6. Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No.

164785, April 29, 2009

Facts:
At around 10:00 p.m., Petitioner, Eliseo F. Soriano, as host of the
program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks
against Respondent Michael M. Sandoval (then a minister of INC and a
regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.), who felt directly
alluded to in petitioner’s remark.

“Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;

Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung
putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang
gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng
lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng
mga demonyong ito. x x x”

Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical
affidavit-complaints were lodged by private respondents (Jessie L.
Galapon and 7 other members), all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC),
against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. MTRCB
preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20
days.

The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the

preventive suspension order, praying that Chairperson Consoliza P.
Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board recuse
themselves from hearing the case.

Two days after, however, petitioner sought to withdraw7 his motion

for reconsideration, followed by the filing with this Court of a petition
for certiorari and prohibition, to nullify the preventive suspension order
thus issued.
 MTRCB then issued a decision finding respondent Soriano liable for
his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months
suspension from his program, "Ang Dating Daan"

Issue:
Whether or not the 3-month preventive suspension order is an
unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of speech and expression
and an impermissible prior restraint.

Ruling:
No, the preventive suspension order is not an unconstitutional
abridgement of the freedom of speech and expression and an
impermissible prior restraint.

In Lagunsad v. Soto vda. De Gonzales¸the Court ruled that the

freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of
Rights, is not absolute. It may be regulated to some extent to serve
important public interests, some forms of speech not being protected. As
has been held, the limits of the freedom of expression are reached when
the expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.

In Trohwerk v. United States, the constitutional guarantee

"obviously was not intended to give immunity for every possible use of
language."

In Lucas v. Royo, comes this line: "[T]he freedom to express one’s

sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the
honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within
the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others."
 In Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, "there are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech that are harmful, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problems."

In this case, the Court finds that petitioner’s statement can be

treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child. Moreover,
petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free
speech since said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to
children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances are to be
treated as unprotected speech.

Furthermore, the three (3) months suspension in this case is not a

prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of
Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB for
such broadcast. Rather, the suspension is in the form of permissible
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for the offensive and
obscene remarks he uttered in his television program, Ang Dating Daan.
It is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter
without running afoul of the free speech clause.

Neither can petitioner’s virtual inability to speak in his program

during the period of suspension be plausibly treated as prior restraint on
future speech. For viewed in its proper perspective, the suspension is in
the nature of an intermediate penalty for uttering an unprotected form of
speech. It is definitely a lesser punishment than the permissible
cancellation of exhibition or broadcast permit or license. In fine, the
suspension meted was simply part of the duties of the MTRCB in the
enforcement and administration of the law which it is tasked to
implement.
(A view has been advanced that unprotected speech refers only to
pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent
lawless action, and expression endangering national security. But this list
is not, as some members of the Court would submit, exclusive or carved
in stone. Without going into specifics, it may be stated without fear of
contradiction that US decisional law goes beyond the aforesaid general
exceptions. As the Court has been impelled to recognize exceptions to the
rule against censorship in the past, this particular case constitutes yet
another exception, another instance of unprotected speech, created by
the necessity of protecting the welfare of our children. As unprotected
speech, petitioner’s utterances can be subjected to restraint or regulation.)

(In Fernando v. Court of Appeals, the Court expressed difficulty in

formulating a definition of obscenity that would apply to all cases, but
nonetheless stated the ensuing observations on the matter:

There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest

word is that of Miller v. California which established basic
guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. But, it would be a serious
misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the
unbridled discretion in determining what is "patently
offensive." x x x What remains clear is that obscenity is an
issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated
on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion.)
9. Davao City v. Aranjuez, 758 SCRA 235
Facts:
11. Near v. Minnesota, 238 US 697
12. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 US 51.
17. Ayer Prod. PTY. LTD. v. Judge Capulong, 160 SCRA 865