CASE- I

Case Name: K. Srinivas Vs. Andhra Pradesh State Co-operative Bank and Ors.

Name of the Court: Andhra Pradesh High Court

Bench Composition: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J.

Citation: MANU/AP/0141/2015

Subject: Service Matters

Facts:

In this case the petitioner was appointed as staff assistant in undivided Andhra
Pradesh Central Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank on 30.12.1969 and was promoted as
Superintendent on 18.04.1997. The said bank was merged with AP state cooperative Bank
and the petitioners services were transferred to the said bank and utilised as Assistant
Development Officer (Legal assistant). In 1998 he was promoted as junior officer. In a charge
memo issued to the petitioner it was alleged that, while working as ADO in sanga reddy
branch he Scrutinized 76 loan applications and recommended loans by exhibiting gross
negligence causing deficit in security and committed other administrative lapses. It was also
alleged that he is also liable for Rs. 3,67,080 jointly with the members of field inspection and
individually Rs. 8,14,130. The petitioner was asked to submit the expiation regarding the
same within two weeks but he didn’t submit the same to the said authorities. An enquiry was
ordered and the said allegations were not proved in the report. The Persons In-charge
Committee of the Bank issued a show cause notice dt.31-05-2001 to show cause within 15
days The petitioner submitted his explanation rejecting his request for giving an opportunity
for personal hearing and decided to confirm the proposed punishment of demotion to the next
post of Staff Assistant An appeal against the said decision was preferred by the petitioner to
the competent authority i.e. General Body of the Bank. allowed the appeal as regards the
quantum of punishment and directed that the petitioner be placed in the minimum scale of the
post held by him prior to demotion subject to fixation of financial liability. . In the meantime,
the petitioner retired from the service of the Bank with effect from 31-03-2002 on attaining
the age of superannuation. A writ pretition was filed to quash the proceedings of the bank
authorities and violate principles of natural justice; and for grant of all consequential benefits
with continuity of service, increments apart from arrears of pay as Junior Officer/Asst.
Development Officer with interest.
ISSUE:

Whether the disciplinary actions i.e., proceedings are valid or not?

REASONING:

If the enquiry report is in the favour of the officer but the disciplinary authority
prposes to differ with the enquiry report, then that authority, which is deciding authority
must be give him an opportunity of being heard. It is open to the disciplinary authority either
to agree with the findings of the enquiring authority or disagree with the same. Difficulties
have arisen in all those cases in which the enquiring authority has recorded a positive finding
that the charges were not established and the delinquent officer was recommended to be
exonerated, but the disciplinary authority disagreed with those findings and recorded its own
findings that the charges were established and the delinquent officer was liable to be
punished.

PRINCIPLE: the disciplinary authority is expected to communicate to the petitioner tentative

reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer, so that the petitioner may
further indicate that the reasons on the basis of which the disciplinary authority proposes to
disagree with the findings recorded by the enquiry authority, are not germane and that the
finding that he is not guilty already recorded by the enquiry authority, was not liable to be
interfered with1. The court applied literal rule of interpretation to this rule laid down by the
supreme court.

CONCLUSION:

Hence the show cause notice dt.31-05-2001 asked the petitioner to show cause why
the proposed punishment of demotion should not be inflicted on him and contained a final
determination by the disciplinary authority that the findings of the enquiry officer are not
correct Since admittedly this requirement of law has not been followed, the decision of the
Committee of Persons In charge of the Bank and general authority of the bank the
proceedings of the said bodies are not valid and quashed

1
Kunj Behari Misra ( 1 supra) and Yoginath D. Bagde (2 supra)
 CASE-02

Case Name: Addagiri Gopal and Ors. Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
Bench Composition: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/AP/0062/2016
Subject matter: Services
Facts:
In this case two writ petitions were filed by the one petitioner and the respondent
bank. The petitioner was elected as director of the managing committee in the Dharmavaram
Co-operative bank, which was a registered society. The term of the director is 5 years and it
has 10,000 share holders and has 12 directors. A show-cause notice was issued to him for
deliberately not attending to the meeting held on 13.09.2013, 20.09.2013 and 03.10.2013, in
spite of the fact that notices were sent to attend the said meeting. It was also alleged that he
had given a statement to Mee Tv channel, that the bank will become bankrupt and the
depositors should take back their deposits. It also alleged that the petitioner himself had
withdrawn Rs. 12,63,913/- which he had deposited in the Bank by closing his deposit and
crediting it to his Savings account. The petitioner was asked to show-cause why he should not
be removed as a Director of the Bank for these acts within fifteen (15) days from the date of
receipt of the notice. An explanation was submitted by the petitioner through a regd. Post
with acknowledgment. He also denied all the allegations mentioned above. The managing
committee denied his explanation and was disqualified as director as per law. Petitioner field
before dy. Registrar under section 61 of AP co-operatives act, 1964. It was held by the dy.
Registrar that he was not disqualified under section 21B of the act. This order was questioned
by the Bank in O.A. No. 70 of 2014 before the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Tribunal at
Vijayawada under Section 76(1) of the Act. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal confirming
the findings of the Deputy Registrar.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the decision of the Deputy registrar ha legal validity or not?
2. Whether the order of the tribunal should be implemented or not?
3. Whether the petitioner was disqualified under section 21B of the act?
4. Whether the notice should be sent in person or courier ?
Reasoning:
The Deputy Registrar as well as the Tribunal had considered the oral and
documentary evidence on record and came to the conclusion that there was no proper service
of notice on petitioner in the manner prescribed by Rule 23-B and did not accept the plea of
Bank that personal notice was sought to be made on petitioner and petitioner had refused to
receive the notices to attend these three meeti Both the Deputy Registrar and the Tribunal
have held that Rule 23-B requires service of notice of meetings on the Directors/Members of
Managing Committee in person or by registered post acknowledgment due and notice was
not sent by registered post acknowledgment due to petitioner for these three meetings.
Conclusion:
It was well settled rule that since the very notices of the meetings on those three dates
had not been served on petitioner and since there was also no quorum for meetings held on
13.09.2013 and 20.09.2013, neither the Managing Committee can recommend petitioners
disqualification under Section 21B nor can the General Body ratify the same. the notice of the
three meetings was not served on petitioner in accordance with the procedure prescribed
under the Act, and there was no quorum for atleast two of those meetings, the disqualification
of petitioner under Section 21-B by the Managing Committee of the Bank or its ratification
by the General Body are void ab initio. The court applied literal meaning to Rule 23B of the
act.
CASE-03
Case Name: Durga B. Rajnala vs. Union of India and Ors. MANU/AP/0991/2016
Bench composition: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/AP/0991/2016
Subject Matter: Service
Facts of the Case:
The petitioner was appointed as an ad hoc medical officer in the central Industrial
force (CISF) for six months but the same was extended from time to time with the approval
of department of Personnel and traning, ministry of health and home affairs. On 8.06.1998
she was served a notice saying that no extension would be done after 30.6.1998. she filed
application before central administrative tribunal (CAT). Tribunal gave orders in her favour
to continue her services. The respondents filed writ petition before chattisgarh High court.
The high court dismissed the writ petition by approving the decision of the CAT. The
respondents there after went for appeal in Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner, acquired the possession of the employment as she was working for
long period under dynamic assured career progression (DACP)
REASONING:
The High court and tribunal held that the petitioner had worked for a long period, possessed
requisite qualifications and even while being appointed on Ad hoc basis, had been selected by
a Selection Committee and her service could not have been terminated in view of the
exception carved out in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi 2.
On 26.10.2009 Union Public Service Commission had interviewed the petitioner on
28-07-2009 and recommended her Ad hoc appointment in the CISF to the Grade of Medical
Officer with effect from 29-10-1994 and so her Ad hoc appointment to the post of Medical
Officer in the said organization was regularized with effect from 29-10-1994, the date on
which she joined on Ad hoc basis. While the said proceedings were going on the GOI issued
DACP scheme. Under this scheme a medicial officer would be promoted to the post of senior
officer on completion of 4 years of service. A senior officer a Senior Medical Officer with
five years of regular service as such would be promoted to the post of Chief Medical Officer;
and after completion of four years in Chief Medical Officer Grade, he/she would be promoted
to the post of Chief Medical Officer (Non Functional Selection Grade).
CONCLUSION:
It is clear that pursuant to the decision in O.A. No. 474 of 1998 dt. 10-04-2002, the
petitioner had been interviewed by the Union Public Service Commission on 28-07-2009 and
her case was recommended for regular appointment in CISF to the grade of Medical Officer
with effect from 29-10-1994, the date when she joined in the CISF on Ad hoc basis. The
Proceedings dt. 06-10-2009 issued by 2nd respondent stated that matters of promotion,
seniority etc would be regulated by the ITBP which was the Cadre Controlling Authority.
This action of the respondents is clearly arbitrary and illegal and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. Accordingly petition dismissed.
CASE-04
Case Name: Sunil Vs Union of India and Ors.
Bench Composition: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/AP/1003/2016
Subject Matter: services
Facts of the Case:
The petitioner is employed as a constable in the CRPF. He was posted as Asst.
Cashier in group centre, CRPF, Hyderabad. On 9.04.2004 he was issued a notice alleging that
the petitioner committed an act of gross negligence and remission in discharge of duty,

2
MANU/AP/0991/2016
because of this one U. Durga Rao a Constable/General Duty, who was performing the duties
in the cash section as helping hand to the cashier and assistant Cashier, fraudulently tampered
transaction of Government money of ` 14,83,104/- by depositing GPF,GIS final payments,
Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity etc relating to various retired personnel on different dates in
the account of his wife Smt. U. Sharada from 3.4.2012 to 13.6.2013. It is alleged that he had
concealed his misdeeds from the Assistant Cashier, Cashier and other supervisory staff. The
petitioner filed a writ petition.
ISSUE:
Whether there any gross negligence on the part of petitioner?
REASONING:
As per Rule 27 (d) (i) of CRPF Rules, if two or more employees are involved in any enquiry,
then a joint enquiry has to be conducted and the petitioner had requested 5th respondent-
enquiry officer to do so on 19-04-2014 itself but the latter has not taken any action." That an
administrative body, which would take a decision causing civil consequences, has to act
without bias is settled law. The disciplinary authority is required to be impartial and unbiased
and the predisposition to decide for or against one party without proper regard to the true
merits of the dispute is bias as held in Secretary to Government
CONCLUSION:
The conduct of the enquiry by respondent would not be an independent enquiry and
that he would be forced to arrive at a conclusion in conformity with that of the respondent
and there is there is a very strong likelihood of the petitioner being found guilty of the
misconduct by respondent. Accordingly the petition was allowed.
CASE-05
Case Name: Ch. Chandrasekhar Babu Vs. Chairman and Managing Director, A.P.
Bench Composition: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/AP/1015/2016
Subject Matter: Service
Facts of the case:
The petitioners in these matters had been previously employed by the Andhra Bank,
which is the 1st respondent in all these cases. The pertitioners all had suffered orders of
punishment of compulsory retirement from service on different dates. None of the petitioners
had opted for pension within the provided period . under a joint note they had applied for
pension on 27.4.2010 recording an agreement between the Indian officers association on
behalf of managements of banks listed under the All india bank officers
confederation(AIBOC), all India banks officers association(AIBOA), Indian national banks
congress(INBUC), national Organisation of bank officers(NOBO). The petitioners contend
that though there was imposed punishment of compulsory retirement, they still come within
the definition of the term 'retired';

ISSUE:
Whether the compulsory retirement comes under the definition of ‘Retired’?
REASONING:
Separate orders have been passed by the Andhra Bank in respect of each of the petitioners
holding that they were not eligible to exercise the option for pension as per the Joint Memo.
In these orders, the Andhra Bank contended that the petitioners had not retired from service
of the Bank voluntarily under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme introduced by the said Bank
in the year 2000, and they had also not retired on superannuation.
(1) Those in the service of the bank prior to 29.09.1995 in case of Nationalised
Banks/26.03.1996. In case of Associate Banks of State Bank of India and continue in the
service of the bank on the date of this Joint Note;
(2) Those who were in service for the same period, as aforesaid, but retired after that date and
prior to the date of this Joint Note;
(3) Family of such officers who were in the service of the bank on the aforesaid dates but
retired after that date and had died will be eligible for family pension;
(4) Family of such officers who were in the service of the bank prior to the dates aforesaid,
but have died while in service of the bank after that date will be eligible for family pension."
CONCLUSION:
It held that the Joint Note as well as the Circular refers to the retirees from the Bank and the
word 'retiree' is a generic term including all categories of retirees. It held that restricting the
meaning of the said word only to those who retired voluntarily or on superannuation is not
only against the object and purpose of the agreement under the Joint Note and the Circular,
but would also amount to reading something else therein.
The court applied principle of literal rule.
CASE-06
Case Name: K. Aravinda Rao Vs. A. Surender Kumar Das and Ors.
Bench Composition: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/AP/0028/2015
Subject Matter: Service
Facts of the Case:
In this case the petitioner is appellant. The 1st respondent is Dy. Superintendent of
police selected in Group-I, which was conducted by APPSC in 1987. He was later promoted
as Add. Superintendent of police and then as superintendent of police. He was then promoted
as IPS in 2002. He mentioned that he belongs to SC community. The 1st respondent felt that
he was discriminated on caste basis for the post of Dy. Commissioner of police by violating
the principles of natural justice and equality. He alleged that the appellant who was then DGP
gave false information to CM. He lodged a complaint on 3.1.2009 along with 2nd respondent
alleging that appellant was guilty of committing an offence under S.C and S.T.( prevention of
atrocities) act, 1955. the 1st respondent wrote a letter dt. 28.02.2009 to the 2nd respondent
stating that under Section 154 Cr.P.C. r/w Rules - 5, 6 and 7 of the SC & ST (POA) Rules,
1995, the 2nd respondent, as Station House Officer, is expected to register a case
immediately after receipt of a complaint and issue a copy of FIR to 1st respondent since what
was stated in the complaint dt. 3.1.2009 against the appellant amounts to a cognizable offence
and start investigation immediately.
CASE-07
Name of the Case: Chadalavada Kishan Kumar Vs. Commissioner Of Endowments, Krishna
District and Ors.
Bench Composition: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/AP/0916/2017
Subject Matter: Service
Facts of the case:
The petitioner has filed the Writ Petition assailing the order dt. 09.06.2017 passed by
the 1st respondent directing removal of the petitioner as Archaka of the 2nd respondent-
temple, and the consequential order dt. 14.06.2017 passed by the Assistant Commissioner-
cum-Executive Officer of the 2nd respondent-temple. The admitted facts are that the
petitioner was unauthorisedly absent from 12.05.2016 to 22.05.2016 and was in
police/judicial custody from 23.05.2016 till 30.05.2016, since he was arrested in Crime No.
145 of 2016 registered under Section 336 I.P.C. (women missing), filed by the mother of a
missing woman on 13.05.2016. Initially, five charges were framed against the petitioner
1. Without giving prior information to the temple authorities and Chef Archaka absent from
duty is treated as negligence shown in duties.
2. In the temple not performing archaka duty behaving according to your will.
3. From 12.05.2016 to 22.05.2016 (11 days) without giving any prior information absent
from duty will be treated as negligence of duty.
4. No changes took place in your behaviour is the negligence in your duty performance.
5. 2016 awarding punishment of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect, no
changes took place in your style.
Additional charges:
1. In archaka profession against you in the Pedakakani Police Station vide Cr. No. 145/2016
dt. 13.5.2016 U/s. 336 IPC regd. the woman missing case and remanded to Guntur sub-jail on
23.5.2016 till issue of this notice and you were in remand is against the Endowments Act
30/87.
2. You are in respected archaka profession facing such woman missing case is the remark to
the profession itself and against the Endowments Act,
on the basis of the enquiry report the petitioner was removed from the post of archaka. The
same was challenged by him by filing writ petition.
ISSSUE:
Whether the order given by the executive officer was valid?
REASONING:
There was no documentary evidence in the enquiry. no notice of the enquiry was
served on him by the enquiry officer. e did not receive the charge-memo as it was served on
his father who is living in the same house as he is living. no charge-sheet is filed in the said
criminal case till date. Therefore, though involvement in the criminal case could be a ground
to suspend the petitioner, the same cannot be a ground to remove the petitioner from service.
CONCLUSION:
Hence it was held that, the orders given by the executive officer were set aside.
Accordingly the petition was allowed.
CASE-08
Name of the Case: V.S.R. Krishna Vs APSRTC and Ors. MANU/AP/0486/2017
Bench Composed: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/AP/0486/2017
Subject Matter: Service
Facts of the case:
The petitioner was employed as a conductor in the APSRTC , Machilipatnam Deport.
It was alleged that the petitioner was unauthorisedly absent from 9.5.2007. a charge memo
was issued to the petitioner by stating that
 1. For having unauthorised absent without any intimation or sanction
2. For taking 18 days leave, reported sick for 63 days and absent for 90 days during
2005 to 2006
3. For having produced govt. hospital sick from 9.05.2007 to 15.05.2007 to cover
absenteeism
There was no explanation for the said memo by the petitioner. An enquiry was held. The
enquiry report held that the charges were proved. A copy of the report was sent to the
petitioner. The petitioner gave an explanation on 24.09.2007 assuring that he would discharge
his duties sincerely in future and requested to give him an opportunity to serve the
Corporation and to prove that he was a good productive employee. On the basis of this
explanation, he was taken on duty by dropping the proposal to remove him from service.
However he again took 17 days leave.
ISSUE:
Whether the punishment of removal from service is disproportionate to the alleged
misconduct?
Whether there was any violation of principles of natural justice?
REASONING:
The evidence on record reveals that petitioner had history of unauthorized absence and the
charge-memo dt. 24.05.2007 specifically mentioned his conduct in taking leave without
sanction and producing sick certificate from Government Hospital though an R.T.C.
dispensary was available at Machilipatnam itself. the fact remains that no charge was framed
against the petitioner for his subsequent absence for this period and the charge-memo issued
on 24.05.2007 did not cover his absence for the period after 28.05.2007. Therefore, it was
not fair on the part of the Corporation to terminate his services without framing a specific
charge and conducting enquiry against him on the basis of the said charge. Therefore, there
has been a gross violation of principles of natural justice.
CONCLUSION:
While admitting the Writ Petition, had directed that petitioner be continued in service by
suspending the proceedings dt. 27.12.2007 terminating his services.
CASE-09
Name of the case: Rao Prameela Rao Vs Visakapatnam Dock Labour Board and Ors.
Bench Composed: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/AP/0703/2017
Subject matter: Service
Facts of the case:
The petitioner was removed from the post of senior staff nurse to the post of junior
staff nurse by the 1st respondent. A charge memo was issued to the petitioner on 2.11.1990 by
the 1st respondent stating that on 26.10.1990 about 1.30 pm she went to the In-Charge Chief
Medical Officer, Sri M.V. Kodanda Ramiah, seeking permission to leave the hospital of the
first respondent at 3.30 p.m. she was given permission and alsp got a prescription of
medicines for her husband, it was alleged that the petitioner suddenly hit the chief medical
officer with sheet board causing injury on the nose. Petitioner gave an explanation on
27.11.1990 denying the said charge and stating that the In-Charge Chief Medical Officer tried
to outrage her modesty and attempted to molest her in his Chamber at about 1.15 p.m. In the
process of self defence she threw the sheet board. She then lodged FIR , She contended that
she belongs to the weaker sections and to a non-official cadre and since the Chief Medical
Officer was a powerful and influential person, different yardstick was applied to him and to
her and that he was being victimized, while he was set scot-free. A counter was filed by
CMO that she had committed an offence under section 332 of IPC. By a common judgment
(cc) the petitioner against the CMO was dismissed but the petitioner was convicted.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner was guilty for committing an offence under section 332 of IPC?
REASONING: The overcoat allegedly stained with blood were not produced before the
criminal Court by the police; that the Chief Medical Officer did not give the real version
before the Court and tried to implicate the petitioner in a false case because she gave a prior
complaint against him; that the prosecution did not examine two crucial witnesses to whom
the Chief Medical Officer claimed to have informed the incident immediately; that in view of
the defence taken by the petitioner that the Chief Medical Officer molested her.
Subsequently, after the petitioner was acquitted in Crl. A. No. 120 of 1994, enquiry was
commenced on the basis of a charge memo dated 02.11.1990 issued to her as mentioned
above.Before the enquiry officer, the management examined some witnesses, but the
petitioner though permitted to engage the services of a clerk by name Ch. Sanyasi Rao to
defend her in the enquiry could not lead evidence, since the said person later backed out and
the petitioner was denied permission to get a co-employee or a lawyer. The enquiry officer
gave a report on 12.05.1999 holding the petitioner guilty of the charge that she caused a
bleeding injury to the Chief Medical Officer on his nose.
CONCLUSION:
 In view of the settled legal position that when criminal prosecution on the same facts
is pending before a Criminal Court, disciplinary proceedings ought not to be applied, the
petitioner cannot be blamed for the delay in conduct of enquiry between 1990 and 1997.
enquiry officer appears to be prejudiced against the petitioner and his report is not based on
evidence and requires to be discarded.
CASE-10
Name of the case: Assistant Provident fund Commissioner(enforcement), A.P and Ors Vs
K.M.R. Explosives Pvt. Ltd.
Bench composed: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/AP/0951/2016
Subject Matter: Service
Facts of the case:
The petitioner contends that the company did not perform any activity from the date
of its commencement till its closure on 13.05.2002. it did not even mobilized funds of 1 lakh
from the date of its incorporation. It was closed with the effect from 13.05.2002. 5 persons
were employed on ad hoc basic and was terminated within one year. on 4.3.2005, the 2nd
respondent issued a show-cause notice stating that a notice dated 31.7.2003 under Section 7-
A of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for short, 'the
Act) was earlier issued by 1st respondent demanding amounts under the Act petitioner
submitted explanations stating that no such notice dated 31.7.2003 was given to petitioner;
that the said proceeding was issued ex parte without giving any opportunity to petitioner; that
the proceedings issued under the Act had been initiated without proper verification of the
records by respondents, and without service of notice before issuing proceedings under
Section 7-A of the Act; and that he came to know about these proceedings only when the
show-cause notice dated 4.3.2005 was served on petitioner.
Petitioner made payment of 2 lakh and another payment 49,000. These amount were credited
and adjusted for the amount 8,49,238

CASE-11
Name of the case: Kadapa District Co-operative central bank ltd. Vs P. V. Siva Prasad and
Ors.
Bench Composed: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/AP/0944/2016
Subject Matter: Service
Facts of the case:
The petitioner was employed in the 1st respondent-Bank as a Deputy General
Manager (Administration). The Bank issued a notification for filling up vacancies of staff
assistants under the quota of Primary Agricultural Co-operative Societies staff on 4.9.2011,
calling for application from eligible candidates. The petitioner was employed in the 1st
respondent-Bank as a Deputy General Manager (Administration). The Bank issued a
notification for filling up vacancies of staff assistants under the quota of Primary Agricultural
Co-operative Societies staff, calling for application from eligible candidates. When the
petitioner was working as Assistant General Manager (Administration) for purpose of
verification of documents, the 1st respondent constituted two teams called Team-1 and Team-
2 on 10.2.2014, consisting of other employees of the Bank of the rank of Manager, Assistant
Manager for the purpose of verification of documents of the prospective employees. The said
Committee functioned between 20.2.2014 and 22.2.2014. It verified the documents as
required by the 1st respondent. Alleging that certain irregularities took place in the
verification process in regard to one particular candidate by name Sri P. Pradeep Reddy, who
was subsequently given appointment, and that the petitioner had acted negligently in that
regard, a show-cause notice dated 4.6.2015 was issued to petitioner inviting his explanation
thereto as to why disciplinary action should not be initiated against him. The petitioner
denied the said allegations. The petitioner was placed under suspension.
ISSUE:
Whether the suspension of the petitioner without complying the rules and provisions is valid?
REASONONG:
The Service Regulations framed by the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Banks Association,
Hyderabad for employees working in the District Co-operative Central banks in consultation
with service associations on 7.6.2012 (which was adopted by the respondents on 8.6.2012)
laid down the procedure for conducting enquiry which mandated the framing of a charge-
sheet, inviting explanation to the charge-sheet and then appointing an enquiry officer and
conducting enquiry. But without framing any charge-sheet against the petitioner, the 1st
respondent appointed an enquiry officer on 7.9.2015 who asked the petitioner to appear
before him on 9.9.2015 and answer a questionnaire prepared by the enquiry officer. No
witness was examined in the presence of petitioner, and no opportunity was given to
petitioner to cross-examine such witness. Even the copy of enquiry report was not furnished
to petitioner wherein the enquiry officer is alleged to have given findings against him.
CONCLUSION:
There has been clearly a gross violation of the provisions of applicable regulations dealing
with conduct of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, and in particular, Regulation
66, by the respondents. Therefore, the entire process commencing from the very initiation of
disciplinary proceedings, suspending the petitioner till the final show-cause notice dated
30.9.2015 is vitiated by arbitrariness, violation of principles of natural justice and violation of
the applicable regulations dealing with disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, the impugned
proceedings commencing from the proceeding dated 4.6.2015 till the final show-cause notice
dated 30.9.2015 are set aside on the above grounds.
CASE-12
Name of the case: Vijay Singh Vs. Secy., Home Department And ors. MANU/AP/1116/2016
Bench composition: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/AP/1116/2016
Subject Matter: service
Facts of the case:
The petitioner was appointed as seed officer in the national seeds corporation limited.
He belongs to a sechedule caste. During seven years of service hw was transferred 5 times
without any reason. He contended that the same amount to harassment on the groung of his
social status . He contended that he was posted five times without any reason and a
punishment of withholding two increments of pay with cumulative effect was also imposed
by proceedings dt. 19-07-2012, but he challenged the same in this Court in W.P. No. 13116
of 2013 and this Court granted stay of the said penalty. Based on this his superior stopped his
promotion. His annual confidential report was written by his junior. This was accepted
without seeking any comments from the petitioner. The petitioner filed a compliant under
section 200 crpc. They committed offences under Section 3(1)(viii) of the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short 'the Act, 1989) read
with Sections 120 B and 500 IPC.

ISSUE:
Whether the grievances of the petitioner falls under the words atrocity?

REASONING:
The Act was intended to prevent the commission of offences of atrocities against the
members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, to provide for Special Courts for the
trial of such offences and for the relief of rehabilitation of the victims of such offences and
for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. It defines the term "atrocities" in clause
(a) of sub Section (1) of Section 2 as an offence punishable under Section 3. Section 3 has
several clauses which indicate the nature of offences which are punishable under the Act. A
reading of the grievances of the petitioner suggests that the petitioner claims to have been
harassed by his superior officers for transferring him without any reason, for imposing of
penalty of withholding of two increments of pay with cumulative effect by order dt. 19-07-
2012 and not properly writing his ACRs.

CONCLUSION:
That the grievance of the petitioner with regard to his transfers, imposition of penalty
or preparation of ACRs is not a grievance and the petitioner is not affected by such actions of
his employer. But the remedy of the petitioner for such actions of his employer by way of
review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the jurisdictional High Court and not
by way of filing a complaint under the provisions of the Act.

The grievances of the petitioner against his superior officers cannot be fall in the category of
an 'atrocity' within the meaning of the said term under Sec. 2(1)(a) of the Act.

CASE-13
Name of the Case: Shaik abdul Kalam Azad and Ors. Vs A. Babu and Ors.
Bench Composition: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/AP/0575/2017
Subject matter: Tenancy
Facts of the case:
One Syed Hussain Khaja Mohiddin, who is the father of respondents No. 2, 4, and 5,
purchased purchased an extent of Acs. 3.06 cents under a registered sale deed dated
17.7.1969 from one Saladi Kanaka Rao. The 1st petitioner is his elder brother. Petitioners
contend that this land is patta land and that the vendor, Sri Saladi Kanaka Rao, had acquired
the property through a partition deed dated 14.12.1951 to which the said vendor, one Gattu
Appala Swamy and one Saladi Naraiah were parties. Petitioners contend that 1st petitioner
purchased Ac.0.5 cents in RS No. 105/1; Ac.0.24 cents in RS No. 105/2 and Ac.0.71 cents in
RS No. 106/1 from one Syed Hussain Khaja Mohiddin, who is his elder brother. The
petitioners have stated in detail how the lands had changed hands over a period of time prior
to purchase by Syed Hussain Khaja Mohiddin. Certain construction activity was going on in
the disputed land.
A show cause notice was issued alleging that alleging that they are transferees of assigned
lands and that the 1st petitioner had bought Ac.0.71 cents in Survey No. 106/1 and petitioner
Nos. 2 to 4 are purchasers of Ac.0.45 cents in RS No. 106/1 and Ac.0.54 1/3 cents in RS No.
106/2, and to show-cause why they should not be evicted from the said land under section
Section 3(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 . an
explanation was given by the petitioners to the said notice by asying that hat they are bona
fide purchasers of the land; that the land was assigned on 24.6.1919 by the then District
Collector, Krishna District in proceedings RC No. 384 of 1917, to one Abdul Jaleel, who is a
sepoy. The thasildar issued a impunged order. that the petitioners are transferees of assigned
lands and that the transfer in their favour is in violation of Section 3(2) of the Act. An appeal
was made to the collector. He kept it aside. Hence a writ petition was filed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the term ASSIGNED LAND means land assigned to landless person?
2. Whether there is any violation by the petitioners?
REASONING:
The assignment policy of the State Government itself permits ex-servicemen to alienate after
enjoying the land for 10 years; that G.O. Ms. No. 743, dated 30.4.1963 issued by the then
State Government had clarified that ex-servicemen were free to sell away their assigned lands
after a period of 10 years; that the sale of the land in their favour is valid; and the respondents
have no jurisdiction to interfere with the land in their occupation, and there is no violation of
the provisions of the Act. Section 2(1) of the Act defines the term 'assigned land' insofar as it
is relevant for our purpose as under: "assigned land" means lands assigned by the
Government to the landless poor persons under the rules for the time being in force, subject
to the condition of non-alienation and includes lands allotted or transferred to landless poor
persons under the relevant law for the time being in force relating to land ceilings; and the
word "assigned" shall be construed accordingly". Thus for provisions of the Act to get
attracted, there must be an assignment in favour of a person with a condition prohibiting
alienation and that there must be a transfer in violation of the said prohibition.
CONCLUSION:
It is un-understandable how a statutory authority like the Sub-Collector, Vijayawada, Krishna
District [3rd respondent in the writ petition, and 2nd respondent in the contempt case] kept
the appeal filed by petitioners on 2.2.2016 as well as the stay application filed therein
pending since 2.2.2016 without taking up the stay application forcing the petitioners to
approach this Court. This action of the 3rd respondent in the writ petition [who is 2nd
respondent in the contempt case as well] is clearly mala fide and it is obvious that the said
official deliberately kept the stay petition pending without passing any orders therein to
facilitate the grabbing of petitioners' land by the respondents.
Accordingly petition allowed.
CASE-14
Name of the case: Shahi Jamia Mosque Managing Committee Vs. Deshmukh Akbar Basha
Khan and Ors
Bench Composition: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/AP/0244/2015
Subject Matter: Tenancy
Facts of the case:
The suit was filed by the respondent 1 and 2 against respondent no. 3 to 56 for
recovery of possession of certain shop rooms, and for a direction to pay arrears of rent for the
said shop rooms till the date of eviction of tenants. The respondents had issued notices
regarding non payment of rents and to vacate the shops. The defendants in written statement
questioned the title and contended that the property belongs to shahi Jamiya mosque and is a
wakf property. There is no landlord and tenant relationship between respondets and
defendants. An IA was filed by petitioner to implead itself as defendant no. 55 contending
that the respondents are not the owners of the property. The court dismissed the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the defendant is tenant or not?
2. Whether the defendant is liable to be evicted?
REASONING:
The facts narrated above indicate that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have pleaded that they are the
owners of plaint schedule property and that respondent Nos. 3 to 56 are their tenants and that
respondent Nos. 3 to 56 are liable to be evicted because they are not paying rents to
respondent Nos. 1 and 2, and they should also be directed to pay arrears of rent till they are
evicted. It may be pointed out that it is well-settled law that the question of title of the
property is not germane for decision of the eviction suit. In a case where a plaintiff institutes
a suit for eviction of his tenant based on the relationship of the landlord and tenant, the scope
of the suit is very much limited in which a question of title cannot be gone into because the
suit of the plaintiff would be dismissed even if he succeeds in proving his title but fails to
establish the privity of contract of tenancy.3
CONCLUSION:
The issue of title is not necessary to be gone into in the suit for eviction filed by respondent
Nos. 1 and 2 against respondent Nos. 3 to 56 and the court below would be primarily
concerned with the question whether there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and respondent Nos. 3 to 56. The scope of the suit is very limited
and a question of title cannot be gone into therein. The suit of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 might
be dismissed even if they succeed in proving their title but fail to establish privity of contract
of tenancy with respondent Nos. 3 to 56.
CASE-15

Name of the Case: Vatlepu Saidulu and Ors. vs. Thummurugoti Sarojanamma and Ors.
Bench Composition: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/AP/0365/2014
Subject Matter: Tenancy
Facts of the case:
The petitioners along with the others filed applications before the RDO for grant of
certificates under section 38 of Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural
Lands Act, 1950. They contended that they are in possession of certain parcels of land as
tenants. They claimed that they were entitled for protected tenancy rights. That they lost the
possession before the application was made and that they had filed an application before the
concerned Mandal Revenue Officer for restoration of possession, but he did not take any
action. The RDO dismissed their petitions. Filed an appeal before joint collector. The said
appeal was dismissed. The same was challenged by CRP No. 1637. The same was dismissed.
The petitioners again filed applications under section 32 of the act before MRO. The MRO
allowed the applications and declared that the petitioners are the protected tenants. The CRP
was again filed. This Court dismissed the Revisions and refused to interfere with the orders
passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer and the Joint Collector.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitioners were protected tenants under the act?
2. Whether they are entitled to get the certificate under the act?
3
Dr. Ranbir Singh MANU/SC/0829/1995
REASONING:
Thereafter, on an application made by the petitioners, the Revenue Divisional Officer,
Miryalaguda issued to them ownership certificates under Section 38E of the Act Challenging
the same, appeals were filed. It is settled law that the principles of estoppel and res judicata
are based on public policy and justice. Doctrine of res judicata is often treated as a branch of
the law of estoppel though these two doctrines differ in some essential particulars. Rule of res
judicata prevents the parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same question over
again even though the determination may even be demonstrably wrong. When the
proceedings have attained finality, parties are bound by the judgment and are estopped from
questioning it. They cannot litigate again on the same cause of action nor can they litigate any
issue which was necessary for decision in the earlier litigation. These two aspects are "cause
of action estoppel" and "issue estoppel". These two terms are of common law origin. Again,
once an issue has been finally determined, parties cannot subsequently in the same suit
advance arguments or adduce further evidence directed to showing that the issue was
wrongly determined. Their only remedy is to approach the higher forum if available. The
determination of the issue between the parties gives rise to, as noted above, an issue estoppel.
It operates in any subsequent proceedings in the same suit in which the issue had been
determined. It also operates in subsequent suits between the same parties in which the same
issue arises. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure contains provisions of res judicata but
these are not exhaustive of the general doctrine of res judicata. Legal principles of estoppel
and res judicata are equally applicable in proceedings before administrative authorities as
they are based on public policy and justice.4
CONCLUSION:
The right of a protected tenant under this section to purchase from his landholder the land
held by him as a protected tenant shall be subject to the following conditions, namely:--
(a) If the protected tenant does not hold any land as a landholder the purchase of the land held
by him as a protected tenant shall be limited to the extent of the area of a family holding for
the local area concerned.
(b) If the protected tenant holds any land as a landholder, the purchase of the land held by
him as a protected tenant shall be limited to such area as along with other land held by him as
a landholder will make the total area of land that will be held by him as a landholder equal to
the area of a family holding for the local area concerned:Provided that the land remaining is
4
Hope Plantations Ltd. (MANU/SC/0686/1998
more than the land which the protected tenant is entitled to purchase under this section, the
first preference to purchase the said land, at the prevailing market price in the local area, shall
vest in the protected tenant:Provided further that in the case of purchase by any person other
than the protected tenant, the rights and interests of the said tenant in the lease land, shall
continue as before.(c) The extent of the land remaining with the landholder after the purchase
of the land by the protected tenant, whether to cultivate it personally or otherwise, shall not
be less than two times the area of a family holding for the local area concerned. Hencethet are
protected.
CASE-16
Name of the case: K. Sugandha Kumar Vs. K. Vijaya Lakshmi
Bench Composition: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/AP/0899/2015
Subject Matter: Family
Facts of the Case:
the petitioner filed I.A. before the Family Court to direct the petitioner, respondent
and the child to undergo a D.N.A. Test at Center for Cellular and Molecular Biology,
Hyderabad by giving blood samples for conducting scientific investigation so as to decide the
paternity of the child and to submit a report. The said petition was dismissed. A revision
petition was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court below was correct in dismissing
the application filed by petitioner to direct petitioner, respondent and the child to undergo a
D.N.A. Test
REASONING:
In the present case, the purpose for which the D.N.A. Test is sought is to establish the
allegation of adultery of the respondent, which is a ground seeking divorce under the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955. May be incidentally the paternity of the child would also get decided if
D.N.A. Test is done, but since the primary purpose for which the D.N.A. Test sought is not to
question the legitimacy of the child, but to prove the adultery of respondent, the principle
behind Section 112 of the Act cannot come in the way for petitioner seeking a direction to the
parties to undergo a D.N.A. Test.
The Supreme Court referred to Section 112 of the Act and opined that it is undesirable
to inquire into the paternity of a child when the mother is a married woman and the husband
had access to her. It held that adultery on her part will not in itself justify a finding of
illegitimacy if husband has had access. It observed that when a particular relationship, such as
marriage, is shown to exist, then its continuance must prima facie be preserved and the fact
that a woman is living in notorious adultery, though of course it amounts to very strong
evidence, is not, in itself quite sufficient to repel the presumption under Section 112 of the
Act. It held that the presumption of legitimacy arises from birth in wedlock and not from
conception, and it is undesirable to inquire into the paternity of a child whose presents (sic.
parents) have access to each other.5
CONCLUSION:
The above observations also indicate that in a matter where paternity of a child is in
issue, use of D.N.A. Test should not be ordered as a matter of course or in a routine manner
since it would bastardise the innocent child even though his mother and her spouse are living
together at the time of his conception. In the present case, the paternity of the child is not
principally in issue. It is only incidentally in issue. The primary question to be decided is
whether respondent can be said to have committed adultery, on the basis of which the
petitioner can be awarded a decree of divorce. The respondent is directed to submit blood
samples of herself as well as that of her child for a D.N.A. Test at C.C.M.B., Hyderabad for
conducting scientific investigation to decide about the paternity of the child at the cost of
petitioner. This exercise shall be completed within a period of eight (08) weeks from the date
of receipt of a copy of this order.

CASE-17
Name of the Case: Resu Rama Rao and Ors. vs. State of Telangana and Ors.
Bench Composition: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/HY/0566/2018
Subject Matter: Land Acquisition
Facts of the case:
The petitioners in this case belongs to the SC and ST caste. They contend that they are
absolute owners and possessors and enjoyers of different extents of land and different sub-
divisions of Ayyagaripeta Village in Sathupalli Mandal of Khammam District. According to
them, these lands were originally assigned to their predecessors and the names of the original
assignees were incorporated in the pahanies as pattadars and possessors of the said lands and

5
In Sham Lal alias Kuldip (supra), 2009
that after the demise of their predecessors, they have succeeded the said lands. on the
requisition of the Singareni Collieries Company Limited (SCCL) dispossessed them from
their lands without any manner of right by saying that petitioners lands have been alienated to
the said Company and that an the order dated 5.2.2018 of the District Collector, Khammam
(2nd respondent) fixing ex gratia payable as Rs. 12 lakhs per acre without following the
proper procedure for determination of compensation. Petitioners contend that they have given
representation on 13.2.2018 to (i) the District Collector, Khammam, (ii) Revenue Divisional
Officer, Kalluru Division and (iii) Tahsildar, Sathupalli, requesting for acquisition of their
land under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act 30 of 2013). They contend that without
following due procedure established by law, respondents paid ex gratia to them invoking
G.O. Ms. No. 571 dated 14.9.2012 amounting to Rs. 12.00 lakhs per acre even though the
prevailing market value is more than Rs. 1.00 crore per acre. They also stated that while
deciding the quantum of ex gratia, no notice was issued to them and that this is arbitrary,
illegal and violates Articles 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there was any violation to the articles 14 and 300A
2. Whether the ex gratia was given in accordance with law and the market price?
REASONING:
"where the assigned land is taken possession of by the State in accordance with the
terms of the grant or patta the right of the assignee to any compensation will have to be
determined in accordance with the conditions in patta itself and where the State does not
resort to the covenant of the grant and resorts to the Land Acquisition Act the assignee shall
be entitled to compensation in terms of the Land Acquisition Act not as an owner but as an
interested person for the interest he held in the property?" The Bench answered the issue
holding that the assignees of Government land are entitled to payment of compensation
equivalent to the full market value of land and other benefits on par with full owners of the
land even in cases where the assigned lands are taken possession of by the State in
accordance with the terms of grant of patta and though such resumption is for a public
purpose.6
the facts narrated above, it is clear that the lands which were assigned to the petitioners in Sy.
Nos. 173 and 175 of Ayyagaripeta Village were sought by the SCCL for construction of
6
Mekala Pandu's case
employees quarters and a colony for Project Displaced Families of Kommepalli Village and
after passing the impugned order on 5.2.2018, possession was taken over by the respondent
Nos. 1 to 4 and they have handed over possession to the company on 23.2.2018.
CONCLUSION:
It is clear that the impugned order insofar as ex gratia payable to the petitioners only at Rs.
12.00 lakhs per acre is clearly arbitrary, unreasonable and violates Articles 14 and 300-A and
the decision in Mekala Pandu's case (supra) and the alleged consent letters obtained from
some or all of the petitioners cannot estop them from claiming higher compensation.
CASE-18

Name of the Case: Mathangi Nagaiah and Ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
Bench Composition: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/HY/0263/2018
Subject Matter: Land Acquisition
Facts of the case:
In all these writ petitions, the petitioners, who are assignees of the Government land,
and who have been deprived of the same by the respondents on account of foreshore
submersion under Somasila Project on river Penna, and who were paid only ex gratia by the
Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), Telugu Ganga Project, Unit-II, Mamillapalli,
Kadapa, seek payment of market value compensation. it is contended that under the said
G.O., the amount paid will be only ex gratia and the assignees cannot seek relief under
Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to a Court for enhancement; and an amount
equivalent to 15% for lands resumed prior to 30.4.1982, and 30% after that date, could be
treated as market value payable under Section 23(1) of the said Act, and was to be included in
the total ex gratia payable to the assignees as solatium, and they would not be entitled to
interest or additional market value.
ISSUES:
Whether the assignees of govt. land are entitled to payment of compensation equivalent to the
full market value of land and other benefits on par with full owners of the land even in cases
where the assigned lands are taken possession of by the State in accordance with the terms of
grant of patta and though such resumption is for a public purpose
REASONING:
In the instant case and poor and illiterate persons like the petitioners cannot be allowed to be
deprived of the compensation to which they are entitled under law on the basis of such
technical pleas particularly since the action of the respondents shocks the conscience of the
Court. The amount paid was not under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and Section 18 of the
said Act, which requires the recipient to make protest when he received compensation in
order to seek further enhancement, has no application.
CONCLUSION:
Therefore, all the writ petitions are allowed; the Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition),
Telugu Ganga Project, Unit-II, Mamillapalli, Kadapa District (4th respondent) is directed to
fix the market value of the lands as well as structures of the petitioners as on the respective
dates of resumption of their lands with structures for the Somasila Project on Penna River in
Chenduvoy Village, Atloor Mandal, Kadapa District as per the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894,
CASE-19
Name of the case: Konduru Nadipamma and Ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
Bench Composition: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/HY/0250/2018
Subject Matter: Land Acquisition
Facts of the case:
In this writ petition, the petitioners, who are assignees of the Government land, have
been deprived of the same by the respondents on account of foreshore submersion under
Somasila Project on river Penna, and who were paid only ex gratia by the Special Deputy
Collector (Land Acquisition), Telugu Ganga Project, Unit-II, Kadapa, seek payment of
market value compensation. They contend that the ex gratia sanctioned vide preliminary
valuations statement proceedings is inadequate and ignoring their demand to pay market
value compensation as per the above Larger Bench judgment, the respondents resumed their
lands with structures and have only paid ex gratia for the structures. It is further stated that
DKT Pattas were issued to 40 householders. It is contended that DKT pattas were issued only
to pay compensation to unauthorized structures on Government land. It is stated that as per
policy of Government, compensation is paid by granting formal DKT pattas to encroachers
on Government land.
ISSUES:
Whether the assigned lands are taken possession of by the State in accordance with the terms
of grant of patta and though such resumption is for a public purpose, those holders are to be
paid ex gratia?
REASONING:
the assignees of Government land are entitled to payment of compensation equivalent to the
full market value of land and other benefits on par with full owners of the land even in cases
where the assigned lands are taken possession of by the State in accordance with the terms of
grant of patta and though such resumption is for a public purpose. It further held that even in
cases where the State does not invoke the covenant of the grant or patta to resume the land for
such public purpose and resorts to acquisition of the land under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, the assignees shall be entitled to compensation as owners of the land
and for all other consequential benefits under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894. It further held that the condition incorporated in the patta denying compensation or
restricting the right of the assignees to claim full compensation is unconstitutional and
infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 31-A of the Constitution and
where deprivation of property leads to deprivation of life or liberty or livelihood, Article 21
would spring into action and any such deprivation without just payment of compensation
amounts to infringement of the said Article also. It declared that no such condition
incorporated in patta/deed of assignment shall operate as a clog putting any restriction on the
right of the assignee to claim full compensation as owner of the land.
CONCLUSION:
Therefore respondents cannot simply pay compensation on some arbitrary basis to the
petitioners who lost their assigned land and structures. Therefore, the writ petition is allowed

CASE-20
Name of the Case: Mohd. Khaleel-ur-Rahman and Ors. vs. Land Acquisition Officer-cum-
Revenue Divisional Officer, Mahabubnagar and Ors.
Bench composition: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J
Citation: MANU/AP/0409/2018
Subject Matter: Land acquisition
Facts of the case:
Petitioners are legal heirs of Mohd. Khaleel-ur-Rahman, who is the owner of an
extent of Acs. 4.28 gts. in Sy. No. 201 and Acs. 3.23 gts., in Sy. No. 202 of Yenugonda
Village, Mahabubnagar Mandal and District. A notification dated 26.12.1980 was issued by
the State Government acquiring this land for the benefit of the 2nd respondent, which is a
Society registered under the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964. 2 awards were passed on
by the 1st respondent fixing the meager compensation of Rs. 4.72 ps. per Square yard. The
petitioners' father sought reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and
the references were numbered in respect of land in Sy. No. 201 and OP No. 3/1988 in respect
of land in Sy. No. 202. he Senior Civil Judge, Mahabubnagar fixed the market value at Rs.
30/- per Square yard. This was challenged by the 1st respondent. Appeals were allowed and
the court made the compensation for the acquired land at Rs. 13.34 ps. per Square yard after
deducting 1/3rd developmental charges.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the compensation given was arbitrary and violation to the constitution of
India?
REASONING:
Petitioners contend that the action of respondents in not satisfying the said decrees is illegal,
arbitrary and violates Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. They placed reliance on the
decision of this Court in Bhimidipati Annapoorna Bhavani v. Land Acquisition Officer,
Yeluru Reservoir Project, Peddapuram, East Godavari District, A.P. and others 7. wherein this
Court held that if awards passed under the Land Acquisition law have become final and the
Acquisition Officers did not pay compensation even after EPs., are filed, claimants can
approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
CONCLUSION:
Till the amount is deposited, the 2nd respondent or its members shall not be permitted to sell
or alienate any of the plots owned by the members of the said Society. It is open to the 1st
respondent as well as the State of Telangana represented by Principal Secretary, Revenue
Department to sell the plots of the members of the 2nd respondent Society as well as the plots
which are yet to be allotted by 2nd respondent for recovery of the compensation amount
payable to the petitioners to satisfy the decree and judgment. Accordingly the writ petitions
are allowed.

7
MANU/AP/0109/2005