Anent complainants’ claim that complainant can no longer question the proceedings

before the barangay, well settled is the following rule echoed by the Supreme Court in Tumpag
v. Tumpag1:

“Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case can

always be raised anytime, even for the first time on appeal,
since jurisdictional issues, as a rule, cannot be acquired
through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or
conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Thus, the
respondent is not prevented from raising the question on the
court's jurisdiction in his appeal, if any, to the June 3, 2002
decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 666.” [citations omitted]

The foregoing has been reiterated in numerous cases by the Supreme Court, including
the recent case of Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Customs2, to wit:

“Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to

hear, try, and decide a case. In order for the court or an
adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the
merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject
matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
the power to hear and determine the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not
by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or
by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it
has is to dismiss the action.”

Assuming that the communication between Rostata and the members of the Lupon
Tagapamaya is privileged, The Supreme Court in Belen v. People3 has held that for the
foregoing to be not actionable, the allegations or statements must be relevant to the issues,
to wit:

“A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not

actionable, even if the author has acted in bad faith. This class
includes allegations or statements made by parties or their
counsel in pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial
and administrative proceedings, as well as answers given by the
witness in reply to questions propounded to them in the course of
said proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements
are relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive to
the questions propounded to said witnesses.”

1
ESPERANZA TUMPAG v. SAMUEL TUMPAG, G.R. No. 199133, September 29, 2014.
2
MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION v. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, G.R. No. 209830, June 17, 2015.
3
MEDELARNALDO B. BELEN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 211120, February 13, 2017.
 Further, the exceptions in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code are qualifiedly, and not
absolutely, privileged communications, as held in Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle
Publishing Corporation, et al.4, to wit:

“The exceptions provided in Article 354 are also known as

qualifiedly privileged communications. The enumeration under
said article is, however, not an exclusive list of qualifiedly
privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of
public interest are likewise privileged. They are known as
qualifiedly privileged communications, since they are merely
exceptions to the general rule requiring proof of actual malice in
order that a defamatory imputation may be held actionable. In
other words, defamatory imputations written or uttered during any
of the three classes of qualifiedly privileged communications
enumerated above (1) a private communication made by any
person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social
duty; (2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions; and (3) fair commentaries on matters of public interest
may still be considered actionable if actual malice is proven.”

In the same case, the Supreme Court made the following pronouncement, shown as
follows:

“When malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the

libelous articles are qualifiedly privileged communications
are futile, since being qualifiedly privileged communications
merely prevents the presumption of malice from attaching in a
defamatory imputation.”

The foregoing is a reiteration of the previous ruling of the Supreme Court in Flor v.
5
People , which stated that the exceptions provided for in Article 354 are qualifiedly or
conditionally privileged communications, to wit:

“The other kind of privileged matters are the qualifiedly or

conditionally privileged communications which, unlike the first
classification, may be susceptible to a finding of libel provided the
prosecution establishes the presence of malice in fact. The
exceptions provided for in Article 354 of the Revised Penal
Code fall into this category.”

In Brillante v. Court of Appeals and People6, malice is defined as follows:

4
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO v. THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION, ROBERTO COYIUTO, JR., NOEL
CABRERA, GERRY ZARAGOZA, DONNA GATDULA, RODNEY P. DIOLA, RAUL VALINO and THELMA SAN JUAN, G.R. No.
184315, November 25, 2009.
5
SALVADOR D. FLOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 139987, March 31, 2005.
 “Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is
prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response
to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed;
it implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is
present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks
made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.”

6
ROBERTO BRILLANTE v. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571,
October 14, 2004.