witnesses for the Government themselves, some of whom were constabulary
officers stationed at Tagbilaran, stated that upon reading the article and seeing the author's picture
they just laughed it off, "thinking that this fellow must be crazy." That was akin to our own reaction,
and there is little or no doubt that it exemplified the general effect upon the minds of other readers of
the article. It is certain that none would commit a rash act upon a vague suggestion of a man who
hanged himself and whom they had never heard of before, while those who had known him, like the
constabulary officers above mentioned, were that the picture was a fake and though the subject was
a crank.

Attack more serious, virulent and inflamatory than the one at bar, by persons well known in politics
and public life and having influence and large following, have frequently appeared in the press or
been launched on the platforms. What the defendant did or said was very tame and mild by
comparison. Nevertheless, those critics have not been brought to court; and it is to the everlasting
credit of the administration and, in the long run, for the good of the Government, that the parties
reviled and the prosecutors have adopted a tolerant attitude. A well-known author on criminal law
quoting classical writers on the same subject has truly said:

Yet while such is no doubt the law, prosecutions of this class have recently fallen, in England
as well as in the United States, for several reasons, into disuse. In the first place, it is now
generally felt that unless criticism be permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of
government, revolution rather than reform may result. Time, says Bacon, is the greatest of
destructives; and truth is to be constantly employed in repairing
the breaches which time makes. The wise conservative, therefore, is often apparently the
most destructive radical; as he is the most prudent repairer who, when the piers of a bridge
are weakend by a storm, advices that the work of reconstruction should begin at the
foundation. To prevent the application of revolutionary criticism to government is of all modes
of government the most revolutionary. And closely allied with this position is another, that
among countries used to freedom libels only begin to bring the state into contempt when they
are prosecuted by the state as contemptuos. The sedition laws, for instance, were among
the Chief causes of the overthrow of the administration of John Adams; and their repeal one
of the chief causes of the popularity of that of Jefferson. If, however, seditious libels are to be
prosecuted, it is well to keep in mind the noble words of princes from whose edicts the
English common law, imbued as it is in so many other respects with the spirit of freedom,
has much, in reference to the law of libel, to learn: "Imppp. Theodosius, Arcarius et Honorius,
A.A.A. Rufino P.P. Si quis modetiae nescius et pudoris ignarus improbo petulantique
maledicto nomina nostra crediderit lacessenda, ac temulentia trubulentus obtrectator
temporum nostrorum fuerit, eum poenae nolumus subiugari neque durum aliquid nec
asperum sustinere, quoniam, si ex levitate processerit, contemnedum est, si ex insania,
miseratione dignissium, si ab injuria, remittendum." (2 Wharton's Criminal Law Section
1947.)

In somewhat parallel vein is the dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes, joined in by Mr. Justice Brandeis, in
U.S. vs. Abrams, 250 U.S., 621, 629. Said Justice Holmes:
 Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no
doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your naturally express
your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to
indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the
circle, or that you do not care whole heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your
power or your premises. But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may some to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy
based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think that we
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we
loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is
required to save the country. I regret that I cannot put into more impressive words my belief
that in their conviction upon this indictment the
defendants were deprived of their rights under the Constitution of the United States.

Moreover, the subject of this prosecution does not reveal personal malice or hatred. Except for the
"Juez de Cuchillo" item which, like words coming from a babe's mouth, did not have the weight or
chance to sway the listeners, the article was but a statement of grievances against officials abuses
and misgovernment that already were of common knowledge and which more influential and
responsible speakers and writers had denounced in terms and ways more dangerous and
revolutionary.

Paras, C.J., and Feria, J., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 76565 November 9, 1988

BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, represented by its President, MARTIN ISIDRO and

its Publisher, APOLONIO BATALLA, BEN F. RODRIGUEZ, FRED J. REYES, JAMIL MAIDAN
FLORES and JOHN DOES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE EDILBERTO NOEL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII of the
Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region with station in Marawi City, ATTY. DIMATIMPOS
MINDALANO, ATTY. MANGORSI A. MINDALANO, SHIEK EDRES MINDALANO, SULTAN
GUINAR MINDALANO, FAROUK CALIPA MINDALANO, SULTAN MAHADI MINDALANO,
SULTAN KHALID MINDALANO, SULTAN MA-AMOR MINDALANO, DR. TAHER MINDALANO,
DATU MAGUIDALA MINDALANO, SOBAIDA MAGUMPARA VDA. DE MINDALANO, RAISHA
MINDALANO MANDANGAN, ATTY. KIMAL M. SALACOP, DATU KAMAR M. MINDALANO,
MAYOR RASLANI MINDALANO, VICE-MAYOR ALIDADI A. MINDALANO, ENG. RASHDI A.
MINDALANO, MRS. PAISHA MINDALANO AGUAM, DATU AZIS MINDALANO AGUAM, MRS.
MOOMINA MINDALANO OMAR, DATU AMINOLA MINDALANO OMAR, in behalf of the
Mindalano Clan, respondents.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako for petitioners.

Kimal M. Salacop, Mahadi Pimping, Dimatimpos Mindalano, Mangorsi Mindalano, Linang

Mandangan, Abdul S. Aguam and Dagoroan Q. Macarambon for private respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

On 3 July 1986 the twenty-one (21) private respondents (plaintiffs below), claiming to be the nearest relatives of the late Amir Mindalano,
suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the entire Mindalano clan of Mindanao, filed a Complaint 1 for damages (docketed as Civil Case
No. 81-86) before Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City charging petitioners with libel. Private respondents' action was
anchored on a feature article written by Jamil Maidan Flores entitled "A Changing of the Guard," which appeared in the 22 June 1986 issue
of Philippine Panorama, a publication of petitioner Bulletin Publishing Corporation. In particular, exception was taken to the following excerpt:

The division of Lanao into Sur and Norte in 1959 only emphasized the feudal nature
of Maranaw politics. Talk of Lanao politics and you find yourself confined to a small
circle of the Alonto, Dimaporo, Dimakuta, Dianalan, Lucman families and a few more.
These are big, royal families. If you are a Maranaw with aspirations for political
leadership, you better be a certified bona fide member of one or several of these
clans.

xxx xxx xxx

About the only time that one who was not of any royal house became a leader of
consequence in the province was during the American era when the late Amir
Mindalano held some sway. That was because Mindalano had the advantage of
having lived with an American family and was therefore fluent and literate in English.
But as soon as the datus woke up to the blessings of the transplanted American
public school system, as soon as they could speak and read and write in English,
political leadership again became virtually their exclusive domain. There must be
some irony in that. 2(Emphasis supplied)

Private respondents alleged in their complaint that, contrary to the above portion of the article, the
Mindalanos "belong to no less than four (4) of the 16 Royal Houses of Lanao del Sur." Private
respondents likewise objected to the statement that the late Amir Mindalano, grand patriarch of the
Mindalano clan, had lived with an American family, a statement which, they alleged, apart from being
absolutely false, "has a distinct repugnant connotation in Maranao society." Contending finally that
petitioners had with malice inflicted "so much damage upon the social standing of the plaintiffs" as to
"irreparably injure" the Mindalano name and reputation, private respondents interposed a claim for
the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses, all in the
aggregate amount of P2,350,000.00.

Reacting to the complaint, petitioners filed on 6 August 1986 a Motion to Dismiss 3 urging that (a)
venue had been improperly laid, (b) the complaint failed to state a cause of action, and (c) the
complainants lacked the capacity to bring the suit. In an Order 4 dated 30 October 1986, however,
respondent Judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and directed petitioners (defendants below) to file
their answer to the complaint.
In the present Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners assail the 30 October 1986 order of
respondent Judge, reiterating basically the arguments raised in their Motion to Dismiss filed with the
trial court.

On 4 December 1986, the court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent Judge
from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 81-86. 5 Petitioners and private respondents
have since then filed responsive pleadings.

On the question of venue raised by petitioners, paragraph 2 of Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides in part:

The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as
provided for in this Chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court
of first instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province or city where the libelous
article was printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense ... (Emphasis supplied)

The law specifically designates as proper venue in criminal and civil actions for libel the Regional
Trial Court of the province or city "where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense;" upon the other hand, the record of this case shows that at the time
the allegedly libelous Panorama article was published, nine (9) of the twenty-one (21) complainants
(private respondents) were then residents of Marawi City. Filing of the complaint (Civil Case No. 81-
86) with the Marawi Regional Trial Court thus did not result in any procedural infirmity as would
vitiate the proceedings undertaken there. Petitioners' argument that venue was improperly laid
simply because the twelve (12) other complainants were non-residents of Marawi at the time of
publication is, therefore, without merit. It is to the benefit of petitioners that the twelve (12) non-
residents of Marawi chose to go along with the suit in Marawi instead of commencing a separate suit
elsewhere. The Court is not, however, to be understood as saying that the 21 complainants, if
residents in 21 different places, could have sued in 21 differing courts and still claim that venue had
been properly laid in each instance. Such a situation may well indicate a pattern of harassment of
the defendant newspaper which could justify intervention on the part of this Court to avoid a potential
paralysing effect upon the exercise of press freedom.

Coming now to the principal issue of whether or not the complaint states a valid cause of action, the
Court finds that libel has not here been committed; the civil suit for damages must fail.

It is axiomatic in actions for damages for libel that the published work alleged to contain libelous
material must be examined and viewed as a whole. 6 We have accordingly examined in its entirety
the subject article "A Changing of the Guard" which is in essence a popular essay on the general
nature and character of Mindanao politics and the recent emergence of a new political leader in the
province of Lanao del Sur. We note firstly that the essay is not focused on the late Amir Mindalano
nor his family. Save in the excerpts complained about and quoted above, the name of the Mindalano
family or clan is not mentioned or alluded to in the essay. The Identification of Amir Mindalano is
thus merely illustrative or incidental in the course of the development of the theme of the article. The
language utilized by the article in general and the above excerpts in particular appears simply
declaratory or expository in character, matter-of-fact and unemotional in tone and tenor. No
derogatory or derisive implications or nuances appear detectable at all, however closely one may
scrutinize the above excerpts. We find in the quoted excerpts no evidence of malevolent intent either
on the part of the author or the publisher of the article here involved.

Private respondents, however, argue that petitioners had in the article falsely and maliciously
ascribed to the late Amir Mindalano, and to the rest of the extended Mindalano family, an inferior
status or condition—i.e., that of not belonging to any of the royal Muslim houses of the Lanao
provinces which respondents assert substantially injured their good family name and reputation. In
their complaint before the trial court, private respondents asserted their affiliations with at least five
(5) royal houses:

11. The late Amir Mindalano, as well as plaintiffs from their heritage from the
Mindalano genealogy, belong to no less than four (4) of the 16 royal Houses of
Lanao del Sur, namely; (1) the Sultanate of Ramain; (2) the Sultanate of Butig, (3)
the Sultanate of Masiu and (4) the Sultanate of Bayang. They also are distinctly
favored for being scions of the Royal House of Noron of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
Noron was the sister of Pagayawan and Diwan of the Royal Houses of Pagayawan
and Bayang respectively;

12. Intermarrying with the Mindalano clan, who are also represented in this suit, are
scions of the other royal families of the two Lanao provinces, all of whom, together
with the nominal plaintiffs and the others represented in this suit, have been
provoked to wrath, exposed to public contempt and ridicule, and their social standing
and reputation besmirched and humiliated by the defamation subject matter of this
suit that blackened and vilified the memory of their departed patriarch, the late Amir
Mindalano;

xxx xxx xxx 7

It is also claimed by private respondents that the excerpts objected to falsely asserted that—

the late Amir Mindalano has acquired his fluency and literacy by living with an
American family [which] has a distinct repugnant connotation in Maranao society in
that during the American time the royal families of Lanao hid their children from the
public school system and the Americans. Only the lowliest commoners were sent to
school or allowed to live with any American family. Amir Manalao Mindalano has
received his education at the Lumbatan High School, was a student leader thereat,
and has not lived with an American family.8

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that titles of royalty or nobility have been maintained and
appear to be accorded some value among some members of certain cultural groups in our society.
At the same time, such titles of royalty or nobility are not generally recognized or acknowledged
socially in the national community. No legal rights or privileges are contingent upon grant or
possession of a title of nobility or royalty and the Constitution expressly forbids the enactment of any
law conferring such a title. 9 Thus, the status of a commoner carries with it no legal disability.
Assuming for present purposes only the falsity (in the sense of being inaccurate or non-factual) of
the description in the Panorama article of Amir Mindalano as not belonging to a royal house, we
believe that such a description cannot in this day and age be regarded as defamatory, as an
imputation of "a vice or defect," or as tending to cause "dishonor, discredit or contempt," or to
"blacken the memory of one who is dead" 10 in the eyes of an average person in our community. The
above excerpts complained of do not disparage or deprecate Maranao titles of royalty or nobility,
neither do they hold up to scorn and disrespect those who, Maranao or not, are commoners. There
is here no visible effort on the part of petitioners to cast contempt and ridicule upon an institution or
tradition of members of a cultural or ethnic minority group, an "indigenous cultural community" in the
language of the Constitution, whose traditions and institutions the State is required to respect and
protect. 11 What private respondents assert is defamatory is the simple failure to ascribe to the late
Amir membership in a Maranao royal house, the ascription, in other words, to him of a factual
condition shared by the overwhelming majority of the population of this country, both Maranao and
non-Maranao, Muslim and non-Muslim. In a community like ours which is by constitutional principle
both republican in character 12 and egalitarian in inspiration, 13 such an ascription, whether correct or
not, cannot be defamatory.

The Court is similarly unable to see anything defamatory in a statement (even if inaccurate) that
private respondents' patriarch once lived with an American family. Since the early decades of this
century a great many young Filipinos (including Muslim Filipinos) have been going abroad for study
and many of them share the experience of staying with a foreign family, improving their language
skills and learning something about the culture and mores of the people. Once more, from the
viewpoint of the average person in our present day community, the statement complained of is not
defamatory.

Private respondents' feelings and sensibilities have obviously been hurt and offended by the
reference to Amir Mindalano as a commoner and as having lived for a time with an American family.
Personal hurt or embarassment or offense, even if real, is not, however, automatically equivalent to
defamation. The law against defamation protects one's interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a
reputation "as good as one's character and conduct warrant," 14in the community and it is to
community standards-not personal or family standards-that a court must refer in evaluating a
publication claimed to be defamatory.

The term "community" may of course be drawn as narrowly or as broadly as the user of the term and
his purposes may require. The reason why for purposes of the law on libel the more general
meaning of community must be adopted in the ascertainment of relevant standards, is rooted deep
in our constitutional law. That reason relates to the fundamental public interest in the protection and
promotion of free speech and expression, an interest shared by all members of the body politic and
territorial community. A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to
report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest, wherever they may
take place within the nation and as well in the outside world, with minimum fear of being hauled to
court by one group or another (however defined in scope) on criminal or civil charges for libel, so
long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing
within the general community. Any other rule on defamation, in a national community like ours with
many, diverse cultural, social, religious and other groupings, is likely to produce an unwholesome
"chilling effect" upon the constitutionally protected operations of the press and other instruments of
information and education. 15

Applying the foregoing to the facts of the present Petition, we note that the subject matter of the
article "A Changing of the Guard" is clearly one of legitimate public interest. As pointed out earlier,
petitioners in the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press have kept well within the generally
accepted moral and civil standards of the community as to what may be characterized as
defamatory. The complaint in the court below failed to state a cause of action and should have been
dismissed by respondent Judge. We hold that such dismissal, in the circumstances of this case,
including in particular the nature of the basic issue here at stake, may be compelled by certiorari and
prohibition. 16 This conclusion renders the third and last issue raised by petitioners quite moot.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. The Order of respondent
Judge dated 30 October 1986 in Civil Case No. 81-86 denying the defendants' Motion to Dismiss is
SET ASIDE, and respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to dismiss Case No. 81-86 forthwith upon
notice hereof. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 4 December 1986 is made
permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Regalado, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63559 May 30, 1986

NEWSWEEK, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE
PLANTERS INC., BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ASOCIACION DE
AGRICULTORES DE LA CARLOTA, LA CASTELLANA y PONTEVEDRA, INC., DONEDCO
PLANTERS ASSOCIATION INC., ARMANDO GUSTILO, ENRIQUE ROJAS, ALFREDO
MONTELIBANO, JR., PABLO SOLA, JOSE MONTALVO, VICENTE GUSTILO, JOSEPH
MARANON, ROBERTO CUENCA, JOSE SICANGCO, FLORENCIO ALONSO, MIGUEL
GATUSLAO, PEDRO YULO, MARINO RUBIN and BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, respondents.

San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin Law Offices for private respondents.

FERIA, J.:

Petitioner, Newsweek, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, in this
special action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeks to annul the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court dated December 17, 1982 sustaining the Order of the then Court of
First Instance of Bacolod City which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the complaint for libel filed
by private respondents (Civil Case No. 15812), and the Resolution dated March 10, 1983 which
denied its Motion for Reconsideration.

It appears that on March 5, 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane

planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar
planters, filed Civil Case No. 15812 in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all
sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two of petitioners'
non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came. The complaint alleged that
petitioner and the other defendants committed libel against them by the publication of the article "An
Island of Fear" in the February 23, 1981 issue of petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek. The
article supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big
landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid
sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them with imprunity. Complainants therein
alleged that said article, taken as a whole, showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood,
slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put them (sugarcane planters) in
bad light, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the Philippines and abroad,
and make them objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of their agricultural workers and of the
public in general. They prayed that defendants be ordered to pay them PlM as actual and
compensatory damages, and such amounts for moral, exemplary and corrective damages as the
court may determine, plus expenses of litigation, attorney's fees and costs of suit. A photo copy of
the article was attached to the complaint.

On November 5, 1981, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the printed article
sued upon is not actionable in fact and in law; and (2) the complaint is bereft of allegations that state,
much less support a cause of action. It pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and,
consequently, the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Private respondents filed an
Opposition to the motion to dismiss and petitioner filed a reply.

On March 17, 1982, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds on which
the motion to dismiss are predicated are not indubitable as the complaint on its face states a valid
cause of action; and the question as to whether the printed article sued upon its actionable or not is
a matter of evidence. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on May 28, 1982.

On June 18, 1982, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court (CA-G. R. No.
14406) seeking the annulment of the aforecited trial court's Orders for having been issued with such
a grave abuse of discretion as amounting to lack of jurisdiction and praying for the dismissal of the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

As earlier stated, respondent Court affirmed the trial court's Orders in a Decision dated December
17, 1982 and ordered the case to be tried on the merits on the grounds that -(1) the complaint
contains allegations of fact which called for the presentation of evidence; and (2) certiorari under
Rule 65 cannot be made to substitute for an appeal where an appeal would lie at a proper time.
Subsequently, on March 10, 1983, the respondent Court denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, hence this petition.

The proper remedy which petitioner should have taken from the decision of respondent Court is an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not the special civil action of certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of said Rules. However, since the petition was filed on time within
fifteen days from notice of the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, we shall treat the
same as a petition for review on certiorari. The two (2) issues raised in the petition are: (1) whether
or not the private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action; and (2) whether or not the
petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper to question the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action.

First, petitioner argues that private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action because
the complaint made no allegation that anything contained in the article complained of regarding
sugarcane planters referred specifically to any one of the private respondents; that libel can be
committed only against individual reputation; and that in cases where libel is claimed to have been
directed at a group, there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the
mere collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual group member's reputation.

We agree with petitioner.

In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) this Court ruled that "in order to maintain a
libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772, November 30,
1962), although it is not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R. 116)." In an earlier case, this Court
declared that" ... defamatory matter which does not reveal the Identity of the person upon whom the
imputation is cast, affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could
have Identified the personality of the individual defamed." (Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and
Lyons 42 Phil. 760).

This principle has been recognized to be of vital importance, especially where a group or class of
persons, as in the case at bar, claim to have been defamed, for it is evident that the larger the
collectivity, the more difficult it is for the individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks
apply to him. (Cf. 70 ALR 2d. 1384).

In the case of Uy Tioco vs. Yang Shu Wen , 32 Phil. 624, this Court held as follows:

Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group of persons in general language

only, are not actionable by individuals composing the class or group unless the
statements are sweeping; and it is very probable that even then no action would lie
where the body is composed of so large a number of persons that common sense
would tell those to whom the publication was made that there was room for persons
connected with the body to pursue an upright and law abiding course and that it
would be unreasonable and absurd to condemn all because of the actions of a part.
(supra p. 628).

It is evident from the above ruling that where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a
group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to
every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or
group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the
action separately, if need be.

We note that private respondents filed a "class suit" in representation of all the 8,500 sugarcane
planters of Negros Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and argues that the absence of any actionable
basis in the complaint cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit on behalf of the aforesaid sugar
planters.

We find petitioner's contention meritorious.

The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all
(Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the representation of
class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class
an actual party (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs
has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general
interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

The disputed portion of the article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to be libelous
never singled out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news report merely stated that the victim had
been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of
Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as it does to an official act performed by an elective public
official, is within the realm of privilege and protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and press.

The article further stated that Sola and the commander of the special police unit were arrested. The
Court takes judicial notice of this fact. (People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393.)

The second issue to be resolved here is whether or not the special civil action of certiorari or
prohibition is available to petitioner whose motion to dismiss the complaint and subsequent motion
for reconsideration were denied.
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject
of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 4 1). The ordinary procedure to be
followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the
issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to
quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment
of acquittal.

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or
motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then
certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused
to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or
offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to
quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In
such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few
examples of the exceptions to the general rule.

In De Jesus vs. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.

In Lopez vs. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of
jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the
respondent court from further proceeding in the case.

In Enriquez vs. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper
venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking
cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.

In Manalo vs. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior
judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss
the case.

In Yuviengco vs. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the
Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended
complaint.

In Tacas vs. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to
quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from
further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.

In People vs. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription
was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.

Respondent Court correctly stated the general rule and its exceptions. However, it ruled that none of
the exceptions is present in the case at bar and that the case appears complex and complicated,
necessitating a full-blown trial to get to the bottom of the controversy.

Petitioner's motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action
against it by pointing out the non-libelous nature of the article sued upon. There is no need of a trial
in view of the conclusion of this Court that the article in question is not libelous. The specific
allegation in the complaint, to the effect that the article attributed to the sugarcane planters the
deaths and brutalization of sugarcane workers, is not borne out by a perusal of the actual text.
The complaint contains a recital of the favorable working conditions of the agricultural workers in the
sugar industry and the various foundations and programs supported by planters' associations for the
benefit of their workers. Undoubtedly, the statements in the article in question are sweeping and
exaggerated; but, paraphrasing the ruling in the Uy Tioco case above quoted, it would be
unreasonable and absurd to condemn the majority of the sugarcane planters, who have at heart the
welfare of their workers, because of the actions of a part. Nonetheless, articles such as the one in
question may also serve to prick the consciences of those who have but are not doing anything or
enough for those who do not have.

On the other hand, petitioner would do well to heed the admonition of the President to media that
they should check the sources of their information to ensure the publication of the truth. Freedom of
the press, like all freedoms, should be exercised with responsibility.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is reversed and the complaint in
Civil Case No. 15812 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental is dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Abad Santos, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 135306 January 28, 2003

MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G.

BINEGAS, JR.,petitioners,
vs.
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG,
IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM
B.A. JUNIO, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

I may utterly detest what you write, but I shall fight to the death to make it possible for you to
continue writing it. —

Voltaire
VOLTAIRE'S PONTIFICAL VERSE bestirs once again the basic liberties to free speech and free
press — liberties that belong as well, if not more, to those who question, who do not conform, who
differ. For the ultimate good which we all strive to achieve for ourselves and our posterity can better
be reached by a free exchange of ideas, where the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the free market — not just the ideas we desire, but including
those thoughts we despise.1

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of more than seventy
(70) Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG,
IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A.
JUNIO, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as
a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC.,
MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., arising from an article
published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid. The article reads:

"ALAM BA NINYO?

Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga
Muslim?

Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit
na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong
Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw
na tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."

The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; that
these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer
ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a
religion in this country, in violation of law, public policy, good morals and human relations; that on
account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire
Muslim world, especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries.

MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., in their defense, contended that
the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not entitled to
damages; and, that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published
without malice nor intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims.2

On 30 June 1995 the trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish
their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically
identified —

It must be noted that the persons allegedly defamed, the herein plaintiffs, were not identified
with specificity. The subject article was directed at the Muslims without mentioning or
identifying the herein plaintiffs x x x. It is thus apparent that the alleged libelous article refers
to the larger collectivity of Muslims for which the readers of the libel could not readily identify
the personalities of the persons defamed. Hence, it is difficult for an individual Muslim
member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. The evidence presented in this
case failed to convince this court that, indeed, the defamatory remarks really applied to the
herein plaintiffs.3

On 27 August 1998 the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It opined that it was
"clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamic faith.
It stated that pigs were sacred and idolized as god by members of the Muslim religion. This libelous
imputation undeniably applied to the plaintiff-appellants who are Muslims sharing the same religious
beliefs." It added that the suit for damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as a Muslim umbrella organization gave it the
requisite personality to sue and protect the interests of all Muslims.4

Hence, the instant petition for review assailing the findings of the appellate court (a) on the existence
of the elements of libel, (b) the right of respondents to institute the class suit, and, (c) the liability of
petitioners for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character,
fame or reputation through false and malicious statements.5 It is that which tends to injure reputation
or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory
feelings or opinions about the plaintiff.6 It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good
name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute.7 Defamation is an invasion of a
relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to
have, of the plaintiff.8

It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per
se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written
or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for
special damages.9 The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable
by itself.10

Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or
identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member
of a class, no member of such class has a right of action11 without at all impairing the equally
demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of
Rights.12 Thus, in Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,13 we dismissed a complaint for
libel against Newsweek, Inc., on the ground that private respondents failed to state a cause of action
since they made no allegation in the complaint that anything contained in the article complained of
specifically referred to any of them. Private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane
planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual members,
filed a class action suit for damages in behalf of all sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental. The
complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Bacolod City alleged that Newsweek, Inc., committed
libel against them by the publication of the article "Island of Fear" in its weekly newsmagazine
allegedly depicting Negros Province as a place dominated by wealthy landowners and sugar
planters who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers but also
brutalized and killed them with impunity. Private respondents alleged that the article showed a
deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts
intended to put the sugarcane planters in a bad light, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and
humiliation in the Philippines and abroad, and make them the objects of hatred, contempt and
hostility of their agricultural workers and of the public in general. We ratiocinated —

x x x where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential
that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in
that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can
prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the
action separately, if need be x x x x The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where
one or more may sue for the benefit of all, or where the representation of class interest
affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an
actual party. We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct
 reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject
matter of the controversy.

In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by
the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private
respondents have no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly
disparaged. Private respondents must have a cause of action in common with the class to which
they belong to in order for the case to prosper.

An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the community. Each
Muslim, as part of the larger Muslim community in the Philippines of over five (5) million people,
belongs to a different trade and profession; each has a varying interest and a divergent political and
religious view — some may be conservative, others liberal. A Muslim may find the article
dishonorable, even blasphemous; others may find it as an opportunity to strengthen their faith and
educate the non-believers and the "infidels." There is no injury to the reputation of the individual
Muslims who constitute this community that can give rise to an action for group libel. Each reputation
is personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not have a single common
reputation that will give them a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

In Arcand v. The Evening Call Publishing Company,14 the United States Court of Appeals held that
one guiding principle of group libel is that defamation of a large group does not give rise to a cause
of action on the part of an individual unless it can be shown that he is the target of the defamatory
matter.

The rule on libel has been restrictive. In an American case,15 a person had allegedly committed libel
against all persons of the Jewish religion. The Court held that there could be no libel against an
extensive community in common law. In an English case, where libel consisted of allegations of
immorality in a Catholic nunnery, the Court considered that if the libel were on the whole Roman
Catholic Church generally, then the defendant must be absolved.16 With regard to the largest sectors
in society, including religious groups, it may be generally concluded that no criminal action at the
behest of the state, or civil action on behalf of the individual, will lie.

In another case, the plaintiffs claimed that all Muslims, numbering more than 600 million, were
defamed by the airing of a national television broadcast of a film depicting the public execution of a
Saudi Arabian princess accused of adultery, and alleging that such film was "insulting and
defamatory" to the Islamic religion.17 The United States District Court of the Northern District of
California concluded that the plaintiffs' prayer for $20 Billion in damages arising from "an
international conspiracy to insult, ridicule, discredit and abuse followers of Islam throughout the
world, Arabs and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" bordered on the "frivolous," ruling that the plaintiffs
had failed to demonstrate an actionable claim for defamation. The California Court stressed that the
aim of the law on defamation was to protect individuals; a group may be sufficiently large that a
statement concerning it could not defame individual group members.18

Philip Wittenberg, in his book "Dangerous Words: A Guide to the Law of Libel,"19 discusses the
inappropriateness of any action for tortious libel involving large groups, and provides a succinct
illustration:

There are groupings which may be finite enough so that a description of the body is a
description of the members. Here the problem is merely one of evaluation. Is the description
of the member implicit in the description of the body, or is there a possibility that a
description of the body may consist of a variety of persons, those included within the charge,
and those excluded from it?
 A general charge that the lawyers in the city are shysters would obviously not be a charge
that all of the lawyers were shysters. A charge that the lawyers in a local point in a great city,
such as Times Square in New York City, were shysters would obviously not include all of the
lawyers who practiced in that district; but a statement that all of the lawyers who practiced in
a particular building in that district were shysters would be a specific charge, so that any
lawyer having an office within that building could sue.

If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is considered to have no
application to anyone in particular, since one might as well defame all mankind. Not only does the
group as such have no action; the plaintiff does not establish any personal reference to himself.20 At
present, modern societal groups are both numerous and complex. The same principle follows with
these groups: as the size of these groups increases, the chances for members of such groups to
recover damages on tortious libel become elusive. This principle is said to embrace two (2)
important public policies: first, where the group referred to is large, the courts presume that no
reasonable reader would take the statements as so literally applying to each individual member;
and second, the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and
expression, as well as of the press, effecting a sound compromise between the conflicting
fundamental interests involved in libel cases.21

In the instant case, the Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who among the Muslims
were particularly defamed. The size of the group renders the reference as indeterminate and generic
as a similar attack on Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists or Mormons would do. The word "Muslim" is
descriptive of those who are believers of Islam, a religion divided into varying sects, such as the
Sunnites, the Shiites, the Kharijites, the Sufis and others based upon political and theological
distinctions. "Muslim" is a name which describes only a general segment of the Philippine
population, comprising a heterogeneous body whose construction is not so well defined as to render
it impossible for any representative identification.

The Christian religion in the Philippines is likewise divided into different sects: Catholic, Baptist,
Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Lutheran, and other groups the essence of which may lie in an inspired
charlatan, whose temple may be a corner house in the fringes of the countryside. As with the
Christian religion, so it is with other religions that represent the nation's culturally diverse people and
minister to each one's spiritual needs. The Muslim population may be divided into smaller groups
with varying agenda, from the prayerful conservative to the passionately radical. These divisions in
the Muslim population may still be too large and ambiguous to provide a reasonable inference to any
personality who can bring a case in an action for libel.

The foregoing are in essence the same view scholarly expressed by Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in
the course of the deliberations in this case. We extensively reproduce hereunder his comprehensive
and penetrating discussion on group libel —

Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander — the one being, in general,
written, while the other in general is oral. In either form, defamation is an invasion of the
interest in reputation and good name. This is a "relational interest" since it involves the
opinion others in the community may have, or tend to have of the plaintiff.

The law of defamation protects the interest in reputation — the interest in acquiring, retaining
and enjoying one's reputation as good as one's character and conduct warrant. The mere
fact that the plaintiff's feelings and sensibilities have been offended is not enough to create a
cause of action for defamation. Defamation requires that something be communicated to a
third person that may affect the opinion others may have of the plaintiff. The unprivileged
communication must be shown of a statement that would tend to hurt plaintiff's reputation, to
impair plaintiff's standing in the community.

Although the gist of an action for defamation is an injury to reputation, the focus of a
defamation action is upon the allegedly defamatory statement itself and its predictable effect
upon third persons. A statement is ordinarily considered defamatory if it "tend[s] to expose
one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion,
ostracism, degradation or disgracex x x." The Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory
statement as one that "tends to so harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."

Consequently as a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove as part of

his prima faciecase that the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3)
of and concerning the plaintiff.

The rule in libel is that the action must be brought by the person against whom the
defamatory charge has been made. In the American jurisdiction, no action lies by a third
person for damages suffered by reason of defamation of another person, even though the
plaintiff suffers some injury therefrom. For recovery in defamation cases, it is necessary that
the publication be "of and concerning the plaintiff." Even when a publication may be clearly
defamatory as to somebody, if the words have no personal application to the plaintiff, they
are not actionable by him. If no one is identified, there can be no libel because no one's
reputation has been injured x x x x

In fine, in order for one to maintain an action for an alleged defamatory statement, it must
appear that the plaintiff is the person with reference to whom the statement was made. This
principle is of vital importance in cases where a group or class is defamed since, usually, the
larger the collective, the more difficult it is for an individual member to show that he was the
person at whom the defamation was directed.

If the defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons, they
applied to any member of the group, and an individual member could maintain an action for
defamation. When the defamatory language was used toward a small group or class,
including every member, it has been held that the defamatory language referred to each
member so that each could maintain an action. This small group or class may be a jury,
persons engaged in certain businesses, professions or employments, a restricted subdivision
of a particular class, a society, a football team, a family, small groups of union officials, a
board of public officers, or engineers of a particular company.

In contrast, if defamatory words are used broadly in respect to a large class or group of
persons, and there is nothing that points, or by proper colloquium or innuendo can be made
to apply, to a particular member of the class or group, no member has a right of action for
libel or slander. Where the defamatory matter had no special, personal application and was
so general that no individual damages could be presumed, and where the class referred to
was so numerous that great vexation and oppression might grow out of the multiplicity of
suits, no private action could be maintained. This rule has been applied to defamatory
publications concerning groups or classes of persons engaged in a particular business,
profession or employment, directed at associations or groups of association officials, and to
those directed at miscellaneous groups or classes of persons.

Distinguishing a small group — which if defamed entitles all its members to sue from a large
group — which if defamed entitles no one to sue — is not always so simple. Some
 authorities have noted that in cases permitting recovery, the group generally has twenty five
(25) or fewer members. However, there is usually no articulated limit on size. Suits have
been permitted by members of fairly large groups when some distinguishing characteristic of
the individual or group increases the likelihood that the statement could be interpreted to
apply individually. For example, a single player on the 60 to 70 man Oklahoma University
football team was permitted to sue when a writer accused the entire team of taking
amphetamines to "hop up" its performance; the individual was a fullback, i.e., a significant
position on the team and had played in all but two of the team's games.

A prime consideration, therefore, is the public perception of the size of the group and
whether a statement will be interpreted to refer to every member. The more organized and
cohesive a group, the easier it is to tar all its members with the same brush and the more
likely a court will permit a suit from an individual even if the group includes more than twenty
five (25) members. At some point, however, increasing size may be seen to dilute the harm
to individuals and any resulting injury will fall beneath the threshold for a viable lawsuit.

x x x x There are many other groupings of men than those that are contained within the
foregoing group classifications. There are all the religions of the world, there are all the
political and ideological beliefs; there are the many colors of the human race. Group
defamation has been a fertile and dangerous weapon of attack on various racial, religious
and political minorities. Some states, therefore, have passed statutes to prevent concerted
efforts to harass minority groups in the United States by making it a crime to circulate
insidious rumors against racial and religious groups. Thus far, any civil remedy for such
broadside defamation has been lacking.

There have been numerous attempts by individual members to seek redress in the courts for
libel on these groups, but very few have succeeded because it felt that the groups are too
large and poorly defined to support a finding that the plaintiff was singled out for personal
attack x x x x (citations omitted).

Our conclusion therefore is that the statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not
specifically identify nor refer to any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the
alleged libelous publication. Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social
censure pointedly resulting in damages.

A contrary view is expressed that what is involved in the present case is an intentional tortious act
causing mental distress and not an action for libel. That opinion invokes Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire22 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that words heaping extreme profanity, intended
merely to incite hostility, hatred or violence, have no social value and do not enjoy constitutional
protection; and Beauharnais v. Illinois23 where it was also ruled that hate speech which denigrates a
group of persons identified by their religion, race or ethnic origin defames that group and the law
may validly prohibit such speech on the same ground as defamation of an individual.

We do not agree to the contrary view articulated in the immediately preceding paragraph. Primarily,
an "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by
an individual24 to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his
character. It has no application in the instant case since no particular individual was identified in the
disputed article of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the article, assuming there was
any, falls under the principle of relational harm — which includes harm to social relationships in the
community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm — which
includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. In
their complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the standing of Muslims in the
community, especially to their activities in propagating their faith in Metro Manila and in other non-
Muslim communities in the country.25 It is thus beyond cavil that the present case falls within the
application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation, rather than the reactive
harm principle on which the concept of emotional distress properly belongs.

Moreover, under the Second Restatement of the Law, to recover for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress the plaintiff must show that: (a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in
reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a
causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The
plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe.26

"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society. The defendant's actions must have been so
terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.27 Generally, conduct will be
found to be actionable where the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community
would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him or her to exclaim, "Outrageous!" as his
or her reaction.28

"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish,
shock, fright, horror, and chagrin.29 "Severe emotional distress," in some jurisdictions, refers to any
type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and
diagnosed by professionals trained to do so, including posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis,
psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia.30 The plaintiff is required to show, among other things, that
he or she has suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to
endure it; severity of the distress is an element of the cause of action, not simply a matter of
damages.31

Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation,
embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances,
petty expressions, or other trivialities. In determining whether the tort of outrage had been
committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of
criticism, rough language, and to occasional acts and words that are definitely inconsiderate and
unkind; the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will
have his feelings hurt, is not enough.32

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell33 illustrates the test case of a civil action for damages on intentional
infliction of emotional distress. A parody appeared in Hustler magazine featuring the American
fundamentalist preacher and evangelist Reverend Jerry Falwell depicting him in an inebriated state
having an incestuous, sexual liaison with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued Hustler and its
publisher Larry Flynt for damages. The United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia ruled that the parody was not libelous, because no reasonable reader would have
understood it as a factual assertion that Falwell engaged in the act described. The jury, however,
awarded $200,000 in damages on a separate count of "intentional infliction of emotional distress," a
cause of action that did not require a false statement of fact to be made. The United States Supreme
Court in a unanimous decision overturned the jury verdict of the Virginia Court and held
that Reverend Falwell may not recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It was argued
that the material might be deemed outrageous and may have been intended to cause severe
emotional distress, but these circumstances were not sufficient to overcome the free speech rights
guaranteed under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Simply stated, an
intentional tort causing emotional distress must necessarily give way to the fundamental right to free
speech.

It must be observed that although Falwell was regarded by the U.S. High Court as a "public figure,"
he was an individual particularly singled out or identified in the parody appearing on Hustler
magazine. Also, the emotional distress allegedly suffered by Reverend Falwell involved a reactive
interest — an emotional response to the parody which supposedly injured his psychological well-
being.

Verily, our position is clear that the conduct of petitioners was not extreme or outrageous. Neither
was the emotional distress allegedly suffered by respondents so severe that no reasonable person
could be expected to endure it. There is no evidence on record that points to that result.

Professor William Prosser, views tort actions on intentional infliction of emotional distress in this
manner34 —

There is virtually unanimous agreement that such ordinary defendants are not liable for mere
insult, indignity, annoyance, or even threats, where the case is lacking in other
circumstances of aggravation. The reasons are not far to seek. Our manners, and with them
our law, have not yet progressed to the point where we are able to afford a remedy in the
form of tort damages for all intended mental disturbance. Liability of course cannot be
extended to every trivial indignity x x x x The plaintiff must necessarily be expected and
required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to acts that are
definitely inconsiderate and unkind x x x The plaintiff cannot recover merely because of hurt
feelings.

Professor Calvert Magruder reinforces Prosser with this succinct observation, viz:35

There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where someone's feelings are
hurt. There must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve
must be left through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.

Thus, it is evident that even American courts are reluctant to adopt a rule of recovery for emotional
harm that would "open up a wide vista of litigation in the field of bad manners," an area in which a
"toughening of the mental hide" was thought to be a more appropriate remedy.36 Perhaps of greater
concern were the questions of causation, proof, and the ability to accurately assess damages for
emotional harm, each of which continues to concern courts today.37

In this connection, the doctrines in Chaplinsky and Beauharnais had largely been superseded by
subsequent First Amendment doctrines. Back in simpler times in the history of free expression the
Supreme Court appeared to espouse a theory, known as the Two-Class Theory, that treated certain
types of expression as taboo forms of speech, beneath the dignity of the First Amendment. The most
celebrated statement of this view was expressed in Chaplinsky:

There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words
— those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Today, however, the theory is no longer viable; modern First Amendment principles have passed it
by. American courts no longer accept the view that speech may be proscribed merely because it is
"lewd," "profane," "insulting" or otherwise vulgar or offensive.38 Cohen v. California39 is illustrative:
Paul Robert Cohen wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in a Los Angeles courthouse in
April 1968, which caused his eventual arrest. Cohen was convicted for violating a California statute
prohibiting any person from "disturb[ing] the peace x x x by offensive conduct." The U.S. Supreme
Court conceded that Cohen's expletive contained in his jacket was "vulgar," but it concluded that his
speech was nonetheless protected by the right to free speech. It was neither considered an
"incitement" to illegal action nor "obscenity." It did not constitute insulting or "fighting" words for it had
not been directed at a person who was likely to retaliate or at someone who could not avoid the
message. In other words, no one was present in the Los Angeles courthouse who would have
regarded Cohen's speech as a direct personal insult, nor was there any danger of reactive violence
against him.

No specific individual was targeted in the allegedly defamatory words printed on Cohen's jacket. The
conviction could only be justified by California's desire to exercise the broad power in preserving the
cleanliness of discourse in the public sphere, which the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant to the
State, holding that no objective distinctions can be made between vulgar and nonvulgar speech, and
that the emotive elements of speech are just as essential in the exercise of this right as the purely
cognitive. As Mr. Justice Harlan so eloquently wrote: "[O]ne man's vulgarity is another man's lyric x x
x words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force."40 With Cohen, the U.S.
Supreme Court finally laid the Constitutional foundation for judicial protection of provocative and
potentially offensive speech.

Similarly, libelous speech is no longer outside the First Amendment protection. Only one small piece
of the Two-Class Theory in Chaplinsky survives — U.S. courts continue to treat "obscene" speech
as not within the protection of the First Amendment at all. With respect to the "fighting words"
doctrine, while it remains alive it was modified by the current rigorous clear and present danger
test.41 Thus, in Cohen the U.S. Supreme Court in applying the test held that there was no showing
that Cohen's jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" had threatened to provoke imminent violence;
and that protecting the sensibilities of onlookers was not sufficiently compelling interest to restrain
Cohen's speech.

Beauharnais, which closely followed the Chaplinsky doctrine, suffered the same fate as Chaplinsky.
Indeed, when Beauharnais was decided in 1952, the Two-Class Theory was still flourishing. While
concededly the U.S. High Tribunal did not formally abandon Beauharnais, the seminal shifts in U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence substantially undercut Beauharnais and seriously undermined what is
left of its vitality as a precedent. Among the cases that dealt a crushing impact on Beauharnais and
rendered it almost certainly a dead letter case law are Brandenburg v. Ohio,42 and, again, Cohen v.
California.43 These decisions recognize a much narrower set of permissible grounds for restricting
speech than did Beauharnais.44

In Brandenburg, appellant who was a leader of the Ku Klux Klan was convicted under the Ohio
Criminal Syndicalism Statute for advocating the necessity, duty and propriety of crime, sabotage,
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reforms; and for voluntarily assembling with a group formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of
criminal syndicalism. Appellant challenged the statute and was sustained by the U.S. Supreme
Court, holding that the advocacy of illegal action becomes punishable only if such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.45Except in unusual instances, Brandenburg protects the advocacy of lawlessness as long as
such speech is not translated into action.
The importance of the Brandenburg ruling cannot be overemphasized. Prof. Smolla affirmed that
"Brandenburgmust be understood as overruling Beauharnais and eliminating the possibility of
treating group libel under the same First Amendment standards as individual libel."46 It may well be
considered as one of the lynchpins of the modern doctrine of free speech, which seeks to give
special protection to politically relevant speech.

In any case, respondents' lack of cause of action cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit. As
correctly pointed out by Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug during the deliberations, "an element of a class suit
is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of
members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is
coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made
parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class; and, (c) any other factor bearing on the
ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.47

The rules require that courts must make sure that the persons intervening should be sufficiently
numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned. In the present controversy, Islamic Da'wah
Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert the interests not only of the Muslims in the
Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as well. Private respondents obviously lack the sufficiency
of numbers to represent such a global group; neither have they been able to demonstrate the
identity of their interests with those they seek to represent. Unless it can be shown that there can be
a safe guaranty that those absent will be adequately represented by those present, a class suit,
given its magnitude in this instance, would be unavailing."48

Likewise on the matter of damages, we agree that "moral damages may be recovered only if the
plaintiff is able to satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis for the damages and its
causal connection with the acts complained of,49 and so it must be, as moral damages although
incapable of pecuniary estimation are designed not to impose a penalty but to compensate for injury
sustained and actual damages suffered.50 Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be
awarded if claimant is able to establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.51 Unfortunately, neither of the requirements to sustain an award for either of these
damages would appear to have been adequately established by respondents."

In a pluralistic society like the Philippines where misinformation about another individual's religion is
as commonplace as self-appointed critics of government, it would be more appropriate to respect the
fair criticism of religious principles, including those which may be outrageously appalling, immensely
erroneous, or those couched as fairly informative comments. The greater danger in our society is the
possibility that it may encourage the frequency of suits among religious fundamentalists, whether
Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, or others. This would unnecessarily make the civil courts
a battleground to assert their spiritual ideas, and advance their respective religious agenda.

It need not be stressed that this Court has no power to determine which is proper religious conduct
or belief; neither does it have the authority to rule on the merits of one religion over another, nor
declare which belief to uphold or cast asunder, for the validity of religious beliefs or values are
outside the sphere of the judiciary. Such matters are better left for the religious authorities to address
what is rightfully within their doctrine and realm of influence. Courts must be viewpoint-neutral when
it comes to religious matters if only to affirm the neutrality principle of free speech rights under
modern jurisprudence where "[a]ll ideas are treated equal in the eyes of the First Amendment —
even those ideas that are universally condemned and run counter to constitutional
principles."52 Under the right to free speech, "there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and
juries but on the competition of other ideas."53 Denying certiorari and affirming the appellate court
decision would surely create a chilling effect on the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech,
of expression, and of the press.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27
August 1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the RTC-Br. 4, Manila, dismissing
the complaint for lack of merit, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Callejo,

Sr., JJ ., concur.
Mendoza, J ., in the result.
Vitug, J ., see concurring opinion.
Panganiban, J ., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice A.T. Carpio.
Carpio, J ., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J ., see dissenting opinion.
Carpio-Morales, J ., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice A.T. Carpio.
Azcuna, J ., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice Austria-Martinez.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8974 October 18, 1957

APOLONIO CABANSAG, plaintiff,

vs.
GEMINIANA MARIA FERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants.
APOLONIO CABANSAG, ROBERTO V. MERRERA and RUFINO V. MERRERA, respondents-
appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and
Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr., appellee.
Merrera and Merrera for appellants.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a contempt proceeding which arose in Civil Case No. 9564 of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan wherein Apolonio Cabansag and his lawyers Roberto V. Merrera were found guilty and
sentenced the first to pay a fine of P20 and the last two P50 each with the warning that a repetition
of the of offense will next time be heavily dealt with.

Apolonio Cabansag filed on January 13, 1947 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a
complaint seeking the ejectment of Geminiana Fernandez, et al. from a parcel of land. Defendants
filed their answer on January 31, 1947 and a motion to dismiss on February 2, 1947 and a motion of
plaintiff's counsel, set the case for hearing on July 30, 1947. The meeting was postponed to August
8, 1947. On that day only one witness testified and the case was postponed to August 25, 1947.
Thereafter, three incidents developed, namely: one regarding a claim for damages which was
answered by defendants, another concerning the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which
was set for on March 23, 1948, and the third relative to an alleged contempt for violation of an
agreement of the parties approved by the court. Pleadings were filed by the parties on these
incidents and the court set the case for hearing on October 27, 1948. Hearing was postponed to
December 10, 1948. On this date, only part of the evidence was received and the next hearing was
scheduled for January 24,1949 when again only a part of the evidence was received and the case
was continued to October 4, 1949.

On October 4, 1949, the court, presided over by Judge Villamor upon petition of both parties,
ordered the stenographers who took down the notes during the previous hearings to transcribe them
within 15 days upon payment of their fees, and the hearing was postponed until the transcript of said
notes had been submitted. Notwithstanding the failure of the stenographers to transcribe their notes,
the hearing was set for March 17, 1950. Two more postponements followed for March 23, 1950 and
March 27, 1950. On August 9, 1950, August 23, 1950, September 26, 1950 and November 29,
1950, hearings were had but the case was only partly tried to be postponed again to January 30,
1951 and February 19, 1951. Partial hearings were held on February 20, 1951, March 12, 1951 and
June 6,1951. These hearings were followed by three more postponements and on August 15, 1951,
the case was partially heard. After this partial hearing, the trial was continued on March 6, 1952 only
to be postponed to May 27, 1952. No hearing took place on said date and the case was set for
continuation on December 9, 1952 when the court, Judge Pasicolan presiding, issued an order
suggesting to the parties to arrange with the stenographers who took down the notes to transcribe
their respective notes and that the case would be set for hearing after the submission of the
transcript. From December 9, 1952 to August 12, 1954, no further step was taken either by the court
or any of the contending parties in the case. .

On December 30, 1953, President Magsaysay assumed office, he issued Executive Order No. I
creating the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), which was later superseded
by Executive Order 19 promulgated on March 17, 1954. And on August 12, 1954 Apolonio
Cabansag, apparently irked and disappointed by the delay in the disposition of his case, wrote the
PCAC, a letter copy which he furnished the Secretary of Justice and the Executive Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads:

We, poor people of the Philippines are very grateful for the creation of your Office. Unlike in
the old days, poor people are not heard, but now the PCAC is the sword of Damocles ready
to smite bureaucratic aristocracy. Poor people can now rely on PCAC to help them.

Undaunted, the undersigned begs to request the help of the PCAC in the interest of public
service, as President Magsaysay has in mind to create the said PACC, to have his old case
stated above be terminated once and for all. The undersigned has long since been deprived
of his land thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer. The said case which had long
been pending could not be decided due to the fact that the transcript of the records has not,
as yet, been transcribed by the stenographers who took the stenographic notes. The new
Judges could not proceed to hear the case before the transcription of the said notes. The
stenographers who took the notes are now assigned in another courts. It seems that the
undersigned will be deprived indefinitely of his right of possession over the land he owns. He
has no other recourse than to ask the help of the ever willing PCAC to help him solve his
predicament at an early date.

Now then, Mr. Chief, the undersigned relies on you to do your utmost best to bring justice to
its final destination. My confidence reposes in you. Thanks.
 Most confidently yours,

(Sgd.) APOLONIO CABANSAG

Plaintiff

Upon the receipt of the letter, the Secretary of Justice indorsed it to the Clerk of Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan instructing him to require the stenographers concerned to transcribe their
notes in Civil Case No. 9564. The clerk of court, upon receipt of this instruction on August 27, 1954,
referred the matter to Judge Jesus P. Morfe before whom the case was then informing him that the
two stenographers concerned, Miss Iluminada Abello and Juan Gaspar, have already been assigned
elsewhere. On the same date, Judge Morfe wrote the Secretary of Justice informing him that under
provisions of Act No. 2383 and Section 12 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, said stenographers are
not obliged to transcribe their notes except in cases of appeal and that since the parties are not poor
litigants, they are not entitled to transcription free of charge, aside from the fact that said
stenographers were no longer under his jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on September 1, 1954, Atty. Manuel Fernandez, counsel for defendants, filed a motion
before Judge Morfe praying that Apolonio Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for an alleged
scurrilous remark he made in his letter to the PCAC to the effect that he, Cabansag, has long been
deprived of his land "thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer", to which counsel for Cabansag
replied with a counter-charge praying that Atty. Fernandez be in turn declared in contempt because
of certain contemptuous remarks made by him in his pleading. Acting on these charges and counter-
charges, on September 14, 1954, Judge Morfe dismissed both charges but ordered Cabansag to
show cause in writing within 10 days why he should not be held liable for contempt for sending the
above letter to the PCAC which tended to degrade the court in the eyes of the President and the
people. Cabansag filed his answer stating that he did not have the idea to besmirch the dignity or
belittle the respect due the court nor was he actuated with malice when he addressed the letter to
the PCAC; that there is no single contemptuous word in said letter nor was it intended to give the
Chief Executive a wrong impression or opinion of the court; and that if there was any inefficiency in
the disposal of his case, the same was committed by the judges who previously intervened in the
case.

In connection with this answer, the lawyers of Cabansag, Roberto V. Merrera and Rufino V. Merrera'
also submitted a written manifestation stating that the sending of the letter to their client to the PCAC
was through their knowledge and consent because they believed that there was nothing wrong in
doing so. And it appearing that said attorneys had a hand in the writing and remittance of the letter to
the PCAC, Judge Morfe on, on September 29, 1954, issued another order requiring also said
attorneys to show cause why they should not likewise be held for contempt for having committed
acts which tend to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.

Anent the charge for contempt preferred by Judge Morfe against Apolonio Cabansag, several
incidents took place touching on the right of the Special Counsel of the Department of Justice to
appear as counsel for Cabansag, which were however settled when the court allowed said Special
Counsel to appear as amicus curiae in his official capacity. In addition to this Special Counsel, other
members of the local bar were likewise allowed to appear for respondents in view of the importance
of the issues involved. After due hearing, where the counsel of respondents were allowed to argue
and submit memoranda, the decision finding respondents guilty of contempt and sentencing them to
pay a fine as stated in the early part of this decision. Respondents in due time appealed to this
Court.
The issues involved in this appeal appear well stated in the decision of the trial Court. They are: (a)
Did the writing in the letter in question to the PCAC tend directly or indirectly to put the lower court
into disrepute or belittle, degrade or embarrass it in its administration of justice?; and (b) Did writing
of said letter tend to draw the intervention of the PCAC in the instant case which will have the effect
of undermining the court's judicial independence?

We agree that the trial court that courts have the power to preserve their integrity and maintain their
dignity without which their administration of justice is bound to falter or fail (Villavicencio vs. Lukban,
39 Phil., 778; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 322). This is the preservative power to punish for
contempt (Rule 64, Rules of Court; Villavicencio vs. Lukban, supra). This power is inherent in all
courts and essential to their right of self-preservation (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil.,
271). In order that it may conduct its business unhampered by publications which tends to impair the
impartiality of its decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, the court will not
hesitate to exercise it regardless of who is affected. For, "as important as is the maintenance of
unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the
independence of the judiciary" (In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil., 801).The reason for this is that
respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such said institution would
be resting on a very shaky foundation (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil., 724).

The question that now arises is: Has the lower court legitimately and justifiably exercised this power
in the instant case?

The lower court tells us that it has because in its opinion the act of respondents to put it belittle or
degrade or embarrass it in its administration of justice, and so it punished them for contempt to
protect its judicial independence. But appellants believe otherwise, for they contend that in sending
the letter in question to the PCAC, they did nothing but to exercise their right to petition the
government for redress of their grievance as guaranteed by our constitution (section 1, paragraph 8,
Article III).

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to
meet peaceably for consultation in respect affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances."
The First Amendments of the Federal expressly guarantees that right against abridgement
by Congress. But mention does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that
cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all civil and political institutions,- principles which the Fourteenth
Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause. (Emerson and Haber,
Political and Civil Rights in the United States, p. 419.).

We are therefore confronted with a clash of two fundamental rights which lie at the bottom of our
democratic institutions-the independence of the judiciary the right to petition the government for
redress of grievance. How to balance and reconcile the exercise of these rights is the problem posed
in the case before us.

. . . A free press is not to be judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither
has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society.

The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that
freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means of assuring judges
their independence is a free press. (Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Pennekamp vs.
Florida, 328 U.S. 354-356)
Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights of similar import
in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between freedom of expression and
independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and present danger" rule and the "dangerous
tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the
comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high"
before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the "substantive evil"
sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly and unfair administration of justice."
This test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words
maybe published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration of justice.

This rule had its origin in Schenck vs. U. S. (249) U. S. 47), promulgated in 1919, and ever since it
has afforded a practical guidance in a great variety of cases in which the scope of the constitutional
protection of freedom of expression was put in issue.1 In one of said cases, the United States
Supreme Court has made the significant suggestion that this rule "is an appropriate guide in
determining the constitutionality of restriction upon expression where the substantial evil sought to
be prevented by the restriction is destruction of life or property or invasion of the right of privacy"
Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88).

Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of this rule, the Supreme Court of the
United States said "Clear and present danger of substantive evils as a result of indiscriminate
publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right of
freedom of speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high. . . . A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection
of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the
courts, upon the theory that in such a case it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair
administration of justice. The possibility of engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the
published criticism of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify impairment of the
constitutional right of freedom of speech and press." (Bridges vs. California, 314 U.S. 252, syllabi)

No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish for contempt in relation to the
freedom of speech and press. We quote; "Freedom of speech and press should not be impaired
through the exercise of the punish for contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances
in question are a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. A judge may hold in
contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or to belittle him. .
. . The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications concerning a judge's decision is
not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute
an imminent not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. (Craig vs. Harney, 331 U. S.
367, syllabi)

And in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by newspaper criticism against
the right of free speech to determine whether such criticism may constitutionally be punished as
contempt, it was ruled that "freedom of public comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily
against a possible tendency to influence pending cases." (Pennekamp vs. Florida, 328 U. S. 331).

The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity
and degree (Schenck vs. U. S., supra).

The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases where extreme
difficulty is confronted determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right of courts to
protect their independence begins. There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic
principle of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition
for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They are subject to
restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against contempt (Gilbert
vs. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325.)

This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the
state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or
immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be
advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to
incite persons to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil the utterance be to bring about
the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. (Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U.S.
652.).

It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press
which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish,
without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license
that gives immunity for every possible use of language, and prevents the punishment of
those who abuse this freedom. . . . Reasonably limited, it was said by story in the passage
cited this freedom is an inestimable privilege in a free government; without such limitation, it
might become the scourge of the Republic.

xxx xxx xxx

And, for yet more imperative reasons, a state may punish utterances endangering the
foundations of organized government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means.
These imperil its own existence as a constitutional state. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial because the effect of a
given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The state cannot reasonably be required to
measure the danger from every such utterance in the nice balance of a jeweler's scale. A
single revolutionary spark, may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a
sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said that the state is acting arbitrarily or
unreasonably when, in the exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect
the public peace and safety it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has
enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be required to
defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary
utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and immediate
danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the
threatened danger in its incipiency. In People vs. Lloyd, supra, p. 35 (136 N. E. 505), it was
aptly said: Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine until
there is a present and imminent danger of the success of the plan advocated. If the state
were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger became certain, than its right to protect
itself would come into being simultaneously with the overthrow of the government, when
there would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the enforcement of the law." Gitlow
va. New York, supra.)
The question then to be determined is: Has the letter of Cabansag created a sufficient danger to a
fair administration of justice? Did its remittance to the PCAC create a danger sufficiently imminent to
come under the two rules mentioned above?

Even if we make a careful analysis of the letter sent by appellant Cabansag to the PCAC which has
given rise to the present contempt proceedings, we would at once see that it was far from his mind
to put the court in ridicule and much less to belittle or degrade it in the eyes of those to whom the
letter was addressed for, undoubtedly, he was compelled to act the way he did simply because he
saw no other way of obtaining the early termination of his case. This is clearly inferable from its
context wherein, in respectful and courteous language, Cabansag gave vent to his feeling when he
said that he "has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical
lawyer"; that the case which had long been pending could not be decided due to the fact that the
transcript of the records has not as yet, been transcribed by the stenographer who took the
stenographic notes", and that the new Judges could not proceed to hear the case before the
transcription of the said notes." Analyzing said utterances, one would see that if they ever criticize,
"the criticism refers, not to the court, but to opposing counsel whose tactical maneuvers" has
allegedly caused the undue delay of the case. The grievance or complaint, if any, is addressed to
the stenographers for their apparent indifference in transcribing their notes.

The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the motivating factor of the lodging of
the contempt charge by the trial judge is the fact that the letter was sent to the Office of the
President asking for help because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the course of
action he had taken may not be a wise one for it would have been proper had he addressed his
letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme Court, such act alone would not be
contemptuous. To be so the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the administration of
justice. Nor can we infer that such act has "a dangerous tendency" to belittle the court or undermine
the administration of justice for the writer merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the
government for redress of a legitimate grievance.

The fact is that even the trial court itself has at the beginning entertained such impression when it
found that the criticism was directed not against the court but against the counsel of the opposite
party, and that only on second thought did it change its mind when it developed that the act of
Cabansag was prompted by the advice of his lawyers. Nor can it be contended that the latter is
groundless or one motivated by malice. The circumstances borne by the record which preceded the
sending of that letter show that there was an apparent cause for grievance.

Thus, the record shows that on January 13, 1947, or more than 8 years ago, appellant Cabansag
filed with the lower court a complaint against Geminiana Fernandez, et al. seeking to eject them from
a portion of land covered by a torrens title. On October 4, 1949, or two years thereafter, the court,
Judge Villamor presiding, issued an order requiring the stenographers who took down the notes to
transcribe them within 15 days upon payment of their corresponding fees. On December 9, 1952, or
almost 3 years thereafter, the court, Judge Pasicolan presiding, issued a similar order requiring the
stenographers to transcribe their notes and decreeing that the case be set for hearing after said
notes had been transcribed. No further step was taken from his last date either by the by the court or
by the opposing parties. Meanwhile, the stenographers were given assignment elsewhere, and when
this matter brought to the attention of the court by its own clerk of court, said court in an indorsement
sent to the Secretary of Justice expressed its inability to take action in view of the fact that the
stenographers were no longer under its jurisdiction. And in said indorsement nothing was said about
its readiness to continue the trial even in the absence of the transcript of the notes.

Under such a state of affairs, appellant Cabansag cannot certainly be blamed for entertaining the
belief that the only way by which he could obtain redress of his grievance is to address his letter to
the PCAC which after all is the office created by the late President to receive and hear all complaints
against officials and employees of the government to facilitate which the assistance and cooperation
of all the executive departments were enjoined (Executive Order No. 1, as amended by Executive
Order No. 19). And one of the departments that come under the control of the President is the
Department of Justice which under the law has administrative supervision over courts of first
instance.(Section 83, Revised Administrative Code) The PCAC is part of the Office of the President.
It can, therefore, be said that the letter of Cabansag though sent to the PCAC is intended for the
Department of Justice where it properly belongs. Consequently, the sending of that letter may be
considered as one sent to the Department of Justice and as such cannot constitute undue
publication that would place him beyond the mantle of protection of our constitution.

. . . under the presidential type of government which we adopted and considering the
departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph, section 12,
Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he
act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive
are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. (Villena vs. The Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil., 451, 463.)

We would only add one word in connection with the participation in the incident of Cabansag's co-
appellants, Attys. Roberto V. Merrera and Rufino V. Merrera. While the conduct of Cabansag may
be justified considering that, being a layman, he is unaware of the technical rules of law and
procedure which may place him under the protective mantle of our constitution, such does not obtain
with regard to his co-appellants. Being learned in the law and officers of the court, they should have
acted with more care and circumspection in advising their client to avoid undue embarrassment to
the court or unnecessary interference with the normal course of its proceedings. Their duty as
lawyers is always to observe utmost respect to the court and defend it against unjust criticism and
clamor. Had they observed a more judicious behavior, they would have avoided the unpleasant
incident that had arisen. However, the record is bereft of any proof showing improper motive on their
part, much less bad faith in their actuation. But they should be warned, as we now do, that a
commission of a similar misstep in the future would render them amenable to a more severe
disciplinary action.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Padilla, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix,
JJ., concur.