CASE DIGESTS FOR CIV PRO

WEEK 5 (VENUE)
NOCUM V TAN
GR NO 145022
SEPT 23, 2005

FACTS:

Lucio Tan filed a complaint before RTC Makati against Nocum, Umali, ALPAP, and Inquirer for the
alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article. In ALPAP and Umali's joint
answer, they alleged, among others, that venue was improperly laid because the complaint failed to state
the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense. RTC Makati
dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper venue. Tan sought reconsideration
of the dismissal and admission of the amended complaint alleging that the article was printed and first
published in Makati. RTC then admitted the amended complaint and set aside its previous order of
dismissal. CA upheld the decision. Petitioners herein allege that RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case on the basis of the original complaint as substantiated by the fact that it had earlier dismissed the
original complaint for its failure to confer jurisdiction upon the court and that, therefore, admitting the
amended complaint was improper.

ISSUE:

WON RTC Makati acquired jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of the original complaint.

RULING:

YES.

From the allegations in the complaint, Tan's cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the
jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. The
additional allegations in the amended complaint that the article and the caricature were printed and first
published in Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction. These additional
allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent's failure to include the
same in the original complaint divest RTC of its jurisdiction. In civil cases, venue is not jurisdictional.
Therefore, the issue of venue is immaterial in conferring jurisdiction.

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP V LIM

GR NO 154338
OCT 5, 2007

FACTS:

A contract of sale was executed between Universal Robina and Lim for the sale of grocery products. After
tendering partial payments, Lim refused to settle his obligation despite repeated demands. Universal
Robina then filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Lim with RTC Quezon City, which
dismissed the complaint motu proprio on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and improper venue.
Accordingly, Universal Robina filed a motion for reconsideration with an amended complaint alleging
that the parties agreed as to the venue. RTC granted the motion and admitted the amended complaint. For
failure to file an answer, Lim was declared in default. However, RTC once again dismissed the complaint
on ground of improper venue.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court may dismiss motu proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue.

RULING:

NO.

As provided in Sec 1, Rule 9, improper venue not impleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the answer is
deemed waived. Thus, a court may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of improper venue
as it is not one of the grounds wherein the court may dismiss an action motu proprio on the basis of the
pleadings.

Lim, despite proper service of summons, failed to file an answer and was thus declared in default. Verily,
he lost his standing in court and his right to adduce evidence and present his defense, including his right
to question the propriety of the venue of the action.

POLYTRADE CORPORATION V BLANCO

GR NO L-27033
OCT 31, 1969

FACTS:

Polytrade Corporation filed a suit before the CFI of Bulacan against Blanco to recover the purchase price
of rawhide delivered by Polytrade to Blanco. Polytrade has its principal office and place of business in
Makati, Rizal, while Blanco is a resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Blanco moved to dismiss the case on
the ground of improper venue claiming that, as per their agreement in the contract, suit may only be
lodged in the courts of Manila. CFI Bulacan overruled him and, due to his failure to submit an answer,
rendered a default judgment against him.

ISSUE:

WON venue was properly laid in Bulacan where Blanco is a resident.

RULING:

YES.

The stipulation in the contract that "The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila," does
not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that the
parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that
Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent therefrom. We cannot read into that clause that
plaintiff and defendant bound themselves to file suits with respect to the last two transactions in question
only or exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or transfer venue. It simply is
permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may resort.
They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of
Rule 4.
SUPENA V DELA ROSA
AM NO RTJ-93-1031
JAN 28, 1997

FACTS:

BPI Agricultural Development Bank decided to extrajudicially foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage
executed by PQL in its favor. A public auction sale was thereafter scheduled. However, one day before
the scheduled sale, the Hon. Rosalio G. de la Rosa, in his capacity as Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, issued an Order holding in abeyance the scheduled public auction sale, on the basis
of a mere ex-parte motion filed by PQL. The only ground relied upon by the ex-parte Motion, "that the
parties have agreed to hold the foreclosure proceedings in Makati and not in Manila," is patently without
merit, according to the complainant, as the venue of foreclosure proceedings is fixed by law and cannot
be subject of stipulation. Supena, President of BAID, then filed a complaint against Judge Dela Rosa for
gross ignorance of the law.

ISSUE:

WON Judge Dela Rosa is culpable as charged.

RULING:

YES.

The case at bench involves an extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage. If the main concern
of respondent judge in holding in abeyance the auction sale in Manila was to determine whether or not
venue of the execution sale was improperly laid, he would have easily been enlightened by referring to
the correct law, definitely not the Rules of Court, which is Act No. 3135. Here, the real property subject
of the sale is situated in Manila. Thus, by express provision of Section 2 of Act No. 3135, the sale cannot
be made outside of Manila.

Respondent judge, however, refers to the venue stipulation in the Loan Agreement signed by the parties to
the effect that, "Any action or suit brought under this Agreement or any other documents related hereto
shall be instituted in the proper courts of Makati x x x." However, again, it is the provisions of Act No.
3135 and not the general provisions of the Rules of Court that will apply. In fact, even Sec 5, Rule 4
states that the Rules of Court on Venue of Actions shall not apply in cases where a specific law provides
otherwise, as in this case.

REPUBLIC V GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECTION

GR NO 170281
JAN 18, 2008

FACTS:

The Republic filed a complaint in the RTC Manila for civil forfeiture of assets, pursuant to the Anti-
Money Laundering Act of 2001, against the bank deposits in the account maintained by Glasgow in
CSBI. Summons to Glasgow was returned unserved as it could no longer be found at its last known
address. Upon the Republic's motion, an alias summons was issued but was also returned unserved. Thus,
the Republic moved for the court to resolve its earlier motion for leave of court to serve summons by
publication. A year after, the OSG received a copy of Glasgow's Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Special
Appeance), which was opposed by the Republic. Thereafter, RTC Manila dismissed the case on the
ground, among others, of improper venue as it should have been filed in the RTC of Pasig where CSBI,
the depository bank of the account sought to be forfeited, was located.

ISSUE:

WON the complaint was correctly dismissed on the ground of improper venue.

RULING:

NO.

Glasgow never questioned the venue of the Republic's complaint. It was not among the grounds
enumerated by Glasgow in its motion to dismiss. The trial court cannot motu proprio dismiss a complaint
on the ground of improper venue.

At any rate, RTC Manila was a proper venue. Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases
of Civil Forfeiture, the venue of civil forfeiture cases is any RTC of the judicial region where the
monetary instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or
to a money laundering offense are located. Pasig City, where the account sought to be forfeited in this
case is situated, is within the National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR). Clearly, the complaint for civil
forfeiture of the account may be filed in any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila is one of the RTCs
of the NCJR, it was a proper venue of the Republic's complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgow's account.

EMERGENCY LOAN PAWNSHOP V CA

GR NO 129184
FEB 28, 2001

FACTS:

Traders Royal Bank sold in favor of petitioner Emergency Loan Pawnshop a parcel of land located in
Baguio City. At the time of the sale, TRB made several misrepresentations to ELPI regarding the land.
ELPI demanded from TRB the rescission and cancellation of the sale of the property. TRB refused,
hence, ELPI filed with the RTC Davao a complaint for annulment of sale and damages against TRB. TRB
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue, which was denied. TRB elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order, contending that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying its
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. CA ruled in TRB's favor.

ISSUE:

WON an appeal may be taken from an RTC decision denying a motion to dismiss on the ground of
improper venue.

RULING:

NO.
The general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an interlocutory order and, hence,
cannot be appealed or questioned via a special civil action of certiorari until a final judgment on the
merits of the case is rendered. However, the rule is not ironclad. Under certain situations, recourse to
certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, that is, (a) when the trial court issued the order without
or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or, (c)
appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy.

In the case at bar, the CA was correct in holding that the trial court erred grievously amounting to ousting
itself of jurisdiction. The motion of respondent TRB was well founded because venue was clearly
improperly laid. The action in the Regional Trial Court was for annulment of sale involving a parcel of
land located in Baguio City. The venue of such action is unquestionably within the territorial jurisdiction
of the proper court where the real property or part thereof lies.

REPUBLIC V GUILALAS
GR NO 159564
NOV 16, 2011

FACTS:

Republic of the Philippines is the registered owner of two parcels of land known as the Tala Estate.
Spouses Guilalas are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Bulacan. Eventually, the NHA started
the development of the 598-hectare portion of the Tala Estate for its intended purpose. However,
respondents resisted the development of the area claiming that a portion of their land was encroached
upon by the government. After an investigation was conducted by the representatives of the NHA, it was
found that the land owned by the respondents was part and parcel of the Tala Estate. Thus, petitioner filed
a Complaint for Cancellation of Title against the respondents before RTC Caloocan. In their Answer with
Counterclaim, respondents claimed that the RTC of Caloocan City had no jurisdiction over the case since
their lot is situated in Bulacan and not Caloocan City. RTC ruled in favor of respondents, as affirmed by
the CA.

ISSUE:

WON RTC correctly dismissed the complaint.

RULING:

YES.

Section 1, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that actions affecting title to or
possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper
court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part thereof is situated.
Considering that the lot in question was not within the territorial jurisdiction of RTC of Caloocan City, it
was but proper for the RTC to have dismissed the complaint.

In both the decisions of the RTC and the CA, both tribunal made determinations regarding the actual
location of respondents lot and petitioners Tala Estate. Therein, both categorically concluded that the
respondents' lot is located in Bulacan, while that of petitioner is situated in Caloocan City and that
respondents lot did not encroach petitioner's property. Considering that the RTC had conducted the trial
and both parties actively participated in the proceedings by submitting and presenting their respective
evidence and witnesses, it would be just and proper to settle the dispute once and for all based on the
findings of the RTC and the CA.

LATORRE V LATORRE
GR NO 183926
MAR 29, 2010

FACTS:

Generosa Latorre filed before RTC Muntinlupa a complaints for collection and declaration of nullity of
deed of absolute sale against her son Luis Latorre and one Ifzal Ali. Respondent and Ali entered into a
contract of lease where respondent declared himself as the owner of the property when allegedly
petitioner and respondent were co-owners. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the sole ground of
improper venue. He stressed that while the complaint was denominated as one for collection and
declaration of nullity of deed of absolute sale, in truth the case was a real action affecting title to and
interest over the subject property. Since the property is located in Makati City, petitioner should have
filed the case before RTC Makati and not Muntinlupa. RTC denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the
nature of an action was determined by the allegations in the complaint. Respondent then filed an Answer
Ad Cautelam. RTC ruled in respondent's favor on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

WON RTC was correct in dismissing the case.

RULING:

YES.

The action in the RTC, other than for Collection, was for the Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale involving the subject property, which is located in Makati City. The venue for such action
is unquestionably the proper court of Makati City, where the real property or part thereof lies, not the
RTC of Muntinlupa City.

The nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the Complaint itself, rather than by its title or
heading. It is also a settled rule that what determines the venue of a case is the primary objective for the
filing of the case. In her Complaint, petitioner sought the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the
strength of two basic claims that (1) she did not execute the deed in favor of respondent; and (2) thus, she
still owned one half () of the subject property. Indubitably, petitioner's complaint is a real action involving
the recovery of the subject property on the basis of her co-ownership thereof.

The RTC, however, committed a procedural blunder when it denied respondent's motion to dismiss on the
ground of improper venue. The RTC insisted that trial on the merits be conducted even when it was
awfully glaring that the venue was improperly laid. After trial, the RTC eventually dismissed the case on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even as it invoked, as justification, the rules and jurisprudence on
venue. Therefore, while dismissal was proper, the RTC obviously meant to dismiss the case on the ground
of improper venue even when its dismissal was for want of jurisdiction.