Introduction

Time, spacetime, and metaphysics

This thesis describes and defends the moving spotlight theory, a metaphysical theory of the

basic temporal structure of reality.

The moving spotlight theory has two essential components: first, a thesis about

presentness; and second, a thesis about the existence (in the most general sense) of things

over time. The first thesis is that exactly one instant of time is absolutely, objectively, non-

relatively present. This thesis is usually called the ‘A-theory’ of time. The opposing view,

according to which no instant of time is absolutely, objectively, non-relatively present (and

therefore presentness for instants is always merely a relative matter) is usually called the ‘B-

theory’ of time. I defend the A-theory in Chapters One and Four.

A-theorists think that there is some fundamental difference between one instant and

all others in virtue of which that instant is absolutely present (and all others are either

absolutely past, if they are earlier than the absolute present instant, or absolutely future, if

they are later than the absolute present instant). Different A-theorists have different ideas

about what this fundamental difference amounts to; but they all agree that there is a

difference. B-theorists, on the other hand, deny that some instant is absolutely present, and

therefore deny that there is something ‘metaphysically special’ about one instant in virtue of

which it is absolutely present. As far as they are concerned, when it comes to presentness, all

instants are, metaphysically speaking, on a par.

Of course, both A- and B-theorists agree that instants of time can be relatively

present: for example, they agree that this very instant is present relative to my typing this

sentence, and that some past instant is present relative to Socrates’ birth, and that every
instant is present relative to itself. The difference is that A-theorists think that in addition to

all the relatively present instants, there is some instant that is also present full stop.

We can illustrate the difference between the A- and B-theories by considering the

analogy between time and space. According to B-theorists, time and space are perfectly

analogous: just as locations in space stand in various spatial relations, instants of time stand

in the temporal relations of earlier than and later than; and just as every location in space can

be said to be north, south, east or west relative to some orientation, every instant can be said

to be past or future relative to some other instant (assuming that there is no first moment of

time). Finally, just as every location in space is here relative to itself, every instant is present

relative to itself. A-theorists, on the other hand, deny that space and time are perfectly

analogous. In particular, even though they accept the obviously true claim that no location in

space is ‘objectively here’, they deny that some instant of time is objectively present.

So far I have written about instants of time and locations in space as if time and space

are separate entities. However, physicists long ago rejected the notion of separate time and

space in favour of unified spacetime. Consider the Neo-Newtonian model of spacetime. The

Neo-Newtonian model abandons the Newtonian notion of permanent spatial locations in

favour of a manifold of spacetime points- momentary spatially non-extended locations-

standing in permanent geometric relations. Crucially, among these relations is the relation of

absolute simultaneity. Thus according to the Neo-Newtonian model, for any spacetime point

p, there is a set of points which are simultaneous simpliciter with p. A maximal set of such

points is called a hyperplane of simultaneity, and given that absolute simultaneity is an

equivalence relation, the set of hyperplanes is a partition of Neo-Newtonian spacetime.

Hyperplanes of simultaneity- maximal, instantaneous regions of spacetime- are structurally

similar to instants of time, as standardly conceived. Therefore one way to make sense of the

notion of an instant of time given the physicist’s spacetime model is to identify instants with
hyperplanes of simultaneity- i.e. maximal slices of spacetime.

Given Neo-Newtonian spacetime, it is possible to define the notion of an instant of

time simpliciter. However, that does not mean that the Neo-Newtonian model is an A-

theoretic model. Neo-Newtonian spacetime may contain instants of time, but the model does

not identify any instant as fundamentally distinct from all others. On the usual view,

fundamentally, all instants are on a par. In other words: absolute simultaneity does not imply

absolute presentness. However, absolute presentness does imply absolute simultaneity: if

some hyperplane is present simpliciter then all the points that are members of it are

simultaneous simpliciter. Moreover, under further plausible assumptions, it will follow from

this that there is a unique ‘correct’ partition of spacetime. Thus given the spacetime model, if

there is absolute presentness, there are instants of time simpliciter.1

The notion of instants of time simpliciter is acceptable given the Neo-Newtonian

model of spacetime or given a commitment to absolute presentness. However, as well as

rejecting the notion of absolute presentness, B-theorists (as well as many A-theorists) reject

the Neo-Newtonian model. The reason is that in the 20th Century, Neo-Newtonian spacetime

was superseded by Minkowski spacetime. Like Neo-Newtonian spacetime, Minkowski

spacetime consists of a four-dimensional manifold of spacetime points standing in permanent

geometric relations. However, the particular structure of fundamental properties and relations

that is typically characterised as ‘Minkowski spacetime’ does not induce the partition of

spacetime into instants of time simpliciter.2 But that does not mean that the notion of an

‘instant of time’ is unacceptable to B-theorists. Given the Minkowskian model, one can

1
Some A-theorists- in particular, those who think that spacetime is quite different to how physicists describe it-
identify instants of time with propositions of a certain sort. On this view, the absolute present instant is the true
instant, and instants are instants simpliciter. I describe the various options for A-theorists when it comes to
instants in Chapter One.
2
That is not to say that there is no fundamental structure in the Minkowskian model which could induce a
particular partition of the manifold (for example, structure concerning the occupation of spacetime by matter).
The point is just that the model as typically understood does not contain the sort of structure that would induce a
partition into what could be thought of as instants of time.
define a notion of simultaneity for spacetime points relative to the state of motion of an

observer along an unaccelerated path through spacetime; or, for short, relative to an inertial

frame of reference. Of course, given that there are different possible reference frames, there

are points that are simultaneous relative to one reference frame and non-simultaneous relative

to another. However, given the notion of frame-relative simultaneity, one can define the

notion of a frame-relative hyperplane of simultaneity: a maximal set of frame-relative

simultaneous points, or in other words, a frame-relative instant of time. Thus, whilst it is true

that B-theorists reject the notion of instants of time simpliciter, they can accept the notion of

relative instants of time.

In this thesis I assume that there really are instants of time, for reasons described in

Chapter One. However, I write as if instants are always instants simpliciter. Outside the

context of the A-theory, B-theorists can read ‘instant’ and other relevant terms as expressing

the relevant frame-relevant notions.

For A-theorists, the Minkowskian model of spacetime typically associated with

contemporary physics is incomplete, as it lacks the fundamental structure underlying the

notions of absolute presentness and absolute simultaneity. For many B-theorists (and indeed,

for many of those without a particular stake in the metaphysics of time), the fact that the A-

theoretic model of fundamental reality is inconsistent with the model associated with

contemporary physics proves that the A-theory is false.3 A-theorists dispute this: they point

out that it is not surprising that the physical model does not posit fundamental structure

corresponding to absolute presentness, as that model is solely designed to explain the

physical phenomena, whereas A-theorists posit fundamental structure corresponding to

absolute presentness in order to provide a philosophical account of time and change. They

argue that while the physical model may well be sufficient for providing a certain kind of

3
For example, see Sider (2001, 42-52).
scientific explanation of the physical phenomena, the reality it describes is one in which there

is no time and change, but merely variation.4

It is useful to compare A-theorists to those who hold that there are fundamental

phenomenal properties.5 For such theorists, the best physical explanation of the mind is

incomplete, because it lacks fundamental structure corresponding to phenomenal

consciousness. They do not reject the physical model of the mind; they merely supplement it.

And they do not dispute that the physical model is perfectly adequate for providing a certain

kind of scientific explanation of the physical phenomena. Their philosophical opponents-

those who hold that phenomenal properties are non-fundamental- may argue that their view is

disproved by the fact that it is inconsistent with the best physical model of the mind, in which

there is no fundamental structure corresponding to phenomenal consciousness. However, this

objection looks weak: surely it is possible that the best physical model of the mind is

incomplete, and that philosophical reflection could lead to a revision of the physical theory.

The real question would seem to be whether there are good philosophical reasons for

believing in the fundamentality of phenomenal properties. Similarly, those who are tempted

to reject the A-theory on the grounds that it is inconsistent with certain contemporary models

of spacetime should at least be willing to consider whether there are good philosophical

reasons for revising those models.6

The second essential component of the moving spotlight theory is the thesis that as

time passes, things neither begin nor cease to exist; in other words, that it is always the case

that everything exists forever.7 I call this thesis permanentism.8 In Chapters Five and Six, I

defend permanentism against its rivals transientism (the view that things both begin and

4
I consider some of the ways that A-theorists can respond to the charge of inconsistency with physics in
Chapter One.
5
For example, see Chalmers (1996).
6
I describe the key arguments for the A-theory in Chapter Four.
7
In the most general sense of ‘exist’, according to which to exist is just to be identical to something.
8
Following Williamson (2013, 4).
cease to exist over time) and pastism (the view that things begin but never cease to exist over

time).

The moving spotlight theory combines the A-theory and permanentism. Historically,

the moving spotlight theory has been the least popular of the plausible theories of time, so it

may come as a surprise that someone should want to defend it. For example, Sider (2001, 18-

9), a B-theorist, describes and dismisses the moving spotlight theory in the space of three

paragraphs. According to Sider, the theory is ‘unmotivated’. Similarly, Zimmerman (2011,

171-2), an A-theorist, describes and dismisses the theory in two paragraphs, on the grounds

that it is inconsistent with the thesis that the future is ‘open’.9 The question is: why has the

moving spotlight theory been so unpopular? There are two plausible reasons. First, there is a

certain contrast between the two essential components of the moving spotlight theory-

namely, the A-theory and permanentism- which makes it less likely that theorists would wish

to combine them. The contrast is that whereas the A-theory looks inconsistent with the

physics-driven model of reality but seems to fit well with ‘common sense’, permanentism

seems to be part of the physics-driven model but is arguably inconsistent with ‘common

sense’. Therefore theorists who are motivated to defend the theory of time that fits best with

the physics-driven model typically reject the A-theory, and theorists who are motivated to

defend the theory of time that appears to fit best with ‘common sense’ typically reject

permanentism. Assuming that these are common motivations when it comes to defending

theories of time, it is not surprising that the moving spotlight theory has been relatively

unpopular.

Second, the moving spotlight theory has typically been badly misconstrued. In

particular, the theory is often falsely described as a theory according to which the only change

9
I respond to this objection in Chapter Two.
that occurs as time passes is change in which instant is absolutely present.10 Understandably,

this mistake has led some, like Sider (2001), to dismiss the view as unmotivated. Similarly,

the theory is often mistakenly thought to imply the absurd result that every instant is

absolutely present (Bourne 2006, Smith 2010, and Sider 2011 all make this mistake). In

Chapter Two, I provide a careful description of the moving spotlight theory which shows that

these really are misconceptions and mistakes. I also show that moving spotlighters can easily

respond to the main arguments that have been raised against their view.

The moving spotlight theory is not merely less implausible than it seems. In this

thesis, I show that the moving spotlight theory, when correctly understood, is the very best

theory of time.11 In particular, I show that the combination of the A-theory and permanentism

is extremely powerful, even if it is not fully in line with either the physics-driven model or

the ‘intuitive’ picture. The moving spotlight theory inherits the simplicity, explanatory power,

and scientific respectability of permanentism, while at the same time describing a world of

real time and change.

10
For example, Sider (2001, 17) appears to characterise the view this way.
11
In fact, I defend a particularly simple and elegant reductive version of the moving spotlight theory called
classic MST. Why ‘classic MST’? Because classic MST is closest to the traditional conception of the moving
spotlight theory.