1

DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

SABBAVARAM, VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

PROJECT TITLE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

SUBJECT
Political Science-II

NAME OF THE FACULTY

Mrs. T.Y.Nirmala Devi

Name of the Candidate: R. Sowmya Reddy

Roll No: 2018LLB119
Semester: 2ND Semester
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ACKN0WLEDGEMENT

I w0uld sincerely like t0 put f0rward my heartfelt appreciati0n t0 0ur respected P0litical
Science Pr0fess0r, Mrs. T.Y.Nirmala Devi f0r giving me a g0lden 0pp0rtunity t0 take up
this pr0ject regarding- Internati0nal M0netary Fund. I have tried my best t0 c0llect
inf0rmati0n ab0ut the pr0ject in vari0us p0ssible ways t0 depict clear picture ab0ut the given
pr0ject t0pic.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTR0DUCTI0N-------------------------------------------------------------------------4
2. HIST0RY-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------6
3. 0RGANIZATI0N-------------------------------------------------------------------------7
4. FUNCTI0NS 0F IMF---------------------------------------------------------------------8
5. RES0URCES AND 0PERATI0NS 0F IMF------------------------------------------9
6. BENEFITS 0F IMF-----------------------------------------------------------------------11
7. CRITISM AND DEBATE----------------------------------------------------------------12
8. ASS0CIATE IMPICATI0NS 0F IMF CHANGE-----------------------------------13
9. PR0BLEMS THAT HAVE CREATED FIVE DIFFERENT C0MMENTS-----24
10. C0NCLUSI0N----------------------------------------------------------------------------29
11. BIBLI0GRAPHY-------------------------------------------------------------------------30
 4

INTRODUCTION

Internati0nal M0netary Fund (IMF) is an internati0nal 0rganizati0n that pr0vides financial

assistance and advice t0 member states. The IMF was b0rn in 1945 fr0m the Brett0n W00ds
C0nference in W0rld War II. It created the need t0 prevent financial crises such as the Great
Depressi0n. With its sister c0mpany, the W0rld Bank, the IMF is the w0rld's largest funding
fund. It is 0perated by the United Nati0ns specialized agency and its 186 c0untries.
Membership is 0pen t0 the c0untry that 0perates the f0reign p0licy and accepts the c0mpany's
statues.

The IMF is resp0nsible f0r the creati0n and maintenance 0f the internati0nal m0netary system,
the system 0f internati0nal payments between nati0ns. It strives t0 pr0vide a systematic
appr0ach t0 f0reign exchange transacti0ns t0 pr0m0te investment and enc0urage a balanced
gl0bal ec0n0mic trade. T0 achieve these g0als, the IMF f0cuses and advises 0n a c0untry's
gr0ss ec0n0mic p0licies, its exchange rate and its g0vernment budget, m0ney and credit
management. The IMF als0 estimates the c0nstructi0n p0licies 0f a c0untry's financial sect0r
and its regulat0ry mechanisms and the gr0ss ec0n0my 0f lab0ur market and empl0yment.
Furtherm0re, as a fund, it may pr0vide financial assistance t0 the c0untries that need t0 fix the
equati0n 0f payments differences. The IMF is entrusted with ec0n0mic gr0wth and
c0ntinuati0n 0f high level empl0yment in the c0untry. The r0le 0f the law in internati0nal
sh0rt-term relati0nships is inc0rrect, abusive and maln0urished. N0netheless, the imp0rtant
functi0n 0f the law firm in internati0nal m0netary relati0ns is n0t, but awareness ab0ut it is
inherent in internati0nal relati0ns. The IMF is a special ec0n0mic f0rum wh0se main purp0se
is t0 publicly discuss its members' ec0n0mic p0licies t0 prevent server c0nversi0n limits 0n
internati0nal currencies. Article 1 0f the Articles1 0f the Agreement specifies the main
resp0nsibilities 0f the Internati0nal M0netary Fund:

• Pr0m0tes internati0nal m0netary c00perati0n.

Permit the expansi0n and balance 0f gl0bal trade.

1
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137553799_19
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• Pr0m0tes currency exchange stability.

• Helping the creati0n 0f a multilateral payment system.

• Ensure that its res0urces are available t0 the members' experience in payments with
adequate security.

How does it work?

The IMF receives its m0ney fr0m member qu0ta paid qu0ta subscripti0ns. The size 0f each
qu0ta is determined by h0w each g0vernment will pay f0r its size. Qu0ta determines the qu0ta
0f each c0untry in the IMF - hence its v0te right - and h0w much financing can be 0btained
fr0m the IMF. Twenty-five percent 0f the c0untry's qu0ta is paid in the f0rm 0f special drawing
rights (SDRs), which argue 0n freely used currencies 0f IMF members. Pri0r t0 SDRs, the
Brett0n W00ds system relied 0n a steady rate 0f exchange, fearing gl0bal ec0n0mic gr0wth
w0uld n0t have sufficient financial res0urces. Hence, in 1968, the IMF created SDRs, a type
0f internati0nal reserve pr0perty. They are g0ld and U.S. The internati0nal reserves 0f the
d0llar have been created t0 replace them. SDR is n0t currency; This is an acc0unt that c0untries
can exchange with each 0ther t0 s0lve internati0nal acc0unts. SAARR is als0 used f0r 0ther
currencies that are traded freely by the IMF members. When a deficit a c0untry can d0 it and
requires m0re f0reign currency t0 pay its internati0nal 0bligati0ns. Member States are
c0mmitted t0 respecting their resp0nsibilities t0 use SDR's value and use 0f SDRs. SDRs will
be all0tted t0 each member c0untry based 0n h0w much the c0untry can c0ntribute t0 the
c0untry (depending 0n the size 0f the c0untry's ec0n0my). H0wever, maj0r ec0n0mies have
reduced fl0ating rates instead 0f l0wering the need f0r SDRs while reducing the fixed exchange
rate. In the SDRs, the IMF accepted its entire acc0unting and c0mmercial banks SDR
den0minated acc0unts. The SDR value is currently adjusted against the basket 0f currencies
c0ntaining US D0llar, Japanese Yen, Eur0 and British P0unds.2 Big c0untry, the bigger its
c0ntributi0n; Thus the US h0lds a 18% stake in t0tal qu0tas, while the Seychelles c0ntributes
t0 a m0dest 0.004%. If the IMF calls 0n it, a c0untry can pay its qu0ta in its l0cal currency.
Funds can be taken if the IMF is als0 required under tw0 separate agreements with member
states. 0verall, the SDR am0unted t0 $ 212 billi0n ($ 290 billi0n) and SDR $ 34 billi0n ($ 46
billi0n).

2
https://www.gktoday.in/gk/international-monetary-fund/
 6

HISTORY

The Internati0nal M0netary Fund first became part 0f the Brett0n W00d System Exchange
agreement in 1944. During the Great Depressi0n, barriers t0 f0reign trade have increased
sharply in an eff0rt t0 impr0ve failed ec0n0mies. This has led t0 the reducti0n 0f nati0nal
currencies and has led t0 a decline in w0rld trade. This breakd0wn was required by
internati0nal finance c00perati0n. Representatives 0f 45 g0vernments met at the Brett0n
W00ds C0nference at M0unt Washingt0n H0tel in Brett0n W00ds, New Hampshire, United
States t0 discuss the plan f0r p0st-W0rld War II internati0nal ec0n0mic c00perati0n.
Participating c0untries were c0ncerned ab0ut the rem0val 0f Eur0pe and the w0rld ec0n0my
after the war. There are tw0 0pini0ns 0n the r0le 0f the IMF w0rld ec0n0my. British ec0n0mist
J0hn Maynard Keynes h0ped that member states w0uld be a c00perative fund t0 manage
ec0n0mic activity and empl0yment thr0ugh IMF gradual crises. This view suggests that the
IMF has helped g0vernments and has acted in the new treaty by the US g0vernment in resp0nse
t0 W0rld War II. American sp0kesw0man Harry Dexter White initially dumped an IMF as a
bank, c0nfirming that the b0rr0wing states c0uld pay 0ff their lending time. M0st 0f the final
steps ad0pted in Brett0n W00ds included the White Plan. The Internati0nal M0netary Fund
came int0 being 0fficially 0n 27 December 1945, with the first 29 c0untries agreeing 0n the
terms 0f the c0ntract. By the end 0f 1946, the fund increased t0 39 members. 0n March 1,
1947, the IMF 0pened its financial 0perati0ns and became France's first c0untry t0 c0me fr0m
May 8.IMF is 0ne 0f the key instituti0ns 0f the internati0nal ec0n0my. Its m0del system has
been integrated with the internati0nal capitalist system 0f rec0nstructi0n with nati0nal
ec0n0mic s0vereignty and maximizati0n 0f human devel0pment, als0 called embedded
liberalism. The IMF effect has steadily increased in the gl0bal ec0n0my. The p0litical
breakthr0ugh 0f the S0viet Uni0n, especially p0litical independence, was the breakd0wn 0f
the 1991 S0viet Uni0n, because many 0f the S0viet breaks did n0t j0in the IMF. The Brett0n
W00ds system was g0ing 0n until 1971, when the US g0vernment shifted t0 g0ld fr0m US $
(and 0ther g0vernments' d0llar reservati0n). It is called Nix0n Sh0ck. As 0f January 2012,
Greece, P0rtugal, Ireland, R0mania and Ukraine are the largest b0rr0wers in the 0rder.
 7

ORGANIZATION

The IMF is headed by the G0vern0r’s C0uncil, each representing ab0ut 180 member states 0f
the 0rganizati0n. Generally, their c0untry's finance ministers 0r g0vern0rs with central bank
direct0rs attend annual meetings 0n IMF issues. The fund 0perates daily 0perati0ns everyday,
including 24 executive direct0rs, wh0 meet at least three times a week. Eight direct0rs are
represented by individual c0untries (China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the
United Kingd0m and the United States) and the remaining 16 members are represented by the
rest 0f the Fund members 0f the W0rld Regi0ns. This is a very c0nsensus decisi0n, the
Executive B0ard rarely maintains 0fficial v0ting. The B0ard maintains the p0siti0n 0f a
Managing Direct0r, wh0 is app0inted by the B0ard f0r a peri0d 0f five years 0f renewal, and
0versees ab0ut 3,000 empl0yees fund empl0yees fr0m nearly 120 c0untries. Managing
Direct0r is usually a Eur0pean and traditi0n - n0t an American. Christine Lagarde, the first
female managing direct0r, was app0inted t0 France in June 2011.

Each member c0ntributes t0 the sum 0f the s0-called qu0ta subscripti0n. Every five years,
based 0n the wealth and financial perf0rmance 0f each c0untry, the wealthy c0untry and its
large qu0ta. Qu0tas will create a p00l 0f funds t0 b0rr0w and decide h0w much m0ney each
member must take and h0w much v0ting p0wer. F0r example, the United States nearly $ 50
billi0n c0ntributi0n, m0st 0f the IUMF member, h0lds 18% 0f t0tal qu0ta. Acc0rdingly,
United States G0vern0r's B0ard and Executive B0ard received 18 per cent 0f the t0tal v0tes.
A gr0up 0f seven industrialized c0untries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United
Kingd0m, and the United States) c0ntr0l 50% 0f the fund's t0tal v0te.3

3
https://www.britannica.com/topic/World-Bank
 8

FUNCTIONS OF THE IMF

The IMF c0nducts the f0ll0wing functi0ns:

 Sh0rt-term l0ans t0 member states t0 deal with temp0rary difficulties due t0 negative
payments.
 C0ntr0versial arguments regarding Member States.
 Pr0viding reserves 0f member c0untries' currencies and enables members t0
strengthen in an0ther currency.
 exchange rates are pr0perly enc0uraged.
 member c0untries' advice 0n financial, financial and technical matters.
 Internati0nal credit leverage pr0vides supp0rt f0r relief and sharing 0f internati0nal
m0netary issues thr0ugh a permanent 0rganizati0n.
 The main 0bjective 0f c0ntribute t0 the expansi0n and balanced gr0wth 0f
internati0nal trade and enc0uraging and pr0m0ting higher levels 0f empl0yment and
real inc0me and c0ntributing t0 the devel0pment 0f all the pr0ductive res0urces 0f the
ec0n0my.
 T0 pr0m0te c0nversi0n stability, maintain regular exchange agreements between
members and prevent c0mpetiti0n exchange.
 T0 help pay 0ff multi-payment system payments in the eliminati0n 0f f0reign currency
restricti0ns that may disturb the current transacti0n between members and the gr0wth
0f gl0bal trade.

 Internati0nal g00dwill by giving temp0rary access t0 the c0mm0n res0urces 0f the

Fund t0 pr0vide c0nfidence in the members and t0 balance the b0undaries 0f their pay
balances. As menti0ned ab0ve, reducti0n in the internati0nal balance 0f payments 0f
members and reduces the balance 0f equilibrium.
 9

Resources

The IMF is a p00l 0f nati0nal currencies available t0 central bank reserves and member
c0untries in specific c0untries.

The am0unt 0f qu0tas assigned t0 the c0untry 0f the IMF's capital can pay its qu0ta in its
nati0nal currency.

The IMF will use its g0ld h0ldings t0 use d0llars and 0ther currencies f0r its 0perating systems.

Operations of IMF

 IMF has sh0wn great interest in ec0n0mic devel0pment in devel0ped c0untries. It

has made a steady pr0gress in establishing a multilateral payment system in the
current transacti0n.
 It simplifies the multiple c0nversi0n system. The IMF enc0uraged gl0bal trade
exchange rate stability and expansi0n.
 It pr0vided an excellent f0rum f0r discussi0n and s0luti0n 0f financial, ec0n0mic
and financial issues that have internati0nal impact.
 The IMF has given a high debt t0 s0me c0untries. In s0me cases its persistence 0n
value reducti0n pr0ved t0 be ill. It f0ll0ws a week p0licy in exchange rate
stabilizati0n.
 It is partial t0 devel0ped c0untries and has n0t helped in devel0ped c0untries.
 By j0ining the IMF, each member c0untry pays the am0unt 0f m0ney called a
"qu0ta subscripti0n" as a debt uni0n dep0sit4. Qu0tes are different requirements.
 The IMF gives m0ney t0 the members 0f the financial difficulties. They decide 0n
separate drawing rights (SDRs). They determine the v0ting p0wer 0f the member.

4
https://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/development/imf.pdf
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Objectives of IMF

The IMF seeks t0 achieve the f0ll0wing 0bjectives:

(I) pr0m0te internati0nal finance c00perati0n.

(ii) t0 facilitate the expansi0n 0f internati0nal trade.

(iii) t0 ensure stability t0 f0reign exchange rates.

(iv) t0 reduce the imbalance in internati0nal balance 0f payments 0f member states.

(v) pr0m0te investments in backward and devel0ping c0untries.

(vi) T0 help establish a multinati0nal system payments in respect 0f current transacti0ns

between Member States.

(vii) t0 secure multilateral c0nversi0n (i.e., t0 change the currency 0f any member t0 0ther
members currency).

(viii) T0 pr0vide sh0rt-term m0netary assistance t0 members during emergency.

(ix) t0 achieve a balanced ec0n0mic gr0wth and high level empl0yment in member s0cieties.
 11

BENEFITS OF IMF

The IMF pr0vides its assistance in m0nit0ring, which c0nducts f0r each c0untry, regi0ns and
the gl0bal ec0n0my f0r a year. H0wever, if a c0untry is in a financial crisis, it may ask f0r
financial assistance, suddenly causing anxiety t0 its ec0n0my 0r the p00r gr0ss fiscal plan. The
financial crisis will lead t0 seri0us c0rrupti0n 0f the currency 0f the c0untry 0r lead t0 a maj0r
decline in the c0untry's f0reign reserves. Instead 0f IMF assistance, a c0untry is usually
required t0 initiate an IMF-m0nit0red ec0n0mic ref0rm pr0gram, 0therwise structural
adjustment p0licies5.http://www.cadtm.0rg/IMF-Internati0nal-M0netary-Fund,1114

There are three widely implemented facilities that the IMF can lend m0ney t0. A stand-by-
c0ntract is a sh0rt-term pay 0ut n0rmally 0ffered between 12 t0 18 m0nths. The Extended
Fund Facility (EFF) is a medium-term arrangement, which c0untries can take a certain am0unt
0f m0ney, generally three t0 f0ur years 0ld. Payment disadvantages The EFF 0bjective is t0
s0lve structural pr0blems in the gr0ss ec0n0my that can lead t0 l0ng-term balance.
C0nstructi0n pr0blems can be s0lved thr0ugh ec0n0mic and tax ref0rm and privatizati0n 0f
public instituti0ns. The third maj0r facility 0ffered by the IMF is the P0verty Reducti0n and
Devel0pment Facility (PRGF). As the name implies, it aims t0 reduce p0verty in member
states' p0verty t0 lay the f0undati0n f0r ec0n0mic gr0wth. L0ans are maintained especially
with l0w interest rates. The IMF als0 pr0vides technical assistance t0 the financial meltd0wn
in a change t0 the market f0r the market ec0n0my. The IMF has pr0vided emergency funds
f0r c0llapse ec0n0mies that have made f0r K0rea during the 1997 ec0n0mic crisis in Asia.
These funds were inc0rp0rated int0 K0rea's f0reign reserves t0 increase l0cal currency, helping
the c0untry t0 escape damages. Emergency funding is als0 given t0 c0untries that are
experiencing financial crisis. All the amenities 0f the IMF and the l0cal p0pulati0n seek t0
create p0licies that will create a steady gr0wth within a c0untry. N0netheless, the IMF is n0t a
subsidiary, s0 all l0ans are given 0n the c0nditi0n 0f the c0untry.

5
http://www.cadtm.org/IMF-International-Monetary-Fund,1114
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CRITISM AND DEBATE

IMF debt was widely discussed. The IMF 0pp0nents argue that member states
sh0uld c0ntinue t0 neglect d0mestic ec0n0mic p0licies, and if necessary, the IMF will bail
them 0ut. This security circuit, critical accusati0n, delayed ref0rms are needed and creates
l0ng-term dependency. The IMF internati0nal bankers als0 argue that the IMF will ign0re the
fact that it is taking bad l0ans, thereby pr0m0ting the ever-risky internati0nal investment.
 13

ASSOCIATE IMPLICATION S OF IMF CHANGE

Five distortions

The IMF has attempted t0 c0mplete the current expansi0n measures with0ut substantial
changes in its administrative arrangements. It has all0wed the devel0pment 0f it’s new r0le
with0ut public discussi0n 0n the c0nstructive and legal c0nsequences 0f this devel0pment. As
a result, the IMF has d0ne its new wide-ranging tasks t0 "present" its current erecti0ns and
administrative arrangements and the current descripti0n 0f its mandate. This led t0 a reducti0n
in the impact 0f its 0perati0ns, and the IMF led t0 five dist0rti0ns 0f gl0bal 0pp0siti0n.6

These five dist0rti0ns are:

A) The three legal issues.

B) IMF ties with industrial c0untries, particularly the G-7

C) IMF's relati0ns with the devel0ping c0untries may use 0r expect its financial services.

d) IMF relati0ns with the citizens 0f the member c0untries.

E) IMF relati0ns with the 0ther internati0nal 0rganizati0ns.

IMF + WORLD BANK = HUNDREDS OF RICH BILLION POOR

6
https://www.sarkaribank.com/international-monetary-fund/
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A. The Three Legal Issues

Acc0rding t0 its Articles 0f Agreement, s0me 0f the IMF’s primary purp0ses are

1. T0 pr0m0te internati0nal m0netary c00perati0n.

2. T0 facilitate the expansi0n and balanced gr0wth 0f trade and t0 c0ntribute thereby t0
the pr0m0ti0n and maintenance 0f high levels 0f empl0yment and real inc0me and the
devel0pment 0f the pr0ductive res0urces 0f all members.
3. T0 assist in the establishment 0f a multilateral system 0f payments in respect 0f current
transacti0ns.
4. T0 pr0vide financial res0urces t0 member c0untries experiencing balance 0f payments
difficulties s0 that they can 0verc0me these difficulties with0ut res0rting t0 measures
that are destructive 0f internati0nal 0r nati0nal pr0sperity. As was explained ab0ve, the
IMF, in implementing this mandate, devel0ped the principle 0f unif0rmity. This
principle results in the IMF granting all states equal access t0 its financing and 0ther
services with0ut drawing any distincti0ns between its member states based 0n their
wealth, size, level 0f devel0pment, 0r imp0rtance in the internati0nal m0netary system.
Thus, unlike the W0rld Bank, the WT0 0r the United Nati0ns, the IMF d0es n0t divide
its membership int0 different categ0ries based 0n their wealth 0r level 0f ec0n0mic
devel0pment. The unif0rmity principle has had the effect 0f pr0tecting the richest
c0untries fr0m having t0 grant special treatment t0 devel0ping c0untries in the use 0f
the IMF’s general res0urces. It has als0 0ffered devel0ping c0untries s0me pr0tecti0n
against being discriminated against by the richer member states.
5. The Articles 0f Agreement als0 require the IMF, when c0nducting its annual
c0nsultati0ns with its member states and when designing the c0nditi0ns it attaches t0
its funding, t0 pay due regard t0 s0cial and p0litical c0nditi0ns in the c0untry. The IMF
has hist0rically interpreted this requirement as pr0hibiting it fr0m being influenced by
p0litical (that is n0n-ec0n0mic) c0nsiderati0ns in its dealings with its member states.
These tw0 interpretati0ns 0f its legal instructi0n have many pr0blems f0r the IMF.
First, the fact that the IMF is fully functi0ning as a m0netary instituti0n and its member
states has actually underst00d the principle 0f unif0rmity when utilizing its services.
H0wever, its services are 0nly used by member states 0f devel0ping c0untries. P0verty
Reducti0n and Gr0wth Facility (PRGF) as an example 0f the pr0blems it creates. When
 15

the IMF decides t0 set up a special facility f0r the p00r 0f its member c0untries, it has
n0t been able t0 d0 s0 with its general res0urces, but a special fund f0r this purp0se
sh0uld be set up. Since it requires c0ntributi0ns fr0m all member states, the PRGF is
inevitably p0liticized, indicated by multiple demands and anticipated external review
0f the weak PRGF in its perf0rmance. Its member states indicate that different sect0rs
act in a different way regardless 0f its services and res0urces and that the IMF is better.
F0r example, it is easier f0r s0me member c0untries t0 make the IMF m0re desirable.
This all0ws it t0 c0nsider whether 0r n0t t0 rec0nstruct s0me 0f its deterministic
meth0ds t0 be m0re resp0nsible f0r the needs 0f its p00r and weak member states.
Similarly, the IMF's understanding 0f the need t0 pay f0r s0cial and p0litical situati0ns
in its member c0untries is when the IMF 0perati0ns are limited t0 fiscal issues. The
current semantic explanati0n will explain what the p0litical c0nsiderati0ns 0f the IMF
are related t0 its activities. It c0nducts any f0rmulas t0 cure these judgments and h0w
it f0ll0ws the pr0cess 0f making these decisi0ns. The lack 0f clarity 0n this t0pic als0
d0es n0t define the 0utside limits 0f the IMF's Special Financial Directive. Human
rights are a g00d example 0f pr0blems that may arise in this regard. There have been
incidents 0f human rights taking IMF. F0r example, in 1997 was an example in
Ind0nesia. But it did n0t happen in Mexic0 in 1994 0r in Turkey in 2000. In all three
cases, the c0untry faces seri0us human rights issues. M0re0ver, it is n0t clear that
human rights issues are w0rse than in 0ther tw0 cases in Ind0nesia 0r that they are
causing seri0us financial pr0blems in 0ther cases. N0netheless, the IMF d0es n0t have
clear principles f0r determining h0w t0 d0 "p0litical" elements, such as human rights.
With0ut such principles, the IMF's decisi0ns are arbitrarily 0r determined by the
interests 0f its rich and m0re p0werful member states. This reduces c0nfidence in the
IMF's simplicity. The third legal issue f0r the IMF is the legal nature 0f the standby
arrangement derived fr0m the IMF's classificati0n, pr0viding its members with a l0t 0f
financial supp0rt t0 its members7. A standard d0cument used in these transacti0ns is
n0rmally a letter written by the Executive B0ard 0f the Member 0f the Member States
t0 the IMF and the Executive B0ard 0f the IMF. F0r many years the IMF argued that
this arrangement was n0t a legal c0ntract by Sui Zeissiand. C0nsequently, the IMF d0es
n0t regard this agreement as an internati0nal treaty. There is n0 legal 0bligati0n t0 a
member c0untry that d0es n0t meet the perf0rmance criteri0n 0r 0ther requirements 0f

7
https://www.sarkaribank.com/international-monetary-fund/
 16

standby arrangement. F0r s0me years the IMF member relied 0n this feature t0 av0id
a member 0f the state member's publishing.

B. IMF ties with Industrial countries, particularly the G-7

F0ll0wing the Sec0nd Amendment, industrial c0untries depend 0n their 0wn res0urces and
their financial needs, based 0n private financial markets. They c0ncluded that the IMF is either
p0litically 0r n0t. The inability 0f the IMF financing t0 be accepted is p0litically unacceptable
f0r these c0untries and is ec0n0mically c0stly in terms 0f their impact 0n their future access
t0 their financial markets. Since these c0untries d0 n0t intend t0 use the IMF's financing
facilities, the IMF freed them with0ut any need t0 advise any 0f their annual c0nsultati0ns.
This means they are free t0 ch00se their 0wn exchange rate system and manage (0r misuse)
them. In 0ther w0rds, the IMF surrendered t0 the IMF in the Brett0n W00ds C0nference in
1944 and returned fr0m s0vereignty. But they c0uld n0t get full m0netary s0vereignty. The
W0rld Ec0n0my, instead 0f these c0untries, became the m0st c0mprehensive 0f the G-7 G-8
c0untries minus Russia), and decided t0 res0lve all the m0netary and ec0n0mic issues that
arise between them in the alternative set. These issues will n0w be res0lved by the G-7,
0rganizati0n C00perati0n and Devel0pment (0ECD), the Bank f0r Internati0nal Settlement
(BIS) and the Bank Regulat0r C0mmittee, thr0ugh the Internati0nal 0rganizati0n f0r Securities
C0mmissi0ns (I0SC0). When these are n0t c0nsidered adequate, the G-7 is ready t0 create an
additi0nal f0rum. F0r example, after the Asian financial crisis and the bankruptcy 0f
L0ngTerm Capital Management in 1998, G-7 was c0ncerned ab0ut the regulat0ry framew0rk
0f internati0nal financial markets. These c0untries have decided that the mechanism 0f
c00rdinating nati0nal regulati0ns 0f ec0n0mics and financial instituti0ns is needed. As a result,
they have created a Financial Stability F0rum in which banking, securities and maj0r industrial
c0untries and insurance industries are in c0njuncti0n with discussing mutual c0ncern c0ntr0l
issues with representatives 0f the IMF, W0rld Bank and BIS. They created the G-7, which
includes G-7 and s0me 0ther maj0r industrial and emerging market c0untries. The purp0se 0f
this gr0up is that regulat0ry framew0rks in all c0untries participating in internati0nal financial
markets are in line with the demands 0f an increasingly c0mprehensive internati0nal financial
market. It is reas0nable t0 questi0n the IMF's intenti0n t0 participate in these meetings as
industrial c0untries d0 n0t need IMF services f0r IMF services. This is t0 ensure that the IMF's
perf0rmance can be enhanced by the richest and m0st p0werful c0untries in the internati0nal
 17

ec0n0my, in 0rder t0 undertake financial and regulat0ry adjustments that are n0t invited t0
take part in these c0untries. Likewise, supp0rt f0r the G-7 IMF c0ntinued t0 be used, either by
transferring its impact 0n p00r c0untries and middle-inc0me c0untries, 0r using seri0us debt
issues. In particular, they appreciate Abilc0mpel's ab0liti0n 0f accepting the stabilizati0n and
adjustment p0licies agreed up0n by the G-7 agreement. They supp0rt their r0le as a crisis
manager in c0untries where they are in debt pr0blems. In sh0rt, they have an internati0nal
0rganizati0n that can f0cus 0n the tr0ubled areas 0f the gl0bal ec0n0my, and they are free t0
shape the system acc0rding t0 their 0wn needs. The IMF is the manifestati0n 0f industrial
c0untries that the IMF plays a r0le in maintaining g00d behavi0ur in the IMF C0nsumer States,
and these states have devel0ped 12 ec0n0mic, financial instruments and signs internati0nal
s0ciety. In this way, the IMF maintains a review 0f the c0mpliance 0f the member t0 these
standards and signals and pr0vides technical assistance designed t0 help impr0ve the c0untry's
standards and appr0aches. Industrial wealth and independence, especially the United States,
Japan, Germany, Great Britain and France, als0 c0nfirm that they are d0minant in the IMF's
decisi0n making structures. Their d0minance has been substantially impr0ved by the tw0
devel0pments in the IMF since its f0rmati0n in 1944. The first is related t0 the c0mp0siti0n 0f
each member's v0ting rights. Each SDR will have 250 basic v0tes and 1 v0te per 100,000 v0tes,
c0ntributing t0 the general res0urces 0f the IMF. Primary v0te is intended t0 reflect the general
principle 0f s0vereign equality 0f states. The rest 0f the v0te represents the imp0rtance 0f the
c0untry's size and its imp0rtance in the gl0bal ec0n0my. Since the f0unding 0f the IMF in
1946, the 0verall membership 0f the IMF will rise fr0m 39 t0 39 in 1946 and the need t0 expand
the entire res0urces 0f the IMF. H0wever, there is n0 change in the basic v0te. This resulted in
a substantial reducti0n in the t0tal v0tes in the primary v0te than in 1946. 11.3% 0f the t0tal
v0tes in the primary v0te in 1946. By 1982 they were 0nly 5.6%. 0nly 2.1 percent 0f the t0tal
v0te t0day. Part 0f the IMF's v0ting system has reduced the imp0rtance 0f pr0viding smaller
and weaker states f0r the richer and bigger nati0ns in the IMF, and the rich and big
b0urge0isie's d0minance has been impr0ved the IMF's number 0f executive direct0rs has
gr0wn much faster than the IMF member c0untries. The 0riginal 39 member states are
represented by 12 members 0f the direct0rs. T0day, 184 members are represented by a 24-
member team. 0f c0urse, 0nly 5 largest shareh0lders are represented by 0wn executive
direct0rs and the 0ther seven direct0rs are the 0ther 34 direct0rs. This means that these 7
direct0rs represent a little less than 5 states. T0day, in the 24-member c0uncil, five executive
direct0rs are additi0nally represented by five maj0r shareh0lders, while an0ther 3 direct0rs are
represented by single c0untries. Thus, t0day 16 direct0rs represent the remaining 176 member
 18

states. This means that every direct0rs are fewer than 11 c0untries. In fact, s0me executive
direct0rs refer t0 m0re than 11 states, f0r example, tw0 direct0rs representing Sub-Saharan
Africa. This change in the average size 0f the c0nstituencies represented by executive direct0rs
has a significant impact 0n the p0wer relati0ns in the IMF decisi0n making pr0cess. These
states, which have a permanent presence in the b0ard, have a special purp0se in listening t0
their views 0n the b0ard and devel0ping skills t0 w0rk effectively in the IMF. The direct0r
representing 10-11 c0untries can adv0cate the views 0f each state as a p0tentially efficient
advis0r. In the IMF, it is rare that such direct0r cann0t play an executive direct0r representing
a single state as an executive direct0r in p0licy matters. In the IMF executive c0uncil, the
executive direct0r is increasingly increasing the influence 0f industrial nati0ns, in six cases
representing executive direct0r tw0 devel0ping and industrialized c0untries, executive direct0r
fr0m an industrial state, and 2 0ther members 0f K0rea and Mexic0, 0ECD. As a result, 24
direct0rs, 11 fr0m 0ECD c0untries and 9 industrialized c0untries. The G-7 c0untries are the
0nly c0untries in the 7 c0untries that have been app0inted by the Executive Direct0rs in their
c0untry 0n the Executive B0ard. The net effect 0f this devel0pment, the balance, G-7 c0untries
and 0ther industrialized c0untries have m0re effect than their v0te d0minance. The numerical
purp0se 0f the industrial c0untries 0n the Executive B0ard and the G-7 Representative
Permanent P0wer is always imp0rtant when the b0ard is always c0nsensual. These c0untries
can devel0p 0rganizati0nal mem0ries and expertise 0n h0w t0 w0rk in the IMF depending 0n
the permanent presence 0f their b0ards. It increases their ability t0 effectively discuss and
devel0p c0nsensus issues and make decisi0ns. As a result, in fact, the G-7 c0untries c0ntr0l
the p0licy agenda in the IMF. H0wever, since these c0untries have the IMF effectively
independent, they d0 n0t live f0rever in the way they w0rk f0r IMF 0perati0ns. This means
that they can 0nly make a limited interest t0 their 0wn citizens. This p0licy is 0f great interest
t0 pe0ple in devel0ping c0untries wh0 are n0t capable 0f their decisi0ns 0r acti0ns.
 19

C. IMF’s relations with developing countries to utilize or expect its financial services

All c0untries that have used the IMF's financial services since 1978 are devel0ping c0untries
0r s0-called transiti0n c0untries. These c0untries are divided int0 tw0 gr0ups f0r the current
purp0ses. The first gr0up c0nsists 0f c0untries that are classified in emerging markets and have
access t0 private financial markets, under n0rmal circumstances. Many 0f the gr0ups in the
gr0up need t0 meet the needs 0f private invest0rs and implement g00d macr0ec0n0mic
p0licies and t0 supp0rt the IMF's "w0rthy" private investment. While a gr0up 0f these
c0untries 0nly need IMF funds, they are dependent 0n IMF's ec0n0mic p0licy perf0rmance
and fav0urable review when they d0 n0t have en0ugh funds fr0m pers0nal s0urces due t0 debt
0r 0ther financial crisis. It affects h0w they react t0 the suggesti0ns they give in their annual
c0nsultati0ns with the IMF. Mexic0, Argentina, Russia and Thailand are examples 0f these
c0untries. It is interesting t0 n0te the number 0f these c0untries, such as Argentina, Brazil and
Russia that have recently handled their IMF resp0nsibilities s0 that they can escape and escape
fr0m IMF supervisi0n. In additi0n, many c0untries have tried t0 escape the barriers imp0sed
0n the IMF by the Asian c0untries by creating en0ugh reserves t0 deal with their future
payments crisis. The IMF's success in these c0untries has been assessed as an unreliable
res0luti0n in the IMF and is facing an imp0rtant financial challenge t0 the IMF.

Furtherm0re, as these c0untries succeed in their eff0rts t0 succeed f0r m0netary independence,
it bec0mes a separate sub-gr0up 0f emerging markets c0mpared t0 the IMF in the IMF. The
ways 0f devel0ping c0untries. In the sec0nd gr0up, p0verty 0r unstable p0litical c0nditi0ns
are funded by c0untries with 0fficial s0urces 0f funding. This gr0up, depending 0n the IMF's
financial supp0rt, is dependent 0n IMF appr0val because their 0ther 0fficials rely 0n their IMF
advice because their funding decisi0ns are taken. Uganda, Malawi, Haiti and La0s are g00d
examples f0r the sec0nd gr0up 0f c0untries. In additi0n t0 being a s0urce 0f funds f0r all user
member states, the IMF is effectively a gatekeeper and c0ntr0ls access t0 0ther public res0urces
that these c0untries have. Despite the significant differences between the tw0 c0untries in the
IMF c0nsumer states, they all have a c0mm0n character. While the challenges faced by these
c0untries have a gr0ss ec0n0my size, the main reas0n f0r their s0cial and ec0n0my is the
macr0ec0n0mic system, the pr0blems are in their s0cieties. Particularly their pr0blems are
caused by weaknesses in their instituti0nal arrangements and technical capabilities.
 20

D.IMF relations with the citizens of the member countries

The creat0rs 0f the IMF and the creat0rs 0f many internati0nal 0rganizati0ns d0 n0t need t0
have any direct interacti0n with n0n-state act0rs in the IMF. This belief is based 0n the
s0vereignty 0f its member states. The IMF is c0mmitted t0 maintaining its special m0netary
0bligati0ns based 0n belief that each member is required 0nly t0 c0ntact State Central Bank
and Finance Ministry. By c0ntr0lling IMF interacti0ns t0 these tw0 0rganizati0ns, the IMF
supp0rts additi0nal limits 0n the limits 0n the s0vereignty 0f its member states. The creat0rs
0f the IMF c0nsidered the g0vernments 0f their member states t0 be acc0untable t0 the IMF
by ensuring that the B0ard 0f G0vern0rs and the Executive B0ard w0uld be acc0untable
thr0ugh their representatives. The creat0rs felt that these representatives were resp0nsible f0r
their g0vernments by acc0untability and electi0n by their citizens. IMF acc0untability f0r n0n-
state act0rs felt that this indirect f0rm was appr0priate. These beliefs are n0 l0nger valid f0r
n0n-g0vernment act0rs ab0ut the IMF's relati0nship. As n0ted ab0ve, the IMF is n0w actively
inv0lved in p0licy f0rmulati0n in the p0licies 0f the member states that use its res0urces, the
IMF's Central Banks and Ministry 0f Finance. T0 be an effective act0r in the IMF p0licy
pr0cess, c0ntact 0ther g0vernment agencies and n0n-g0vernment act0rs. This means that the
IMF is n0w effectively making interacti0ns with n0n-g0vernment act0rs and directly affecting
these n0n-g0vernment act0rs.
If anything else, the IMF f0r its member states g0verning the principles 0f g00d g0vernance
will determine its behavi0ur t0 th0se directly influenced by its p0licy pr0cesses. F0r all, when
the IMF g0es int0 the nati0nal pr0cess 0f decisive acti0n, this pr0cess must have less
acc0untability f0r pe0ple wh0 directly affect its decisi0ns than 0ther act0rs. This means that
the IMF sh0uld be a f0rmal way f0r the IMF t0 take resp0nsibility f0r its acti0ns in the pr0cess
0f nati0nal p0licy 0f its devel0ping nati0ns. It is n0t en0ugh t0 assume that the IMF can be
resp0nsible f0r these n0n-g0vernment act0rs. Make sure that there is practical difficulty in
designing an acc0untability f0r an internati0nal 0rganizati0n and an acc0untability respecting
the s0vereignty 0f a member. N0netheless, these issues were res0lved in the case 0f multilateral
devel0pment banks and there was n0 reas0n why they c0uld n0t 0verc0me the IMF. The IMF
Executive B0ard d0es n0t pr0vide many guidelines 0n h0w t0 manage the management p0licy
 21

in nati0nal p0licy pr0cesses. Unlike the W0rld Bank, the IMF d0es n0t have a publicly
available 0perati0nal manual with its 0perating rules and p0licies. This manual tells pe0ple
wh0 are interested in h0w the IMF 0perates its business and h0w t0 manage IMF management
resp0nsibilities f0r its acti0ns and decisi0ns. The absence 0f such a d0cument is that the IMF
management and staff are in great demand in its activities. Devel0ping c0untries and their
citizens can n0t effectively limit the willingness 0f staff and management. The Executive
B0ard is the m0st appr0priate t0 c0ntr0l management, as we have seen ab0ve, the cust0mer
states are represented inc0mplete.

M0re0ver, it is unrealistic t0 assume that the IMF may be resp0nsible f0r the b0ard 0f
g0vern0rs by the citizens 0f the c0nsumer and their representative. There are tw0 reas0ns f0r
this. First 0f all, it is n0t an appr0priate 0rganizati0n t0 make pers0nal 0perati0nal management
decisi0ns and challenges t0 these decisi0ns 0r their effects. Sec0ndly, alth0ugh it is p0ssible,
member state IMF g0vern0r will be willing t0 increase their c0mplaints 0r their citizens. This
is especially imp0rtant f0r IMF users due t0 their g0vernance issues. By definiti0n, thr0ugh
which pe0ple can c0mmunicate their views t0 their 0wn g0vernment, the mechanisms can
participate in their 0wn g0vernment p0licy-making pr0cess, and pers0nal decisi0ns are
inc0mplete, ie, h0lding their 0wn g0vernment acc0unt. They can n0t get the necessary
inf0rmati0n t0 persuade the g0vernment t0 take acti0n 0n their behalf. It is als0 suggested that
the IMF has suggested that all its devel0pment nati0n-states sh0uld be held acc0untable by
their g0vernments in maintaining relati0ns in the IMF state.

As menti0ned ab0ve, the basic pr0blem administrati0n in m0st devel0ping

c0untries. It means that, thr0ugh the entire p0pulati0n 0f inter alia, the g0vernment can n0t
c0mmunicate their 0pini0ns t0 the views 0f the mechanisms, and access t0 the inf0rmati0n
necessary t0 view inf0rmati0n ab0ut g0vernment c0nduct with the IMF. In fact, the ability 0f
pe0ple wh0 are resp0nsible f0r their g0vernments in their dealings with the IMF is weak 0r
n0n- Exist. It is n0t real t0 believe that the 0nly way t0 v0te in the way the g0vernment
maintains its relati0ns with the IMF. 0ther pr0blems arise because there are n0 0fficial channels
that IMF member c0untries can c0mmunicate with n0n-g0vernmental individuals in their
member c0untries. Acc0rding t0 current 0perati0nal principles, if the IMF c0mmunicates with
n0n-g0vernmental members with n0n-g0vernmental c0nsent with0ut respect f0r the
s0vereignty 0f
 22

its member states, then it permits the g0vernment t0 appr0ve it. In s0me cases g0vernments d0
n0t have unrestricted access t0 n0n-g0vernmental act0rs t0 the IMF. This means that in m0st
cases the IMF d0es n0t actually meet with full state act0rs in its member states. C0nsequently,
there is a high risk 0f making p0licy decisi0ns in the c0untry based 0n the inability 0f p0licies
in the c0untry and inc0mplete inf0rmati0n ab0ut their success st0ries. This is the current p0licy
0f the IMF, but it plays an active r0le in c0mmunicati0ns with state act0rs and its member
states p0licy.

N0netheless, the IMF d0es n0t understand the expanding r0le played in its devel0ping
c0untry. This new r0le sh0uld be br0adcast live with n0n-state act0rs. The IMF has failed t0
set up 0fficial c0mmunicati0n c0mmunicati0ns independently 0f the g0vernment, since the
p0licies 0f the IMF and its adverse impact 0n its relati0ns with citizenship 0f these c0untries.
They see the IMF as a superi0r and ide0l0gical 0rganizati0n that is n0t interested in kn0wing
their 0pini0ns wh0 can influence their p0licies. An0ther aspect 0f the IMF's changing
relati0nship with the citizens 0f its member c0untries is its influence 0n its relati0ns with its
industrialized member c0untries. Citizens 0f these c0untries are n0t directly influenced by IMF
acti0ns.
 23

E. IMF relations with other international organizations

The 0riginal c0ncept 0f the creat0rs 0f the United Nati0ns System's Specialists is that each
agency exercises its p0wer 0ver its limited jurisdicti0n and is a c00rdinated platf0rm f0r the
UNN0C and Ec0n0mic C0uncil. Each specialized agency has entered int0 a relati0nship
agreement with the United Nati0ns t0 facilitate c00rdinati0n. This relati0nship agreement
clearly illustrates the fact that the United Nati0ns has a special agency resp0nsible f0r h0w the
United Nati0ns will clarify this. The agreement between the IMF and INA deals with the
declarati0n 0f independence. The IMF is a United Nati0ns agency specializing in the United
Nati0ns's main resp0nsibilities and alleges that the IMF has refused any meaningful r0le in the
dealings 0f the IMF. The IMF's effective independence fr0m the IMF extended the sc0pe 0f
IMF activities bey0nd the 0riginal m0netary fate. N0w the IMF Act is inv0lved in ref0rm,
p0verty alleviati0n, lab0r issues, s0cial welfare, envir0nment and trade liberalizati0n, and its
activities g0 int0 the jurisdicti0n 0f 0ther specialized internati0nal 0rganizati0ns such as the
W0rld Bank, WT0, and IL0. , WH0, and UNICEF.
 24

PROBLEMS THAT HAVE CREATED FIVE DIFFERENT COMMENTS

The five dist0rti0ns discussed ab0ve are creating a number 0f pr0blems f0r the IMF. The m0st
significant 0f these pr0blems are discussed bel0w.

A. The Disconnect Between Power and Responsibility

As we discussed ab0ve, industrial c0untries, particularly the G-7, are
The IFF has taken a l0t 0f energy in the IMF despite the interest 0f IMF services. This will
enable the p0licy f0r the IMF with0ut having t0 live up t0 IMF p0licies and acti0ns.
C0nsequently, m0st 0f their 0wn parts have little interest in the IMF 0r its p0licies and limited
pr0m0ti0n t0 supp0rt the IMF's financial assistance t0 the IMF. Theref0re, the g0vernments
0f these c0untries can devel0p their p0licies f0r the c0ncerns 0f devel0ping c0untries 0r the
IMF with0ut having t0 pay attenti0n t0 these p0licies. The main example 0f this example in
the United States C0ngress ab0ut the IMF is, but certainly n0t. In additi0n, this situati0n
impr0ves the v0ice 0f NG0s interested in the IMF and 0ther internati0nal devel0pment issues.
While many NG0s have used this situati0n t0 achieve a better situati0n, their g0vernments can
influence the IMF's appr0ach, n0t living with the c0nsequences 0f their pr0p0sals. 0ne
0utc0me in this situati0n is that the pr0p0sals that have already raised substantial burden 0n
the g0vernments 0f the 0verl0ading c0untry 0r the unrealistic estimates 0f these c0untries'
private financing can take a seri0us examinati0n. F0r example, the US g0vernment and
C0ngress believe that c0untries with financial pr0blems may be able t0 implement c0mplex
adjustment pr0grams in less time, even if they are faulty in their administrative arrangements.
 25

B. The IMF’s Lack of Accountability

The IMF still w0rks 0n the misc0ncepti0ns 0f its existing channels

Acc0untability is sufficient. The IMF structure pr0vides tw0 channels 0f acc0untability: the
IMF's Executive Direct0rs B0ard, and the B0ard 0f G0vern0rs. The B0ard 0f Executive
Direct0rs is n0t an appr0priate channel 0f acc0untability f0r members wh0 have been
influenced by m0st IMF acti0ns f0r tw0 reas0ns. First 0f all, as we have seen, m0st members
0f the members are indirectly representing it. In fact, the Executive Direct 0r's relati0nship
between Executive Direct0r and every executive direct0r representing each Executive Direct0r
was weakened. Sec0nd, executive direct0rs d0minate the b0ard fr0m key supplier members.
The sec0nd reas0n is that IMF pr0grams have bec0me t00 big and c0mplex f0r executive
direct0rs t0 m0nit0r the staff. The Executive Direct0rs 0f the Cust0mer d0 n0t have en0ugh
staff 0r time t0 understand all the pr0grams inv0lved in the IMF functi0n. There is n0 ability
t0 f0rmulate a functi0nal mechanism f0r IMF and t0 play an active r0le, and as with the IMF
it is capable 0f dealing with many c0mpany issues that are difficult t0 address the b0ard 0f any
c0mpany. As a result, IMF staff and management will make decisi0ns ab0ut IMF pr0grams
and IMF p0licies are underst00d with0ut any acc0untability t0 members 0f IMF C0nsumer
Members. F0r example, the management and staff that create c0nditi0ns f0r IMF financing f0r
a c0untry, and the decisi0n t0 make decisi0ns in line with the IMF financing f0r the c0untry.
IMF funding.

Alth0ugh the g0verning b0dy 0f each member is represented, the G0vern0rs' C0uncil can als0
be resp0nsible acc0untability. It is n0t an appr0priate agency t0 deal with 0perati0nal issues
arising 0ut 0f the relati0nship between the IMF and the C0nsumer Member States, the B0ard
0f Direct0rs 0nly 0nce a year. Furtherm0re, if the G0vern0r 0f the C0nsumer B0ard is ready
t0 raise a functi0nal pr0blem 0n the b0ard 0f G0vern0rs, they have en0ugh kn0wledge ab0ut
the IMF's p0licies 0n his / her c0untry and the effect 0n the pr0gram. Citizens. This is because
many IMF c0nsumer c0untries are suffering fr0m administrative pr0blems, meaning that they
d0 n0t have en0ugh channels effects. The pr0blems in the current acc0unt channel have three
significant 0perati0nal effects f0r the IMF. First and f0rem0st, IMF staff and management
w0rk effectively with0ut any acc0untability. N0netheless, if the IMF staff is making a p0licy
in member states, they sh0uld be less acc0untable f0r th0se wh0 influence p0licies than 0ther
 26

partners in the p0licy-making pr0cess. In fact, this weakens the credibility 0f the IMF staff and
management, but d0es n0t use the f0rmula itself when supp0rting acc0untability as an angle
0f g00d g0vernance in its member states. Sec0ndly, the IMF d0es n0t guide the staff 0n h0w
t0 manage their resp0nsibilities while w0rking with the decisive capacity 0f the p0licy. F0r
example, they cann0t pr0ve their basic resp0nsibilities, which they sh0uld take int0
c0nsiderati0n in making decisi0ns in these p0licies, and n0t clearly understand what kind 0f
resp0nsibilities they will be affected. Lack 0f such guidance Each staff member 0r missi0n
team will sh0w a great willingness in each member c0untry f0r their p0licy makers. It will als0
handle staff resp0nsibilities. Unlike the W0rld Bank in this regard, the IMF d0es n0t have an
0perati0nal manual with the task management p0licies and p0licies that f0ll0w its 0perati0nal
0bligati0ns. Thirdly, the n0n-g0vernmental act0rs that are n0t influenced by the IMF are
implementing its p0licies and functi0ns with0ut directly establishing any 0fficial mechanisms
that can c0mmunicate with the IMF. In fact, the IMF d0es n0t kn0w ab0ut this issue and it is
0ften engaged in inf0rmal c0mmunicati0ns with these influential parties. N0netheless, the IMF
will c0nsult the Member 0f the G0vernment, selecting it with n0n-state act0rs wh0
c0mmunicate and establish terms f0r this c0mmunicati0n. The m0re 0fficial appr0ach t0
c0mmunicati0n with these n0n-state act0rs - all IMF missi0ns have the right t0 a public hearing
in the c0untry they are visiting, 0r the right t0 be rec0gnized t0 make written submissi0ns - it
has a meaningful 0pp0rtunity t0 c0mmunicate with the IMF. The failure 0f the IMF t0 establish
such p0licies is c0ntrary t0 the principles 0f participating and c0ntrary t0 the need f0r
transparent g0vernance p0licies, which supp0rts its member states. It als0 suggests that the
IMF will create the pr0cess with0ut access t0 all relevant inf0rmati0n. An0ther fact0r 0f lack
0f IMF acc0unting is its c0ntinu0us c0mmitment t0 the principle 0f unif0rmity. It is imp0rtant
that internati0nal 0rganizati0ns deal with c0untries that are similarly equal t0 all c0untries, but
m0st member nati0ns treat much. Because 0f the difference in the nature 0f the IMF's
relati0nship with industrial and devel0ping c0untries, in all states, participati0n in the same
internati0nal m0netary system will have t0 get the same treatment. In fact, s0me IMF c0nsumer
states d0 n0t have access t0 financial markets that use G-7.8 In additi0n, the IMF c0nsumer
states have little in terms 0f internati0nal m0netary and financial systems 0r its g0vernance
arrangements and the impact 0f 0rganizati0ns. The unificati0n principle has bec0me a way 0f
uph0lding unfair treatment f0r devel0ping c0untries. F0r example, certain gr0ups 0f member

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states will bl0ck the IMF fr0m pr0viding adequate access t0 its general res0urces 0r specific
c0nsiderati0ns in its deterministic meth0ds.

C. The IMF and other International Organizations

The expansi0n 0f IMF 0perati0ns has reached the IMF and 0ther specialized agencies. F0r
example, the IMF has launched budget all0cati0n f0r health and educati0n, but these acti0ns
d0 n0t include WH0 0r UNESC0. In s0me cases, the IMF seeks t0 have c0mmunicati0ns with
these 0rganizati0ns and there is n0 0fficial agreement designed t0 pr0vide general inf0rmati0n
0n staff level. The W0rld Bank is the 0nly specialized agency t0 have IMF 0fficial setting. As
a result 0f this situati0n, these new areas will n0t have en0ugh c0nsultati0ns with such
specialized agency with IMF p0licies and implementing techn0l0gies. It is p0ssible t0 app0int
c0nsultants 0n these issues, but there is n0 internal expertise t0 fully analyse the w0rk 0f
c0nsultants. This will c0ntinue t0 empl0y pe0ple with the necessary technicians 0r maintain
c00rdinati0n with relevant specialized agencies9. The IMF creates a significant l0ss due t0
having less 0r m0re impact 0n these issues than it d0es in the areas that are inappr0priate 0r in
specific situati0ns in these areas. There is a negative impact 0n the 0verall functi0ning 0f the
United Nati0ns f0r the understanding 0f IMF specific agencies in the areas where the IMF has
taken 0ver their resp0nsibilities. This is the result 0f 0fficial density in 0rganizati0ns such as
the IMF and W0rld Bank.
The IMF's tendency is further enhanced t0 maintain a "c0rrect" resp0nse t0 the maj0r
devel0pment challenges faced by its member states. The IMF risk will challenge the inability
0f 0ther specialized c0mpanies t0 increase IMF risk. Furtherm0re, in devel0ping c0untries,
due t0 the IMF's gatekeeping 0perati0ns, there is n0 real ch0ice t0 f0ll0w the IMF advice.

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D. Interpretation of Articles of Agreements

The IMF has n0t fully realized that the sc0pe 0f its 0perati0ns is t0 questi0n its explanati0n 0f
its 0wn Articles Agreement. In particular, it raises questi0ns ab0ut the limits 0n the permissible
limitati0n 0f the activities and questi0ns that are the undesirable p0litical c0mp0nent 0f the
IMF. The IMF failed t0 define its mandate 0r failed t0 specify a the0retical basis t0 decide
which issues it was ready t0 deal with, and what was 0utside 0f its directi0ns due t0 its
underlying p0litical 0r n0n-financial nature. Human rights in Ind0nesia F0r example, human
rights are hard t0 understand why the IMF can s0lve pr0blems f0r human rights in Mexic0 in
1994 0r Zimbabwe. It relies 0n the IMF 0n the allegati0ns that it deals with a unilateral and
caprici0us interpretati0n 0f its articles.
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CONCLUSION

The future 0f b0th Brett0n W00ds instituti0ns remains uncertain. B0th the IMF and W0rld
Bank escaped the eff0rts 0f the Republican U.S. C0ngress in the mid-1990s t0 sharply curtail
and even eliminate b0th 0rganizati0ns. These agencies have been less successful in answering
the charges fr0m the left, as the IMF retains its demand f0r structural adjustments and the
W0rld Bank still fav0urs funding f0r large, pr0ject-driven funding. While b0th the IMF and
the W0rld Bank have instituted s0me ref0rms, they have been unable t0 appease the c0ncerns
0f 0utraged envir0nmentalists, lab0ur uni0nists, and nati0nalists and adv0cates 0f indigen0us
pe0ples in the devel0ping w0rld.

Still, as this essay has suggested, these tw0 0rganizati0ns are really the misguided target f0r
the legitimate c0ncerns pe0ple 0f all ide0l0gical stripes have had ab0ut the rapid pace 0f
gl0balizati0n in the past half century. It is likely this gl0balizati0n w0uld have 0ccurred
whether 0r n0t there had been a Brett0n W00ds c0nference, and it is all but certain it will
c0ntinue in the future regardless 0f the p0licies pursued by the IMF and W0rld Bank. While it
is true that they have 0ften been t00 driven by U.S. f0reign p0licy c0ncerns, in the end the
influence 0f b0th instituti0ns has been widely 0verstated.10 And despite their mistakes during
the past half century, they have rarely been given credit f0r many 0f the little things they d0
well. F0r example, b0th instituti0ns perf0rm ec0n0mic surveillance 0ver m0st 0f the w0rld's
ec0n0my, a valuable task that n0 0ther internati0nal 0r private 0rganizati0n c0uld perf0rm
with such skill. B0th agencies als0 serve as a st0re 0f expert kn0wledge and wisd0m f0r
c0untries thr0ugh0ut the w0rld that lack trained specialists. While neither the IMF n0r the
W0rld Bank has met the l0fty g0als 0f their f0unders 0r wielded the nefari0us influence
charged by their critics, they have and sh0uld c0ntinue t0 play a small but imp0rtant r0le in
pr0m0ting pr0sperity and ec0n0mic stability w0rldwide.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Web sources:

https://link.springer.c0m/chapter/10.1057/9781137553799_19

https://www.du.edu/k0rbel/hrhw/researchdigest/devel0pment/imf.pdf

https://www.invest0pedia.c0m/terms/g/gfsr.asp

https://www.gkt0day.in/gk/internati0nal-m0netary-fund/